Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Jefferson County (County), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive growth management plans and amendments thereto. At issue in this case is a land development regulation adopted by the County. Petitioner, Jack Hamilton, is a resident of Jefferson County. He owns and operates a nursery, orchard and cattle operation on his property on the east side of Highway 19, approximately two miles north of Monticello, Florida. The land, which is approximately 135 acres in size, is presently designated in a land use category known as Agriculture 2. For almost thirty years, the Jefferson Nursing Center (JNC), a nursing home, has been situated on a seven acre parcel of land surrounded on three sides by petitioner's property. Here, petitioner challenges a land development regulation which allows nursing homes, including JNC, in the Agriculture 2 category. The parties have stipulated that petitioner is a substantially affected person within the meaning of the law and thus he has standing to bring this action. The County adopted its comprehensive plan (plan) on July 19, 1990. The plan was later determined by the DCA to be in compliance. The County has also adopted a Land Development Code (Code) containing various land development regulations which implement the plan. Prior to the adoption of the challenged ordinance, Section 2.02.03(B)3. of the Code included a provision allowing, among other things, the following uses in the Agriculture 2 land use district: Institutional, excluding residential care facilities and nursing homes. On September 1, 1994, the County adopted Ordinance No. 94-15, which amended Section 2.02.03(B)3. by removing the exclusion, thereby allowing nursing homes and residential care facilities in the Agriculture 2 land use district. Thus, the ordinance made nursing homes a permitted use in the Agriculture 2 district, like all other institutional uses which were allowed in agriculture districts. This was also consistent with other Code provisions which allowed nursing homes in almost every other district. On August 15, 1995, petitioner filed a petition with the DCA contending that the land development regulation was not consistent with the plan. An amended petition was later filed on September 12, 1995, alleging generally that nursing homes did not conform to, and were incompatible with, agriculture uses. On November 13, 1995, the DCA entered its Determination of Consistency of Jefferson County Ordinance 94-15. Among other things, the DCA based its finding of consistency on the following provisions in the Housing Element of the plan: GOAL: Assure the availability of housing to meet the existing and future needs of all residents of Jefferson County for all income levels. Objective 5: The useful life of the existing housing stock will be conserved and extended, and neighborhood quality will be improved. Policy 5-3: The County shall establish non-discriminatory standards and criteria addressing the location of group homes and foster care facilities as well as other types of special need housing. The specific uses to be allowed in the agricultural land use categories were largely deferred to the land development regulations contained in the Code. Those regulations define residential care facilities and nursing homes (group homes) as institutional uses. Policy 5-3 requires that the County establish "non-discriminatory standards and criteria" in addressing the location of group homes. Before the adoption of Ordinance 94-15, all institutional uses, except nursing homes and residential care facilities, were allowed in agricultural districts. The new land development regulation removes this discriminatory feature. The plan recogizes that the character of development in the rural areas of the County is of mixed uses which are of a scale to intermix without creating incompatibilities. The area in which petitioner's property and JNC are located contains a mix of uses. Ordinance No. 94-15 is consistent with the character of rural development in the County. The Future Land Use Element of the plan provides in relevant part as follows: GOAL: Efficiently manage and regulate land use types, locations, and densities in compatibility with natural and man-made resources so as to provide the residents of Jefferson County with an aesthetically pleasing, economically beneficial, and socially adequate environment. * * * Policy 1-3: The categories on the Future Land Use Map are defined as follows: * * * Agriculture 2: This includes areas appropriate for a variety of agricultural uses, including but not limited to crop land, pasture land, orchards and groves, or forestry. Dwellings and associated accessory farm buildings are allowable. Density for residential use shall not exceed 1 unit per 5 acres, except that transfer of property to members of the principal owner's immediate family is allowable, provided that all other applicable requirements are met. However, as provided in other policies of the Future Land Use Element, density is calculated on a gross basis (area-based allocation); actual units should be clustered, subject to the requirements set forth in the objectives and policies of the comprehensive plan so long as the gross density is not exceeded. Under the plan, dwellings are allowed uses in the agriculture 2 land use district. A disputed issue is whether the uses allowed by Ordinance No. 94- 15 are residential uses. Petitioner's expert conceded that it is within the discretion of a local government to define nursing homes as a residential use, and that the County's plan tends to do so. The evidence establishes that residential care facilities, such as adult congregate living facilities, are a residential land use. Since dwellings (residences) are an allowed use in the agriculture 2 land use district, it is at least fairly debatable that residential care facilities are also allowed in that district. In addition, in the Housing Element of the plan, nursing homes are included in the discussion and inventory of group homes in the County. They are considered to be special needs housing for the elderly. The plan recognizes that housing needs for the elderly often form a distinct sub-market of the total housing market, and projects that the elderly population (65 and older) will be the second fastest growing age group in the County by the year 2000. When reading the Housing Element provision in pari materia with the Future Land Use Element, it is at least fairly debatable that nursing homes are residential or dwelling uses in the plan and are therefore allowed in the agriculture 2 district. Given the foregoing, it is found that the challenged land development regulation is consistent with the plan.
The Issue Whether the 14 applications (application numbers 54481 through 54494) for the eight sign structures (six double-sided and two single-sided) adjacent to Interstate Route 95 and the Florida Turnpike within the City of Port St. Lucie should be granted or denied by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner’s Applications Petitioner’s applications are for sign structures at eight different locations within the City of Port St. Lucie (the City). Six of the structures are two-sided sign structures and two are single-sided sign structures. Petitioner’s 14 applications were received by Respondent on July 1, 2003. The applications were completed in accordance with Respondent's Rules. Respondent’s original Notices of Denied Application were dated and mailed out July 29, 2003, and were received by Petitioner on August 1, 2003. Petitioner filed its Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on August 21, 2003. On December 2, 2003, Respondent issued amended notices of denied application on each of the 14 applications. Referral of the Petitions to the DOAH was delayed at the request of Petitioner. All Sign Sites are Located in a Commercial or Industrial Zone. The sites upon which the proposed sign structures will be erected are located on parcels that have been zoned commercial or industrial. The parcels where the proposed sign structures will be erected have been designated “Utility” by the City’s Future Land Use Map and have been designated “Utility” under its Land Development Regulations. The City’s Comprehensive Plan includes the “Utility” land use as a category of Industrial land use. The City’s Land Development Regulations include the “Utility” land use category under Article IX, Industrial Districts. The sign sites are designed to correspond to the parcels of land designated in the City’s Zoning Book, as follows: Application No. 54487 is located at site 7-1, on Parcel 7. Application Nos. 404708 & 404710 are located at site 35-2, on Parcel 35. Application Nos. 404701 & 404702 are located at site 35-5, on Parcel 35. Application Nos. 404697 & 404699 are located at site 35-6, on Parcel 35. Application Nos. 404705 & 404706 are located at site 35-7, on Parcel 35. Application No. 404698 is located at site 41-2 on Parcel No. 41. Application Nos. 404704 & 404704 are located at site 46-1, on Parcel 46. Application Nos. 404707 & 404709 are located at site 48-1, on Parcel 48. The certified statements of the City’s zoning official establish that the sign sites are each located in a commercial or industrial zone. All applications submitted by Petitioner were submitted on Respondent's forms, which have been incorporated into Respondent’s rules by reference. Page 2 of 2 of each application submitted by Petitioner included a section to be completed by a City zoning official, and each provided as follows: To be completed by appropriate zoning official: Designation of parcel on the Future Land Use Map: UTILITY, WHICH IS AN INDUSTRIAL LAND USE CATEGORY. The primary land uses under this designation are: DEVELOPMENT ACCOMMODATING MAJOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE UTILITIES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STORM WATER SYSTEMS, WATER AND WASTEWATER PLANTS, ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND TRANSMISSION AND STORM WATER RIGHTS-OF-WAY, TELEPHONE SWITCHING STATIONS. Current Zoning of parcel (from Land Development Regulations): UTILITY, WHICH IS AN INDUSTRIAL LAND USE CATEGORY. The primary land uses under this designation are: UTILITIES FACILITIES, STORM WATER SYSTEMS, WATER AND WASTEWATER PLANTS, ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND TRANSMISSION FACILITIES, TELEPHONE, CABLE TELEVISION AND SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES. Sign located within city limits? _X_ Yes No Please provide the name and telephone number of the person the Department may contact if additional information is required: I certify that the above information reflects the designation of the parcel as it is shown on the current comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, and with all local governmental requirements, and that I am authorized to sign this form on behalf of the county/municipality named above: Cheryl S. Friend ________ Signature of Local Government Official Cheryl S. Friend, Asst. Director of P&Z Printed Name and Title 5/22/03 Date The testimony of Petitioner’s expert witness established that the proposed sign sites are each located in a commercial or industrial zone. Edward Williams was accepted in this case as an expert in planning and zoning, and he has over 28 years' experience in applying planning and zoning principles. He has been a[0]ccepted as an expert in planning and zoning in Florida courts in over 30 counties. Williams [0]testified that he reviewed the issue of whether the parcels where signs are to be located are within commercial or industrial zones and concluded that they were[0]. [0] Williams reviewed the Future Land Use Element of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, which plainly defines "Utility" as an industrial land use. [0]The City’s zoning code also shows Utility zoning as an industrial use. [0]The City decided it was appropriate, considering all factors, to adopt a utility zoning category as a part of the industrial use classification because of the nature of the community. Williams concluded that, based on the actual uses identified under the various land use categories designated by the City, the City correctly placed the "Utility" category under the industrial land use category. [0]9. The Utility category under the City's Future Land Use Element and Land Development Regulations is intended for facilities that are larger than those that serve residential areas. They are more significant than just service lines. 10. Long-established land use classification systems utilized by planners to classify land use, and which are based on the activities performed and their impact on other properties and other uses, show that the proposed sign sites are located in commercial or industrial zones. These long-established land use classification systems have been used by local governments in Florida[0] to prepare comprehensive plans, land development regulations, and zoning maps. An evaluation of all of these classification systems shows that utilities are listed in the heavy commercial and in the industrial type categories. By their nature, by their use, and by their compatibility issues, they are commercial and industrial uses.[0][0] [0]11. The utility uses described under the City’s Future Land Use Element and its Land Development Regulations do meet the definition of industrial uses in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(58). The public considers those utility uses to be industrial uses. The unchallenged statements of the City’s “zoning official” and Williams’ expert testimony establish that each sign site is located on a parcel of land designated for commercial or industrial use under both the Future Land Use Map of the City’s Comprehensive Plan and the City’s Land Development Regulations adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (2003).1 John Garner’s contention that the uses authorized under the “Utility” designation are not commercial or industrial uses is not consistent with the land use planning principles or land use classification systems used as the basis for comprehensive planning in Florida. Garner has misapprehended the nature and patterns of industrial development in Florida. His description of industrial development is incorrect, to the extent that Florida's industrial uses are of a less heavy and dirty type typical of heavy industrial states and are more easily integrated with commercial and residential areas. Security is an issue for industrial uses in some areas of the state, and they are fenced in, but this is not common in the current development of industrial parks, where security is provided at the building, not the roads or perimeter. Though providing a general description of the nature of industrial uses in Florida that emphasized controlled access, heavy traffic, and the like, Garner acknowledged that industrial uses can be stand alone locations on a single lot. Comprehensive planning in Florida is accomplished under Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The general purpose of the future land use element of a comprehensive plan is to reflect the local government’s long-range vision of how a community should develop and where certain uses are going to develop. From a planning standpoint, it is inappropriate to direct Respondent to review comprehensive plans and land development regulations to identify permitted uses on a parcel, but ignore technical planning and zoning principles in favor of lay definitions. Respondent works closely with the Department of Community Affairs and should be consistent in how it applies planning principles. Respondent’s Uniform Interpretation of Subsection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes According to Garner, Respondent interprets the terms “commercial or industrial use” found in Subsection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, as those words are “commonly understood,” rather than as applied in land development regulations. Garner uses the layman’s everyday interpretation of the term "industrial" when applying the term. Respondent has a uniform interpretation of Subsection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, under which it utilizes an everyday lay definition of commercial or industrial zone, rather than a technical planning and zoning approach. Garner’s opinion that the sign sites were not designated as industrial uses was based on this uniform interpretation. That interpretation is not reflected in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-10. Commercial or Industrial Zoning Not Enacted Primarily to Permit Signs The testimony of Petitioner’s expert witness is persuasive that the commercial or industrial zoning of the proposed sign sites was not enacted primarily to permit signs. According to Garner, Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 10.0052(2)(a) is not triggered if commercial or industrial uses are the primary permitted uses. There is no problem under that portion of the rule if the allowed uses for a parcel are commercial or industrial in nature. Similarly, Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052(2)(b) is not triggered if commercial or industrial uses are the primary permitted uses. The industrial uses authorized under the City’s Future Land Use Map and its Land Development Regulations are primary permitted uses and not incidental to other primary uses or permitted only by variance or special exception. Such uses are expressly permitted under the City’s Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations. As applied by Respondent, in order for zoning of a parcel to run afoul of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 10.0052(2)(c), both factors in that portion of the rule must exist; that is, both the physical dimensions or other attributes of the affected parcel would not reasonably accommodate traditional commercial or industrial uses and the area surrounding the affected parcel is not predominantly commercial or industrial. Williams e[0]valuated whether the dimensions or other attributes of the parcels would accommodate traditional industrial uses and [0]concluded that traditional commercial and industrial uses could be accommodated on the parcels. His conclusions are persuasive. There are many possible commercial or industrial uses that can be accommodated on all of the parcels at issue in this case, including warehousing, equipment storage yards, material storage yards, and small manufacturing facilities. The utility uses designated for these parcels are one of the types of industrial uses that could be accommodated on these parcels. However, regardless of that fact, a full range of industrial uses, including warehousing, manufacturing facilities, and storage facilities, can be accommodated on these parcels. The sizes or configurations of these parcels do not preclude their development for commercial and industrial uses in the traditional sense. Lots in the 50 to 60-foot range can accommodate traditional commercial and industrial uses, including regular warehouses, fabrication yards, contractor yards, equipment yards, and material yards. A review of the City's Land Development Regulations shows that there are no restrictions that would prevent industrial uses on these parcels. It is not unusual to see industrial development on parcels the size and shape of those on which the signs are proposed to be located. Many of these parcels are actually quite large in size. They are oddly configured as a result of platting and construction of roads, but not so oddly configured that they couldn't be developed for commercial or industrial uses. Garner offered the opinion that none of the parcels upon which the sign sites were located would accommodate traditional industrial uses. However, Garner has had no direct experience in the ownership, proposal, permitting, development or operation of any commercial or industrial development in Florida. Garner was of the opinion that three of the parcels had size or shape problems, but admitted that the other parcels were large enough to physically accommodate industrial development. Garner admitted that essentially all of the parcels could be fenced for security and access control. Ultimately, the principal basis for Garner’s position that the parcels would not accommodate traditional industrial development was that it is not “appropriate” for industrial uses to obtain their access through residential streets. He testified that all but one parcel (containing Site No. 48-1) currently obtains access exclusively through residential streets. However, Garner did not know how much industrial development in Florida actually uses access through residential streets and was not personally familiar with actions of local zoning officials on requests by industrial developers to have access through residential streets. In order to determine whether these parcels can accommodate traditional commercial or industrial uses, it is necessary to consider the development history of Port St. Lucie, and platting by General Development Corporation, in the 1960's, that restricted the size and location of lots within the City. There are differences in typical commercial and industrial development in a rural versus urban/city setting. In a city, 2,000 square-foot lots are developable and are highly desirable. Commercial and industrial development can be found on lots as small as 30 feet wide, due to past platting, but commercial or industrial development on 50-foot lots is fairly standard. A review of the City’s Future Land Use Map shows that many existing commercial and industrial areas in the City have their access through residential areas. Preexisting plats prohibit access in any other way. [0]The reason that the City does not restrict access for industrial uses through residential areas is that the prior plats by General Development limited how the community could grow. Garner was not aware of any restriction under City codes that would restrict industrial development from using residential streets for access. He was not aware of any restriction that would prevent access for an industrial use from using residential streets, or whether the City has any problem with a developer bringing industrial traffic through a residential area. In fact, there are no restrictions under the City’s Land Development Regulations against industrial uses having their access through residential areas. The reason that there are no such restrictions is revealed through the City’s Future Land Use Element. The City’s Future Land Use Element shows that the City is trying to increase its commercial/industrial acreage, provide jobs and employment opportunities and deal with the plats and roads its been given. The General Development plat and the extension of the interstate and turnpike system have seriously constrained how the community can develop. The City’s Future Land Use Element recognizes that there is insufficient commercial and industrial development in the City and attempts to increase that through the planning process. The commercial or industrial zoning of the parcels was not enacted primarily to permit signs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order granting the 14 applications (application numbers 54481 through 54494) for outdoor advertising sign permits submitted by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether the City of Jacksonville's small scale development amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2003-1070-E on October 27, 2003, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Bartram is a limited liability corporation which owns an 8.5-acre tract of land at 5720 Atlantic Boulevard between Bartram Road and St. Paul Avenue in Jacksonville, Florida, or less than a mile east of the Hart Bridge (which crosses into downtown Jacksonville) and around one-quarter mile south of the Arlington River.4 The property is now vacant; from 1939 until 1990, however, a three-story, 125,000 square-foot hospital (with three separate "out buildings") for children operated on the site. The unused buildings remained on the site until they were demolished in 1998. On October 27, 2003, the City approved an application filed by Wal-Mart's counsel (originally on behalf of the property's former owner, the Christopher Forrest Skinner Trust, and then the new owner, Bartram) for a small scale plan amendment. This was formalized through the adoption of Ordinance No. 2003-1070-E, which changed the property's land use designation on the FLUM, a component of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) in the Plan, from RPI to NC. Both land use categories are commercial classifications. If the amendment is found to be in compliance, Wal-Mart intends to construct a 40,000 square-foot free-standing grocery store with a 7,500 square-foot outparcel for other retail stores. The grocery store will be operated 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Wal-Mart has also agreed to file a second land use application to change approximately 3.0 acres of the site to Conservation (CSV), which means that portion of the property cannot be developed in the future. Ordinance No. 94-1011-568, enacted in 1994, requires that small scale plan amendments be reviewed with a companion rezoning application. This is to ensure that when examining an application for a small-scale amendment, the City’s determination of "in compliance" is predicated on both the Plan and its Land Development Regulations. Pursuant to that requirement, the City also approved a change in the zoning on the property from Commercial, Residential, Office (CRO) to Planned Unit Development (PUD). Under the PUD, the City has limited development of the site to a 40,000 square-foot grocery store and a 7,500 square-foot outparcel for limited retail uses; imposed a limitation on curb cuts; provided for setback restrictions, building orientation, and design standards; and preserved over 70 trees on the property as well as green space. These limitations and restrictions are more stringent than those set forth in the NC category. The City's rezoning decision (Ordinance No. 2003-1071-E) has been challenged in Circuit Court by one of Petitioners. (While the new zoning and site plan appear to be solidified, the City concedes that it has the authority at a later date to approve modifications to the site plan, or even change the zoning on the property to another category that is allowed under NC.) On November 18, 2003, Petitioners filed their Petition challenging the plan amendment. In their unilateral Prehearing Stipulation,5 Petitioners contend that the amendment is not supported by adequate or professionally acceptable data and analysis, and it is inconsistent with the standards governing "the location and extent of commercial uses," "the current designation of Bartram Road as a local road," and "the protection of established residential neighborhoods." At hearing, counsel for Petitioners further stipulated that the allegations of internal inconsistencies regarding urban sprawl and roadway/traffic capacity (contained in the Petition) were being withdrawn. A request to add affordable housing as an issue was denied as being untimely. The parties have stipulated that Petitioners and Intervenors reside, own property, or own or operate a business within the City and offered comments, recommendations, or objections to the City prior to the adoption of the amendment. Accordingly, these stipulated facts establish that Petitioners and Intervenors are affected persons and have standing to participate in this action. Because the City's action involves a small scale (as opposed to a large scale) development plan amendment, the Department of Community Affairs did not formally review the plan amendment for compliance. See § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat. The Existing and Proposed Land Use on the Site The City's Plan, which was adopted in 1990, includes five types of commercially denominated land use categories, two of which are RPI and NC. The RPI category (in which category the Bartram property has been assigned since 1990) is a mixed- use category "primarily intended to accommodate office, limited commercial retail and service establishments, institutional and medium density residential uses." Among others, this category also authorizes large institutional uses, office-professional uses, veterinarians, filling stations, off street parking, nursing homes, residential treatment facilities, day care centers, and other institutional uses "when sited in compliance with [the FLUE] and other elements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan." According to the Plan Category Description in the FLUE (pages 50-51, Respondent's Exhibit 13), "RPI developments are frequently appropriate transitional uses between residential and non-residential areas." While the existing RPI designation on the property allows Commercial Neighborhood zoning, which may include a grocery store like Wal-Mart proposes, because of some uncertainty over this, and its desire to have a PUD on the property, the City has required that Bartram seek a land use change to NC with PUD zoning, which serves to limit the range of allowable uses and imposes other development restrictions. The Plan Category Description in the FLUE (pages 51- 52, Respondent's Exhibit 13) provides that NC designated lands "serve the needs of contiguous neighborhoods"; they "will generally be located within a ten minute drive time of the service population"; they allow uses which "serve the daily needs of contiguous neighborhoods"; and they must not "penetrate into residential neighborhoods." They may include "convenience goods, personal services, veterinarians, filling stations and other low intensity retail and office-professional commercial uses developed in freestanding or shopping center configurations," and "[n]ormally, such centers will be anchored by a food or drug store and will contain four to ten other supporting retail and office uses." Finally, NC sites "should abut a roadway classified as a collector or higher facility on the [City's] adopted functional classification system map." The Property and Surrounding Area As noted above, the property has been vacant since 1990, when an existing hospital was closed; demolition of the buildings was completed some eight years later. On its northern boundary (which measures approximately 400 feet), the property abuts Atlantic Boulevard, an extremely busy, six-lane roadway classified on the City’s Highway Functional Classification Map (Map) as a principal arterial road. The eastern boundary of the property (which runs around 480 feet deep) abuts Bartram Road, a two-laned paved road with an 80-foot right-of way which runs south from Atlantic Boulevard for around one-half mile and then curves east where it meets University Boulevard (a north-south arterial road) a few hundred feet away. When the hearing was conducted in January 2004, or after the amendment was adopted, Bartram Road was still classified as a local road on the City's Map. Whether it is still classified as a local road at this time is not of record.6 On its western side, the property abuts St. Paul Avenue, a local road which dead ends just south of Bartram's property on Heston Road (another local road), while nine single-family lots are located adjacent to the southern boundary of the property (and on the northern side of Heston Road). The property is around one-quarter mile west of a highly developed major intersection at Atlantic and University Boulevards. The property (on both sides of the roadway) lying between the eastern side of Bartram's property and the major intersection is currently classified as Community/General Commercial (CGC), which authorizes a wide range of slightly more intense commercial uses than are authorized in NC. That land use category is "generally developed in nodal patterns and [is intended to] serve large areas of the City." Directly across Bartram Road to the east (and in the southeastern quadrant of Bartram Road and Atlantic Boulevard) is an older shopping center anchored by a 50,000 square-foot Publix grocery store. The shopping center also has a sandwich shop, florist, pizza parlor, and beauty salon, and sits on a tract of land approximately the same size as Bartram's property. That parcel has approximately the same depth as the Bartram property (480 feet), and the rear of the stores come as close as 35 feet to the single-family homes which lie directly behind the shopping center. Since 1887, the St. Paul Episcopal Church has occupied the 5-acre tract of property directly across St. Paul Avenue to the west. Besides the church itself, a library, office building, educational wing, parish fellowship hall, and a small house (all owned by the church) sit on the property. From the church property to the Little Pottsburg Creek, or around a quarter of a mile to the west, a large, single parcel of land fronts on the southern side of Atlantic Boulevard and is classified as RPI. While aerial photographs appear to show that the property west of the church is either undeveloped or largely undeveloped, under its present RPI classification it may be used for commercial, institutional, or medium density residential purposes at some time in the future. The distance from the intersection of Atlantic and University Boulevards to the Little Pottsburg Creek appears to be six-tenths of a mile or so. An apartment complex (the Villa Apartments) sits on the northeastern quadrant of Bartram Road and Atlantic Boulevard on a fairly narrow sliver of land classified as Medium Density which extends north-northwest some 1,200 feet or so to the Arlington River, a tributary of the St. Johns River. Immediately west of the apartment complex along the northern side of Atlantic Boulevard (and across the street beginning at the eastern part of Bartram's property and extending west) the land uses along the roadway include a relatively small CGC parcel containing a dry cleaning establishment and an upholstery shop; an approximate 350 to 400- foot strip of Low Density Residential (LDR) property (which faces more than half of the Bartram site) with two single-family homes located directly on Atlantic Boulevard, as well as two grandfathered non-conforming uses (a plumbing establishment and a coin shop); then an RPI parcel (which faces the western edge of Bartram's property and extends perhaps 150 feet along the road) with a small office development consisting of 8-10 offices; and finally more LDR parcels until the road crosses the Little Pottsburg Creek. Two local roads which dead end on Atlantic Boulevard and provide access into the residential areas north of Atlantic Boulevard are Oak Haven Street, which terminates directly across the street from the Bartram property, and Campbell Street, which terminates in front of the St. Paul Episcopal Church. Except for the limited commercial uses which front on the northern side of Atlantic Boulevard, and the apartment complex which lies in the northeastern quadrant of Atlantic Boulevard and Bartram Road, virtually all of the property directly across the street to the north and west of Bartram's property running 1,200-1,500 feet or so to the Arlington River is made up of an old, established residential neighborhood (known by some as the Oak Haven neighborhood) consisting of single-family homes, some of which (closest to the Arlington River) are on larger multi-acre tracts and have historical significance. Indeed, the oldest home in the City of Jacksonville, built around 1848, is located in this area. The area directly south of the property and to the west of Bartram Road is classified as Low Density Residential and contains single-family homes for perhaps one-half mile or so. As noted above, some of these homes back up to the rear of the Bartram property. The Amendment and Review by Staff Under the process for reviewing small scale amendments, the application is first reviewed by the City's Planning and Development Department for completeness and accuracy. After the staff reviews the data and performs an analysis of the data, the application is assigned an ordinance number. A staff report is then prepared, and the application is set for hearing before the City's Planning Commission (Commission), an advisory board which makes a recommendation on the application. The Commission's decision (which in this case was a recommendation to deny both applications) is then reviewed by the Land Use and Zoning Committee of the City Council, which consists of 7 members (and voted 5-1 in this case to approve the applications), and the matter is finally considered by the full 19-member City Council (which in this case approved the applications by a 13-2 vote, with 4 members abstaining or absent). After the application was filed, among other things, the City staff reviewed various maps, the FLUM, a zoning atlas, other relevant portions of the Plan, and data provided by other governmental agencies. It also made an inspection of the site and other potentially affected properties in the neighborhood. In preparing its report, the staff analyzed the roadway system, the neighborhood character, the site characteristics, the commercial node, compatibility with the Plan and existing uses, and compatibility with the Strategic Regional Policy Plan and State Comprehensive Plan. A more detailed account of the data relied upon by the staff and its analysis of that data is found in Respondent's Exhibit 19. Besides the staff report, there are underlying work papers (not attached to the report) used by the staff to support its findings (Respondent's Exhibit 33). As a part of its review and analyses, the City considered and applied the locational criteria found in the Operative Provisions of the FLUE, which describe the factors to be used in determining appropriate locations for primary use plan categories (such as NC) in plan amendment requests. Those factors include street classification, public facilities and services, land use compatibility, development and redevelopment potential, structural orientation and other site design factors, ownership patterns, and environmental impacts. The analysis included an evaluation by staff of the impact of development based upon the most intensive uses permitted on NC property. Besides the locational criteria, the FLUE contains a number of policies directed at combating the expansion of strip commercial uses that have historically developed along the City's arterial and collector roadways, including Atlantic Boulevard. These are found in FLUE Policies 3.2.2, 3.2.5, 3.2.7, 3.2.8, and 3.2.16. In reviewing the application, the staff considered these policies and concluded that the amendment would be consistent with those provisions. Objections by Petitioners As noted earlier, Petitioners generally contend that the amendment is not supported by adequate data and analyses. They further contend that the amendment is inconsistent with standards governing the location and extent of commercial uses, the current designation of Bartram Road as a local road, and the protection of established residential neighborhoods. While the various papers filed by Petitioners did not identify the specific provisions of the Plan allegedly being violated, they were disclosed through their expert at the final hearing. Petitioners first contend that the City's data and analyses were predicated on the uses and restrictions contained in the PUD rezoning proposal, and not on alternative development scenarios that are possible under the NC land use designation. They also contend that the City failed to develop data and analyses regarding the impact on FLUE Objective 3.1 or FLUE Policies 1.1.19 and 3.1.7. The latter FLUE policy and the cited objective pertain to affordable housing, an issue not timely raised by Petitioners, while the remaining policy requires that FLUM amendments be based on the amount of land required to accommodate anticipated growth and the projected population of the area. The evidence shows that, prior to the adoption of the amendment, the City reviewed appropriate data from a number of different sources, and it evaluated the plan amendment based upon the most intensive uses that could be permitted under the NC land use designation. In every instance where Petitioners' expert testified that there was insufficient data and analyses, the testimony and exhibits credibly countered that testimony. Therefore, it is found that the plan amendment is supported by adequate and acceptable data, and that the data were collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. Petitioners' main contention regarding consistency is that the amendment conflicts with FLUE Policies 1.1.8, 3.2.1, and 3.2.5 in several respects. The first policy requires in relevant part: that all new non-residential projects [including commercial projects on NC lands] be developed in either nodal areas, in appropriate commercial infill areas, or as part of mixed or multi-use developments such as Planned Unit Developments (PUDs), . . . Policy 3.2.1 requires that the City promote, through the use of development incentives and other regulatory measures, development of commercial and light/service industrial uses in the form of nodes, centers or parks, while discouraging strip commercial development patterns, in order to limit the number of curb cuts and reduce conflicts in land uses, particularly along collectors and arterials. Finally, Policy 3.2.5 provides that the City shall require neighborhood commercial uses to be located in nodes at the intersections of collector and arterial roads. Prohibit the location of neighborhood commercial uses interior to residential neighborhoods in a manner that will encourage the use of local streets for non-residential traffic. Petitioners first contend that Bartram's property does not lie within a "node," as that term is defined in the Definitions portion of the FLUE, and that by siting the NC land outside of a nodal area, the amendment is encouraging strip development in contravention of all three policies. They also contend that the amendment conflicts with Policy 3.2.5 because the Bartram property is not located at the corner of an arterial or collector road. Finally, they assert that the amendment is at odds with Policy 1.1.8 because the Bartram parcel is not an "appropriate commercial infill location." In resolving these contentions, it is first necessary to determine whether Bartram Road is a collector or a local street. By virtue of its high traffic volume (an Average Daily Traffic count of more than 1,600), the road actually functions as a collector road, that is, it collects traffic from the local roadway network in the neighborhood, two elementary schools, and a church campus (all south of Atlantic Boulevard) and distributes that traffic to both Atlantic and University Boulevards on each end, both of which intersections are signalized. Indeed, one of Petitioners' witnesses described Bartram Road as a heavily-used, cut-through street for persons traveling between Atlantic and University Boulevards. When the amendment was adopted, however, and even as late as the final hearing in January 2004, the road was still classified on the City's Map as a local road. For purposes of making a land use change, the actual classification on the City's Map should be used, rather than basing the decision on a future change on the Map that may or may not occur. Therefore, the property does not lie at the intersection of a collector or arterial roadway. A "node" is defined in the Definitions portion of the FLUE (page 74, Respondent's Exhibit 13) as follows: A focal point within the context of a larger, contiguous area surrounding it. It is an area of concentrated activity that attracts people from outside its boundaries for purposes of interaction within that area. The developed or developable land areas at the confluence of collector or higher classified roadways, which are suitable for medium to high densities and intensities of use for either single, multiple or mixed use developments. Petitioners contend that a fair reading of the definition is that a node (or focal point of concentrated activity) exists only at the intersection of University and Atlantic Boulevards, and does not extend outward to include the vacant Bartram site. In other words, Petitioners contend that the node is limited to the individual parcels at the intersection itself. On the other hand, the City and Intervenors take the position that a commercial node extends from its center (the intersection) outward in a lineal direction along a roadway until it ends at a natural physical boundary; if no physical boundary exists, then the node extends only to the end of the existing development along the roadway. Using this rule of thumb, they argue that the node begins at the intersection of Atlantic and University Boulevards and extends westward, presumably on both sides of the road,7 in a lineal direction along Atlantic Boulevard until it ends at a natural physical boundary, the Little Pottsburg Creek, approximately six-tenths of a mile away. The purpose of a node is, of course, to concentrate commercial uses near an intersection and reduce the potential for strip development along arterial roads, such as Atlantic Boulevard (which now has strip development extending eastward from the intersection for more than a mile to the Regency Square Shopping Mall). All parties agree that the existing development along Atlantic Boulevard west of the intersection up to the Bartram site is strip or ribbon development, as defined in the Plan, that is, development which "is generally characterized by one or two story commercial/office uses that are located immediately adjacent to one another, or in close proximity, extending out in a development pattern, typically along arterial roadways and usually each individual structure has one or more driveway accesses to an arterial." (Respondent's Exhibit 13, page 76.) The more persuasive evidence supports a finding that the node, that is, the area of concentrated commercial activity or the developed or developable lands at the confluence of University and Atlantic Boulevards, logically extends from the intersection westward in a lineal fashion along the southern side of Atlantic Boulevard until the end of the existing development, that is, the Publix shopping center, where virtually all commercial uses on both sides of the roadway end. (On the northern side of the road, the node would terminate just east of the Villa Apartments, where the CGC uses end). This collection of parcels (up to the eastern side of the Bartram site) includes all of the "developed or developable land areas at the confluence of collector or higher classified roadways, which are suitable for medium to high densities and intensities of use for either single, multiple, or mixed use developments." (If the contrary evidence was accepted, that is, the node extends to the Little Pottsburg Creek, the City could arguably change the land use on the property west of the church to a more intensive commercial use, and in doing so encourage more strip development.) Therefore, the Bartram property is not located within a nodal area and is not a developable land area suitable for "medium to high densities and intensities" of use. By changing its classification to NC and encouraging further strip development beyond the node, the amendment conflicts with Policies 1.1.8, 3.2.1, and 3.2.5. "Commercial infill" is defined in the FLUE as "[c]ommercial development of the same type and scale as adjacent commercial uses that is sited between those uses in existing strip commercial areas." (Respondent's Exhibit 13, page 68.) To qualify as commercial infill under this definition, the adjacent commercial uses must be "of the same type and scale" as those being sited on the vacant property. In the staff report, the City describes the property as "a true infill site," since the land on both sides of the parcel is developed, and the Bartram property is now vacant. However, while the Bartram property has a similar type and scale of development on its eastern side (an older Publix grocery store with 4 connected small retail shops), the property on its western side is a church campus and therefore a completely dissimilar use. (In addition, the property on its southern side is single-family residential). Because the surrounding uses are not of the same type and scale as the proposed infill, the change in land use is not an appropriate commercial infill area. Therefore, the amendment conflicts with Policy 1.1.8, which requires that "all non-residential projects be developed in either nodal areas, [or] in appropriate commercial infill areas." In their Amended Proposed Recommended Order, the City and Intervenors contend that the development nonetheless qualifies as "urban infill," which is defined in part at pages 77-78 of the FLUE as "[t]he development of vacant parcels in otherwise built-up areas where public facilities . . . are already in place." While this catch-all definition would appear to authorize the type of infill being proposed by Bartram (as well as virtually any other type of infill since the Bartram site is a vacant parcel in an otherwise built-up area), other FLUE provisions refer to commercial infill and nodal areas as the primary considerations for siting NC property. Finally, the City and Intervenors suggest that the plan amendment provides an appropriate transition from the busy intersection uses to residential neighborhoods, that is, from intense commercial uses to the east and residential uses to the south and west. The change, if approved, will result in two fairly large grocery stores, one in a shopping center configuration, and both with attendant retail stores, sitting side by side, with a church campus immediately to the west, existing residential uses to the south, and primarily residential uses directly to the north. This pattern of development is at odds with Policy 1.1.7, which requires a "[g]radual transition of densities and intensities between land uses in conformance with the [FLUE]." The other contentions of Petitioners have been considered and found to be unpersuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the small scale development amendment adopted by the City of Jacksonville in Ordinance No. 2003-1070-E is not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2004.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Environmental Coalition of Broward County, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition"), is a Florida corporation. The Coalition has offices located in Broward County. The Coalition has approximately 500 members, most of whom reside in Broward County. A substantial number of the Coalition's members own property in Broward County and/or operate businesses within Broward County. The Coalition is a not-for-profit corporation, chartered for educational and scientific purposes. The primary purpose of the Coalition is to present objections and recommendations to local governments concerning planning issues on behalf of its membership. The Coalition is authorized to participate in actions of this type and to represent its membership in administrative proceedings. The Coalition presented oral and written objections to Broward County during the review and adoption process concerning the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Among other things, the Department is required to review local government comprehensive plans and amendments thereto for compliance with the Act. Respondent, Broward County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the local government with the authority pursuant to the Act and the Broward County Charter to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan. The County has adopted the 1989 Broward County Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"). The Broward County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commission"), is the local planning agency for the County. The County Commission is advised on land use planning issues by the Broward County Planning Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Planning Council"). The Planning Council was created by the County Charter. Intervenors, Miramar Lakes, Inc., d/b/a Miramar Rock, Robert A. Whitcombe, Trustee, and the South Broward Trust own or have under contract virtually all of the property affected by the Plan amendment which is the subject of this proceeding. These Intervenors have entered into a joint venture agreement with Intervenor Atlantic Gulf Communities Corporation to develop the subject property. Intervenors applied for the amendment that is the subject of this proceeding and presented oral or written comments, recommendations and objections during the period of time between the transmittal hearing and adoption of the subject Plan amendment. The County's Plan. The County adopted a comprehensive plan as required by the Act in 1989. The planning horizon of the plan is 2010. The Plan includes two volumes of text, two volumes of support documents and associated maps. See Petitioner's exhibit 8. Volume One is text and is effective countywide. Volume Three contains support documents for the Plan. The Plan also includes the 1989 Broward County Future Land Use Plan Map (Series) (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The FLUM depicts the proposed distribution, extent and location of categories of land uses allowed under the Plan. Among others, those land uses include "residential" at various densities and "agricultural". Pursuant to the Plan, the eastern approximately one-third of the County may be developed. The developable area consists of approximately 400 square miles of land area. The western approximately two-thirds of the County are designated as water conservation areas and are separated by a levee from the developable one- third. Future land use elements of municipal comprehensive plans in the County must be in substantial conformity to the Plan. The Subject Property. The property which is the subject of the Plan amendment at issue in this case consists of 1,280 acres of a total of 1,965 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). The Property is located in the City of Miramar, in southwest Broward County, Florida, Sections 25, 26, 27 and 36, Township 51 South, Range 39 East. The Property is located in the southwestern portion of the developable one-third of the County. See Map 1 of Broward County exhibit 1. The Property is bounded on the east by S.W. 184th Avenue and on the north by Honey Hill Road. It is east of U.S. Highway 27. Part of the Property is vacant. Part of the Property is being used as cattle pasture and for a rock mining, batching, mixing and crushing operation. Existing land uses in the vicinity of the Property include vacant land, rock mining and some development to the north, single-family residential development to the east, rock mining and vacant land to the south, in Dade County, Florida. Residential development immediately to the east in a development known as "Silverlakes" is being developed at a density of three dwelling units per acre. Further to the west of the Property is the eastern boundary of the water conservation areas of the Everglades. These areas are separated from the rest of Broward County by a levee. The land use designation of the Property and other property in the surrounding area is "agricultural". Under the Plan, the land use designation allows agricultural uses and residential development of one dwelling per 2.5 acres. Under its current land use designation, a total of 786 dwelling units may be developed on the Property. The First Amendment Requested by the Intervenors. In early 1994 Intervenors filed an application with the County seeking an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Low (2) Residential". "Low (2) Residential" allows the development of two dwelling units per acre. The Planning Council conducted a review of the proposed amendment. The Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection raised objections to the proposed amendment because the Property is located in an area of water recharge and wetlands. The area is identified as within a general wetlands area on the "Southwestern Generalized Wetlands Map" of the Plan. 30 Based upon the objections of the County Department of Natural Resource Protection, the staff of the Planning Council recommended denial of the proposed amendment. The South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "SFWMD"), an agency with broad regional responsibility for water management in southeast Florida, raised objections with the Planning Council concerning the location of the property in an area which was being considered for use as part of a project to restore the Everglades. The SFWMD was concerned that the Property is located within an area which has come to be known as the "East Coast Buffer". In early 1994, at the time of the initial review of the proposed amendment, the East Coast Buffer was a study area abutting the eastern water conservation areas of southeast Florida. The SFWMD was studying the East Coast Buffer for use in water conservation efforts in southeast Florida. At the time of the first review of the proposed amendment, the portion of the East Coast Buffer in which the Property is located was being considered for preservation as a reservoir site. The Planning Council transmitted the proposed amendment to the County Commission without recommendation. The County Commission decided not to transmit the proposed amendment to the Department for its review, ending review of the initial application. The Initial Review of the Subject Amendment. A second application on the Property was resubmitted by the Intervenors in March of 1994. The application was designated Application PC 94- 15. Application PC 94-15 sought an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". "Irregular 1.5 Residential" allows 1.5 dwelling units per acre. The amendment sought by Intervenors would have allowed an increase from 786 dwelling units to 2,947 dwelling units on the Property. An increase of 2,161 units. Application PC 94-15 was again reviewed. The same comments about, and objections to, the proposed amendment were raised concerning groundwater and aquifer recharge. The staff of the Planning Council again recommended denial of the proposed amendment. 41 The Planning Council recommended transmittal of the application, subject to the Intervenors satisfying the concerns raised by the SFWMD. On August 17, 1994, the County Commission transmitted Application PC 94-15 to the Department, conditioned upon the Intervenors satisfying the concerns of the SFWMD. The SFWMD objected to Application PC 94-15 because of its conclusion that the proposed future land use designation was not compatible with the East Coast Buffer then under evaluation by the SFWMD. SFWMD had developed data and conducted computer modeling concerning the utilization of a buffer for a variety of purposes, including reducing seepage of water from the Everglades, increasing groundwater recharge into aquifers and creating a natural buffer to protect the Everglades from the impacts of development. The SFWMD had commissioned a worldwide engineering firm, CH2M Hill to prepare a report on the East Coast Buffer. The SFWMD recommended that Application PC 94-15 not be approved until it had completed its study of the East Coast Buffer because the land use designation being sought might be incompatible with the conclusions reached from the SFWMD's and CH2M Hill's evaluation. The Department reviewed Application PC 94-15 and, based upon comments from the SFWMD similar to those raised before the County Commission, issued an Objections, Recommendations and Comments report concerning Application PC 94-15. The Department raised objections consistent with the adverse comments from the SFWMD. Modification of the Proposed Amendment. Parts of southwestern Broward County and northwestern Dade County were designated "Management Unit 5" by the SFWMD. Management Unit 5 was being considered, as recommended by CH2M Hill, as a reservoir area. Development of the Property was, therefore, not considered to be a use comparable with the concept of the East Coast Buffer being considered by the SFWMD at the time of the County's and Department's decision to reject Application PC 94-15. Intervenors worked with the SFWMD in an effort to find a way of modifying Application PC 94-15 to satisfy the SFWMD's concerns. SFWMD utilized computer modeling to simulate groundwater and surface water flows in Management Unit 5 to determine the impact of allowing development of the Property. The SFWMD concluded that Management Unit 5 was more suitable as a recharge area rather than as a reservoir. This conclusion was based, in part, of the transmissibility of the soil and other site conditions which were not conducive to storing water above ground for long periods of time. Use of Management Unit 5 as a recharge area and not a reservoir requires less surface area. Therefore, it was concluded that development in the area might be compatible with the SFWMD's East Coast Buffer concept. The SFWMD modeled four development alternatives for Management Unit 5 and analyzed the impact of each alternative on the efforts to retard seepage, provide groundwater recharge and enhance wetland benefits: (a) retaining the Property as a recharge area and allowing no development; (b) retaining the entire western two-thirds as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern one-third; (c) retaining the western one-third as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern two-thirds; and (d) allowing development of the entire management unit. Alternatives (b) and (c) assumed that a berm would be constructed between the recharge area and the developed area. After meeting with Intervenors and discussing the results of the modeling, Intervenors indicated willingness to remove the western portion of the Property from the proposed development. The SFWMD then conducted a more detailed, computer analysis of the following alternatives: (a) continuing existing conditions; (b) constructing a berm around Management Unit 5 and utilizing the entire area as a recharge area; (c) constructing a berm between the eastern and western sections of the Management Unit 5 and utilizing the western section for recharge with no development in the eastern section; and (d) alternative "(c)" with development of the eastern section. As a result of computer modeling of the alternatives, it was concluded that alternatives (b), (c) and (d) could significantly reduce seepage from the Everglades and increase groundwater recharge in to the aquifers when compared to development under the agricultural land use designation of alternative (a). As a result of the more detailed analysis, the SFWMD concluded that essentially all of its goals could be achieved for Management Unit 5 if the western section of Management Unit 5 is preserved even if development is allowed in the eastern section. The SFWMD concluded that the eastern two-thirds of the Property, consisting of approximately 1,280 acres, could be developed as "Irregular 1.5 Residential" if the western one-third, consisting of approximately 685 acres, was utilized as a recharge area. Intervenors agreed to preserve the western third of the Property (685 acres) and grant the SFWMD a flowage easement, consistent with the East Coast Buffer and at a savings of $43 million. On December 14, 1994, the staff of the SFWMD presented the results of the computer modeling to the SFWMD. On December 15, 1994, the SFWMD withdrew its objection to Application PC 94-15, conditioned upon the deletion of the 685 acres from the application and the granting of a flowage easement. The County and the Department were informed of the decision of the SFWMD. Approval of Application 94-15. On December 20, 1994, the County Commission adopted by Ordinance 94-55 an amendment to the Plan, Amendment PC 94-15 (hereinafter referred to as the "Amendment"), subject to the conditions suggested by the SFWMD, which resolved the SFWMD's objections. The Amendment included modifications to the FLUM and text amendments. The Amendment, in relevant part, modifies the future land use designation of approximately 1,280 acres of the Property from "Agricultural" to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". This will allow the construction of a total of 1,920 dwelling units on the Property, or an increase of 1,408 dwelling units over the number of dwelling that may be constructed under the current future land use designation for the Property. In light of Intervenor's modifications of the application, the removal of the SFWMD's objections and the approval of the application by the County, the Department found the Amendment to be in compliance with the Act. On February 14, 1995, the Department issued a notice of intent to find the Amendment in compliance. The County and the Department accepted and relied upon the data and methodology employed by the SFWMD and the conditions for removal of the SFWMD's objections. Petitioner's Challenge. On or about March 8, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department challenging the Amendment. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on April 25, 1995. At the commencement of the final hearing, Petitioner withdrew all issues it had raised in the Amended Petition except the issues of: (a) whether the data and analysis available supports a conclusion that there is a need for additional residential development; and (b) whether the Amendment is supported by data and analysis in light of an ongoing study of the East Coast Buffer. Residential Housing Need. The Plan includes the following Goal and Objective concerning the provision of adequate areas for residential use: Goal 01.00.00 Provide residential areas with a variety of housing types and densities offering convenient and affordable housing opportunities to all segments of Broward County's population while maintaining a desired quality of life and adequate public services and facilities. Objective 01.01.00 Accommodate the projected population of Broward County by providing adequate areas on the Future Broward County Land Use Plan Map (Series) intended primarily for residential development, but which also permit those non-residential uses that are compatible with and necessary to support residential neighborhoods. The Plan, including the methodology utilized to determine residential need, was found to be in compliance by the Department. The residential need methodology of the Plan utilized the Broward County Population Forecasting Model to project the population of southwest Broward County in 1994 to be 225,489 people. This projected population formed the basis for the allocation of residential housing units for Subregion 5 under the Plan. The Property is located in an area of southwest Broward County designated as Subregion 5 in the Plan. In reviewing the Amendment, the County conducted an analysis of the need for additional residential development in southwest Broward County. This analysis utilized, and was consistent with, the residential need methodology of the Plan. A summary of the data and analysis utilized by the County was provided to the Department. The County's analysis indicated that the population of Subregion 5 has exceeded the population projections for the Subregion of the Plan. By 1994, there were 284,361 people living in Subregion 5 or 17,872 more than projected in the Plan. The increased population rate of growth in Subregion 5 was projected to represent an increase in projected demand for approximately 6,847 residential units in excess of the projected demand expected under the Plan. The analysis also took into account amendments to the Plan which have resulted in a reduction of 1,087 residential units for Subregion 5. When combined with the increased population, the data and analysis supports a conclusion that there is a need for 7,934 additional residential units in Subregion 5. The Amendment increases residential housing in Subregion 5 by 1,134 dwelling units (1,920 units allowed under the Amendment, less 786 dwelling units allowed under the current agriculture classification), well below the projected need for additional residential units for Subregion 5. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and submitted to the Department supports the conclusion of the County that there is need for the proposed additional residential development approved by the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was professionally acceptable and adequate to support the Amendment. The evidence presented by Petitioner failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was not professionally acceptable and adequate. Rather than attempting to prove that the County's methodology was not professionally acceptable or was flawed, Petitioner utilized a methodology based upon an annualized population growth rate for Subregion 5. Petitioner offered evidence that there is sufficient residential housing approved under the Plan to meet the projected population for 15.6 years, beyond the remaining life of the Plan. The methodology utilized by Petitioner was, by the admission of the Petitioner's own witness, not a professionally acceptable methodology. The evidence failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County does not support its conclusion that there is sufficient need for the additional residential housing authorized for the County by the Amendment. The East Coast Buffer Zone. Efforts to restore the Everglades have been initiated and are ongoing. As a part of these efforts a group of technical and scientific staff members of various federal agencies involved in the restoration efforts were formed as the "Science Sub Group." The Science Sub Group was formed as an advisory group to provide guidance towards ecosystem restoration efforts. The Science Sub Group had no implementing authority. It issued at least one report in late 1993 which included an East Coast Buffer concept. The East Coast Buffer identified by the Science Sub Group included the area in which the Property is located. The Science Sub Group relied upon data obtained from the SFWMD and various computer models developed by the SFWMD, and SFWMD personnel contributed to the preparation of the report. The East Coast Buffer concept generally includes a series of interconnected water flow-ways along the eastern edge of the water conservation areas necessary to restore the Everglades. The federal government has also instituted a study known as the "Central & South Florida Project: Comprehensive Review Study" (hereinafter referred to as the "Restudy"). The United States Corps of Engineers is the lead agency of the Restudy. The first phase of the Restudy's efforts has resulted in a "Reconnaissance Report", also known as the "Recon Study". The second phase of the Restudy's efforts will be the feasibility phase. The feasibility phase will begin in the summer of 1995 and will be completed several years later. The purpose of the Restudy is to bring together the interested federal agencies to review the current management of the Everglades and identify strategies for altering management practices and systems to improve the Everglades. The Recon Study was completed in late 1994. It describes various conceptual strategies for restoring the Everglades. The determination of the feasibility of the strategies has not, however, been started, much less completed. Therefore, although the East Coast Buffer concept is considered in the Recon Study, the actual identification of the area which will constitute the Buffer has not been identified. Nor has the area which should constitute the East Coast Buffer been recommended in the Recon Study. The Recon Study identifies problems and opportunities, formulates alternative plans, evaluates conceptual alternative plans and recommends further study. The Recon Study is advisory. It does not identify, recommend or implement a plan of action. The Coalition presented evidence concerning the ongoing analysis of Everglades restoration efforts. That evidence proved that the Property is located within a very large area, which completely surrounds the Everglades, which is being considered as part of the Everglades restoration effort because of the impact of this large area on restoration efforts. The evidence presented by the Coalition, however, failed to prove that the Property has been, or will be, determined to be essential or even necessary for future Everglades restoration efforts. At the time of the approval of the Amendment and, even at the time of the final hearing of this case, no such determination had been made. Nor had any determination been made as to what will be necessary for the restoration of the Everglades or whether decisions will be made to carry out the necessary restoration efforts. As recognized by the Coalition in its proposed order: 52. The study necessary to make [a determination of the water levels needed] for the areas which are implicated by this amendment will be done in the next two years or three years. * * * 55. There is no way of telling, based on the data and analysis available at this point, how much water will be necessary in order to fully restore the Everglades. . . . Coalition proposed findings of fact 52 and 55. The Coalition also recognized the following: The Reconnaissance study has not reached the point where conclusions can be drawn about parcel specific uses. The next step is the feasibility planning phase, which is a much more detailed phase which will run for several years. . . . Coalition proposed finding of fact 107. Instead of attempting to prove that the data and analysis at the time of adoption of the Amendment indicated that development of the Property authorized by the Amendment would be detrimental to restoration efforts, the Coalition attempted to prove that development of the Property should be delayed until data and analysis is available indicating conclusively what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts. The Act does not require such delay. In addition to failing to prove what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts, the evidence presented by the Coalition also failed to prove that the conclusions reached by the Science Sub Group and the Restudy will even be implemented. The evidence presented by the Coalition failed to prove that the conclusions of the SFWMD with regard to the impact of the Amendment are not supported by data and analysis or were not arrived at by professionally acceptable methods. While the evidence proved that there will be some reduction in the amount of groundwater recharge function and seepage control function as a result of the Amendment, the evidence failed to prove what ultimate impact the reductions in recharge and seepage control will be or that the SFWMD's conclusions are not reasonable. While the Coalition proved that the SFWMD's conclusions were not based upon a consideration of what should be done to restore the Everglades, the evidence failed to prove that the information available was sufficiently conclusive that the SFWMD should have objected to the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County in approving the Amendment was collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. None of those agencies charged with responsibility to review the Amendment raised objections to its approval. The evidence failed to prove that the state of the data and analysis available to the County from the Science Sub Group and the Restudy or any other source concerning the area referred to as the East Coast Buffer and the Property is such that it proved that the data that was relied by the County upon was inadequate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department dismissing finding the Amendment "in compliance" and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Coalition's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1-2. Accepted in 2. 3-4 Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5 Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 5-6. Accepted in 6. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 14-15 Not relevant. 16-18 Not relevant. See 81-84. 19-25 Not relevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 81-84. Accepted in 29. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 26 and hereby accepted. 30-31 See 24. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 36 and 62. Accepted in 62. 35-41 Hereby accepted. 42-48 These proposed findings are generally correct. They are not, however, relevant to the ultimate determination in this case. 49-50 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. See 96. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in 96. The last sentence is not relevant. Hereby accepted. 57-63 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 64-65 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 89 and 91 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90 and 92. See 86 and 92. Hereby accepted. Although generally true, the evidence failed to prove that this finding specifically applies to the Property. Except for the first sentence, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31-33. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76-87 Although generally correct, these findings were too broad and the evidence failed to prove that they specifically apply to the Property. 88-90 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-97 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 98 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 99-100 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 104-105 Not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 97. Accepted in 90. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 111-114 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The County's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 1. 2 Accepted in 7. 3 Accepted in 8. 4 Accepted in 11. 5 Hereby accepted. 6 Accepted in 12. 7 Accepted in 13. 8 Accepted in 14. 9 Accepted in 15. 10 Accepted in 9-10. 11 Accepted in 18. 12 Accepted in 16. 13 Accepted in 17. 14 Accepted in 61. 15 Accepted in 60. 16 Accepted in 19-20, 26 and 62. 17 Accepted in 23. 18 Accepted in 21-22 19-20 Accepted in 24. 21 Hereby accepted. 22 Accepted in 37. 23-24 Hereby accepted. 25 Accepted in 68. 26 Accepted in 65-67. 27-28 Accepted in 67. 29-30 Hereby accepted. 31-32 Accepted in 28. 33 Accepted in 29. 34 Accepted in 30. 35 Accepted in 34. 36 Accepted in 31 and hereby accepted. 37 Accepted in 32-33. 38 Accepted in 31. 39 Accepted in 33. 40 Accepted in 35. 41 Accepted in 316. 42 Accepted in 37. 43 Accepted in 39. 44 Accepted in 40. 45 Accepted in 41. 46 Accepted in 42. 47 Accepted in 72. 48-49 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 73-77 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 76-77. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 79-80 Accepted 58 and 62. 55-57 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 82. Hereby accepted. 60-61 Accepted in 81-84. 62 Hereby accepted. 63-65 Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 43 and 45. Accepted in 88. Accepted in 89-90. 69-70 Accepted in 85-86. 71 Accepted in 90 and 92-93. 72-77 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 32 and 44. Hereby accepted. None proposed. Accepted in 33. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 49 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 87-88 Accepted in 52. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 53 and 58 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 54. Accepted in 56. Accepted in 58. 95-96 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 60. Accepted in 61. The Department's and Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 8. Accepted in 11. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 9-10. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 16. Accepted in 17. Accepted in 61. Accepted in 11 and 19-20. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. Accepted in 36-38. 22-37 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 43. Accepted in 88. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31. 42-43 Accepted in 44. Accepted in 43 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 42. Accepted in 42 and 46. Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 46. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 46. 52-53 Accepted in 48. Accepted 49. Accepted in 49, 52 and 54. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 54 and 57. 59-60 Accepted 54. 61-63 Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 55. Accepted in 56-57. 66-67 Accepted in 58. 68-70 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 64. Accepted in 58 and 62. Accepted in 60 and 62. Accepted in 63. Accepted in 67. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 67 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 37 and hereby accepted. Not relevant. Accepted in 86. Hereby accepted. 82-83 Accepted in 86. Accepted in 87. Accepted in 89 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90. Accepted in 90 and 92-93. Accepted in 93. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 72-78. Accepted in 69-71. Accepted in 70. Accepted in 73-74 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 75. Accepted in 76. Accepted in 77. Accepted in 78. Accepted in 79-80. 101-102 Accepted in 82. Accepted in 83. Accepted in 83-84. Accepted in 81 and 84. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brion Blackwelder, Esquire Jack Milbery, Esquire 8751 West Broward Boulevard, #206 Plantation, Florida 33324 Sherry A. Spiers Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Tracy Lautenschlager, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Glenn Smith, Esquire Michael A. Cohn, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Honorable Gerald F. Thompson Chairman, Broward County Board of County Commissioners Governmental Center 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Sumter County comprehensive plan amendment 94D1 adopted on September 20, 1994, by Ordinance No. 94-6 is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact have been determined: Background The parties Respondent, Sumter County (County), is a local government subject to the comprehensive land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered and enforced by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive land use plans and amendments made thereto. Petitioners, T. D. Farnsworth and James E. Boyd, own property and reside within the northern part of unincorporated Sumter County. Petitioner, Sumter Citizens Against Irresponsible Development (SCAID), is an organization founded by a small group of citizens for the purposes of preserving the "rural lifestyle" of the County, preventing urban sprawl, and ensuring "that development will not be a burden to the taxpayers" of the County. Farnsworth is president of the group while Boyd serves as its treasurer. By stipulation of the parties, petitioners are affected persons within the meaning of the law and have standing to bring this action. Intervenor, Villages of Lake Sumter, Inc. (Villages), is a Florida corporation and the owner and developer of the Tri-County Villages development of regional impact, which is the subject property of this proceeding. Villages submitted oral and written comments during the plan amendment review and adoption proceeding and thus has standing as an affected person to participate in this proceeding. Tri-County Villages To place this dispute in proper perspective, it is necessary to trace the history of the development which has occurred in and around the subject property. As noted earlier, intervenor is the owner and developer of the Tri- County Villages development located in unincorporated Sumter County. Development which predated the existing Tri-County Villages development commenced in approximately 1968 with Orange Blossom Garden North (OBGN). OBGN was an approximately 1,000-acre project owned and operated by Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. as a mobile home retirement community located mostly in the Town of Lady Lake, Florida. That community lies in the northwestern corner of Lake County, which adjoins the northeastern corner of Sumter County. Because the development of OBGN commenced prior to July of 1973, it is vested for purposes of development of regional impact (DRI) review pursuant to Section 380.06(20), Florida Statutes. In 1987, Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. submitted an Application for Development Approval (ADA) with the Town of Lady Lake which requested authorization to develop Orange Blossom Gardens South (OBGS). The OBGS development was an approximately 595-acre extension of the vested OBGN retirement community and was determined by the DCA and Town of Lady Lake to be a DRI. On January 18, 1988, the Town of Lady Lake approved the proposed OBGS development. In 1989, Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. submitted to the Town of Lady Lake and the County an ADA requesting a substantial deviation from the OBGS DRI. The substantial deviation request sought authorization to develop Orange Blossom Gardens West (OBGW). OBGW was planned as an approximately 1,700-acre extension to the OBGS DRI. The Town of Lady Lake approved the substantial deviation request through the issuance of an Amended Development Order on May 7, 1990. The County approved the development within its jurisdiction on May 29, 1990. In September 1993, intervenor, as successor to Orange Blossom Hills, Inc., submitted an ADA to the County which requested a substantial deviation from the OBGS and OBGW DRI's. By submitting this latest development, intervenor sought to add approximately 1,960 acres to the existing OBGS and OBGW DRI's and modify the development already approved by adding a total of 6,250 residential units and 910,000 square feet of commercial square footage. The overall development was renamed Tri-County Villages. The development order approving the substantial deviation for Tri-County Villages was adopted by the County on September 20, 1994. The Challenged Amendment On September 20, 1994, or prior to approval of the Tri-County Villages development substantial deviation, but in conjunction with it, the County adopted plan amendment 94D1 by Ordinance No. 94-6. On November 10, 1994, the DCA determined the amendment to be in compliance. That amendment amended the plan's Future Land Use Map (FLUM) to revise the land use designations on approximately 1,960 acres of land. Specifically, the plan amendment designated as Planned Unit Development (PUD) all areas of the approved OBGW DRI and the additional 1,960 acres referred to in Exhibit 1 of 94D1 as parcels 5 and 8. Prior to the amendment, parcels 5 and 8 had been designated predominantly as agricultural, with small pockets of rural residential. The plan amendment also revised the FLUM by extending the urban expansion area to include all of parcels 5 and 8. Prior to the amendment, only a small section of parcel 8 was included in the urban expansion area. The plan amendment further included several textual revisions to the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), including a revision to FLUE Policy 1.5.7 concerning the ratio of commercial square footage to residential units and the addition of FLUE Objective 1.14 and Policies 1.14.1 - 1.14.6, which essentially incorporated the concept of sector planning into the plan. Finally, the plan amendment revised Policy 2.1.5 of the Sanitary Sewer Element which, subject to submission of appropriate data and analysis, and Department of Environmental Protection approval, reduced the established level of service for sanitary sewer throughout the Tri-County Villages development. The Tri-County Villages DRI and ADA and plan amendment are related in that Section 380.06(6), Florida Statutes, requires that the local government's review of the DRI and corresponding comprehensive plan amendment be initiated and concluded at the same time. In the instant case, the Tri-County Villages ADA served as much of the background data and analysis for the plan amendment. The Tri-County Villages DRI also served as the sector plan for the area covered by the amendment. In addition to the voluminous data and analysis included in the Tri- County Villages ADA, the plan amendment also included detailed data and analysis. The data and analysis accompanying the amendment included a compatibility and land use suitability analysis, a soils analysis, an evaluation of urban sprawl related issues, an analysis of environmental considerations, a population and housing analysis, a concurrency analysis, and an analysis to ensure that the amendment was consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan. The data and analysis collectively demonstrated that the urban development proposed by the amendment was appropriate for the designated area. C. Is the Plan Amendment in Compliance? In their proposed recommended order, petitioners summarize their objections to the plan amendment as follows: (a) the amendment fails to protect agricultural lands, (b) the amendment encourages urban sprawl, (c) the future land use map is internally inconsistent, (d) there is no demonstrated need for 1,960 acres of PUD land use, (e) PUD is not a valid land use category, (f) the amendment does not ensure adequate fire and emergency medical services, (g) the County failed to coordinate with the local school board, (h) there is no reasonable protection from flooding, (i) the amendment does not provide adequate parks and recreational facilities, (j) affordable housing needs are not met, and there is no requirement that the developer install water and sewer facilities at its own expense. These contentions will be discussed separately below. Protection of agricultural lands Under the amendment, 1,960 acres of agricultural land will be converted to urban type uses. Petitioners contend that the amendment fails to protect agricultural land as required by FLUE objective 7.1.2 and Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(g)5., Florida Administrative Code. The cited objective "establishes agriculture as the primary use outside of the urban expansion area" and "insures retention of agricultural activities." If the plan amendment fails to "adequately protect adjacent agricultural areas," the cited rule considers this failure to be a prime indicator that the amendment does not discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. The rule and objective do not prohibit the conversion of agricultural lands to urban uses. Indeed, FLUE objective 1.2 and the corresponding policies allow for the conversion of suitable agricultural lands as the need for additional urban land is demonstrated. The policies also require that the conversion be done in a well planned, orderly and logical fashion based on need and suitability. The agricultural lands being converted as a result of the plan amendment are appropriate for conversion. The plans, FLUE data and analysis demonstrate that one of the best areas for urban development in the County is the northeast portion of the County which covers the agricultural lands in the plan amendment. This determination was based on an extensive analysis of various factors including soil suitability, environmental constraints, and other planning criteria such as proximity to existing urbanized areas. The evidence establishes that the conversion of agricultural land contemplated by the plan amendment was justifiable because of the extent of urban development already existing in the area and the urban infrastructure currently in place. In addition, future populations will be directed away from the remaining agricultural lands throughout the County and to the development proposed by the plan amendment. The open space required by the PUD and Tri- County Villages amended development order sector plan will also serve to buffer and ensure compatibility of land covered by the plan amendment and the adjacent agricultural and rural lands. In view of the above, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment fails to protect agricultural land. Urban sprawl In the same vein, petitioners contend that the amendment fails to discourage urban sprawl because of the conversion of 1,960 acres of agricultural land to urban uses. In support of this contention, they cite a number of provisions within Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, all dealing with urban sprawl, and which have allegedly been violated. They also point to the fact that large portions of the existing development have not been sold or built out, only 2 percent of the 1,960 acres will be devoted to commercial land use, the multiplier for the plan amendment is in excess of 1.25, which is an indicator of urban sprawl, and no future public facilities and services are planned for the lands covered by the amendment prior to its adoption. The plan amendment includes an evaluation of urban sprawl. That evaluation references FLUE policy 1.2.5.(a), which was adopted by the County specifically as a mechanism for discouraging urban sprawl. A review of that policy indicates that, for a PUD to be allowed in an agricultural area, it must score approximately 50 points based on factors including, but not limited to, proximity to the urban expansion area, proximity to urban services, including water, sewer, and roads, and proximity to other services such as fire protection and emergency medical services. If a proposed amendment or PUD failed to score 50 points, it was deemed to encourage urban sprawl and would not be approved by the County. The plan amendment scored 130 points, well in excess of the 50 point threshold. In addition to satisfying FLUE policy 1.2.5.(a), the plan amendment is consistent with FLUM maps VII-18A and VII-18C, which are the future land use constrained area overlay and urban sprawl evaluation overlay, respectively. As the FLUE data and analysis indicate, these maps were prepared for the purpose of directing urban development into areas most suitable for such development. Map VII-18A demonstrates that the land included in the plan amendment has only slight limitations for urban development. Similarly, Map VII-18C indicates that the land has only slight limitations in regard to urban sprawl. In fact, portions of land covered by the plan amendment are already within an established urban expansion area which is the OBGW DRI. Finally, the PUD mixed land use category and sector plan concept adopted by the plan amendment are planning methods specifically recognized and encouraged by prior DCA policy as reflected in the DCA's Technical Memo Special Edition 4-4 and the urban sprawl provisions incorporated into Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(l), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 18, 1994, as methods of discouraging urban sprawl. Indeed, the rule provides in part that mixed use development and sector planning . . . will be recognized as methods of discouraging urban sprawl and will be determined consistent with the provisions of the state comprehensive plan, regional policy plans, Chapter 163, Part II, and this chapter regarding discouraging the proliferation of urban sprawl. Given the above, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment encourages urban sprawl. The consistency of the future land Petitioners next argue in general terms that the FLUM does not "reflect policies which call for maintaining agricultural lands, discouraging urban sprawl, promoting land use compatibility, protection from flooding, providing for adequate public recreation facilities, and other objectives," and thus it is internally inconsistent. The FLUM series in the plan as well as the FLUM series as amended by the plan amendment is a pictorial representation of the goals, objectives, and policies of the comprehensive plan. In the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, it is found that petitioners have failed to show to the exclusion of fair debate that the FLUM is internally inconsistent as alleged in their petition. Demonstrated need Petitioners next allege that the plan amendment "is premature in time and fails to provide demonstrated need" as required by various provisions within Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code. They further allege that the FLUM "is not based upon adequate surveys, studies, or data regarding the amount of land needed to accommodate anticipated growth." Initially, it is noted that the data and analysis in the plan are not subject to the compliance review process. Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, authorizes the DCA in a compliance review to determine only if the plan or plan amendment is based on appropriate data and analysis and whether the data was collected in a professionally acceptable manner. Planning methodologies used in analysis of the data, such as the calculation of a multiplier, must also be prepared in a professionally acceptable manner. In addition, the DCA may not choose one methodology over another. At hearing, petitioners raised issues concerning the methodology used in calculating the County's residential land use allocation multiplier and contended that other factors such as mortality rates and resale figures should have been used in calculating the multiplier. The preparation of the multiplier in issue came as a result of the DCA's Objections, Recommendations and Comments report. That report recommended that the County provide an analysis which demonstrated that the land use change requested in the plan amendment was based on the amount of additional land needed to accommodate the projected population during the planning time frame (the year 2014) established by the Tri-County Villages Amended Development Order sector plan. Based on historic data, the County calculated a multiplier which depicted the allocation of residential land countywide. The multiplier was 1.87, which means that the County allocated residential land uses approximately 87 percent above its demonstrated need for the planning period. The evidence shows that, in order to allow some degree of development flexibility, a local government will routinely allocate more land than is actually needed. Indeed, a multiplier of 1.87 is low when compared to the other multipliers found in compliance in adjacent local governments as well as in other local governments statewide. In actuality, a 1.87 multiplier is not really the most accurate depiction of the allocation of residential land county-wide because the population for OBGW and the other PUD in the County was not included in the calculation. In an effort to provide a more accurate multiplier, the County added to the equation the projected population for OBGW and the PUD. The resulting revised multiplier equalled 1.46. Petitioners developed a multiplier of their own of 1.88. However, they failed to show that the County's multiplier was not developed in a professionally acceptable manner. Moreover, petitioners' methodology was unacceptable because it did not project its population over the correct planning horizon. Petitioners failed to consider the 2014 planning horizon established by the Tri-County Villages Amended Development Order sector plan which controls the development of land covered by the plan amendment. Instead, petitioners multiplier incorrectly used the 2001 planning horizon established by the plan. In addressing the need for additional residential allocation, the amount of residential land allocated must be a reflection of the population expected through the end of the Tri-County Villages sector plan 2014 planning horizon. The type of development contemplated by the plan amendment and the additional population has not previously occurred in the County. Since development of OBGW commenced in 1992, the building permits issued in the County have increased by 94 percent. Much of this increase can be attributed to OBGW. The number of yearly certificates of occupancy for OBGW has stayed relatively constant and is expected to remain constant throughout the planning horizon. Intervenor's marketing scheme for OBGW seeks to attract retirees predominately from the northeastern part of the United States. The residents are not generally County residents prior to moving to Tri-County Villages. This same marketing scheme will be used for the future development of the Tri-County Villages. Thus, the future Tri-County Villages residents are not expected to be from the County. Tri-County Villages is a new type of development for the County. This new population was not taken into account in the original comprehensive plan which also had a low multiplier. Therefore, the need for residential allocation for this new population was not addressed. Because this new population is a reality which was not comtemplated by the plan, and the plan does not have an excess of allocated residential land, the need for the increased residential densities has been demonstrated. Petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment was premature or not based on a demonstrated need. PUD as a land use category Because a planned unit development (PUD) is not "recognized" as a land use category in Rule 9J-5.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, petitioners contend that the use of that category in the plan amendment renders it not in compliance. For purposes of its compliance review, the DCA used the version of chapter 9J-5 which was in effect at the time of the submittal of the plan amendment. Then existing Rule 9J-5.006(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which was effective on March 23, 1994, established the generalized land uses which must be shown on the Existing Land Use Map (ELUM). Rule 9J-5.006(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, requires that these same generalized land uses must be depicted on the FLUM as well. While it is true that PUD is not one of the generalized land uses listed in chapter 9J-5, the two rules cited above both allow a local government to depict other land use categories on the ELUM and FLUM. Because the plan references PUD as a mixed land use category, the County has properly depicted that category on both the ELUM and FLUM. Petitioners have failed to show that PUD as a mixed land use category is not recognized under the rules in existence when the plan amendment was reviewed. Compatibility with adjacent agricultural lands Petitioners have also alleged that the County has "not demonstrated compatibility with adjacent agricultural and rural residential land uses." They point to the fact that the area adjacent to and near the development is a "friendly rural community," and they allege that the development will harm this wholesome atmosphere. The plan allows for the well planned conversion of agricultural lands in the County. One of the requirements of the plan's PUD provisions is that PUD development be buffered from adjacent lands and contain open space. The purpose of this provision is to ensure compatibility. A review of the PUD application and DRI Master Development Plan, both incorporated into the plan amendment, shows that the Tri-County Villages development will provide approximately 1,100 acres of open space. Much of this open space will act as a buffer between the development and the adjacent agricultural and rural land uses. The project will also cluster its development which serves to separate the more urban development from the adjacent agricultural and rural uses. Another mechanism which ensures compatibility is the phased method of development proposed for the project. Under the phasing approach, only contiguous portions of the property will be developed at any given time during the planning period. In addition, existing agricultural uses on the property will continue until such time as the proposed development reaches that property. Given these considerations, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment is incompatible with adjacent land uses. Levels of service In their amended petition, petitioners assert that the plan amendment is in violation of FLUE objective 7.1.6 and FLUE policy 7.1.6.1, objective 1.1 and policy 1.1.1 of the Capital Improvements Element, Rules 9J-5.005(3), 9J- 5.011(2)2., 9J-5.015(3)(b)1., and 9J-5.016(3)(a) and (b)4., Florida Administrative Code, and Section 187.201(16)(b)6., Florida Statutes, all pertaining specifically or generally to levels of service for recreational facilities, schools, fire protection, emergency medical services and flooding. Policy 1.1.1 of the Capital Improvements Element adopts a recreational facility level of service for such facilities as softball fields, baseball fields, basketball courts, boat ramps and the like. The amount of facilities required is based on population. Under the plan, the County must take the necessary steps to insure that the availability of these facilities is addressed during the concurrency review process and not at the compliance review stage. In other words, when a proposed development reaches the stage of requesting a building permit, the County may require as a condition of the issuance of that building permit that a developer provide a certain facility. In this regard, it is noted that Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, requires that any development comply with concurrency requirements while the Tri-County DRI Amended Development Order requires that the developer provide for adequate public facilities. Both the plan amendment and the development authorized therein generally address the recreational level of service. However, if no additional facilities are constructed in the future, the plan amendment does not provide adequate baseball fields, softball fields, boat ramps or handball courts consistent with policy 1.1.1. In addressing these potential deficiencies, intervenor represented to the County that as a retirement community, the development would not generate a demand for these types of facilities. That is to say, the retiree population inhabiting the development would be less likely to participate in activities such as baseball or softball. The population would, however, generate a need for other recreational facilities such as golf courses, swimming pools, shuffleboard courts and bocci ball facilities, all of which the development has a surplus. In response to this concern, the County concluded that it was not appropriate to require the construction of certain facilities when the project would not generate a need for them. The County indicated that, during the plan evaluation and appraisal stage required in 1998, an amendment to the plan would be transmitted which would revise the plan to take into account such situations. If such an amendment is not adopted, intervenor will need to provide additional facilities necessary to meet concurrency requirements. There is no established level of service in the plan for fire protection or emergency medical services. Intervenor has, however, addressed these services in the Amended Development Order for the development. As reflected in that order, intervenor donated a five-acre parcel and constructed a fire station adjacent to the development. The station may also be used to house emergency medical services, if needed, although an existing emergency medical service provider is located in close proximity. Intervenor also donated to the County $80,000 for the purchase of fire fighting equipment, and each household pays the County a $30 annual fee for fire protection. Therefore, fire protection and emergency medical services have been addressed. The plan establishes no level of service standard for schools. Because the development is a retirement community, children under age 19 are prohibited. As a consequence, it was determined that impacts to school facilities would be minimal. Intervenor contacted and advised the school board of its retirement community development plans and projected student impacts. In response, the school board concluded that minimal impact was expected as a result of the development. To the extent that the development in the future allows school age children to reside therein, the Amended Development Order specifically calls for a substantial deviation determination pursuant to Section 380.06(19), Florida Statutes, to evaluate the potential impacts to school facilities. As a result of further review, intervenor may be required to provide additional school facilities. The plan establishes a level of service for stormwater drainage in terms of quantity and quality. Based on flooding which has occurred in the existing OBGW development, petitioners suggest that flooding will occur in the development proposed in conjunction with the plan amendment. While such flooding has occurred in the OBGW development, there is no evidence that the flooding was caused by a reduction or violation of the stormwater drainage level of service. Indeed, the evidence shows that the flooding was caused by an unusually heavy period of rainfall in combination with debris clogging the inlets of the stormwater system. The actual stormwater system for OBGW, which was reviewed and approved in the OBGW DRI review process, was designed for and required to meet the plan's drainage level of service. As a concurrency matter, any system designed for the future development contemplated in the plan amendment will also be required to meet the stormwater drainage level of service. Accordingly, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment violates the plan's level of services standard for stormwater drainage. Affordable housing Petitioners further allege that the plan amendment "fails to provide for affordable housing as required by Objective 3.5 of the Housing Element of the (plan)" in violation of various rules and the state comprehensive plan. The rule alleged to have been violated requires a local government to analyze the affordable housing stock within the local government. The local government must then adopt comprehensive plan goals, objectives, and policies which establish programs to ensure an adequate supply of affordable housing for the present and future residents. Housing Element objective 3.5 and the implementing policies which follow provide one of the mechanisms, coordination with the private sector, which the County uses to address the provision of affordable housing countywide. The provisions of objective 3.5 and the implementing policies place no specific requirements on the private sector. These plan provisions only require that, in addressing the provision of affordable housing, the County work with the private sector. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, neither the plan provisions nor chapter 9J-5 require the plan amendment to address the affordable housing deficiencies countywide. As a DRI requirement, however, the plan amendment does address the provision of affordable housing. A detailed housing analysis was provided in the Tri-County Villages ADA. The analysis included a review of the affordable housing stock pursuant to the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council's housing demand, supply and need methodology. The analysis further concluded that after phase 3, additional affordable housing may be necessary. To address this deficiency, the ADA for the development requires intervenor to reanalyze the available affordable housing consistent with objective 3.5 of the Housing Element. Thus, it is found that petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment fails to provide affordable housing. i. Infrastructure funding Finally, petitioners allege that the plan amendment is inconsistent with FLUE policy 1.5.4. That policy provides as follows: All PUDS shall provide for central potable water and sanitary sewer facilities at the developer's expense and provide for fire hydrants and fire flow within the development in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association Standards. Intervenor has created community development districts as a mechanism to fund the development infrastructure. Intervenor is able to raise funds by the sale of bonds through these districts. The residents of the development will ultimately repay the bonds. Even so, petitioners allege that this funding mechanism is inconsistent with the cited policy because the infrastructure is not funded "at the developer's expense." The purpose and intent of the policy was to insure that the County not be obligated to fund infrastructure related to the PUD development. The developer, and ultimately the residents, of the project will fund the infrastructure through the community development districts. The County will not be obligated. This funding mechanism is consistent with policy 1.5.4. in that the County is not responsible for the funding of the PUD-related infrastructure. Accordingly, petitioners have not shown to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment is inconsistent with the cited policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that Sumter County's comprehensive plan amendment 94D1 is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11 day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6974GM Petitioners: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4-5. Rejected as being unnecessary. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 40. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. 8-9. Rejected as being unnecessary. 10. Partially accepted in findings of fact 7-9. 11-14. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 19-21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 22-23. Covered in procedural statement. 24-29. Partially accepted in findings of fact 16-20. 30-41. Partially accepted in findings of fact 21-25. 42. Rejected as being unnecessary. 43-77. Partially accepted in findings of fact 28-36. 78-85. Partially accepted in findings of fact 37-39. 86-95. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40-42. 96-148. Partially accepted in findings of fact 43-49. 149-162. Partially accepted in findings of fact 50-53. 163-166. Partially accepted in findings of fact 54-56. Respondents/Intervenor: With certain changes, the substance of proposed findings 1-53 has been generally incorporated into this recommended order. Note: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan R. Stengle, Esquire General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mr. T. D. Farnsworth 12364 County Road 223 Oxford, Florida 34484 Felix M. Adams, Esquire 236 North Main Street Bushnell, Florida 33513-5928 David L. Jordan, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Nancy G. Linnan, Esquire Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 R. Dewey Burnsed, Esquire Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357
The Issue The issue in Case 08-1144GM is whether Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan (CGMP or Plan) Amendment 7-20, called the "Land Protection Incentives" (LPI) Amendment (LPIA), which was adopted by Ordinance 777 on December 11, 2007, and amended by Ordinance 795 on April 29, 2008, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.1 The issue in Case 08-1465GM is whether Martin County's Comprehensive Plan Amendment 7-22, called the "Secondary Urban Service District" (SUSD) Amendment (SUSDA), which was adopted by Ordinance 781 on December 11, 2007, is "in compliance," as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners' Standing FOF and MCCA objected to the LPIA and the SUSDA during the time period from transmittal to adoption of those amendments.3 FOF FOF is a non-profit organization incorporated in 1986, shortly after Florida’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation (Growth Management) Act was enacted to monitor the Act's implementation. FOF engages in legislative, legal, and grassroots advocacy for sustainable comprehensive land use planning in Florida. It conducts membership meetings, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings open to the general public, and initiates or participates in litigation or administrative proceedings concerning amendments to local comprehensive plans. Its main office is in Tallahassee, where several employees work. It also has a branch office in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, where one employee works. It has no office or employees in Martin County. There was no evidence that FOF has applied for or obtained any license or permit to operate a business in Martin County; nor was there any evidence as to the requirements for obtaining such a license or permit. FOF has approximately 3,500 members; approximately 550 members live or own property in Martin County. FOF does not have a continuous presence in Martin County, other than its members who live and own property there, but it continuously monitors comprehensive planning and related growth management issues in Martin County and from time to time engages in activities in Martin County. Since 1990, FOF was involved in the Loxahatchee Greenways project, a major river corridor running through Martin County; was involved in the protection of Jonathan Dickinson State Park, which is in Martin County; undertook its Palm Beach and Martin County Green Initiative (which addressed housing, legal, transportation, and other planning issues in Martin County and resulted in the distribution of educational materials on Martin County planning issues); opposed specific local development proposals; supported a sales tax referendum to buy and preserve environmentally- sensitive lands; collaborated with the County planning department to update the housing element of the County Comprehensive Plan; assisted with a local affordable housing initiative; published a booklet on comprehensive planning in the County; and conducted a public survey of County residents assessing attitudes about planning. FOF staff members speak at and participate in annual growth management forums in Martin County, which are attended by a substantial number of its members. FOF has regularly commented in person and in writing to the Martin County Commission on proposed CGMP changes. FOF also has previously participated as a party in administrative hearings conducted in the County concerning the CGMP, during which its president has testified as an expert planner. The relief requested by FOF in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. MCCA MCCA is a Florida not-for-profit corporation created in 1997. It is a membership-based organization of 120 individuals and 14 other organizations. MCCA itself does not own real property in Martin County. However, at least 38 individual members reside and own real property in the County, and at least one organizational member (Audubon of Martin County) owns real property in the County. MCCA does not maintain an office or have paid employees. It operates through its members, who volunteer. MCCA's Articles of Incorporation state that it was formed "to conserve the natural resources of Martin County, to protect the native flora and fauna of Martin County, [and] to maintain and improve the quality of life for all of the residents of Martin County." It engages in various forms of lobbying and advocacy for or against amendments to Martin County's Comprehensive Plan, including initiation or participation in litigation and administrative proceedings. It conducts membership meetings in the County, sends newsletters to members and others, hosts meetings in the County that are open to the general public (including an annual growth management meeting with FOF and an annual awards luncheon with local conservation groups), and works with member organizations on issues relating to the Indian River Lagoon (IRL), including petition drives. The relief requested by MCCA in this case is germane to its goals and appropriate to request on behalf of its members. Martin County Comprehensive Growth Management Plan The CGMP establishes two "urban service districts" in the County, a Primary Urban Service District (PUSD) and a Secondary Urban Service District (SUSD). See CGMP, § 4.4.G. The PUSD has been part of the Plan since it was first adopted in 1982, while the SUSD was added during the major revision of the Plan in 1990. Approximately 65,702 acres (101 square miles) are located within the PUSD. The PUSD encompasses most of the eastern coastal area of the County surrounding four incorporated municipalities, (Stuart, Sewall's Point, Jupiter Island, and Ocean Breeze Park), plus an isolated inland area known as Indiantown. Approximately 9,621 acres (14 square miles) are located within the SUSD. All land within the SUSD is immediately adjacent to land within the PUSD, but is split into several discontinuous sections so that some of the land along the western border of the PUSD abuts land outside the urban service districts. The County's purpose for having urban service districts is to "regulate urban sprawl tendencies by directing growth in a timely and efficient manner to those areas where urban public facilities and services are available, or are programmed to be available at the levels of service adopted in [the Plan]." CGMP, § 4.4.G. The Plan further provides: Objective: Martin County shall concentrate higher densities and intensities of development within the strategically located [PUSDs], as delineated, including commercial or industrial uses as well as residential development exceeding a density of two units per acre . . . . * * * b. Policy: Martin County shall require that new residential development containing one-half acre or smaller lots, commercial uses, and industrial uses shall be located within the [PUSD]. * * * Objective 2. Martin County shall concentrate rural and estate densities not exceeding one unit per gross acre within the [SUSDs] where a reduced level of public facility needs are programmed to be available at the base level of service adopted in the Capital Improvements Element. a. Policy: Martin County shall designate land uses within the [SUSD] in order to provide for the use and extension of urban services in an efficient and economical manner, and consistent with the reduced intensity of urban services normally associated with densities of one unit per gross acre (Estate Density RE-1A) and one unit per two gross acres (Rural Density). . . . * * * f. Policy: In areas designated as [SUSD], where development is proposed that would contain one- half acre lots, or commercial and industrial uses, a change to a [PUSD] designation must be approved by the Board of County Commissioners as part of a land use amendment . . . . The Plan thus generally establishes residential density for land within the PUSD at 2 or more dwelling units per acre, and for land within the SUSD at 1 dwelling unit per acre to 1 dwelling unit per 2 acres. The remaining land within the County that is not within the PUSD or SUSD is generally referred to as "outside" the urban service districts. There are approximately 269,034 acres of such land. The vast majority of such land (approximately 210,379 acres) is designated in the Plan for "agricultural" use. Most of the other land outside the urban service districts is designated for either "public conservation" or "public utilities" See CGMP, § 4.4.L., § 4.4.M.1.a., i., and j. The Plan currently allows residential use of land outside the urban service boundaries that is designated for agricultural use but limits it to either 1 dwelling unit per 5 acres, known as "agricultural ranchette," or 1 dwelling unit per 20 acres. See CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.& c. The Plan further specifies for the latter that: Residential development in the agricultural area is restricted to one-single family residence per gross 20-acre tract. [N]o development shall be permitted which divides landholdings into lots, parcels or other units of less than 20 gross acres. Acreage may be split for bona fide agricultural uses into parcels no smaller than 20 gross acres. . . . Residential subdivisions at a density or intensity or greater than one single- family dwelling unit per 20 gross acre lot shall not be allowed. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.a.) Throughout the Plan, residential development on lots of 2 acres or more is consistently referred to as "rural" development (even within the SUSD), while residential development on smaller lots is consistently referred to as "urban" and must be in either the PUSD or SUSD. It was undisputed that the County's adoption of such a distinction between urban and rural residential lots was a professionally acceptable planning practice. Preservation of the County's agricultural lands is a goal of the Plan. See CGMP, § 4.4.L.1. It is also later stated in a policy related to the allocation of land: Through its planning, capital improvements, cooperative extension, regulatory and intergovernmental coordination activities, Martin County shall continue to protect agriculture as a viable economic use of land. (CGMP, § 4.4.M.1.b.) Preservation of conservation and open space areas within the County is the subject of an entire element of the Plan. See CGMP, Chap. 9.4 The County's goal is "to effectively manage, conserve, and preserve the natural resources of Martin County, giving consideration to an equitable balance of public and private property rights. These resources include air, water, soils, habitat, fisheries, and wildlife, with special emphasis on restoring the St. Lucie Estuary and the Indian River Lagoon." CGMP, § 9.4.A. Preservation of conservation and open space areas is also addressed in numerous other objectives and policies throughout the several elements of the Plan and is a predominant theme of the entire Plan. The provision of "urban public facilities and services" is expressly limited by a policy to the County's urban service districts "in order to preserve agricultural lands and provide maximum protection to the farmer from encroachment by urban uses." CGMP, § 4.4.L.1.a. The Plan defines the term "public urban facilities and services" as "regional water supply and wastewater treatment/disposal systems, solid waste collection services, acceptable response times for sheriff and emergency services, reasonably accessible community park and related recreational facilities, schools and the transportation network." CGMP, § 4.1.B.4. However, the term is often used in the Plan in a rearranged or abbreviated manner, such as "urban public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G.1.f.(7)), "public facilities and services" (§ 4.4.G and § 4.4.G.1.f.), "public services and facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.c.), "public urban facilities" (§ 4.4.G.1.i.), or merely "public facilities (§ 4.4.G.1.) or "urban services " (§ 4.4.G.2.a.). LPIA Provisions The LPIA adds a new objective and new policies under the Future Land Use Element goal addressing "natural resource protection," which provides: Martin County shall protect all the natural resource systems of the County from the adverse impacts of development, provide for continued growth in population and economy and recognize the inter-relationship between the maintenance of urban support infrastructure in waste management, air and water quality, and the coastal zone environmental quality. (CGMP, § 4.4.E.) To the existing 6 objectives under that goal, the LPIA adds a seventh which states: Martin County shall create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007. For the purposes of Section 4.4.E.7., and supporting paragraphs, the definition of open space, found in Section 9.4.A.11., CGMP, shall not include roads, highways and their median strips and berms. This objective is intended to encourage the conveyance of fee simple title of land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local environmental or governmental agencies or land trusts. Lands listed for acquisition include, but are not be limited to [sic], land designated for public acquisition under the Save Our Rivers program, the Indian River Lagoon, North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program. The overall purpose of the LPIA is to encourage the owners of tracts of land outside the urban service districts that are at least 500 acres to choose a different pattern of development than the Plan now allows, by allowing a substantial reduction in the minimum lot size so that the development may be "clustered" on a smaller "footprint" within the overall tract of land, but only if at least 50% of the entire tract is "set aside" permanently for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and stripped of its potential for future development. This approach, it is hoped, will make it easier and cheaper for the County and other governmental entities to acquire the large tracts of land they desire to use for the CERP and other conservation projects. The LPIA does not allow for more development than is allowed under the Plan currently. It allows the same amount of development to be arranged on a tract of land in a different pattern than is currently allowed. It accomplishes this primarily through the combination of a change in the minimum lot size from "20 acres" to "over 2 acres" with a new allowance for "clustering" the smaller lots on a portion of an overall tract of land rather than having an equal number of larger lots spread throughout the entire tract of land. The LPIA adopts six policies to accomplish the new objective: Policy (7)a. provides for the protection of the land "set aside" to be conveyed or subject to an easement in favor of a combination of the County, the South Florida Water Management District, and a third entity, chosen from among the other governmental or not-for-profit conservation- oriented organizational entities listed in the policy. Policy (7)b. requires that a combination of a comprehensive plan amendment and a PUD agreement be used for the change in the development characteristics of the land. The PUD agreement would address the portion of the tract subject to development and not "set aside," while the plan amendment would address (at a minimum) the remaining portion of the tract which is permanently "set aside" for conservation, open space, or agricultural use and would no longer have any potential for residential development. Policy (7)c. provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the comprehensive plan amendment, such as any required change in land use designation for the set-aside portion of the tract of land, and if it remains designated for agricultural use, the removal of any potential for development. Policy (7)d. primarily provides additional specificity concerning the subject matters that would be addressed by the PUD agreement, setting minimum requirements to be met such as the tract having to be a minimum of 500 acres in size; the development being "fiscally neutral to existing taxpayers"; the lots having to be more than 2 acres in size; the inability to develop in environmentally sensitive areas on the tract; and the acknowledgment of a permanent restriction against any future increase of density on the tract. The policy also essentially repeats some of the requirements enunciated in the second and third policies regarding the conveyance of title or easement and the required comprehensive plan amendment, and addresses who pays the closing costs for the set-aside portion of the tract. Policy (7)e. establishes additional requirements specifically applicable to land that has been "listed for acquisition by state, regional, or local agencies as part of an established conservation program." Policy (7)f. enumerates the "site specific benefits" that the second policy states the County must consider when deciding whether to approve an application for development under the optional pattern allowed by the LPIA, such as whether more than the minimum 50% of the tract will be "set aside" permanently, whether the location fills "gaps in natural systems, wildlife corridors, greenways and trails," or whether buffers are provided along roads "to limit access and to protect vistas." The LPIA requirement for at least 50% of an entire tract being set aside for one of the three public purposes, when coupled with other requirements of the Plan such as establishment of construction setback distances, preservation of wetlands and creation of buffers around wetlands, preservation of certain uplands, would result in more than 50% of an undeveloped tract of land remaining in an undeveloped state and at least 50% of agricultural land remaining in agricultural use. Meaning and Predictability of LPIA Standards Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards in numerous respects. No Guide to Location and Pattern of Development Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to establish meaningful and predictable standards essentially because it does not identify the lands to be preserved and developed, leaving the results up to the choice of landowners to make proposals and Martin County's case-by-case decisions on future development proposals. See PPRO, ¶¶52-53. However, the goals of the LPIA are quite clear, and there is no basis to speculate that Martin County will make decisions contrary to those goals--for example, by approving PUDs or agricultural uses on the most environmentally-sensitive part of tract, ignoring the importance of environmentally-sensitive and agricultural lands and the impact of development patterns on them, and ignoring the impact of the pattern of development under the LPIA on rural character. Petitioners also criticize the LPIA for not being clear "whether a subject property must be in single ownership." (PPRO, ¶61.) However, it is not clear why that omission would be pertinent. Undefined Increase in Maximum Density Petitioners contend that, in four ways, the LPIA increases maximum density in the Agricultural category without defining the amount of the increase. Waiver of Density Limits Clearly, the LPIA exempts the PUD option from "the agricultural land use policies in Section 4.4.M.1.a. pertaining to the 20 acre lot size . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(8). Contrary to Petitioners' contention, that does not eliminate density standards. Residential lots must be greater than two acres. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(3). Maintenance of Residential Capacity Petitioners contend the LPIA increases density because its objective is to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses while maintaining residential capacity as it existed on January 1, 2007." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. (Emphasis added.) Petitioners complain that County-wide residential capacity on that date is not identified and that the objective requires residential capacity in Agricultural lands to increase as it decreases elsewhere in the County. This interpretation is unreasonable. The County's interpretation, that residential units lost by preservation are to be maintained by clustering on the remaining Agricultural lands, is more reasonable. Transfer of Wetland Density Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by allowing transfer of wetland density in the Agricultural future land use category. See LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). Under the Plan before the LPIA, up to half of wetland density can be transferred to uplands in a PUD. See CGMP § 9.4A7.b.(8). PUDs were not allowed in Agricultural lands before the LPIA. But Petitioners did not prove that allowing the transfer and clustering of residential units into a PUD on Agricultural lands under the LPIA would change the total number of residential units already allowed in Agricultural lands (at one unit per 20 acres). Alleged Failure to Remove Density from All Non-PUD Land Petitioners contend that the LPIA increases density by not stripping residential units from all so-called non-PUD land. Contrary to this contention, the more reasonable interpretation is that land not set aside for permanent preservation in a proposal made under the LPIA must be part of the proposed PUD. In any event, even if an LPIA proposal could include land that is neither set aside for preservation nor part of the PUD land, no residential units is such land would be transferred to the PUD, and failure to strip such land of its residential units would not affect the total number of units associated with the LPIA proposal. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA allows text amendments to increase density on land set aside for preservation under the LPIA because it specifies that such land must be changed on the FLUM and will not be eligible for "any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." LPIA § 4.4E.7.d.(7). The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. Even if text amendments are not prohibited, they would apply to all land in a particular land use category, not just to land set aside under the LPIA. Subsequent Plan Amendments Not Required for PUD Petitioners contend that the LPIA "is unclear as to whether a PUD can be approved without a subsequent plan amendment specifically authorizing the two-acre lot subdivision site plan." PPRO, ¶80. This contention supposedly arises from the language of LPIA § 4.4.E.7.c.: "The Comprehensive Plan amendment that is part of a joint Plan Amendment and concurrent PUD application submitted under this objective must address the land use designation on the land set aside in perpetuity as contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and/or agricultural land uses in the following manner: . . . ." (Emphasis added in PPRO, ¶82.) The negative implication Petitioners draw from this language is contrary to the intent of the LPIA and is not warranted. It ignores LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7): "The Comprehensive Plan amendment filed concurrently with the PUD application shall allow the site-specific clustering of density in one portion of the total subject site, including the transfer of full density of any wetlands on the site, at a density that shall not exceed one unit per twenty acres for the total site prior to conveyance. . . . The Plan amendment shall further specify that neither the land conveyed nor the land controlled by the PUD agreement shall be eligible for any additional [FLUM] amendment which increases residential density or intensity of use . . . ." While LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(7) discusses land that is conveyed, it is reasonably clear that a Plan amendment addressing the PUD also would be required for lands that are set aside using one of the other mechanisms specified in the LPIA. Public Benefit Criteria Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.b. and f. gives the County "unfettered discretion to reject or approve a PUD 'for any reason.'" PPRO, ¶90. Those sections provide that approval of a PUD will be based on consideration of "significant site-specific public benefits," some of which are listed. While it is true that the LPIA gives the County discretion to grant or approve a PUD based on its consideration of those factors, Petitioners did not prove "unfettered discretion." First, minimum requirements under the LPIA first must be met. Second, the list of public benefits gives some guidance as to the kinds of additional public benefits that will justify approval of a PUD. Petitioners did not prove that a comprehensive plan provision allowing for PUD zoning need be any more specific to be implemented in a consistent manner. Protection of Land Set Aside Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to protect land set aside under the LPIA because it does not identify the land most appropriate for preservation or require that it be set aside. This contention ignores the objective to encourage conveyance of "land listed for public acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of established conservation programs" which "include, but are not be [sic] limited to land designated for public acquisition under" several named public acquisition programs. LPIA § 4.4.E.7. It also ignores the policy: "No development in the PUD shall be allowed on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.d.(4). It also ignores the policy that "PUDs that include land listed for acquisition by state, regional or local agencies as part of an established conservation program shall be subject to . . . additional requirements": including fee simple conveyance of at least half of such land; and no development in the PUD on such land "unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities and the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7.e.(1)-(2). In addition, various means of protecting such lands are several of the listed "additional significant site-specific benefits" of a PUD proposal to be considered in the approval process. See LPIA § 4.4.E.7.f. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to "require set-aside lands to be contiguous to other farmland, open space, or natural lands" and "contiguous, functional, and connected to adjacent and regional systems." PPRO, ¶¶102-98 [sic]. These contentions ignore the objective to "create opportunities for the permanent preservation of contiguous open space, environmentally sensitive land and agricultural land uses. . . ." LPIA § 4.4.E.7. They also ignore that land in public acquisition programs ideally is contiguous to other open space and natural lands. Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶97 [sic] that it is necessary to specify the public acquisition programs for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that the LPIA fails to define the "perpetual easement" mechanism allowed in LPIA Section 4.E.7.a. for setting aside land in lieu of fee simple conveyance. See PPRO, ¶103. This contention ignores the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(5) to use perpetual easements as a means of enforcing the prohibition against increasing residential density or intensity of use by FLUM amendments, as well as the policy in LPIA Section 4.E.7.d.(6) to use perpetual easements "to restrict future uses and ensure the government agencies or other entities holding fee simple title do not sell or develop the property inconsistent with this policy or the approved uses within the PUD Agreement." Petitioners did not prove their contention in PPRO ¶103 that it is necessary to further define "perpetual easement" for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend in PPRO ¶¶105 and 107 that the LPIA fails to define the "agricultural uses" to be preserved in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) and allows the County to "specify allowed uses" without limitation and with "no certainty that farmland will be protected as farmland by easement." (Emphasis in PPRO ¶105.) Petitioners contend that everything allowed in the Agricultural category under the Plan will be allowed. See PPRO ¶107. Contrary to Petitioners' contention, it is reasonably clear that, while the language of LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(3) contains a typographical error, the policy clearly is to maintain existing agricultural uses, not to allow intensification of agricultural use or expansion into "non-farm" uses that might be allowed in the Agricultural category. Alleged Threat to IRL and CERP Lands Petitioners contend that, by making development under its PUD option more marketable, the LPIA will encourage PUDs that do not protect and that fragment IRL and CERP lands. Petitioners did not prove that such a result is likely. Petitioners contend that the adverse impacts on IRL and CERP lands is more than speculation in part because of the wording of the policy in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.c.(2), which is misstated in PPRO ¶114 and actually states: "If the land to be protected and maintained in perpetuity is land that is part of the North Palm Beach, and the Lake Okeechobee portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as well as Northern Everglades and Estuaries Protection Program, the plan amendment must include a future land use amendment to change the Future Land Use Designation to Institutional-Public Conservation." The language used in the policy is poor. But Petitioners' interpretation--that only land set aside for protection that is part of all of the described CERP projects will be protected--is absurd since no such land exists. That interpretation and Petitioners' interpretation that no IRL lands are protected under the LPIA ignore and are contrary to the language and intent of the objective stated in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7. and of the policies stated in Section 4.4.E.7.a., c.(1), and d.(5). The County's interpretation, that CERP and IRL lands are eligible for protection, is more reasonable. Definition of Critical Habitat Petitioners contend that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) does not provide a meaningful or predictable standard because the term "critical to the support of listed plant or animal species" is not better defined. Actually, PUD development is prohibited "on unique, threatened or rare habitat, or other environmentally sensitive lands that are critical to the support of listed plant or animal species." While the policy could have been better defined, Petitioners did not prove that a better definition is necessary for the LPIA to be implemented in a consistent manner. Petitioners contend that, regardless of the "critical habitat" definition, the policy language in LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4) by prohibiting PUD development "on land listed for acquisition . . . unless the land has been previously impacted by agricultural activities " Actually, the policy continues to state that the exception only applies if "the proposed development is determined to be inconsequential to the implementation and success of the conservation program . . . ." Petitioners' interpretation, that the policy allows PUD development on virtually all Agricultural lands, is unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the LPIA. The County's interpretation is more reasonable and is reasonably clear. It allows for distinctions among the various kinds of agricultural activities, which the Plan already recognizes. See, e.g., CGMP § 4.2.A.6.b.(8) ("Many low intensity agricultural uses such as range (pasture) land can be compatible with environmentally significant resource areas.") For these reasons, Petitioners did not prove that LPIA Section 4.4.E.7.e.(2) "guts" Section 4.4.E.7.d.(4), or that the LPIA cannot be implemented in a consistent manner. LPIA and Urban Sprawl In part based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA's objective and policy language, Petitioners contend that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the LPIA no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the LPIA encourages urban sprawl. In part because the interpretations were unreasonable, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. Even if the LPIA results in a proliferation of PUDs with clusters of residences on lots slightly larger than two acres, which is the minimum lot size, it would not equate to urban (or suburban) sprawl. Assuming PUDs based on 500-acre tracts, it would result in a cluster of 25 homes within a 500-acre rural area. The LPIA does not plan for the extension of urban services to those homes and does not provide for or allow any new commercial or industrial development. Both the LPIA and the rest of the CGMP include provisions, most notably those related to the urban service districts, to reasonably ensure that urban sprawl will not result. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the first primary indicator of urban sprawl in Florida Administrative Code Rule5 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("designates for development substantial areas of the jurisdiction for low-intensity, low density or single use development or uses in excess of demonstrated need"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the second primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[p]romotes, allows or designates significant amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development"). The development promoted, allowed, or designated by the LPIA is not "urban" and does not "leap over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." It allowed for development already promoted, allowed, and designated to arrange itself differently in a rural area. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the third primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (designation of urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fourth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (promotes premature conversion of rural land to other uses, thereby failing to adequately protect and conserve natural resources). To the contrary, its primary purpose is to protect and conserve natural resources and rural land. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the fifth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to adequately protect "adjacent agricultural areas" as well as "passive agricultural activities and dormant, unique and prime farmlands and soils"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers either the sixth or seventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) (fails to maximize use of existing and future public facilities and services). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the eighth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[a]llows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase the cost in time, money and energy, of providing and maintaining facilities and services"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the ninth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses"). Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the tenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[d]iscourages or inhibits infill development or redevelopment of existing neighborhoods and communities"). Although LPIA PUDs obviously would not be infill or redevelopment, it was not proven that they will discourage or inhibit infill and redevelopment. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the eleventh primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[f]ails to encourage an attractive and functional mix of uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. To the extent that the LPIA triggers the twelfth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in poor accessibility among linked or related uses"), the Agricultural lands designation already does. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA triggers the thirteenth primary indicator of urban sprawl in Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(g) ("[r]esults in the loss of significant amounts of functional open space"). The LPIA does not exacerbate the two already-existing indicators of urban sprawl, but Petitioners still contend that the indicators are triggered by the LPIA essentially because development will proceed more quickly under the LPIA. This contention was not proven. Even if it were, Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl or that the CGMP, as amended by the LPIA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. LPIA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis because the County explained it as a necessary response to the proliferation of 20-acre ranchette developments whereas only 75 have been built and only 15 have certificates of occupancy. Actually, the ranchette developments were only one reason for the LPIA, and the data and analysis showed 13 approved developments as of mid-September 2007, and three more approvals plus two pending applications for approval a year later. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA implements some but not all of the recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA does not conform to some recommendations in the various reports and studies cited by the County as part of the data and analysis. However, Petitioners base their contentions largely on unreasonable interpretations of the language of the objective and policies of the LPIA. In addition, the data and analysis they point to essentially reflect merely that planners disagree on the best plan for the Agricultural lands. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is not supported by data and analysis essentially because the LPIA is not identical to the Atlantic Ridge project amendment. While all agree that the Atlantic Ridge project is a resounding success story, it is unique. The obvious and understandable inability to instantaneously duplicate Atlantic Ridge to the greatest extent possible in the Agricultural lands should not prevent the County from taking any action in its direction, such as the LPIA. Taken together, the data and analysis are adequate to support the LPIA. LPIA and TCRPC Regional Policy Plan Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP). The TCRPC's SRPP was not introduced in evidence, but the TCRPC's Executive Director testified and sponsored the TCRPC's report on the LPIA and the SUSDA. The TCRPC's findings on consistency with its SRPP were not contradicted. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's Strategic Regional Policy Plan (SRPP) Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2, which are to determine areas that are environmentally significant and to map, acquire, and manage them. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Goal 1.1, which requires sustainable countryside development in urban enclaves, such as towns and villages, with mixed-use and appropriate densities between 4-10 units per acre, on strategically selected locations while preserving contiguous, targeted land identified through SRPP Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. The LPIA does not do this. According to the TCRPC, the LPIA is inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1, which is to increase the clarity of local land use plans so that preferred forms of development can be pre-approved. Instead, the LPIA uses the case-by-case PUD approval process to determine the ultimate development patterns for the Agricultural lands. The inconsistency with SRPP Policy 15.1.3.1 is the only LPIA inconsistency not already equally present in the existing CGMP. The TCRPC's concern as to the other inconsistencies is that the LPIA will make residential development in the Agricultural lands more marketable and increase the rate of residential growth in a manner inconsistent with SRPP Goal 1.1 and Policies 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. Internal Consistency of the LPIA Petitioners contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Sections 1.6 and 1.11.A. for being inconsistent with the TCRPC's SRPP. CGMP Section 1.6 states that "elements of the [CGMP] shall be consistent and coordinated with policies of [various entities, including the TCRPC]. Petitioners did not prove that the County does not interpret that provision to require internal consistency and coordination with the other entities' policies, or that such an interpretation would be incorrect. CGMP Section 1.11.A. refers to amendment procedures. Essentially, it states that plan amendments must be "in compliance." There was no evidence that the County intended it to require strict and absolute consistency with the TCRPC's SRPP, or any evidence to prove that it would be incorrect for the County to interpret it not to. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K., which also refers to amendment procedure. Petitioners did not prove that the LPIA is inconsistent with CGMP Section 1.11.K. for not having concurrently-processed land development regulations (LDRs) since concurrently-processed LDRs are only required "[t]o the extent necessary to implement a proposed amendment," and Petitioners did not prove that concurrently-processed LDRs are necessary. Petitioners also contend that the LPIA is inconsistent with numerous other provisions of the CGMP. These contentions were not proven. Most, if not all, were based on unreasonable interpretations of the LPIA. SUSDA Provisions The SUSDA amends the text of the future land use element, the sanitary sewer services element, and the potable water services element of the Plan. As amended, the Plan would allow owners of real property within the SUSD to apply for connection to regional water and sewer service rather than be limited to using individual potable water wells and individual septic tanks, provided all costs of connection to the public services would be paid by the owner. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.g. expressly states: The County Commission has determined that it is in the best interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Martin County that regional water and sewer services be made available to properties within the [SUSD], in order to: (1) Protect our natural resources . . . from the negative impacts of onsite sewage disposal (septic) systems and private wells to serve individual residential units; (2) Provide fire protection; [and] (3) Provide safe drinking water. The policy of SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.h. requires that the extension of any such services to properties within the SUSD must have Board approval, which cannot occur unless the Board finds that certain enumerated criteria have been met, including: Regional utility services may be provided to properties within the [SUSD] upon the request of the affected property owner, and upon payment of the required costs for connection to the regional system. Such services may only be provided by a regional utility, public or private, within a service area shown on Figure 11-2. Package plants for the provision of utility service are prohibited except under the provisions of the [CGMP]. The regional utility must demonstrate the treatment facility has capacity for the proposed connection and priority has been given to projects within the [PUSD]. Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in the residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]. Property lying outside the Urban Service Districts . . . shall not receive utility service from a regional wastewater system. Extension of utility service outside the Urban Service Districts shall be prohibited. Development within the [SUSD] shall maintain lot sizes that exceed one-half acres. The SUSDA also contains new charts added to both the sanitary sewer services element and the potable water services element that display the numerical capacity of the regional water and sewer systems to handle additional customers upon extension of lines to the SUSD. See SUSDA Tables 10-3 through 10-6 and 11- 12 through 11-15. There was no credible evidence of any likelihood that the adoption of the SUSDA would allow the further extensions of water and sewer lines from the SUSD to properties outside the urban service districts. The testimony offered by Petitioners was speculative at best and depended upon an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting such extension of services. See SUSDA §§ 4.4.G.2.h.(6)-(7) and 4.5.H. Meaning and Predictability of SUSDA Standards Petitioners contend that the SUSDA's standards are not meaningful or predictable because of the undefined term "central water and sewer" in the policy in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a. Petitioners contend that "central water and sewer" can be interpreted to mean something other than a regional utility, and that the SUSDA can be interpreted to allow regional utility, package plant, and other similar types of utility systems serving two or more houses outside the urban services districts. Petitioners' interpretations are unreasonable and contrary to the language and intent of the SUSDA. Petitioners' evidence was speculative and depended on an unproven assumption that the County would violate the explicit provisions of the SUSDA prohibiting package treatment plants in the SUSD. See SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(3) and § 4.5.H. In addition, the evidence was that package treatment plants may no longer be economically feasible. The County's interpretation is more reasonable--"central water and sewer," as used in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., means the provision of regional utility services by Martin County in the SUSD, and no such facilities may be provided outside the urban service districts. SUSDA Data and Analysis Petitioners contend that the data and analysis do not support the SUSDA essentially because they do not establish "any actual health, safety, or welfare problems." PPRO, ¶208. The absence of proof of actual health, safety, or welfare problems is not fatal in view of the rest of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA. Since the creation of the SUSD in 1992, development in the PUSD has resulted in the extension of water and sewer lines up to the border between the PUSD and the SUSD. In effect, the intended SUSD transition area has transitioned. Meanwhile, the regional water and sewer utilities serving the County now have the necessary capacity to serve the PUSD and the SUSD. Improved fire protection in the SUSD is a benefit of regional water service, allowing installation of community fire hydrants. Without it, developers in the SUSD must rely on installed sprinklers and emergency generators and water drawn from nearby lakes or installed water tanks. While regional water service can fail temporarily in major storms, and the data and analysis did not include actual instances of fire damage cause by the lack of regional water service in the SUSD, regional water service generally provides more reliable and less costly fire protection. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit potable water wells, regional water service generally is better, more reliable, and less costly. The data and analysis did include actual instances of home owners having to install expensive water treatment systems due to increasing chloride levels in their potable water wells. Connection to regional water service would eliminate those costs and concerns. While the data and analysis do not establish that developers and property owners in the SUSD have not been able to permit septic tanks systems for onsite sewage treatment (i.e., systems that meet environmental and health standards), such systems can fail if improperly installed, maintained, and repaired. If they fail, nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus can leach into and harm the groundwater and nearby surface waters. The North Fork of the Loxahatchee River, which is nutrient-impaired, probably would benefit from elimination of septic tanks. Regional sewer service generally is better for the environmental and public health. The data and analysis suggest that allowing regional water and sewer service in the SUSD, with the SUSDA's requirement for developers to pay the cost of installation, probably will save the County money in the long run. It will be a significant cost to the County if it has to install water and sewer lines post-development. Petitioners attack the credibility of the data and analysis supporting the SUSDA because regional water and sewer service is optional in the SUSD. But there were data and analysis that, even if regional water and sewer service in the SUSD is preferable, there are valid reasons to make it optional at this time. Alleged Environmental Impact of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part from a proliferation of package treatment plants in the SUSD, which is discouraged in CGMP Section 4.4. See PPRO, ¶¶221, 223. This contention is based on Petitioners' unreasonable interpretations of two sentences of the SUSDA. SUSDA Section 4.5.G. prohibits interim water systems outside the urban service districts and allows them, with conditions, in the PUSD where connection to a regional utility is not feasible. Petitioners interpret these two sentences to mean that interim water systems are allowed, without conditions, in the SUSD. The County's interpretation is more reasonable. Since the SUSDA makes connection to the regional utilities optional, there is no need for interim water systems in the SUSDA, and the SUSDA should not be construed to allow them there. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will have negative environmental impacts in part essentially because increased development results in increased pollution. See PPRO, ¶228. To the extent true, it would be equally or more true of similar development without regional water and sewer services. SUSDA and Urban Sprawl Petitioners contend, in part due to their unreasonable interpretations of the objective in SUSDA Section 4.4.G.2.a., that Martin County's Comprehensive Plan as amended by the SUSDA, no longer discourages urban sprawl and that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. In part due to the unreasonableness of Petitioners' interpretation of the SUSDA, Petitioners' urban sprawl contentions were not proven. It is unlikely that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl. Petitioners also contend that the SUSDA will encourage urban sprawl simply by allowing denser development in the 5,000- 6,000 acres of the SUSDA not yet developed. This contention is contrary to the SUSDA policy: "Extension of utility services shall not be construed to imply support for any increase in residential density of the property inside the [SUSD]." SUSDA § 4.4.G.2.h.(5). Even if the SUSDA increased density in the SUSDA, increase in density itself does not promote urban sprawl. To the contrary, it is possible for increased density to discourage urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that increasing density in the SUSDA itself encourages urban sprawl or that, with the SUSDA, the CGMP will discourage urban sprawl less. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will create pressures to develop areas that border the SUSD, leaping over areas suitable for urban development. See PPRO, ¶¶236-237. This contention actually devalues the very urban service district concept Petitioners seek to defend and can be said about any urban district boundary. Currently, there are many places where the PUSD borders the Agricultural lands. The pressures created by the SUSDA will be no greater than the pressures that have existed in those places all along. Petitioners contend that the SUSDA will increase costs to the County essentially because, notwithstanding SUSDA's requirement that developers pay the cost of connection, development will not pay for itself in the long run (taking into account costs of operations, maintenance, and repair.) To the extent true, it can be said of all development and does not prove that the SUSDA encourages urban sprawl. Petitioners did not prove that the SUSDA triggers any of the indicators of urban sprawl; did not prove that the SUSDA encourages the proliferation of urban sprawl; and did not prove that the CGMP, as amended by the SUSDA, fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Internal Consistency of the SUSDA Petitioners contend that the SUSDA is internally inconsistent with CGMP Section 4.4.G.1.i., which gives priority in the provision and funding of water and sewer services to the PUSD, essentially because the data and analysis ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met through 2025. The lack of data and analysis at present to ensure that water demands in the PUSD can be met beyond 2025 does not prove that priority will not be given to the needs of the PUSD.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the LPIA and the SUSDA are "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background The parties Respondent, Franklin County (County), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter authorizes the County, under certain conditions, to adopt what is known as a small scale development amendment to its comprehensive plan. At issue in this case is a small scale development amendment adopted by the County on October 3, 1996. Petitioner, St. George Plantation Owners Association, Inc. (petitioner), is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the protection and management of the Plantation Area of St. George Island. The island lies just south of Apalachicola, Florida in the Gulf of Mexico. The parties have stipulated that petitioner is an affected person within the meaning of the law and thus it has standing to bring this action. Intervenors, Ben Johnson and Coastal Development Consultants, Inc., are the owners of approximately 58 acres on St. George Island known as the Resort Village Property. The property is adjacent to the St. George Island Airport. A portion of intervenors' property, 9.6 acres, is the subject of the plan amendment being challenged. The nature of the dispute Intervenors' property is subject to a 1977 Development of Regional Impact (DRI) order adopted by the County in 1977. The order has been amended from time to time. Among other things, the order provides conceptual approval for the development of "one or more high quality resort hotels or motels, together with such affiliated uses as may be appropriate or desirable, such as gift and tourist shops, restaurants, recreational activities and similar activities." Intervenors desire to develop the Resort Property Village consistent with the 1977 DRI order. The first part of the project consists of approximately 9.6 acres which they have designated as Phase I. The land is located within the Plantation Area of St. George Island and has a land use designation of residential. In June 1995, intervenors submitted detailed site plans for Phase I to the County. On August 1, 1995, the County conducted a public hearing to review the proposed site plans and specifications for Phase I. It adopted a motion which directed its staff "to review and perfect the plans presented, so that the Board can consider the final approval of the plan." It also directed its staff to provide advice concerning the procedure to be followed. After consulting with the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), which recommended that the comprehensive plan be amended to change the land use to accommodate the commercial uses, the staff recommended that the County adopt a small scale development amendment by changing the designation on its Future Land Use Map (FLUM) for 9.6 acres from residential to commercial. By a 3-2 vote, on October 3, 1996, the County adopted Ordinance No. 96- 22 which changed the designation for the 9.6 acres on the FLUM from residential to commercial. Because the amendment affected ten or fewer acres, the County opted to make the change with a small scale development amendment under Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes. According to the site plan which accompanied a Notification of Proposed Change filed with the County on May 26, 1996, the Phase I development includes four hotels, 10,250 square feet of commercial space, 300 square feet of retail space, a beach club, a 325 seat conference center, various support and recreational facilities, and a wastewater treatment plant. The Phase I site plan, however, does not include the three subsurface absorption beds which are required to service the effluent from the wastewater treatment plant. If the absorption beds were included, they would increase the size of Phase I from 9.6 to approximately 14.6 acres. In a petition challenging the adoption of the small scale amendment, petitioner contends that, if the absorption beds are properly included in the land use amendment, the land use area would exceed ten acres and thus would require a full-scale land use amendment subject to DCA review. In response, the County and intervenors have contended that, under the current plan, there is no need to change the land use where the wastewater treatment facility will be located since such facilities are allowed in any land use category. As such, they contend there is no requirement to include such property in Ordinance 96- 22. The Wastewater Treatment Facility The proposed development will be served by a wastewater treatment facility. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has issued a permit to Resort Village Utility, Inc., a utility certified by the Florida Public Service Commission to serve the entire 58-acre Resort Village property. The permit provides that the plant can accommodate up to, but not exceeding, 90,000 gallons of treated effluent per day. The facility consists of the wastewater treatment plant, lines to the plant from the development which carry the untreated wastewater to the plant, and lines from the plant to three sub-surface absorption beds where the treated effluent is disbursed. The absorption beds required for the Phase I project wastewater treatment facility will not serve any residential customers. Rather, they will only serve Phase I and any other subsequent phases of Resort Village development, which is a commercial development. Construction must begin on the wastewater treatment plant once the flow of waste effluent reaches 7,500 gallons per day, or if the wastewater from restaurants reaches 5,000 gallons per day. The Phase I project is required to use this facility once the rate of flow of waste effluent exceeds 10,000 gallons per day. Until these thresholds are met, the project will rely temporarily on aerobic systems to handle and treat waste effluent. Under the permit issued by the DEP, the wastewater treatment facility required for Phase I consists of both a wastewater treatment plant and three absorption beds. Through expert testimony of a DEP professional engineer, it was established that the absorption beds were integral to the design and successful operation of the facility. The County and intervenors acknowledge this fact. Therefore, the "use" that is the subject of the amendment is the entire wastewater treatment facility, including the absorption beds, and "involves" some 14.6 acres. Since the plan amendment does not involve "10 or fewer acres," as required by statute, the amendment cannot qualify as a small scale development amendment and is thus not in compliance. In making these findings, the undersigned has considered a contention by the County that Policy 2.3 of the comprehensive plan sanctions its action. That policy reads as follows: Public utilities needed to provide essential service to existing and future land uses in Franklin County shall be permitted in all the land use classifications established by this plan. Public utilities includes all utilities (gas, water, sewer, electrical, telephone, etc.) whether publicly or privately owned. At hearing, the County planner construed the term "public utilities" as being "minor (utility) infrastructure," including wastewater treatment plants not exceeding 100,000 gallons per day. Relying on this provision, the County reasons that the proposed facility is "minor" infrastructure, since it will only have 90,000 gallons per day capacity, and thus it can be placed in a residential land use category. They go on to argue that, since no change in land use classification is needed to permit the facility, it is unnecessary to include the facility in the plan amendment. According to the County, however, the plant (but not the beds) was included only because it was easier to draw a map for the entire 9.6 acres rather than excise that portion of the land where the plant will be located. Under the same theory, the County has placed at least two existing wastewater treatment facilities in the residential land use category. Those facilities, however, predate the adoption of the comprehensive plan in April 1991, and both serve residential, as opposed to commercial, developments. Moreover, the County admitted that it lacks any "clear" policy about the meaning of "public utilities," and it has never adopted a land development regulation to implement the interpretation given at hearing. The County's position is contrary to conventional land use planning practices which define "utilities" as infrastructure such as water or electrical lines that transport a service and would, by their very nature, be required to cross different land uses. Conversely, conventional land use planning practices define "facilities" as infrastructure that performs a service, such as power plants or pumping stations. This infrastructure does not cross different land use categories. In this case, the absorption beds perform a service by further processing and treating waste effluent from Phase I. Therefore, conventional land use planning practices would logically call for the plant and related absorption beds to be classified as "public facilities" under Policy 2.2(i) of the County's comprehensive plan. That policy defines the term as including "water and sewer facilities." The classification would also be compatible with the definition of "public facilities" found in DCA Rule 9J-5.003(105), Florida Administrative Code. Finally, the County and intervenors point out that the facility may not be constructed for many years, depending on the rate and amount of development that occurs in Phase I. Thus, they contend that there is no immediate requirement for the County to change the future land use designation of the property where the absorption beds will be located. But given the fact that the beds and plant are a single, interrelated system, the County cannot choose to change the land use designation for a portion of the facility while ignoring the remainder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a Final Order determining Ordinance No. 96-22 adopted by Franklin County on October 3, 1996, as not in compliance for failing to meet the criteria of Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Room 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Richard W. Moore, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1759 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1759 Alfred O. Shuler, Esquire Post Office Drawer 850 Apalachicola, Florida 32320-850 L. Lee Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1169 Stephanie Gehres Kruer, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Gregory C. Smith, Esquire Office of the Governor The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue The issues are whether the City of Jacksonville's (City's) Ordinance No. 2008-628-E adopted on September 9, 2008, which remediates Ordinance No. 2007-383-E, is in compliance, and whether Chapter 2009-96, Laws of Florida, renders this proceeding moot, as alleged by Petitioner, Dunn Creek, LLC (Dunn or Petitioner).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties Petitioner is the owner of a vacant 89.52-acre parcel of property in Council District 11, which is located in the northern reaches of the City. More specifically, the property lies around four or five miles east of the airport and Interstate 95, just south of Starratt Road between Dunn Creek Road and Saddlewood Parkway, and within a "couple of miles of Main Street," a major north-south State roadway. Dunn submitted oral and written comments to the City during the plan amendment process. As such, it is an affected person and has standing to participate in this proceeding. The City is a local government that is subject to the requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. It adopted the amendments being challenged by Dunn. Except for the challenged plan amendment, the City's current Plan is in compliance. Intervenor Britt owns property and resides within the City. The parties have stipulated to the facts necessary to establish that she is an affected person and therefore has standing to participate in this matter. The Department is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility for reviewing plan amendments of local governments, including the City. Background On May 14, 2007, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2007- 383-E, which amended the FLUM by changing the land use category on Dunn's property from LDR to RPI, which would allow an increase in the density and intensity of use on the property. (The LDR land use allows up to seven dwelling units per acre, while RPI is a mixed-use category that allows up to twenty dwelling units per acre if built to the maximum development potential.) On July 9, 2007, the Department issued its Notice and Statement of Intent finding that the Ordinance was not in compliance on the ground the map change was not supported by adequate data and analysis to demonstrate that the City would achieve and maintain the adopted LOS standards for the roadways within its jurisdiction. The Department further determined that the traffic study submitted by the City was not based on the maximum development allowed under the RPI category. On August 1, 2007, the Department initiated this case by filing a Petition, which tracked the objections described in its Notice and Statement of Intent. The City, Dunn, Department, and Britt later entered into settlement discussions. As part of the settlement discussions, Dunn submitted a revised traffic study and coordinated with other applicants for map changes to perform cumulative traffic impact studies. The parties eventually entered into a proposed settlement agreement which would limit development of the property to 672 condominiums/townhomes and 128,000 square feet of non-residential uses through an asterisk to the Plan. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 25. Also, the proposed settlement agreement noted that the data and analysis confirmed that certain future road improvements in the Capital Improvement Element (CIE) of the Plan would offset the traffic impacts of the new RPI land use. These were improvements to the East-West Connector (U.S. Highway 17 to New Berlin Road) and Starratt Road. Id. Finally, Dunn agreed to pay $4.3 million in "fair share money" to the City to offset the proportionate share of the development's traffic impacts. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6. The proportionate share agreement was intended to match the trip count anticipated from the RPI development. On September 3, 2008, the proposed settlement agreement and remedial amendment were presented to the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee (Committee) for approval as Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 2008-628, respectively.3 At that meeting, the Committee heard comments from several members of the public who opposed the amendment, a Dunn attorney, and the City's Director of Planning and Development, William B. Killingsworth. The City Council member who represents District 11 and is a member of the Committee also spoke in opposition to the proposal. Based primarily upon data in a new traffic study prepared on August 28, 2008, by a member of Mr. Killingsworth's staff, and the opposition of the District 11 Council member, the Committee voted unanimously to revise the proposed settlement agreement and remedial amendment by changing the land use designation on the property back to LDR, its original classification. The revised settlement agreement was approved by Ordinance No. 2008- 627-E, while the remedial amendment changing the land use was approved by Ordinance No. 2008-628-E. The two Ordinances were then forwarded to the full City Council, which approved them on September 9, 2008. The revised settlement agreement was later executed by the City, Department, and Britt, but not by Dunn, and is known as the Sixteenth Partial Stipulated Settlement Agreement. See Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The essence of the revised agreement was that by changing the land use back to its original designation, the potential adverse impacts to transportation facilities would be resolved. Id. The remedial amendment package was transmitted by the City to the Department for its review. On December 18, 2008, the Department issued a Cumulative Notice of Intent to Find Ordinance Nos. 2007-383-E and 2008-628-E in compliance. On January 8, 2009, Dunn filed a Motion to Amend Petition to Intervene pursuant to Section 163.3184(16)(f)1., Florida Statutes. Because Dunn objected to the revised settlement agreement and challenged the remedial amendment, the parties were realigned, as reflected in the style of this case. On June 1, 2009, Senate Bill 360, engrossed as Chapter 2009-96, Laws of Florida, became effective. That legislation amends Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, in several respects. Among other things, it designates the City as a Transportation Concurrency Exception Area (TCEA).4 See § 163.3180(5), Fla. Stat. The new law also provides that plan amendments for land uses of a local government with a TCEA are deemed to meet the LOS standards for transportation. See § 163.3177(3)(f), Fla. Stat. Therefore, after a TCEA becomes effective, the Department no longer has the authority to review FLUM amendments in the TCEA for compliance with state-mandated transportation concurrency requirements. However, Senate Bill 360 contains a savings clause, which provides that "this subsection does not affect any contract or agreement entered into or development order rendered before the creation of the [TCEA] except as provided in s. 380.06(29)(e)." See § 163.3180(5)(f), Fla. Stat. The City, Department, and Britt contend that this provision "saves" the Sixteenth Partial Stipulated Settlement Agreement executed by them in November 2008, and that the Department still retains jurisdiction to consider the remedial amendment. Conversely, Dunn contends that the savings clause does not apply to the revised agreement, that the Department no longer has jurisdiction to review the challenged amendment, that the remedial amendment was not authorized, and that because the remedial amendment never became effective, the Department's Petition should be dismissed as moot. Objections to the Remedial Amendment Besides the contention that the proceeding is moot, Dunn raises three issues in its challenge to the amendment. First, it contends that the amendment is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis related to traffic impacts and therefore is not in compliance. Second, Dunn contends that the amendment does not address the concerns raised in the Department's original Notice and Statement of Intent regarding the City's achieving and maintaining the adopted LOS of affected roadways. See § 163.3184(16)(f)2., Fla. Stat. Third, Dunn contends that due to procedural errors in the amendment adoption process, it was unduly prejudiced. Data and analysis Because almost all of the unresolved FLUM amendments in this case involved "traffic issues," on September 4, 2007, a Department employee, Melissa Hall, sent an email to counsel for a number of applicants, including Dunn, describing "what the department would be looking for in terms of traffic analysis." See Petitioner's Exhibit 12, p. 1. The email required those applicants to submit revised traffic studies. Id. Among other things, the applicants were advised that the revised traffic impact analysis for each amendment had to use "a professionally acceptable traffic impact methodology." Id. Dunn followed the requirements of the email in preparing its revised traffic study. At the time Ordinance No. 2007-383-E was adopted, based on total background traffic, which includes existing traffic plus reserve trips for approved but not-yet-built developments, eight road segments in the study area already failed to meet LOS standards. (LOS E is the adopted passing standard on those roadways.) The study area includes affected roadways within a two-mile radius of the boundaries of the proposed project site where project traffic consumes more than one percent of the service volume. If the Dunn project is built, six segments impacted by the development will continue to fail. According to the City's expert, as a general rule, an applicant for a land use amendment is not required to bring a failing segment back up to its adopted LOS. Rather, it is only required to pay its proportionate share of the improvements for bringing it up to compliance. The unique aspect of this case is that the City has simply reclassified the property back to what it was, LDR, when Ordinance No. 2007-383-E was adopted. At that time, the Plan was in compliance. In response to Dunn's contention that Ordinance No. 2008-628-E is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis, the City, joined by the Department and Britt, first contends that, given the unique circumstances presented here, no data and analysis were required. Alternatively, it contends that there are sufficient relevant and appropriate data and analysis to support maintaining the LDR land use designation. The data and analysis include the traffic study prepared by Dunn's consultant in October 2007, the additional traffic analysis performed by the City staff just before the Committee meeting, and the testimony provided at the Committee meeting on September 3, 2008. At hearing, the City first pointed out that the RPI designation was never determined to be in compliance, Ordinance No. 2007-383-E never became effective, and the property has remained LDR throughout this proceeding. See § 163.3189(2)(a), Fla. Stat. ("[p]lan amendments shall not become effective until the [Department] issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance in accordance with s. 163.3184(9), or until the Administration Commission issues a final order determining the adopted amendment to be in compliance"). Therefore, the City takes the position that Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E did not need to be supported by data and analysis because the LDR category was the land use designation on the property at the time of the adoption of Ordinance No. 2008-628-E. In the same vein, it argues that the remedial amendment is the equivalent of a repeal of the prior ordinance (2007-383-E), which would not require any data and analysis support. While at first blush these arguments appear to be plausible, the City could not cite any provision in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 9J-55 that relieves a local government from the requirement that a plan amendment be supported by data and analysis. The City also argues that even if Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E is deemed to be a change in the land use (from LDR to LDR), the net impact of the change would be zero. This argument is based on the accepted testimony of Mr. Killingsworth, who stated that the City, Department, and Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) agreed upon a methodology which entitled the City to give "credit" for uses permitted under the existing land use category.6 Under that methodology, the City subtracts the number of trips that the existing land use (LDR) generates from the additional trips generated by the proposed land use (LDR). Therefore, the net transportation impact of a change from LDR to LDR, in effect, would be zero. The methodology is described in Petitioner's Exhibit 15, a memorandum authored by Mr. Killingsworth and sent on October 4, 2007, to Dunn and other parties seeking map changes in this case. The memorandum stated that the methodology described therein was "developed in coordination [with] FDOT District 2" and "is the suggested methodology for use in determining traffic impacts of proposed land uses for the City." See Petitioner's Exhibit 15, p. 1. Mr. Killingsworth could not cite any provision in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 9J-5 allowing for such a credit for traffic generated by a prior permitted land use in the data and analysis required for a FLUM amendment. At the same time, however, Petitioner could not cite any rule or statute that prohibits the Department from allowing this type of methodology when deemed to be appropriate. Even though it differed from the methodology described in Ms. Hall's earlier email by allowing credit for the existing land use, it was nonetheless "a professionally acceptable traffic impact methodology" approved by the Department and FDOT and could be used as data and analysis to support a change back to the property's original land use classification. Therefore, it constitutes relevant and appropriate data and analysis to demonstrate that the net traffic impact of the change in land use from LDR to LDR is zero. The City further argues that if it was required to provide other data and analysis, the traffic impacts of the new ordinance are offset by the two roadway improvements negotiated with the Department in the proposed settlement agreement for Ordinance No. 2008-627. See Finding 7, supra. Based upon the City staff's analysis, which is found in City Exhibit 3, the LDR land use generates less trips than the RPI land use. (This study was prepared a few days before the Committee meeting in response to an inquiry from a Committee member.) More specifically, page 3 of that exhibit reflects that there are 169 less afternoon peak hour trips for LDR than RPI with the development cap of 672 dwelling units and 128,000 square feet of non-residential uses. It is fair to infer, then, that if the proposed mitigation in the original settlement agreement offsets the impacts of the more intense RPI land use, the mitigation also offsets the impacts of the less intense LDR land use. City Exhibit 3 is a comparative calculation of the difference in vehicle trips generated by development of the property under the LDR category approved by Ordinance No. 2008- 628-E and the development of the property under the RPI category approved by Ordinance No. 2007-383-E. Dunn points out, however, that the exhibit does not show how the trips generated are distributed on affected roadways or how those trips, as they may be distributed, affect LOS of any roadways. Despite the fact that the data in Exhibit 3 are limited to trip generation data, and establish no facts relating to the LOS of affected roadways, they support a finding that more trips will be generated under the RPI designation than the existing LDR designation. Also, they provide further support for a finding that if the proposed road improvements offset the impacts of the RPI use, the mitigation will offset the impacts, if any, of the original LDR use. For data and analysis relating to the LOS of affected roadways, the City, joined by the Department and Britt, rely upon a traffic study performed by Dunn's traffic consultant, King Engineering Associates, Inc. (King). That firm prepared a transportation analysis dated November 19, 2007, for the purpose of supporting a mixed-use development on the property under the RPI category. See Petitioner's Exhibit 8. This study, however, does not apply to development of the property under the LDR category because it was based upon a mixed-use project which would allow for credit based upon the internal capture of some trips. (In other words, a portion of the new trips will be internal to the site, that is, trips between the residential and commercial land uses on the property.) Because of this, any reference to the King study and proposed mitigation therein was deleted from the revised settlement agreement. In this respect, the study does not support the amendment. The King study addresses impacted roadway segments, existing and background traffic, proposed traffic generated by the development, and LOS for the impacted roadways, as suggested by Ms. Hall in her email. Dunn's traffic engineer established that in the impacted study area, six out of eight roadway links will continue to fall below adopted LOS standards based upon existing traffic and that generated by the RPI development (segments 174, 372, 373, 374, 377, and 543). See Table 4, Petitioner's Exhibit 8. The study also identifies proposed roadway improvements in the vicinity of the project site that are intended to help cure or mitigate the failing standards. See Petitioner's Exhibit 8, p. 12. These improvements are listed in the CIE and will cost around $85 million. A "fair share" agreement has also been executed by the City and Dunn, which requires Dunn to pay more than $4.3 million to offset impacts of the RPI development. Those monies would be applied to improvements in Sector 6.1 (the North Planning District), which includes Starratt Road and the East-West Connector. The agreement notes that this contribution would offset the proportionate share of traffic impacts of the proposed RPI development. Notably, the City has already funded both the widening of Starratt Road and the improvements to the East-West Connector, U.S. Highway 17 to Berlin Road, through the Better Jacksonville Plan. Therefore, even if the Dunn fair share agreement is not implemented, the two improvements will still be made. According to Dunn's engineer, the completion of the four projects listed on page 12 of his traffic study, which are labeled as "mitigation," will not restore or cure any of the LOS failures that now exist on the six impacted segments in Table 4 of the study. However, two of the failing segments (373 and 543) may be "helped" by the projects listed on that page. Dunn's engineer also analyzed City Exhibit 3 and concluded that if the Dunn property is developed as LDR, rather than RPI, there would be potentially one less roadway segment (374) impacted by development, while five other segments would continue to fail. When the proposed mitigation in the King study is factored in, he opined that the East-West Connector may help two other failing segments. He further opined that if LDR development on the property occurs, probably three of the six impacted segments will continue to fail adopted LOS standards. Even so, the improvements identified in the CIE, including those already funded by the Better Jacksonville Plan, should offset the proportionate share of traffic impacts associated with any future LDR development.7 The foregoing data and analysis establish that the LDR land use category generates less traffic impacts than the originally-proposed RPI use; that a change from LDR to LDR should have zero effect in terms of traffic impacts; that even if there are impacts caused by a change back to LDR, the proposed mitigation in the CIE will offset the proportionate share of the impacts associated with any LDR use; that while it differed from other studies, a professionally acceptable traffic impact analysis was used by the City to support the remedial amendment; and that the proposed road improvements are fully funded without having to implement the fair share agreement. Finally, in adopting the amendment, the City has reacted to the data and analysis in an appropriate manner. Does the Remedial Amendment Resolve All Issues? Dunn also asserts that the amendment does not resolve the issues raised by the Department in its Notice and Statement of Intent dated July 9, 2007. Under Section 163.3184(16)(f)2., Florida Statutes, an affected party may assert that a compliance agreement does not resolve all issues raised by the Department in its original notice of intent. The statute allows an affected party to then address those unresolved issues in the realigned proceeding. In this case, Petitioner asserts that the Department's original objection that the change in land use would result in a lowering of the LOS in the study area was not addressed by the remedial amendment. In its Notice and Statement of Intent to find the amendment not in compliance, the Department cited the following rules and statutes as being contravened: Sections 163.3164(32) and 163.3177(3)(b),(6)(a), (8), and (10), Florida Statutes, and Rules 9J-5.005(2)(a) and (c), 9J-5.006(2)(a), (3)(b)1. and 3., 9J-5.016(4)(a)1. and 2., and 9J-5.019(3)(a) through (h) and (4)(b)2. Although these sources of authority were cited in a single generic notice of intent as a basis for objecting to all seventeen map changes, it is assumed that they have equal application to this proceeding. The cited statutes relate to funding of transportation projects and concurrency issues, while the rules relate to data and analysis requirements, concurrency issues, the capital improvement element, and required transportation analyses, all subjects addressed by Dunn at the final hearing. Assuming arguendo that the remedial amendment does not address all of the issues raised in the original notice of intent, Dunn was given the opportunity to fully litigate those matters in the realigned proceeding. Procedural Irregularities Rule 9J-5.004 requires that the City "adopt procedures to provide for and encourage public participation in the planning process." See also § 163.3181(1), Fla. Stat. ("it is the intent of the Legislature that the public participate in the comprehensive planning process to the fullest extent possible"). Dunn does not contend that the City failed to adopt the required procedures. Rather, it contends that the City did not follow those procedures during the adoption of the remedial amendment. More specifically, prior to the Committee meeting, Dunn says it spent "hundreds of thousands of dollars on top of the millions that [it] had spent previously, working for fourteen months in conjunction with the City and [Department]" so that the parties could resolve the Department's objections. Dunn argues that it was unduly prejudiced by the last-minute revisions made by the Committee and City Council, and that it did not have an adequate opportunity to respond. Dunn points out that a City Planning Commission meeting was conducted before the Committee meeting, and that body unanimously recommended that Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 628 be approved. It further points out that when the Committee met on September 3, 2008, the proposed revisions to the settlement agreement, the accompanying remedial amendment, and the new traffic data were not discussed until after the public comment portion of the meeting was closed. (The transcript of that meeting reflects, however, that after the new revisions and traffic study were raised, Dunn's counsel was briefly questioned about Dunn's traffic study and the density/intensity of the project. Also, according to Mr. Coe, a copy of the City's newly-prepared traffic study was given to a Dunn representative just before the Committee meeting.) For both public meetings, the City's published notices indicated that the purpose of the meetings was to consider the proposed revised settlement agreement and remedial amendment allowing a cap on the development of the RPI property through the use of an asterisk, as reflected in Ordinance Nos. 2008-627 and 2008-628. See Petitioner's Exhibits 16 and 17. Dunn contends that it had insufficient time between the Committee meeting on September 3, 2008, and the final City Council meeting on September 9, 2008, in which to review and evaluate the new traffic information and respond to the comments of the Committee member who supported the revisions. It also points out that, like other members of the public, Dunn's attorney was only given three minutes to present comments in opposition to the revised agreement at the City Council meeting on September 9, 2009. Notwithstanding any procedural errors that may have occurred during the City's adoption process, Dunn received notice and attended both the Committee and City Council meetings, it presented written and oral objections to the revised plan amendment prior to and at the City Council meeting on September 9, 2008, and it was given the opportunity to file a petition to challenge the City's decision and present evidence on the revisions at the hearing in this case. Savings Clause in Senate Bill 360 In support of its position that the matter is now moot, and that the savings clause in Senate Bill 360 does not "save" the revised settlement agreement executed by the City, Department, and Britt, on November 10, 2008, Dunn submitted extrinsic evidence to show the Legislature's intent in crafting a savings clause, which include four separate analyses by the Legislative staff (Appendices A-D); an article authored by the Bill's Senate sponsor (Senator Bennett) and published in the St. Petersburg Times on May 23, 2009 (Appendix E); a similar article authored by the same Senator and published in the Sarasota Harold-Tribune on June 11, 2009 (Appendix F); a seven-page letter from Secretary Pelham to Senator Bennett and Representative Murzin dated July 23, 2009, concerning the new law and a two and one-half page summary of the bill prepared by the Department (Appendix G); a power point presentation for the Senate Community Affairs Committee on October 6, 2009 (Appendix H); and an article published in the October 2009 edition of The Florida Bar Journal (Appendix I). The Florida Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact contained in Appendix A was prepared on February 17, 2009, and does not reference the relevant savings clause. A second Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact contained in Appendix B and prepared on March 19, 2009, merely acknowledges that the legislation includes a savings clause but provides no further explication. See App. B, p. 9. Appendix C is the Florida House of Representatives 2009 Session Summary prepared in May 2009, while Appendix D is a Summary of Passed Legislation prepared by the House of Representatives Economic Development and Community Affairs Policy Council on an undisclosed date. Neither document addresses the issue of what types of agreements were intended to be saved. Appendices E through I are guest newspaper columns, correspondence, a power point presentation, and an article in a professional journal. None are authoritative sources of legislative intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2008-628-E, which remediates Ordinance No. 2007- 383-E, is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether plan amendments 00-1, 97-4, and 01-7 adopted by Ordinance No. 598 on September 25, 2001, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this land use dispute, Petitioners, Sally O'Connell (O'Connell), Donna Melzer (Melzer), and Martin County Conservation Alliance, Inc. (MCCA), contend that three amendments (Amendments 00-01, 01-7, and 97-4) to the Martin County Comprehensive Plan (Plan) adopted by Respondent, Martin County (County), are not in compliance. Amendment 00-01 makes certain textual changes to the Economic Element and Future Land Use Element (FLUE) of the Plan. Amendments 01-7 (also known as the Blydenstein amendment) and 97-4 (also known as the Seven J amendment) amend the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) by changing the land use designation on property owned by Intervenor, Dick Blydenstein (Blydenstein), and Seven J's Investments, Inc., from Mobile Home Residential and Medium Density Residential, respectively, to General Commercial. The parties agree that the validity of Amendments 01-7 and 97-4 is contingent on whether Amendment 00-01 is in compliance. On September 25, 2001, the County approved Ordinance No. 598, which adopted the foregoing amendments and three other FLUM amendments not relevant to this dispute. On November 16, 2001, Respondent, Department of Community Affairs (Department), the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive land use plans and amendments, issued its Notice of Intent to find the amendments in compliance. In addition, an external review of the amendments was conducted by the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, the Department of State, and the Department of Environmental Protection. Except for minor objections by DOT, which were satisfactorily resolved, no objections were filed by any reviewing agency. On December 7, 2001, as later amended on December 20, 2001, Petitioners filed their Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the plan amendments. As reflected in their unilateral Pre-Hearing Statement, Petitioners contend that: The data and analysis for the amendments was not available to the public throughout the review and adoption process. The conclusions about supply and demand for commercial land uses that underlie the adoption of the amendments to the Economic and Future Land Use Elements, and the "Blydenstein" and "7J" [FLUM] Amendments are not supported by the best available and professionally acceptable data and analysis. Instead of a deficit of, and need for, land available for commercial uses, there is a surplus of land available for such uses. The "Blydenstein" and "7J" [FLUM] Amendments are not supported by data and analysis concerning the availability of infrastructure, the character of the land and the need for redevelopment. The approval of these FLUM amendments is inconsistent with several provisions of Ch. 163, Fla. Stat., Rule 9J-5, F.A.C., and the Martin County Comprehensive Plan. These allegations may be grouped into three broad categories: that the data and analysis was not available for public inspection throughout the adoption process; (2) that the plan amendments are not based on the best available, professionally acceptable data and analysis; and (3) that the Blydenstein and Seven J amendments are not supported by data and analysis as they relate to infrastructure, character of land, and need for redevelopment and thus are inconsistent with relevant statutes, Department rules, and Comprehensive Plan provisions. Although Petitioners have not addressed the first allegation in their Proposed Recommended Order, and have apparently abandoned that issue, in an abundance of caution, a brief discussion of that matter is presented below. The parties The Department is the state land planning agency responsible for reviewing and approving comprehensive plan amendments by local governments. The County is a political subdivision of the State and is the local government which enacted the three plan amendments under review. The overall size of the County is approximately 538 square miles, with agricultural uses on 72 percent of the land, residential uses on 16 percent of the land, public conservation uses on 6.5 percent of the land, and other uses (such as commercial, industrial, and institutional) on the remaining 5.5 percent of the land. The current population is around 125,300 residents. Blydenstein is the owner of the property that is the subject of Amendment 01-7. He submitted oral and written comments concerning Amendment 01-7 to the County during its adoption. Melzer is a former County Commissioner who resides and owns property within the County. She is also the chairperson and member of the board of directors for MCCA. Melzer presented comments in opposition to all three amendments during the time period beginning with the transmittal hearing for the plan amendments and ending with the adoption of those amendments. O'Connell has resided and owned property in the County since 1984. She presented comments to the County in opposition to Amendments 00-01 and 97-4 (but not to Amendment 01-07) during the time period beginning with the transmittal hearing for the plan amendments and ending with the adoption of those amendments. MCCA is a not-for-profit corporation first organized in 1965 and later incorporated in 1997 to advocate and promote the protection of the natural environment and quality of life in the County. The specific purpose of the corporation is to "conserve the natural resources of Martin County, to protect the native flora and fauna of Martin County, to maintain and improve the quality of life for all of the residents of Martin County, and to work to these ends." The corporation holds monthly meetings and annual forums to educate its members and others about issues related to the County's growth management. In prior years, it has actively participated in the development of the County's Comprehensive Plan and actively advocated for a public land acquisition program in the County. Presently, there are 104 individual members (of whom 99 reside in the County), 9 delegates at large, and 20 corporate and non-profit corporate members. The latter group includes such organizations as 1000 Friends of Florida, the Marine Resources Council, and the Citizens Stormwater Protection Group, who also have individual members residing within the County. The parties have stipulated that MCCA made comments to the County in opposition to the three amendments and that a substantial number of MCCA members own businesses within the County. The record also shows that MCCA's Board of Directors passed an appropriate resolution authorizing MCCA to file this action. Intervenor, the Economic Council of Martin County (ECMC), is a non-profit corporation whose mission is to dedicated to building a quality community which provides a healthy economy and protects the quality of life and to encourage the planned growth of the County. Like the MCCA, the ECMA has actively participated in the development of the Comprehensive Plan. Its members are individuals and businesses who reside, own property, and operate businesses within the County. The ECMC made comments to the County in support of the three amendments during the adoption of those amendments. The Amendments Amendment 00-01 represents a policy change by the County and amends the text of the Economic Element and FLUE to change the methodology for determining the need for commercial land within the County. Prior to the amendment, the County used a supply-demand equation based upon an "acreage per population" methodology to determine the amount of commercial land use necessary to serve the County. Under the old methodology, relevant portions of the FLUE, in conjunction with various provisions in the Economic Element, were used to establish a supply-demand equation that would determine whether the projected need for commercial lands by a future population of the County could be met by the current amount of designated lands. If the result of the equation was a surplus of commercial lands, that factor alone would require the denial of any request to redesignate land for commercial use, regardless of any other factor or circumstance. According to the repealed text of the Plan, this methodology produced a 1,131-acre surplus of commercial lands for the year 2010. The County proposes to use a more flexible policy and guideline type of review to make this need determination. Rather than projecting future demand for commercial land based solely on a numerical calculation, the County will make that determination based on a number of factors which must be weighed together, such as suitability, location, compatibility, community desire, and numerical need. It also proposes to change the manner in which numerical need is determined. Under the new methodology, the County will now use jobs and the amount of land needed to support those jobs. Put another way, commercial demand will be based on the projected number of jobs in the future. Using the new methodology, and after adding a 25 percent market factor, the County projects that in the year 2015 there will be a commercial land deficit of 112 acres. To accomplish this change in policy, the amendment alters the text of the Economic Element and FLUE by moving some language from the goals, objectives, or policies sections of the elements to preliminary sections that contained summaries of the data and analysis relied upon for each element. It also eliminates certain language from the goals, objectives, and policies of the elements, or from the preceding sections containing summaries of data and analysis, where such language was redundant and already appeared elsewhere in the Plan. In contrast to the former provision, the new amendment makes a finding that "the raw data appears to show that there is a significant deficit of commercial land necessary to accommodate economic needs if Martin County's ten year trend toward retail/service jobs continues." Amendment 01-07 pertains to a 27.8-acre triangular- shaped tract of land located less than a mile south of the center of the urban area of Indiantown, a small community in the southwestern part of the County. The property, which lies within the County's Primary Urban Service District, is bounded on the north by State Road 76, a major arterial roadway which connects Indiantown with Stuart, on the west by State Road 710, another major arterial roadway which connects Indiantown with Okeechobee and Palm Beach Counties, and on the east by Southwest Indiantown Avenue, which connects State Roads 76 and 710. The site is surrounded by vacant property, including Agriculture-designated land on three sides, and Estate Density Residential on the other. Immediately north of State Road 76 lies the C-44 Canal, a major waterway that connects Lake Okechobeee with the South Fork of the St. Lucie River and ultimately the Atlantic Ocean. A two-lane bridge (with no pedestrian walkway) provides automobile access from Indiantown to the Blydenstein property. The amendment changes the land use designation on the property from Mobile Home Residential (8 dwelling units per acre) to General Commercial. Even though the property is designated for use as a mobile home park, the property has been vacant and undeveloped for more than 20 years and is used principally for cattle grazing. The Seven J property consists of 2.99 acres located just west of Jensen Beach in the northern part of the County at the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and Westmoreland Boulevard, both major arterial roadways. The property is adjacent to a partially built Development of Regional Impact (DRI) known as the West Jensen DRI and is virtually surrounded by other commercial uses. The amendment changes the land use designation on the property from Medium Density Residential (8 dwelling units per acre) to General Commercial. Presently, a nursery, older residential homes, rental property, and wetlands are found on the property; the nearby property is primarily made up of both developed and undeveloped commercial land. Availability of Data and Analysis Rule 9J-5.005(1), Florida Administrative Code, requires in part that "[a]ll background data, studies, surveys, analyses, and inventory maps not adopted as part of the comprehensive plan shall be available for public inspection while the comprehensive plan is being considered for adoption and while it is in effect." Relying upon this provision, Petitioners have contended in their Unilateral Prehearing Stipulation that the County failed to make such data and analysis "available to the public throughout the review and adoption process." At least one general source of data that was used by County experts was not physically present in the County offices for inspection by the public during the adoption process. That derivative data source was entitled "CEDDS 2000: the Complete Economic and Demographic Data Source" and was prepared by Woods and Poole Economics, a Washington, D.C. consulting firm. The data source was used by one of the County's experts (Dr. Nelson) "to generate [the] demand numbers" in his technical report. In order to inspect and review this data, Petitioners, like the County or any other interested person, would have had to purchase a copy from the authors. However, all of the data and analyses accumulated or generated by the County staff were available for public inspection during the time between the transmittal and adoption of the amendments under review. Further, Petitioners did not show how they were prejudiced by the failure of the County to maintain the Woods and Poole data in their offices. The Department does not construe the foregoing rule as narrowly as Petitioners, that is, that every piece of data relied upon by a local government must be physically present in the jurisdiction of the local government. Indeed, the Department has never found a plan amendment out of compliance solely on the basis that data was not physically located at a local government's offices. Rather, it construes the rule more broadly and considers the rule to have been satisfied so long as data and analyses are "available for public inspection," even if this means that derivative source data such as the Woods and Poole report must be purchased from out- of-state sources. Were the plan amendments based on the best available, professionally acceptable data and analysis? Petitioners contend that the plan amendments "are not supported by the best available and professionally acceptable data and analysis." As to this contention, Rule 9J-5.005(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, sets forth a general directive that all plan provisions "be based upon relevant and appropriate data and analyses applicable to each element." In addition, the same rule requires that the data must be "collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner." Petitioners contend that the County's collection of data to support the amendments, and its analysis of that data, was not professionally acceptable, as required by the rule. More specifically, Petitioners contend that the County undercounted the commercial land inventory used in projecting future need by omitting between 80 and 100 acres of undeveloped commercial land from the West Jensen DRI, by failing to count commercial development allowed in industrial- designated lands, and by failing to include 30 acres of land at the Witham Field airport which remains available for commercial development. They also contend that the County inadvertently failed to include more than 60 acres that were placed in the Commercial category by amendments to the FLUM in 1995 and 1996 and which remain undeveloped and available for new commercial development. In support of the amendments, the County submitted to the Department more than 1,000 pages of supporting materials and maps, including 384 pages related to the FLUM amendments, 642 pages of revised supporting data for the text amendments, and 89 pages of public comments. In choosing the sources of data to support the plan, the County used generally accepted, nationally available data as the basis for its review and revision of the Plan. After reviewing the foregoing material, the Department found such data and analysis to be relevant and appropriate. The County also generated extensive data from locally available information that is unique to the County, such as an inventory of the lands within the County that are designated for Commercial uses on the FLUM, but do not yet have any developed commercial uses on them. As to one of Petitioners' contentions, the County agrees that its staff inadvertently omitted 60.4 acres of commercial property which was changed to that designation by certain 1995-96 FLUM amendments. However, the greater weight of evidence shows that this omission was not significant in terms of the overall collection of data, and it did not render the gathering of the other data as professionally unacceptable. Petitioners go on to contend that the analysis of the data (in determining the supply inventory) was flawed for a number of reasons. First, they argue that the undeveloped portions (around 70 acres or so) of the West Jensen DRI that are commercially-designated land should have been included in the commercial land inventory. The West Jensen DRI is an approximately 180-acre residential/commercial development with a large commercial component. Even though specific site plans have not been issued for some of the undeveloped property, the County excluded all of the undeveloped acreage because the property is dedicated under a master plan of development, and therefore it would be inappropriate to include it as vacant inventory. On this issue, the more persuasive evidence shows that the treatment of undeveloped land in a DRI (subject to a master plan of development) is a "close call" in the words of witness van Vonno, and that it is just as professionally acceptable to exclude this type of undeveloped land from vacant commercial inventory as it is to include it. Therefore, by excluding the West Jensen DRI land from its inventory count, the County's analysis of the data was not flawed, as alleged by Petitioners. The Plan itself does not allow commercial uses within the Industrial land category. However, the County's Land Development Regulations (LDRs) permit certain commercial uses on Industrial lands when done pursuant to specific overlay zoning. While the County (at the urging of the Department) intends to review (and perhaps repeal) these regulations in 2003, and possibly create a new mixed-use category, there are now instances where commercial uses are located on Industrial lands by virtue of the LDRs. Because of this anomaly, Petitioners contend that the County's analysis of the data was flawed because it failed to count vacant, surplus lands in the Industrial land use category that are available for commercial development. Except for arbitrarily allocating all undeveloped industrial land to the commercial category, as Petitioners have proposed here, the evidence does not establish any reasonable basis for making an industrial/commercial division of industrial-designated lands for inventory purposes. Indeed, no witness cited to a similar allocation being made in any other local government's comprehensive plan as precedent for doing so here. In those rare instances where the Plan itself permits multiple uses in a single land category, such as Commercial Office/Residential (an office and multi-family land use designation), the County used a supply figure that was derived from estimating how much land in this category was developed commercially as opposed to residential and allocating acreage from the category based on that percentage. No party has suggested that such a methodology be used here, particularly since the mixed use categories are distinguishable from single land use categories, such as Industrial and Commercial. Moreover, the County has demonstrated a conscious effort to separate these two types of land uses (industrial and commercial) into separate and distinct categories, they are depicted separately on the County's FLUM, and the Plan has separate locational criteria for the siting of these lands. Based on the foregoing, it is found that the County's analysis of the data was not flawed (or professionally unacceptable) because it failed to include undeveloped industrial lands in the commercial inventory. Petitioners next contend that the County erred in its commercial inventory count by failing to include around 30 acres of vacant land located at Witham Field, a local airport. Under the present zoning scheme at the airport, only aviation- related commercial uses are allowed, and thus the vacant land cannot be used for any other commercial purpose. Further, the airport is designated Institutional on the land use map, rather than Industrial, and it would be inappropriate to count vacant institutional lands in the commercial land inventory. Therefore, the exclusion of the Witham Field land from the commercial inventory did not render the County's analysis of the data professionally unacceptable. Finally, the remaining contentions by Petitioners that the County understated its supply inventory for both commercial and industrial property have been considered and rejected. In summary, it is found that the amendments are based on relevant and appropriate data and analyses, and that the data was collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. The Blydenstein FLUM Amendment Petitioners generally contend that there is no demonstrated need for the Blydenstein parcel to be redesignated as General Commercial, that the amendment is not based upon data and analysis, that the County failed to coordinate the land use with the availability of facilities and services, that the amendment is inconsistent with redevelopment and infill policies, and that the amendment encourages urban sprawl. The Blydenstein amendment reclassifies 28 acres to commercial use and will amount to 36 percent of the existing commercial development in downtown Indiantown. In terms of need, the County projects that only 17 acres of commercial development will be needed in Indiantown through the year 2015, and there presently exist around 186 acres of undeveloped commercial acreage in that community. At the same time, Amendment 00-01 reflects a deficit of 112 acres of commercial land in the County during the same time period. Although the local and countywide demand calculations are seemingly at odds, at least in the Indiantown area, there will be a surplus of unused commercial lands through the end of the current planning horizon, and thus there from that perspective there is no need for an additional 28 acres of commercial property in that locale. Notwithstanding a lack of numerical need, that consideration is not the sole factor in determining whether the amendment should be approved. As noted earlier, in addition to need, the County considers such factors as the suitability of the property for change, locational criteria, and community desires in making this determination. Here, the subject property is suitable for commercial development because of its location on two major arterial roadways and its ready access to a railroad and major waterway. Further, the property is located within the Primary Urban Services District, which is an area specifically designated for more intense, urban development. In addition, the current land use designation allows 8 residential units per acre, which is an "urban" type of designation. Finally, because there is vacant, undeveloped property surrounding the subject property, the redesignation of the property to General Commercial will not pose a compatibility problem with any residential areas. When these considerations are weighed with the need factor, it is found that the proposed land use change is appropriate. The existing land use designation of Mobile Home Residential is a carryover land use designation which recognized the mobile home use that occurred on the property when the future land use maps were originally created. At the present time, all mobile home use has ceased and the property is vacant. The nearest residential neighborhood is located to the north across State Road 76 beyond the Canal and is at least 600 feet away. Because of the property's configuration and immediate proximity to major arterial roads, railroad tracks, and a canal, the greater weight of evidence shows that it is not suitable for residential development. These considerations support the County's determination that the property has been inappropriately designated as residential for more than a decade. Although the County did not conduct formal studies to determine whether the public facilities and services will be capable of serving the proposed change in land use, a general analysis of the availability and adequacy of public facilities was performed by its staff. That analysis reflects that the property lies within the service area of a local water and sewer utility and has access to two major roadways. Based on its proximity to major roadways and local public utilities, the County does not anticipate that the change in land use will adversely impact public facilities and services. To ensure that this does not occur, the County will require a traffic impact analysis at the time the parcel is submitted for development review. Rule 9J-5.006(3)(b)8., Florida Administrative Code, requires that a plan "[d]iscourage the proliferation of urban sprawl." Leapfrog development is a form of urban sprawl and typically means leaping over a lower density development and placing higher density development just beyond the lower density development. Given the location of the Blydenstein property within the Primary Urban Services District, and the adjacent major arterial roads, railroad, and canal, the greater weight of evidence supports a finding that the proposed land use change will not constitute leapfrog development. The change in land use will not promote, allow, or designate urban development in radial, strip, isolated, or ribbon patterns; it will not result in the premature or poorly planned conversion of rural land; it will not discourage or inhibit infill or redevelopment of existing neighborhoods; it will not result in poor accessibility among linked or related land uses; and it will not result in a loss of significant amounts of functional open space. In the absence of these indicators, it is found that the amendment will not contribute to urban sprawl. The Seven J FLUM Amendment Like the Blydenstein amendment, Petitioners likewise contend that there is a lack of demonstrated need for the Seven J amendment; that the amendment lacks data and analysis; that the County failed to coordinate with the availability of services; that the amendment will promote urban sprawl; and that the amendment is internally inconsistent. The Seven J property is surrounded by the partially built-out West Jensen DRI, is located within the County's Primary Urban Services District, and is considered to be in a "regional hub" of activity, that is, within the core of major commercial development in the northern part of the County. Further, it is located on an eight-lane road at a major intersection (U.S. Highway 1 and Westmoreland Boulevard). Therefore, the change is compatible with surrounding existing and planned commercial uses, and the County's redesignation of the property from Medium Density Residential (8 units per acre) to General Commercial is appropriate. Further, the greater weight of evidence shows that because the property is located within the Primary Urban Services District, is near existing commercial and residential development, and urban services are already provided, the Amendment will not contribute to urban sprawl. Finally, the greater weight of evidence supports a finding that the amendment is internally consistent and based on adequate data and analysis, contrary to Petitioners' assertions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that Martin County Plan Amendments 00-01, 01-07, and 97-4 are in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven M. Siebert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Richard J. Grosso, Esquire Environmental and Land Use Center, Inc. 3305 College Avenue Shepard Broad Law Center Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7721 Joan P. Wilcox, Esquire 2336 Southeast Ocean Boulevard, PMP 110 Stuart, Florida 34986 Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David A. Acton, Esquire Office of County Attorney 2401 Southeast Monterey Road Stuart, Florida 34996-3322 Johnathan A. Ferguson, Esquire Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Shuster & Russell, P.A. 145 Northwest Central Park Plaza, Suite 200 Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986-2482 Linda R. McCann, Esquire Royal Palm Financial Center 789 South Federal Highway, Suite 310 Stuart, Florida 34994-2962
