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THE CROSSINGS AT FLEMING ISLAND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT vs FLORIDA LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION AND MONROE COUNTY, 98-004159 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orange Park, Florida Sep. 23, 1998 Number: 98-004159 Latest Update: Feb. 10, 1999

The Issue The sole issue to be addressed is whether the amendment of the boundaries of The Crossings at Fleming Island Community Development District meets the applicable criteria set forth in Chapter 190, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 42-1, Florida Administrative Code.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the undersigned Administrative Law Judge recommends that the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, pursuant to Chapters 190 and 120, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 42-1, Florida Administrative Code, amend the boundaries of The Crossings at Fleming Island Community Development District as requested by the Petitioner by formal adoption of the proposed rule attached to this Report of Findings and Conclusions as Exhibit 3. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Bradley, Secretary Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Executive Office of the Governor 2101 Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Elizabeth C. Bowman, Esquire Jonathan T. Johnson, Esquire Hopping, Green, Sams and Smith, P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 David Schwartz, Esquire Office of the Governor Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001

Florida Laws (3) 120.541190.005190.046
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TOM W. ANTHONY, TALLAHASSEE INTERSTATES WEST vs CITY OF TALLA, 90-006317VR (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 04, 1990 Number: 90-006317VR Latest Update: Dec. 10, 1990

The Issue Whether Interstate-Tallahassee West has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?

Findings Of Fact The Purchase of the Property. In the Spring and Summer of 1985, Thomas W. Anthony began an inquiry relative to the purchase and development of 21.5 acres (original tract) located at the intersection of Capital Circle West and I-10. (R-2, pp. 11-15.) On December 11, 1985, a Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase was executed between Rehold, Inc. and C. Gary Skartvedt, Thomas W. Anthony, and Mary J. Price, d/b/a Denver West Joint Venture (Denver, Colorado) for the purchase of the original tract. (Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase.) On March 14, 1986, the Interstate-Tallahassee West Partnership Agreement was executed and Interstate purchased the original tract from Rehold, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 1.) At the time of the closing on the initial purchase of the original tract, the property was zoned C-2, with the exception of a small portion in the northwest corner of the tract which was zoned A-2. (R-2, pp. 34-35, Preliminary Plat approved on January 18, 1990.) Development Chronology. During 1987 and 1988 the original tract was held to realize growth potential in terms of Interstate's economic investment. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) In 1989, Interstate began negotiations for the sale of a portion of the original tract to Kent C. Deeb (Deeb). (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On June 26, 1989, Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. prepared a drawing of easement location and depiction of a 25 year flood line relative to the portion of the original tract which was the subject of the negotiations between Interstate and Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2, R-2 p. 20.) On September 12, 1989, Tilden Lobnitz and Cooper, Inc., (Consulting Engineers) recommended a reconfiguration of the original tract relative to the location of high voltage power lines. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On October 11,1989, final descriptions of the lakes on the original tract were prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events p. 2.) On November 13, 1989, a sketch depicting a revised legal description of a proposal to subdivide the subject property was prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 7, 1989, an Environmental Assessment of the site was prepared for Interstate by Jim Stidham and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 14, 1989, Deeb executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement which contemplated the conditional purchase of 6.98 acres of the original tract from Interstate. Interstate signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate contends the execution of this Purchase and Sale Agreement resulted in it incurring substantial contractual obligations and argues that these obligations (along with other items and events) are elements in support of "common law vesting" of its development rights. This agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. The services that Interstate obtained during 1989 (as described in paragraphs 6-11 above) were related to the eventual consummation of the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. (R-2, pp. 20-21 and 27, Chronological listing of Events, p. 2.) On January 18, 1990, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat of the subject property. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) On April 4, 1990, the Tallahassee City Commission approved Interstate's previously filed application to rezone a portion of the subject property from A-2 to C-2. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) Interstate entered into a written Utility Agreement with the City on or about July 10,1990. (Letter of agreement dated June 25, 1990 from Henry L. Holshouser, Director of Growth Management, to Interstate Tallahassee West.) The Utility Agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. On August 20, 1990 a Vested Rights Application covering 6.98 acres of the original tract, which is the subject of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Interstate and Deeb, was approved. (Letter dated August 21,1990 to Kent Deeb from Mark L. Gumula, Director of Planning, Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, containing CERTIFICATION OF VESTED STATUS.) The Vested Rights Application for the approximately 15.6 acres remaining of the original tract was disapproved by the Staff Committee and that portion of the property is the subject of this appeal. (R-1, p. 17.) Interstate has not prepared a specific building or development design for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 97, R-1, p. 5.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had no specific building plans for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 38.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not chosen a specific land use for the property. (R-2, pp. 38-39.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not made application for environmental permits for the property. (R-2, pp. 49 and 98.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, the only infrastructure that had been constructed on the original tract are two storm water ponds which were built in the 1970's, and prior to Interstate's purchase of the property. (R-2, pp. 86, 87.) Interstate was never assured by the City that the property could be used for any specific use such as a motel, apartments or offices. Interstate and the City made no commitments as to any specific uses of the property. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) The City advised Interstate by letter dated August 13, 1990, that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan requires Planned Unit Development zoning for an office park (which is by definition an office building or buildings of more than 40,000 square feet). (Letter from Martin P. Black, City's Chief of Land Use Administration, to Interstate Tallahassee West, dated August 13, 1990.) The City did not advise Interstate that it could not build such an office building on its property. (R-2, pp. 45, 46, and 100.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not requested a determination from the City as to whether the 2010 Comprehensive Plan would prohibit development of the property as the market might dictate. (R-2, p. 40.) At the hearing in this case, Interstate presented the testimony of Mr. Deeb regarding the existence of a master environmental permit for the original tract which was in place before Interstate purchased the property. (R-2, p. 67.) However, Interstate offered no evidence that such permit contemplated any specific use or density regarding development of the property. Costs Associated with Interstate's Property. Interstate purchased the original tract in 1986 at a cost of $748,000. (R-2, p. 17; Development Expenditures.) The cost to purchase the property was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $325,063.82 in interest on acquisition loans, pursuant to the property purchase. (Development Expenditures.) The interest cost on acquisition loans was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $46,824.95 in Ad Valorem taxes on the property. (Development Expenditures) These costs were not incurred based on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $28,839.75 on engineering and survey work on the property. (Development Expenditures) The costs of the engineering and survey work during 1989 were substantially incurred by Interstate in conjunction with the negotiations of the potential sale of the 6.98 acre parcel of its property to Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, pp. 2-3; R-2, p. 27.) These costs were not incurred based upon any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $8,500.00 in legal and miscellaneous fees associated with development of the original tract and the potential sale of the 6.98 acres to Deeb. (Chronological Listing, Development Expenditures) Interstate has failed to prove that these costs were incurred based on any representation of the City. The Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. Negotiations between Interstate and Deeb regarding The Purchase and Sale Agreement began in the Spring of 1989. (R-2, p. 20.) Deeb executed the agreement on December 14, 1989, and the Interstate partners signed the agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate does not assert that the City was privy to this agreement and has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City in entering into this agreement or in incurring any costs or future obligations pursuant to the agreement. Interstate was aware that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was being developed when the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat on January 18, 1990. (R-2, p. 50.) Interstate knew that the Comprehensive Plan "was coming" at the time Mr. Anthony (partner in Interstate) understood that the original tract was to be subdivided in order to "cut out" a site for Deeb so as to "key on him" as to the development of the property. (R-2, p. 46.) The Preliminary Subdivision Plat drawing, subsequently presented to the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, is dated November 29, 1990. (Preliminary Subdivision Plat as approved on January 18, 1990.) The testimony of Thomas W. Anthony that Interstate would not have entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb if it knew that it would not be able to move forward with C-2 development of the remaining lots is accepted. (R-2, p. 36.) However, Interstate has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City that it could so proceed upon adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Utility Agreement. The Utility Agreement (previously described in paragraph 16) was executed by the City on June 25, 1990. The agreement was signed by on behalf of Interstate on June 29, 1990, by C. W. Harbin and Tommy Faircloth, and on July 10, 1990, by Mr. Anthony. This agreement outlines what Interstate and the City have each agreed to do in terms of Interstate's proposed development. The agreement describes Interstate's proposed development activity in general terms as "commercial development". In this agreement, the City makes no representation or commitments relative to any specific land use or specific density concerning Interstate's property. Interstate has failed to prove that the City, in executing the Utility Agreement, made any representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The Preliminary Plat Approval. The Preliminary Plat Approval of January 18, 1990, does not contemplate any specific uses, intensities or designations. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) Interstate has failed to prove that the approval of the Preliminary Plat constitutes an act or representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The A-2 Rezoning Approval. Interstate has failed to prove that it relied upon the act of the City, in approving Interstate's request to rezone a portion of the original tract from A-2 to C-2 in incurring any costs or future obligations. Interstate's Application for Vested Rights. On or about July 25, 1990, Interstate filed an application for vested rights determination (Application), with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department. (Application VR0008T.) The Following information concerning the development of the subject property is contained on the Application: "Kent C. Deeb" is listed as the "owner/agent". Question 3 lists the name of the project as "Interstates Tallahassee West." The project is described as a "Four Lot Subdivision." The project location is described as "lots 1 and 2 Block A Commonwealth Center." The total project costs are estimated at $2.5 Million." Progress towards completion of the project is listed as: A. Planning: "Plans; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat Approval; Utility Agreement for Extension with the City"; B. Permitting: "Existing with the original Commonwealth Center Development; C. Site Preparation: "Zoning, Platting, and Plans"; D. Construction: "Original Holding Ponds". Total expenditures to date attributed to the progress towards completion of the project are listed as $1.325 Million. The form of government approval allowing the project to proceed is listed as "Original Plat; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat." On August 20, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the application before the City's three member Staff Committee. Kent C. Deeb appeared and testified for Interstate. By letter dated August 21, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning for the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Department, informed Interstate that the Application had been denied. During the hearing before the undersigned, Interstate stipulated that it sought approval of its Application based upon "common law vesting" and not upon "statutory vesting," as those terms are defined in City of Tallahassee Ordinance 90-0-0043AA.

Florida Laws (2) 120.65163.3167
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SAMPSON CREEK COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT vs FLORIDA LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION AND MONROE COUNTY, 00-000849 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Feb. 24, 2000 Number: 00-000849 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 2000

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the petition to establish the Sampson Creek Community Development District meets the applicable criteria set forth in Chapter 190, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 42-1, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is seeking the adoption of a rule by the Commission to establish the Sampson Creek Community Development District. The proposed District consists of approximately 1,015 acres located within unincorporated St. Johns County, Florida. There are two out-parcels, totaling 3.7 acres, within the areas to be included in the District. No adverse impact on these out parcels is expected from the establishment of the district. The estimated cost of the infrastructure facilities and services which are presently expected to be provided to the lands within the District was included in the Petition. Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 was identified for the record as a copy of the Petition and its exhibits as filed with the Commission. Witnesses Maier, Walters, Boring, and Fishkind each stated that he had reviewed portions of the contents of the petition and its attachments and affirmed the petitions findings. Witness Maier testified that the Petitioner has written consent to establish the District from the owners of one hundred percent of the real property located within the lands to be included in the District. Witness Maier also presented deeds for parcels of land within the boundaries of the proposed District which have been acquired by the Petitioner or its subsidiaries, as well as consent forms from the Petitioner's subsidiaries. The Petition and its attached exhibits are true and correct, with the addition of the deeds showing land ownership and owners' consent as specified above. Witnesses Walters and Fishkind reviewed the proposed District in light of the requirements of the State Comprehensive Plan, Chapter 187, Florida Statutes. Witness Walters also reviewed the proposed District in light of the requirements of the St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan. From a planning and economic perspective, four subjects, subject 16, 18, 21, and 26, of the State Comprehensive Plan apply directly to the establishment of the proposed District as do the policies supporting those subjects. Subject 16, titled Land Use, of the State Comprehensive Plan recognizes the importance of locating development in areas with the fiscal ability and service capacity to accommodate growth. The proposed District will: have the fiscal capability to provide a wide range of services and facilities to the population in the designated growth area; help provide infrastructure to development the County, thereby helping limit unintended, unplanned sprawl; facilitate the delivery of infrastructure and services to assist in fulfilling the community plan. Subject 18, titled Public Facilities of the State Comprehensive Plan provides that the state shall protect substantial investments in public facilities and plan for and finance new facilities to serve residents in a timely, orderly and efficient manner. The proposed District will be consistent with this element because the District will: plan and finance the infrastructure systems and facilities needed for the development of lands within the District in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner; provide the infrastructure systems and facilities within the District with the landowners and residents benefiting from the new public facilities bearing the costs associated with construction, operation, and maintenance of the facilities; act in a type of 'infrastructure partnership' with St. Johns County; have financial self-sufficiency through the use of special assessments, as well as user charges or fees, to provide public facilities; provide a consistent, innovative and fiscally sound alternative for financing public facilities by bringing the cost of managing and financing public facilities down to a level of government closest to its beneficiaries and connecting those who pay for facilities with those who directly benefit from those facilities and services; and be structured to assure secure revenue sources capable of meeting District responsibilities. Subject 21, titled Governmental Efficiency of the State Comprehensive Plan provides that governments shall economically and efficiently provide the amount and quality of services required by the public. The proposed District will be consistent with this element because the proposed District will: cooperate with other levels of Florida government, such as through entering into interlocal agreement to address maintenance issues for certain roads; be established under uniform general law standards as specified in Chapter 190, Florida Statutes; be professionally managed, financed, and governed by those whose property directly receives the benefits; not burden the general taxpayer with costs for services or facilities inside the District; and plan and implement cost efficient solutions for the required public infrastructure and assure delivery of selected services to residents. Subject 26, titled Plan Implementation of the State Comprehensive Plan, provides that systematic planning shall be integrated into all levels of government, with emphasis on intergovernmental coordination and citizen involvement. The proposed District is consistent with this element of the State Comprehensive Plan because: the proposed District will systematically plan for the construction, operation and maintenance of the public improvements and the community facilities authorized under Chapter 190, Florida Statutes, subject to and not inconsistent with the local government comprehensive plan and land development regulations; the District meetings are publicly advertised and are open to the public so that all District property owners and residents can be involved in planning for improvements; Section 189.415, Florida Statutes, requires the District to file and update public facilities reports with the County, which it may rely upon in any revisions to the local comprehensive plan. Based on the testimony and exhibits in the record, the proposed District will not be inconsistent with any applicable element or portion of the State Comprehensive Plan. Witness Walters testified that since St. Johns County has already found the development within the proposed District to be not inconsistent with the St. Johns County local comprehensive plan, the establishment of a community development district would not cause any inconsistency and would be in furtherance of four of the plan's policies, goals and objectives: Policy H.1.3.4 of the St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan states that 'DRI's planned unit subdivisions, and other large developments shall provide for the dedication of parks and open space to be generated by the development according to the level of service standards.' The proposed District will finance the construction of, and ultimately own and maintain, a community recreational facility. Goal J.1 of the St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan states that St. Johns County is to ensure the orderly and efficient provision of infrastructure facilities and services such as roads, utilities, recreation, and drainage. The proposed District will serve as an alternative provider of these infrastructure systems and services to meet the needs of the lands within its boundaries; Objective J.1.7 of the St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan states that the County shall manage fiscal resources to ensure the provision of needed infrastructure. The proposed District will provide the infrastructure facilities and services needed for its lands without burdening the fiscal resources of the County or impacting the bonding limits contained in Policy J.1.7.; Objective K.1.6 of the St. Johns County Comprehensive Plan calls for St. Johns County to work cooperatively with other units of government to address issues and concerns. The proposed District may be expected to enter into interlocal agreements with the County to provide certain enhanced maintenance. Additionally, over the long term, the establishment of the proposed District will provide another unit of local government in place and able to cooperate with the County on future issues and concerns. The State of Florida Department of Community Affairs also reviewed the petition to establish the proposed District and concluded that the petition was consistent with the local comprehensive plan. Based on the evidence in the record, the proposed District will not be inconsistent with any applicable element or portion of the local comprehensive plan, and will in fact further the goals provided. Most of the land in the proposed District is part of a planned community included in a Planned Unit Development (PUD) approval issued by St. Johns County. The PUD was approved on February 10, 1998. The PUD is found in St. Johns County Ordinance No. 98-7. Section 6 of the PUD Application, which is incorporated into Ordinance 98-7 by reference, explicitly states that a community development district will be established and requires the establishment of the District prior to the sale of the first lot within the development. Petitioner is developing all of the lands within the District as a single master-planned community. Witness Walters testified that functional interrelation means that each community purpose has a mutual reinforcing relationship with each of the community's other purposes. Each function requires a management capability, funding source and an understanding of the size of the community's needs, so as to handle the growth and development of the community. Each function must be designed to contribute to the development or the maintenance of the community. The size of the District as proposed is approximately 1,105 acres. From a planning perspective, this is a sufficient size to accommodate the basic infrastructure facilities and services typical of a functionally interrelated community. Compactness relates to the location in distance between the lands and land uses within a community. The community is sufficiently compact to be developed as a functionally inter-related community. The compact configuration of the lands will allow the District to provide for the installation and maintenance of its infrastructure facilities in a long-term cost efficient manner. The property is sufficiently contiguous when all parts of a project are either in actual contact or are close enough to allow the efficient design and use of infrastructure. The proposed District is sufficiently contiguous for planning purposes and for the purpose of district governance. The size of the proposed community within the District provides a sufficient economic base to absorb the debt costs and annual operating costs for the proposed District. There will be no economic disincentives to the provision of the infrastructure facilities contemplated. From planning, economics, engineering, and management perspectives, the area of land to be included in the proposed District is of sufficient size, is sufficiently compact, and is sufficiently contiguous to be developed as a single functionally interrelated community. It is presently intended that the District will participate in the construction or provision of certain infrastructure improvements as outlined in the petition. Installation and maintenance of infrastructure systems and services by the District is expected to be financed by bonds and repaid through the imposition of special assessments on benefited property within the District. Use of such assessments will ensure that the real property benefiting from District services is the same property which pays for them. Two types of alternatives to the use of the proposed District were identified. First, the County might provide facilities and services from its general fund or through a MSTU. Second, facilities and services might be provided by some private means, without public bidding, with maintenance delegated to a homeowners association (HOA). The District exceeds the available alternatives at focusing attention to when and where and how the next system of infrastructure will be required. This results in a full utilization of existing facilities before new facilities are constructed and reduces the delivered cost to the citizens being served. Only a community development district allows for the independent financing, administration, operations, and maintenance of the land within such a district. Only a community development district allows district residents to completely control the district. All of the other alternatives do not have these characteristics. From an engineering perspective, the proposed District is the best alternative to provide the proposed community development services and facilities because it is a long-term stable, perpetual entity capable of maintaining the facilities over their expected life. From planning, economic, engineering, and special district management perspectives, the proposed District is the best alternative available for delivering community development services and facilities to the are that will be served by the District. The services and facilities proposed to be provided by the District are not incompatible with uses and existing local and regional facilities and services. The District's facilities and services within the proposed boundaries will not duplicate any existing regional services or facilities which are provided to the lands within the District by another entity. None of the proposed services or facilities are presently being provided by another entity for the lands to be included within the District. Therefore, the community development services and facilities of the proposed district will not be incompatible with the capacity and uses of existing local and regional community development services and facilities. As cited previously, from planning, economics, engineering, and special district management perspectives, the area of land to be included in the proposed District is of sufficient size, is sufficiently compact, and is sufficiently contiguous to be developed and become a functionally interrelated community. The lands to be included within the proposed District have a need for the basic infrastructure being provided. From an engineering perspective, the area within the proposed District is also large enough to support a staff necessary to operate and maintain the proposed infrastructure systems and facilities. Based upon these characteristics, the proposed District is expected to be financially viable. From planning, engineering, economic, and management perspectives, the area that will be served by the intended District is amenable to separate special-district government. Chapter 190, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 42-1, Florida Administrative Code, impose specific requirements regarding the petition and other information to be submitted to the Commission. Section 190.005(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires the petition to contain a metes and bounds description of the external boundaries of the District. Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 contains such a description. Section 190.005(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes, also requires a description of any real property within the external boundaries which is to be excluded from the District and the last known address of the owners of such properties. Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 contains the required information. Section 190.005(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that the petition contain the proposed timetable for the construction of any district services and the estimated construction costs for those services as well as the designation of the future general distribution, location, and extent of public and private land uses proposed for the area by the future land use element of the adopted local government comprehensive plan. Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 contains this information. Section 190.005(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires the petition to contain written consent to establishment of the District by the owners of one-hundred percent of the real property to be included within the proposed District. Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 contains this information which was supplemented by Petitioner at hearing, as it or its subsidiaries acquired title to the lands proposed to be included within the District. Sections 190.005 and 190.006, Florida Statutes, require that each member of a board of supervisors be a resident of Florida and a citizen of the United States. The proposed board members meet these criteria. Section 109.005(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires the petition to include a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs (SERC), which meets the requirements of Section 120.541, Florida Statutes. The petition contains a SERC. It meets all requirements of Section 120.541, Florida Statutes. The SERC contains an estimate of the costs and benefits to all persons directly affected by the proposed rule to establish the District -- the State of Florida and its citizens, the country and its citizens, Petitioner, and consumers. Beyond administrative costs related to rule adoption, the State and its citizens will only incur minimal costs from establishing the District. These costs are related to the incremental costs to various agencies of reviewing one additional local government report. The proposed District will require no subsidies from the State. Benefits will include improved planning and coordination of development, which is difficult to quantify but is nonetheless substantial. Administrative costs incurred by the County related to rule adoption should be minimal. Benefits to the County will include improved planning and coordination of development, without incurring any administrative or maintenance burden for facilities and services within the proposed District except for those it chooses to accept. Consumers will pay non-ad valorem or special assessments for certain facilities. Location within the District is voluntary. Generally, District financing will be less expensive than maintenance through a property owners' association or capital improvements financed through developer loans. Benefits to consumers in the area within the community development district will include a higher level of public services and amenities than might otherwise be available, completion of District-sponsored improvements to the area on a timely basis, and a larger share of direct control over community development services and facilities within the area. Petitioner has complied with the provisions of Section 190.005(1)(b), Florida Statutes, in that St. Johns County was paid the requisite filing fees. Section 190.005(1)(d), Florida Statutes, requires the Petitioner to publish notice of the local public hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in St. Johns County for four consecutive weeks prior to the hearing. The notice was published in a newspaper of general paid circulation in St. Johns County (the St. Augustine Record) for four consecutive weeks on March 13, 2000, March 20, 2000, March 27, 2000, and April 3, 2000. All publications were prior to the hearing. Mr. Stephenson, on behalf of the County's community development district processing group formed in accordance with Section 5.06.00 of the St. Johns County Land Development Code, presented the following proposed findings regarding the approval of the development within the proposed District: On October 28, 1999, the St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners entered into an Impact Fee Agreement with St. Joe Residential Acquisitions, Inc., and A & S Land Development Company to widen a portion of CR 210 in order to meet concurrency requirements for two projects. St. Joe Residential Acquisitions, Inc. is the developer of the property contained within the Sampson Creek CDD Petition. The project is approved with a Planned Unit Development (PUD) zoning and contains 799 single family residential dwelling units and associated roadways, retention areas, common areas, sales and recreation complex, and an 18-hole golf course. St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners approved the PUB on February 10, 1998. The PUD provides that a CDD will be established and will be in place prior to the sale of the first lot so that purchasers will be aware of their participation and membership in the CDD and of their obligation to pay any taxes that may be levied by the CDD. The PUD and Impact Fee Agreement are separate County approved documents and the creation and operation of a CDD does not in any way affect these documents or their approval without further review by the St. Johns County Board of Commissioners. Impact fee credits shall be awarded in accordance with approved Impact Fee Agreement which ensures that the credits are awarded to the appropriate entity. The CDD processing group finds no inconsistencies with the six factors as described in Section 190.005(6), Florida Statutes. With these findings, Mr. Stephenson testified that St. Johns County has no objection to the establishment of the proposed District.

Conclusions On Monday April 10, 2000, at 10:00 a.m., the local public hearing for the Petition to Establish the Sampson Creek Community Development District was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Cleavinger, at the St. Johns County Public Library, 950 Davis Pond Boulevard, in St. Johns County, Florida. The hearing was conducted pursuant to Section 190.005, Florida Statutes, for the purpose of taking testimony, public comment, and receiving exhibits on the petition of the St. Joe/Arvida Company, L.P. (Petitioner) to establish the Sampson Creek Community Development District (District) in northern St. Johns County, Florida. This report is prepared and submitted to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (Commission) pursuant to Section 190.005, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, pursuant to Chapters 120, and 190, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 42-1, Florida Administrative Code, establish the Sampson Creek Community Development District as requested by Petitioner by formal adoption of the proposed rule, after inclusion of the legal description, in substantially the form attached to this Report of Findings and Conclusions as Attachment 3. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan T. Johnson, Esquire Carolyn S. Raepple, Esquire Hopping, Green, Sams & Smith, P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Daniel Woodring, Esquire Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Donna Arduin, Secretary Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission The Capitol, Suite 1601 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carol Licko, General Counsel Office of the Governor The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001

Florida Laws (4) 120.541120.57190.005190.006
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MEADOWBROOK NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.; VICTOR CORDIANO; LYNN HILL; A. A. SULKES; PHILIP BENNETT; VERA HARPER; AND CARLOS MCDONALD vs CITY OF TALLAHASSEE; GEORGE K. WALKER, TRUSTEE; GENESIS GROUP; AND TTK, L.L.C., 00-003907 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 20, 2000 Number: 00-003907 Latest Update: Mar. 27, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether the site plan for the Evergreens project should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this land use dispute, Petitioners, Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc.; Lynn Hill; A.A. Sulkes; Philip Bennett; Vera Harper; and Carlos McDonald (Petitioners), have contested a decision by the Developmental Review Committee (DRC) of Respondent, City of Tallahassee (City), to approve a Type B site review application for a project known as Evergreens at Mahan (Evergreens). In its decision, the DRC exempted the project from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan based upon a 1991 agreement by the City and the property owner which conferred vested rights on the property. Thus, the project was never reviewed for compliance with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. If the application is approved, the applicant will be authorized to commence the process for constructing 416 apartment units in ten three-story buildings on approximately 24.56 acres of land located just south of the intersection at East Mahan Drive and Riggins Road in Tallahassee, Florida. The apartment complex will be one of the largest in the City. The application was filed by Respondent, Genesis Group (Genesis), acting as an agent for the owner of the property, Respondent, George K. Walker, Trustee (Walker). After the application is approved, Walker is contractually obligated to sell the property to Respondent, TTK, L.L.C. (TTK), a New Hampshire developer, who will actually construct the complex. In response to the DRC's decision, on August 9, 2000, Petitioners filed a Notice of Intent to File Petition for Formal Proceedings. On August 28, 2000, Petitioners filed their Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings. As grounds for denying the application, Petitioners contended that a Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement) entered into by Walker and the City on August 6, 1991, in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR determining that the property was presumptively vested violated in a number of respects the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance); that any vested rights acquired on the property have expired under Section 18-104(1)(c), Code of Ordinances; and the site plan is inconsistent with the City's Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code. As to the latter ground, the parties have agreed that this issue need not be addressed now, but rather it can be considered by the DRC in the event Petitioners prevail on the merits of this action. Other than the vesting status, no issues have been raised regarding the site plan itself. On September 11, 2000, the Commission entered its Determination of Standing. Pursuant to the Bylaws of the Commission, the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on September 20, 2000, for an evidentiary hearing. The parties Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Association) is a not-for-profit corporation organized on February 18, 2000, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Association represents approximately 200 of the 279 homeowners who reside in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. The Meadowbrook neighborhood is zoned for Residential Preservation-1 and has a residential density of less than three units per acre. A portion of the Meadowbrook neigborhood is adjacent to the proposed project. Lynn Hill, A.A. Sulkes, Philip Bennett, Vera Harper, and Carlos McDonald reside and own property in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. Their property either abuts, or is close to, the location of the proposed Evergreens project. All are members of the Association and bring this action in their individual capacity and as a member of the Association. During the course of the hearing, Respondents stipulated to the standing of all Petitioners. The City is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. It has authority to review proposed site plans for real property located within the City's geographic boundaries. Genesis is a Tallahassee consulting firm which prepared the application for Walker and acted as his agent in seeking approval of the site plan for the Evergreens project. TTK, a New Hampshire limited liability corporation, is a developer and builder of real property, and has a contract to purchase the site of the Evergreens project pending final approval of the site plan by the City. Walker is the owner of the approximately 30-acre parcel (the subject property) which is at issue in this proceeding, and is the applicant for the Evergreens site plan. The Evergreens project will be located on 24.56 acres of this 30-acre parcel. The property and its history The subject property has been owned by the Walker family, either as a part of a consortium of investors or in trust, for more than 70 years. Since the mid-1960's, Walker has controlled the property as trustee for himself and his brother. The site of the apartment complex lies a few hundred feet south of the intersection of East Mahan Drive (U.S. 90) and Riggins Road. Approximately 11.738 acres of the land sit on the eastern side of Riggins Road while the remaining 12.821 acres sit on the western side. The remainder of the property, which consists of around 7 or 8 acres, is situated just north of the apartment site, fronts on East Mahan Drive, and is currently zoned commercial. The Meadowbrook neighborhood begins approximately 1,250 feet or so south of Mahan Drive and sits on around 100 acres. The boundaries of the neighborhood abut the southern and southeastern ends of the project site. The relevant history of the property goes back to January 9, 1926, when the original plat of Glenwood Estates was recorded in Leon County (County). The property was located in the County, but not within the City, and was owned by a group that included Walker's father. The subject property was identified in the plat as Blocks L and M. The Glenwood Estates plat did not contain any statements establishing use or density for the subject property. On April 7, 1943, Glenwood Estates was replatted for taxation purposes. Walker's mother, a widow and the heir of Walker's father, was among the owners of the property. The 1943 replat reconfigured the subject property as a single, large acre parcel. The replat does not contain any statements establishing uses or densities for the platted parcels. Prior to 1967, Glenwood Estates became the sole property of Walker's mother. Upon her death, the property was placed in trust for the benefit of Walker and his brother. George K. Walker is the named trustee of the property. On March 22, 1989, the remaining property owned by Walker was subdivided into three parcels; two of the small parcels on the southwestern corner of Riggins Road and Mahan Drive were sold, thereby reducing the size of the subject property by approximately 1.56 acres. By 1991, the 1943 replat of Glenwood Estates had been resubdivided a minimum of seven times which changed the replat substantially from its original configuration. Five of the resubdivisions involved the Meadowbrook tract. Since 1989, the subject property has been configured as a large parcel of approximately 30 acres. Since 1991, the subject property is the only property in the replat that Walker has owned. In addition to his ownership of the subject property, until 1971 Walker owned approximately 69 acres of land that presently constitute a large part of the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On October 6, 1971, Walker entered into a contract for the sale of that land. Among the conditions of the sale was a requirement that the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood be rezoned R-3; that the property that is the proposed apartment site be rezoned RM-2; and that the property fronting Mahan Drive be rezoned C-1. Costs of the rezoning were to be shared equally by the buyer and seller. At the time of this sale, the subject property and the Meadowbrook tract were undeveloped. In 1972, the County rezoned the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood as R-2 for single-family residential development; rezoned the approximately 25-acre portion of the subject property north of the Meadowbrook tract as RM-2, for multi-family residential development; and rezoned the property fronting Mahan Drive as C-1 for commercial development. The multi-family zoning on the property that is the proposed location for the Evergreen project authorized a range of dwelling units from single-family to two-family to multi-family up to a maximum of 17.4 units per acre. One of the conditions of the 1971 sale was the granting of an easement by Walker to the buyer (Collins Brothers) to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract. At the time of the sale, there was no direct access from the Meadowbrook tract north to Mahan Drive. On an undisclosed date, Collins Brothers was forced into receivership. Therefore, between 1971 and 1980, there was no development on the Meadowbrook tract or the subject property, other than the roughing-out of the location of what was to become Riggins Road. In 1980, Guardian Mortgage Investors (Guardian) took over the previous buyer's interest. At that time, Walker entered into a road construction agreement with Guardian in which he agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the Meadowbrook subdivision. Guardian agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs as well as all of the cost for the installation of the main water and sewer trunk lines, except for laterals which were to be installed at Walker's expense. In 1981, the construction of Riggins Road and the main water and sewer trunk lines were completed. The minimum allowable width of Riggins Road from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract was 30 feet. However, it was constructed 36 feet wide so that it could serve not only the Meadowbrooks neighborhood, but also Walker's future development. For the same reason, even though the minimum right-of-way for this section of Riggins Road was 60 feet, an extra 20 feet (or 80 feet in all) were dedicated for the right-of-way. No development has occurred on the subject property since this dedication. The sewer main serving the Meadowbrook neighborhood is a gravity feed system flowing into a pump station within the Meadowbrook neighborhood. From there, it is pumped into a force main to a point under or adjacent to Riggins Road approximately 50 feet into the property that is zoned RM-2. From there, the system is again a gravity feed system flowing north under Mahan Drive to another pump station. If the sewer system had been installed to serve only the Meadowbrook neighborhood, it could have consisted only of a forced main system between the two pump stations. However, because further development was anticipated, the developer installed a gravity feed system that flowed through the RM-2 property, through the C-1 property, and under Mahan Drive at considerably more expense than a forced main system. Both the water and sewer systems have the capacity to serve 670 domestic equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the subject property. Following their completion, the water and sewer facilities, and Riggins Road, were dedicated to the City. Since 1983 or 1984, the City has owned, operated, and maintained Riggins Road and the water and sewer lines from Mahan to the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On April 14, 1983, Walker petitioned the City to annex his property. By Ordinance No. 83-0-2185 adopted on December 30, 1983, the Walker property, the Meadowbrook neighborhood, and considerable other properties were annexed into the City. Prior to annexation, Walker received assurance from the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop the RM-2 and C-1 portions of his property. The City's vesting process On July 16, 1990, the City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Concurrent with its adoption, the City adopted a Vested Development Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance), which established "the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner" could assert that he had acquired certain property rights and obtain a vested rights determination from the City. The Ordinance is codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the City's Code of Ordinances. The Ordinance established the administrative procedures and standards for common law or statutory vesting. A property that was determined to be vested under the Ordinance was exempt from the application of the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Once a property is found to be exempt, or vested, it retains that status in perpetuity. In order to claim vested development rights under the Ordinance, a property owner was required to apply for a vested rights determination with the City's Planning Department within 120 days of July 16, 1990. A failure to timely file an application constituted a waiver of any vested rights claim. However, a property owner whose property was located within a recorded subdivision, or unrecorded subdivision which the City determined had satisfied the City's infrastructure requirements, did not have to submit an application for a vested rights determination. In those cases, vested rights were "presumed," based upon the infrastructure requirements being satisfied, and the property was "presumptively" vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Section III.1.a. of the Ordinance. The right of a property owner to assert that his property is presumptively vested can be made at any time, even today. After reviewing its land development records, on July 25, 1990, the City published in the Tallahassee Democrat a lengthy list of recorded and unrecorded subdivisions it had determined were presumptively vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. The subject property, identified on the City's tax rolls by Tax I.D. #11-28-20-071-000-0, was included within the City's list of presumptively vested recorded subdivisions. The notice stated that it was the City's intent to only exempt subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for development had been completed by July 16, 1990. Recorded subdivisions included on the list of exempt subdivisions were presumed to have satisfied the infrastructure requirements. The City did not inspect recorded subdivisions to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements, but presumed the existence of the requisite infrastructure. Any recorded subdivision subsequently determined not to be in compliance with the infrastructure requirements could be removed from the exempt list. Unrecorded subdivisions were not included on the exempt list unless they had first been physically inspected to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements. Walker's application for vested rights On October 17, 1990, the City's Director of Growth Management instructed that Walker's property be removed from the list of exempt subdivisions due to the resubdivision of the original plat and because all of the infrastructure was not in place. At that time, however, there was no provision in the Ordinance that made resubdivision a factor in the determination of an exemption or vesting. On the other hand, the issue of infrastructure was a valid consideration. On November 13, 1990, Walker timely submitted an application for a vested rights determination on the basis that his property was entitled to vesting under the common law. The City assigned Number V.R.0195T to the application. On January 8, 1991, in accordance with Section III.3.b. of the Ordinance, the City Planning Department determined that the subject property was not vested and notified Walker that Application Number V.R. 0195T was denied. No reason was given. The letter of denial advised him of his rights to contest the planning staff's denial of his vested rights. On January 22, 1991, Walker notified the City of his decision to challenge planning staff's denial of his vested rights application. He elected to waive his right to a hearing before the City Staff Committee, and he requested a hearing before DOAH pursuant to Section III.3.c. of the Ordinance. On July 3, 1991, the City referred Walker's request for an administrative hearing to DOAH on the planning staff's denial of Application Number V.R.0195T. The request was assigned DOAH Case Number 91-004109VR. On July 9, 1991, the case was scheduled for a hearing on August 29, 1991. During the pendency of the DOAH case, and at the request of the City, Walker and his counsel met with representatives of the City, including a Planning Department staffer and an assistant city attorney. Before the meeting, Walker reconfirmed with City officials that his property had been rezoned to C-1, RM-2, and R-2 in 1972, and that the necessary water and sewer lines were in place to serve his property. After learning at the meeting that infrastructure for the property had already been built, the City agreed to find Walker's property vested to the extent that the infrastructure was in place. In other words, Walker would be allowed to develop as many units as the existing infrastructure would accommodate. After the meeting, Walker secured an affidavit from Wayne Colony, the engineer who designed the water and sewer system for the property and the southern extension of Riggins Road. In his affidavit dated August 6, 1991, Coloney attested that the sewer line between Mahan Drive and the Meadowbrook neighborhood was designed to serve the single-family residences, the RM-2 property and the C-1 property; that the sewer line had the capacity to serve 670 residential equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of that property; and that the sewer had sufficient capacity for the maximum density of development on the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the property. A letter from the City's Water and Sewer Department dated August 1, 1991, also confirmed that the City had "the necessary water and sewer lines to serve the property." Finally, Riggins Road and the stormwater drain to serve the property had been completed in the early 1980's. With this information in hand, counsel for the City agreed that the property was presumptively vested. On August 6, 1991, or just prior to the scheduled administrative hearing, counsel for Walker and the City executed the Settlement Agreement which declared the subject property an exempt subdivision based upon Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance, and presumptively vested the property from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Settlement Agreement authorized the development of the subject property for up to 670 residential equivalent units. The Settlement Agreement also stated that there was no time frame in which the Walker property was required to commence or complete development, and that the property was vested in perpetuity. On August 7, 1991, the Settlement Agreement was filed with DOAH. On August 8, 1991, an Order Approving Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement was entered. Therefore, an administrative hearing was never held on Application V.R.0195T. Walker's application was one of hundreds of vested rights applications being processed by the City at that time. Although many of the specific details underlying the City's decision to approve the settlement are not known now because of the passage of time, the subsequent loss by the City of Walker's application file, and the sheer number of applications then being processed, the City Attorney is certain that he would have known about the petition and the underlying facts before he authorized the Assistant City Attorney to execute the agreement. Based on the information then available, the City Attorney now says that Walker clearly qualified for either common law or presumptive vesting. Petitioners contend that the Assistant City Attorney (and/or City Attorney) lacked authority to settle the case without obtaining specific prior authority from the City Commission; however, the more credible and persuasive evidence shows otherwise. This is true even though the Ordinance does not specifically address the settlement of vested rights cases. The City Attorney's policy is and has been to involve the affected City staff in settlement negotiations rather than negotiating without the consent of his client. Moreover, the present City Attorney, and his two predecessors, have always considered it a part of their inherent authority to settle litigation on the City's behalf when it is in the best interest of the City to do so. The only exception to this inherent authority is when there is a budgetary impact; in those cases, prior approval must be obtained before committing the City to spending money. Here, however, there was no fiscal impact resulting from the Walker settlement. Further, at no time after the Settlement Agreement was signed has the City Commission ever expressed its disagreement with the City Attorney's interpretation of the Ordinance, taken steps to curtail his inherent authority, or acted to vacate the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, in the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, it is found that the Assistant City Attorney, after consultation with the City Attorney and appropriate City staff, had the authority to execute the Settlement Agreement on behalf of the City without prior City Commission approval. Petitioners also contend that based upon the language in Section III.3.e.7. of the Ordinance, there was no authority for the hearing officer to approve the Settlement Agreement until a substantive review of the information which formed the basis for the agreement had been made. The cited provision sets forth the criteria upon which the decision of the hearing officer in a vested rights case must be based. They include an evidentiary presentation by the parties at a formal hearing, adherence to certain land use guidelines and relevant case law, and a recommended order at the conclusion of the proceeding. The City points out, however, that under its interpretation of the Ordinance, once the parties learned that the property was exempt and the dispute had been settled, the criteria in Section III.3.e.7. did not apply. In those situations, no useful purpose would be served in requiring the parties to go through the formality of a de novo hearing. Otherwise, the parties (including the taxpayers) would be required to expend time, resources, and energy to litigate a matter in which no material facts were in issue. Accordingly, the City's interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be the most logical and reasonable, and it is found that the DOAH hearing officer had the authority to accept the parties' settlement without conducting a hearing. Petitioners next contend that when the Settlement Agreement was executed, the City lacked sufficient evidence to show that Walker had installed the infrastructure necessary for presumptive vesting. More specifically, they assert that except for Wayne Colony's affidavit, and the letter from the City, there was no evidence to support that determination. Petitioners go on to contend that not only must the primary roadways and water and sewer lines be built before the vesting cut-off date, but the "on-site" water and sewer lines, stormwater facilities, and other facilities necessary to begin vertical construction on each apartment building must also be in place. This contention is based on Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance which requires that in order for a subdivision to attain exempt status, the "streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development must have been completed as of July 16, 1990." The City Attorney's testimony on this issue is found to be the most persuasive. According to his interpretation of the Ordinance, only that infrastructure necessary to serve the subdivision must be completed in order to qualify for vesting. Conversely, on-site or private infrastructure does not have to be completed in order to satisfy the terms of the Ordinance. Therefore, on-site infrastructure is not a factor in determining whether a property qualifies for an exempt status. Indeed, as the City Attorney points out, if Petitioners' interpretation of the Ordinance were accepted, there would be "no vested lots in the City" since infrastructure is never extended from the public street to the lot prior to its development. Finally, Petitioners contend that the Settlement Agreement is invalid because Walker's application in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR was for common law vesting while the Settlement Agreement made a determination that the property was presumptively vested. As a practical matter, there is no difference between property being exempt or being vested. Under either category, the property would not have to meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. Here, the evidence shows that Walker's property qualified for both common law and presumptive vesting. Since the two types of vesting have the same practical effect, the validity of the Settlement Agreement has not been impaired. Expiration of vested rights Sections II.5.a., d., and i. of the Ordinance provide, respectively, that for purposes of a vested rights determination, an "[e]xempt subdivision," "[f]inal subdivision plat approval," or "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued" shall be deemed a final development order. Section IV.1.c. of the Ordinance provides that "[a]ll final development orders shall expire in one year or such shorter time as may be adopted unless it is determined that substantial development has occurred and is continuing in good faith." Petitioners argue that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a "development order" within the meaning of the foregoing provisions of the Ordinance, and because no activity has occurred on the land since the Settlement Agreement was approved in 1991, the development order has expired by operation of the law. For the following reasons, this contention has been rejected. The Settlement Agreement did not approve "the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use" and did not allow "development activity on the land." Further, it did not allow the owner to pull building permits and commence development on his land. Rather, it simply determined which set of rules and regulations (pre-1990 or post-1990) Walker had to comply with in order to develop his property. Therefore, it cannot be "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued." At the same time, a recorded subdivision such as Glenwood Estates is "complete" since all necessary infrastructure is in place. It has no expiration date, and no further development remains to be done to show "continuing good faith," as that term is used in the Ordinance. Therefore, even if the Walker property technically meets the definitions of an "exempt subdivision" or a "final subdivision plat approval," the expiration provisions of the Ordinance still do not apply. Finally, the City has never applied the expiration provisions of the cited provision to terminate the exempt status of a recorded subdivision, nor has it construed a vested rights determination as being a "final development order" within the meaning of the Ordinance. This interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be reasonable, and it is hereby accepted. Equitable estoppel As noted earlier, when Walker sold the Meadowbrook tract (69 acres) to Collins Brothers in 1972, he made the sale contingent on his obtaining not only residential zoning for the Meadowbrook tract, but also upon obtaining commercial and multi-family zoning on the remainder of the tract. Thus, he sold the site in reliance on his ability to develop the remainder of the tract in conformance with his master plan. As a part of that sale, Walker gave the purchasers credit towards the purchase price to defray one-half of the cost of installing the infrastructure for the entire 100-acre parcel, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. When Collins Brothers defaulted, he paid the successor developer (Guardian) the money necessary to defray one-half of the cost of the communal infrastructure, and he paid additional funds for water and sewer taps and a storm drain, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. Walker also petitioned the City to annex his property in the early 1980's based on a representation by the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop his property. After the annexation, Walker has continued to pay property taxes to the City based upon the value of the property to be developed under the property's C-1 and RM-2 zoning. In addition, Walker encumbered his property to secure loans in reliance on his ability to develop it in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. After the Settlement Agreement was approved, the City adopted a site-specific zoning plan which impacted Walker's property. Walker agreed to reduce the maximum density he might otherwise have obtained through litigation in reliance upon the City's representation that the Settlement Agreement remained in effect and that his rights under that Agreement would survive in perpetuity. Finally, Walker has entered into an option contract for the sale of his property to TTK based upon the validity of the Settlement Agreement. He has also expended substantial monies to further that sale and to develop his site plan. Other contentions Petitioners have also contended in their Proposed Recommended Order that "[t]he creation of new lots through the re-subdivision of the parent parcel [in 1989] subjects the property under review to the consistency and concurrency provisions in the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan." Because this contention was not raised in the initial pleading or in the parties' Joint Pretrial Statement, it has been disregarded. Finally, the Association points out that multiple three-story apartment buildings will be constructed immediately adjacent to single-family homes in the Association with only an 8-foot fence and a 30-foot setback dividing the two areas. In addition, its members logically fear that the project will generate additional traffic, crime, and pollution and result in the lowering of property values in the neighborhood. It also asserts that the developer has never been willing to sit down with neighborhood members and attempt to compromise on any design aspect of the apartment complex. While these concerns are obviously legitimate and well- intended, they are not relevant to the narrow issues raised in this appeal.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order granting the Type B site plan review application filed by George K. Walker which determined that his property is presumptively vested. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth D. Goldberg, Esquire 1725 Mahan Drive, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5201 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Hall, Second Floor 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 Jay Adams, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731

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IN RE: CENTREX HOMES, A NEVADA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP AND OWNER OF FLEMING ISLAND PLANTATION vs *, 99-003021 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jul. 13, 1999 Number: 99-003021 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petition to Establish Rule and the Amended Petition to Establish Rule (the Petition) should be granted.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Centrex Homes, is a Nevada General Partnership which owns or has authority over the property proposed for establishment of the state created District. Clay County is the affected local general purpose government, a political subdivision of Florida, within whose jurisdiction in the unincorporated area of the county the proposed land is located. The Petition proposes the establishment by rule of Fleming Island CDD on certain proposed real property in the unincorporated area of Clay County. (The uniform statutory charter for all established community development districts (CDDs) is found in Sections 190.006 through 190.046, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), as amended by Chapter 99-378, Laws of Florida (1999). See Conclusions, infra.) The proposed land to be served by Fleming Island CDD consists of approximately 1,580 acres bounded on the north and west by vacant property; on the east by U.S. Highway 17, Fleming Island Estates and the St. Johns River; on the southwest by Black Creek; and on the south by Black Creek and the St. Johns River. A map showing the location of the land areas to be served by the CDD was attached as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 to the Petition. As proposed, Fleming Island CDD contains no enclaves; the land is contiguous and will be separated only by roads, streets, or other similar, small barriers. The Petition alleges that the metes and bounds legal description of the property is contained in Petition Exhibit No. 2. The Petition Exhibit Nos. 3, 4, and 5 constitute documentation that the owners of all the real property proposed to be included in Fleming Island CDD have given written consent to the establishment of the CDD on the proposed property. The Petition names the five persons (revised in the Amended Petition) to serve on the initial Board of Supervisors upon establishment of the CDD by rule. The Petition identifies and depicts in Petition Exhibit No. 6 proposed land uses within the previously-approved DRI. The Petition identifies the DRI development order in Petition Exhibit No. 7. The Petition identifies and depicts in Petition Exhibit No. 8 the main trunk waterlines, sewer interceptors, and outfalls on the property proposed to be served by the CDD. The Petition sets forth in Petition Exhibit No. 9 (revised in the Amended Petition) the proposed timetable and schedule of estimated costs for the construction of the proposed facilities. The Petition alleges and Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted at the hearing demonstrates that the Clay County Local Government Comprehensive Plan is an effective local government comprehensive plan which is in compliance with state law. The Petition also alleges that the Clay County future land use map (FLUM) designates the land to be within Fleming Island CDD. Petition Exhibit No. 11 is a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs. The Petitioner paid $15,000 to Clay County for the required filing and processing fees prior to filing the Petition on April 30, 1999. Based on the evidence, all statements contained within the Petition are found to be true and correct. See pre-filed and oral testimony of Gary L. Moyer; testimony of Petitioner's land use planner, Susan Fraser, AICP; and testimony of Petitioner's business expert, William J. Rizzetta. The underlying community development anticipated to be served by the CDD is described in Section 1.0 of the Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs at Petition Exhibit No. 11 and in the testimony of Gary L. Moyer. It will be consistent with and similar to the adjacent development. Development in Fleming Island CDD is to proceed under the development order for development of regional impact (DRI). The evidence, especially the testimony of Susan Fraser (AICP), indicates that establishment of Fleming Island CDD will not be inconsistent with any applicable element or portion of the state comprehensive plan or of the Clay County Comprehensive Plan. There was no evidence to the contrary. The evidence indicates that the area of land within the proposed CDD is of sufficient size, is sufficiently compact, and sufficiently contiguous to be developable as one, functional, interrelated community. There was no evidence to the contrary. The evidence indicates that the CDD is the best alternative available for delivering community development services and facilities (including recreational facilities) to the area that will be served by the CDD. There was no evidence to the contrary. The evidence indicates that the CDD's services and facilities will not be incompatible with the capacity and uses of existing local and regional community development services and facilities. There was no evidence to the contrary. The evidence was that the area to be served by Fleming Island CDD is amenable to separate special-district government. There was no evidence to the contrary. Clay County also held a public hearing on the Petition, which resulted in the County's adoption of a Resolution 99-57 supporting the Petition and establishment of the Fleming Island CDD.

Conclusions On October 2, 1999, a local public hearing was held in this case in Green Cove Springs, Clay County, Florida, before Don W. Davis, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Division of Administrative Hearings, under the authority of Section 190.005(1)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).

Florida Laws (6) 120.57190.003190.005190.006190.012190.046 Florida Administrative Code (2) 42-1.01042-1.012
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MONROE COUNTY vs DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, 06-002856GM (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 08, 2006 Number: 06-002856GM Latest Update: Jul. 05, 2024
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WESTINGHOUSE GATEWAY COMMUNITIES, INC. vs. FLORIDA LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION AND MONROE COUNTY, 85-002045 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002045 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 1986

Conclusions Having considered the totality of the record in this cause and being mindful of the development order of Lee County referenced above and the lack of expressed opposition to the establishment of the subject community services district by Lee County or any other person or entity, it is, concluded: That all statements contained within the petition are found to be true and correct. That the creation of the district is consistent with applicable elements or portions of the Lee County Comprehensive Plan. That the area of land within the proposed district is of sufficient size, sufficiently compact, and is sufficiently contiguous to be developable as one functional, interrelated community. That the district is the best alternative available for delivering community development services and facilities to the area that will be served by the district. That the community development services and facilities of the district would be compatible with the capacity and uses of existing local and regional community development services and facilities. That the area that will be served by the district is amenable to separate, special-district government. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of January, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Ken van Assenderp, Esq. YOUNG, VAN ASSENDERP, VARNADOE & BENTON, P.A. Post Office Box 1833 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Melvin D. Deutsch, II, Esq. Timothy Jones, Esq. Westinghouse Gateway Communities, Inc. 1625 Hendry Street, Suite 201 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Michael J. Ciccarone, Esq. Assistant County Attorney Lee County Post Office Box 398 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Glenn Robertson, Secretary Florida Land Water Adjudicatory Commission Office of the Governori The Captol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.54190.005190.012
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CITY OF HALLANDALE BEACH vs BROWARD COUNTY AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, 99-003915GM (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Sep. 16, 1999 Number: 99-003915GM Latest Update: Oct. 16, 2003

The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether Broward County Ordinance 1999-26, amending the Broward County Comprehensive Plan (Plan), is "in compliance," as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and more specifically whether that portion of PCT 99-2, adopted through Ordinance 1999-26, which limits the use of flexibility units and reserve units east of the Intracoastal Waterway is not "in compliance" under Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged by the City of Hallandale Beach.

Findings Of Fact Parties The Petitioner, the City of Hallandale Beach (the City or Hallandale) is an incorporated municipality located in Broward County, Florida. The City is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The City has adopted the City of Hallandale Comprehensive Plan (the City's Plan). In August of 1999, the City of Hallandale officially changed its name to the City of Hallandale Beach. The Respondent, Broward County (the County or Broward) is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is a charter county. The County has adopted the Broward County Comprehensive Plan (the County's Plan). The Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA), is the state land planning agency which under Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, is responsible for, among other things, the review of municipal and county comprehensive plans to determine if the plans, and subsequent amendments thereto, are "in compliance" as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Standing The transmittal hearing for the proposed amendment was conducted on February 23, 1999. The adoption hearing was held June 22, 1999. During the plan amendment process, the City submitted three letters dated January 22, 1999, February 11, 1999, and April 30, 1999, in opposition to the proposed amendment. These letters, along with other materials in support of and in opposition to the proposed amendment were forwarded to the Department in the adopted amendment package on June 30, 1999. The City is an "affected person" under Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The County Charter The Charter of Broward County took effect on January 1, 1975. (The current Charter submitted as Joint Exhibit 1 is revised as of November 5, 2002). With reference to land use planning, the County Charter in Article VIII creates the Broward County Planning Council (Planning Council). The Planning Council is the local planning agency for the Broward County Land Use Plan (BCLUP). The Planning Council employs a staff, which includes professional planners, gathers data, performs analyses of data, conducts hearings, and recommends the adoption of land use ordinances by the Broward County Commission. The Planning Council has final authority over the approval, or recertification, of municipal land use plans and amendments. Under the Charter, the County has primary responsibility for land use planning. Municipal comprehensive plans must be in conformity with the BCLUP. Pursuant to section 11.01 of the Charter, County Ordinances relating to land use planning prevail over municipal ordinances. Flexibility Units/Reserve Units Broward County is a highly urbanized, fast-growing county located in the southeastern portion of Florida. The estimated 1998 population was 1,460,890, a 16.4 percent increase over the 1990 census. In addition to the County government, there are 29 municipalities in the County. In November 1977, Broward County first devised the concept of allowing flexibility to municipalities in land use planning by creating "flexibility units" (flex units) which could be used by municipalities in land use planning. The number of flex units is equal to the difference between the density permitted on the BCLUP map and the density permitted on the applicable municipal land use plan for any particular parcel of land. Flex units are unique to Broward County in the State of Florida. The entire County is divided into 126 flexibility zones. Each flexibility zone has a determined number of available flex units based on the difference in densities between the future BCLUP map and the municipal land use plan. Within each of the 126 flexibility zones, designated on the future BCLUP map, the appropriate municipality may rearrange and revise land uses and densities, within limits specified in the County Plan, without the necessity of an amendment to the County Plan. The total density within any particular flexibility zone cannot exceed the density on the future BCLUP map. The Administrative Rules Document contains rules and procedures regulating flexibility zones and units. Modifications to flexibility zones may be requested by the municipality, the County, or the Planning Council, subject to final approval by the Board of County Commissioners. Municipal plan amendments revising land uses by use of flex units within flexibility zones are subject only to recertification by the Planning Council. Without the use of flex units, the land use category for a particular piece of property on the BCLUP map can be amended through an amendment to the BCLUP. "Reserve units" are additional permitted dwelling units equal to 2 percent of the total number of dwelling units permitted in a flexibility zone by the future BCLUP map. Reserve units function similarly to flex units and may be allocated by a municipality to rearrange and revise densities within a flexibility zone. For the purpose of this Recommended Order, reserve units shall be treated as flex units. Hallandale contains flexibility zones 93 and 94. Review of the Operation of Flexibility Rules In 1996, in response to state requirements for periodic evaluations of county comprehensive plans, the planning council staff, including Henry Sniezek of the County planning staff, prepared the Broward County Land Use Plan "Flexibility Rules" Study. After many hours spent obtaining data and analyses, the staff recommended that flexibility rules include more consideration of compatibility with surrounding land uses and the impacts on public schools. The 1996 report concluded: (1) that flexibility rules generally continued to serve the purpose of allowing local governments to address local planning issues and market concerns; (2) that local governments have utilized the flexibility rules consistent with their intent; and (3) that flexibility rules should continue to be available for local government use. The issue which is the subject of this proceeding, as to whether flex units should continue to be authorized for land planning uses in areas east of the Intracoastal Waterway to increase density from 25 to 50 units per acre, was not specifically within the scope of the 1996 report. Coastal Densities An April 24, 1998, version of the County land uses plan map, which is apparently still in force, designated a number of parcels throughout Broward County, east of the Intracoastal Waterway on the Atlantic Ocean, as land use category "H," for high density dwellings of 50 units per gross acre. Under the Broward County land use regulations, gross acreage is calculated by including the property owned by the landowner and half of adjacent right-of-way. In County-designated "H" parcels, developments of 50 units per acre are permitted, without the need to allocate flex units to the parcels. The Hallandale Ordinance In 1998, Hallandale passed an Ordinance 1998-3, creating a new Residential High Density-2 Land Use Designation (HD-2), allowing developments up to 50 residential dwelling units per acre, but only by the allocation of available flex units. On June 1, 1999, the Mayor of Hallandale was notified, by letter, that the land use element, as amended to create the HD-2 category, was recertified by the Planning Council. The recertification process constitutes a determination that the municipal plan amendment substantially conforms to the County Plan. The DCA found Hallandale's HD-2 ordinance in compliance. The Regional Planning Council determines whether comprehensive plan amendments comply with the 1995 Strategic Regional Policy Plan. The Planning Council approved the City's HD-2 category as consistent with the Strategic Regional Policy Plan. The intent of the ordinance was to promote and attract redevelopment to Hallandale, particularly the beach area, where many buildings date from the 1960's and 1970's, and may be approaching the end of their useful lives. The City used the HD-2 for the redevelopment of a property called Riviera Beach, which consisted of a deteriorating motel, a restaurant, and offices. The City also used the category to promote the redevelopment of the Ocean Marine property site of another deteriorating motel with a yacht club on the Intracoastal Waterway, which is currently going through the approval process. The City's former Director of Growth Management, Lorenzo Aghemo, opined that with existing average density on the beach in the range of 86 to 89 units an acre, redevelopment up to only 25 dwelling units per acre is not economically advantageous. The Proposed Amendment The Amendment that is the subject of this proceeding began as a "housekeeping" amendment which was initially designed to establish a uniform cap of 50 units per acre for the use of flex units to be consistent throughout the County Plan. During the process of meetings and public hearings before the Planning Council and the County Commission, and in response to comments and suggestions from members and staff as well as comments from DCA, the Planning Council, the Broward County League of Cities and various municipal governments, the Amendment evolved as more particularly described below. The Amendment ultimately became a mechanism to further goals contained in a Governor's Commission report entitled "Eastward Ho!" which was published in July 1996 and discussed in more detail below. A primary focus of the Eastward Ho! report is the recommendation that development in Southeast Florida, including Broward County, should be redirected into a corridor of land that generally consisted of the land between CSX and Florida railroads. The precise parameters of the Eastward Ho! corridor are undefined and the corridor eventually was expanded beyond the lands between the railroads; however, it is agreed that this corridor contains many of the older municipal regions of the County west of the Intracoastal Waterway. In its adopted form, the portion of the County's challenged amendment PCT 99-2, adopted through Ordinance 1999- 26, implements several changes which encourage the redevelopment of the County's urban corridor, and redirects development away from the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA) as well as away from the environmentally sensitive western areas of the County. With respect to the use of flex units, the challenged Amendment establishes four areas ("Areas A-D") within the County. Each area is given its own designation regarding the use of flex units. Area A This area generally encompasses all land west of the Urban Infill Area line. It is treated differently from the other areas for planning purposes because of its environmentally sensitive lands. Included in this area are portions of the Florida Everglades, other wetlands and well fields. In recognition of the environmental features of this area, the Amendment restricts the use of flexibility units to a maximum of 25 units an acre and helps to minimize urban sprawl. Area B This area is defined as all land east of the Intracoastal Waterway. It lies entirely within the County’s CHHA, which includes the land and water eastward of the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway to the Atlantic Ocean. CHHAs are areas that are prone to damage from flood and wind from a hurricane event. This vulnerability to hurricanes presents special planning issues which led the County to limit the use of flexibility units to a maximum of 25 units an acre. In order to better protect human life and property, the County not only places a limit on flexibility units in this area, but encourages development and redevelopment in other portions of the County outside the CHHA. Area C This area generally comprises all of the land east of the Urban Infill Area Line and West of the Intracoastal Waterway. It includes many of the County’s older cities, where there is the greatest need for redevelopment. This area generally includes the Eastwood Ho! corridor. In order to encourage redevelopment in this area, the County continues to allow local governments to use up to 50 flexibility units an acre. Area D This area contains pocket areas that lie west of the Urban Infill area. Although the Amendment restricts the use of flexibility units to a maximum of 25 units an acre in this area, no compatibility review is required. At this time, there are two areas with this designation. Both of these pocket areas lie close to the Urban Infill Area. Application to Hallandale Most of Hallandale lies within Area C. A small potion of the City consisting of the beach east of the Intracoastal Waterway is in Area B and also within the CHHA. Under the challenged Amendment the City is limited to a maximum allowable density, with the allocation of flex units, to 25 units per acre, because the area is east of the Intracoastal Waterway. For purposes of this proceeding, the objectionable effect of the challenged Amendment is that it prohibits the use of flex units to that small portion of Hallandale that is east of the Intracoastal Waterway to attain densities greater than 25 units per acre. Lorenzo Aghemo, formerly Hallandale's Director of Growth Management, testified that the County's challenged Amendment is inconsistent with the following elements of the County's Plan: Objective 8.03.00, on discouraging urban sprawl by directing development to areas with existing facilities and services; Goal 13.00.00, on maximizing intergovernmental coordination and cooperation; Policy 13.01.08, on the Planning Council's responsibility to ensure consistency, as compared to its decisions to approve 50 units and than a few months later 25 units per acre; Goal 17.00.00, directing growth to identified urban infill, in areas of existing infrastructure and services to promote redevelopment; Policy 17.02.02, on urban infill and redevelopment to promote economic development and increase housing opportunities. Mr. Aghemo testified that the County's Ordinance, limiting the flex units to 25 per acre is also inconsistent with the following statutes: Section 163.3177(11)(c) - on maximizing the use of existing facilities and services through redevelopment and urban infill development; Section 187.201(15)(a) and (b) - on directing development to areas which have, in place, land and water resources, fiscal abilities and service capacity; Section 187.201(16)(b)5. - on allowing local government flexibility to determine and address urban priorities. Henry Sniezek testified that the proposed Amendment viewed in its entirety, is consistent with the above-cited provisions. Evolution of the Proposed Amendment On January 15, 1999, the County Planning Council's Land Use/Traffic Ways Committee discussed, for the first time, an early version of a County amendment to limit the density allowed from the use of flex units. At that time, the staff recommended that flex units should result in densities no higher than 50 units per acres. As stated above, the maximum of 50 units an acre, recommended in 1999, was intended for "housekeeping" purposes to establish the same cap for flex units consistently referenced throughout the plan. Robert Daniels, the principal planner for the Regional Planning Council, first recommended that the coastal barrier island be excluded from certain flex unit allocations in a letter to Mr. Sniezek, on January 27, 1999. Mr. Daniels testified that his concern was based on the Strategic Regional Plan goal and policy of reducing densities on coastal barrier islands, the beaches and areas east of the Intracoastal Waterway. The Broward League of Cities Technical Advisory Committee, composed of planners from various municipalities in the County, also recommended to the County Commission that it attempt to direct growth to the area between the Everglades on environmentally sensitive west and the CHHA. That policy is included in the County's "Eastward Ho" voluntary initiative. The Broward County urban infill area has a western boundary that coincides with the western boundary of the challenged amendment but extends east to the Atlantic Ocean. The Amendment, as adopted, ultimately excluded the area east of the Intracoastal Waterway within the urban infill area, as designated on the County land use map, from the maximum flex unit uses without County Commission approved. Eastward Ho! "Eastward Ho! Revitalizing Southeast Florida’s Urban Core" is a 1996 planning initiative of the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida. It was developed by the South Florida Regional Planning Council in conjunction with the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council. Eastward Ho! promotes urban infill and redevelopment in order to revitalize older communities. Among its other goals is to direct development away from environmentally sensitive lands, prime agricultural areas, and water resources. The Eastward Ho! initiative attempts to capture some of the projected growth in the western and CHHA and redirect it to the urbanized areas. The boundaries for the Eastward Ho! initiative include portions of Palm Beach County, Broward County and Miami-Dade County. Its boundaries are not precisely defined and have evolved over time. The original study area encompassed the area between the Florida East Coast Railroad and the CSX Railroad. As the program progressed, it became apparent that additional areas should be included. This larger Eastward Ho! area includes the lands lying east to US 1 and west to the Palmetto Expressway, the Florida Turnpike, State Road 7 and Military Trail. The Amendment Area C is generally compatible with the Eastward Ho! boundaries in Broward County. Area B does not lie within the Eastward Ho! boundaries. In its totality, the Amendment advances the purposes of Eastward Ho! by redirecting growth towards already urbanized areas and away from the environmentally sensitive areas in the western portion of the County and the CHHA. The Eastward Ho! initiative is advanced by the Amendment in that the proposed flexibility units scheme promotes the goals of directing some future development away from environmentally sensitive areas and the CHHA and redirects that future development to the urban infill areas. As the Amendment is consistent with, and furthers, Eastward Ho! goals, the contents of the document entitled "Eastward Ho! Revitalizing Southeast Florida's Urban Core" constitute relevant and appropriate data and analysis which supports the Amendment. In February 1999, a report was issued by Rutgers University, Center for Urban Policy Research in which the Eastward Ho! program is described and analyzed. This report was prepared for the Florida Department of Community Affairs and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. This document is entitled "Eastward Ho! Development Futures: Paths to More Efficient Growth in Southeast Florida." Included in this report are data and analysis contrasting projected Eastward Ho! and non-Eastward Ho! development patterns. In this report, it is concluded that directing some residential development growth from the hurricane hazard area and the western areas into the Eastward Ho! areas in the next twenty-five years will save 52,856 acres of prime farmland and 13,887 acres of fragile environmental lands. It is also expected that housing costs would drop approximately 2.3 percent. The report also concludes that by directing some future development over a 25-year period into the Eastward Ho! areas, the following savings in infrastructure costs can be gained: $1.54 billion dollars in local road costs, $62 million in state road costs, $157 million in water capital costs, and $135.6 in sewer capital costs. As the Amendment helps implement the goals of Eastward Ho!, it reasonably can be concluded that this report contains data and analysis that supports the Amendment. Local Mitigation Strategy Broward County’s emergency management staff has prepared a local mitigation strategy (LMS), which is the County’s plan to mitigate the effects of potential natural disasters, especially hurricanes. In this document, the County identifies the trend of conversions of living units in the coastal hurricane evacuation zone from seasonal to year-round use, increasing the number of residents in the coastal hurricane evacuation zones. This area is basically the same as the portion of the County described in the Amendment as Area B. In order to minimize the impact of natural disasters, the LMS recommends discouraging additional public expenditures to expand or improve infrastructure in the CHHA. The Amendment implements these recommendations by providing an incentive for directing some future growth away from the CHHA to Area C. Accordingly, the LMS constitutes data and analysis which supports the Amendment. Consistency with the Broward County Comprehensive Plan The City contends that the Amendment is inconsistent with the following provisions of the Broward County Comprehensive Plan: Objective 8.03.00, Goal 13; Policy 13.01.08, Goal 17; and Policy 17.02.02. Those provisions are part of the BCLUP. Objective 8.03.00 is entitled "EFFICIENT USE OF URBAN SERVICES" and reads: Discourage urban sprawl and encourage a separation of urban and rural uses by directing new development into areas where necessary regional and community facilities and services exist. The BCLUP does not define "urban sprawl." The Department of Community Affairs has a rule that defines "urban sprawl" as meaning: . . . urban development or uses which are located in predominantly rural areas, or rural areas interspersed with generally low- intensity or low density urban uses, and which are characterized by one or more of the following conditions: (a) The premature or poorly planned conversion of rural land to other uses; (b) The creation of areas of urban development or uses which are not functionally related to land uses which predominate the adjacent area; or (c) The creation of areas of urban development or uses which fail to maximize the use of existing public facilities or the use of areas within which public services are currently provided.... Rule 9J-5.003(134), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 9J-5.006(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides guidance on how to ensure that plans and plan amendments are consistent with applicable requirements pertaining to the discouragement of urban sprawl. Rule 9J- 5.006(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The rule contains sections on primary indicators, land use evaluations, and development controls, each of which includes many factors to be carefully considered. The Amendment provides incentives for development in Area C, which is the older urban corridor of the County. Although some of it is also urban, Area B lies in the CHHA and the data and analysis support its disparate treatment. Taken as a whole, the Amendment has the effect of discouraging urban sprawl by promoting infill in older downtown areas (Area C) and directing development away from the environmentally sensitive areas (Areas A and B) and areas with inefficient land use patterns (Area A) such as the western areas of the County. Goal 13 and Policy 13.01.08 are located in the section of the plan entitled "INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION." They read as follows: GOAL 13.00.00 MAXIMIZE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION AND COOPERATION AMONG STATE, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES. POLICY 13.01.08 The Broward County Planning Council shall continue to coordinate, cooperate and share information and services with all City and County planning offices and all local government agencies in order to ensure consistency and compatibility among the Broward County Land Use Plan and the other elements of the Broward County Comprehensive Plan, as well as municipal comprehensive plans. The Amendment does not modify the intergovernmental coordination provisions. While the Amendment restricts the effect of Hallendale Ordinance 1998-2 in that small portion of the City that is east of the Intracoastal Waterway, that restriction alone does not support a finding that the Amendment as a whole is inconsistent with Policy 13.01.08. Moreover, the County complied with the letter and spirit of Goal 13.00.00 and Policy 13.01.08 in developing and adopting this Amendment. It kept the municipalities informed of the Amendment by providing written drafts and coordinated with entities including the Broward County League of Cities, the South Florida Regional Planning Council, the Broward County Planning Council, and its technical advisory committee. Suggestions and comments from the South Florida Regional Planning Council and the League of Cities were a major influence in the ultimate version of the adopted Amendment. Goal 17.00.00 and Policy 17.02.02 are contained in the Plan’s section entitled "URBAN INFILL AREAS, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AREAS AND DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION." They read as follows: GOAL 17.00.00 DIRECT GROWTH TO IDENTIFIED URBAN INFILL, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION AREAS WITHIN BROWARD COUNTY IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE URBAN SPRAWL, REDUCE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURES ON RURAL LANDS, MAXIMIZE THE USE OF EXISTING PUBLIC FACILITIES AND CENTRALIZE COMMERCIAL, GOVERNMENTAL, RETAIL, RESIDENTIAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES. POLICY 17.02.02 Local land use plans should include policies to provide for adequate housing opportunities necessary to accommodate all segments of present and future residents of identified urban infill, urban redevelopment and downtown revitalization area(s). In its totality, the Amendment is not inconsistent with Goal 17.00.00 and may further it. By limiting development in the CHHA and the western portions of the County, the Amendment effectively encourages significant future growth to the urban infill areas and older downtown areas. The area encouraged for growth under this goal and policy is consistent with Area C, and targeted for the densest development and redevelopment. The Amendment is not inconsistent with Policy 17.02.02. Area B as a Coastal area is not particularly economically suitable for affordable housing. By encouraging development away from the CHHA, the Amendment may promote a wider range of housing opportunities through redevelopment in the Eastward Ho! corridor. Moreover, the Amendment provides that applications of flex units for affordable housing, Regional Activity Centers and special residential facilities are exempt from the Amendment’s restrictions in specified situations should affordable housing units be developed in Area B. Even if the Amendment were construed to be inconsistent with any of the above-discussed plan provisions, there are several other portions of the Plan that the Amendment furthers by encouraging development away from the CHHA and the environmentally sensitive areas in the western portion of the County. Those provisions include Objective 9.03.00, which requires developing and implementing land use controls to protect and enhance the County's beaches, rivers, and marine resources, and Policy 9.05.09, which requires considering the impact land use plan amendments have on wetland resources and minimizing those impacts to the maximum extent practicable. Objective 9.07.00 reads: Protect identified floodplains and areas subject to seasonal or periodic flooding. The Amendment advances this objective by limiting development in the CHHA (Area B), which is subject to storm surge, as well as limiting development in the western portion of the County (Area A), which has many flood-prone areas. Consistency with Section 163.3177(11)(c) The City alleges that the Amendment is inconsistent with Section 163.3177(11)(c), Florida Statutes, which reads: It is the further intent of the Legislature that local government comprehensive plans and implementing land development regulations shall provide strategies which maximize the use of existing facilities and services through redevelopment, urban infill development, and other strategies for urban revitalization. To the extent this statute is a substantive compliance criteria, the Amendment is consistent with this statute. By promoting development in Area C, the Amendment will help achieve the goal of maximizing existing facilities through redevelopment, urban infill and urban revitalization. Consistency with the South Florida Regional Policy Plan The Strategic Regional Policy Plan for South Florida (SFRPP) is the regional policy plan adopted by the South Florida Regional Planning Council. It is adopted by reference in Rule 29J-2.009, Florida Administrative Code. The Amendment is consistent with provisions in the SFRPP, particularly those related to land use, public facilities, natural resources, and emergency management. The Amendment is consistent with Strategic Regional Goal 2.1, which requires directing development and redevelopment to areas least exposed to coastal storm surges and where negative impacts on the environment are minimal. The Amendment is consistent with several of Goal 2.1's implementing policies, including Policies 2.1.2 (reducing allowable densities on barrier islands and in the Category 1 Hurricane Evacuation Area), 2.1.3 (restricting development, redevelopment, and public facility construction in the CHHA), and 2.1.4 (directing development away from environmentally sensitive lands). The Amendment also furthers Strategic Regional Goal 7.1 by directing future development away from the areas most vulnerable to storm surges. Viewed in its entirety, the Amendment is consistent with the SFRPP construed as a whole. Consistency with the State Comprehensive Plan The City contends that the Amendment is inconsistent with the following provisions in the State comprehensive plan: Sections 187.201(15)(a) and (b) and 187.201(16)(b)(5), Florida Statutes. Goal (15)(a) recognizes the importance of preserving natural resources and requires development to be directed into areas which can accommodate growth in an environmentally sensitive manner. Implementing Policies (b)1., 2., and 5. requires the encouragement of efficient development, the separation of urban and rural uses, and the consideration of impacts on natural resources and the potential for flooding in land use planning. As discussed in earlier findings, the Amendment is consistent with such directives. The Amendment furthers Goal (15)(a) and Policies (b) 1., 2., and 5. Policy (16)(b)(5) reads: Ensure that local governments have adequate flexibility to determine and address their urban priorities within the state urban policy. The Amendment coordinates the policy for prioritization of urban development. Development is promoted in areas away from the CHHA and environmentally sensitive lands in the west. This is accomplished through the use of a cap on flexibility units. Local governments may choose to utilize less than the full extent of their available flexibility units or use alternative mechanisms to achieve higher densities. The use of flexibility units is only one method for controlling densities. If a local government needs more density to address its planning goals than is allowed by the Amendment, it may request a Future Land Use Map amendment. Additionally, local governments may avoid the Amendment's limits by maximizing density by the use of affordable housing developments, Regional Activity Centers or special residential facilities. The Amendment is not inconsistent with Policy (16)(b)(5). The Amendment is consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan construed as a whole.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Plan Amendment adopted by Broward County in Ordinance No. 1999-26 is "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the rule promulgated thereunder. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. RICHARD A. HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Goldstein, Esquire City of Hallandale 400 South Federal Highway Hallandale, Florida 33009 Craig Varn, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Jose R. Gonzalez, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue Governmental Center, Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Colleen M. Castille, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David Jordan, Acting General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57163.3177163.3180163.3184163.3245187.201
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