The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Petitioner by the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") for services performed during the audit period of December 4, 1996 to December 4, 1998, and, if so, what is the total amount of these overpayments.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Parties Petitioner is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 29615. His specialty area of practice is general or family practice. His office is located in Brandon, Florida. AHCA is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of AHCA's duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes. The Provider Agreement During the audit period, Petitioner was authorized to provide physician services to eligible Medicaid patients. Petitioner provided such services pursuant to Medicaid Provider Agreements he entered into with AHCA and its predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, on November 27, 1992, and December 3, 1996. The 1996 Provider Agreement, in effect at the time of the audit, contained the following provisions, among others: Quality of Service. The provider agrees to provide medically necessary services or goods of not less than the scope and quality it provides to the general public. The provider agrees that services or goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary, of a quality comparable to those furnished by the provider's peers, and within the parameters permitted by the provider's license or certification. The provider further agrees to bill only for the services performed within the specialty or specialties designated in the provider application on file with the Agency. The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time. * * * 5. Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid [sic]. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as otherwise provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (including but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid- related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. * * * (f) Within 90 days of receipt, refund any moneys received in error or in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled from the Medicaid program. Handbook Provisions Among the "manuals and handbooks" referenced in paragraph 3 of the Provider Agreement in effect during the audit period were the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HFCA- 1500 ("Reimbursement Handbook") and the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook ("C&L Handbook"), with their periodic updates. The term "medically necessary" was defined in Appendix D of the Reimbursement Handbook as follows, in relevant part: Medically Necessary or Medical Necessity Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: (a) Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and Be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. . . . Chapter 3 of the C&L Handbook sets forth procedure codes to be used by physicians in claiming reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid recipients. The origin of the procedural and diagnosis codes is as follows, in relevant part: The procedure codes listed in this chapter are Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) Levels 1, 2, and 3. These are based on the Physician's Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book. The CPT includes HCPCS descriptive terms and numeric identifying codes and modifiers for reporting services and procedures. . . . The CPT book is a systematic listing and coding of procedures and services provided by physicians. Each procedure or service is identified with a five digit code. For purposes of this proceeding, the relevant section of the CPT book is "Evaluation and Management-- Office or Other Outpatient Services," which sets forth the codes used to report evaluation and management services provided in the physician's office or in an outpatient or other ambulatory facility. The CPT book sets forth instructions for selecting the proper level of Evaluation and Management ("E/M") service, as follows in relevant part: Review the Level of E/M Service Descriptors and Examples in the Selected Category or Subcategory The descriptors for the levels of E/M services recognize seven components, six of which are used in defining the levels of E/M services. These components are: history; examination; medical decision making; counseling; coordination of care; nature of presenting problem; and time. The first three of these components (i.e., history, examination, and medical decision making) should be considered the key components in selecting the level of E/M services. . . . Determine the Extent of History Obtained The extent of the history is dependent upon clinical judgment and on the nature of the presenting problem(s). The levels of E/M services recognize four types of history that are defined as follows: Problem focused: chief complaint; brief history of present illness or problem. Expanded problem focused: chief complaint; brief history of present illness; problem pertinent system review. Detailed: chief complaint; extended history of present illness; problem pertinent system review extended to include a review of a limited number of additional systems; pertinent past, family, and/or social history directly related to the patient's problems. Comprehensive: chief complaint; extended history of present illness; review of systems which is directly related to the problem(s) identified in the history of the present illness plus a review of all additional body systems; complete past, family and social history. The comprehensive history obtained as part of the preventive medicine evaluation and management service is not problem-oriented and does not involve a chief complaint or present illness. It does, however, include a comprehensive system review and comprehensive or interval past, family and social history as well as a comprehensive assessment/history of pertinent risk factors. Determine the Extent of Examination Performed The extent of the examination performed is dependent on clinical judgment and on the nature of the presenting problem(s). The levels of E/M services recognize four types of examination that are defined as follows: Problem focused: a limited examination of the affected body area or organ system. Expanded problem focused: a limited examination of the affected body area or organ system and other symptomatic or related organ system(s). Detailed: an extended examination of the affected body area(s) and other symptomatic or related organ system(s). Comprehensive: a general multi-system examination or a complete examination of a single organ system. Note: The comprehensive examination performed as part of the preventive medicine evaluation and management service is multi-system, but its extent is based on age and risk factors identified. For the purposes of these CPT definitions, the following body areas are recognized: Head, including the face Neck Chest, including breasts and axilla Abdomen Genitalia, groin, buttocks Back Each extremity For the purposes of these CPT definitions, the following organ systems are recognized: Eyes Ears, Nose, Mouth and Throat Cardiovascular Respiratory Gastrointestinal Genitourinary Musculoskeletal Skin Neurologic Psychiatric Hematologic/Lymphatic/Immunologic Determine the Complexity of Medical Decision Making Medical decision making refers to the complexity of establishing a diagnosis and/or selecting a management option as measured by: the number of possible diagnoses and/or the number of management options that must be considered; the amount and/or complexity of medical records, diagnostic tests, and/or other information that must be obtained, reviewed and analyzed; and the risk of significant complications, morbidity and/or mortality, as well as comorbidities, associated with the patient's presenting problem(s), the diagnostic procedure(s) and/or the possible management options. Four types of medical decision making are recognized: straightforward; low complexity; moderate complexity; and high complexity. To qualify for a given type of decision making, two of the three elements in Table 2 below must be met or exceeded. Comorbidities/underlying diseases, in and of themselves, are not considered in selecting a level of E/M services unless their presence significantly increases the complexity of the medical decision making. The referenced Table 2, titled "Complexity of Medical Decision Making," sets forth guidelines for the four types of decision-making (straightforward, low complexity, moderate complexity, and high complexity) in terms of the relative number and/or complexity of three elements: number of diagnoses or management options (minimal, limited, multiple, or extensive); amount and/or complexity of data to be reviewed (minimal or none, limited, moderate, or extensive); and risk of complications and/or morbidity or mortality (minimal, low, moderate, or high). The "Office or Other Outpatient Services" section of the CPT book provides the codes for those services in terms of the guidelines set forth above. Five codes of increasing complexity are provided for new patients, and five counterpart codes are provided for established patients: New Patient 99201 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: a problem focused history; a problem focused examination; and straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are self- limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99202 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; and straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 20 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99203 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; and medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 30 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99204 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99205 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient which requires these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problems are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Established Patient 99211 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient that may or may not require the presence of a physician. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are minimal. Typically, 5 minutes are spent performing or supervising these services. 99212 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a problem focused history; a problem focused examination; straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self- limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99213 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: an expanded problem focused history; an expanded problem focused examination; medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99214 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a detailed history; a detailed examination; medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 25 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99215 Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 40 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Medicaid reimburses physicians according to the level of complexity of the office visit. The more complex the visit (and hence the higher the CPT code number), the greater the level of reimbursement. The Audit During the audit period, Petitioner submitted 2,215 Medicaid claims for services rendered to 382 patients, for which he received Medicaid payments of $134,469.21. In making a determination of overpayment, AHCA is not required to review each and every Medicaid claim submitted by a provider. Section 409.913(19), Florida Statutes, permits the agency to employ "appropriate statistical methods," including "sampling and extension to the population," to make its determination. In this instance, AHCA randomly selected a "cluster sample" of 39 patients from the 382 Medicaid patients to whom Petitioner had provided services during the audit period, and asked Petitioner to produce the medical records he had on file for these 39 patients. AHCA chose the cluster sample of 39 patients according to a statistical formula indicating a 95 percent probability that any overpayment amount would be at least the amount identified. By selecting the 95 percent confidence factor, AHCA attempted to ensure that any potential error in the audit would be resolved in favor of the audited physician. AHCA's statistical expert, Dr. Mark Johnson, validated the methodology used by AHCA. Dr. Johnson not only reviewed AHCA's work, but conducted his own independent analysis that reproduced AHCA's results. Dr. Johnson's testimony as to the reliability of AHCA's methodology is credited. Copies of the medical records were provided to AHCA by Zheila Galvez, the office assistant in charge of Petitioner's billings, on or about March 1, 1999. Ms. Galvez certified that she provided AHCA the complete medical records for the 39 patients, and acknowledged that these records would provide the only information AHCA would use in its audit. Petitioner was later provided an opportunity to supplement the records, but provided nothing further to the agency. At the hearing, counsel for Petitioner objected that AHCA failed to prove that the records it produced in evidence were the complete records as provided to AHCA by Ms. Galvez. The objection was rejected. No evidence was presented to show that AHCA mishandled the documents. Petitioner made no claim that a specific record was missing, and Petitioner was in the best position to know whether the records were complete. Petitioner had submitted a total of 232 claims for services rendered to the 39 patients in the cluster sample during the audit period. Each of these claims was reviewed by AHCA to determine whether it was supported by information contained in the medical records produced by Petitioner in response to AHCA's request. AHCA employee Dr. John Sullenberger, a physician who was not in active practice, performed the initial audit, reviewing all the claims for the 39 patient cluster sample. Dr. Sullenberger's work resulted in the First Audit Report that concluded Petitioner had been overpaid $72,724.89. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, AHCA withdrew Dr. Sullenberger's audit because newly enacted Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, mandated "peer review" in agency determinations of overpayment. Dr. Sullenberger did not meet the statutory definition of "peer" because he was not in active practice. See Section 409.9131(2)(c), Florida Statutes. AHCA engaged Dr. Timothy Walker, an active, Board- certified family practice physician who is a faculty member of Tallahassee Memorial Hospital's Family Practice Residency Program, to perform a second audit. Through Dr. Walker's deposition testimony, AHCA established that Dr. Walker's background, work experience and education establish him as an expert in CPT coding, qualified to render an opinion on the propriety of Petitioner's coding and billing practices. Dr. Walker reviewed the records that Petitioner had provided regarding the 39 patients in the cluster sample to determine whether there was documentation to support the Medicaid claims relating to these patients. Dr. Walker's review found that Petitioner exclusively billed the highest levels of CPT coding for outpatient services, i.e., 99205 for new patients and 99215 for established patients. Dr. Walker found that Petitioner failed to document a level of service consistent with these codes. Dr. Walker performed his own review of Petitioner's medical records and noted his conclusions as to the level of CPT coding that could be supported by the record of each patient for each visit to Petitioner's office. Dr. Walker found that all of the visits should have been billed at lower levels, based on the documentation provided by Petitioner. Dr. Walker's testimony is credited as to his review of Petitioner's records. Margarete Johnson, AHCA's registered nursing consultant, performed the calculations by which Dr. Walker's conclusions as to the proper coding were translated into dollar figures. These calculations were a simple function of addition and subtraction, using the relevant Medicaid reimbursement amounts for the various codes. Petitioner had been reimbursed $14,101.44 for the claims related to the 39 patients. Following Dr. Walker's analysis, Ms. Johnson calculated that $8,520.59 of that amount constituted overpayments. Using the generally accepted, appropriate, and valid statistical formula described by Dr. Johnson, AHCA extended this result to the total population of 2,215 Medicaid claims that Petitioner had submitted for services rendered during the audit period, and correctly calculated that Petitioner had been overpaid a total of $77,848.16. Petitioner did not present a case-in-chief. Petitioner's only exhibits were three pages that duplicated documents presented by AHCA, except for the fact that they carried an additional, later agency date stamp not found on those presented by AHCA. Petitioner claimed that these documents proved that AHCA did not produce its entire file on Petitioner during discovery or at the hearing. AHCA's witness Jack Williams explained that the extra, later date stamp on these documents resulted from Petitioner's having re-submitted these pages to AHCA as exhibits to his petition for formal hearing. This explanation was sufficient to allay any suspicion that AHCA's production was less than complete. On the strength of the evidence and testimony presented by AHCA, and in the absence of any evidence or testimony to the contrary, it is found that Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments in the amount of $77,848.16.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Petitioner received $77,848.16 in Medicaid overpayments for services rendered to his Medicaid patients from December 4, 1996 to December 4, 1998, and requiring him to repay this amount to the agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald W. Weidner, Esquire Matthew D. Weidner, Esquire Weidner, Bowden & Weidner 11265 Alumni Way, Suite 201 Jacksonville, Florida 32246 Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues presented are whether Petitioner is responsible for reimbursing the Agency for Health Care Administration for an overpayment for Medicaid services and, if so, whether administrative sanctions should be applied.
Findings Of Fact From April 19, 1995, through October 30, 1996, Petitioner was a pharmacy licensed to do business in the State of Florida. From April 15, 1995, through October 30, 1996, Petitioner was a Medicaid provider in good standing, pursuant to a Medicaid contract with the Agency. In 1996 Kathryn Holland, an agency employee, conducted an audit of Petitioner's records, using a method which the Agency calls an aggregate analysis. This analysis focuses on the inventory of a Medicaid provider and analyzes invoices and other documentation to determine if the provider had available during the audit period sufficient quantities of goods or products to support the quantity of goods or products billed to Medicaid. Holland analyzed the Agency's records to ascertain the claims filed by Petitioner and the amounts paid to Petitioner. She compiled a list of those drugs most frequently billed to the Agency's Medicaid program by Petitioner and selected 23 medications. She selected April 1, 1995, through October 30, 1996, as the audit period. She contacted Petitioner and requested records showing Petitioner's purchases of the medications on that list. She also contacted Mason Distributors, Inc., and H. I. Moore, Inc., two of Petitioner's primary suppliers, and requested copies of their invoices for medications purchased by Petitioner between May 1, 1995, and October 28, 1996. She prepared charts of the invoices and other documents received as a result of her requests. She reduced the number of audited drugs to 20 based upon adequate documentation provided to her for three of the listed medications. She prepared a preliminary report, which she sent to Petitioner with a request that Petitioner supply her with any additional records to show that additional supplies of the listed medication were available to Petitioner during the audit period. Petitioner responded to that request by providing additional documentation. Holland did not credit Petitioner with additional supplies based upon the additional documentation because the invoices appeared to be for a different pharmacy or appeared to reflect purchases outside the audit period. Further, the cancelled checks were payable to cash, had no notation as to the purpose of the checks, had a notation reflecting only a "business expense," had a notation for medication not on Holland's list, or reflected purchases outside the audit period. Petitioner was unable to document sufficient inventory during the audit period to justify the amount of medication billed to, and paid for by, the Agency. The Agency overpaid Petitioner in the amount of $12,529.11 for the 20 listed medications during the audit period and is entitled to reimbursement by Petitioner in that amount.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered determining that Petitioner is responsible to repay the Agency in the amount of $12,529.11 by a date certain, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000, and terminating Petitioner from the Medicaid program for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Mark Thomas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Highpoint Center, Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent has been the state agency charged with responsibility for overseeing the Florida Medicaid Program, including the recovery of overpayments to Medicaid providers pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was an authorized Medicaid provider, having been issued provider number 377290000. Petitioner had valid Medicaid Provider Agreements with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) during the Audit Period, which began on January 1, 1996, and ended on May 10, 1999. Petitioner graduated from the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine in 1987, did an internship at Tulane University, did a residency in internal medicine at Eastern Virginia Graduate Medical School, and did a fellowship in hematology at Washington Hospital Center. He served as Chief of Hematology for Kessler Medical Center in Biloxi, Mississippi, while serving in the United States Air Force (with the rank of major). At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was licensed to practice medicine in Florida, Virginia, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was employed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as a Medical Officer, Health Scientist Administrator. Petitioner served as an advisor to the director of the NIH on issues related to HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome). Petitioner’s specialty is internal medicine with a sub- specialty in hematology. Petitioner has extensive experience treating persons suffering with HIV and AIDS dating back to 1987. Pursuant to his Medicaid Provider Agreements, Petitioner agreed to: (1) retain for five years complete and accurate medical records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program; (2) bill Medicaid only for services or goods that are medically necessary; and (3) abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. Respondent audited Petitioner’s Medicaid claims during the Audit Period and conducted a peer review of Petitioner’s billings and medical records of 25 of Petitioner’s patients as part of that audit.2 Joseph W. Shands, M.D., conducted the peer review of the documentation provided by Petitioner for purposes of the audit conducted by AHCA. Dr. Shands first reviewed documentation provided by Petitioner in 1999. He had no further participation in the audit until he reviewed information in preparation for his deposition in this proceeding. Dr. Shands graduated from medical school in 1956, trained in internal medicine, and worked as a microbiologist for approximately 15 years. He served as Chief of Infectious Diseases at the University of Florida for 23 years and also treated patients through the Alachua County Public Health Department and Shands Hospital at the University of Florida. Dr. Shands' practice was devoted almost entirely to the treatment of patients diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. Dr. Shands retired from the practice of medicine in May 2002. For three years prior to his retirement, Dr. Shands practiced medicine part-time. Petitioner was sent a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) dated May 25, 1999, that found an overpayment in the amount of $862,576.72. In response to that PAAR, Petitioner had the attorney representing him at that time respond to AHCA in writing. The letter from the attorney, dated June 2, 1999, requested a copy of AHCA’s supporting materials and clarification of certain matters. AHCA did not respond. AHCA issued its FAAR on January 22, 2004, asserting that Petitioner was overpaid by the Florida Medicaid Program in the total amount of $261,336.14 for services that in whole or in part were not covered by Medicaid. There was no plausible explanation why the FAAR was not issued until 2004, whereas the audit period ended in 1999. The difference between the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the PAAR and the amount of the alleged overpayment reflected by the FAAR is attributable to the use of different methodologies in calculating the amounts overpaid. The FAAR used the correct methodology that was not challenged by Petitioner. The FAAR sets forth five categories of alleged overpayments. Each category accurately describes an overpayment based on applicable Medicaid billing criteria. The five categories are as follows: Medicaid policy specifies how medical records must be maintained. A review of your medical records revealed that some service for which you billed and received payment were not documented. Medicaid requires documentation of the services and considers payments made for services not appropriately documented an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category I.) Medicaid policy defines the varying levels of care and expertise required for the evaluation and management procedure codes for office visits. The documentation you provided supports a lower level of office visit than the one for which you billed and received payment. The difference between the amount you were paid and the correct payment for the appropriate level of service is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category II.) Medicaid policy addresses the type of pathology services covered by Medicaid. You billed and received payment for laboratory tests that were performed outside your facility by an independent laboratory. Payments made to you in these instances are considered overpayments. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category III.) Medicaid policy requires the Medicaid services be provided by or under the personal supervision of a physician. Personal supervision is defined as the physician being in the building when the services are rendered and signing and dating the medical records within twenty-four hours of service delivery. You billed and received payment for services which your medical records reflect you neither personally provided nor supervised. Payment made to you for all or a part of those services is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category IV.) Medicaid policy requires services performed be medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness. You billed and received payments for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, indicated that the services provided did not meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. The claims which were considered medically unnecessary were disallowed and the money you were paid for these procedures is considered an overpayment. (For ease of reference, this will be referred to as Category V.) CATEGORY I CLAIMS The disputed Category I claims can be separated into two subcategories: services performed while an employee of a corporate employer and services performed while a recipient was hospitalized. As to both subcategories Petitioner argues that he has been prejudiced by Respondent’s delay in issuing the FAAR because Medicaid requires providers to retain medical records only for five years from the date of service.3 Although Respondent was dilatory in prosecuting this matter, Petitioner’s argument that Respondent should be barred (presumably on equitable grounds such as the doctrine of laches) should be rejected. Petitioner has cited no case law in support of his contention, and it is clear that any equitable relief to which Petitioner may be entitled should come from a court of competent jurisdiction, not from this forum or from an administrative agency. All billings for which there are no medical records justifying the services rendered should be denied. CATEGORY II CLAIMS The following findings as to the Category II claims are based on the testimony of the witnesses and on the information contained in the exhibits.4 Although nothing in the record prior to the final hearing reflects that position, Petitioner did not dispute most of the down-codings at the final hearing. Office visits, whether supported by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note, for the sole purpose of administering IVIG treatment, will be discussed in the section of this Recommended Order dealing with Category V claims. The office visits, which were for the purpose of intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) treatment and for other reimbursable medical services, are set forth as part of the Category II disputes. The following findings resolve the Category II disputes. The date listed is the date the service was rendered. The billing code following the date is the billing code that is supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Recipient 1:5 01-20-98 99213 Recipient 2 09-27-96 99214 10-10-96 99213 11-13-96 99214 12-23-96 99212 02-24-97 99214 04-21-97 99213 04-28-97 99214 05-21-97 99213 06-02-97 99213 07-09-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 08-06-97 99213 08-11-97 99212 10-01-97 99213 10-10-97 99213 10-15-97 99214 10-21-97 99214 11-10-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 12-17-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-21-98 99213 Recipient 3 10-21-97 99213 11-04-97 99213 11-25-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-27-98 99214 02-26-98 99214 Recipient 4 01-03-98 99254 01-04-98 99261 01-05-98 99261 Recipient 5 09-29-97 99204 Recipient 6 11-11-97 99204 11-18-97 99213 Recipient 7 01-26-98 99204 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 8 09-26-96 99214 09-30-96 99213 10-03-96 99213 10-10-96 99212 10-25-96 99214 11-29-96 99213 12-04-96 99213 12-30-96 99213 01-22-97 99214 01-31-97 99211 02-14-97 99212 03-17-97 99214 04-04-97 99213 04-25-97 99212 05-30-97 99211 07-11-97 99213 08-08-97 99213 08-22-97 99213 09-05-97 99212 09-19-97 99214 10-31-97 99214 11-24-97 99214 12-03-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-09-98 99214 01-16-98 99213 01-30-98 99214 02-13-98 99214 Recipient 9 11-24-97 99203 Recipient 10 10-14-96 99205 11-04-96 99213 11-11-96 99213 11-25-96 99214 12-30-96 99213 01-27-97 99214 02-24-97 99214 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 04-07-97 99213 04-21-97 99214 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 05-21-97 Deny 06-09-97 99213 07-07-97 99212 08-04-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 09-24-97 992136 10-06-97 99213 10-10-97 99214 10-27-97 99213 11-10-97 99213 11-19-97 99214 11-24-97 99213 12-08-97 99213 02-02-98 99213 Recipient 11 06-30-97 99204 11-06-97 Recipient 12 Deny due to lack of documentation. 10-14-97 99213 11-06-97 99204 11-20-97 99213 12-16-97 99213 01-06-98 99213 Recipient 13 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 14 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 15 09-16-97 992157 Recipient 16 02-19-98 99212 Recipient 17 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 18 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 19 09-27-96 99212 10-01-96 99213 10-10-96 99213 10-23-96 99213 11-06-96 99213 11-20-96 99213 12-18-96 99211 12-30-96 Deny due to lack of 01-09-97 documentation. Deny due to lack of 01-22-97 documentation. 99211 02-05-97 99214 03-05-97 99214 03-19-97 99211 03-24-97 99214 03-26-97 04-02-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 04-21-97 99213 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99213 06-02-97 99212 06-30-97 99213 07-07-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 07-28-97 99212 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-08-97 99213 09-15-97 99214 09-22-97 99213 10-28-97 99214 11-04-97 11-07-97 Deny due to lack documentation. 99213 of 11-24-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-12-98 99213 01-26-98 99213 02-19-98 99214 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 20 12-04-96 99204 12-13-96 99213 01-03-97 99213 01-17-97 99213 01-27-97 99213 02-07-97 99214 02-21-97 99213 03-07-97 99214 03-21-97 99212 04-04-97 99214 04-21-97 99212 05-06-97 99213 06-04-97 99213 06-13-97 99213 06-30-97 99213 07-14-97 99213 08-04-97 99213 01-19-98 99213 Recipient 21 04-29-97 99204 05-13-97 99214 05-16-97 99213 05-23-97 99212 06-09-97 99212 06-23-97 99212 07-11-97 99211 07-25-97 99213 08-11-97 99213 09-10-97 99213 11-05-97 99214 11-19-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 01-07-98 99214 01-21-98 99213 02-04-98 99213 Recipient 22 02-16-98 99205 02-20-98 99213 02-23-98 99213 Recipient 23 06-23-97 99215 10-02-97 992138 Recipient 24 There are no Category II billings at issue for this Recipient. Recipient 25 01-24-97 99213 02-07-97 99213 02-24-97 99212 03-10-97 99213 03-24-97 99212 05-05-97 99212 05-19-97 99212 06-02-97 99212 06-16-97 99212 07-14-97 99213 07-23-97 99212 07-28-97 99213 08-18-97 99213 08-25-97 99213 09-15-97 99213 10-01-97 99213 10-13-97 99213 10-27-97 99214 12-08-97 99213 12-22-97 99213 12-29-97 99213 01-13-98 99212 01-19-98 99214 02-02-98 99212 CATEGORY III As set forth in the Physician Coverage and Limitation Handbook (Respondent’s Exhibit 6), Petitioner is not entitled to billings for laboratory tests that were performed outside his facility by an independent laboratory. The only billing arguably in Category III is the billing for Recipient 1 on February 19, 1998. That billing should have been approved because it was for a urinalysis by dip stick or tablet that was administered and analyzed by Petitioner. It was not analyzed by an independent laboratory. CATEGORY IV All Category IV billings pertained to Petitioner’s supervision of his staff while patients were receiving treatments of IVIG. Those billings will be subsumed in the Category V billings discussion. CATEGORY V The alleged Category V overpayments relate to Petitioner’s IVIG treatment of Patients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25, each of whom was an adult diagnosed with AIDS. In many of these cases a nurse administered the IVIG treatment. A dispute as to whether Petitioner properly supervised the nurse while he or she administered the IVIG treatment is moot because of the findings pertaining to the IVIG treatments set forth in Paragraphs 20 and 21. The Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook requires that rendered services be medically necessary, as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary and do not duplicate another provider’s service. In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: the services must be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient’s needs; the services cannot be experimental or investigational; the services must reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; and the services must be furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient’s caretaker, or the provider. The use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). The use of a drug for a purpose other than the uses approved by the FDA is referred to as an “off-label” use. The off-label use of IVIG in adult AIDS patients is not effective either from a medical standpoint or from an economic standpoint. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions other than AIDS that would justify the IVIG treatment administered by Petitioner. The following finding resolves that conflict. Utilizing applicable Medicaid billing criteria, the medical records produced by Petitioner fail to document that any of the Recipients at issue in this proceeding had a medical condition or conditions that warranted treatment with IVIG.9 All of Petitioner’s billings for IVIG treatments for Recipients 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 25 were properly denied under the rationale of the FAAR’s Category V. Included in the billings that were properly denied were billings for office visits (whether documented by a doctor’s note or a nurse’s note) when the sole purpose of the office visit was the administration of an IVIG treatment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order require that Petitioner repay the sum of the overpayment as determined by Respondent’s staff based on the Findings of Fact set forth in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2005.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent for payments totaling $1,140,763.88 that Petitioner received from the Medicaid Program in compensation for the provision of prescription drugs between late-August and November of 1998. Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to retain the payments in question because Petitioner allegedly has failed to demonstrate that it had available during the pertinent period a sufficient quantity of the prescription drugs in question.
Findings Of Fact The parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts and the evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties The Agency for Health Care Administration (the “Agency”) is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As one of its duties, the Agency must recover "overpayments . . . as appropriate," the term "overpayment" being statutorily defined to mean "any amount that is not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claiming, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or mistake." See Section 409.913(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Palm Beach Pharmacy, Inc. (“PBPI”), d/b/a Eddie’s Drug (“Eddie’s”) was, at all times material hereto, a duly contracted Medicaid provider, having entered into a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency and been assigned a Medicaid Provider Number: 106343000. Eddie’s is a Florida licensed pharmacy.1 As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Eddie’s is authorized to dispense drugs and supplies to Medicaid recipients. In return, Eddie’s has agreed to comply with all governing statutes, rules, and policies, including those policies set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (the “Handbook”). The Agency, which prepared the Handbook and furnishes it to Medicaid providers, has incorporated the Handbook by reference into Rule 59G-4.250(2), Florida Administrative Code. PBPI, which owned and operated a number of pharmacies (including Eddie’s), maintained its corporate headquarters in West Palm Beach, Florida. Eddie’s was located in Miami, Florida. On July 1, 1998, PBPI acquired a drug store known as Jay’s Drugs (“Jay’s”). Jay’s was located in Miami, Florida, across the street from Eddie’s. Thus, before both stores came under common ownership, they had been competitors. This case arises out of the Agency's attempt to recover alleged overpayments on Medicaid claims for which Eddie’s was paid several years ago. The "audit period" that is the subject of the Agency's recoupment effort is April 1, 1998 to July 31, 1999, although the actual period in controversy is much shorter. From July 1, 1998, until the end of the audit period, PBPI owned and operated both Eddie’s and Jay’s. The Underlying Facts The transactions at the heart of this case occurred between late-August and November of 1998, during which period (the “Focal Period”) Medicaid reimbursed Eddie’s more than $1 million for prescription drugs including Neupogen and Epogen/Procrit (collectively, the “Drugs”). The Drugs are used to treat AIDS patients and persons infected with HIV. Prior to the Focal Period, Eddie’s had not dispensed $1 million worth of the Drugs——or any figure approaching that amount——in three or four months’ time. The reason for the dramatic spike in Eddie’s business is that Eddie’s was dispensing the Drugs to customers of Jay’s pursuant to an arrangement designed to manipulate PBPI’s contractual obligations to the former owner of Jay’s under the purchase and sale agreement by which PBPI had acquired Jay’s. Essentially, the arrangement was this. Jay’s was dispensing the Drugs to a large number (approximately 150) of Medicaid beneficiaries who were receiving treatment at a nearby clinic. Because the Drugs were administered to the patients via intravenous infusion, the clinic typically obtained the Drugs from Jay’s in bulk. To fill these prescriptions, Jay’s ordered the Drugs from a wholesale supplier, which usually delivered the Drugs to Jay’s the next day. At some point before the Focal Period, arrangements were made to have the clinic present its prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s rather than Jay’s.2 The evidence does not show, exactly, how this was accomplished, but whatever the means, the clinic abruptly began bringing prescriptions for the Drugs to Eddie’s.3 This diversion of Jay’s’ business to Eddie’s was intended to deprive Jay’s of Medicaid reimbursements to which Jay’s’ former owner had access as a source of funds for paying down a note that PBPI had given for the purchase of Jay’s. By having Eddie’s dispense the Drugs and submit the Medicaid claims, Medicaid money flowed into Eddie’s’ bank account (rather than Jay’s’ bank account) and hence was not immediately available to the former owner of Jay’s to reduce PBPI’s debt. During the Focal Period, Eddie’s did not purchase the Drugs from a wholesaler but instead acquired them from Jay’s. The process by which this was accomplished involved a pharmacy technician named Wright, who was employed at Eddie’s, and a pharmacist named Shafor, who worked at Jay’s. Wright (at Eddie’s) accepted the prescriptions for the Drugs as the clinic brought them in Then, she called Shafor (at Jay’s) and told him the quantities needed to fill the prescriptions. Shafor ordered the Drugs from a wholesaler, which delivered them in bulk to Jay’s, usually the next day. Upon receiving the Drugs, Shafor personally delivered them to Wright, who, recall, was across the street at Eddie’s. Wright labeled and dispensed the Drugs. Eddie’s submitted a claim for the Drugs to Medicaid, and Medicaid paid Eddie’s. PBPI maintained separate accounting ledgers for Eddie’s and Jay’s, respectively. The company’s accountants recorded the subject transactions in these ledgers so that Jay’s——not Eddie’s——would “recognize” the sales of the Drugs. In a nutshell, this was done through “inter-company” transfers whereby all of the money that Eddie’s received from Medicaid for the Drugs was moved, on the books, into an account of Jay’s. In this way, any profit from the sales of the Drugs (the difference between the wholesale cost of the Drugs and the Medicaid reimbursement therefor, less overhead) was realized on Jay’s’ books.4 The Medicaid payments to Eddie’s that the Agency seeks to recoup were included in four remittance vouchers dated September 2, 1998; September 30, 1998; October 28, 1998; and November 25, 1998, respectively. The September 2 payment to Eddie’s totaled $287,205.52. Of this amount, $276,033.23 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of September 30, 1998, the sum of $276,033.23 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The September 30 payment to Eddie’s totaled $439,175.77, of which $432,700.36 was paid in consideration of the Drugs. The October 28 Medicaid payment was $431,753.82, of which total the Drugs accounted for $424,202.76. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of October 31, 1998, the sum of $870,929.59 (439,175.77 + 431,753.82) had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The November 25 payment to Eddie’s totaled $407,088.00. Of this amount, $393,063.00 reimbursed Eddie’s for dispensing the Drugs. Eddie’s’ accounting ledger reflects that, as of November 30, 1998, the sum of $407,088.00 had been transferred from an account of Eddie’s to an account of Jay’s. The Agency’s Allegations On October 31, 2000, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (“Audit”) in which Eddie’s was alleged to have received $1,143,612.68 in overpayments relating to the Drugs. In the Audit, the Agency spelled out its theory of the case; indeed, the Audit is the only document in the record that does so. The Agency cited several statutory provisions. First, Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes, was referenced. This section states: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: * * * (e) Are provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes. The Agency did not allege (or prove), however, that Eddie’s had violated Section 409.913(7)(e), Florida Statutes.5 Put another way, the Agency did not plead or prove lack of supervision, submission of a false claim, or that the Drugs were not provided in accordance with applicable law. Next, the Agency cited Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: A Medicaid provider shall retain medical, professional, financial, and business records pertaining to services and goods furnished to a Medicaid recipient and billed to Medicaid for a period of 5 years after the date of furnishing such services or goods. The agency may investigate, review, or analyze such records, which must be made available during normal business hours. However, 24-hour notice must be provided if patient treatment would be disrupted. The provider is responsible for furnishing to the agency, and keeping the agency informed of the location of, the provider's Medicaid- related records. The authority of the agency to obtain Medicaid-related records from a provider is neither curtailed nor limited during a period of litigation between the agency and the provider. The Agency further alleged, as fact, that Eddie’s had failed, upon request, “to submit invoices from [its] suppliers to substantiate the availability of drugs that [were] billed to Medicaid” and thus had not “fully substantiated such availability.” The Agency, however, did not invoke any of the available remedial provisions as authority to impose a sanction for this alleged failure to turn over Medicaid-related records. See, e.g., Sections 409.913(14)(b), (c), and (d), Florida Statutes. The Agency cited Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the Agency to “require repayment for inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive goods or services from the person furnishing them, the person under whose supervision they were furnished, or the person causing them to be furnished.” There was no allegation (or proof), however, that the Drugs which Eddie’s had purported to dispense (i.e. the Drugs for which it had submitted Medicaid claims) were “inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive.” Thus, Eddie’s was not alleged (or shown) to have violated Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes. Finally, the Agency relied upon Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes, which is the basis of the Agency’s legal theory. This section provides: The agency may seek any remedy provided by law, including, but not limited to, the remedies provided in subsections (12) and (15) and s. 812.035, if: * * * (n) The provider fails to demonstrate that it had available during a specific audit or review period sufficient quantities of goods, or sufficient time in the case of services, to support the provider's billings to the Medicaid program[.] The Agency contended, additionally, that “[b]illing Medicaid for drugs that have not been demonstrated as available for dispensing is a violation of the Medicaid laws and regulations and has resulted in the finding that [Eddie’s] ha[s] been overpaid by the Medicaid program.” (Emphasis added). The Agency explained, “Medicaid payments that have been substantiated by documented inventory are assumed to be valid; and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid.” Thus, the Agency’s theory of recovery is that Eddie’s must forfeit “overpayments” arising from its failure to demonstrate the availability, in inventory, of a sufficient quantity of the Drugs for which claims were submitted, as required by Section 409.913(14)(n), Florida Statutes. After the Audit was issued, the Agency accepted a handwritten note regarding the transfer of a small quantity of Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s as sufficient to demonstrate the availability of such amount. This resulted in a slight reduction of the amount of the alleged overpayment, to $1,140,763.88. The Separate Audit of Jay’s The Agency conducted a separate audit of Jay’s, concerning which some evidence was introduced at hearing. Without getting into unnecessary detail, the audit of Jay’s revealed that Jay’s had purchased, during and around the Focal Period, a quantity of the Drugs that exceeded the number of units that Jay’s had billed to Medicaid. It was Eddie’s theory that this “excess inventory” of Jay’s matched, more or less, the alleged inventory shortfall at Eddie’s, thereby corroborating the testimony concerning the transfer of these Drugs from Jay’s to Eddie’s for dispensation. At hearing, the parties sharply disputed whether, in fact, Jay’s had transferred the Drugs to Eddie’s. The Agency, of course, maintained that such transfers were not properly documented; Eddie’s argued that the documents and other evidence, including testimony about the transactions in question, adequately demonstrated that the transfers had, in fact, occurred. There was no dispute, however, that if it were found that such transfers had occurred, and if, further, the documents (and other evidence) pertaining to the inventory of Jay’s were accepted as proof of the quantities of Drugs so transferred, then all but $176,078.30 worth of the Drugs could be accounted for. Thus, as counsel for Eddie’s conceded at hearing, the Agency is entitled to recoup some sum of money. The question is whether that sum is $1,140,763.88 or $176,078.30. Ultimate Factual Determination Based on all of the evidence in the record, including the deposition testimony received through the parties’ joint stipulation, it is determined that, more likely than not, Eddie’s had available during the Focal Period a sufficient quantity of the Drugs to support all but $176,078.30 worth of the claims in dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Eddie’s to repay the Agency the principal amount of $176,078.30. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2002.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (Petitioner or Agency), is entitled to a Medicaid reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the authority and responsibility of administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As part of this authority, the Petitioner is required to recover Medicaid overpayments when appropriate. See § 409.913, Fla. Stat. (2006). At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a licensed physician and a Medicaid provider subject to the provisions of Chapter 409. As a Medicaid provider, the Respondent was authorized to provide services to eligible patients but was obligated to comply with the Medicaid Provider Agreement in doing so. The Medicaid Program contemplates that authorized providers will provide services to eligible patients, bill the program and be paid according to the Medicaid standards. All Medicaid providers must practice within the guidelines of the Physicians Coverage and Limitations Handbook and applicable law. Providers may be audited so that it can be verified the process was appropriately followed. In this case, the Respondent was audited. According to the audit findings, the Respondent received payment for services that he did not perform. Dr. Eiber (a physician not part of the Respondent’s practice group) reviewed and signed off on x-ray studies and reports for which the Respondent billed and was paid by Medicaid. Dr. Eiber is a Medicaid provider but he is not affiliated with the Respondent or the Respondent’s group. In order for the Respondent to bill and receive payment for Dr. Eiber’s work, the latter physician would have to be listed and identified within the group in which the Respondent practiced. The Respondent was responsible for all billings for which he received payments. In connection with billing, the Respondent was required to maintain and retain all Medicaid- related invoices or claims for the audit period. In this regard, the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook specifies that when a radiological study is performed in an office setting, either the physician billing the maximum fee must have performed or indirectly supervised the performance and interpreted the study; or if a group practice, a member of the group must perform all components of the services. That procedure was not followed. When the Agency disallows a paid Medicaid claim, it must seek to recover the overpayment from the Medicaid provider who received payment on the claim. This is the basis of the “pay and chase” methodology used in the Medicaid program. The claims are paid, subject to audit, and recovery is sought when the claim is disallowed. Based on the audit findings in this cause, the Agency seeks $32,935.96 as an overpayment of Medicaid claims paid to the Respondent. The Petitioner also seeks an administrative fine in the amount of $1000.00. The Respondent was given the results of the audit and afforded an opportunity to respond and provide additional information to the Agency to show that the amounts billed were correct. The Respondent has presented no supplemental information to corroborate the correctness of the claims at issue.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order sustaining the Final Audit Report and finding an overpayment against the Respondent in the amount of $32,9935.96. The Final Order should also impose an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig A. Brand, Esquire Law Offices of Craig A. Brand, P.A. Grove Forest Plaza 2937 Southwest 27th Avenue, Suite 101 Miami, Florida 33133 Willis Melvin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $11,077.65 for claims filed between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida. His Medicaid provider number is No. 3801578-00. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Respondent was subject to all statutes, rules, and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. Specifically, Petitioner was required to follow the guidelines set forth in the Medicaid Coverage and Limitation Handbook and the Medicaid Reimbursement Handbook. Additionally, Petitioner was required to maintain all "Medicaid-related records" that supported his Medicaid invoices and claims and to furnish those records to Respondent upon request. In 1997 and until April 1998, Petitioner's advertisement in the yellow pages of the Panama City, Florida, telephone book invited the public to make an appointment for a "free spinal exam," which specifically included two X-rays, if medically necessary. The advertisement indicated that Petitioner's office accepted patients with major medical insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid coverage. The advertisement did not specifically exclude Medicare and Medicaid patients, but specifically stated that the free spinal exam did not include further examination, treatment, or workers' compensation and personal injury cases. However, Petitioner's subsequent advertisements in the telephone book specifically included Medicaid as a type of case that Petitioner excluded from the offer of free services. The original and subsequent advertisements further stated as follows: Our office policy: The patient and any other person responsible for payment has the right to cancel payment, or be reimbursed for payment for any other service, exam, or treatment which is performed as a result of and within 72 hours of responding to the ad for the free service, exam or treatment. ($99.00 value) Respondent's investigator, Julie Canfield-Buddin, saw the advertisement excluding Medicaid patients as recipients of the free services. After confirming that Petitioner was a Medicaid provider, Ms. Canfield-Buddin performed an audit of Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001. The audit revealed that Petitioner had not provided the advertised free services to Medicaid patients. In other words, Petitioner had received Medicaid reimbursements for initial office visits and X-rays of new patients who were Medicaid eligible. Petitioner received reimbursements for these services even though Medicaid policy prohibits payments to providers for services that are given to non-Medicaid patients free of charge. In April 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner a preliminary audit report. The preliminary report indicated that for the period beginning April 15, 1998, up to and including December 31, 2001, Petitioner had received $13,522.02 for certain claims that were not covered by Medicaid. The report included a request for Petitioner to send Respondent that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. After receiving the preliminary report, Petitioner's office contacted Ms. Canfield-Buddin, stating that Petitioner had some issues with the denied claims. Ms. Canfield-Buddin responded that Petitioner should state his concerns in writing and furnish Respondent with any additional medical documentation that would serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner sent Ms. Canfield-Buddin a letter dated April 25, 2002. Petitioner did not send Respondent any additional medical documentation with the letter to substantiate his position regarding the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner did not provide Respondent with any written office policy that delineated any difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In a final audit report dated May 9, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $13,522.02 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The final audit report included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. Ms. Canfield-Buddin subsequently received a telephone call from Petitioner's office on May 30, 2002. She received Petitioner's written request for a formal administrative hearing on June 3, 2002. After receiving Petitioner's request for a hearing, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reviewed Petitioner's account statements that related to the Medicaid overpayments. Based on that review, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reduced the amount of overpayment to $11,077.65. The revised overpayment reversed denied charges for X-rays of Medicaid patients in excess of the two X-rays that should have been provided free of charge pursuant to the offer for free services. For example, Petitioner was reimbursed for services provided to B.A. on August 10, 2001. These charges included an initial office visit under the Current Procedures Terminology (CPT) code 99203, two X-rays under the CPT code 7240, two X-rays under the CPT code 72072, and two or three X-rays under the CPT code 72100. The final audit denied reimbursement for all charges except the two or three X-rays under CPT code 72100. The revised overpayment reversed the denied charges for two X-rays under the CPT code 72070. The end result was that Respondent denied Petitioner reimbursement only for the initial office visit and two X-rays that ordinarily would have been provided free to non-Medicaid patients. Medicaid allows reimbursement for services equal to the lesser of the Medicaid fee or the provider's usual and customary charge. Petitioner's advertisement offered free services to the public at large with certain exceptions. Petitioner cannot exclude Medicaid patients from that offer by also excluding patients with personal injury or workers' compensation claims. All patients who are not Medicaid eligible are non-Medicaid patients regardless of their payment source. Just because Petitioner excludes free services to non-Medicaid patients with personal injury and workers' compensation claims, does not mean that he can deny those free services to Medicaid patients when his usual and customary practice is to provide the services free to non-Medicaid patients. Some of the denied charges at issue here allegedly involve spinal manipulations that Petitioner claims he performed on Medicaid patients during their initial office visits. Medicaid reimbursement policy requires a spinal manipulation performed during an initial office visit under a 99203 CPT code for a new patient visit to be included as part of the examination conducted during that visit. Medicaid does not allow Petitioner to be separately reimbursed for a spinal manipulation performed on the same day of service as an initial office visit. Petitioner did not include more than two X-rays or any spinal manipulations in his offer of free services for any patient. When a patient has an initial office visit in response to Petitioner's offer of free services, Petitioner first takes the patient's history, performs an examination, and reviews the first two free X-rays. Depending on the results of the evaluation, Petitioner may or may not advise the patient that additional X-rays and/or a spinal manipulation are medically necessary. Petitioner then allows the patient to arrange for payment of those services with his office staff. If the patient is non-Medicaid eligible and is able to pay for services, Petitioner proceeds to take the additional X-rays and/or to perform the spinal manipulation immediately or during a subsequent visit with payment due as arranged. If a non-Medicaid patient requires subsequent examinations during the course of treatment, Petitioner bills the patient or his or her insurance carrier for those services. If the patient is Medicaid eligible, Petitioner may either proceed with taking the X-rays and/or performing the spinal examination immediately, knowing that he will not be separately reimbursed for the spinal manipulation, or make an appointment for the Medicaid patient to return on another day so that he can be reimbursed for the spinal manipulation. In any event, Medicaid regulations do not allow reimbursement for further examinations within a three-year period. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that some of the denied charges for initial office visits under the CPT code 99203 included spinal manipulations that he never intended to be free and that he did not provide spinal manipulations as a free service to non-Medicaid patients. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credited for two reasons. First, he did not produce any medical documentation to support his testimony as to any Medicaid patient receiving a spinal manipulation during an initial office visit. Second, he did not identify any such patient during his testimony. Respondent performs Medicaid audits after a provider renders services. Therefore, it is essential for providers like Petitioner, who contest denied claims, to be able to substantiate their billing with appropriate documentation. Such documentation must be created at the time of service, maintained pursuant to statutory and rule requirements, and furnished to Respondent upon request. Petitioner never responded to Ms. Canfield-Buddin's request for medical documentation to substantiate Petitioner's challenge to the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner testified that the services he performed for some Medicaid patients were not equivalent to the free services he performed for non-Medicaid patients because they often involved a higher level of service, including additional services, tests, or examinations. According to Petitioner, some of the Medicaid patients required more extensive screening and counseling that consumed more of Petitioner's time. Despite this testimony, Petitioner admitted that the histories he took of Medicaid patients and non-Medicaid patients were basically the same. Petitioner testified that the difference in the level of service provided to all patients varied based upon the individual patients and did not depend on whether they were or were not Medicaid patients. He had no written or unwritten guidelines or policies that limited the scope of screening or level of service in an initial office visit for either type of patient. Petitioner's testimony that the level of services provided to Medicaid patients differed from the level of services offered to non-Medicaid patients is not persuasive. Once again, Petitioner failed to provide the required medical documentation to support his testimony or to identify in his testimony Medicaid patients who required a higher level of service. Moreover, Petitioner knew, when he made his offer of free services, that he would not be able to claim reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid patients that were not separately reimbursable even if Petitioner was entitled to exclude Medicaid patients from the offer. This includes cases where a Medicaid patient may have required a high level of service in terms of the time expended during the screening or a spinal manipulation during the initial office visit. Petitioner provides free services to members of his family. The provision of free services to family does not establish that Petitioner had a usual and customary practice of providing free services. At times, Petitioner treats police officers and indigent persons free of charge. However, Petitioner does not publicly advertise that he treats these patients free of charge because he does not want to be overrun with people taking advantage of the offer. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely treats police officers covered by private health insurance and indigent patients covered by Medicaid free of charge. Therefore, it cannot be said that Petitioner's usual and customary practice is to furnish services to these patients free of charge. A Medicaid provider is allowed to use the CPT code 99203 for a new patient visit once per recipient every three years. Petitioner's offer of free services for non-Medicaid patients allows them one free office visit and two free X-rays regardless of the passage of time. According to Petitioner, this means that Respondent's interpretation of Medicare regulations would entitle a Medicaid patient to the free services every three years whereas a non-Medicaid patient would not be so entitled, showing yet another difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients under the offer of free services. However, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive because it is not based on medical documentation or testimony showing that Petitioner ever treated a Medicaid patient as a new patient more than once.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $11,077.65 for Medicaid reimbursement overpayments. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Grant P. Dearborn, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Hal Cowen ChiroNetwork Health Care Centers 127 West 23rd Panama City, Florida 32405 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner must reimburse Respondent for overpayments totaling $2,851.19 which Petitioner received from the Florida Medicaid Program during the period May 24, 1999 through January 26, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Agency is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. See Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. Among other responsibilities, the Agency is authorized "to recover overpayments . . . as appropriate . . . ." Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Meji, Inc., d/b/a 7th Avenue Pharmacy (hereinafter referred to as "Meji"), was, at all times pertinent to this case, a duly authorized Medicaid provider, having entered into a Medicaid Provider Agreement with the Agency. Meji was assigned Medicaid Provider Number 0165076-00. Meji is also a licensed pharmacy in Florida, having been issued license number PH0016158. As a Medicaid provider, Meji is authorized to dispense drugs and supplies to Medicaid recipients, for which Meji is entitled to reimbursement from the Medicaid Program. In return, Meji has agreed to comply with all governing statutes, rules, and policies, including policies set forth in the Florida Medicaid Prescribed Drug Services Coverage Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook, incorporated by reference into Rule 59G- 4.250(2), Florida Administrative Code. On March 20, 2001, an audit was performed of payments from the Medicaid Program to Meji. On January 24, 2002, a Provisional Agency Audit Report was issued finding that Meji had received $40,062.52 in overpayments from the Medicaid Program and offering Meji an opportunity to respond to the Agency's provisional determination. When Meji failed to respond to the Provisional Agency Audit Report, the Agency issued a Final Agency Audit Report informing Meji that the Agency intended to seek reimbursement of the $40,062.52 in overpayments Meji had received for services provided during the period May 24, 1999 through January 26, 2001. The Final Agency Audit Report was issued March 8, 2002. Meji requested a hearing to contest the Agency's determination and provided documentation not previously provided to the Agency. On March 19, 2003, after reviewing the newly provided documentation, the Agency issued an Amended Final Agency Audit Report in which the Agency informed Meji that it had received overpayments of $2,851.19. In response to this notice, Meji requested a formal administrative hearing by letter dated March 20, 2003. The amount of the overpayments which the Agency seeks to recoup in this proceeding was determined by taking a statistically valid random sample of Meji's submitted Medicaid claims submitted during the audit period. The amount of the overpayments found in the random sample was then extended to the total of Meji's claims for the audit period based upon generally accepted statistical formulas and methods. By failing to respond to the Agency's Request for Admissions, Meji is deemed to have admitted the validity of the statistical formula utilized by the Agency. The Amended Final Agency Audit Report, along with the supporting work papers, were offered and accepted in evidence in this case. The Amended Final Agency Audit Report, in an attached Pharmacy Audit-Final Report, sets out the manner in which the overpayments were calculated. Those calculations are further described in proposed finding of fact P.(1) through (6) of the Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order and Incorporated Closing Argument. Those findings are hereby accepted and incorporated into this Recommended Order by reference. The Amended Final Agency Audit Report and supporting work papers admitted in evidence in this case show that Meji received overpayments in the amount of $2,851.19. No evidence to the contrary was offered by Meji. The Agency incurred costs during the investigation of this matter. The amount of those costs was not known at the time the final hearing was conducted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Meji's to repay the Agency the principal amount of $2,851.19 plus interest as provided in Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Debora A. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sola Gafaru, President Meji, Inc. 14812 Northwest 7th Avenue Miami, Florida 33168 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3116 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308
