The Issue Whether the subject Endorsement to an HMO benefit contract language is ambiguous and, if so, whether the subject subscriber is entitled to additional benefits because of the ambiguity.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, T. C. was enrolled as a participant in the group HMO contract issued by Petitioner to a construction company for the benefit of its employees and their eligible dependents. The HMO contract consisted of a Group Health Services Agreement, a Member Handbook, and any endorsements to either document. The Member Handbook and an Endorsement to the Member Handbook in September 1999 are the documents pertinent to this proceeding. In those documents, Petitioner is referred to as HOI. Prior to September 1999, paragraph 1.08 of the schedule of benefits section of the Member Handbook (page 42) provided, in pertinent part, as follows. 1.08 Short-term physical, speech, or other therapies designed to correct functional defects which remain after a catastrophic illness or crippling injury, . . . when medically appropriate for the treatment of a Condition, provided that significant improvement of the Member's Condition, as determined by the Medical Director of HOI, is expected within two months from the first date of treatment. This benefit is limited to a maximum of two months of treatment per Member per Calendar Year. The subject HMO contract was amended in September 1999 by the Endorsement styled "Endorsement: Rehabilitation Services (85999.459/99SR)" 3/ provided, in pertinent part, as follows: All prior references to short-term physical, speech, or other therapies in the Group Health Services Agreement and/or Member Handbook and any Endorsement attached thereto is [sic] hereby deleted and replaced with the following new subsection entitled Rehabilitation Services: Rehabilitation Services Prescribed short-term inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation services [are] limited to the therapy categories listed below. In order to be covered: (1) HOI must review, for coverage purposes only, a Rehabilitation Plan submitted or authorized by the Member's 4/ Primary Care Physician; (2) HOI must agree that he Member's Condition 5/ is likely to improve significantly within 62 days from the first date such services are to be rendered; (3) such services must be provided to treat functional defects which remain after an illness or injury; and (4) such services must be Medically Necessary 6/ for the treatment of a Condition. Rehabilitation Plan means a written plan, describing the type, length, duration, and intensity of rehabilitation services to be provided to a Member with rehabilitation potential. Such a plan must have realistic goals which are attainable by the Member within a reasonable length of time and must be likely to result in significant improvement within 62 days from the first date such services are to be rendered. The Rehabilitation Plan must be renewed every 30 days. Outpatient Outpatient rehabilitation services are limited per Member per Condition to the number of Medically Necessary rehabilitation services which are received by the Member within the consecutive 62-day period which immediately follows the first date that the Member begins such services. Outpatient rehabilitation services are limited to the therapy categories listed below: Speech Therapy: . . . Physical/Occupational Therapy: Services of a Physical Therapist or Occupational Therapist or Massage Therapist for the purpose of aiding in the restoration of normal physical function lost due to illness, injury, stroke or a surgical procedure while this coverage was in force. In order for Physical Therapy, Occupational Therapy, or massage therapy to be covered under this provision, such services must be part of an approved Rehabilitation Plan and provided by a provider licensed to render such services. Cardiac Therapy: . . . Inpatient Rehabilitation services of the therapy categories described above provided during a covered inpatient confinement will be covered for the duration of the confinement. T. C. was injured in a fall on December 31, 1999. He sustained a fracture of his left proximal humerus with neurovascular compromise. He underwent surgery to reduce the fracture at St. Mary's Medical Center in West Palm Beach where he remained hospitalized until his discharge on January 10, 2000. Upon discharge, his physicians recommended and prescribed a Rehabilitation Plan which provided for physical therapy on Tuesdays and Thursdays of each week. This Rehabilitation was reviewed and approved by Petitioner, effective January 31, 2000. T. C. began receiving rehabilitation services on Thursday, February 10, 2000, from a provider known as Pediatric Therapy. On or about March 24, 2000, Petitioner notified T. C.'s family and Pediatric Therapy that additional physical therapy would not be covered after that date. On Friday, March 24, 2000, T. C.'s mother telephonically filed an expedited grievance with Petitioner requesting coverage for additional physical therapy. As part of her request, she informed Petitioner that although Petitioner's authorization period began on January 31, 2000, T. C. did not commence treatment at Pediatric Therapy until February 10, 2000. Thus, approximately ten days of the authorized period were not utilized. She further informed Petitioner that he had not completed treatment and continued to require physical therapy. Upon review of his treatment dates in relation to the authorization period and consideration of the information provided by his mother, Petitioner approved coverage for a further period of rehabilitation services from Tuesday, March 28, 2000, to April 13, 2000, the date the 62-day period starting February 10, 2000, expired. Petitioner declined coverage for rehabilitation services beyond April 13, 2000, on the basis that the benefits for outpatient therapy under the contract had been exhausted. In its correspondence to T. C.'s mother, Petitioner stated that it was relying on paragraph 1.08, page 42, of the HMO contract. The reference to this provision was an error because the provision had been replaced and superseded by the Endorsement. There was no evidence that T. C.'s family suffered any prejudice because of the erroneous reference in the denial correspondence. The operative language at issue in this proceeding is the language set forth in the Endorsement.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's license as a Physical Therapist should be suspended or revoked or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 486, Florida Statutes, as is more particularly set forth hereinafter and which is contained in a Second Amended Administrative Complaint filed December 12, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Steven R. Bernstein, is and at all times material, was a licensed physical therapist having been issued license number PT 0002304. (Stipulation) Respondent maintained two separate offices in Fort Lauderdale: 4580 North State Road 7, Suite K, and 2951 Northwest 49th Avenue, Suite 308. (Stipulation) From March 1981 to March 1983, Respondent employed Kathy Schillace as an aide at both of his offices. At no time was Schillace licensed as a physical therapist or a physical therapist assistant. (Stipulation) Schillace's duties included giving treatments to patients such as electrical stimulation, range of motion exercises and ultrasound. To perform these duties, Schillace reviewed patient charts and determined what procedures were needed based on notations which had been recorded by Respondent or one of his licensed physical therapists employed in one of the two offices. Schillace received on the job training from Respondent and Susan Trider, a licensed physical therapist, on how to operate the equipment. Susan Trider supervised Schillace during most of her employment with Respondent. Susan Trider worked for Respondent from November 16, 1981 thru June 21, 1982. Trider was licensed in Florida by endorsement on June 3, 1982. Trider was licensed in Massachusetts in April 1980. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) From April 1982 to May 1983, Respondent employed Patricia Sears as an aide at both of his offices. At no time was Sears licensed as a physical therapist or a physical therapist assistant. (Stipulation) Sears routinely performed treatments on patients with electrical stimulation, range of motion and ultrasound exercises. Although Sears felt that she did not receive adequate training to do the treatments she performed for patients, it is found that Sears received adequate training and there were ample licensed supervisory personnel on hand to answer any inquires or provide the needed assistance. As example, it is alleged that based on the inadequate training and lack of supervision that Sears received, she burned a patient with the electrical stimulation machine. Upon review of the testimony concerning that incident, it is found that Sears was working under the supervision of an employee of Respondent, Paula Allia, a licensed physical therapist. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 12, lines 21-25; page 13 lines 1-4). Respondent had a policy of requiring licensed physical therapists to be on the premises at all times while aides were administering treatment to patients. The training included reviewing contra-indications, the indications, what procedures the equipment was capable of doing, reviewing the operating manuals and explaining the various equipment including hands-on training by licensed personnel. (TR 76-77) Prior to administering any procedures to patients, the aides were given a training exam and they had to demonstrate their abilities by passing the exam and by providing treatment to the licensed personnel. Respondent endeavors to insure that the aides were adequately trained by duplicating the training program that he received while in school to become licensed. (TR 77, lines 23-25) After they were trained, the typical case would be that the aides would only perform procedures diagnosed by a licensed physical therapist. While performing the procedures, licensed therapists were on the premises throughout the period during which the procedures were being administered. (TR 78-79) The procedures that were performed by the aides were procedures ordered by private physicians and all patients of Respondent's were referred from private physicians. Respondent constantly checked the administration of procedures by licensed personnel. (Testimony of Fran Wade, TR 97-98. Testimony of Susan Trider, TR 104) During times material herein, the procedures that Respondent's aides performed were the typical procedures engaged in by aides at other hospitals and private physical therapists in South Florida. (Testimony of Todd Williams, (TR 116-117) Respondent's offices were small and it was possible to hear communications between the patients, aides and the licensed physical therapist constantly monitored the treatment modalities administered by the aides. (Testimony of Respondent, R 92) In the opinion of Paul Hughes, an expert physical therapist, a physical therapist actively involved in the treatment or who is in the immediate area to provide supervision to an aide, is engaged in an acceptable practice in Florida. (TR 39) The testimony of other licensed physical therapists herein support Respondent's position that the treatment modalities that Respondent allowed his aides to administer were the type modalities which were considered acceptable by the local community. (Testimony of Diane Siweck, Sue Chestnut, Todd Williams and Fran Wade).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of June 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Shope, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Hubert, Esquire Paragon Center Suite 512 2400 East Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Dorothy Faircloth, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Wings T. Benton, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was licensed as a physical therapist assistant in Florida. He has held a physical therapist assistant license for approximately 18 years and worked approximately five and one-half years as an orthotec. In June 1985, Respondent was employed by Southeast Rehabilitation Services (Southeast) as a physical therapist assistant. On or about June 3, 1985, a patient had been transferred to Southeast with one knee immobilized. The physician's order transferring the patient to Southeast directed the immobilizer be removed. When Respondent provided treatment to the patient, he removed the immobilizer without first having received written instructions from the physical therapist to do so. On or about June 11, 1985, Respondent provided treatment to a patient at Southeast which consisted of strengthening exercises using small weights, when the physical therapist orders called only for range of motion exercises without weights. Respondent had been working at Southeast only a short while and had been taken on rounds by another physical therapist assistant. When Respondent gave treatment to this patient on his own, he couldn't locate the patient's chart and relied on his memory to provide treatment. He thought he remembered the other physical assistant gave this patient strengthening exercise, but this was incorrect. Respondent readily acknowledged committing the violations alleged, but contended the June 11 incident was a simple mistake and that he had followed physician's orders at other physical therapy centers at which he had worked, without waiting for written orders from the physical therapist.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 007919. Respondent is an orthopedic surgeon, practicing in Hallandale, Florida. Respondent first met N. L. on March 6, 1985, when she came to him for treatment of injuries which she received in a motor vehicle accident on March 2, 1985. N. L. began receiving physical therapy in Respondent's office and was examined by Respondent on a regular basis. The primary medication given to N. L. by Respondent was B-12 IM. On a number of occasions, Respondent gave N. L. a prescription for valium (Diazepam). Diazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance as defined by Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Respondent made a notation in N. L.'s records whenever he gave her a prescription for medication and whenever he gave her a sample of medication which he had received from manufacturers' representatives. Although subsequently released from active treatment, N. L. continued to return to Respondent's office for treatment and therapy due to continued complaints and due to episodes of exacerbation of the injuries which she had previously received. Respondent saw N. L. as a patient for the last time on February 20, 1987. Respondent gave her no prescriptions for valium subsequent to that date. Thereafter, Respondent did see N. L. socially. She was a friend of his children and dated one of his sons. She was a guest in Respondent's home on a number of occasions. On occasion, she accompanied his sons when they came to Respondent's office. On several occasions, she flew with Respondent in his airplane. N. L. was never drunk or "stoned" when she was in Respondent's presence. Respondent never saw any evidence that N. L. was an alcohol and/or drug abuser. On or about July 25, 1989, N. L. died as a result of a car accident. Some Diazepam was found in her blood at the time of her death. Her blood also revealed a high alcohol content. Respondent kept his blank prescription pads in more than one location in his office. He kept some in his desk and kept some in a cabinet in the hallway across from the examining rooms. According to the records of Eckerd Drug Store, on May 18, 1989, someone had a prescription for valium filled. That prescription appeared to be signed by Respondent. It was issued in an alias used by N. L. and reflected N. L.'s home address. That prescription was filled in increments on May 18 and May 19 by the pharmacists working at Eckerd. According to the records of Eckerd Drug Store, on June 13, 1989, someone had a prescription for valium filled. That prescription appeared to be signed by Respondent. It was issued in an alias used by N. L. and reflected N. L.'s home address. That prescription was filled on June 13, 1989, was refilled on June 27, 1989, and was refilled on July 18, 1989, by the pharmacists working at Eckerd. Although the signature on the two prescriptions described above is similar to Respondent's, Respondent did not sign or issue those prescriptions to N. L. C. F. is a 28-year-old female who slipped and fell in her apartment on August 23, 1989. She sought medical treatment immediately following her fall. She then retained an attorney to represent her in the civil litigation she would be filing as a result of her fall, and that attorney referred her to Respondent for treatment and physical therapy. Respondent's first contact with C. F. occurred on her first visit to his office on August 31, 1989. At that time, Respondent performed a full physical examination on C. F. and started her on a course of physical therapy. It was not Respondent's practice to see each patient every time that patient came in for physical therapy. Rather, Respondent would see such patients once a week, either in the physical therapy room or in one of his examining rooms. On November 2, 1989, Respondent saw C. F. in the therapy room. C. F. listed her complaints, and Respondent examined her and dictated notes for her medical chart. C. F. asked Respondent if she could talk to him in a different room. She was placed in one of the examining rooms. When Respondent came into the examining room, C. F. asked if the door could be closed and if it could be secured. Respondent then closed the sliding door to the examining room, securing it with a pin. C. F. then told Respondent that she was "very good at giving head." Respondent replied that that was nice but he was busy. C. F. continued to joke and was laughing when she left the examining room. Thinking it insignificant, Respondent gave no further thought to the banter which had taken place. As C. F. left the office, she stopped at the front desk and made an appointment for a physical therapy treatment the following week. On November 7, 1989, C. F. arrived for her scheduled physical therapy treatment. She was not scheduled to see Respondent on that date. While C. F. was lying on the traction table, she asked the physical therapist if Respondent were in the office that day. The therapist responded that he was and asked if C. F. needed to speak to him. At first, C. F. said she did not need to see Respondent, but she later became insistent that Respondent see her. By the end of C. F.'s therapy session, C. F. was demanding that she be seen by Respondent, taking the position that she would not leave without seeing him even if that meant that she had to wait all day. The therapist told Respondent that C. F. was demanding to see him, and Respondent told the therapist to put C. F. in an examining room. Respondent then became busy, and the therapist did not have an opportunity to tell Respondent that C. F. was acting "a little eerie." C. F. was taken to an examining room. She waited for approximately an hour before Respondent was able to see her. When Respondent entered the examining room, C. F. asked him to close the door and motioned to him to lock it by putting the locking pin in place. Respondent closed the door and inserted the pin. C. F. walked over to Respondent, abruptly opened his belt, opened his pants, pulled his pants down, pulled down his underwear, pulled up his shirt, and told Respondent to "hold this," referring to his penis. C. F. then told Respondent that she had to get a napkin. She turned, took two steps toward her pocketbook, reached in, pulled out a camera, and instantly shot two pictures of Respondent. She then ran to the door shouting for her husband whom she had brought with her to her therapy session on that day. Respondent reached for her pocketbook, but C. F. pulled the pin out of the door, opened the door, and ran out still loudly calling her husband's name. C. F. and Respondent were alone in the examining room for no more than two minutes. By this time, her husband Patrick had entered the examining room area, where he immediately attacked the x-ray technician, placing his hands around the x-ray technician's throat and attempting to strangle him. C. F. told her husband he had gotten the wrong doctor, and Patrick then ran to Respondent and placed a stranglehold on him. C. F. and Patrick left Respondent's office, stopped by the gas station where C. F. worked, and then went to the Hallandale police station. Within 24 hours from the time that C. F. seduced Respondent in his office, she had contacted the attorney representing her in her "slip and fall" lawsuit regarding his filing an action against Respondent, had had a "falling out" with that attorney over him representing her, had hired a different attorney to file a lawsuit against Respondent, had been referred by that second attorney to a third attorney who would represent her along with the second attorney in suing Respondent, had been interviewed by a local television station at the office of one of her new attorneys, her interview and the interview with her new attorneys had been shown on both the early evening and the late evening news, and contact had been made between C. F.'s new attorneys and Respondent's attorney regarding C. F.'s demand for money from Respondent. No civil suit was ever filed by C. F. against Respondent. Numerous contacts took place between C. F.'s attorneys and Respondent's attorney. Additionally, C. F.'s attorneys contacted the Department's investigator a number of times attempting to obtain confidential information from the investigator to be used in C. F.'s claim against Respondent. Over the next several months, C. F.'s attorneys continued to demand money from Respondent and threatened Respondent with additional publicity. In the face of C. F.'s threats of expanded publicity against Respondent, a settlement was entered into in February of 1990. Under the terms of that settlement, C. F. received a cash payment from Respondent's medical malpractice carrier with an "extremely nominal" contribution from Respondent. Respondent was immediately devastated by his encounter with C. F. on November 7, 1989. He walked down the hallway in his office building and made an appointment to see Dr. Burton Cahn, a psychiatrist practicing in that building. He was not able to see Dr. Cahn until November 9, 1989. Dr. Cahn began treating Respondent for his depression, seeing Respondent at first twice a week and then once a week. Respondent was still seeing Dr. Cahn regularly at the time of the final hearing in this cause. Respondent voluntarily ceased practicing medicine on November 9, 1989, to avoid the possibility that the problems with C. F. would distract him from providing good quality medical care. He resumed his office practice on March 7, 1990, with Dr. Cahn's full approval and following Dr. Cahn's suggestion that Respondent never see a female patient without another female in the room. Respondent had ceased performing hospital surgical procedures by approximately August of 1989, two months before the incident with C. F., since he was not doing much surgery in a hospital setting and had someone else in his office who was performing hospital surgical procedures. When he resumed his office practice on March 7, 1990, Respondent did not resume performing hospital surgical procedures since he thought he might be "too rusty". Respondent is able to practice orthopedic surgery. He does not represent a danger to himself or to the people in the community. A further suspension of Respondent from his practice would be of no benefit to him or to the community.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against him. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of October, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-1565 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, 6-9, 22, 28, and 31 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 13-18, 23, and 24 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues under consideration herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 11, 12, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, and 35 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible and/or competent evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 19, 27, and 36-41 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, conclusions of law, or argument of counsel. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 32-34 have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's four unnumbered paragraphs contained in the Findings of Fact section of his post hearing Report and Recommendation of Referee have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, conclusions of law, or argument of counsel. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation/Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mary B. Radkins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 David Bogenschutz, Esquire 633 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
