Findings Of Fact Chapter 479 and the rules promulgated pursuant to that chapter establish the authority for Petitioner to regulate outdoor advertising in Florida. This regulatory function includes signs which are located on Interstate 75 in Florida. Interstate 75 is part of the interstate highway system in the United States as defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Respondent is in the outdoor advertising business and is subject to the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All signs which are in dispute in these cases are located adjacent to Interstate 75 in Alachua County, Florida and are or were owned by Respondent at all relevant times. The signs within the relevant time frame associated with this dispute could be seen from Interstate 75. Bartley Burch is a property and outdoor advertising inspector who routinely inspects the signs in question on a weekly basis. During the roughly three years which he had been performing inspections in the area in question he had inspected the seven signs a minimum of 200 times. His inspection schedule for the signs was on a weekly basis. His inspections led to the citations of those signs belonging to the Respondent. The basis of the citations are described in the Statement of the Issues. The citations date from July 18, 1990, based upon inspections performed July 12, 1990. The citations were received by Respondent on July 23, 1990. As described, Respondent having served the citations, this prompted the formal hearing. The sign in 5871T is located on Interstate 75 North, 22.4 miles north of the Marion County line. It advertises the Red Lobster restaurant. It is depicted in the photographs consisting of Petitioner's exhibits 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C. Concerning the complaint, Burch discovered what he considered to be a lack of permit through his inventory or inspection activities that are routinely performed mentioned before. In conducting these inspections Burch used a computer printout issued by Thomas N. Brown, district outdoor advertising administrator in the Petitioner's district where the subject signs were found. That printout indicates the sign location and whether the signs are permitted or not. The printout also includes signs which Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, describes as nonconforming signs. The sign in 5871T did not show up on the computer printout as having been permitted. Burch does not recall that a permit tag was attached to the sign in 5871T. In addition to checking his printout Burch contacted Petitioner's Tallahassee office to see if that office had any record of a permit being issued to the sign in 5871T. He was told that the Tallahassee records did not reflect a permit issuance. From the tenor of his remarks, Burch also examined records in the district office where he works to ascertain whether a permit had been issued for the sign in 5871T. Those records dated back to 1987. They did not reveal the issuance of a permit. In his contacts with the Tallahassee office of Petitioner, he did not determine how far back in time those records went. Neither did he go to Tallahassee to examine the records which were held by the Petitioner on this subject. The methods of looking at his inventory list, available information at the district level where he works and contacts with Tallahassee, in Burch's attempts to ascertain whether permits had been issued were the same in 5873T and 5876T as they were in 5871T concerning the basic methods which Burch employed to find out if permits had been issued for the latter two signs. The sign in 5873T is at Interstate 75 North at mile 5.93. It is a Red Lobster advertisement. It is depicted in Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits numbers 2A through 2C, photographs of the sign. The photographs taken of this sign and all other signs which are Petitioner's exhibits were made by Burch on July 12, 1990. The photographs which are Respondent's exhibits were made by Andrew Wayne Lee on August 23, 1990. In 5873T a permit tag is not attached to the sign or any of its supporting posts. Burch noted at hearing that if an application was made at that point in time to have a new permit issued it would not be approved because of a spacing problem. In 5876T, the sign in question is a Red Lobster advertisement. The sign is at Interstate 75 South at mile 3.49. Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C are photographs of the sign in 5876T. The Respondent's photographs depict attached permit tags. The details of those permit tags may not be discerned by examining the photographs. Burch had no recollection of those tags at the time that he made his inspection. His attempts to determine if a permit had been issued for this sign are as previously described. These attempts did not lead to the confirmation that a permit had been issued. In 5872T, the sign is at Interstate 75 North at mile 23.46. Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C are photographs of the sign. They depict a blank sign face which has been painted. At no time during the inspections which Burch made did he observe any advertising on the sign face. The sign had been painted before the formal complaint was made concerning the allegation of being void of advertising for 12 months or longer. The sign had a permit tag attached dating from 1974. It is classified as a nonconforming sign. In addition to the date of the permit tag being 1974, the spacing which Burch measured pointed out that the sign was nonconforming. According to Burch, the sign at 5872T became void of advertising approximately two years before the hearing date. What he meant was whatever was on the sign was not legible to Burch. What the witness said was that approximately two years ago is when he noticed that he was unable to read the message on the signboard even though there was something written there. That is the reason why he began to believe that it was void of advertising. Legibility to Burch means that the message is dilapidated, faded or the paint pealing off, things of that nature. He is unaware of any policy by the Petitioner by way of a memorandum which sets out standards of what it means to be void of advertising as a definitional matter. From the record there does not appear to be any standards by Petitioner which further describe the meaning of void of advertising beyond what is stated in Rule 14-10.007(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. In 5874T the sign in question is at Interstate 75 North at mile 21.79. It is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 2A and B and Respondent's Exhibits 2A-C, photographs of the sign. Unlike the situation in 5872T, this sign does have information which is portrayed; however, the message that is being presented is unclear. In his inspections Burch has never viewed advertisement that he considered legible. His statement of legibility equates to the notion of clarity evidenced by the photographs referred to. The sign also had a spacing problem and was nonconforming for that reason. Again, this sign had been void of advertising in terms of legibility for approximately two years before the hearing date, according to Burch's observations. In 5875T the sign in question is located at Interstate 75 North at mile 22.39. The sign is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibits 2A and B and Respondent's Exhibits 2A-C. This sign is in disrepair in that some of the panels are missing. The sign while it contains writing is unclear in its message or lacking in legibility when observing the photographs. Respondent's Exhibits No. 2A and B show permit tags affixed. Those tags cannot be read as to their contents concerning dates upon which the permit tags were issued. Burch confirmed that the sign was void of advertising for over 12 months by making weekly inspections. The sign in question is nonconforming because of spacing problems. In 5877T the sign in question is at Interstate 75 South at mile 3.44. This sign is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 and Respondent's Exhibit No. 2A-2C. The photographs show that the sign has been painted and has no message portrayed. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2B shows certain tags affixed. The uppermost tags on the pole bear dates of 1973 and 1974. This sign had been painted before the complaint was issued concerning the alleged violation. The sign is a nonconforming sign based upon spacing problems. No prior action had been taken concerning the signs that have been discussed, as Burch understands it, based upon the Petitioner's policy of not filing complaints against a Respondent unless the process may be concluded by removing the signs that are offending. Brown supervises Burch. He rides Interstate 75 and conducts periodic inspection or inventories in the same areas where his inspectors perform their duties. This had made Brown familiar with the signs in question. As Brown describes it, if there is no permit tag, and the inventory related to signs based upon computer records at the district level don't include questioned signs, resort is made to the records in Tallahassee to ascertain whether a permit exists for a questioned sign. If the records checks locally and in Tallahassee do not reveal that a permit was issued then the district officials conclude that the sign is illegal. Alternatively, at times the sign owner may have records which will verify the existence of a permit and that would be available to the Petitioner. Copies of applications for permits are available to Brown and in the absence of an approved application this is further evidence that the permit was not issued. It may also be evidence that the approved application has been lost. At the end of each year a list of signs held by companies such as that of the Respondent is prepared and sent to the sign owner for billing purposes, the collection of fees. This gives an indication of permits that are held by the sign owner and the sign owner assists in verifying the ownership by remitting annual fees to pay for the sign operation and through such remittance clarifying the status of permitted signs which are held by that vendor. As Brown describes, Petitioner also becomes aware of the status of signs through transfers of permit tags from one owner to another related to a given sign. Brown employed general methods for researching the question of whether a permit had been issued for the questioned signs as was described before. In particular related to 5871T, 5873T and 5876T he checked for original applications and could find none. He called Tallahassee and tried to get research information from Tallahassee concerning permits being issued and was unable to find any information. He went through old filing cabinets at the district level and found nothing. This search in the filing cabinets was a manual search in addition to the computer search which he had made at the district level. None of these attempts led to verification of a permit being issued for the signs in question. There was information which suggested that the signs may have been in violation as far back as 1983. He did find one permit that had been issued related to 5871T, that permit belonged to the National Company for a Manatee County sign. It was not for a permit for the Alachua County sign owned by Respondent. The 1971 permit tag belonging to National can be seen in the photographs by Respondent, his Exhibit No. 2. That same tag number is referenced in an affidavit requesting a new tag permit for a loss permit that relates to that location and is found as Petitioner's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence. It was submitted on August 6, 1990 and will be further discussed in describing the testimony of Andrew Wayne Lee at hearing. The computer records at the district level at times include unpermitted signs as well as those that have permits. This is not an indication that a permit had been issued for the sign upon some former date. Mr. Brown believes that the idea of a sign void of advertising is a sign which has no copy on the sign, an example is a sign that is painted blank for a period of one year. In 5874T Brown recalls this sign as being void of advertising for five and a half years, this is taken to mean illegible. When shown the photographs depicting the sign in 5874T he described that sign as looking the same way as depicted in the photographs for a period of five and a half years. He said that in driving 55 or 60 miles an hour he could not read what was on that sign. He also remarked that in 5875T he couldn't read some of the letters in that sign well enough to tell what was written. Brown described the speed limit in the area of the signs in question as being 65 miles per hour. His representation is accepted. Brown describes the fact that when the owner of the signs do not pay the annual fees the signs are found in violation and a "take down" order is issued. In making his record search to discover whether the signs which were charged with having no permit had ever been recorded as permitted, Brown indicated that the records of the Petitioner went back as far as 1971 but that they were not complete. This incompleteness as to some of the records refers to the absence of a paper record or a computer entry record. Brown acknowledges certain contacts with Respondent or members of his family. He does not recall that Respondent or members of the family were requested to submit Respondent's proof of permitting for the three signs that are the subject of a claim that no permits were issued for them. Notwithstanding this lack of inquiry, the hearing presented the opportunity for the Respondent to submit any information it had regarding the matter of permits being issued for those three signs in defending against the allegations. In the annual billing lists which are submitted to the vendors such as Respondent, they include properly permitted signs or signs in good standing as well as signs that are considered in violation. The idea of in violation would include the problem of not having permits issued for the sign. This is borne out by Respondent's exhibit number 4 which is a billing list which Respondent had which refers to the three signs in question for which permits are said to be lacking. For that reason permit numbers are not found on that page of the exhibit which describes the signs. Andrew Wayne Lee, son of Respondent described how he is in the cattle business, the outdoor advertising business and that he buys and sells properties. He says his family has been in the outdoor advertising business since about 1965. His involvement in the outdoor advertising business has been more extensive in the last three or four years. He became involved because his father was diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease in or around April or May of 1985. Before that date the son had very little participation in the outdoor advertising business. Respondent's son made an attempt to find records which would verify the status of the signs in question, especially those which Petitioner claims to not have permits. He describes that a number of records concerning the outdoor advertising business had been stored in a family residence around 1972 and in 1981 an accidental fire occurred and those records were burned up. He says that other records were put in different places by his father and that he is unable to converse with his father about where those additional records may be found given his father's illness. Lee points out in 5871T, the photograph Respondent's 2B showing the 1971 tag permit. As stated that tag permit is the incorrect tag permit for the sign. In 5873T, Respondent's 2A and 2C show markings on the pole where permit tags were probably affixed, according to Lee. Unfortunately it is unclear what happened to those permit tags and whether they were the appropriate permit tags for the sign at the time they were affixed. It may well be that they were the inappropriate permit tags as was the case of the 1971 permit tag which was affixed to the sign in 5871T at the time Lee took photographs on August 23, 1990. In 5876T Lee refers to Respondent's exhibit 2C which shows two permit tags. He did not describe the idea that these two permit tags were the appropriate permit tags for the sign in question. He made no mention of those permit tags when he attempted to obtain a new permit tag for that sign by submission of an affidavit on August 6, 1990 as depicted in Respondent's exhibit number 3 in 5876T. It is unexplained why Respondent in making an affidavit in furtherance of its attempt to gain a new permit tag for the sign in 5876T would not refer to the older permit tags affixed to the sign and their numbers in an attempt to verify that a permit had been issued in the past. On the other hand, resort to that information found on the preexisting permit tags located on the sign post would be unavailing if they were not associated with that sign when they were issued or if they could not be cross-referenced with the older records held by the Petitioner that established the permits on the signpost as being related to the sign in question. Neither party made connection in the record between the permit tags on the sign post and the idea of a permit having been issued specifically for that sign at that location. In his attempt to bring the signs in compliance by making affidavits seeking the reissuance of a tag permit for the three signs in question where Petitioner claims permits did not exist, Lee described his methods. Having found no record held by Respondent which would describe the issuance of permits for those three signs, in preparing the affidavit in 5871T, he used a 1971 permit tag number that was found on the sign because it was the only number he had available. He was hopeful that the Department could use that as some sort of cross reference to verify the existence of a permit. He believed the three signs were permitted, but felt that he had no means of tracking down the proper numbers. In addition to searching the records held by Respondent he went up and down the road trying to ascertain the appropriate permit numbers. Lee also went to Tallahassee and examined Petitioner's files. He noted that the amount of records concerning the activities of his father in the outdoor advertising business, which is much more extensive than the seven signs in question, were not the same as on other occasions when he and his father had visited the Petitioner's office in Tallahassee. This refers to records held by the Petitioner. The comparison of what he saw on the occasion of his attempt related to the present cases and what he found on trips made by Lee and his father differed in that on prior occasions he found considerably more material than he found on the latter trip. In describing the permit affidavit for obtaining a new permit tag in 5871T, Lee describes this as having been involved in an agreement with Peterson Outdoor Advertising. This is in addition to his remarks about the use of the 1971 tag which have been stated before. The significance of this swap agreement, if one existed with Peterson Outdoor Advertising, as it relates to the question of an appropriate sign permit having been issued in 5871T was not explained in the hearing. In 5873T, as with 5871T and 5876T Lee prepared an August 6, 1990 affidavit requesting a new tag permit. This is found in Respondent's exhibit number 3 in case number 5873T. The several affidavits submitted in an attempt to gain new permit tags for the three signs Petitioner claims do not have permits were rejected. All affidavits were returned. In summary, Lee believes that the three signs in question had permits issued but has no proof from any source which would confirm that belief. In the signs which are the subject of the claims of being in jeopardy for reasons that they are void of advertising, the signs in 5874T and 5875T have been removed by Petitioner. The signs in 5872T and 5877T have been painted but have not been leased given the pendency of these proceedings. Robert Still is construction manager and supervisor for Respondent. He has worked for that concern for over 18 years. Still describes the painting of the signs at 5872T and 5877T in June of 1990. The sign in 5872T had copy related to McDonald's and the sign related to 5877T had copy related to Sonny's Bar-B-Q before they were painted over in the blank color described in the photographs. Still offered no comments concerning the legibility of the McDonald's copy in 5872T and the Sonny's Bar-B- Q copy in 5877T before that copy was painted over in June, 1990. Still's relationship with the Respondent's company did not extend to being responsible as records custodian for information associated with permit issuance and permit renewal fees. He expresses, as did Lee, the belief that the three signs in question were permitted at one time or another but has no records to verify this belief. He does recall placing permit tags on the signs in question. In 5876T he makes mention of the fact of the older permit tags which are shown in the photographs by Respondent. He states that the sign in 5871T had a permit at one time which was a 1974 permit. This was as distinguished from the 1971 permit which was found on that sign on August 23, 1990 depicted in Respondent's photographic exhibit. Still has worked with the sign in 5871T for about 12 years; the sign in 5876T for 12-14 years and the sign in 5873T since 1973. In spite of the remarks by Lee and Still concerning their belief that permits had been issued for the signs in 5871T, 5873T, and 5876T, on balance based upon the record and the facts found herein, permits were not issued for those signs.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Federal Highway Beautification Act, as amended, which pertains to lighting, design and spacing of signs on the interstate, federal and primary highway systems. Respondent, First Coast Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (First Coast), is an outdoor advertising firm located in St. Augustine Beach, Florida, and is the owner of a sign erected on State Road A1A in Flagler County, Florida. Respondent, Motel Delores, is a motel located at 5992 Oceanside Boulevard (State Road A1A) in Flagler County and has a sign erected near its place of business. Both signs are located on the same side of the highway and are subject to DOT's regulatory jurisdiction. The underpinnings of this controversy began in 1966 when Motel Delores decided it would erect a sign with a message reading "Delores Motel & Restaurant". The actual location of the sign is 385 feet south of the intersection of Malacompra Road and State Road A1A, or 10.2 miles north of the intersection of State Roads 100 and A1A, in Flagler County, Florida. At that time, the property on which the sign was erected was owned by Malcolm Johnson. According to Jerrald D. Schatz, who is one of the motel owners, Motel Delores was given permission by Johnson for the sign to be erected on Johnson's property. In 1970, ITT Development Corporation (ITT) purchased Johnson's land. There is no indication in the record that ITT initially lodged any objections to Motel Delores continuing to have its sign located on ITT's property. The date on which DOT began regulating outdoor advertising signs is not of record. However, Motel Delores first learned of the need to obtain a sign permit in early 1977 when a DOT representative advised it that a permit was necessary. Accordingly, respondent made application with DOT for a permit on March 9, 1977, and was issued tag number 5697-02 on March 16, 1977. Thereafter, the tagged sign remained at the same location until March 1990. In 1984, ITT and DOT became embroiled in a civil action over ownership of land on and near State Road A1A where the two signs are now located. In 1986, the lawsuit was settled when DOT and ITT agreed to exchange land in the immediate area. As a result of that settlement, the land on which Motel Delores' sign was located was deeded from ITT to DOT and now constitutes right- of-way on State Road A1A. Without DOT's written permission, the placement of a sign on state right-of-way is prohibited. In March 1990, Motel Delores' sign and tag were stolen by unknown individuals. Within a few days, Schatz began erecting a new sign a few feet closer to A1A. By chance, a DOT sign inspector, William Terry, happened to be traveling on A1A and observed the new sign. After a preliminary investigation was conducted, including contact by DOT with ITT, Terry concluded that the sign was within fifteen feet of DOT right-of-way on a federal primary highway and the sign owner did not have ITT's written permission to have the sign at that location. The inspector was unaware of the fact that DOT and ITT had exchanged land some four years earlier and was under the impression that the land on which the sign was located belonged to ITT. Accordingly, on March 29, 1990, Terry posted a cease work order on the sign and recommended that a notice of violation be issued. The recommendation was accepted by the district administrator of outdoor advertising and a notice to show cause was issued on April 6, 1990. On April 23, 1990, Schatz filed a request for hearing with the DOT district office. In late February 1990 First Coast began erecting an outdoor advertising sign approximately 523 feet north of where the Motel Delores sign was located. In conjunction with this activity, on March 14, 1990, First Coast filed an application with DOT for a sign permit. However, A1A is designated as a part of the federal-aid primary highway system and state law prohibits two permitted signs from being located within 1,000 feet of one another on such a road. Because the DOT "inventory book" for permitted signs carried the tag number for the sign owned by Motel Delores, which was 523 feet south of First Coast's sign, the application was returned to First Coast on March 21, 1990, with a notation by the district administrator that it was "Dis-Approved" (sic). A short time later, Terry posted a cease work order on First Coast's uncompleted sign, and a notice to show cause was issued on April 6, 1990, on the ground the sign did not meet spacing requirements. However, because at that time Motel Delores' sign was on DOT right-of-way without DOT's permission, there was no lawful, permitted sign on the same side of the road within 1,000 feet of First Coast's sign and thus the notice was improvidently issued. Indeed, a DOT representative acknowledged at hearing that Motel Delores' sign was "illegal" at the time the notice to show cause was issued against First Coast. In view of this, First Coast's application for a sign permit should have been approved. On April 19, 1990, First Coast requested a hearing to contest DOT's preliminary decision. Among other things, First Coast contended that the Motel Delores sign was illegally erected and thus its sign met all spacing requirements. For reasons not of record, DOT did not forward this and Motel Delores' first request for hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings until more than a year later. During this period of time, both respondents completed construction of their new signs and have continued to use them pending the outcome of these proceedings. Even so, DOT agreed at hearing that respondents should not be charged with violating the cease work orders posted on the two signs. On October 17, 1991, DOT advised Schatz by letter that it was "rescinding all violations issued under the (April 6, 1990) notice" because the notice had incorrectly identified the location of the sign as 385 feet north of Malacompra Road when in fact the actual location was 385 feet south of Malacompra Road. Schatz's happiness was short-lived, however, because DOT then issued another notice to show cause on November 1, 1991, alleging that the sign did not have a valid permit tag and was located on DOT's right-of-way. Motel Delores thereafter requested a hearing on November 8, 1991. On November 20, 1991, Motel Delores filed with DOT an outdoor advertising permit affidavit form in which it represented that its sign tag had been stolen and a replacement tag was necessary. The request was approved by DOT on January 14, 1992, and replacement tag number BF 209-25 was issued. On February 1, 1992, or less than a week prior to final hearing, DOT and Motel Delores executed a five year lease agreement whereby DOT agreed that the motel could keep its sign on DOT's property for $200 per year. According to Schatz, he had requested such a lease from DOT in late 1990 and it took more than a year for DOT to formalize the agreement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the notices to show cause issued against respondents on April 6, 1990, and November 1, 1991, be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that a sign permit be issued to First Coast Outdoor Advertising, Inc. for its sign erected on State Road A1A in Flagler County. DONE and ORDERED this 30 day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30 day of March, 1992. Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Suite 1150 200 East Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801 Jerrald D. Schatz 5992 North Oceanside Boulevard Hammock, FL 32137-2601 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, Agency Clerk 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue At issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the permits for signs bearing tag numbers BT339, AE862, and AX116 should be revoked, pursuant to Section 479.08, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact Lamar owns and maintains outdoor advertising signs in the State of Florida. Pursuant to the permitting requirements of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, the Department issues permits and tags to outdoor advertising signs along interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems. Signs that met permitting criteria at the time they were erected, but that do not comply with subsequently enacted laws or that no longer comply with the law due to changed conditions, may nonetheless be permitted and maintained as "nonconforming signs."1 In compliance with Subsection 479.02(8), Florida Statutes, the Department in 1997 and 1998 conducted a statewide inventory of all signs on the state interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems. This inventory became the database for all signs permitted at the time it was completed. The Department sent the inventory results to all sign owners in order to provide them an opportunity to confirm or challenge the accuracy of the results. The database includes the location of the sign; the dates the sign was permitted and constructed; its date and method of construction; the height, including the Height Above Ground Level ("HAGL"); the height, width, and square footage of the sign facing; the number and type of support structures used; whether the sign is lighted or not; the status of the sign as a conforming, nonconforming, or illegal sign; and other identifying information. Subsection 479.02(8), Florida Statutes, provides that the inventory of signs is to be updated no less than every two years. The Department in fact performs the update every year. In 2004, a series of hurricanes passed through Florida, destroying or damaging thousands of outdoor advertising signs. The Department issued notices of intent to revoke the permits of nonconforming signs that appeared to have been destroyed by the storms. In February 2005, the Department and Lamar entered into a settlement agreement that allowed Lamar to rebuild some signs and required the removal of others. The signs at issue in this proceeding were among those allowed to remain standing with repair. As to these signs, the settlement agreement provided: The outdoor advertising signs referenced above remain lawfully erected nonconforming signs and LAMAR may repair said signs, provided that said repair shall be at the pre-storm location and to pre-storm specifications, including configuration, type of materials, height, size, area of face and lighting. Exceptions to pre-storm specifications will be allowed to the extent required to comply with local building codes. Such repairs shall be completed within 270 days of entry of a Final Order approving this Joint Stipulation of Settlement. The referenced Final Order was entered on March 15, 2005. The Department issued permit numbers 13778 and 137790 and tag numbers BT339 (replaced by tag number CF221 at the time of the hearing) and AE862 to a nonconforming, back-to-back sign located along U.S. 1 in Martin County, .08 miles north of Constitution Boulevard in Hobe Sound. At the time of the 1997 inventory, the Martin County sign was a five-pole wooden structure. The Martin County sign sustained heavy damage during the 2004 hurricanes. After the storms, Lamar sent a work crew to the sign's location to rebuild the sign. The work crew replaced the sign with a four-pole wooden structure. Dave Henry, the real estate leasing manager for Lamar, testified that he gave the crew no particular instruction on how to rebuild the sign. During the rebuilding process, Mr. Henry gave his crews the locations, and told them to rebuild the signs as they had been before the storms. Mr. Henry stated that the crew probably looked at the remains of the damaged sign, saw only four stumps in the ground, and assumed that the original sign had only four supports. On March 21, 2006, the Department issued a Notice to Lamar, stating that the sign bearing tag numbers BT339 and AE862 "has been structurally changed and is no longer substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming, in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code Rule." On February 20, 2007, a Recommended Order was entered in Lamar South Florida v. Department of Transportation, Case No. 06-3281 (DOAH February 20, 2007). In that case, Judge R. Bruce McKibben recommended that the Department withdraw a Notice issued to Lamar South Florida because the Notice failed to specify exactly which changes to the sign in question caused the sign to be in violation of the Department's rules. Rather, the Notice merely provided a citation to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007(2)(a). In a final order dated May 21, 2007, the Department accepted Judge McKibben's recommendation, and acknowledged the "apparent confusion" regarding the running of the 30-day notice period and the nature of the notice required to trigger the running of that period. As a result of the Lamar South Florida case, the Department began to issue Notices that contained more specific information regarding the alleged violations. On July 31, 2007, the Department sent Lamar a replacement Notice for the Martin County sign, adding a more specific description of the violation, which stated that the sign "has been structurally modified in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code Rule: the number of supports has changed."2 The replacement notice also added the following provision: REVOCATION OF THE PERMIT(S) WILL BECOME FINAL thirty (30) days from your receipt of this notice unless you provide information to the Department showing the Notice was issued in error OR you correct the violation within 30 days of your receipt of this Notice, and provide evidence of the correction to the Department. For nonconforming signs, while you may correct the violation, you may not exceed the allowable maintenance standards as stated in s. 14-10.007(2), F.A.C. Lamar did not act within 30 days of the Notice to correct the violation and restore the Martin County sign to a five-pole structure. Mr. Henry testified that a fifth pole was added to the structure on November 16, 2007. The Department issued permit number 7359 and tag number AX116 to a nonconforming, single-faced sign in Polk County along U.S. 27, .141 miles east of Heatherwood Boulevard in Lake Wales. On November 22, 1997, the Polk County sign was inventoried and photographed as a seven-pole wooden structure. Lamar did not own the sign at the time the 2004 hurricanes damaged it. Lamar acquired the Polk county sign in 2005, after it had been rebuilt as a six-pole structure. On March 21, 2006, the Department issued a Notice to Lamar, stating that the sign bearing tag number AX116 "has been structurally changed and is no longer substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming, in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code." On July 31, 2007, the Department sent Lamar a replacement Notice for the Polk County sign, adding a more specific description of the violation which stated that the sign "has been structurally modified in violation of s. [sic] 14- 10.007(2), Florida Administrative Code: the number of supports has changed. . .".3 The replacement notice also contained the language quoted at finding of fact 14, supra. Lamar did not act within 30 days of the Notice to correct the violation and restore the Polk County sign to a seven-pole structure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation revoking the permits for the nonconforming signs bearing tag numbers BT339, AE862, and AX116. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2008.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this sign permit dispute, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke the permit for an off- premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc. (Respondent), on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a fire in June 1998, the newly rebuilt sign has lost its nonconforming status, and any rebuilt sign is now illegal. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that the fire that destroyed the sign was an act of criminal mischief or arson, rather than an Act of God, and thus the sign still qualifies for a nonconforming status. The sign in question is located 12.2 miles north of the Flagler County line on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) facing south, and is perhaps a mile or so south of the intersection of State Road 207 and I-95 (intersection) in St. Johns County, Florida. Respondent does not own the property where the sign is located, and it conducts no other business activities on that property. The property on which the sign is located is zoned Open Rural by St. Johns County (County), and it is not designated predominately for commercial or industrial uses by the County under the County's future land use map, comprehensive plan, or zoning ordinances. The sign is used to advertise Respondent's combination gas station and "open-area fruit market" located "just off" the intersection. The parties have stipulated that the sign was originally constructed more than 20 years ago before the current sign regulations became effective; under the present law, it would be a nonconforming sign and illegal. On May 27, 1998, a thunderstorm occurred in St. Johns County, resulting in between one-quarter and one-half inch of rainfall in the area. Due to a lightning strike on a tree, a 2-acre fire started approximately 1,000 feet southwest of the intersection in the vicinity of the sign. Although firefighters believed they had "knocked out" the fire within a day or two, the fire continued to smoulder under the dampened top layer of organic matter for several weeks until June 15, 1998, when it "worked its way back to the surface," broke out again, and cleared the containment line of the earlier fire. Aided by a light wind from the southeast and extremely dry conditions, the fire quickly spread eastward at the rate of 1,000 to 1,500 feet every 15 minutes and consumed several hundred acres, including the land on which Respondent's sign was located, before it was brought under control. That fire is commonly referred to as the Fort Peyton fire. In determining the cause of the Fort Peyton fire, forestry officials could not find any indicators of arson, and visual burn patterns clearly indicated that the new fire's origin was where the May 27 fire had begun. Therefore, it was officially classified as a "rekindle or breakout" of the May 27 fire, which was started by lightning. Put another way, the fire was the result of an Act of God, which is "the sudden manifestation and forces of nature." On either May 30 or June 5, 1998, depending on whether court or forestry records are accepted as being the most accurate, a fire began in Flagler Estates, which, "as the crow flies," lies approximately 12 to 15 miles southeast of the Fort Peyton fire. The Flagler Estates fire, however, was the result of an unattended illegal burn which was started by three individuals and went out of control. The fire was brought under control the same evening by firefighters, but only after some 450 surrounding acres were destroyed. The three individuals were later charged with arson. Respondent established that the prevailing winds during May and June 1998 were from the southeast and that "spoilers" or "floaters" (hot debris) from existing fires can sometimes float in the air and ignite new fires several miles away. Indeed, Respondent's investigator observed spoilers from inland fires floating through the air some 8 or 9 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean while he was fishing during that period of time. Accordingly, Respondent contends that it is just as likely that a spoiler floated northeastward from the Flagler Estates fire on May 30, 1998, and ignited the Fort Peyton blaze, some 12 to 15 miles away. If this theory is accepted, it would mean that the Fort Peyton fire would be attributable to arson, and not to an Act of God. The foregoing assumption has been rejected for several reasons. First, spoilers from the Flagler Estates fire did in fact ignite several spot fires in the area, but all of these spot fires occurred on the same day as the fire started and were within an eighth of an mile from the Flagler Estates perimeter. Second, it is highly unlikely that a spoiler would float up to 15 miles and then lie dormant for two weeks before igniting the Fort Peyton fire. Finally, the theory goes counter to the more persuasive evidence given by the supervising forester who investigated the Fort Peyton fire and concluded that it was an outbreak of the earlier fire that was started on May 27, 1998. After the sign was destroyed, Respondent rebuilt the sign at the same location using substantially the same materials that had composed the sign before it burned. However, the materials used to rebuild the sign were not part of the sign structure which was burned in the Fort Peyton fire. The new sign is the same size, shape, and height of the destroyed sign.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc., under sign permit number BR 252-55 is illegal and must be removed. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 17th of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 J. Stephen Alexander, Esquire 19 Old Mission Avenue St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Transportation (Respondent) should approve the application filed by Thoroughbred Development, Inc., and Rodney Dessberg (Petitioners) to permit an existing sign under the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2012).1/
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with regulation and permitting of certain outdoor advertising signs placed on specified highways. The Petitioners are the applicants for a sign permit, application number 58806/58807. The Petitioners own the sign and the property upon which the sign is located. The sign and property are located on U.S. 41, a federal aid primary highway designated in 2003 as a "Scenic Highway." The relevant portion of U.S. 41 is also referred to as the Tamiami Trail. The sign at issue in this proceeding (the "1964 sign") was erected in 1964 by owner Blue Heron fruit shippers. The sign has remained unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location since installation. The 1964 sign was built on a parcel of land (the "sign parcel") located at 7450 Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida. A small commercial building also occupied the parcel. The location is within an unincorporated part of Manatee County. The sign parcel has been zoned for commercial use since the erection of the sign in 1964. The sign is not located on state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. When the 1964 sign was erected, it was used to promote the Blue Heron fruit shipping business located on an adjacent parcel at 7440 Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida (the "Blue Heron parcel"). At all times material to this case, the two parcels have had separate legal descriptions. The parcels have separate driveway connections to Tamiami Trail. For reasons unknown, the addresses of the parcels were changed at some point, but the legal descriptions of the parcels have not been amended. Although the parcels were presumably commonly owned or leased by the Blue Heron fruit business at the time the 1964 sign was erected, the parcels were independently sold and owned individually by separate purchasers. The sign parcel is currently designated as 7851 North Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida. The commercial building remains on the property. The Blue Heron parcel is currently designated as 7849 North Tamiami Trail, Sarasota, Florida. In October 1976, Kerry and Jane Kirschner purchased the Blue Heron parcel and the fruit business thereon. The Kirschners continued to operate the fruit business. The sign parcel was owned by another individual. Although there was no written agreement between the Kirschners and the owner of the sign parcel, Mr. Kirschner testified at the hearing that he made a monthly payment to the owner of the sign parcel so that he could continue using the sign to promote the fruit business. It is reasonable to presume that the monthly payment was based upon an agreement between the two owners. It would be unreasonable to assume that the payment was a gift from Mr. Kirschner to the owner of the sign parcel. In January 1978, the Kirschners purchased the sign parcel from the owner to whom Mr. Kirschner had been paying rent. Mr. Kirschner testified that the Kirschners bought the sign parcel to obtain the commercial building and to continue using the 1964 sign to promote the fruit business. In October 1978, "Florida Outdoor, Inc." filed an application for a two-sided sign (the "1978 sign") located on Tamiami Trail, 444 feet to the north of the 1964 sign. A sign permit application must identify the location of regulated signs located nearby the site of the proposed sign. Because the 1964 sign appeared to advertise an on-premises business and was therefore not subject to regulation, the applicant did not reference the 1964 sign. The Respondent approved the application and issued a permit (tag number AW881/AW882) to the applicant. In November 1979, "Florida Outdoor, Inc." filed an application for a two-sided sign (the "1979 sign") located on Tamiami Trail, 150 feet to the south of the 1964 sign. Again, the applicant did not reference the 1964 sign. The Respondent approved the application and issued a permit (tag number AW698/AW699) to the applicant. Both the 1978 and 1979 signs remain at their permitted locations. The Kirschners never combined the two parcels. They sold the Blue Heron parcel in 1986 and sold the sign parcel in 1993. The Notice of Violation dated January 31, 2012, was the first violation ever issued by the Respondent regarding the 1964 sign. At the hearing, the Respondent acknowledged that, had the 1964 sign not been considered exempted from regulation as an "on premises" sign, it could have been permitted prior to the installation of the 1978 and 1979 signs. Following the installation of the 1978 and 1979 signs, the 1964 sign could not have been permitted (absent the "grandfather" provision) due to sign spacing regulations not at issue in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order granting the application for the sign permit referenced herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2012.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer would recommend that the agency head enter a final order permitting the voluntary removal of the advertising structure within 30 days of the date of the agency head's final order, and directing employees of the Department of Transportation to remove the structure after the 30-day period without compensation to the owner. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, FlorIda 32301 James P. Appleman, Esquire 206 Market Street Post Office Box 3115 Marianna, Florida 32446 Charles M. Wynn, Esquire 310 East Jackson Street Post Office Box 793 Marianna, Florida 32446
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's sign permits and retrieve Petitioner's permit tags because Petitioner violated Sections 479.07(5) and 479.08, Florida Statutes, 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 10.004(7), 2/ by allegedly removing its sign from its property and by failing to display the permit tag prior to removing the sign.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation formed in 1983 by Mr. Rodney Forton. Mr. Forton is the president and sole shareholder of Petitioner. Sometime in 1987, Petitioner entered into a management agreement with Cotee River Outdoor Advertising Company ("Cotee River"). The management agreement provided that Cotee River would construct a sign on property owned by Petitioner on U.S. highway 19 in New Port Richey, Florida (the "Cotee River sign"). Cotee River agreed to pay Petitioner a portion of the advertising revenues from the sign. The Cotee River Permit On May 26, 1987, Cotee River applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit from Respondent. The application described the Cotee River sign as a rectangular wood sign measuring 10 feet by 20 feet, with its lowest point approximately 15 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 25 feet above the crown of the road. Respondent approved the application and mailed the approval to Cotee River on May 29, 1987. On June 3, 1987, Respondent located the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory at, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.06 in F/N." The number "5.06" indicates that the sign is located at milepost 5.06 on U.S. 19. 3/ Mileposts describe the location of each sign by the distance of the sign from a fixed point. Each of Respondent's outdoor advertising inspectors measures the milepost for each sign in his or her territory using a distance measuring instrument. Respondent then enters the milepost for each sign in Respondent's sign inventory. The milepost of 5.06 that Respondent assigned to the Cotee River permit was incorrect. In May 1987, Cotee River constructed a sign on Petitioner's property pursuant to the permit granted by Respondent. The sign was a metal monopole sign rather than the wood sign described in the application. The Cotee River sign was not constructed at milepost 5.060. Cotee River rented the sign to outdoor advertisers. However, Cotee River failed to pay any portion of the advertising revenue to Petitioner, and the parties resolved the matter by mutual agreement. Petitioner and Cotee River agreed that Cotee River would release its right to manage the Cotee River sign in consideration for the right to manage a sign located on other property owned by Petitioner. The agreement provided that Petitioner would pay Cotee River a prescribed sum in exchange for the performance of specific duties by Cotee River. Cotee River failed to perform the duties specified in the agreement. Petitioner refused to pay the balance of payments. Petitioner sued Cotee River. Cotee River went into bankruptcy and was dissolved. Petitioner's Permit On July 14, 1992, Petitioner applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the Cotee River sign. The application described the sign as an existing rectangular, metal, monopole "sign in place," measuring approximately 10 feet by 20 feet. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Petitioner and mailed the approval to Petitioner on October 12, 1992. Respondent again incorrectly listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.060 in F/N." Respondent issued permit tag number BG341-25 to Petitioner. Although Petitioner used the Cotee River sign to generate advertising revenue, Petitioner never displayed any tag numbers on the sign. The tag numbers remained in Petitioner's files until sometime in 1995. Dr. Goluba's Permit At about the same time that Cotee River went out of business in 1992, Robert L. Goluba, D.D.S., owned property immediately adjacent to Petitioner's property. Prior to March 1993, an unidentified representative of Respondent contacted Dr. Goluba. The representative told Dr. Goluba that there were two signs on Dr. Goluba's property that were going to be taken down if the sign permits were not renewed. The representative mistakenly identified one of the two signs as the Cotee River sign. The representative went on to explain that Respondent could avoid the expense of taking down the two signs if Dr. Goluba obtained permits for the signs. Dr. Goluba wanted the advertising revenues and agreed to obtain the necessary permits. On March 2, 1993, Dr. Goluba applied for a sign permit for the Cotee River sign he mistakenly believed to be located on his property. The application described the sign as an "existing" rectangular, metal, monopole sign measuring approximately 10 feet by 24 feet, with its lowest point approximately 18 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 30 feet above the crown of the road. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Dr. Goluba and mailed the approval to him on March 8, 1993. Respondent listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/M.P. 4.870 in F/N." Respondent incorrectly listed Dr. Goluba's permit in the sign inventory at milepost 4.870. On March 24, 1993, Respondent issued permit number BG960-35 to Dr. Goluba. Although Dr. Goluba never derived advertising revenue from the Cotee River sign, he did display his permit on the sign. Dr. Goluba inadvertently failed to pay the fee required to renew the sign permit in 1994 and, therefore, failed to display current permits on the sign. On April 11, 1994, Respondent issued a Notice of Violation, Failure To Display Permit Tag. The New Outdoor Advertising Inspector In early 1995, a new outdoor advertising inspector assumed responsibility for the territory in which the Cotee River sign was located. On April 11, 1995, the inspector conducted a field inspection to verify the mileposts and signs in the territory for which he was responsible. The inspector correctly identified the milepost of the Cotee River sign as milepost 4.980. He found no sign subject to regulation by Respondent 4/ located at milepost 5.060. Milepost 5.060 and 4.980 are approximately 422 feet apart. Relevant law prohibits the location of regulated signs within 1,000 feet of each other. 5/ No exceptions to 1,000 foot prohibition applied to the Cotee River sign. The inspector concluded that Petitioner had removed the wood sign originally permitted to Cotee River in 1987 and which Respondent had incorrectly listed in its sign inventory as being located at milepost 5.060. On July 12, 1995, Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice Of Violation -- Removed Sign. On August 22, 1995, Respondent ordered the revocation of Petitioner's tag permit because Petitioner had allegedly removed the Cotee River sign from milepost 5.060. Respondent never issued a Notice of Violation to Petitioner for failure to display his tag numbers on the Cotee River sign. Petitioner protested the revocation of its permit and refused to return the permit tags to Respondent. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. In the meantime, Dr. Goluba's accountant had inadvertently failed to pay the permit fee for the Cotee River sign. Respondent placed the Cotee River sign on Respondent's "cutdown list" for failure to pay the required fees. On June 20, 1995, Respondent had the Cotee River sign cut down and removed. Respondent sent Dr. Goluba a bill in the amount of $4,990 for the cost of cutting the sign down and removing it. Prior to the date Respondent cut down and removed the Cotee River sign, Petitioner notified the inspector verbally and with written documentation that the sign was owned by Petitioner, located on Petitioner's property, and permitted to Petitioner. The inspector found that Respondent's records did not agree with Petitioner's records. The inspector informed Petitioner that the "cutdown order" came from Tallahassee and there was nothing the inspector could do. Dr. Goluba's tags were displayed on the Cotee River sign at the time it was cut down and removed. Ms. Maria Passanisi was the broker who managed the sign for Dr. Goluba. Ms. Passanisi was at the site when the sign was cut down and removed. She protested Respondent's action so vehemently that the police officers regulating traffic at the scene had to intervene to quell the disturbance. After Respondent cut down the Cotee River sign, Petitioner drove a stick into the ground where the sign had been located and displayed the permit tags for the removed sign on the stick. The tags were displayed on the stick at the time of the hearing. The Computerized Sign Inventory Respondent uses a computer system to maintain its sign inventory. The computer system does not accept the same milepost for two or more regulated signs. When Petitioner applied for its sign permit in 1992, Respondent was required to carry the Cotee River permit in the inventory as a void permit. The computer system would not accept the same milepost for Petitioner's permit and the void Cotee River permit. In order to circumvent the computer system, Respondent's supervisor of property management arbitrarily changed the milepost number entered for the Cotee River permit from milepost 5.060 to milepost 4.970. As late as September 20, 1993, Respondent's computerized sign inventory identified the Cotee River sign as being located at three incorrect mileposts. The inventory located the same sign permitted to Cotee River, Petitioner, and Dr. Goluba, respectively, at mileposts 4.970, 5.060, and 4.870. In 1995, the new outdoor advertising inspector correctly located the Cotee River sign at milepost 4.980. However, he mistakenly assumed that milepost 5.060 was the correct milepost for Petitioner's sign and erroneously concluded that Petitioner had removed its sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not remove the permitted sign and that the permits issued to Petitioner are valid. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1997.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent?s Outdoor Advertising Permits should be revoked pursuant to section 479.08, Florida Statutes, because the associated sign has not remained substantially the same, has been disassembled and re-erected, or has been destroyed, as set forth in the Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation regulates outdoor advertising signs located in proximity to the State Highway System, the Interstate, and portions of the Federal-aid Primary System. Green?s Wrecker Service, begun in 1947, was one of the first wrecker services in Alachua County. Mr. Allen Green was the owner and operator. There was no precise testimony as to when Mr. Green first erected the advertising sign at issue here, but Mr. Green?s daughter, Pamela, vaguely remembered that happening: Well, I was seven or eight years old. I remember Daddy and Grandpa going down there after they opened up the road. It was woods there and we used to play on our bikes and I remember my Grandmother coming out and sitting beside the road because she was scared we was gonna get onto 301 because it was always woods back there before, and we could ride and we didn?t have her bothering us, you know. So when the woods got cleared out to 301, then, you know, Granny was sitting out there and daddy and grandpa went down there and done something, put that sign up, I guess. Based upon Pamela?s current age and her recollection, it can be roughly calculated that the sign was put up over 40 years ago. It is a small sign, about three feet by six feet, and has the words “Green?s Garage” in red letters and a smaller “Pennzoil” logo in yellow, along with a large arrow pointing toward the business. The sign sits at the intersection of US Highway 301 and 165th Avenue, the business being located about a hundred yards down 165th Avenue. The sign is important to the business because, due to the trees, one cannot see the actual building or cars at the business location from US Highway 301 until one is already at the 165th Avenue intersection, where one can finally see them through the area that has been cleared out for the road. Mr. Green turned the business over to Pamela before he died, and she has operated the business ever since. She subsequently married Mr. Gary Keen. Mrs. Pamela Green Keen incorporated the business as “Green?s Garage and Wrecking Service, Inc.” There was no evidence as to when the subsequent provision of state law or local ordinance with which the sign fails to comply was passed, but the parties stipulated that the sign is nonconforming, so it is clear that the sign was lawful when erected but could not be put up today. The sign was permitted as a wooden sign with a back-to- back configuration and two supports. That configuration has never changed. The sign was assigned tag numbers BE893 and BE894 by the Department. These tags look like small license plates that are posted on the sign and must be visible from the main travel-way. Mr. Tom Simmons is a senior outdoor advertising inspector for Cardno TBE Consultants (Cardno TBE), a contractor for the Department. Cardno TBE manages the outdoor advertising program for the State of Florida. Mr. Simmons has been employed with them for 12 years, and, before that, performed a similar job for four years with the Department. Mr. Simmons oversees 16 counties in northeast Florida, including Alachua County. Mr. Simmons was very credible in his testimony. Mr. Simmons testified that he was aware of the sign: In the due process of traveling from point A to point B on 301, I had seen it before. Like I stated earlier, after you have been out here a long time like I have, when structures disappear and go away, you pick up on it because it?s something that you are looking for constantly. On September 7, 2011, Mr. Simmons took a picture of the sign. It was down on the ground and was not erect. Mr. Keen testified that shortly before this, he had been having problems with vandals. The windshield of his tow truck had been shattered by a man whose car had been towed to Green?s Garage. That man was caught and ultimately paid restitution. A vehicle had also been stolen from Green?s Garage in June, and Mr. Keen or his wife had requested increased sheriff?s patrols at the business address in August, as evidenced by records from the Alachua County Sheriff?s Department. Mr. Keen testified that people often became upset when their cars were towed and that some were vindictive and would resort to vandalism. He said it was an unavoidable consequence of the business, since he towed cars for the Sheriff?s Department and the Florida Highway Patrol. Mr. Keen testified that he goes down 165th Avenue to US Highway 301, right past where the sign is located, almost every day. His testimony that the sign was not down for more than a day is accepted. Mr. Keen?s first action was to look for signs as to who had knocked it down, but he could not find any evidence such as cigarette butts, or cans, or footprints, so he decided it would do no good to call the police. Mr. Keen re-erected the sign. He did not have to reassemble or add to the materials on the sign in any way, since it was still intact. He just put it back up. The Department issued its original Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation, dated October 26, 2011, alleging that the sign had been abandoned. Respondent denied this in its response to the Department and requested an administrative hearing. The Department did not request an administrative law judge within 15 days of Respondent?s request. Green?s Garage and Wrecker Service is substantially affected by the Department?s intended action to revoke the permits for the sign. If the permit is lost, the sign must be taken down and no new sign can be erected. Almost a year later, on October 18, 2012, Mr. Simmons took a picture of the sign which showed that it was back up in its original location. He testified that it appeared to be the same sign, constructed of the same materials as before. On March 28, 2013, the Department issued Green?s Garage an Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation, alleging violations of three different provisions of the rules. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sign remained substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming. Even if it was determined that the sign did not remain substantially the same simply because it was down for a day or two, simply re-erecting the sign when no assembly or construction was required constituted reasonable repair and maintenance of the sign. The sign was never disassembled throughout the time relevant to this proceeding. Less than 60 percent of the upright supports of the sign were physically damaged at any time relevant to this proceeding. One pole was not damaged at all; the other had only very minor damage. The minor damage to one pole was not such that the normal repair practices of the industry would call for that pole?s replacement. Respondent never had an intention to abandon or discontinue the sign at any time relevant to this proceeding. The facts did not show that the sign structure ceased to exist. All the interrelated parts and material -- including the beams, poles, and stringers -- which were constructed for the purpose of supporting or displaying the message remained completely intact and never ceased to exist as an integrated structure.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation and allow the outdoor advertising permits to continue. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2013.
