The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Petitioner by the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") for services performed during the audit period of December 4, 1996 to December 4, 1998, and, if so, what is the total amount of these overpayments.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Parties Petitioner is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 29615. His specialty area of practice is general or family practice. His office is located in Brandon, Florida. AHCA is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of AHCA's duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes. The Provider Agreement During the audit period, Petitioner was authorized to provide physician services to eligible Medicaid patients. Petitioner provided such services pursuant to Medicaid Provider Agreements he entered into with AHCA and its predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, on November 27, 1992, and December 3, 1996. The 1996 Provider Agreement, in effect at the time of the audit, contained the following provisions, among others: Quality of Service. The provider agrees to provide medically necessary services or goods of not less than the scope and quality it provides to the general public. The provider agrees that services or goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary, of a quality comparable to those furnished by the provider's peers, and within the parameters permitted by the provider's license or certification. The provider further agrees to bill only for the services performed within the specialty or specialties designated in the provider application on file with the Agency. The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time. * * * 5. Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid [sic]. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as otherwise provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (including but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid- related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. * * * (f) Within 90 days of receipt, refund any moneys received in error or in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled from the Medicaid program. Handbook Provisions Among the "manuals and handbooks" referenced in paragraph 3 of the Provider Agreement in effect during the audit period were the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HFCA- 1500 ("Reimbursement Handbook") and the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook ("C&L Handbook"), with their periodic updates. The term "medically necessary" was defined in Appendix D of the Reimbursement Handbook as follows, in relevant part: Medically Necessary or Medical Necessity Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: (a) Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and Be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. . . . Chapter 3 of the C&L Handbook sets forth procedure codes to be used by physicians in claiming reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid recipients. The origin of the procedural and diagnosis codes is as follows, in relevant part: The procedure codes listed in this chapter are Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) Levels 1, 2, and 3. These are based on the Physician's Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book. The CPT includes HCPCS descriptive terms and numeric identifying codes and modifiers for reporting services and procedures. . . . The CPT book is a systematic listing and coding of procedures and services provided by physicians. Each procedure or service is identified with a five digit code. For purposes of this proceeding, the relevant section of the CPT book is "Evaluation and Management-- Office or Other Outpatient Services," which sets forth the codes used to report evaluation and management services provided in the physician's office or in an outpatient or other ambulatory facility. The CPT book sets forth instructions for selecting the proper level of Evaluation and Management ("E/M") service, as follows in relevant part: Review the Level of E/M Service Descriptors and Examples in the Selected Category or Subcategory The descriptors for the levels of E/M services recognize seven components, six of which are used in defining the levels of E/M services. These components are: history; examination; medical decision making; counseling; coordination of care; nature of presenting problem; and time. The first three of these components (i.e., history, examination, and medical decision making) should be considered the key components in selecting the level of E/M services. . . . Determine the Extent of History Obtained The extent of the history is dependent upon clinical judgment and on the nature of the presenting problem(s). The levels of E/M services recognize four types of history that are defined as follows: Problem focused: chief complaint; brief history of present illness or problem. Expanded problem focused: chief complaint; brief history of present illness; problem pertinent system review. Detailed: chief complaint; extended history of present illness; problem pertinent system review extended to include a review of a limited number of additional systems; pertinent past, family, and/or social history directly related to the patient's problems. Comprehensive: chief complaint; extended history of present illness; review of systems which is directly related to the problem(s) identified in the history of the present illness plus a review of all additional body systems; complete past, family and social history. The comprehensive history obtained as part of the preventive medicine evaluation and management service is not problem-oriented and does not involve a chief complaint or present illness. It does, however, include a comprehensive system review and comprehensive or interval past, family and social history as well as a comprehensive assessment/history of pertinent risk factors. Determine the Extent of Examination Performed The extent of the examination performed is dependent on clinical judgment and on the nature of the presenting problem(s). The levels of E/M services recognize four types of examination that are defined as follows: Problem focused: a limited examination of the affected body area or organ system. Expanded problem focused: a limited examination of the affected body area or organ system and other symptomatic or related organ system(s). Detailed: an extended examination of the affected body area(s) and other symptomatic or related organ system(s). Comprehensive: a general multi-system examination or a complete examination of a single organ system. Note: The comprehensive examination performed as part of the preventive medicine evaluation and management service is multi-system, but its extent is based on age and risk factors identified. For the purposes of these CPT definitions, the following body areas are recognized: Head, including the face Neck Chest, including breasts and axilla Abdomen Genitalia, groin, buttocks Back Each extremity For the purposes of these CPT definitions, the following organ systems are recognized: Eyes Ears, Nose, Mouth and Throat Cardiovascular Respiratory Gastrointestinal Genitourinary Musculoskeletal Skin Neurologic Psychiatric Hematologic/Lymphatic/Immunologic Determine the Complexity of Medical Decision Making Medical decision making refers to the complexity of establishing a diagnosis and/or selecting a management option as measured by: the number of possible diagnoses and/or the number of management options that must be considered; the amount and/or complexity of medical records, diagnostic tests, and/or other information that must be obtained, reviewed and analyzed; and the risk of significant complications, morbidity and/or mortality, as well as comorbidities, associated with the patient's presenting problem(s), the diagnostic procedure(s) and/or the possible management options. Four types of medical decision making are recognized: straightforward; low complexity; moderate complexity; and high complexity. To qualify for a given type of decision making, two of the three elements in Table 2 below must be met or exceeded. Comorbidities/underlying diseases, in and of themselves, are not considered in selecting a level of E/M services unless their presence significantly increases the complexity of the medical decision making. The referenced Table 2, titled "Complexity of Medical Decision Making," sets forth guidelines for the four types of decision-making (straightforward, low complexity, moderate complexity, and high complexity) in terms of the relative number and/or complexity of three elements: number of diagnoses or management options (minimal, limited, multiple, or extensive); amount and/or complexity of data to be reviewed (minimal or none, limited, moderate, or extensive); and risk of complications and/or morbidity or mortality (minimal, low, moderate, or high). The "Office or Other Outpatient Services" section of the CPT book provides the codes for those services in terms of the guidelines set forth above. Five codes of increasing complexity are provided for new patients, and five counterpart codes are provided for established patients: New Patient 99201 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: a problem focused history; a problem focused examination; and straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are self- limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99202 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; and straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 20 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99203 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; and medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 30 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99204 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99205 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Established Patient 99211 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient that may or may not require the presence of a physician. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are minimal. Typically, 5 minutes are spent performing or supervising these services. 99212 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a problem focused history; a problem focused examination; straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self- limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99213 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99214 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 25 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99215 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 40 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Medicaid reimburses physicians according to the level of complexity of the office visit. The more complex the visit (and hence the higher the CPT code number), the greater the level of reimbursement. The Audit During the audit period, Petitioner submitted 2,215 Medicaid claims for services rendered to 382 patients, for which he received Medicaid payments of $134,469.21. In making a determination of overpayment, AHCA is not required to review each and every Medicaid claim submitted by a provider. Section 409.913(19), Florida Statutes, permits the agency to employ "appropriate statistical methods," including "sampling and extension to the population," to make its determination. In this instance, AHCA randomly selected a "cluster sample" of 39 patients from the 382 Medicaid patients to whom Petitioner had provided services during the audit period, and asked Petitioner to produce the medical records he had on file for these 39 patients. AHCA chose the cluster sample of 39 patients according to a statistical formula indicating a 95 percent probability that any overpayment amount would be at least the amount identified. By selecting the 95 percent confidence factor, AHCA attempted to ensure that any potential error in the audit would be resolved in favor of the audited physician. AHCA's statistical expert, Dr. Mark Johnson, validated the methodology used by AHCA. Dr. Johnson not only reviewed AHCA's work, but conducted his own independent analysis that reproduced AHCA's results. Dr. Johnson's testimony as to the reliability of AHCA's methodology is credited. Copies of the medical records were provided to AHCA by Zheila Galvez, the office assistant in charge of Petitioner's billings, on or about March 1, 1999. Ms. Galvez certified that she provided AHCA the complete medical records for the 39 patients, and acknowledged that these records would provide the only information AHCA would use in its audit. Petitioner was later provided an opportunity to supplement the records, but provided nothing further to the agency. At the hearing, counsel for Petitioner objected that AHCA failed to prove that the records it produced in evidence were the complete records as provided to AHCA by Ms. Galvez. The objection was rejected. No evidence was presented to show that AHCA mishandled the documents. Petitioner made no claim that a specific record was missing, and Petitioner was in the best position to know whether the records were complete. Petitioner had submitted a total of 232 claims for services rendered to the 39 patients in the cluster sample during the audit period. Each of these claims was reviewed by AHCA to determine whether it was supported by information contained in the medical records produced by Petitioner in response to AHCA's request. AHCA employee Dr. John Sullenberger, a physician who was not in active practice, performed the initial audit, reviewing all the claims for the 39 patient cluster sample. Dr. Sullenberger's work resulted in the First Audit Report that concluded Petitioner had been overpaid $72,724.89. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, AHCA withdrew Dr. Sullenberger's audit because newly enacted Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, mandated "peer review" in agency determinations of overpayment. Dr. Sullenberger did not meet the statutory definition of "peer" because he was not in active practice. See Section 409.9131(2)(c), Florida Statutes. AHCA engaged Dr. Timothy Walker, an active, Board- certified family practice physician who is a faculty member of Tallahassee Memorial Hospital's Family Practice Residency Program, to perform a second audit. Through Dr. Walker's deposition testimony, AHCA established that Dr. Walker's background, work experience and education establish him as an expert in CPT coding, qualified to render an opinion on the propriety of Petitioner's coding and billing practices. Dr. Walker reviewed the records that Petitioner had provided regarding the 39 patients in the cluster sample to determine whether there was documentation to support the Medicaid claims relating to these patients. Dr. Walker's review found that Petitioner exclusively billed the highest levels of CPT coding for outpatient services, i.e., 99205 for new patients and 99215 for established patients. Dr. Walker found that Petitioner failed to document a level of service consistent with these codes. Dr. Walker performed his own review of Petitioner's medical records and noted his conclusions as to the level of CPT coding that could be supported by the record of each patient for each visit to Petitioner's office. Dr. Walker found that all of the visits should have been billed at lower levels, based on the documentation provided by Petitioner. Dr. Walker's testimony is credited as to his review of Petitioner's records. Margarete Johnson, AHCA's registered nursing consultant, performed the calculations by which Dr. Walker's conclusions as to the proper coding were translated into dollar figures. These calculations were a simple function of addition and subtraction, using the relevant Medicaid reimbursement amounts for the various codes. Petitioner had been reimbursed $14,101.44 for the claims related to the 39 patients. Following Dr. Walker's analysis, Ms. Johnson calculated that $8,520.59 of that amount constituted overpayments. Using the generally accepted, appropriate, and valid statistical formula described by Dr. Johnson, AHCA extended this result to the total population of 2,215 Medicaid claims that Petitioner had submitted for services rendered during the audit period, and correctly calculated that Petitioner had been overpaid a total of $77,848.16. Petitioner did not present a case-in-chief. Petitioner's only exhibits were three pages that duplicated documents presented by AHCA, except for the fact that they carried an additional, later agency date stamp not found on those presented by AHCA. Petitioner claimed that these documents proved that AHCA did not produce its entire file on Petitioner during discovery or at the hearing. AHCA's witness Jack Williams explained that the extra, later date stamp on these documents resulted from Petitioner's having re-submitted these pages to AHCA as exhibits to his petition for formal hearing. This explanation was sufficient to allay any suspicion that AHCA's production was less than complete. On the strength of the evidence and testimony presented by AHCA, and in the absence of any evidence or testimony to the contrary, it is found that Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments in the amount of $77,848.16.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Petitioner received $77,848.16 in Medicaid overpayments for services rendered to his Medicaid patients from December 4, 1996 to December 4, 1998, and requiring him to repay this amount to the agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald W. Weidner, Esquire Matthew D. Weidner, Esquire Weidner, Bowden & Weidner 11265 Alumni Way, Suite 201 Jacksonville, Florida 32246 Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues presented are whether Petitioner is responsible for reimbursing the Agency for Health Care Administration for an overpayment for Medicaid services and, if so, whether administrative sanctions should be applied.
Findings Of Fact From April 19, 1995, through October 30, 1996, Petitioner was a pharmacy licensed to do business in the State of Florida. From April 15, 1995, through October 30, 1996, Petitioner was a Medicaid provider in good standing, pursuant to a Medicaid contract with the Agency. In 1996 Kathryn Holland, an agency employee, conducted an audit of Petitioner's records, using a method which the Agency calls an aggregate analysis. This analysis focuses on the inventory of a Medicaid provider and analyzes invoices and other documentation to determine if the provider had available during the audit period sufficient quantities of goods or products to support the quantity of goods or products billed to Medicaid. Holland analyzed the Agency's records to ascertain the claims filed by Petitioner and the amounts paid to Petitioner. She compiled a list of those drugs most frequently billed to the Agency's Medicaid program by Petitioner and selected 23 medications. She selected April 1, 1995, through October 30, 1996, as the audit period. She contacted Petitioner and requested records showing Petitioner's purchases of the medications on that list. She also contacted Mason Distributors, Inc., and H. I. Moore, Inc., two of Petitioner's primary suppliers, and requested copies of their invoices for medications purchased by Petitioner between May 1, 1995, and October 28, 1996. She prepared charts of the invoices and other documents received as a result of her requests. She reduced the number of audited drugs to 20 based upon adequate documentation provided to her for three of the listed medications. She prepared a preliminary report, which she sent to Petitioner with a request that Petitioner supply her with any additional records to show that additional supplies of the listed medication were available to Petitioner during the audit period. Petitioner responded to that request by providing additional documentation. Holland did not credit Petitioner with additional supplies based upon the additional documentation because the invoices appeared to be for a different pharmacy or appeared to reflect purchases outside the audit period. Further, the cancelled checks were payable to cash, had no notation as to the purpose of the checks, had a notation reflecting only a "business expense," had a notation for medication not on Holland's list, or reflected purchases outside the audit period. Petitioner was unable to document sufficient inventory during the audit period to justify the amount of medication billed to, and paid for by, the Agency. The Agency overpaid Petitioner in the amount of $12,529.11 for the 20 listed medications during the audit period and is entitled to reimbursement by Petitioner in that amount.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered determining that Petitioner is responsible to repay the Agency in the amount of $12,529.11 by a date certain, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000, and terminating Petitioner from the Medicaid program for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Mark Thomas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Highpoint Center, Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments, and, if so, what is the aggregate amount of the overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration, is the single state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, The Doctor's Office, was a Florida corporation approved by the Agency to provide group Medicaid services. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was owned entirely by non-physicians who employed salaried physicians to provide Medicaid services. Petitioner, at all times relevant to this matter, offered physician services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a contract with the Agency under provider number 371236P-00. Petitioner, pursuant to the specific terms in the contract with the Agency, agreed to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program, and Federal laws and regulations. Petitioner, pursuant to its contract with the Agency, agreed to only seek reimbursement from the Medicaid program for services that were "medically necessary" and "Medicaid compensable." The Audit In mid-1996, the Agency, pursuant to its statutory responsibility, advised Petitioner that it intended to audit Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims for the alleged medical services it provided between July 1, 1994 and June 30, 1996. In September 1996, the Agency conducted an initial audit site visit, and randomly selected 61 patient files for review. The complete patient files, provided by Petitioner, were reviewed by Sharon Dewey, a registered nurse consultant and Agency employee, as well as Dr. Solenberger, a physician consultant and Agency employee. In accordance with its procedure, the Agency determined that Petitioner had submitted a total of 580 claims for reimbursement relating to the 61 patient files and had received full payment from the Medicaid program for each claim. On March 3, 1997, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR), and advised Petitioner that it had over-billed Medicaid and received an overpayment from the program. Shortly thereafter, the Agency auditors, Dr. Solenberger and Ms. Dewey, met with Frank Colavecchio, Petitioner's Corporate Representative, and discussed the Medicaid violations alleged in the review. During the meeting, the Agency requested Mr. Colavecchio to instruct Petitioner's staff physicians to review their records and provide a written rebuttal to the Agency's initial determinations. Within days, and prior to any further action, the Agency placed the audit on indefinite hold. The Agency decided to delay the audit until certain proposed legislation relating to peer review and the integrity of the Medicaid reimbursement program was enacted. Two years later, Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, was enacted during the 1999 legislative session and became law. Shortly thereafter, in 1999, the Agency hired Dr. Larry Deeb, a board-certified, practicing pediatrician, to perform a peer review of Petitioner's practices and procedures. Dr. Deeb has performed similar medical records reviews for the Medicaid program since 1981 and possesses a thorough understanding of CPT coding and the EPSDT requirements. Dr. Deeb received the medical files provided by Petitioner, and reviewed each patient file in the random sample, including the medical services and Medicaid-related claim records. On November 11, 1999, Dr. Deeb completed his peer review of 564 of the 580 claims provided in the random sample and forwarded his findings to the Agency. Dr. Deeb advised the Agency that 16 reimbursement claims involved adult patients and he therefore did not review them. Utilizing Dr. Deebs findings, the Agency employed appropriate and valid auditing and statistical methods, and calculated the total Medicaid overpayment that Petitioner received during the two year audit period. On July 17, 2000, approximately four years after the original audit notification, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). The Agency advised Petitioner that, based upon its review of the random sample of 61 patients for whom Petitioner submitted 580 claims for payment between 1994 and 1996, Petitioner received $875,261.03 in total overpayment from the Medicaid program during the audit period. Petitioner denied the overpayment and requested a formal administrative hearing. Following the initial commencement of the final hearing in this matter in December 2001, Dr. Deeb, again, reviewed the disputed claims and modified his opinion relating to 6 claims. Thereafter, the Agency recalculated the alleged overpayment and demanded Petitioner to pay $870,748.31. The Allegations The Agency alleges that specific claims submitted by Petitioner, which were paid by the Medicaid program, fail to comply with specific Medicaid requirements and therefore must be reimbursed. Since its inception, the Medicaid program has required providers to meet the Medicaid program's policies and procedures as set forth in federal, state, and local law. To qualify for payment, it is the provider's duty to ensure that all claims "[a]re provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with . . . state . . . law." Section 409.913(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1993). Medicaid manuals are available to all Providers. Petitioner, as a condition of providing Medicaid services pursuant to the Medicaid program, is bound by the requirements and restrictions specified in the manuals, and under the contract, is required to reimburse the Medicaid program for any paid claims found to be in violation of Medicaid policies and procedures. The evidence presented at hearing established that Petitioner frequently violated various Medicaid policies and procedures. First, Petitioner repeatedly failed to comply with Section 10.9 of the Medicaid Physician's Provider Handbook, (MPPH), and Sections 409.905(9), 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp. 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes, which require all medical services to be rendered by, or supervised by a physician, and attested to by the physician's signature. Medical records reflecting services for paid claims must be physician signature certified and dated, or the services are not defined as physician's services. In addition, Petitioner routinely failed to correctly document the provision of certain physician's assistant (P.A.) Medicaid services that require the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath. See Chapter 1 of the Physician Assistant Coverage and Limitations Handbook, March 1995, and Appendix D (Glossary) in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (HCFA-1500). In addition, Petitioner failed to comply with Medicaid regulations that require an approved physician to be present in the facility when certain P.A. services are delivered and to attest to it by signature within twenty-four hours of service. See Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, and Sections 409.905, and 409.913 (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996 Supp.), Florida Statutes. The evidence presented at hearing also demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly violated specific record keeping requirements located in Section 10.9 of the MPPH, Sections 10.6 and 11.5 of the Medicaid EPSDT Provider Handbook (EPSDT), and Sections 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes. In addition, the Agency demonstrated that Petitioner occasionally failed to document support for the necessity of certain services or simply billed for services that were not medically necessary. As indicated, Medicaid policy limits a physician to bill only for services that are medically necessary and defines the circumstances and varying levels of care authorized. In fact, Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, provides in part: The physician services program pays for services performed by a licensed physician or osteopath within the scope of the practice of medicine or osteopathy as defined by state law . . . . The services in this program must be performed for medical necessity for diagnosis and treatment of an illness on an eligible Medicaid recipient. Delivery of all services in this handbook must be done by or under the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath . . . at any place of service . . . . Each service type listed has special policy requirements that apply specifically to it. These must be adhered to for payment. The manual further provides clear guidelines defining authorized services for reimbursement which Petitioner apparently overlooked. For example, the manual defines the four types of medical history exams that Medicaid providers may conduct, the nature of the problems presented, and the appropriate and authorized tests. The manual also identifies the varying degrees of medical decision-making complexity related to Medicaid services and provides instructions relating to the method of selecting the correct evaluation and management code for billing. Petitioner consistently violated coding restrictions. Moreover, the Medicaid policy manual also outlines the specific procedures and billing requirements necessary for seeking payment for medical services including the early periodic screening for diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT) services. Chapter 10 and 11 of the MPPH specifically state that services that do not include all listed components of the EPSDT are not defined as an EPSDT, and upon audit, the Agency re-calculated Petitioner's medical services at the appropriate procedure code. Stipulation Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that certain paid claims were correctly determined by the Agency to be overpayments. Specifically, the parties agreed that portions of samples 1, 3, 14, 21, 28, 41, 46, 47, 51, 53, and 56 could not be claimed for reimbursement since lab services which are part of an office visit reimbursement and/or lab service fees performed by an independent outside lab are not permitted. In addition, the parties agreed that specific portions of samples 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 33, 35, 43, 46, 47, 52, 53, and 55 could not be claimed since Modifier 26 billing, the professional component, is only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital and Petitioner's services were rendered in an office. Pediatric Sample With regard to the random sample of pediatric files, upon careful review, the evidence presented at hearing sufficiently demonstrates that Petitioner was overpaid the following amounts on the following paid claims for the following reasons: The prolonged physician's services billed to Medicaid were not documented as having been provided or medically necessary. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 1 1/18/1996 99354 $ 36.64 1 5/14/1996 99354 $ 36.64 13 9/25/1995 99354 $ 36.64 19 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 21 12/18/1995 99354 $ 36.64 28 3/06/1995 99354 $ 36.64 42 6/04/1996 99354 $ 36.64 43 12/19/1994 99354 $ 36.64 47 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 47 10/17/1995 99354 $ 36.64 51 4/05/1995 99354 $ 36.64 53 11/02/1995 99354 $ 36.64 56 5/01/1996 99354 $ 36.64 The level of care billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care provided was at the 99213 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 1 9/14/1995 $ 34.14 1 1/18/1996 $ 34.14 1 5/14/1996 $ 34.14 33 9/28/1994 $ 20.00 47 10/17/1995 $ 34.14 The level of care billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99214 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 5/31/1995 $ 21.69 The level of care billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 25 7/27/1994 $ 2.00 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99203 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 35 5/11/1995 $ 37.96 51 12/08/1994 $ 15.00 55 11/21/1995 $ 37.96 58 9/22/1995 $ 37.96 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 43 12/11/1994 ($ 3.00) credit The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the medical services provided and documentation supported an EPSDT visit. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 2/06/1995 $ 16.53 The required components of the EPSDT were not documented as being performed at the office visit that had been claimed and paid as an EPSDT and therefore, the difference between the EPSDT payment received and the value of the procedure code for the documented level of office visit that occurred (i.e., 99214, 99213, 99212, 99211, or 99203), is deemed an overpayment. Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 1 7/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 3 6/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 5 3/03/1995 99203 $ 21.43 6 7/07/1994 99213 $ 5.00 10 8/17/1995 99212 $ 43.82 12 1/31/1996 99204 $ 0.00 14 5/31/1995 99213 $ 39.82 18 10/04/1994 99213 $ 5.00 18 1/29/1996 99214 $ 27.37 20 8/25/1994 99213 $ 5.00 21 12/11/1995 99214 $ 27.37 29 8/17/1994 99212 $ 9.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 29 9/06/1995 99213 $ 39.82 40 7/25/1994 99203 $ 0.00 41 5/06/1996 99214 $ 27.37 46 9/19/1994 99213 $ 5.00 46 10/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 47 11/02/1994 99213 $ 5.00 51 9/07/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 7/10/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 1/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 59 5/02/1996 99203 $ 43.39 Adult Samples At hearing, Petitioner disputed all of the Agency's findings relating to patients over the age of 21 and objected to Dr. Deeb, a pediatrician, performing any review of their files. While Dr. Deeb is not the appropriate peer to review adult patient files, the following adult claims did not require substantive peer review and resulted in overpayment due to the stated reason: There were not any medical records in existence to indicate that any medical services were performed. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/20/1995 99215 $ 53.00 2 7/11/1995 99215 $ 59.14 2 8/09/1995 99215 $ 57.14 2 9/07/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 10/11/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 1/02/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 3/22/1996 73560/Rad.Ex. $ 16.36 2 4/01/1996 99215 $ 57.14 2 4/05/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 4/23/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/16/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/19/1996 99215 $ 57.14 16 5/14/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 16 5/14/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/14/1996 99215 $ 57.14 23 7/28/1994 99213 $ 23.00 23 5/09/1995 72069/26 Rad.Ex. $ 6.98 23 5/09/1995 72069/Rad.Ex. $ 17.45 23 10/20/1995 99213 $ 23.00 34 4/24/1996 99214 $ 35.45 57 11/17/1995 99215 $ 59.14 60 4/10/1996 99215 $ 57.14 61 5/22/1995 99213 $ 23.00 The medical records failed to contain the required physician's signature and date authenticating the fact that the services billed were performed by either P.A. Olsen or P.A. Avidon under physician supervision. The services provided by the non-physician employee were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Cluster Number Date of Service Proc. Code Pd./ P. Code Allowed Overpayment 2 6/30/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 2 7/20/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 7/28/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 9/05/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 8 4/17/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 17 3/27/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 23 5/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 23 6/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 34 4/23/1996 99205/99203 $ 35.96 The medical records failed to contain the required physician signature authenticating the fact that the services were provided by a physician. The services provided were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Procedure Code Cluster Number Date of Service Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 6/14/1995 99215/99211 $ 45.14 16 5/15/1996 99215/99211 $ 45.14 61 5/05/1995 99205/99204 $ 14.53 The provider improperly sought payment for lab services that were part of the office visit reimbursement and/or lab services performed by an independent outside lab. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 3/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 2 4/03/1996 UA $ 3.00 15 2/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.50 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 The provider improperly sought payment for Modifier 26 billings (professional component) which are only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/17/1995 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 2 6/14/1995 Radiologic exam $ 7.20 8 4/17/1995 Tympanometry $ 9.00 16 5/13/1996 Radiologic exam $ 5.45 16 5/15/1996 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 In addition to the policy and procedural violations, Petitioner, in egregious violation of the Medicaid program, admittedly submitted Medicaid claims for the services of specialist physicians (such as an allergist, OB/GYN, podiatrist, psychologists, and ophthalmologists) not within its Provider group, collected Medicaid funds based on those claims, and reimbursed the respective specialist. While Petitioner's corporate representative, Mr. Colavecchio, was admittedly responsible for the coding and billing of the Medicaid services submitted for reimbursement, he was minimally aware of the Medicaid policy requirements and possessed limited working knowledge of CPT coding and EPSDT billing. In addition, Petitioner's employees, Dr. Keith Wintermeyer and Dr. Marcia Malcolm, were only moderately familiar with the CPT coding and EPSDT component requirements. They provided little input to Petitioner regarding CPT coding and the sufficiency of certain physician's services relating to EPSDT billing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency re-calculate the overpayment consistent with the Findings of Fact, and include only those identified violations in the cluster samples of the adult patient files, and issue a Final Order requiring Petitioner to reimburse, within 60 days, the Agency for the Medicaid overpayments plus any interest that may accrue after entry of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Felker-Little, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Charles D. Jamieson, Esquire Ward, Damon & Posner, P.A. 4420 Beacon Circle West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Medicaid program as set forth in Petitioner's Final Agency Audit Report dated June 12, 2006 for the period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004.
Findings Of Fact AHCA audited certain of Dr. Negrette's Medicaid claims pertaining to services rendered between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2004, hereinafter the audit period. Dr. Negrette was an authorized Medicaid provider during the audit period. During the audit period, Dr. Negrette had been issued Medicaid provider number 061422000. No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Dr. Negrette had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA. For services provided during the audit period, Dr. Negrette received in excess $79,523.70 in payments for services to Medicaid recipients. By a preliminary audit report dated August 25, 2005, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that a preliminary determination was made that he was overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $137,051.25. Subsequently, by a FAR dated June 12, 2006, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that, after a review of all documentation submitted, it determined that he had been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, thus, reducing the amount of the overpayment. The FAR further provided how the overpayment was calculated using a sample of the claims submitted during the audit period, including the statistical formula for cluster sampling; and indicated that the statistical formula was generally accepted and that the statistical formula showed an overpayment in the amount of $79,523.70, with a 95 percent probability of correctness. Dr. Negrette agrees that the mathematical computation of the audit is correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Jesus Negrette, M.D., received overpayments from the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, during the audit period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004, and requiring Jesus Negrette, M.D., to repay the amount of overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or Petitioner) is entitled to recover from Ideal Pugh, Sr., d/b/a Services on Time, LLC (Respondent), alleged Medicaid overpayments, administrative fines, and investigative, legal, and expert witness costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Respondent, Ideal Pugh, Sr., d/b/a Services on Time, LLC: To repay the sum of $563,073.76, for overpayments on claims that did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; To pay interest on the sum of $563,073.76 at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the overpayment determination; To pay a fine of $1,000 for failure to furnish all Medicaid-related records within the requested timeframe; To pay a fine of $1,500 for violations of the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; and To pay allowable costs pursuant to subsection 409.913(23)(a), Florida Statutes. If a disputed issue of material fact arises regarding the appropriate amount of those costs, the matter may be referred back to DOAH for a further recommendation regarding costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments and, if so, the total amount of the overpayments. Petitioner agreed at the onset of the hearing not to contest the findings of the Agency that Petitioner received Medicaid monies to which he was not entitled. Therefore, the issue remaining for determination is: Whether Respondent calculated the overpayment amount of $52,850.82 using a valid statistical formula and a valid sample of recipients and claims during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence, official recognition granted, evidentiary rulings made, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are established. The Agency is charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida pursuant to Sections 409.907 and 409.913, Florida Statutes (2003). Among its administrative duties, the Agency operates a program to oversee the activities of Florida Medicaid providers to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior and neglect occur to the minimum extent possible and to recover overpayments and impose sanctions as appropriate. "Overpayment" is statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid Program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse or mistake." § 409.913(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2000). The FAAR, covering the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, together with the Agency's work papers, set out a Medicaid overpayment amount of $52,850.82 that the Agency seeks to recoup from Petitioner. Petitioner is a physician enrolled in the Medicaid program under provider number 0580091-00, who operated under his provider number during the audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, under the auspices of a standard Medicaid provider agreement. As a part of the Medicaid provider agreement, the provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, and statements of policy. Petitioner participated in the Medicaid program during the FAAR period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002, and received payment for the services that the Agency now questions and are the subject of the audit. During the above audit period, the applicable statutes, rules, and Medicaid handbooks required Petitioner to retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. Petitioner had to retain these records for at least five years from the date of services. The Florida Medicaid program prepares and furnishes handbooks to all enrolled Medicaid providers, including Petitioner. These handbooks set forth the Medicaid policies with regard to services rendered and billed by providers. Petitioner had a duty to make sure that each claim submitted was true and accurate and was for goods and services that were provided, by an enrolled Medicaid provider, in accordance with the requirements of Medicaid rules, handbooks, and policies, and in accordance with federal and state law. Medicaid providers who do not comply with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies hereinabove may be subject to administrative sanctions and/or recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation and/or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Mr. Hector Tapining (Mr. Tapining) and Phyllis Stiver (Nurse Stiver), registered nurse consultant for Medicaid Program Integrity, conducted an on-site visit to Petitioner's office and requested records. From the files of Petitioner, Mr. Tapining generated a random list of 30 Medicaid recipients (the cluster sample) who had received services by Petitioner during the two- year audit period of March 1, 2000, through March 1, 2002. The Agency thereafter generated worksheets reflecting: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) total number of claims made by Petitioner, with dates of medical services provided; (3) the total amount of money paid Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Additional Agency-generated worksheets reflected: (1) the total number of Medicaid recipients during the audit period; (2) the total number of claims of Petitioner, with dates of service; (3) the total amount of money paid to Petitioner during the audit period; and (4) the analyst's worksheets representing his review of each recipient's claim(s) for the audit period. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to Nurse Stiver for her review of compliance with Medicaid enrollment and documentation. Mr. Tapining provided the worksheets to E. Rawson Griffin, III, M.D. (Dr. Griffin), the medical records consultant, for his review and evaluation of appropriate billing codes. The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. Dr. Griffin, after review of 30 patient records, concluded that Petitioner engaged in a general pattern of over coding at the highest level of code (99205) for services rendered that appeared to be rather straight-forward and simple for the medical services rendered at the time of each visit. Over coding is the term employed when supporting documentation for medical billing does not support the billing code chosen and assigned by the provider. In his review, Dr. Griffin saw no middle codes (99213s and/or 99214s) billed by Petitioner. Dr. Griffin opined that it was extraordinary that Petitioner would see and service 30 patients on their first visits, who at that time presented a complaint necessitating a medical necessity level code 99205, the highest level of Medicaid service. Continuing, Dr. Griffin explained that over coding is entering in the patient's billing statement a code higher than the patient's medical complaint and the Patient's recorded medical necessity warranted for the visit or visits (1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) on the date those services were provided by Petitioner. In Dr. Griffin's opinion, Medicaid billing codes are to be determined by consideration of the following medical factors: (1) the patient's particular medical complaint and the degree of complexity of that complaint at the time of the initial visit, (2) the type of and the complexity of medical examinations and the tests necessarily required to be administered based upon the type and complexity of the initial complaint, and (3) the resulting interpretations of the tests and the examinations administered for treatment of the complaint. It is only after completion of the above analysis and documentation in the patient's medical records, would a code 22915 billing be appropriate. Dr. Griffin's analysis of the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner resulted in his down coding Petitioner’s billing as shown below.2 I.D. Number Service Date Code Billed Adjustment B.K. 1 03-29-2000 215 (5) 214 B.K. 1 07-19-2000 214 213 1 08-17-2000 214 213 1 12-11-2000 215 214 1 02-22-2001 215 214 1 05-23-2001 214 213 1 06-24-2001 214 212 J.A.C. 4 No date 215 214 J.R. 5 10-02-2000 215 213 B.F. 6 07-25-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 04-10-2000 215 213 F.H. 8 05-04-2000 214 213 (2 visits) D.C. 9 01-23-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-07-2000 215 213 T.M. 10 06-28-2000 214 213 D.W. 13 01-12-2000 215 213 P.L. 14 01-10-2000 214 213 I.H. 15 12-18-2000 215 213 M.V. 17 04-10-2000 215 213 R.R. 21 04-17-2001 214 213 S.K. 25 11-20-2000 212 211 A.H. 26 12-19-2000 215 212 T.P. 27 02-20-2000 215 213 M.R. 28 11-14-2002 215 214 E.C. 29 04-28-2000 214 213 E.C. 07-03-2000 214 213 12-28-2000 214 212 01-02-2000 214 212 01-23-2000 214 212 02-06-2000 214 212 04-03-2000 214 212 (6 visits) R.S. 30 04-16-2001 215 213 Nurse Stiver reviewed the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid records of patients serviced by Petitioner for compliance with Medicaid policy(s) to ensure that services billed are the services for which Medicaid pays and are services that meet all aspects of the Medicaid policy(s) as specified in the Medicaid Handbook. Medicaid policy, regarding provider enrollment, requires (all) providers who services Medicaid patients to be (individually) enrolled in the Medicaid program as providers before providing service and billing Medicaid for those services. The Agency verifies the education, credentials, and criminal background of each enrollee to ensure the safety of Medicaid recipients. The individual provider enrollment is required as a condition precedent for providers to bill Medicaid for services and to be paid by Medicaid for those services. The enrollment requirement includes PAs and ARNPs. Nurse Stiver's review of Petitioner's documents sought to ascertain whether each provider who actually rendered services had executed a voluntary enrollment contract agreement between the Agency and that provider. In these contract agreements, the provider agrees to comply with all laws and rules pertaining to the Medicaid program when furnishing a service or goods to a Medicaid recipient, and the Agency agrees to pay a sum, determined by a fee schedule, payment methodology, or other manner, for the service or goods provided to the Medicaid recipient. The Medicaid Handbook requires separate and/or individual enrollment of each and every entity that provides Medicaid service(s) to Medicaid recipients. The mandatory enrollment includes a provider(s) who makes written entries on and/or signs Medicaid documents. Should the medical service provider and the provider documenting the Medicaid recipient's medical files and the provider billing Medicaid for services rendered be different providers, each provider must be individually enrolled in the Medicaid program. Within a chain of provider entities, the failure of one provider entity to be enrolled entitles the Agency to full recoupment of all Medicaid payments made to the enrolled Provider. Nurse Stiver applied the above analysis to the cluster sample of 30 Medicaid recipients' records recovered from Petitioner's files and to the Agency's worksheets. Nurse Stiver's review and her investigation revealed specific instances in which the paid billing claims evidenced that Petitioner's non-enrolled PAs and/or Petitioner's non-enrolled ARNP either provided the medical services or documented the medical services provided to the Medicaid recipients as shown below: Patient Service Date(s) Services and/or documentation 1. B.K. Serviced 9 times Signature-not enrolled 2. E.J. 08-14-01 Records written and signed by PA not enrolled and (not countersigned by Petitioner) 3. E.T. Serviced 4 times Services provided not entitled to Medicaid payment (unauthorized) J.A. (stipulation) Stipulation3 B.F. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled M.R. 7 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled F.H. 11 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled through 12. Stipulations 13. D.W. 2 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 14. through 17. Stipulations 18. L.A. 5 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 19. and 20. Stipulations 21. R.R. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 22. and 23. Stipulations 24. L.S. 1 visit-serviced Provider not enrolled 25. S.K. 3 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 26. through 28. Stipulations 29. E.C. 12 visits-serviced Provider not enrolled 30. Stipulation After the review and examination of the claims submitted within the cluster sample, Nurse Stiver concluded the above services billed to the Agency were not performed by Petitioner. She opined that either or both of Petitioner's employees, Justo Lugo and Phillip Nguyen (PAs) and/or Andrea McDonald (ARNP) provided or assisted in providing services. As non-enrolled providers in the Medicaid program, the PAs and the ARNP’s participation in providing services to Medicaid recipients and/or participation in assisting Petitioner in providing medical services and/or participation in Petitioner's billing Medicaid for medical services to Medicaid recipients violated Medicaid policy. Respondent established that the Medicaid program payments for services provided by an individual not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program are overpayments of which the Agency is entitled to full recoupment. After the reviews and the analysis by Nurse Stiver and Dr. Griffin, using the Agency's formula for calculating the extrapolated overpayments, the Agency determined overpayment in the amount of $64,453.74 to have occurred. Based upon these findings, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) letter setting out the overpayment amount of $64,453.74 and inviting Petitioner to submit additional documentation. Petitioner's additional documentation submittals were reviewed by the Agency. The post-PAAR review resulted in a reduction of overpayment to $52,850.82 as the total overpayment for all claims considered, and sought to be recovered from Petitioner by the Agency. The Agency's worksheets resulting in the $52,850.82 overpayment included: (1) the medical record review summary; (2) a spreadsheet setting out the names of the recipients, the dates of service, the procedure billed, the amount paid by the Agency, the amount allowed by the Agency, and the resulting overpayment; (3) the overpayment calculation using cluster sampling; (4) the patient worksheets, or claims; and (5) the procedure code summary of the claims in the universe, as defined in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2000). The formula used by the Agency is a valid statistical formula, the random sample used by the Agency was statistically significant, the cluster sample was random, and the algebraic formula and the statistical formula used by the Agency are valid formulas. The Agency's data and calculations were reviewed by Ian McKeague, Ph.D. (Dr. McKeague). He reproduced the calculations and concluded that $52,850.82 is the correct overpayment amount made by Medicaid to Petitioner. Petitioner produced neither written authority nor expert testimony contesting the validity of the statistical formula and Dr. McKeague's resulting calculation of overpayment. Nurse Stiver, with over 14 years employment with the Agency, worked with the Medicaid policies and handbooks. She worked with Mr. Tapining on the audit of Petitioner documents. Specifically, she reviewed Petitioner's records for compliance with Medicaid policy, to ensure that the services billed are the services Medicaid paid for and that those services met all aspects of Medicaid policy. Nurse Stiver's investigation and review revealed specific instances in which the paid claims show that the PAs and/or the ARNP, not Petitioner himself, provided the services to Medicaid patients. In each case where the Agency determined Petitioner was not entitled to payment, Nurse Stiver reviewed the medical records and determined that the ARNP or one of the PAs, who were not enrolled in the Medicaid program, actually rendered services to Medicaid recipients. Her determination was based upon her many years of nursing experience that the person rendering the services is the person who documents the services rendered. From her review, it appeared that the ARNP or a PA (not enrolled), not Petitioner, documented the service billed to and paid by Medicaid. Services rendered by an ARNP or a PA who is not enrolled as a provider in the Medicaid program cannot be compensated by the Medicaid program. Petitioner argued that he provided all Medicaid services billed to Medicaid and, on those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees (either the ARNP or the PAs), who by happenstance would be present in the treatment room, aided him by merely documenting services he himself rendered to the Medicaid patients. Petitioner presented an alternative argument that on other of those rare occasions reviewed by Nurse Stiver, his employees would be in the room when Petitioner actually provided services to Medicaid patients, and, while he was providing those services, he would simultaneously dictate to his employee who would transcribe his dictations on the Medicaid forms. Petitioner elected not to compel attendance by subpoena of his employees, even though the final hearing was continued to provide Petitioner an opportunity to do so. Petitioner's argument, that the proposed testimony by his employees would have been sufficient to challenge the Agency determination that Petitioner's billing was for services performed by a provider who was not enrolled in the Medicaid program, is without a foundation in fact and rejected. The Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook provides, in part, that "Records must be retained for a period of at least five years from the date of service." The handbook goes on to provide in pertinent part: PAs must meet the general Medicaid provider enrollment that are contained in Chapter 2 of the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HFCA-1500 and Child Health Check- Up 221. In addition, PAs must follow the specific enrollment requirements that are listed in this section. * * * PAs must meet the provider requirements and qualification and their practice must be fully operational before they can be enrolled as Medicaid providers. * * * If a PA is employed by or contracts with a physician who can enroll as a Medicaid provider, the physician must enroll as a group provider and the PA must enroll as a treating provider within the group. * * * Services provided by a PA under the direct supervision of a physician may be billed using the physician's provider number instead of the PA's provider number. Direct physician supervision means the physician: (*) Is on the premises when the services are rendered, and (**) reviews, signs, and dates the medical record. * * * Medical records must state the necessity for and the extent of services provided. The following minimum requirements may vary according to the services rendered: * * * Note: See the service-specific Coverage and Limitations Handbook for record keeping requirements that are specific to a particular service. Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in this chapter may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid Payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Note: See Chapter 5 in this handbook for information on administrative sanctions and Medicaid payment recoupment. Petitioner, by signing a Medicaid provider agreement, agreed that all submissions for payment of claims for services will constitute a certification that the services were provided in accordance with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules and regulations applicable to the Medicaid program, including the Medical Provider Handbooks issued by the Agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Petitioner, Mazhar G. Nawaz, M.D., to repay Respondent the principal amount of $52,850.82 plus interest as provided in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2002). DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated federal and state laws addressing Medicaid payments, and, if so, what is an appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the single state agency charged with the administration of the Medicaid program in Florida pursuant to Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and federal law. One of AHCA's duties is to recover overpayments. Overpayments are any amounts paid to providers that were not authorized. Dr. Valente, during all times pertinent, was a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida. She was an authorized Medicaid Provider and held provider number 253493200. As such, she was on notice of Medicaid billing policy and rules. AHCA conducted a generalized analysis of obstetricians in Florida who submitted Medicaid claims during the period January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2005. AHCA investigated over-billing in three different categories: (1) excessive prenatal visits, (2) billing for Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening (Screening) more than once during a pregnancy, and billing for the W1992 Screening during the second and third trimesters. The W1992 Screening was and is only applicable to the first trimester of pregnancy. Dr. Valente was one of the obstetricians AHCA found to have over-billed in the three categories. With regard to Category 1, excessive prenatal visits, the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook provides, at page 2-53, that "Antepartum visits are limited to a maximum of 10 for low-medical risk recipients and 14 for high-medical risk recipients. Payment for antepartum care is based on a total amount for complete care. Antepartum care is prorated, based on an average standard of 10 visits for a low-medical risk recipient or 14 for a high-risk recipient. Reimbursement for the 10 or 14 visits is the maximum reimbursement for the full course of antepartum care. If additional visits are provided, payment is considered to have already been made, and the provider may not bill the additional visits to Medicaid or the recipient." For Category 1, the audit searched for instances when Dr. Valente billed for excessive prenatal visits 38 times, as follows: Patient 1: This was a high-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 16 visits, which was two more than the 14 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $102.00 more than allowed. Patient 2: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Therefore, according to AHCA, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. However, Dr. Valente stated, and medical records indicated, that Patient 2 was a high-risk patient even though her claimed Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook diagnosis code, 642.43, a code for high risk, did not appear on the billing submission. Upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 3: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente asserted that the patient was a high-risk patient because of high blood pressure. However, in the billing submission there is no code indicating high risk. Dr. Valente claimed at the hearing that it should have been coded 645.13. That is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 4: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente claimed the patient had an iron deficiency and should have been coded 281.2. That is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 5: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. The medical record revealed that Patient 5 was obese with poor sugar control, and Dr. Valente asserted she should have been coded 642.43, which is high risk. She did not use this code in the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 6: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. Dr. Valente stated that this was a high- risk patient because she was suffering from oligohydramnious. Dr. Valente did not code this on the bill. The code she claimed, 656.93, is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 7: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. This patient had lung problems. Dr. Valente asserted she should have been coded 496.0 and 491.2 instead of the V22.0 presented on the bill. Codes 496.0 and 491.2 are not high-risk codes. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 8: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for a patient that was not high risk. Dr. Valente suspected a possible birth defect and coded the patient 759.9 and 655.23. Code 655.23 is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente did not use this code in the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 9: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for only five visits, thus never reaching the ten visit threshold. The assertion that Dr. Valente over-billed with regard to Patient 9 was not proven. Patient 10: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the records revealed decreased fetal movement, codes 655.73 and V28.4. Code 655.73 is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente did not put this code on the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 11: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 12: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $50.00 more than allowed. Patient 13: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 14: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 12 visits, which was two more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $100.00 more than allowed. Patient 15: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 16: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 17: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 12 visits, which was two more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $104.00 more than allowed. Patient 18: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 19: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 20: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 21: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente said this patient was at risk for cervical cancer and entered diagnosis codes 795.0 and 795.09. These are not high- risk codes. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 22: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente stated, and the records revealed, that the patient had a psychiatric disorder and, therefore, should have had a diagnosis code of 648.43, which is high risk. Dr. Valente did not assert this code on the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, the amount billed was permissible. Patient 23: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. This patient's baby had dilated kidneys. The patient was coded 655.0, which is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 24: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente's records indicated that this patient had impending pre-eclampsia, which she coded 642.03, as hypertension. This is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente failed to assert that code on the Medicaid bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, Dr. Valente did not bill more than was permissible. Patient 25: This was a high-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 15 visits, which was one more than the 14 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $50.00 more than allowed. Patient 26: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 27: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the patient had a heart murmur and was asthmatic requiring medicine, which is code 493.0. She billed for 493.0, a high-risk code, and, therefore, was entitled to see the patient 14 times. Dr. Valente only saw the patient 11 times. Therefore, Dr. Valente did not bill more than allowed. Patient 28: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits that she coded V22.0. She said the patient had a childhood seizure disorder and should have been coded 345.0, which is high risk. Therefore, Dr. Valente did not bill more than allowed. Patient 29: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente found this patient to have high-risk viral cells and assigned diagnosis code 622.1. According to the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook, this is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 30: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 31: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 32: AHCA asserted that this was a low- risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which is one more than permitted. Dr. Valente stated that this patient had a mild pregnancy-induced hypertension and should have been assigned diagnosis code 642.43, which is high risk. However, no such code was assigned. The only code assigned on the Medicaid bill was V22.0. This is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 33: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the patient was an alcohol abuser and that the patient developed decreased fetal movement late in the pregnancy. Dr. Valente assigned the code 655.43, which is a high- risk code. The patient was entitled to 14 visits. Dr. Valente billed for 11, which was within the allowed limits. Patient 34: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 35: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 36: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient and that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente decided that the patient's baby was not reactive to a stress test, and the patient had to be induced. Dr. Valente coded this 658.03, which is not high risk. AHCA's witness, Dr. Franz, agreed with this. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 37: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 38: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. The total amount over-billed in Category 1 was $1,602.00. Category 2 addressed billing for the Screening more than once during a pregnancy. The Physician Coverage and Limitation Handbook provides for Florida's Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening. It states, "The Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening should be offered at the first antepartum visit. The antepartum visit that includes completion of the Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening is reimbursed once per pregnancy by billing code W1991 antepartum visit plus Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening, or W1992 antepartum visit plus Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening performed during the first trimester of pregnancy." Therefore, for Category 2, the audit searched for situations where there was more than one Healthy Start prenatal visit per pregnancy. In other words, a W1991 might be billed or a W1992 might be billed, but both could not be billed during a single pregnancy. The audit asserts this occurred nine times as follows: Patient 1: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $148. Patient 2: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $98. Patient 3: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 4: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a H1001, which is the Screening during the first trimester for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $104. Patient 5: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 6: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 7: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 8: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 9: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $150. The total amount overpaid in Category 2 was $1,000. Dr. Valente pointed out that even though she over-billed in this category, she should have received $50 on each occurrence for an office visit. Although this may be true, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this forum to make recommendations with regard to that. Category 3 included a search for billings for W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, that were made subsequent to the end of the first trimester. AHCA defines the first trimester as the first 13 weeks of a pregnancy. The Screening form says the first trimester is determined to be 13 weeks (or 91 days) from the date of the last menstrual cycle. The audit asserted 61 instances of billing for the Screening, subsequent to the first trimester. In determining whether the Screening was accomplished later than the first trimester, 181 days were subtracted from the delivery date. This meant that a Screening provided less than 181 days before delivery was, perforce, beyond the first trimester. The auditors found 61 instances where this occurred. Dr. Valente agreed that she screened subsequent to the first trimester for patients number 2-8, 11-14, 16-18, 20-22, 25-31, 33-36, 38, 40, 43-46, 48-49, 51-54, and 56-61. This amounted to 44 over-bills at $50 and two at $49.34, for a total of $2,298.68. When evaluating the audit at this point, it is helpful to recall that the medical records of the patients were not available when the final audit was issued, but they were available at the time of the hearing. The Medicaid bills for the Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening Instruments are typically submitted before the baby is born. Thus, the physician at the time of submission cannot know the actual delivery date with mathematical precision. Accordingly, the physician has to estimate the due date using the date of the last menstrual period (LMP); by ultrasounds; and by following the progress of the pregnancy. Moreover, babies arrive before their predicted due date as well as after. The disputed cases in Category 3 are discussed below. Patient 1: The estimated delivery date (EDD) was July 9, 2003. The actual delivery date was May 15, 2003. The EDD on December 3, 2002, was determined by ultrasound to be nine weeks and by LMP to be ten weeks. The Screening date was December 3, 2002. This was well within the 13-week window for the Screening. Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 9: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 10: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 15: An ultrasound on this patient on June 18, 2003, indicated the patient was nine weeks pregnant. The Screening was accomplished on the same day. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 19: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 23: The Screening for this patient is dated February 26, 2003, according to the Screening form signed by the patient. The delivery date provided to AHCA is incorrect because due to an absence of fetal heartbeat the patient experienced a "Suction D&E followed by sharp D&C of the uterine cavity." This occurred about the 13th week, on March 28, 2003. In other words, there was no delivery. However, the Screening was not signed at the bottom and that is a reason for rejecting payment. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 24: The Screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 32: This patient declined screening, so Dr. Valente over-billed $49.34. Patient 37: The Screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 39: This patient declined screening, so Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 41: The Screening date for this patient was October 30, 2002. The first ultrasound on this patient was provided on the same day and indicated the baby was at 12.7 weeks with an EDD of May 9, 2003. The baby was delivered April 19, 2003, which means it came earlier than anticipated and that the Screening was accomplished during the first trimester. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 42: The screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 47: The Screening for this patient listed on the AHCA spreadsheet was May 8, 2003. However, the form indicates it was signed by the patient on March 27, 2003. The patient's LMP was February 13, 2003, and the first ultrasound indicated the patient was eight and one-half weeks pregnant on April 10, 2003. Even if the Screening was accomplished May 8, 2003, as alleged, it was accomplished in the first trimester. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 55: The alleged Screening was accomplished August 7, 2003. The Screening date is unreadable as to month, but the day is 31. Dr. Valente's testimony is that it was in March and that the patient was at 11 weeks and three days. This appears more correct than AHCA's allegation. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. The over-payment alleged was a total of $3,048.68. The evidence indicates that on five occasions Dr. Valente was correct in her assertion that the Screening for five of the patients, at $50.00 per patient, was actually within the first trimester. Accordingly, it is found that Dr. Valente only owes $2,748.02 for Category 3. A request for records was sent to Dr. Valente via certified mail to the address she maintained on file with AHCA, on or about October 29, 2007. This provided Dr. Valente with the preliminary audit findings and invited her to illuminate or explain the findings so they could be adjusted if appropriate. The letter was returned. AHCA found a more current address and sent the same letter, and it was delivered to that address in Jacksonville on December 6, 2007. The receipt was signed by Dr. Valente's father. Eventually, Dr. Valente received the materials and called AHCA Investigator Terri Dean, who was listed as the contact point in the letter sent to Dr. Valente. Dr. Valente informed Investigator Dean that she could not get the records. Accordingly, the audit became final as written on March 21, 2008, and was provided to Dr. Valente. The report stated that Dr. Valente owed $6,118.68 for overpayments and should pay a $500.00 fine for failure to provide records. Dr. Valente provided the records about six months later, in late September or early October of 2008. AHCA reviewed the records and determined that there were overpayments in the amount of $7,344.00. Because litigation was already underway, AHCA did not attempt to extract the additional amount from Dr. Valente.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order requiring Dr. Grace Valente, M.D.: to pay the sum of $5,350.02 for the purpose of reimbursing improperly billed Medicaid services; to pay a fine of $1,500 for failing to provide medical records in a timely fashion; and to pay interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the sum of $5,350.02, from March 21, 2008, the date of the final audit report; and interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the sum of $1,500 from the date the final order is entered, until the sums are paid completely. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: William Blocker, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grace Valente, M.D. 3474 Paddle Point Spring Hill, Florida 34609 Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Holly Benson, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner is the state agency that administers the Florida Medicaid program, which includes pharmacies that participate in the program. The Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity is responsible for insuring that the goods and services billed to the Medicaid program are those that are actually provided to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid is a joint program, funded by the federal government and by the State of Florida, and is administered pursuant to both state and federal statutes and rules. All services or goods billed to the program must be necessary, Medicaid compensable, and must also have actually been provided to eligible recipients by providers prior to submitting claims. Any payment made by the Medicaid program for goods or services not actually provided to an eligible recipient is subject to recoupment by the Petitioner, and the provider is also subject to the imposition of administrative fines and exclusion from the program for a specified period of time. The Respondent is a community pharmacy located in a hispanic section of Miami, Florida, which has been owned and operated for the past six years by Frances Larin, a licensed pharmacist, who makes all drug purchases and does all Medicaid billings at the pharmacy herself. Most of Respondent's customers have limited financial resources and are Medicaid recipients. The Respondent has participated in the Medicaid program for approximately eight years, and has not previously been charged with overbilling the Medicaid program. The Respondent has cooperated fully with the Petitioner throughout these proceedings. Prior Review From February to April 1988, the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity had a review performed of the Respondent's billings to Medicaid from March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. This review was conducted for the Petitioner by the Foundation for Health Care, Inc. (Foundation), contract auditors, and resulted in the determination that the Respondent had overbilled the Medicaid program for prescription drugs dispensed to program recipients during the review period. In performing this review, the Foundation used an across-the-board Medicaid percentage of 54% in determining the available units of the various drugs on hand for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. Based upon the Foundation's review, the Petitioner sought recoupment for overpayments in the amount of $28,649.99 by letter to the Respondent dated July 20, 1988, as well as an administrative fine of $7,162.49, and a three month suspension from the program. The Respondent timely sought a formal administrative hearing in which it disputed the results of the Foundation review. However, after the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Petitioner withdrew its notice of overpayment and imposition of administrative sanctions, and thus, without a determination on the merits, the Division of Administrative Hearings file was closed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Petitioner. Subsequently, the Petitioner entered a Final Order which provided that the Respondent would be re-audited. The Respondent timely sought judicial review of this Final Order in which it challenged that Petitioner's right to conduct a further review of the period March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. However, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, dismissed the Respondent's appeal, and the Petitioner proceeded with a further review. The KPMG Review (a) For purposes of its further review, the Petitioner employed the public accounting and management consulting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick which designed a statistically valid sampling methodology to determine the Respondent's Medicaid percentage for each drug, and also to perform a management review of the Respondent. It was established by competent substantial evidence in the record, and in particular by the expert testimony in statistics from Dr. Robert Ladner and Robert Peirce, that the KPMG methodology was statistically valid. The KPMG review was conducted during the latter half of 1989, and included developing a Medicaid percentage for individual drugs based upon an analysis of prescriptions for all drugs in question to determine the portion of each drug's total sales that went to Medicaid recipients, calculating the total units claimed for each drug for which the Respondent sought reimbursement during the audit period, and calculating the total units purchased by the Respondent for each drug claimed for reimbursement during the audit period. The Medicaid percentage of each drug was then applied to total purchases for each specific drug to determine the amount of each drug that was on hand at the Respondent's pharmacy for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. This number of available units was then compared with the total units claimed for reimbursement. Where the units claimed exceeded the units available for dispensing, a positive variance was noted, and this number of excess units claimed was then multiplied by the per unit reimbursement amount for that particular drug in order to obtain the amount of the apparent overbilling for that particular drug. Where the total units available for dispensing exceeded the total units claimed for a particular drug, a negative variance was noted. It was stipulated by the parties that negative variances did not indicate underpayments, and the evidence, including specifically the testimony and report of Dr. Victor Pestien, an expert in statistics, does not establish that such negative variances should be offset against the positive variances or that they in any way reduce the positive variances. This is the first instance in which this methodology has been utilized by the Petitioner in seeking a recoupment of an alleged Medicaid overpayment from a pharmacy, and this methodology was not set forth in any rule or regulation of the Petitioner that had been adopted at any time material hereto. Previous audits used an overall Medicaid percentage to calculate the portion of a pharmacy's business that was comprised of Medicaid recipients, and the quantity of drugs that were available to them. Using a drug specific Medicaid percentage, however, is a more accurate and conservative approach to determining overpayments than using a fixed percentage. Based upon the consideration of all evidence in the record, it is specifically found that the greater weight of evidence establishes that the methodology used by KPMG in this review for calculating Medicaid percentages was sound and reasonable, and in no way precluded the Respondent from presenting additional competent substantial evidence to the Petitioner, or at hearing, which would have established different Medicaid percentages for particular drugs. (a) The type of review conducted by KPMG is known as an aggregate analysis, a generally accepted type of statistical analysis, in which drugs that have been billed to and paid for by the Medicaid program are reviewed to determine whether the pharmacy under review purchased or otherwise acquired a sufficient quantity of drugs to justify its billings to Medicaid. Interchangeable brand-name drugs and generic equivalents were grouped together so that in conducting this review, whole equivalent groups of drugs were considered as one type of drug, regardless of differences in individual product names. To obtain a statistically random sample, prescriptions were put in numerical order and every fourth prescription for the review period was examined, and since prescriptions may be refilled for up to a year after they are originally filled, reviewers also examined every prescription for the year prior to the review period. Competent substantial evidence establishes that KPMG performed an appropriate and valid statistical analysis, and that they used an acceptable sampling methodology which produced a truly random result. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that before a drug can be claimed to have been dispensed and billed to Medicaid, the pharmacy under review must have that drug in its possession. (b) The approach taken by KPMG and the Petitioner was to be as conservative as possible in resolving all uncertainties and questions which arose during the course of this review in favor of the Respondent. KPMG did not conduct a financial audit of the Respondent, but did prepare a management report based upon its review of Respondent's operations during the audit period. Data used by KPMG in its methodology in calculating the amount paid by Medicaid to the Respondent, the unit price of drugs dispensed, and the quantity claimed by Respondent for payment by Medicaid, was derived from computer based information provided by the Petitioner's fiscal agent. During the period of time being reviewed in this case, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was the Petitioner's fiscal agent, while Consultec was the Petitioner's fiscal agent during the period when the KPMG review was actually being performed. When Consultec was selected as the Petitioner's fiscal agent and replaced EDS on January 1, 1989, EDS turned over its computer records to the new agent by copying all of its magnetic, computer files, along with supporting microfiche documentation, which it then provided to Consultec under the supervision of the Petitioner. Upon receipt of these magnetic tapes, Consultec placed them in a controlled environment vault, and then later converted the information on these tapes to a new format used by Consultec. It was established by competent substantial evidence that in this process, no data was added, deleted or changed in any manner. The "units claimed" data was subsequently provided by computer download from the Consultec claims data base directly to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity. It was established by competent substantial evidence that data regarding claims which originated with EDS passed through Consultec to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity unchanged. Specific information regarding Respondent, including the claimed quantity of drugs dispensed and amounts paid, was accessed by staff in the Office of Program Integrity, randomly verified, and then made available to KPMG. Both Consultec and EDS are nationally recognized data processing and management companies. Competent substantial evidence established that the claims processing function utilized by the Petitioner in the Medicaid program during the period at issue was subject to several quality control checks to insure that claims were properly processed and appropriate payments were made. On occasion claim adjustments were made, but these were reasonable and for good cause, such as a substantiated underpayment. The computer hardware utilized in this process was reliable and properly maintained. In order to verify the data used by KPMG concerning the dollar amount of claims paid and the quantity of units of medication claimed, an "audit trail" was performed using 140 randomly selected sample claims by tracing each claim from its claim reference number to its associated remittance voucher and cancelled checks, where available. This audit trail verified that the data used as the basis for quantity claimed and total dollars paid was valid and reliable. The KPMG review was not limited to the top 100 drugs, by volume claimed, during the audit period, but included each drug dispensed by the Respondent to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. In its report dated November 20, 1989, KPMG calculated a total Medicaid overpayment to Respondent of $30,452.59, and based thereon, the Petitioner notified the Respondent that it was seeking recoupment of this amount, as well as an administrative fine of $2,000 and termination from the Medicaid program for at least two years. Subsequently, however, the Petitioner and KPMG reviewed and considered additional invoices documenting additional purchases of drugs in question by the Respondent during the audit period, and prepared a revised report dated August 30, 1990. Based upon this revised report, the Petitioner sought recoupment of a revised, reduced overpayment calculated to be $21,939.93, as well as a $2,000 administrative fine and a minimum two year termination from the program, and it was on this basis that this matter proceeded to final hearing. The Top 100 Drugs Subsequent to the final hearing, the Petitioner issued an amended recoupment letter dated October 17, 1990, which limited the recoupment it is seeking in this matter to the top 100 drugs, by dollar volume of claims, plus their generic equivalents. This resulted in the elimination of many individual drugs with relatively small overpayments from the list of overpayments, and left only five instances among these top 100 drugs where the difference between the quantity available, adjusted for standard error, and the quantity claimed is less than 100 units. In many instances the difference is well in excess of 1,000 units. The sanctions being sought in this amended recoupment letter further reduced the recoupment being sought to $12,643.11, reduced the administrative fine to $1,400, and reduced the period of exclusion from the program that is being sought to 16 months. However, due to an error in calculating the top 100 drugs and equivalents, the Petitioner issued a second amended recoupment letter dated October 26, 1990, further reducing the administrative fine sought to $1,200 and reducing the period of exclusion to 14 months. Inventory Analysis In performing its review, KPMG obtained information concerning the quantities of drugs purchased during the review period by the Respondent directly from the pharmacy's wholesalers and from a review of invoices retained by the Respondent for a period that included one month prior to the review period through one month after the review period (February 1, 1987, to January 31, 1988). The effect of seasonal variations in pharmacy sales and ordering patterns was also taken into account, and balanced, by extending this period to a full twelve months. All documentation concerning drug acquisitions was requested from Respondent, and the information received and considered by KPMG and the Petitioner was checked for reasonableness by a consultant pharmacist and cross validated by two reviewers. It was stipulated by the parties that the Respondent's main wholesaler, Gulf Distribution, Inc., had and maintained accurate information and records regarding its sales to the Respondent, and that it properly transferred that information to computer disks which were provided to KPMG. Subsequent thereto, additional invoices were discovered and were also made available to KPMG. The Petitioner stipulated that these additional invoices from Gulf did not reduce the number of drug units purchased by, and invoiced to, Respondent. Pharmacies in Florida which choose to participate in the Medicaid program are required to maintain complete and accurate patient and fiscal records which fully substantiate the extent of services rendered and billings made for a period of five years from the date of billing or service, and are also required to retain all invoices from wholesalers, or from the transfer or receipt of drugs through barter or exchange, for a period of five years. (a) Actual beginning and ending inventories of the top 100 drugs reviewed by KPMG for which the Petitioner now seeks recoupment in the amount of $12,643.11 were not determined. Rather, an estimate of inventory on hand was derived by counting invoices of all drug acquisitions through purchase, transfer or exchange made by the Respondent during the review period, as well as invoices of acquisitions made one month prior to and one month after the review period. Additionally, all documentation provided by the Respondent of bulk, or large, acquisitions made during or prior to the review period was also considered and included in the Petitioner's estimate of inventory. It was established by competent substantial evidence that pharmacies generally keep a drug inventory consisting of a two to two-and-a-half week supply on hand, and acquire drugs in anticipation of future sales rather than as a replacement of inventory depletion from past sales. Therefore, a basic assumption of the KPMG methodology, relied upon and accepted by the Petitioner, that Respondent had only those drugs available for dispensing which were obtained by invoiced purchase from wholesalers, or through transfer or exchange, between February 1, 1987 and January 31, 1988, as well as documented invoiced bulk purchases prior to this time period, is reasonable. At hearing, the Respondent established that a significant quantity of nine specific drugs were purchased during the review period from suppliers other than Gulf that were not considered by KPMG. These drugs include Xanax (.5 mg.), Inderal (10 mg.), Tagamet (300 mg.), Nitrostat (.4 mg.), Trental (400 mg.), Motrin (400 mg.), Motrin (600 mg.), Quinamm (260 mg.), and Quinidine Sulfate (200 mg.). It is, therefore, found that the overpayment of $2,902.19 calculated by KPMG and relied upon by the Petitioner for these particular drugs has not been supported by competent substantial evidence. Frances Larin, Respondent's owner and operator, testified that she did not follow the generally accepted practice of retaining only a two to two-and-a- half week supply of drugs on hand. Rather, she testified that for a significant number of the top 100 drugs at issue in this proceeding, she would purchase large quantites in bulk, and was thus able to draw down on these inventories without making additional purchases of particular drugs for over a year. The Respondent sought to establish that due to very large beginning inventories of particular drugs at issue, it was able to legitimately dispense more units during the review period than it purchased during the same time. However, the Respondent did not produce evidence in support of its position, such as invoices for bulk purchases which KPMG or the Petitioner did not consider, or complete records of bartering or transfers which had not been considered, and which would have supported its claim of a significantly larger beginning inventory for these particular drugs than would be the generally accepted practice. To the contrary, competent substantial evidence in the record, as well as the demeanor of Larin while testifying, establishes that Respondent's claim is unreasonable and lacks credibility. The deposition testimony of JoAnn Padell is outweighed by the testimony of Deborah Launer, Susan McCleod, and Robert Peirce. A review of the Respondent's purchasing patterns clearly shows that Respondent generally and routinely kept low inventories of drugs on hand, placing daily orders with Gulf to obtain drugs on an as-needed basis. Recoupment Based upon the foregoing, it is found that competent substantial evidence establishes that the Respondent overbilled the Medicaid program during the review period at issue in this case in the amount of $9,740.92 ($12,643.11 claimed in the second amended recoupment letter minus the $2,902.19 claim associated with the nine specific drugs for which significant purchases were omitted from the KPMG review, as found above at Finding 13). Petitioner is authorized to recoup the established overpayment of $9,740.92 from the Respondent. Sanctions (a) In determining the sanctions stated in the second amended recoupment letter which Petitioner seeks to impose upon the Respondent, the Petitioner considered the provisions of Section 409.266(13), Florida Statutes, as well as the impact which sanctioning this Medicaid provider would have upon Medicaid recipients. Competent substantial evidence establishes that there are eight pharmacies which accept Medicaid within a one mile radius from the Respondent's location, and twenty-six such pharmacies within a two mile radius. Medicaid recipients are issued new cards each month and may transfer pharmacies at the beginning of each month. Therefore, it is found that Medicaid recipients would not be substantially affected by the imposition of sanctions upon the Respondent. The parties stipulated that the sanction matrix set forth in Rule10C- 7.063, Florida Administrative Code, was not applied by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case because it was not in effect at the time of this review. The sanctions which the Petitioner seeks to impose against the Respondent, therefore, are based upon non-rule policy which must be explicated in this proceeding. In seeking to explicate its non-rule policy upon which the sanctions set forth in the second amended recoupment letter are based, the Petitioner established that it was concerned that sanctions imposed in prior cases, as well as in the original recoupment letter which had been sent to the Respondent in this case, had been too lenient in view of the seriousness of Medicaid violations. The Petitioner developed its non-rule sanctions policy after the KPMG review had been completed, and based its proposal upon the maximum sanctions set forth in state and federal statutes and rules. Specifically, Section 409.266(12), Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fine of $10,000; the maximum exclusion period applied in previous cases by the Office of Program Integrity is ten years, and the minimum exclusionary period imposed by the federal government has been five years for the failure to supply payment information. At hearing, the Petitioner explained that it first determined the percent of Respondent's total Medicaid payments that the overpayment represented, and then applied that percentage to these maximum sanctions allowed under law and existing policy. The overpayment of $12,643.11 claimed by the Petitioner in its second amended letter of recoupment is 12% of the total payment of $100,397.88 made by the Petitioner to Respondent for the review period, and 12% of the maximum fine and exclusion period is $1,200 and 14 months, respectively. While the Petitioner explained the manner by which this exclusionary period and fine were calculated, it did not explicate its non-rule policy by establishing a reasonable, rational basis for applying the percentage of Medicaid overbillings to the maximum fine and exclusionary period. Certainly, the arithmetic calculation used to arrive at these proposed sanctions is clear, but there was no explication through competent substantial evidence which would establish that there is a basis in fact or logic for this calculation. Therefore, it is found that the Petitioner's non-rule policy used to propose these sanctions is arbitrary and capricious. Due to the lack of any evidentiary basis in the record which would support the imposition of the sanctions of an administrative fine or a period of exclusion from the Medicaid program, the Petitioner is not authorized to impose sanctions on the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order which requires that Respondent to repay the Petitioner for Medicaid overbillings in the amount of $9,704.92, but which does not impose sanctions consisting of either an administrative fine or period of exclusion. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Findings 4 and 5. 7-10. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 11-17. Rejected as unnecessary. 18-20. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7. 21-24. Adopted in Finding 12. 25. Adopted in Finding 2. 26-28. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 29-30. Adopted in Finding 8. 31-32. Adopted in Findings 7 and 10. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as unnecessary. 35-39. Adopted in Finding 7. 40-47. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 48. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 49-51. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54-63. Adopted in Finding 12, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 9. 66-67. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 68-69. Adopted in Finding 9. 70-78. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 79-82. Adopted in Finding 8. 83-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-93. Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 94-97. Adopted in Finding 14, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 98-103. Adopted in Finding 14. 104-105 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 106-107 Adopted in Finding 12. 108. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 109-112 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 113-115 Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. Adopted in Finding 11. 118-119 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 120-122 Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. 125-128 Rejected as unnecessary. 129. Adopted in Finding 6. 130-132 Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 11. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 135-147 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 148. Adopted in Finding 11. 149-150 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 151-152 Rejected as unnecessary. 153. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 4. 2-3. Adopted in Finding 5, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 6 and 7. 6-7. Adopted in Finding 10, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in Finding 11. 10-11. Adopted in Finding 3, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 14-15. Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as immaterial. Adopted in Finding 13, but Rejected in Finding 14 and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding and as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding 14, as immaterial, speculative, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 20-21. Rejected in Finding 6, as immaterial, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 22-23. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14. 26-30. Rejected as a statement of the Respondent's position and not a proposed finding, as speculative and contrary to competent substantial evidence, and as totally without citation to authority in the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. 31-35. Rejected in Finding 6, and as not based on competent substantial evidence and as unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 39-41. Adopted in Finding 8. 42. Rejected as immaterial. 43-44. Rejected in Finding 9. 45. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a proposed finding. 46-48. Rejected in Finding 9, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. 49-50. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 51. Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 16. 56-57. Adopted in Finding 16. 58-61. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 62. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 15. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esquire Building Six, Room 233 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 James J. Breen, Esquire Michael P. Scian, Esquire 900 Sun Bank Building 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, Acting General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert B. Williams, Acting Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
