Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Florida Brethren Homes, Inc. is a not for profit corporation doing business as the Palms. The Palms is a nursing home facility certified to participate in the Medicaid program. The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing costs claimed by facilities participating in the Medicaid program. The Palms filed a cost report for Medicaid reimbursement for the fiscal period ending December 31, 1987. The cost report reviews the past payment rate and sets the prospective rate. The Department reviewed Petitioner's report and disallowed interest costs in the amount of $298,500 which were included by the Palms. The Palms timely challenged that disallowance. In 1984, the Palms participated in a revenue bond issuance in order to finance the construction of certain improvements to its health care facilities. That bond issue in the amount of $13,970,000 bore a tax exempt interest rate of approximately 12.89 %. For the period ending December 31, 1987, the interest which was due on that bond debt was $298,500. On April 5, 1988, the Palms filed a Chapter 11 action in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. The Palms did not pay the accrued interest prior to filing its petition in bankruptcy. In fact, the Palms was in default on the interest at the time of the bankruptcy petition. The Medicaid rate which had been established prior to that time had presumed an allowable interest cost for the period and had included that interest payment in the calculation of the rates then available to the Palms. In filing bankruptcy, the Palms sought to restructure its debt. As a result, the Palms executed an Amended And Restated Indenture of Trust which included the accrued but unpaid interest which had accumulated under the 1984 revenue bond issue. The plan called for a bond issuance and for deferred interest certificates to cover the unpaid interest. The deferred interest certificates had not been issued as of the date of the final hearing. The accrued but unpaid interest provided in the deferred interest certificate has a maturity date of December 1, 2016. The unpaid interest is subject to a mandatory prepayment from available net cash flow after December 1, 1992. The restructure of Petitioner's debt has allowed it to remain in business. The plan of reorganization was entered into as a good faith, arm's length transaction. The plan of reorganization was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court and the proceedings before that tribunal have concluded. In its audit of the Palms, the Department determined that the deferred interest obligation does not mature and become due and payable until December 1, 2016, and that, therefore, the interest expense is not a reimbursable cost for the period that ended December 31, 1987. The Palms' claims that for cost reimbursement purposes the accrued interest was paid by the refinancing of the debt and that the amount should remain an allowable cost to be included for that period.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department audit disallowing interest claimed for the period that ended December 31, 1987, be confirmed. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-1770 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are not findings of fact but restate the stipulation reached by the parties at the outset of the hearing. Paragraphs 6 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as it is not a finding of fact but, if accurate, would be a conclusion of law. Such conclusion has not been reached in this case. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 14 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 15, it is accepted that the repayment of the accrued interest is not a short term liability. Otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is rejected as a restatement of the issue or fact not supported by the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 17 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are rejected as irrelevant or a conclusion of law. Paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is rejected as a conclusion of law not supported by the record in this case. Paragraph 25 is rejected to the extent that the term "refinancing" is used to suggest a payment of allowable interest; it is accepted that restructuring the Palms' debt was required to allow it to continue in business. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Department: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 14 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott D. LaRue Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Karen L. Goldsmith Goldsmith and Grout, P.A. P.O. Box 2011 Winter Park, Florida 32790-2011 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent may levy upon property belonging to Petitioner (specially, funds in Petitioner's account, number 300126719, at Admiralty Bank), as proposed in Respondent's March 30, 2000, Notice of Intent to Levy?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner operates a Chevron station at 4109 Northlake Boulevard in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, at which it engages in the business of selling motor fuels at posted retail prices. Petitioner maintains a business account at Admiralty Bank. The number of its account is . Petitioner's Local Option Motor Fuel License number is 60-023068. Petitioner was delinquent in remitting to the Department "local option gas tax" payments for the period from July 1, 1995, through June 30, 1996. The Department provided Petitioner notice of Petitioner's failure to make these payments. The Department filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Palm Beach County a Tax Warrant "for collection of delinquent local option gas tax[es]," in the amount of $106,904.62, plus penalties (in the amount of $59,556.47), interest (in the amount of $12,026.25), and the amount of the "filing fee" ($12.00), for a "grand total" of $178,499.34. Rafael Fanjul is the president and sole owner of Petitioner. On May 2, 1997, Mr. Fanjul, on behalf of Petitioner, entered into a Stipulation Agreement with the Department, which provided as follows: THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND ELF SERVICES, D/B/A PALM BEACH CHEVRON S/S THE TAXPAYER, TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. 60- 123068, HEREBY AGREE THAT THE $178,024.29 TAX LIABILITY IS DUE THE STATE OF FLORIDA. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THE SUM OF TAX, PENALTY, AND INTEREST REFERENCED ON THE WARRANT OR WARRANTS DATED 02/20/97 IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING STIPULATIONS: The taxpayer will retire the tax, penalty, and interest shown on the Tax Warrant or Warrants whose dates or dates are shown above. The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any further judicial or administrative proceedings under S.72.011, F.S., with respect to this liability and; The taxpayer further agrees to meet each payment term which is detailed on the Amortization Schedule and Payment Coupons provided by the Department of Revenue. IN THE EVENT THE TAXPAYER FAILS TO MEET THE PAYMENT TERMS DETAILED ON THE ENCLOSED AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE AND PAYMENT COUPONS OR FAILS TO TIMELY REMIT ALL TAXES WHICH BECOME DUE AND PAYABLE SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY UNPAID BALANCE OF TAX, PENALTY, AND/OR INTEREST SCHEDULED PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BECOME IMMEDIATELY DUE AND PAYABLE. Mr. Fanjul had the authority to bind Petitioner to the terms set forth in the Stipulation Agreement. There has been no showing that, in so doing, he acted involuntarily or under coercion or duress. Petitioner made some, but not all of the payments, set forth on the Amortization Schedule incorporated by reference in the Stipulation Agreement. 4/ On May 1, 1998, Petitioner entered into a second Stipulation Agreement with the Department, which provided as follows: THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND ELF SERVICES, D/B/A PALM BEACH CHEVRON S/S 4806, THE TAXPAYER, TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. 60- 123068, HEREBY AGREE THAT THE $142,701.38 TAX LIABILITY IS DUE THE STATE OF FLORIDA. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THE SUM OF TAX, PENALTY, AND INTEREST REFERENCED ON THE WARRANT OR WARRANTS DATED 02/20/97 IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING STIPULATIONS: The taxpayer will retire the tax, penalty, and interest shown on the Tax Warrant or Warrants whose dates or dates are shown above. The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any further judicial or administrative proceedings under S.72.011, F.S., with respect to this liability and; The taxpayer further agrees to meet each payment term which is detailed on the Amortization Schedule and Payment Coupons provided by the Department of Revenue. IN THE EVENT THE TAXPAYER FAILS TO MEET THE PAYMENT TERMS DETAILED ON THE ENCLOSED AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE AND PAYMENT COUPONS OR FAILS TO TIMELY REMIT ALL TAXES WHICH BECOME DUE AND PAYABLE SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY UNPAID BALANCE OF TAX, PENALTY, AND/OR INTEREST SCHEDULED PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BECOME IMMEDIATELY DUE AND PAYABLE. Mr. Fanjul had the authority to bind Petitioner to the terms set forth in the second Stipulation Agreement. There has been no showing that, in so doing, he acted involuntarily or under coercion or duress. Petitioner made some, but not all of the payments, set forth on the Amortization Schedule incorporated by reference in the second Stipulation Agreement. 5/ On August 12, 1999, Petitioner entered into a third Stipulation Agreement with the Department, which provided as follows: THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND ELF SERVICES, D/B/A PALM BEACH CHEVRON S/S 4806, THE TAXPAYER, TAX IDENTIFICATION NO. 60- 123068, HEREBY AGREE THAT THE $88,375.04 TAX LIABILITY IS DUE THE STATE OF FLORIDA. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THE SUM OF TAX, PENALTY, AND INTEREST REFERENCED ON THE WARRANT OR WARRANTS DATED 02/20/97 IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING STIPULATIONS: The taxpayer will retire the tax, penalty, and interest shown on the Tax Warrant or Warrants whose dates or dates are shown above. The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any further judicial or administrative proceedings under S.72.011, F.S., with respect to this liability and; The taxpayer further agrees to meet each payment term which is detailed on the Amortization Schedule and Payment Coupons provided by the Department of Revenue. IN THE EVENT THE TAXPAYER FAILS TO MEET THE PAYMENT TERMS DETAILED ON THE ENCLOSED AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE AND PAYMENT COUPONS OR FAILS TO TIMELY REMIT ALL TAXES WHICH BECOME DUE AND PAYABLE SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY UNPAID BALANCE OF TAX, PENALTY, AND/OR INTEREST SCHEDULED PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BECOME IMMEDIATELY DUE AND PAYABLE. Mr. Fanjul had the authority to bind Petitioner to the terms set forth in the third Stipulation Agreement. There has been no showing that, in so doing, he acted involuntarily or under coercion or duress. The Amortization Schedule incorporated by reference in the third Stipulation Agreement required Petitioner to make 47 weekly payments of $1,000.00 each from August 12, 1999, to June 29, 2000, and to make a final payment of $28,994.57 on July 6, 2000. As of January 12, 2000, Petitioner was five payments behind. Accordingly, on that date, the Department sent a Notice of Delinquent Tax to Admiralty Bank, which read as follows: RE: ELF SERVICES INC. DBA: PALM BEACH GARDENS CHEVRON STA 48206 FEI: 65-0055086 ACCT: ST#: To Whom It May Concern: You are being notified, under the authority contained is Subsection 212.10(3), Florida Statutes, that the referenced dealer is delinquent in the payment of gas tax liabilities in the amount of $75,581.47 to the State of Florida. You may not transfer or dispose of any credits, debts, or other personal property owed to the dealer, that are to become under your control during the effective period of this notice. Any assets in your possession exceeding the dollar amount shown above may be released in the ordinary course of business. This notice shall remain in effect until the Department consents to a transfer or disposition or until sixty (60) days elapse after receipt of this notice, whichever period expires the earliest. Please furnish a list of all credits, debts, or other property owed to the dealer in your possession and the value of these assets to the Department. Chapter 212.10(3), F.S. requires this list within five (5) days. If you fail to comply with this notice, you may become liable to the State of Florida to the extent of the value of the property or amount of debts or credits disposed of or transferred. Thank you for your cooperation. If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned at the telephone number below. On or about January 18, 2000, in response to the foregoing notice, Admiralty Bank advised the Department in writing that "the balance being held" in Petitioner's account at the bank was $2,223.53. On February 10, 2000, the Department sent Admiralty Bank a Notice of Freeze, which read as follows: RE: Elf Services Inc. DBA Palm Beach Gardens Chevron FEI: 65-0055086 ACCT: ST#: Dear Custodian: You are hereby notified that pursuant to Section 213.67, Florida Statutes, the person identified above has a delinquent liability for tax, penalty, and interest of $75,581.47, which is due the State of Florida. Therefore, as of the date you receive this Notice you may not transfer, dispose, or return any credits, debts, or other personal property owned/controlled by, or owed to, this taxpayer which are in your possession or control. This Notice remains in effect until the Department of Revenue consents to a transfer, disposition, or return, or until 60 consecutive calendar days elapse from the date of receipt of this Notice of Freeze, whichever occurs first. Further, Section 213.67(2), F.S., and Rule 12-21, Florida Administrative Code, require you to advise the Department of Revenue, within 5 days of your receipt of this Notice, of any credits, debts, or other personal property owned by, or owed to, this taxpayer which are in your possession or control. You must furnish this information to the office and address listed below. Your failure to comply with this Notice of Freeze may make you liable for the amount of tax owed, up to the amount of the value of the credits, debts or personal property transferred. Thank you for your cooperation. If you have any questions please contact the undersigned at the telephone number listed below. On March 22, 2000, the Department sent to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Levy upon Petitioner's "Bank Account # , in the amount of $2,320.07, . . . in the possession or control of Admiralty Bank" "for nonpayment of taxes, penalty and interest in the sum of $75,581.47." After receiving information from Admiralty Bank that Petitioner actually had $7,293.36 in its account at the bank, the Department, on March 30, 2000, sent Petitioner a second Notice of Intent to Levy, which was identical in all respects to the March 22, 2000, Notice of Intent to Levy except that it reflected that Petitioner's account at Admiralty Bank contained $7,293.36, instead of $2,320.07. Petitioner's account at Admiralty Bank does not contain any monies paid by a third party to Petitioner as salary or wages. The amount of the Petitioner's current outstanding delinquent "tax liability" is $75,581.47.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order upholding its March 30, 2000, Notice of Intent to Levy and proceed with the garnishment of the funds in Petitioner's account at Admiralty Bank. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2000.
Findings Of Fact In the late 1960's Gulf Standard corporation, a corporation wholly owned by William V. Gruman, constructed the Pine Apartments which is the property involved in this hearing. Gulf Standard remortgaged the property in 1973 and in order to obtain the mortgage it was necessary for William V. Gruman and his wife to guarantee payment of the note secured by the mortgage. This unconditional guarantee agreement was entered into evidence with an accompanying letter dated March 15, 1978, as Exhibit 4. Without the Grumans, in effect, cosigning the promissory note for $1,849,000 secured by a mortgage on the property the loan would not have been made. In October 1975 Gulf Standard corporation was dissolved and by quitclaim deed dated October 28, 1975, Gulf Standard corporation transferred the property to William Victor Gruman and Eva Gruman. Minimum documentary stamp tax was placed on this deed. A proposed assessment dated January 20, 1978 (Exhibit 2) was issued on this transfer in the amount of $6,933.38; however this assessment was withdrawn when evidence was presented to the Department of Revenue that the corporation had been dissolved and the property transferred to the sole shareholders who had primary liability on the mortgage before and after the transfer. By quitclaim deed dated 30 September 1976 the Grumans transferred this property to Northwest Liquor Industries, Inc. (Northwest), a corporation wholly owned by Gruman. Minimum documentary stamp tax was placed on this deed. It is this transaction upon which Petitioner claims insufficient documentary stamp tax was paid and which is the basis for the proposed assessment. No issue was raised regarding the accuracy of the amounts alleged to be due in the proposed assessment; Respondent contending only that no consideration passed, therefore only the minimum documentary stamp tax that was placed on the deed was required. At the time of this conveyance the market value of the property was less than the mortgage encumbering the property and the payment of the note secured by this mortgage had been guaranteed by Gruman (Exhibit 4). Subsequent to the transfer to Northwest no more than one mortgage payment was made by Northwest before the loan was defaulted. Thereafter the lender foreclosed on the property and obtained a deficiency judgment against the Grumans based upon their guarantee of the note secured by the mortgage.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's September 29, 1993, claim (Claim No. 34092993) for reimbursement of expenses for medical services rendered in 1992 should be denied on the ground that said claim was not timely filed with Department of Management Services, Division of State Employees' Insurance (hereinafter referred to as the "Department")?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a participant in the State of Florida Flexible Benefits Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan") with an established Medical Reimbursement Account. The following were among the medical expenses incurred by Petitioner and members of her immediate family during the 1992 calendar year: DATE TYPE OF SERVICE AMOUNT 6/29/92 Dental $70.00 7/9/92 Dental $310.00 7/11/92 Endodontic $450.00 7/17/92 Optical $266.75 7/22/92 Dental $500.00 7/27/92 Optical $84.70 8/19/92 Optical $416.50 12/29/92 Dental $210.00 In August of 1992, Hurricane Andrew ravaged parts of South Florida. Petitioner's residence was extensively damaged by the storm. Most of the contents of the residence, including medical records and receipts, were destroyed. Petitioner and her family were forced to vacate the premises. They packed their remaining belongings and moved to another location in Dade County, with the intention of returning to their home once the damage to the structure had been repaired. As of the date of the hearing in this case, all of the necessary repairs to the home had yet to be made and therefore the family had not moved back in. Petitioner and the other members of her family were among those residents of South Florida whose lives were significantly disrupted by the hurricane and the destruction and devastation it caused In the aftermath of the hurricane, Petitioner directed her energies toward obtaining a return to normalcy in her life. Although she realized that there were medical expense reimbursement claims that she needed to file with the Department, filing these claims was not a priority of hers. She focused her attention on other matters that she considered to be more deserving of her time given her situation. In January or February of 1993, Petitioner telephoned the Department to inquire if extensions of time for filing reimbursement claims were being given to Plan participants, such as herself, who were still suffering from the consequences of Hurricane Andrew. The person to whom Petitioner spoke advised her that such extensions were indeed being given. Based upon what she had been told by this Department representative, Petitioner reasonably believed that she would be able to file reimbursement claims for 1992 medical expenses after March 1, 1993, without having these claims rejected on the ground that they had been untimely filed. She therefore felt that there was no urgency with respect to the filing of these claims and she acted accordingly. Shortly after gathering all of the supporting documentation she believed she needed, 1 Petitioner, on September 29, 1993, filed a claim with the Department requesting that she be reimbursed from her Medical Reimbursement Account for the medical expenses enumerated in Finding of Fact 2 of this Recommended Order. The Department designated the claim as Claim No. 34092993. Petitioner also sought reimbursement, through the filing of this claim, of certain medical expenses incurred in 1993, including $140.00 for dental work that Petitioner had inadvertently indicated on the claim form had been performed in July of 1992. The work had actually been done in July of 1993. By letter dated October 8, 1993, the Department advised Petitioner that "[o]nly expenses for services rendered during the January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1993 plan year are eligible for reimbursement" and that "[s]ince [her] 1992 expense does not fall within this plan year, it is not reimbursable." Petitioner responded to this advisement by sending the following letter, dated November 28, 1993, to the Department: This is a petition or application requesting a formal hearing on my Claim #34092993 for Payment/Reimbursement for expenses incurred during my period of coverage for 1992. This Claim was denied. My Name is: Luretha F. Lucky My Address is: 10430 S.W. 162nd Terrace (temporary) Miami, Florida 33157 My permanent address is: 10361 S.W. 139th Street Miami, Florida 33176 I am employed at Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199. I filed my claim late because my home was severely damaged when hit [b]y Hurricane Andrew, August 24, 1992. In addition, the content[s] in my home w[ere] destroyed, therefore, it took awhile for me to collect documentation for my claim from medical personnel. Also, I had to move and the few items saved were packed away. Lastly, I called the Department of Management Services, Division of State Employees' Insurance to inform them of what had happened to me and asked if . . . they were providing extensions on submitting claims. I was told they were. My mistake was not asking and recording the name of the person with whom I spoke. As you can see from my temporary address, I am still not back in my home! In fact we just settled (with the assistance of the Insurance Commissioner's Office) with our insurance company to complete the work on our home. We had to request an extension on filing our income tax for 1992. This past year has been an awful experience for us, and I do hope you will provide me a hearing on my reimbursement. My Claim # is: 34092993. The decision that my claim was denied was received by regular mail. Thank you very much for considering my request.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Petitioner's September 29, 1993, claim (Claim No. 34092993) for reimbursement of expenses for medical services rendered in 1992 to have been timely filed and therefore subject to consideration on its merits. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of April, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings 15th day of April, 1994.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Bobbie Lynn Teddlie, Jr., should be disciplined on charges that he violated various provisions of the Insurance Code in connection with the replacement of an 82-year-old's retirement investments with an annuity.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Bobbie Lynn Teddlie, Jr., is a Florida- licensed life insurance agent, life and health insurance agent, health insurance agent, and life and health variable annuity contracts salesman. He is not licensed to sell or broker securities. There was no evidence that Respondent previously was subject to license discipline. In May 1998, while he was employed with Senior Estate Services, Respondent visited Genevieve Rathje, an 82-year-old widow and retiree, for purposes of delivering a revocable living trust prepared at her request, having it executed, and listing Rathje's assets that would be subject to the trust. Rathje's 40- year-old son, Larry, one of two beneficiaries under her estate planning arrangements, was at her home when the documents were delivered. After delivery and execution of the trust, Rathje's assets were discussed; they included an Edward Jones securities account, a COVA Financial Life Insurance Company (COVA) annuity, and a SunTrust account. Rathje mentioned that she was not happy about the market risk and fluctuations in the value of the Edward Jones account. Her son concurred. They showed Respondent some recent Edward Jones statements showing the fluctuations and some negative returns. In discussing their concerns, Respondent compared the Edward Jones account to the COVA annuity, with its guaranteed rates of return. Ultimately, Rathje and her son both stated that they preferred the annuity investment. (According to Rathje's deposition testimony, she also had been advised by an estate planning attorney to replace her Edward Jones account, which would be subject to probate on her death, with an annuity.) Respondent then presented an American Investors Life Insurance (American Investors) annuity offered by Senior Estate Services. Rathje and her son decided to liquidate and replace her investments, less approximately $30,000 for capital gains taxes and purchase of a new condominium, with an American Investors annuity. There was no evidence that Respondent misrepresented the American Investors annuity to Rathje or her son; to the contrary, there was convincing evidence that there were no misrepresentations. Nor was there any convincing evidence that Respondent made any misrepresentations to induce Rathje to liquidate her investments to purchase the American Investors annuity. To facilitate the transaction, Respondent arranged to have Rathje's Edward Jones account liquidated through Financial West Group (Financial West), a California securities broker associated with Senior Estate Services. There was no convincing evidence that Respondent made these arrangements against the wishes of Rathje and her son, or without their knowledge and approval. There was no evidence that either Rathje or her son had any complaint about the use of Financial West. Respondent also had Respondent cash in the COVA annuity, less surrender charges. The proceeds, less approximately $30,000 for capital gains taxes and the new condominium, were used to purchase an American Investors annuity. Less than 30 days later, Senior Estate Services went out of business, and Respondent obtained employment with Professional Insurance Systems. Respondent decided to replace the American Investors annuity because his commission was being held, and Respondent did not think it ever was going to be paid to him. In his new employment, Respondent was able to offer Rathje a United Life and Annuity Insurance Company (United Life) annuity, which was superior to the American Investors annuity in several respects. Since the 30-day "free look" period on the American Investors annuity had not yet expired, it was possible to replace it with a United Life annuity without any penalty or surrender charge. Respondent returned to Rathje's home with a more experienced Professional Insurance Systems agent named Phil Mednick to offer the United Life annuity and compare it to the American Investors annuity. Rathje's son was there to participate in his mother's decision, since he was a beneficiary. Respondent's presentation persuaded Rathje and her son that the United Life annuity was superior to the American Investors annuity. Arrangements were made to rescind the American Investors annuity for a full refund and replace it with a United Life annuity. (Respondent's commission on the sale of the American Investors annuity was reversed, so Respondent received no additional compensation by replacing the American Investors annuity with the United Life annuity. To the contrary, he had to split the commission on the United Life annuity with Mednick-- $4,500 each.) At Rathje's request, it was arranged for United Life to pay her monthly interest checks in the amount of $200 (according to Respondent) prior to the "Annuity Commencement Date" (July 28, 2008). There was no evidence that Respondent made any misrepresentations in comparing the two annuities. Two weeks later, Respondent and Mednick returned to Rathje's home to deliver the United Life annuity. Rathje's son, Larry, was there again. During this visit, Rathje expressed dissatisfaction with her IRA account at SunTrust. Respondent and Mednick told them about a Life USA Fixed Index Annuity. Rathje and her son agreed that it was better than the SunTrust account, and arrangements were made to liquidate the SunTrust account and replace it with a Life USA Fixed Index Annuity. Since the IRA was being rolled over, there were no tax consequences. It is not clear from the evidence how or why the complaint against Respondent was filed. Neither Rathje's son, Larry, nor anyone from the Department of Insurance testified. Rathje's deposition testimony was unclear. Apparently, when she was having her income tax return prepared in 1999, she "got a little alarmed" when her "tax man" told her she had no money "in there" (presumably the Edward Jones account). This apparently led to a Department of Insurance inquiry into Respondent's role in these transactions and eventually to a complaint being filed by Rathje. Yet in her deposition, Rathje testified: "I didn't say [Respondent] did anything wrong. I'm not sure if he did." Asked in her deposition what she thought the problem was, Rathje answered: "I don't know. Why ask me?" Rathje also became upset when she requested $2,300 (presumably from United Life) to put new hurricane shutters on her house and, according to Rathje's deposition testimony, was told: "You're already getting $400 a month." (This statement does not make sense and never was explained by the evidence.) Apparently, one basis for the charges against Respondent was that Rathje was not made to understand that the United Life annuity was subject to its own terms regarding withdrawal of funds before the "Annuity Commencement Date," and related surrender charges. But the greater weight of the evidence was that Respondent explained all of this to both Rathje and her son. In addition, it was clearly explained in the annuity documents themselves. It was not proven that Respondent misled Rathje and her son with respect to withdrawal of funds and surrender charges under the United Life annuity. The other basis for the charges against Respondent was the Department's assertion that the liquidation of the Edward Jones account and COVA annuity and their replacement with the United Life annuity patently was to Rathje's financial detriment. (Respondent presented some evidence that the United Life annuity was better than the American Investors annuity, but the Department presented no evidence of the specifics of the American Investors annuity.) According to the March 1998 Edward Jones account statement, Rathje had assets with a total value of $171,329.56. Included in the account were several stock and bond mutual funds, taxable and non-taxable bonds, and a GNMA mortgage-backed security fund. Also reflected on the Edward Jones statement as being held outside Edward Jones was the COVA annuity. These assets are detailed in Findings 11 through 16. The Income Fund of America, Inc. and the Putnam Growth and Income Fund were funds consisting of a mix of stocks and bonds. The Income Fund of America, Inc. had a value of $17,132.97, an unrealized capital gain of $1,323.09, and an estimated annual yield of 4.26%. The Putnam Growth and Income Fund had a value of $15,055.70, an unrealized capital gain of $2,528.96, and an estimated annual yield of 1.59%. The Putnam High Yield Advantage Fund was a taxable bond fund with a current value of $25,928.17, an unrealized capital loss of $1,071.83, and an estimated annual yield of 9.4%. The Putnam Tax-Free Income Trust High Yield Fund was a non-taxable bond fund with a value of $28,131.57, an unrealized capital gain of $818.31, and an estimated annual tax-free yield of 4.88%. As a Class B fund, Rathje could have been assessed a sales charge on the sale of shares of this fund. There were two Van Kampen American Capital Municipal Income Funds. Both were tax-free municipal bond funds. One was a Class A fund, which charges an up-front load on the purchase of shares but no sales charge on the sale of shares; the other was a Class B, which did not charge an up-front load on the purchase of shares but imposed a charge on their sales. The Class A fund had a value of $7,314.69, and an estimated annual tax-free yield of 5.38%. The Class B fund had a value of $15,544.23 and an estimated annual tax-free yield of 4.65%. The unrealized gain or loss of the Van Kampen funds was stated as "not available," probably because the cost bases of the funds were not known. There was a municipal bond issued by the Metropolitan Sewer District of Walworth County, Wisconsin, which had current (maturity) value of $15,000, an unrealized gain of $708.75, and a tax-free yield of 6.3%. There also was a taxable corporate bond issued by the Philadelphia Electric Company with a current (maturity) value of $26,000, an unrealized capital loss of $1,007.50, and an estimated yield of 7.125%. The GNMA fund paid interest of 9.5%. It had a principal value of $1,000 but a current value of $990. The COVA annuity was a five-year fixed annuity in the amount of $10,000 with a current value of $17,814.28. It was issued on May 25, 1990, and was renewed five years later for a second five-year term. As of March 1998, it was paying 6% interest, tax-deferred; this appears to have been the interest rate for the five-year renewal period. The COVA annuity was subject to a 6% surrender charge and an interest (or market) adjustment. At the time the COVA annuity was liquidated, there was a net surrender charge of $780, after credit was given for a positive $202.08 interest adjustment. The United Life annuity ultimately purchased by Rathje also paid 6% interest, tax-deferred, but paid a 1% bonus in addition the first year. On the $120,000 annuity purchased by Rathje, the bonus was worth a total of $1,200. After the first year, interest was subject to adjustment annually but was guaranteed not to fall below 4%. Surrender charges were 10% in the first year, decreasing 1% each year until the eighth year, to 3%, where it would remain until eliminated in year 11. Contrary to the Department’s argument, it was not patently against Rathje’s financial interest to liquidate the Edward Jones investments and replace them with cash (for capital gains taxes and a new condominium) and the United Life annuity. While some of the Edward Jones investments were performing well (and arguably better than the United Life annuity) at the time, it is not clear that all of them were performing that well, and all of them were subject to market fluctuations. Two of the investments were showing unrealized capital losses in March 1998. (Even the individual bonds were subject to the market on a sale before their maturity; the return of the principal only was guaranteed if held until maturity.) It was not patently unreasonable for Rathje to resort to an annuity to reduce her exposure to losses if the market went down. It certainly was not so obvious that the transaction was contrary to Rathje’s financial interests that Respondent, who was not an expert in securities investing, should have refused to participate. Less easily explained was the decision to liquidate the COVA annuity, at a loss of $780 in net surrender charges (after credit for the interest adjustment.) Even taking into account the United Life annuity’s one-time 1% bonus, this only resulted in $174 on the $17,418.77 net surrender value of the COVA annuity on August 5, 1998, for a net loss of approximately $606 on the exchange. It would be five years before the surrender charge on the United Life annuity fell to the 6% surrender charge on the COVA annuity; by that time, the COVA renewable term would have expired, and the value of the COVA annuity could have been reinvested at no surrender charge. There was no basis in the evidence to predict the interest adjustment on the COVA annuity if liquidated later but before expiration of the renewal period. The only apparent financial reason to prefer the exchange of annuities would have been the potential for the United Life annuity to pay more than 6% (on the assumption that the COVA annuity was locked-in at 6% until expiration of the renewal period.) But there also was the potential for the United Life annuity’s interest to decrease to the guaranteed floor of 4%, and preference for such market sensitivity would have run counter to Rathje’s primary stated objective of eliminating market fluctuations. The only other logical reason for Rathje to liquidate the COVA annuity and replace it with United Life would have been to reduce the number of her investments to just one. Respondent testified that Rathje and her son indeed expressed such a desire. Although Respondent omitted this claim in his written statement to the Department (Petitioner's Exhibit 2), there was no evidence to the contrary. In the absence of any coherent complaint by Rathje or her son, Respondent's testimony is accepted as a valid explanation for Respondent's participation in the liquidation of the COVA annuity, even at a net cost of $606. As a result, not only was the evidence insufficient to prove intent to defraud or misrepresent, it also was insufficient to prove negligent analysis of the transaction and improper advice to Rathje. A fortiori, the evidence was insufficient to prove lack of fitness, incompetence or untrustworthiness.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order finding Respondent, Bobbie Lynn Teddlie, Jr., not guilty of the charges alleged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Stacey L. Turmel, Esquire 412 East Madison Street, Suite 803 Tampa, Florida 33602 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 2 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Developers Diversified Services Limited, an Ohio limited partnership (DDS) , entered into negotiations with petitioners with a view toward acquiring certain property owned by petitioners in Pasco County (the Santos tract) for use as part of a shopping center site. It was understood on all sides that the Santos tract would he unsuitable for this purpose without another, contiguous parcel which was owned by a bank. As a result of these negotiations, on April 23, 1974, petitioner Bay Crest Plaza, Inc. executed a deed to the Santos tract in favor of DDS. Respondent's exhibit No. 2. Attached to this deed are stamps reflecting payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of seventy-five dollars ($75.00) and of documentary surtax in the amount of two hundred seventeen and one half dollars ($217.50). The remaining named petitioners executed a second deed to the same Santos tract in favor of DDS, on April 23, 1974. Respondent's exhibit No. 1. Attached to this deed are stamps reflecting payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of six hundred seventy-five dollars ($675.00) and of documentary surtax in the amount of two hundred forty-seven and one half dollars ($247.50). Both conveyances (of the same property) were subject to an outstanding mortgage in favor of Mr. and Mrs. James L. Stevens in the original amount of one hundred thirty-one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($131,250.00). On April 25, 1974, DDS executed a purchase money mortgage to secure payment of a promissory note in the amount of two hundred six thousand three hundred two and sixty-nine hundredths dollars ($206,302.69) , in favor of petitioners. The mortgage provided that "there is and will be no personal liability of the mortgagor. Respondent's exhibit No. 3. The deeds executed by petitioners in favor of DDS anci DDS' mortgage in favor of petitioners were all recorded in Pasco County on August 12, 1974, in the office of the clerk of the circuit court. There is no issue in the present case with respect to taxes due on account of the recording of any of these instruments. When it became clear that the bank was unwilling to sell the parcel DDS sought to buy from it, DDS reconveyed the Santos tract to petitioners by deed dated November 11, 1974. The deed from DDS to petitioners was filed in Pasco County in the office of the clerk of the circuit court on December 27, 1974. Attached to this deed are stamps reflecting payment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of thirty cents ($0.30) and of documentary surtax in the amount of fifty-five cents ($0.55). Thereafter, petitioners executed a satisfaction of the purchase money mortgage DDS had executed in favor of petitioners on April 25, 1974, and the satisfaction was filed in Pasco County in the office of the clerk of the circuit court on January 24, 1975.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's revised notice of proposed assessment be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frank and Aniana Santos Frank and Ruby Johnson 36 Sandpiper Road Tampa, Florida 33609 Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue There is little controversy as to the facts in this cause. The issue is essentially a legal issue and is stated as follows: When parties act in reliance and in conformity to a prior construction by an agency of a statute or rule, should the rights gained and positions taken by said parties be impaired by a different construction of said statute by the agency? Both parties submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders filed March 17 and 18, 1983. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based on the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Vanguard Investment Company, is a Florida corporation with its principal offices at 440 Northeast 92nd Street, Miami Shores, Florida 33138. On or about March 3, 1981, Vanguard purchased an aircraft described as a Turbo Commander, serial number N9RN, from Thunderbird Aviation, Inc., for a purchase price of $120,000 plus $4,800 in sales tax. The sale price plus the sales tax was paid by Vanguard to Thunderbird, which remitted the $4,800 in sales tax to the Department of Revenue (DOR) less a three percent discount as authorized by law. On February 27, 1981, Vanguard had executed a lease of said aircraft to General Development Corporation for a term of two years commencing on March 1, 1981, contingent upon Vanguard's purchase of said aircraft from Thunderbird. Prior to March 1, 1981, General Development had leased said aircraft from Thunderbird, and the least terminated on February 28, 1981. Vanguard purchased said aircraft for the sole purpose and in anticipation of continuing its lease to General Development. Vanguard never took possession or control of said aircraft, which remained in General Development's possession at Opa-locka Airport in Dade County, Florida. No controversy exists that all sales tax payable under General Development's lease of the aircraft, both with Thunderbird and subsequently with Vanguard, had been remitted to DOR with no break in continuity of the lease as a result of the change in ownership of the aircraft on or about March 1, 1981. At the time Vanguard purchased the aircraft from Thunderbird, Vanguard had not applied for or received a sales and use tax registration number pursuant to Rule 12A-1.38, Florida Administrative Code. Vanguard applied for said sales and use tax registration number on or about April 2, 1981, approximately 30 days after the purchase of said aircraft. The sales and use tax registration number was granted by DOR on or about April 23, 1981. Shortly thereafter, Vanguard inquired of DOR concerning a refund of the $4,800 in sales tax paid on the aircraft plus the three percent discount taken by Thunderbird. In lieu of Vanguard's providing Thunderbird a resale certificate and having Thunderbird apply for the sales tax refund, it was suggested that Vanguard obtain an assignment of rights from Thunderbird and apply directly for the refund because Thunderbird had been dissolved immediately after the sale of the aircraft to Vanguard. Acquisition of the assignment of rights from Thunderbird by Vanguard was delayed by the dissolution of Thunderbird and the death of Thunderbird's principal officer. Vanguard received the assignment of rights from Thunderbird on or about July 1, 1982, and immediately applied for a refund of the sales tax. Said application for refund was well within the three years permitted by Florida law to apply for a sales tax refund. On November 22, 1982, the Office of Comptroller (OOC) notified Vanguard of its intent to deny Vanguard's application for the sales tax refund because Vanguard had failed to obtain a sales and use tax registration number prior to purchasing the aircraft from Thunderbird. At the time of the purchase, it was the policy of DOR to permit individuals to apply late for a sales and use tax registration number and not to deny refunds on the basis that the applicant did not have the sales and use tax registration number at the time of the taxable purchase. On or about July 1, 1982, this policy of DOR was altered to conform with the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State Department of Revenue v. Robert N. Anderson, 403 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1981). Vanguard was aware of the DOR policy at the time of the sale, relied on that policy, and conformed to that policy. It was clearly stated that had Vanguard applied for its refund even a month earlier, in June of 1982, the refund would have been approved under the then-existing policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the application of Vanguard Investment Company for refund of sales tax be approved, and that said refund be paid by the Office of Comptroller. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Kaplan, Esquire 907 DuPont Plaza Center Miami, Florida 33131 William G. Capko, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 203 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas L. Barnhart, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Office of Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent Office of the Comptroller should refund to Petitioner taxes paid pursuant to Chapter 199 and 201, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts set forth in paragraphs 1 through 9 of the Petition herein, as follows: The agencies affected in this action are the Department of Revenue, Tallahassee, Florida, and the Office of the Comptroller, Tallahassee, Florida. The Petitioner is Zimmer Homes Corporation, 777 Southwest 12th Avenue, Pompano Beach, Florida. Zimmer Homes Corporation, on or about December 12, 1974, conveyed a piece of property described as follows: All of that part of the Southeast quarter of Section 10, Township 44 South, Range 42 East, of Palm Beach County, Florida, lying North of the North right-of-way (r/w) line of Forest Hill Boulevard, less the West 40 feet thereof for road right-of-way and less the East 40 feet thereof. The sellers paid the necessary excise tax on documents and intangible tax as follows: a. $11,250.00 total consideration $3,750,000.00 of Section Florida 201.02(1) Statutes b. 3,900.00 based upon note of $2,600,000.00 Section Florida 201.07 Statutes c. 1,542.00 based upon note of $1,027,906.00 Section Florida 201.07 Statutes d. 4,125.00 based upon total consider- ation of $3,750,000.00 Section Florida 201.021(1) Statutes e. 5,200.00 based upon mortgage secur- ing note of $2,600,000.00 Section Florida 199.032(2) Statutes f. 2,055.81 based upon mortgage secur- ing note of $1,027,906.00 Section Florida 199.032(2) Statutes A lawsuit was commenced for reasons not relevant to this Petition and the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida entered a Final Judgment on July 12, 1978, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". In the Final Judgment the Court determined that the Purchasers had a right to rescind the transaction. The Court ordered that all obligations of the parties arising out of the Purchase and Sale Agreement were cancelled and that the Purchasers were entitled to a sum of money in order to restore the parties to their original positions. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). On March 22, 1979, pursuant to Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, Zimmer Homes Corporation applied for a refund of the excise tax on the documents in an amount as specified in Paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) and 4(d), above. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). On April 3, 1979, pursuant to Section 199.252, Florida Statutes, and Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, Zimmer Homes Corporation applied for a refund of the intangible tax paid in an amount as specified in Paragraphs 4(e) and 4(f) above. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). According to a letter from the Office of the Comptroller dated April 23, 1979, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B", the Office of the Comptroller indicated that they concurred with the findings and conclusions of the Department of Revenue in denying the refund request on the excise tax on documents as specified in paragraph 6 above. As grounds therefore, it was indicated that the refund requests were denied because the statute of limitations under Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, barred the request for refund. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). By letter dated April 26, 1979, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C", the Office of the Comptroller indicated that they concurred with the findings of the Department of Revenue on denying the refund for intangible taxes which had been paid as specified above. As grounds therefore it was indicated that the request was denied because the applicable statute of limitations had run. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2).
Recommendation That Petitioner's application for refund of tax paid under Chapters 199 and 201, Florida Statutes, be approved. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard B. Burk, Esquire Scott, Burk, Royce and Harris 450 Royal Palm Way Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Barbara Harmon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
