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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES vs. DELTA OIL COMPANY, INC., 82-002131 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002131 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1983

Findings Of Fact On July 6, 1982, Jimmy Haywood Nixon, an employee off petitioner, took a sample of gasohol offered for sale as "super unleaded ethanol enriched" (by pumping it through a nozzle) at the 7-11 food store, 111 West Burgess Road, Pensacola. He delivered the sample to Pat Flanagan, a chemist with petitioner's mobile lab No. 2. According to Mr. Flanagan, there was a third again too much alcohol in the mixture. He was of the opinion that the high alcohol content accounted for the low (1590F.) "50 percent evaporated temperature." Being advised by Mr. Flanagan that the gasohol was nonstandard, Mr. Nixon returned on July 7, 1982, to lock the pump. Later that day, after posting bond, respondent's Mr. Cooper tried to figure out how much unleaded gasoline to add to the 4,589 gallons in the 7-11 tank in order to reduce the fraction of alcohol to one-tenth. To this end, samples taken, not from the nozzle, but from deep in the tank were analyzed. Mr. Flanagan performed the same procedure on the tank sample as he had run on the nozzle sample. He added dyed ethylene glycol to the sample, shook the mixture and waited for it to stratify. Then he measured the amount by which the dyed layer had grown. This increment was assumed to be pure alcohol. The tank sample test indicated that the mixture was 12.3 percent alcohol, a full point less than the nozzle sample's ethanol component. The difference is presumably attributable to slight stratification in the tank. Mr. Cooper also performed a test. This test employed the same methodology as Mr. Flanagan's test, but the reagent was distilled water rather than ethylene glycol, and the result was 9.8 or 9.9 percent alcohol. It may be that additives other than ethanol dissolved in the ethylene glycol. On July 9, 1982, Mr. Cooper arrived in a compartmented truck with an empty chamber for blending, 100 gallons of alcohol, and 1500 gallons of unleaded gasoline. He added 1300 gallons of unleaded gasoline to the tank and blended the mixture. This resulted in 5889 gallons that tested at 7.5 percent alcohol, so all 100 gallons of alcohol were added. The resulting mixture tested at 9.167 percent alcohol.

Recommendation This matter came on for hearing in Pensacola, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Robert T. Benton, II, on November 29, 1982. Respondent was unrepresented at the hearing, but Mr. Donald P. Robinson, respondent's treasurer, was oresent and was, without objection, called as a hearing officer's witness. Petitioner was represented by counsel: Robert A. Chastain, Esquire Room 513, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 In order to secure the release of certain gasohol, respondent posted a thousand dollar ($1,000.00) bond and petitioner withdrew its stop sale notice. The issues are whether the gasohol was nonstandard when impounded and what disposition to make of the bond respondent posted.

Florida Laws (2) 525.01526.06
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs. CHARLES RAMSEY, 89-000098 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000098 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 1989

The Issue The issue is whether the certificate issued to Mr. Ramsey by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission should be revoked for his failure to maintain good moral character through the use of cocaine.

Findings Of Fact Charles Ramsey was issued a certificate on October 2, 1981, by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, number 19-81-502-01, as a correctional officer. On April 12, 1988, Mr. Ramsey went to the Mount Sinai Medical Center for Industrial Medicine at 4300 Alton Road, Miami Beach, Florida 33140. The overall purpose of the visit was not clear, but as a part of his activities at the Center, Ramsey provided urine specimen for analysis. Before providing the specimen, Ramsey had disrobed, was wearing a hospital gown, and was escorted to a bathroom at the site, where he was given two marked specimen bottles. The first bottle was for the main sample, the second for any overflow if Mr. Ramsey's urine donation was greater than the size of the first bottle. Each bottle was a 60 ml. pharmaceutical round bottle. The specimen bottles had his name on them, a bar code identifying the bottles as bottles from an employee of the Metro-Dade Law Enforcement Department, and the unique specimen number of 117270. At that time, Mr. Ramsey initialed the information on the bottle acknowledging that it was correct. After he exited the bathroom and delivered the urine bottle it was sealed with evidence tape by the technician at Mount Sinai, Sonia Abreu, and was placed in a locked cabinet. The cabinet was opened with a key belonging to the courier for the Toxicology Testing Service of Miami, Florida. The urine was kept under lock and key until it was removed and brought to the screening room at Toxicology Testing Service. The technician there broke the seal and dispensed a sample into an automated clinical analyzer which performed an EMIT screen test on 3 ml. of urine. That test showed the presence of cocaine metabolites, i.e., substances left in the body after cocaine has been ingested and been processed by the metabolic action of the body. Based on this initial positive screening test result, another 3 ml. of the sample was used to perform the screening test again. When the screening test again was positive for cocaine metabolites, a more specific test for the presence of cocaine metabolites was performed by Dr. Terry Hall, who holds his doctorate in chemistry, and has specialized in forensic toxicology. The test was performed using a gas chromatograph and a mass spectrometer. The study showed the presence of methylecganine in the urine, which is a cocaine metabolite. The concentration of the methylecganire in the sample was such that it is likely that Mr. Ramsey used cocaine within the previous two weeks. Exposure to trace amounts of cocaine, such as from airborne cocaine which might be inhaled while measuring cocaine seized as part of a drug arrest, could not have yielded the high level of methylecganine found in Mr. Ramsey's urine. The level of metabolite is such that Mr. Ramsey would have had to ingest approximately 10 grams of cocaine.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the certificate held by Charles Ramsey be revoked for failure to maintain good moral character. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Charles Ramsey 1064 Northwest 61st Street Miami, Florida 33127 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission

Florida Laws (4) 120.57893.13943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (2) 11B-27.001111B-27.00225
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MANATEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ANNE J. WAMPOLE, 12-000801TTS (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Feb. 29, 2012 Number: 12-000801TTS Latest Update: Oct. 05, 2012

The Issue Whether Petitioner established, pursuant to section 1012.33(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011),1/ "just cause" to terminate Respondent from employment based on a breath alcohol level of 0.112, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated February 8, 2012.

Findings Of Fact In January 2003, Petitioner hired Respondent to teach exceptional student education courses. Since commencing her employment with Petitioner, Respondent has always received an annual performance evaluation rating of no less than fully satisfactory. Respondent has a bachelor's degree in exceptional student education and, most recently, received a master's degree with an endorsement in reading and special education. For the 2011-2012 academic school year, Respondent was employed by Petitioner pursuant to a professional services contract. Respondent's professional services contract provides that "THE TEACHER SHALL BE BOUND TO SERVE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 1012.33, FLORIDA STATUTES," and "SHALL NOT BE DISMISSED DURING THE TERM OF THIS CONTRACT EXCEPT FOR JUST CAUSE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 1012.33(1)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES." (Capitalization in original). The contractual term of Respondent's contract covered the period of August 16, 2011, through June 8, 2012. On the morning of January 13, 2012, Respondent began her day by dressing both herself and her two-year-old daughter. Respondent safely drove her daughter to daycare and then proceeded to safely drive herself to Bayshore High School. Respondent arrived at school around her customary time of between 7:15 a.m. and 7:25 a.m., parked her car in the school's parking lot, without incident, and then entered the school building where she checked her mail, walked to her classroom, and made general preparations for the school day, which included briefly exchanging pleasantries with her colleague, Michele Neathery. Although the exchange between Respondent and Ms. Neathery was brief, at no time during the encounter did Ms. Neathery smell alcohol about Respondent's person or observe Respondent behaving in a way that would suggest impairment. Respondent's first instructional period of the day on January 13, 2012, started at 8:50 a.m., and ended at 10:20 a.m. A.M. was a student in Respondent's first class and also served as Respondent's classroom aide. At the time of the final hearing, A.M. was 19 years old. A.M. testified that on January 13, 2012, Assistant Principal Ginger Collins came to Respondent's classroom and asked her to step into the hallway. Before this occurred, A.M. had conversed with Respondent for about ten minutes, and during this time, he did not notice anything unusual about Respondent's appearance or her behavior. At approximately 10:20 a.m., on the day in question, Ms. Collins had gone to the classroom occupied by Respondent to discuss with her a situation from the previous day that involved one of Respondent's students. Ms. Collins entered the classroom occupied by Respondent and asked Respondent to step into the hallway with her so that they could discuss the situation from the previous day. Respondent complied with the request from Ms. Collins, exited the classroom, and positioned herself outside of her classroom door so that she could speak with Ms. Collins and simultaneously monitor her students through the window of the door to the classroom. Respondent, while speaking with Ms. Collins in the alcove to her classroom, observed that two of her students were not on-task. Ms. Collins, from her vantage point, did not observe the two students that Respondent saw who were off-task and otherwise did not witness any "rambunctiousness or loud behavior" in Respondent's classroom. Respondent, in an attempt to alert the two students to the fact that they were being monitored and to otherwise get them back on-task, slapped her hand against the door three times. Ms. Collins had never observed Respondent use this student management technique. Because Ms. Collins did not see that two of Respondent's students were off-task during the time when she conversed with Respondent, Ms. Collins thought it was odd and out of character for Respondent to have slapped the classroom door for what to Ms. Collins, was no apparent reason. Although Ms. Collins thought it "odd" when Respondent slapped the door, Respondent's student, A.M., credibly testified that prior to January 13, 2012, he had witnessed Respondent slap her hand against the door a "couple of times before" as a technique for refocusing her students. There was no evidence offered during the hearing that slapping a door with one's hand is an inappropriate classroom management technique. Respondent's act of slapping the door with her hand is not evidence of Respondent's normal faculties being impaired but is instead, under the circumstances, evidence that her faculties were intact. Respondent was able to observe and appreciate that two of her students were off-task and she responded by taking appropriate corrective action to redirect the errant students. Had Respondent not taken such corrective action, it would certainly make for a more credible assertion that her normal faculties were impaired because, then, it could be said that Respondent was unable to appreciate the need to correct her students because of alcohol-related influences on her judgment. This, however, is not the case. Furthermore, the evidence establishes that all of Respondent's students were on-task until Respondent was asked to step into the hallway by Ms. Collins. The fact that all of Respondent's students were on-task when Ms. Collins initially entered Respondent's room is further indication that Respondent was in control of her classroom and not suffering from diminished faculties related to alcohol consumption. When Ms. Collins conversed with Respondent outside of Respondent's classroom, Ms. Collins became concerned about allowing Respondent to return to the classroom because Ms. Collins observed that Respondent "was covering her mouth" with her hand when she spoke, was shifting her body "from side to side," had a strong smell of alcohol emanating from her person, and was speaking louder than usual. Although Ms. Collins had concerns about Respondent's ability "to return to the classroom," Ms. Collins did not monitor Respondent's performance in the classroom upon completion of their conversation. According to evidence stipulated to by the parties, one of the behaviors associated with alcohol-related impairment is "decreased inhibition." The word "inhibition" is defined as "a mental process imposing restraint upon behavior or another mental process." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Respondent's act of covering her mouth while speaking is not evidence of decreased inhibition, but is, instead, evidence of heightened inhibition. Respondent was cognizant of the smell of her breath and by covering her mouth with her hand, she was taking steps which were reasonably designed to deflect any offending breath-related odor. Had Respondent suffered from "decreased inhibition," then it is certainly more likely that Respondent would have spoken to Ms. Collins in such a way as to not have shielded Ms. Collins from any smells that may have been emanating from Respondent's mouth. After completing her initial conversation with Respondent, Ms. Collins immediately shared her concerns about Respondent with Assistant Principal Baron McCombs, Respondent's supervisor. Within a few minutes of being alerted to the situation by Ms. Collins, Mr. McCombs went to Respondent's classroom. Mr. McCombs entered Respondent's classroom and asked Respondent to accompany him to his office. The total time that Mr. McCombs was in Respondent's classroom was "[j]ust a matter of seconds." During the few seconds that Mr. McCombs observed Respondent in her classroom, he noticed that Respondent "was acting very out of character . . . sort of flamboyantly, [and] [h]er voice was sort of boisterous, and her hands were sort of flailing, and her speech patterns were sort of elongated." Mr. McCombs described Respondent as usually being a very reserved person. Although Mr. McCombs observed Respondent behaving in a manner that he considered "out of character," he did not believe that Respondent's behavior was detrimental to her students. Respondent admits the behaviors described by Mr. McCombs, but credibly testified that the observed behaviors were intentionally orchestrated because she was trying to get her students excited about learning about President George Washington and his false teeth. Mr. McCombs and Respondent exited her classroom and walked together to his office. During the walk to his office, Mr. McCombs did not observe Respondent staggering or otherwise having difficulty ambulating. Once in Mr. McCombs' office, Respondent and Mr. McCombs spoke briefly about an incident from the previous day involving one of Respondent's students. Respondent did not elongate her words while speaking with Mr. McCombs in his office, and according to Mr. McCombs, Respondent's demeanor at the time was "reserved." Ms. Collins entered Mr. McCombs office within a few minutes of Respondent's arrival, and once Ms. Collins took her seat, the conversation shifted to the real reason why Respondent had been summoned to the office by Mr. McCombs. Mr. McCombs informed Respondent that she was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. Respondent's initial response to the accusation was to say, "Oh my God, I can't believe that this is happening," and she then became emotional and started to cry. When questioned, Respondent admitted that she had been drinking the night before. Specifically, Respondent admitted that she had her last drink "somewhere around 1:00 or 1:30 in the morning." Mr. McCombs left the room to report the matter to school Principal David Underhill. While waiting for Mr. Underhill to arrive, Respondent continued to converse with Ms. Collins. Respondent asked questions about the protocols and procedures related to the allegations and also wanted to know the impact of the situation on her employment. While discussing these issues with Respondent for more than an hour, Ms. Collins did not detect that Respondent's "speech was slowed or sluggish." Mr. Underhill eventually arrived and explained to Respondent the procedures and protocols associated with suspected impairment testing. At about 12:30 p.m. Ms. Collins, who had been with Respondent the entire time since entering Mr. McCombs' office, prepared to transport Respondent to the medical clinic for suspected impairment testing. Before leaving for the clinic, Ms. Collins escorted Respondent to her car to retrieve some items. The walk to Respondent's car took about five minutes. During the walk, Ms. Collins observed that Respondent did not experience any difficulty walking and that Respondent was coherent. Ms. Collins drove Respondent to the medical clinic for suspected impairment testing. Once at the medical clinic, Respondent provided two breath samples for a breathalyzer testing machine that measured Respondent's breath-alcohol level at 0.112. Since commencing employment with Petitioner, this was Respondent's first positive, confirmed alcohol test. The testing protocol at the medical clinic was such that Respondent met with a nursing assistant and stayed in the presence of the nursing assistant throughout the testing process. During the 20 or so minutes that Respondent was with the nursing assistant, it was observed by the nursing assistant that Respondent was coherent, she understood instructions that were given to her, and her speech was not sluggish. The nursing assistant did observe that Respondent had glassy eyes. After completing her final breathalyzer test, Respondent met with medical doctor Craig Trigueiro for about five to ten minutes. Dr. Trigueiro has been a physician for 37 years. When Dr. Trigueiro evaluates patients for suspected alcohol impairment, he described his process for face-to-face evaluation as follows: I look at them. I smell their breath. I observe their behavior. I ask them various questions, and then I document everything on the drug testing forms. [T-17] When Dr. Trigueiro met with Respondent, he noted the following on her drug testing form: Admits to last p.m. drinking until 1:00 a.m. In Alcoholics Anonymous. Glassy eyed. Has alcohol on breath. Breath alcohol, 0.112 and 0.112. Assistant principal. Ginger Collins here. Legally under the influence. Acutely intoxicated and cannot drive. Dr. Trigueiro stated that he noticed that Respondent was "a little unsteady on her feet," but on cross-examination, admitted that Respondent's apparent unsteadiness could have been related to causes other than alcohol consumption. Dr. Trigueiro, contrary to his stated practice of "document[ing] everything on the drug testing form," did not note on Respondent's drug-testing form that she was "a little unsteady on her feet." Dr. Trigueiro also testified that he noticed that Respondent was "sluggish in her speech." On cross-examination Dr. Trigueiro admitted that he did not mention on Respondent's drug-testing form that Respondent was "sluggish in her speech." Dr. Trigueiro testified that the reason why he did not note on Respondent's drug-testing form his observations of Respondent's sluggish speech and her being unsteady on her feet, was because he "didn't think that this type of situation would end up in court." Dr. Trigueiro stated that had the instant case been one involving "great bodily harm or death," as opposed to one merely involving an employer for-cause breath test, he would have performed a higher level of medical examination that would have included diagnostic exams, such as the "finger to nose" and "heel to toe" test. In Dr. Trigueiro's opinion, Respondent's intoxication was "cut and clear" because she had a breath-alcohol test which showed that Respondent was "legally intoxicated." Contrary to Dr. Trigueiro's conclusion that Respondent was "legally intoxicated," a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher does not establish, ipso facto, "legal intoxication," but instead merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, as it relates to the operation of a motor vehicle, that a person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired. § 316.1934(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Specifically, section 316.1934(2) provides that the presumptions created therein do "not limit the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties were impaired." Id. Ms. Collins was with Respondent when she was seen by Dr. Trigueiro. According to Ms. Collins, when Dr. Trigueiro spoke to Respondent "he was very upset" and treated Respondent quite harshly. When Respondent told Dr. Trigueiro that she had been drinking until about 1:00 a.m., Dr. Trigueiro said to Respondent: "Do you think I'm a fool?" Dr. Trigueiro went on to state that he had been practicing medicine for over 30 years and that Respondent could not have consumed her last drink at the stated hour and then some twelve hours later have a breath- alcohol level of 0.112. Despite this initial assertion by Dr. Trigueiro, he, nevertheless, admitted on cross-examination that some people are more tolerant of alcohol than others and that not all individuals metabolize alcohol at the same rate. According to Dr. Trigueiro: The more alcohol someone drinks, the more enzymes in the liver exist to detoxify alcohol, which is why someone who drinks all the time has to drink more alcohol to . . . get a buzz to become--you know, feel the central nervous system effects of the alcohol. So someone who drinks a lot has to drink more alcohol simply because the liver enzymes are revved up to detoxify alcohol; whereas someone who doesn't drink much alcohol would become intoxicated at a much lower beverage intake, alcohol intake because the liver enzymes are not induced by chronic drinking. Dr. Trigueiro did not perform any tests on Respondent to determine that rate at which her body metabolizes alcohol. Dr. Trigueiro's medical opinion establishes that Respondent had glassy eyes, but does not establish that Respondent's normal faculties were impaired. When asked specifically if Respondent's "normal faculties were impaired," Dr. Trigueiro could only state that Respondent was "clinically impaired." Petitioner did not offer any evidence as to whether "clinical impairment" is synonymous with impairment of one's normal faculties, and Dr. Trigueiro's response suggests that the two standards are not synonymous. Dr. Trigueiro was more concerned with lecturing Respondent about her alcohol consumption, as opposed to conducting a thorough assessment of Respondent's level of functional impairment. Dr. Trigueiro obviously believed that a more thorough evaluation of Respondent's level of cognitive functioning was unwarranted because in his opinion, Respondent's case was "cut and clear" due to her breath-alcohol level of 0.112 and the fact that this was merely a case involving an employer for-cause evaluation. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that when Respondent reported to school on January 13, 2012, and through and including the time that she met with Dr. Trigueiro, she was coherent, she was able to process information that was communicated to her and provide appropriate responses thereto, she was oriented to time and place, her speech was not sluggish or slurred, and she did not have any difficulty ambulating. The greater weight of the competent substantial evidence also establishes that during all times relevant hereto, the glassy appearance of Respondent's eyes was the only objective manifestation of the alcohol that was in Respondent's system and that the presence of "glassy eyes" does not establish in and of itself that a person's normal faculties are impaired. Respondent admits to being a recovering alcoholic. She is actively involved in an alcoholics support group and consults with her sponsor regularly. Near the end of the 2010-2011 academic school year, Respondent was experiencing difficulty in maintaining sobriety. There was no evidence presented that Respondent's challenges with maintaining sobriety during the previous school year negatively impacted her performance in the classroom. In recognition of her challenges, Respondent self-disclosed to the school principal, Mr. Underhill, her challenges with alcohol and requested a leave- of-absence so that she could receive in-patient treatment. Respondent's request for leave-of-absence was granted, and she attended and completed a rehabilitation program. Mr. Underhill, when asked about whether he had concerns about Respondent being in the classroom with students with alcohol in her system, testified that he "would be extremely concerned when a teacher in a classroom has to make multiple decisions, all at any given time, that any type of circumstances can arise [and Respondent's] level of [breath] alcohol is going to impair good judgment." Petitioner did not offer any credible evidence establishing that on January 13, 2012, Respondent's judgment was impaired or that she had difficulty, or would likely have difficulty, making appropriate decisions while in her classroom.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The violations alleged in paragraphs 10, 12, 13, and 14 of the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed. The violation alleged in paragraph 11 of the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed to the extent that it seeks to establish just cause for termination of Respondent's employment. Paragraph 11 of the Administrative Complaint should be sustained to the extent that it establishes grounds for imposing non-terminable discipline against Respondent. Respondent shall be suspended, without pay, for a period of 60 calendar days. Respondent shall not be eligible to use any accrued leave during her period of suspension. Upon return from her suspension, Respondent, during the remainder of the 2012-2013 academic year, shall at her expense be subject to random alcohol testing as determined by the Manatee County School Board or its designee. A positive alcohol test shall result in further disciplinary action. Upon return from her suspension, Respondent, during the remainder of the 2012-2013, shall be assigned to a position where she does not have responsibility for the supervision of students. During Respondent's period of suspension, she shall remain eligible to participate in the Employees' Assistance Program and shall enroll in and successfully complete an alcohol dependency program. Respondent may be subject to disciplinary action should she fail to successfully complete the alcohol dependency program. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 2012.

Florida Laws (7) 1012.33112.042112.044112.0455120.569120.57316.1934
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING vs KIRK M. ZIADIE, 14-004716PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 10, 2014 Number: 14-004716PL Latest Update: Jan. 12, 2016

The Issue Whether Respondent raced an animal with a drug in violation of section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012),1/ as alleged in the Administrative Complaints, and, if so, what sanction is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering in the state of Florida, pursuant to chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2015). At all times material, Mr. Ziadie held a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, number 701515-0121, issued by the Division. At all times material, Mr. Ziadie was subject to chapter 550 and the implementing rules in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 61D-6.2/ Under section 550.2415(1)(a), an animal may not be raced with any drug. It is a violation for any person to administer a drug to an animal which results in a positive test in samples taken from the animal after the race. Under section 550.2415(1)(c), "[t]he finding of a prohibited substance in a race-day specimen constitutes prima facie evidence that the substance was administered and was carried in the body of the animal while participating in the race." Under rule 61D-6.002(1), "[t]he trainer of record shall be responsible for and be the absolute insurer of the condition of the . . . horses he/she enters to race." As reflected in Division records kept in accordance with the 2010 Equine Detention Barn Procedures Manual ("the Manual"), which was in effect at all relevant times, Mr. Ziadie was the trainer of record of the thoroughbred horses from which samples were obtained in Ziadie I and Ziadie II. Mr. Ziadie is substantially affected by the Division's intended action. The equine detention barn is the site at each licensed racetrack in Florida where employees of the Division collect urine and blood samples from racehorses. It includes a fenced- in and secured area that generally has at least six stalls, as well as an area for walking the horses after a race. After a horse has been selected for sample collection (usually the top two or three finishers and sometimes a "special" that has been added at the request of the stewards), a Division employee tags the horse and accompanies it back to the detention barn. Along the way, a Division veterinary assistant assigned to the horse assumes custody and escorts the horse. At the barn, the horse is positively identified by means of a tattoo on the underside of its lip. The horse is walked to cool it down and sometimes bathed, and then taken into a stall for sample collection. Following their respective races, Mr. Ziadie's horses were immediately taken in this fashion to the detention barn for the taking of urine and blood samples. The Division publishes the Manual under the direction of Ms. Blackman as the chief of operations. The Manual is used at all horse racing facilities in the state of Florida and was last updated on June 25, 2010. The Manual provides that veterinary assistants, chief veterinary assistants, detention barn security guards, and detention barn supervisors "study, become completely familiar with, and put into practice" the procedures outlined in the Manual. It describes seven steps in chain-of-custody procedures, three of which are "collecting the specimen, sealing the specimen, and completing the required forms," and describes detailed procedures in this "strict sequence of events that must be followed." As the Manual makes clear, Division employees at the detention barns in the state of Florida are all required to follow the procedures outlined in the Manual "each and every time" they work with samples. They do not have discretion not to follow its requirements. Mr. Stirling credibly testified that in his capacity as executive director of the Florida Horseman's Benevolent and Protective Association, a position he has held for 20 years, he was an advocate for the horsemen. He attended all of the workshops for rules relating to medication overages as one of his primary duties. The centrifuging process, extraction of the serum, and sealing of the serum specimen as described in detail in the Manual were never discussed at a rulemaking hearing. These procedures are not a part of rule 61D-6.005, adopted in 2001. As he testified, Mr. Stirling was not even aware of these procedures until a month or two before the final hearing in these cases. The Manual has not been adopted under the procedures of section 120.54. At the time of these races, rule 61D-6.005, effective November 19, 2001,3/ governed the procedures for the taking of urine and blood samples from the horses. Subsection (3) provided in part: The specimen shall be sealed in its container, assigned an official sample number which is affixed to the specimen container, and the correspondingly numbered information portion of the sample tag shall be detached and signed by the owner, trainer, groom, or the authorized person as a witness to the taking and sealing of the specimen. Subsection 4.5 of the Manual describes the sample tag in greater detail: RL 172-03 is a self-adhesive sequentially numbered bar-coded, three part form (blood label, urine label and card) provided by the University of Florida Racing Laboratory that is used to catalog specimens by assigning them "Specimen Numbers." As specimens are collected, information regarding the animal from which the sample was collected is written on the bottom of this form. The top two portions of the form (Blood, Urine) are completed with the Track Number and Collection Date. The applicable top portions of the form are then separated and applied to the urine specimen cup and/or evergreen blood tube. The bottom portion, or Specimen Card, is completed and appropriately signed and is sent to the Tallahassee Office of Operations to be filed. The sample tag thus consists of three portions: the numbered portion designated for the blood specimen ("blood label"), the numbered portion designated for the urine specimen ("urine label"), and the numbered portion containing additional information about the animal and trainer that is to be signed by the witness ("card"). In the sampling procedures followed in these cases, the blood label was not affixed to the collection tube. The blood label, from which the card portion was "detached," was affixed to the evergreen blood tube. This was consistent with the governing rule, as well as the Manual. The evergreen tube is the specimen container for the serum. The sampling procedures followed with respect to the serum and urine samples taken in Ziadie I and Ziadie II were in compliance with the procedures set forth in the Manual. As stated in subsection 4.4 of the Manual, "[s]ealing the sample ensures the specimen does not spill during shipment to the laboratory and assures all parties that the sample has not been tampered with." The same purposes are served by sealing the serum specimen. After the blood samples were taken by the veterinarian, they were not "sealed" in the collection tubes. The fact that the collection tubes are air tight prior to and after the taking of the blood and initially contain a partial vacuum to facilitate collection, does not constitute "sealing" of the specimen in its container for purposes of the rule. As Dr. Watson testified: Q: Okay. Are these 15 milliliter tubes sealed? A: Well, they're sealed in that there's a vacuum in there and in order to draw the blood efficiently, that vacuum has to be there. If that seal is broken then it would not work. But, as far as sealing for legal purposes, they're not sealed at that time. There's a process that it has to go through in order to extract the serum. The three collection tubes are not the specimen container, but the last three digits of the number from the blood label affixed to the specimen container were written on each blood collection tube with a black "Sharpie" type marking pen to ensure control of the sample. The Manual prescribes detailed procedures for spinning the blood collected from the race horses in a centrifuge to extract the serum. After the blood was centrifuged, and the serum was poured into the evergreen tube, the serum was sealed with evidence tape, as described in the Manual, and the chief veterinary assistant put his initials over the seal. This constituted "sealing" of the specimen in its container. Subsection 4.6 of the Manual provides: Serum is poured into applicable (numbered) "evergreen" tubes. Each "evergreen" tube is immediately properly sealed with evidence tape. Rule 61D-6.005 does not make any reference to spinning the blood in the centrifuge to extract serum, the pouring of serum into an evergreen tube, the sealing of the evergreen tube with evidence tape, or the freezing of the specimen. The Manual establishes additional policies and procedures not contained in the rule. The serum must be separated from the blood because whole blood cannot be frozen without damage that would affect its usefulness in laboratory testing. Centrifuging facilitates the separation of the serum from the whole blood. The transfer of the separated serum from the glass collection tubes to the plastic evergreen tube is then done for two reasons. First, the plug that helps separate the serum can allow the blood cells to seep around and return to the serum, where they can release hemoglobin and iron, which can distort laboratory analysis. Second, using the plastic evergreen tube saves shipping weight and reduces the incidence of breakage during shipping. The centrifuged collection tubes are stored in a locked refrigerator. The opening of the centrifuged collection tubes and the pouring of the serum into correspondingly numbered evergreen specimen containers is carefully performed by Division employees with the intent to avoid contamination. The sealed evergreen specimen containers then remain in a locked freezer until they are shipped to the laboratory. The evidence was clear and convincing that the serum specimens in these consolidated cases were derived from the blood sample tubes bearing the same last three numbers as the tag which was prepared when the blood was taken. The serum specimens came from Mr. Ziadie's horses. Dr. Barker testified that the "free pour" of the serum was the point at which the specimen was most vulnerable, and that contamination or tampering was possible. He stated he would have preferred more supervision, witnessing, and documentation as to who was doing what, at what time. Dr. Cole concurred that there is always a possibility of contamination when a sample is transferred from one container to another. However, the free pour method used to transfer the serum from the collection tubes into the evergreen specimen container is one of the better approaches, as opposed to using a pipette or other method that would put something into the sample. Contamination from the free pour of the serum is unlikely. There was no evidence introduced to suggest that misidentification, tampering, or contamination of the specimens was likely or probable. The state veterinarian who took the blood sample from each horse signed PMW Form 504, a Daily Record of Sample Collection, indicating that this had been done. After centrifuging the whole blood in the collection tubes, at the end of the day the state veterinarian usually leaves the collection tubes with the chief veterinary assistant, who pours the separated serum from each collection tube into the correspondingly numbered evergreen container and seals it. Sometimes, the state veterinarian stays to observe the transfer of the serum to the evergreen specimen container. No document is signed to note the time that the state veterinarian leaves the samples at the detention barn or the time that the chief veterinary assistant opens the collection tubes and transfers the serum. Custody of the samples remains with Division personnel throughout this process. No transfer of custody takes place until the specimen containers are shipped to the laboratory. In each instance of sampling in these cases, the owner's witness signed the card portion of the sample tag (Form RL 172-03) after the taking of the urine and blood samples. In each instance of sampling in these cases, the owner's witness signed the card portion of the sample tag after the sealing of the urine specimen in its container, but before the sealing of the serum specimen in its container, the evergreen tube. In each instance of sampling in these cases, the owner's witness did not observe the extraction of the serum or the sealing of the serum specimen in its container with the evidence tape. The witnesses could have remained to watch those procedures had they requested to do so. Subsection 4.6 of the Manual states, "the owner, trainer of record or designated authorized witness may leave with the released animal or may elect to witness the conclusion of the collected blood specimen processing and sealing cycle." According to Division policy, two signs are posted in the detention barns to advise owners' witnesses that they may remain to witness the centrifuge process and sealing of the sample. Specific testimony that a sign was in place at the exact times sample collection took place in each of these races, or the exact location that it was posted, was lacking. However, there was more general testimony from Dr. Watson that signs have been posted ever since he has been employed. Dr. Watson credibly testified that, during the five years he has been working at the tracks, no owner's representative has ever stayed to watch the centrifuging of the samples or the sealing of the serum specimen container. The pouring of the collection tubes into the specimen container takes place at the end of the racing day, after all of the horses have departed from the detention barn. It would be very inconvenient for an owner's witness to remain until the serum specimens were sealed. The procedures that were followed--set forth in the Manual--which allowed the owner's witness to sign the sample tag after witnessing the taking of the blood but before the sealing of the specimen, were not in compliance with rule 61D-6.005(3), quoted above, which required the owner's representative to sign as a witness to both the taking and sealing of the specimen. Even had it been clearly shown that signs advising the owners' representatives that they were allowed to stay and witness the sealing of the specimen container were prominently displayed on every occasion on which the samples were taken, this would not bring the procedure being followed into compliance with rule 61D-6.005(3). The requirement that the authorized representative must witness not only the taking, but also the sealing of specimens, is a provision directly related to maintaining integrity in the sample collection process. Such deliberate disregard of the plain language of the rule directly affects the fairness of the entire blood sampling procedure. The urine and serum samples in these cases were properly delivered to the University of Florida racing laboratory and the integrity of the samples was intact. The laboratory conducts an initial screening of each urine sample in a process of elimination to weed out negative samples that do not contain any suspected drugs. This screening looks at a large number of samples and screens them broadly. The suspicious samples are then subjected to confirmation testing, in either serum or urine, testing a fewer number of samples and targeting for detection of specific drugs. The Association of Racing Commissioners International create Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances. Classes range from class I drugs, which have no therapeutic value and are most likely to affect the outcome of a race, to class V drugs, which have the most therapeutic value and the least potential to affect the outcome of a race. Class III, IV, and V drugs all have some therapeutic value. Clenbuterol is a bronchodilator, a drug which may be prescribed for horses for therapeutic purposes. If a horse had blood or sand in his lungs after a race, he might be placed on clenbuterol for five to eight days, twice a day, and the medication would clean the lungs out completely. Clenbuterol also has the capacity to be a repartitioning (conversion of fat into muscle) agent. It is not as effective as an anabolic steroid, but it does have the capacity for building muscle. Rule 61D-6.008 does not permit any clenbuterol in the body of a racing animal on race day. Clenbuterol is a Class III drug under the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances. Phenylbutazone is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug effective in treating fever, pain, and inflammation. It was credibly described as having effects similar to aspirin. Rule 61D-6.008(2)(a)2. provided in part that, "[p]henylbutzone may be administered to a horse providing . . . the post-race serum sample of such horse contains a concentration less than 2 micrograms (mcg) of Phenylbutazone or its metabolites per milliliter (ml) of serum." Phenylbutazone is a class IV drug under the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances. The laboratory routinely receives only the information on the urine and blood labels with the specimens and does not know the identity of the horse or trainer. Samples tested in the laboratory are assigned an "LIMS" number internal to the laboratory and do not contain any information that would identify the horse or trainer. The technicians who actually conduct the tests are not informed of the name of the horse or trainer involved. Once the Division is advised by a laboratory report that a sample has "tested positive" for a particular substance, the Division matches the laboratory report to the sample tag, which has been kept under lock and key, to determine the identity of the horse and trainer. The stewards and trainer are then notified. After the trainer is notified of positive results, he has the opportunity to request a split sample. In this procedure, a portion of the specimen is shipped from the University of Florida laboratory to an outside laboratory for independent analysis. There is a minimum amount of a drug that can be detected scientifically with a reliable concentration range. As the scientific capability to detect a drug improves, this testing level can be lowered by a laboratory. The instrumentation can almost always detect the presence of the drug below the reliable concentration range that establishes the testing level. As Ms. Wilding testified, a "withdrawal time" is the time interval prior to sample collection at which the last administration of a drug can take place to allow the drug to be cleared from the horse's system so that no "positive" would be reported in that sample based upon the test detection level or reporting point for that particular drug. Mr. Stirling testified that based upon informal conversations with Dr. Tebbet, Dr. Cole, and Dr. Sams, former directors of the laboratory, he had disseminated information to horsemen for years that a five-day withdrawal time would be appropriate for clenbuterol. From July 1, 2010, until June 30, 2011, there were four clenbuterol positives from horse race tracks in Florida. From July 1, 2011, until June 30, 2012, there were 13 clenbuterol positives from horse race tracks in Florida. During this same fiscal year, the laboratory also found the presence of clenbuterol in 193 additional samples, but did not deem them "positives." In these samples, the laboratory detected clenbuterol in a concentration of less than 25 picograms per milliliter. Dr. Barker credibly testified that the fact that 193 findings of clenbuterol at less than 25 picograms per milliliter were not called "positives" indicated that either the laboratory or the Division had some form of confirmation level established. As Ms. Wilding testified, changes to the protocol as to the amount of a drug that must be present in a sample before that sample will be called "positive" are made through revisions to the laboratory's standard operating procedures (SOPs). Ms. Blackman testified that she had conversations with Ms. Wilding at the laboratory "sometime in, maybe, the summer of 2012" about the ability of the laboratory to calibrate their instruments to detect clenbuterol at the lowest level, based upon Ms. Blackman's understanding that clenbuterol was being abused, in that it was being prescribed not just for its bronchodilator effect, but also for its anabolic effects. SOP DCN: R1.07.04.05.04-07, entitled "Extraction of Clenbuterol from Horse Serum or Plasma and Identification by Liquid Chromatography-Tandem Mass Spectrometry," effective April 27, 2012, established the low end of the calibration curve at 10 picograms per milliliter. The amount of the lower positive control was 25 picograms per milliliter. The SOP provided: "If the mean concentration of clenbuterol in the test sample is less than the lower end of the calibration curve, it will not be reported." From July 1 until December 31, 2012, there were nine clenbuterol positives from horse race tracks in Florida. The first Florida positive called by the laboratory for a thoroughbred race horse whose post-race serum sample contained a level of clenbuterol less than 25 picograms per milliliter of serum was for the first race in Ziadie I, on July 4, 2012, which was reported as a positive with a level of 18 picograms per milliliter. Testing also confirmed in serum the presence of phenylbutazone in that first sample, in the amount of 2.3 micrograms per milliliter, an amount in excess of the 2 micrograms per milliliter which is permitted. The laboratory results were sent to the Division by letter dated August 6, 2012. The initial confirmation of the phenylbutazone overage and clenbuterol positive from the race of July 4, 2012, was originally sent to the stewards to resolve but was later taken from the stewards and turned into an administrative complaint. On August 9, 2012, a long article appeared in the Miami New Times entitled "Cheaters Prosper at Calder Park." The article described a racing industry tainted by drug violations and criticized the Division for lax regulations and poor enforcement. The article identified Mr. Ziadie by name, giving a short biography and saying there were signs of "systematic rulebreaking" over his long racing career. Ms. Blackman saw the article. She also forwarded an e-mail attaching the article to Ms. Wilding at the laboratory. Clenbuterol was confirmed in serum taken after the other four races of the Ziadie I complaint, held on August 17, August 30, September 14, and September 27, 2012. The concentration of clenbuterol in those samples ranged from 10 to 21 picograms per milliliter. The results from the laboratory were provided to the Division on September 25, October 1 (two races), and October 16, 2012. At Mr. Ziadie's request, the samples were split, and an independent laboratory confirmed the presence of clenbuterol in each sample. In late December 2012, the Division gave the laboratory authority to begin conducting confirmation testing for clenbuterol in urine rather than in serum. In the beginning of 2013, the laboratory changed to a 140 picogram per milliliter confirmation level for clenbuterol in urine. The Division did not give notification to the horsemen or veterinarians of these changes. From January 1, 2013, until June 30, 2013, there were 154 clenbuterol positives from the horse race tracks in Florida. Dr. Barker testified: So you would be able to see clenbuterol in urine for a much longer period of time. And, of course, that's also why ARCI now has a urine threshold instead of a plasma threshold because the idea was to push it out as far as they could and still be able to call it. They couldn't do that sufficiently in blood, they felt, so they converted it to a urine threshold. So if you go from a plasma threshold to a urine threshold, particularly the-–if it's a threshold that ARCI has recommended, you know, ARCI threshold is 140 picograms per ml in urine, and that's based on using the lowest dose and a 14-day withdrawal. Well, if you had been using the lowest dose and had been following a five-day withdrawal, you would come up positive. If you had been using the lowest dose and had been following a ten-day withdrawal, you're going to come up positive. And so if people, trainers and veterinarians, were not being informed of a change in how the laboratory was testing and interpreting data, and basically was working from a position that required a longer withdrawal time and the horsemen didn't know that, well, you're going to-–you should get all kinds of positives. Dr. Barker's explanation of the consequences of changing from a serum confirmation to a urine confirmation for clenbuterol is credited. His testimony also at least partially explains why there is not a clear correlation between the concentrations of clenbuterol detected in serum with the concentrations detected in urine from samples taken at the same time. The amounts of clenbuterol and the times it was administered to the horse remain unknown variables, and clenbuterol is detectable for a longer period of time in urine. Differences might also be explained by the amount of water the horse drank, or other factors. On or about February 8, 2013, following the great increase in the number of positive calls for clenbuterol, Mr. Stirling posted a notice regarding withdrawal times at the tracks and published it in the "overnights" that went to trainers. The notice stated: According to the Department [sic] of Pari Mutuel Wagering the withdrawal time for clenbuterol is the same as it was previously (5 days) at the proper dosage. If you had a recent positive for clenbuterol and used the old/new withdrawal time there should be no administrative action taken against you. At either the end of February or the beginning of March of 2013, the Division requested the laboratory to return to clenbuterol confirmation screening in serum, rather than urine. SOP DCN: R1.07.04.05.04-09, entitled "Extraction of Clenbuterol from Horse Serum or Plasma and Identification by Liquid Chromatography-Tandem Mass Spectrometry," effective March 7, 2013, established the low end of the calibration curve at 5 picograms per milliliter. The low end of the calibration curve reflects the lower limit of detection at which the SOP can detect a drug with a reliable concentration range. The amount of the lower positive control was set at 15 picograms per milliliter. The SOP provided: "If the mean concentration of clenbuterol in the test sample is less than the lower end of the calibration curve, it will not be reported." Clenbuterol was confirmed in serum in confirmation testing of 13 of the Ziadie II samples, taken after races from March 13, 2013, through October 27, 2013, ranging in concentration from 5 to 14 picograms per milliliter. These samples were also split, and an independent laboratory confirmed the presence of clenbuterol in each sample. Testing also confirmed in serum the presence of phenylbutazone in the sample taken from the race on January 19, 2014, in Ziadie II, in the amount of 2.3 micrograms per milliliter, plus or minus .3 micrograms. The Division did not give notification to the horsemen of any changes in the testing level at which the laboratory would report that a sample had tested positive for clenbuterol. Ms. Blackman testified that clenbuterol is not permitted at any level on race day, and it is the trainers' responsibility, in conjunction with their veterinarians, to decide whether to administer a particular medication at all. She testified that she did not think it was in the best interest of the horses or the Division to make announcements every time they are able to detect a new drug or an existing drug at a lower level. In contrast, she noted, when the amount of phenylbutazone permitted in a horse on race day was lowered from mg to 2 mg, this was announced to the horsemen through the public rulemaking process. An advance notice of about six months allowed trainers to work out adjustments with veterinarians so there would not be a huge number of phenylbutazone positives when the new rule became effective. Since phenylbutazone is a "threshold" drug permitted on race day at no greater than prescribed amounts, Ms. Blackman testified that it was reasonable to give horsemen notice of this change. Dr. Cole testified that she had a different view about changes to testing levels of drugs such as clenbuterol that were completely prohibited on race day when she was the director of the lab, saying she believed it was "prudent and fair" to notify the horsemen of changes in advance: Often when we're changing levels or sensitivity for medication type—drugs that have legitimate use in a horse, we would try to have a conversation with the horsemen to let them know that change was coming so that they could comply. Generally it's going to be an increase in the withdrawal time that they're going to be needed. On March 20, 2013, Mr. Stirling sent an e-mail to Ms. Blackman stating that he was beginning to get low-level positives for clenbuterol again, giving an example of picograms per milliliter. He stated he thought the testing medium had been changed back to blood to return to a five-day withdrawal time and asked how the Division planned to handle the low-level clenbuterols from December. In e-mail correspondence continuing through April and May of 2013, Mr. Stirling continued to question the Division about the withdrawal time and to urge a 25 picogram per milliliter testing level. Ms. Blackman advised that the laboratory was re-confirming in serum the clenbuterol positives that had been confirmed in urine. She noted that a 10 picogram per milliliter reporting point for testing in serum had been established prior to the change in the medium for confirmation and noted there was no "threshold" for clenbuterol in Florida. On May 24, 2013, Ms. Blackman advised Mr. Stirling that clenbuterol positives confirmed in serum at 5 picograms per milliliter or a greater concentration would be prosecuted. On or about May 29, 2013, Mr. Stirling issued a memorandum to Florida horsemen advising that the Division was continuing to call clenbuterol positives at levels detected below 25 picograms per milliliter and suggesting that they should no longer rely on a five-day withdrawal time. The memorandum suggested that a 14-day withdrawal time "should be more than safe" for avoiding a clenbuterol positive. Mr. Ziadie admitted he did not change his practice of utilizing a five-day withdrawal time in response: I was still stuck on the five days, your honor. I was stubborn. I know I did wrong. I know that there was a rumor and I know there was a brochure going around 14 days. but I was trying to do the best for my horses. I thought that it was the medication that they needed at the time when we were racing and I take blame for being stubborn and making a mistake, but I did keep it at 5 days. SOP DCN: R1.07.04.05.11-06, entitled "Extraction of Clenbuterol from Horse or Dog Urine and Identification by Liquid Chromatography-Tandem Mass Spectrometry," effective October 9, 2014, established the low end of the calibration curve at 50 picograms per milliliter and the high end of the calibration curve at 2000 picograms per milliliter. The amount set for both positive controls was 140 picograms per milliliter. The SOP provided: Report the calculated concentration of clenbuterol in the suspect sample as the average of its duplicates if its calculated value lies within the range of the calibration curve. If the calculated concentration of clenbuterol in the test sample is outside the range of the calibration curve, it will be reported as either greater than, or less than the limits of the calibration curve. Based on the serum test results, the Second Amended Complaint in Ziadie I was served on Mr. Ziadie on or about September 8, 2014. The First Amended Complaint in Ziadie II was served on Mr. Ziadie on or about March 16, 2015. Other trainers whose horses tested positive for clenbuterol did not have administrative complaints filed against them. The Division, instead, settled their cases with fines. Almost all of these trainers had few prior violations, however. There was credible testimony that the Division had offered to settle charges against one other trainer who had numerous prior violations with the imposition of fines and a short suspension, but there was no evidence that a settlement had been reached. It was also noted at hearing that this trainer's recent violations were in close proximity, which suggested that he might not have been informed of the violations in one case before the samples were taken in the next. The Division noted that this could be a mitigating factor, because a trainer would not reasonably have had an opportunity to adjust his medication levels in response to the earlier violations. Ms. Wilding testified that, in early 2015, she was asked by the Division to re-confirm the 2012 positive serum confirmations from Ziadie I using the urine samples taken immediately after those races. The urine samples had been used for initial screening in 2012, but had not been used for confirmation at that time. The urine samples had been stored in a minus 30-degree freezer since the initial screening in 2012 had determined them suspicious for clenbuterol. On March 18, 2015, Ms. Wilding sent an e-mail to her immediate subordinates, the supervisors of the laboratory's four main divisions, advising that "PMW Legal is asking us to analyze the five urine samples in the first Ziadie case for clenbuterol." Her e-mail listed the sample numbers for the five urine samples and directed that they be rescreened for clenbuterol and then tested for confirmation. The 2012 urine samples were rescreened for clenbuterol in 2015, and, as Ms. Wilding testified, the results were in "good agreement" with the screening results from 2012. This indicated that the presence of clenbuterol remained relatively stable over that period of time. Although the laboratory supervisors knew the trainer associated with the samples, as Ms. Wilding and Mr. Russell testified, samples tested in the laboratory do not contain identification of the horse or trainer and are only marked with a "LIMS" number internal to the lab. The technicians who actually performed these tests were not informed of the name of the horse or trainer involved. Clenbuterol was confirmed in the urine in the 2015 tests in each of the five samples from Ziadie I, ranging in concentration from 1.8 nanograms per milliliter to 1.3 nanograms per milliliter. The samples were also split, and an independent laboratory confirmed the presence of clenbuterol in each urine sample. There was no significant degradation of the urine samples over the three-year period. The results were scientifically sound. In early May 2015, again at the Division's request, the laboratory began confirmation testing for clenbuterol in urine samples from the Ziadie II races. These urine samples were not rescreened because, as Ms. Wilding had earlier determined from the Ziadie I urine samples, the stability of clenbuterol in urine stored in a minus 30-degree freezer for several years was "excellent." The senior staff members were again likely told about the identity of the trainer. Again, samples tested in the laboratory do not contain identification of the horse or trainer and are only marked with a "LIMS" number internal to the lab. The technicians who actually performed the confirmation testing were not informed of the name of the horse or trainer involved. The samples confirmed positive for clenbuterol at concentrations, in picograms per milliliter, of 973, 551, 390, 212, 718, 450, 236, 740, 698, 225, 435, 197, and 435, all amounts with a measurement of uncertainty at plus or minus 30 picograms. Again, these results were scientifically sound. The serum specimens were routinely collected without the owners' representatives witnessing the sealing of the specimens and were not collected pursuant to the requirements of chapter 61D-6. The systematic and regular violation of this important requirement constituted a significant procedural error that affected the fairness of the blood sampling procedure. Subsection 4.6 of the Manual is an unadopted rule. The only evidence of the presence of phenylbutazone in any of Mr. Ziadie's horses was from serum obtained pursuant to the unadopted procedures of subsection 4.6 of the Manual and in a manner contrary to the Division's own rule. The Division failed to prove that Mr. Ziadie's horses carried a prohibited level of phenylbutazone in their bodies on race day. The urine test results proved that Mr. Ziadie's horses in these consolidated cases had clenbuterol in their bodies on race day. Mr. Lawson testified that as a licensed horse owner in the United States, South Africa, and Jamaica, he has had an opportunity to observe the different ways that trainers care for their thoroughbred horses. He testified that Mr. Ziadie's stalls were always clean, the handling of the feed was always done in a very systemized and structured way, and the best feed available was used, even though it had to be imported and was much more expensive. He testified that Mr. Ziadie's horses were always well groomed, they always looked very healthy, their coats were very shiny, their feet were carefully inspected, and they were happy horses. He testified that Mr. Ziadie looked after the specific needs of each horse, rather than treating them all the same, and spent a lot of time personally inspecting them. He noted that Mr. Ziadie didn't race his horses as often as other trainers. Mr. Lawson's testimony was bolstered by the stipulated testimony of Dr. Al Smollen, a veterinarian for the tracks, and the testimony about the excellent condition of Mr. Ziadie's horses, the cleanliness of their surroundings, the quality of the feed, and the care given to the horses is credited. The Division presented clear evidence that Mr. Ziadie has had 14 prior violations of section 550.2415, Florida Statutes. The Division case number, date of offense, name of restricted drug, classification, and disposition are as follows: CASE NUMBER DATE DRUGS CLASS

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order finding Mr. Kirk M. Ziadie guilty of 18 counts of violating section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-6.002(1); imposing an administrative fine of $18,000; and suspending his license for six years. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2015.

Florida Laws (8) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57120.68550.0251550.2415 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61D-6.005
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JOHN GOODMAN vs FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 14-001918RX (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 24, 2014 Number: 14-001918RX Latest Update: Feb. 09, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013 are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has been charged with “DUI Manslaughter/Failed to Render Aid” and “Vehicular Homicide/Failed to Give Information or Render Aid” in Palm Beach County, Circuit Court Case No. 502010CF005829AXXXMB. The prosecution in the criminal case intends to offer the results of a blood alcohol test performed on blood collected from the Petitioner as evidence at the trial. The Petitioner has moved to exclude the blood alcohol test results from the trial based, in part, on the method used to collect his blood for forensic testing. The Respondent is the state agency responsible for implementing the “Implied Consent” blood alcohol testing program, including the adoption of rules. The Respondent has adopted such rules which are set forth in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 11D-8. The Petitioner has asserted that the Respondent’s “Implied Consent” rules are insufficient to ensure the scientific reliability of the blood alcohol test results to be offered against him in the criminal trial. On March 21, 2014, the circuit court judge presiding in the criminal trial entered an Order Granting State’s Motion to Invoke the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, which specifically directed the Petitioner to file a petition challenging rule 11D-8.012 with the Division of Administrative Hearings. On April 24, 2014, the Petitioner filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule, challenging rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013 as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The parties stipulated that the Petitioner is substantially affected by, and has standing to challenge the validity of, rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013. Rule 11D-8.002 provides the following relevant definitions: (2) Accuracy - the nearness of a measurement to a known concentration. * * * (4) Agency - a law enforcement agency other than the Department, or an entity which conducts breath tests or submits blood samples for alcohol testing pursuant to these rules, or a civilian entity performing such duties on behalf of a law enforcement agency. * * * (7) Alcohol - ethyl alcohol, also known as ethanol. * * * Analyst - a person who has been issued a permit by the Department to conduct blood alcohol analyses. Approved Blood Alcohol Test - the analyses of two separate portions of the same blood sample using a Department- approved blood alcohol test method and a Department-approved procedure, with results within 0.010 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL), and reported as the blood alcohol level. * * * Blood - whole blood. Blood Alcohol Level - the alcohol concentration by weight in a person’s blood based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL). * * * (19) Department - the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. * * * (22) Methods - types of alcohol analyses approved by the Department to conduct chemical or physical tests of blood or breath. * * * (24) Permit - when issued by the Department, certifies that the holder has met all necessary qualifications, remains in full compliance with these rules and is authorized to perform all related duties. A permit is issued only to a qualified applicant and remains valid and in full effect until determined otherwise by the Department. Rule 11D-8.012 The Petitioner has asserted that rule 11D-8.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the rule does not establish a venipuncture procedure regulating needle gauge and tourniquet usage by which blood is obtained for the purpose of performing a blood alcohol test. At the same time, the Petitioner asserts, and the Respondent agrees, that the Respondent lacks statutory authority to adopt such a rule. Rule 11D-8.012 provides as follows: Blood Samples - Labeling and Collection. Before collecting a sample of blood, the skin puncture area must be cleansed with an antiseptic that does not contain alcohol. Blood samples must be collected in a glass evacuation tube that contains a preservative such as sodium fluoride and an anticoagulant such as potassium oxalate or EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid). Compliance with this section can be established by the stopper or label on the collection tube, documentation from the manufacturer or distributor, or other evidence. Immediately after collection, the tube must be inverted several times to mix the blood with the preservative and anticoagulant. Blood collection tubes must be labeled with the following information: name of person tested, date and time sample was collected, and initials of the person who collected the sample. Blood samples need not be refrigerated if submitted for analysis within seven (7) days of collection, or during transportation, examination or analysis. Blood samples must be otherwise refrigerated, except that refrigeration is not required subsequent to the initial analysis. Blood samples must be hand-delivered or mailed for initial analysis within thirty days of collection, and must be initially analyzed within sixty days of receipt by the facility conducting the analysis. Blood samples which are not hand-delivered must be sent by priority mail, overnight delivery service, or other equivalent delivery service. Notwithstanding any requirements in Chapter 11D-8, F.A.C., any blood analysis results obtained, if proved to be reliable, shall be acceptable as a valid blood alcohol level. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3., (d) FS. Law Implemented 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. Commercially available kits, generally containing glass evacuation tubes, a non-alcohol skin wipe, and a 21-gauge needle assembly, may be used to collect samples for blood alcohol testing. The Respondent’s rules do not require usage of such kits, and the components of the kits are commonly available where blood collection is performed. The Legislature identified the persons authorized to collect samples for blood alcohol testing in section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which states as follows: Only a physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or technician, acting at the request of a law enforcement officer, may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances therein. However, the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood shall not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes. The Petitioner asserts that the gauge of the needle used to puncture a vein for blood collection and improper application of a tourniquet during the collection process can result in “hemolysis” of blood and an inaccurate blood alcohol test result. As noted above, rule 11D-8.002(14) defines “blood” to mean “whole blood.” Whole blood is comprised of four components, including white cells, red cells, platelets, and plasma. Hemolysis is the release of the contents of red blood cells (hemoglobin) into blood plasma. Hemolysis can occur from a variety of causes, including, but not limited to, the manner of collection (regardless of the gauge of the needle used to puncture the vein), improper agitation of a sample in the collection tube, and storage of a sample. All blood alcohol testing performed by forensic laboratories in Florida is conducted through “gas chromatography headspace analysis.” Extensive testimony was presented at the hearing as to the process of gas chromatography headspace analysis. The reliability and accuracy of the gas chromatography headspace analysis process is not at issue in this proceeding. Gas chromatography headspace analysis involves the removal and testing of a subsample of the blood sample contained in a collection tube. A subsample taken from a sample that exhibits hemolysis contains all of the components present at the time of collection and is whole blood. The evidence fails to establish that hemolysis alters the concentration of alcohol within a subsample taken from a sample of whole blood. The evidence fails to establish that hemolysis affects the results of a blood alcohol test performed on whole blood by gas chromatography headspace analysis. Rule 11D-8.013 Rule 11D-8.013 governs the issuance of permits to analysts conducting blood alcohol tests, including a requirement that analysts define the method and procedures to be followed in conducting the tests. The Petitioner has asserted that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the rule does not explicitly require analysts performing a blood alcohol test to identify and/or exclude an “unreliable” blood sample from the testing process. Essentially, the Petitioner argues that samples exhibiting hemolysis or coagulation should not be analyzed for alcohol content. Rule 11D-8.013 provides as follows: Blood Alcohol Permit - Analyst. The application for a permit to determine the alcohol level of a blood sample shall be made on a form provided by the Department and shall include the following information: Name and address of applicant; A copy of state license if licensed, or college transcript; Name and address of employer and laboratory facility where applicant performs analyses; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, A complete description of proposed analytical procedure(s) to be used in determining blood alcohol level. Qualifications for blood analyst permit - To qualify, the applicant must meet all of the following requirements: Department approval of analytical procedure(s). All proposed analytical procedures will be reviewed and a determination of approval will be made by the Department; Satisfactory determination of blood alcohol level in five proficiency samples provided by the Department using the proposed analytical procedure. Satisfactory determination shall be made by reporting results for blood alcohol proficiency samples within the acceptable range for the samples. For blood alcohol testing, acceptable ranges shall mean the calculated proficiency sample mean + or - 3 standard deviations iterated twice. The mean and standard deviations will be calculated using the results reported by the analysts and reference laboratories; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, Meet one of the following: Possess a clinical laboratory license in clinical chemistry as a technologist, supervisor or director, under Chapter 483, F.S.; or Be a licensed physician pursuant to Chapter 458, F.S.; or Complete a minimum of 60 semester credit hours or equivalent of college, at least 15 semester hours of which must be in college chemistry. The department shall approve gas chromatographic analytical procedures and enzymatic analytical procedures based on alcohol dehydrogenase which meet the following requirements: Includes the approved method used and a description of the method, and the equipment, reagents, standards, and controls used; Uses commercially-prepared standards and controls certified by the manufacturer, or laboratory-prepared standards and controls verified using gas chromatography against certified standards. For commercially-prepared standards and controls, the manufacturer, lot number and expiration date must be documented for each sample or group of samples being analyzed. For laboratory-prepared standards and controls, date, person preparing the solution, method of preparation and verification must be documented; A statement of the concentration range over which the procedure is calibrated. The calibration curve must be linear over the stated range; Uses a new or existing calibration curve. The new calibration curve must be generated using at least three (3) standards: one at 0.05 g/100mL or less, one between 0.05 and 0.20 g/100mL (inclusive) and one at 0.20 g/100mL or higher, and must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher. The existing calibration curve must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher; Includes the analysis of an alcohol- free control, and the analysis of a whole blood or serum control. The whole blood or serum control may be used to satisfy the control requirement(s) in paragraph (d); A gas chromatographic analytical procedure must discriminate between methanol, ethanol, acetone and isopropanol and employ an internal standard technique; An enzymatic analytical procedure based on alcohol dehydrogenase must use the procedure recommended by the instrument manufacturer/test kit vendor for whole blood alcohol analysis, and the enzyme used must have sufficient selectivity to provide negligible cross-reactivity towards methanol, acetone and isopropanol. The permit shall be issued by the Department for a specific method and procedure. Any substantial change to the method, analytical procedure, or laboratory facility must receive prior approval by the Department before being used to determine the blood alcohol level of a sample submitted by an agency. The Department shall determine what constitutes a substantial change. An analyst shall only use a Department- approved procedure to determine the blood alcohol level of samples submitted by an agency. Approval of blood alcohol analysis methods and procedures shall be based on rule requirements in effect at the time they were submitted for approval. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3) 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b)3. FS. Law Implemented 316.1932(1)(b), 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b), (e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. Analysts submit the procedures referenced in the rule in the form of written “standard operating procedures” (SOP) filed with the Respondent. No SOP was admitted into the record of the hearing. As set forth above, the evidence fails to establish that hemolysis affects the results of a blood alcohol test performed on whole blood by gas chromatography headspace analysis. A subsample taken from a sample that exhibits hemolysis contains all of the components present at the time of collection and is whole blood. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish that a sample exhibiting hemolysis should be excluded from testing. Notwithstanding the requirement in rule 11D-8.012 that glass evacuation tubes containing a preservative and an anticoagulant be used in the collection process, a collection tube containing a blood sample submitted for testing can, on occasion, include coagulated blood. Coagulation can occur for a variety of reasons, including the type of needle used in the collection process or the failure to mix the sample properly with the anticoagulant contained in the tube. Rule 11D-8.002(15) defines “blood alcohol level” as “the alcohol concentration by weight in a person’s blood based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL).” The entire sample in a collection tube containing a portion of coagulated blood contains all of the components that were present in the “whole blood” of the subject from whom the blood was collected. However, coagulation causes some of the blood components to solidify. Alcohol (ethanol) is water-soluble. Coagulation alters the ratio of liquid to solid in the sample and can increase the concentration of alcohol in the liquid portion of the sample. The evidence fails to establish that the mere presence of coagulation inevitably precludes the withdrawal of a subsample that properly reflects the components of the whole blood contained in the collection tube. Because gas chromatography headspace analysis uses a subsample of the liquid portion of the sample, the accuracy of the blood alcohol level reported by the subsample is related to the degree of coagulation present in the sample.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.56120.68316.1932316.1933316.1934322.63327.352327.353
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs MARKEITH L. DANIELS, 09-002140PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Apalachicola, Florida Apr. 22, 2009 Number: 09-002140PL Latest Update: Aug. 21, 2009

The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and if so, what penalty should be imposed?

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Markeith Daniels (Respondent or Daniels), is a correctional officer certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, having been issued certificate number 254286. At the time of the events giving rise to these proceedings, Respondent was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections as a correctional officer assigned to the Dade Correctional Institution. On or about November 2, 2007, then-Deputy (now Lieutenant) Thomas Webb stopped Respondent in Apalachicola for an improper start of the vehicle he was driving. After approaching Respondent's car, Lt. Webb could smell alcohol on his breath. Lt. Webb asked if Respondent had been drinking, and Respondent indicated he had had a few beers. Lt. Webb asked Respondent to step out of the car and perform selected field sobriety tests. Lt. Webb testified that, based upon his training and experience, Respondent was under the influence of alcohol. He failed the field sobriety tests because he did not wait for complete directions to be given before starting the tests, and did not follow directions once given. For example, on the "one- leg stand" test, he did not count out loud as instructed, began counting at 4 and at the end of what was to be 30 seconds, Respondent had only counted to 22. Daniels' vehicle was searched. Lt. Webb found two bottles of Verdi Spumante, an alcoholic beverage, in the car. One bottle was unopened while the other was open and empty. Lt. Webb also found two cans of cold, Natural Lite beer in the back seat. Respondent claimed that the beer had been taken from a refrigerator at approximately 9:30 p.m., and that he had given several beers from the twelve-pack to a friend. Daniels was placed under arrest and transported to the Franklin County Jail, where his breath was tested for alcohol content. Protocols for breath alcohol testing require two samples to be given and tested. The first breath sample given by Respondent registered a reading of .121 at 4:28 a.m. The machine provides a two-minute break between breath sample attempts, and this two-minute window is recorded on the breath alcohol test affidavit as "air blanks," at 4:29 and 4:30. From the air blank recorded at 4:30, Respondent had three minutes to provide an additional sample. After three minutes, no sample had been provided, and Lt. Webb pressed the "refusal" button. Respondent would have been able to see the results from the first breath sample before being asked to give the second one. The criminal charges against Daniels were dismissed for reasons that are not clearly identified in this record.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding that Markeith Daniels has violated Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's license be placed on probation for a period of one year, with terms to be determined by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon S. Traxler, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Markeith L. Daniels Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57316.193327.35877.111943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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JOHN DAVID ROUSE AND ELIZABETH G. YOSKIN vs DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 16-002579RX (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 10, 2016 Number: 16-002579RX Latest Update: Dec. 21, 2017

The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.002(1) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: FDLE is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the operation, inspection, and registration of breath test instruments utilized under the driving and boating under the influence and related provisions of chapters 316, 322, and 327, Florida Statutes. § 316.1932(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. The cited statute enumerates FDLE's powers under the Alcohol Testing Program as follows, in relevant part: The program shall: Establish uniform criteria for the issuance of permits to breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Have the authority to permit breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Have the authority to discipline and suspend, revoke, or renew the permits of breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments. Establish uniform requirements for instruction and curricula for the operation and inspection of approved instruments. Have the authority to specify one approved curriculum for the operation and inspection of approved instruments. Establish a procedure for the approval of breath test operator and agency inspector classes. Have the authority to approve or disapprove breath test instruments and accompanying paraphernalia for use pursuant to the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. * * * l. Promulgate rules for the administration and implementation of this section, including definitions of terms. * * * p. Have the authority to approve repair facilities for the approved breath test instruments, including the authority to set criteria for approval . . . . Petitioners are defendants in pending criminal prosecutions in Marion County. Each has been charged with Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”), in violation of section 316.193. Pursuant to the implied consent law,2/ each of the Petitioners took a breath alcohol test that utilized the Intoxilyzer 8000 breath alcohol testing instrument manufactured by CMI, Inc. FDLE has not contested the standing of Petitioners to initiate this proceeding. In those criminal prosecutions, the state intends to use the results of the Intoxilyzer 8000 tests as evidence that Petitioners had unlawful breath alcohol levels at the time of their respective charged offenses. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 11D-8 sets forth rules governing the implied consent program. These include rules regarding the approval and disapproval of breath test methods and instruments, and regulation of the operation, inspection, and registration of breath test instruments for use pursuant to the DUI statute. Chapter 11D-8 also sets forth rules related to the regulation of individuals who operate, inspect, and instruct on breath test instruments. Rule 11D-8.002 sets forth the operational definitions for the rule chapter. Section (1) of rule 11D-8.002 provides as follows: Acceptable Range-–the results of alcohol reference solutions and dry gas standard analyses which fall within the following ranges at each alcohol vapor concentration: 0.05 g/210L range is 0.045 to 0.055 g/210L; 0.08 g/210L range is 0.075 to 0.085 g/210L; 0.20 g/210L range is 0.190 to 0.210 g/210L; or the Alcohol Reference Solution gas chromatographic results which fall within the following ranges: 0.0605 g/100mL range is 0.0586 to 0.0623 g/100mL; 0.0968 g/100 mL range is 0.0938 to 0.0997 g/100mL; 0.2420 g/100mL range is 0.2347 to 0.2492 g/100mL. Rule 11D-8.002(9) defines “alcohol reference solution” as “a standard used to verify the calibration of a breath test instrument consisting of a mixture of alcohol and distilled or deionized water that will produce a known alcohol vapor concentration at a specific temperature.” Rule 11D-8.002(20) defines “dry gas standard” as “a National Institute of Standards and Technology or international equivalent traceable standard consisting of a mixture of alcohol and gas which produces a known alcohol vapor concentration used to verify the accuracy of a breath test instrument.” Both alcohol reference solutions and a dry gas standard are used in conducting annual FDLE inspections of breath test instruments, as well as by local law enforcement agencies in conducting monthly inspections of their instruments. The three alcohol vapor concentrations set forth in the rule are the alcohol reference solutions that FDLE uses during inspections to verify the calibration of the breath test instruments. A reference solution of a known value of alcohol vapor concentration is placed in the machine. If the machine fails to perform within the acceptable range for the reference solution, it is removed from service for corrective action. The acceptable range of error for an instrument is an average error of no more than plus or minus .005g/210L, or 5%, whichever is greater. For ease of reference, this range will henceforth be referenced as the “5% standard.” Prior to 1992, the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (“HRS”) was responsible for breath and blood testing compliance under the implied consent law. HRS’ rules, then Florida Administrative Code Chapter 10D-42, did not define an acceptable range of error for alcohol reference solutions and dry gas standard analyses. Sections 20 through 22 of Chapter 92-58, Laws of Florida, transferred the Alcohol Testing Program to FDLE. FDLE first adopted chapter 11D-8 on October 31, 1993. The original version of rule 11D-8.003(7) included the 5% standard as the “accuracy standard” for test instruments. The 5% standard’s position in chapter 11D-8 has shifted since 1993, and the terminology has been changed from “accuracy standard” to “acceptable range,” but the numerical value of the accepted range for accuracy has not changed since 1993. Rule 8D-11.003 provides that all breath test instruments must be evaluated in accordance with the procedures set forth in FDLE/ATP Form 343/ prior to being approved for use in Florida. The first paragraph of Form 34 states, “[o]nly breath test instruments listed on the US Department of Transportation Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices will be evaluated.” The Conforming Products List is a catalog of all evidentiary breath testing instruments approved by the U.S. Department of Transportation as conforming to the model specifications of breath testing devices published in the Federal Register. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Alcohol Measurement Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 35747 (June 14, 2012); Model Specifications for Devices to Measure Breath Alcohol, 58 Fed. Reg. 48705 (Sept. 17, 1993). The Intoxilyzer 8000 was added to the Conforming Products List in 2002. See 67 Fed. Reg. 62091 (Oct. 3, 2002). The version of rule 11D-8.003(2) approving the Intoxilyzer 8000 for use in Florida was proposed in July 2002 and became effective on November 5, 2002. See Vol. 28, No. 30, Fla. Admin. W., p. 3238, 3239 (July 26, 2002); and Vol. 28, No. 44, Fla. Admin. W., p. 4811 (Nov. 1, 2002). At that time, a predecessor product, the Intoxilyzer 5000, was kept on the list of instruments approved for use in Florida. The Intoxilyzer 5000 was deleted from the approved list by an amendment to rule 11D-8.003(2) that took effect on July 29, 2015. The Intoxilyzer 8000 is now the only breath test instrument approved by FDLE. Despite its continued presence on the list of FDLE- approved instruments, the Intoxilyzer 5000 was in fact eliminated from evidentiary use in Florida on March 27, 2006. On the same date, the Intoxilyzer 8000 was placed into evidentiary use as the sole breath test instrument used in Florida. Laura Barfield, who served as program manager of the Alcohol Testing Program from 2001 through the spring of 2013, and Matthew Malhiot, who worked in the Alcohol Testing Program for eight years in various capacities related to inspection and maintenance of breath test instruments, testified at length about the transition from the Intoxilyzer 5000 to the Intoxilyzer 8000, and the similarities and differences between the machines. Both machines employ infrared spectroscopy to determine the amount of alcohol in a sample. Ms. Barfield explained that molecules absorb infrared light at specific wavelengths. The infrared spectrum of a sample is obtained by passing a beam of infrared light through the sample. The alcohol molecule will absorb specific wavelengths of infrared light in a unique and consistent way. Based on the amount of absorption and the amount of transmittance, meaning the amount of light that remains after absorption, a measurement is correlated to a response from the calibration of the instrument. The Intoxilyzer 5000 and the Intoxilyzer 8000 use different methods to measure infrared light. The Intoxilyzer 5000 had three filters mounted on a wheel that spun at approximately 2,100 revolutions per minute. The filters were each at a different wavelength: 3.39 µm, 3.48 µm, and 3.80 µm. It had a single detector that measured the light coming through each of the three filters. The Intoxilyzer 8000 has two detectors with a filter in front of each, one set at 3.4 µm, and one at 9.4 µm. The light source for the Intoxilyzer 5000 was a projector lamp similar to that found on a Power Point projector. The Intoxilyzer 8000 uses a pulsing infrared light source. The Intoxilyzer 5000’s light source was separate and had to be focused into the sample chamber, then refocused out of the sample chamber to the detector as the light passed through the wheel. This system caused some inevitable dispersion of the light. In the Intoxilyzer 8000, all components are internal to the instrument, leaving no room for dispersion of the light. Mr. Malhiot testified that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was developed in the 1970s and had computing power similar to an old Atari game system. The newer Intoxilyzer 8000 has much more computing power and data storage capability. The Intoxilyzer 8000 can be accessed remotely and is portable. A police officer can plug it into the cigarette lighter of his or her patrol car. Mr. Malhiot described the Intoxilyzer 5000 as similar to a 1960s car with a V-8 engine and the Intoxilyzer 8000 as a “fuel-injected Ferrari.” CMI, Inc.’s specifications sheet for the Intoxilyzer 8000 states that the instrument’s accuracy is “± 3% or ± 0.003G/210L (whichever is higher).” The Intoxilyzer 5000 was represented as accurate within plus or minus 5%. Local law enforcement agencies throughout the state own their breath test instruments. Rule 11D-8.004(1) provides that FDLE shall register and inspect each instrument for accuracy and reliability prior to its being placed into evidentiary use by an agency. Rule 11D-8.004(2) provides that registered breath test instruments shall be inspected by FDLE at least once each calendar year to ensure accuracy and reliability. Rule 11D-8.006 provides that evidentiary breath test instruments must be inspected by an agency inspector at least once each calendar month. The agency is also required to inspect the instrument when it is taken out of evidentiary use and prior to returning it to evidentiary use. Petitioners’ contention is that the definition of “acceptable range,” set forth in rule 11D-8.002(1), is outdated and obsolete. The numerical values in the definition of “acceptable range” have remained at the same 5% standard since rule 11D-8.002 was first adopted in 1993. The federal standard for placement on the Conforming Products List is also the 5% standard. Petitioners point to the fact that the specifications sheet for the Intoxilyzer 8000 states that the instrument’s accuracy is “± 3% or ± 0.003G/210L (whichever is higher).” Petitioners argue that it is arbitrary and capricious for FDLE’s rule to continue employing the 5% standard, which predates even the Intoxilyzer 5000, when the manufacturer’s specifications for the Intoxilyzer 8000 plainly state that it is accurate to within plus or minus 3%. Petitioners further argue that FDLE is in fact applying the 3% standard in some of its own inspection procedures and that it should be required to codify its own internal standard and practice by rule. Petitioners note that FDLE’s own Alcohol Testing Program Procedures Manual (the “Manual”) provides a set of quality control checks that require the Intoxilyzer 8000 to meet the 3% standard. Ms. Barfield testified that the Manual was written to standardize FDLE’s lab practices. The Manual has never been adopted by reference in a rule. Dr. Brett Kirkland, the current program manager of the Alcohol Testing Program, credibly testified that it would be impractical and unproductive for FDLE to attempt to adopt all of its laboratory’s standard operating procedures by rule. Current lab methodologies would be locked in place by rule and would not give the analyst discretion, should lab equipment or some other factor change. The agency would have to initiate rulemaking in order to make the smallest change in its methodologies. Dr. Kirkland opined that this would devolve into a hopeless endeavor because FDLE’s rulemaking could never keep up with the science that leads to modifications in laboratory operating procedures. The portion of the Manual in question is section 2.19, titled, “Instrument Quality Control Check Procedures,” which states by way of introduction: “For quality control purposes and prior to conducting a Department inspection, the following quality control checks will be conducted.” Among the listed quality control checks are “Stability Check Procedures.” These procedures require the analyst to perform three repetitions each of 0.05, 0.08, and 0.20g/210L alcohol reference solutions and three repetitions of a 0.08g/210L dry gas standard. The results of these analyses must be as follows: for the 0.05 standard, within a lower limit of 0.047 and an upper limit of 0.053; for the 0.08 standard, within a lower limit of 0.077 and an upper limit of 0.083; and for the 0.20 standard, within a lower limit of 0.194 and an upper limit of 0.206. These values are consistent with the plus or minus 3% set forth in the manufacturer’s specifications. If any of the stability check measurements fall outside of the prescribed range, the analyst is directed first to determine whether the cause is user error or external equipment. If the cause is not external equipment or user error, the analyst must perform either an optical bench calibration or have the instrument sent to an authorized repair facility of the owning agency’s choice. This repair is performed prior to the FDLE inspection, meaning that the agency is required to pay for repair of a machine that has failed to meet the Manual’s 3% standard, without regard to whether it meets the 5% standard imposed by the rule. From this, Petitioners argue that FDLE is in fact imposing the 3% requirement on local law enforcement agencies and should be required to formally adopt the 3% standard in rule 11D-8.002(1).4/ Dr. Kirkland described the quality control procedures as providing a “snapshot” of a given instrument’s function. FDLE uses the quality control check to determine whether to perform a calibration on an instrument. If the instrument is falling near the 3% margin, it is realigned to bring it closer to the target range. Dr. Kirkland described the quality control check as a good way to ensure that the instrument will meet the acceptable range criteria during the inspection. He noted that in any form of testing, it is good quality assurance to set slightly narrower constraints than what is allowable. Only after the instrument has passed the FDLE quality control checks, including the stability check, may it proceed to the more complex FDLE inspection, which is conducted according to the 5% standard set forth in rule 11D-8.002(1). The monthly agency inspections are also conducted using the 5% standard set forth in rule 11D-8.002(1). Dr. Kirkland testified as to the differences between the FDLE quality control checks and annual inspections on the one hand and the monthly agency inspections on the other.5/ First and foremost, the FDLE personnel are better trained. FDLE personnel have been trained specifically at the manufacturer’s labs to work with the instruments they are inspecting. The FDLE inspections are performed in an ATP lab under better controlled conditions than the agency inspections, which are generally conducted in the same room where the breath testing occurs. The FDLE inspectors use simulators that they keep under strict temperature control and regularly calibrate. Dr. Kirkland stated that the local agency personnel have been trained on how to use the breath test instrument, but not on how to take it apart and how it functions internally. They are trained to push a button and follow procedures. Agency inspectors are able to discover when a machine is not working properly but are not trained to diagnose the problem. Dr. Kirkland opined that the training of the FDLE inspectors is the main reason the agency is able to use the 3% standard for realigning an instrument. Dr. Kirkland pointed out differences in the inspections themselves. The local agency inspection involves a triplicate analysis of each individual standard. The FDLE inspection involves ten analyses of the individual standard, measures barometric pressure, and does a minimum volume sample check. Both inspections check for interference to make sure that ethanol is being measured rather than some other chemical in the breath. Dr. Kirkland explained that FDLE sees a distinction between the accuracy statement set forth in the specifications for the Intoxilyzer 8000 and the acceptable range set forth in the rule. He testified that the specifications represent CMI, Inc.’s representation as to the instrument’s accuracy as a stand-alone proposition, without reference to factors external to the instrument’s analytical capability. Other variables include the dry gas standards and wet bath simulators used in the testing and the tubing and temperature controls associated with the simulators. The skill, training, and experience of the operator may have an effect on the measurement. Dr. Kirkland testified that, while it is possible to achieve the 3% standard under controlled laboratory conditions, the 5% standard is more realistic in the day-to-day usage of the breath test instruments. The Intoxilyzer 8000 is capable of 3% “on really good days,” but the specifications on the external items can introduce a variation to the measurements. In practice, the instrument would have to work better than its specifications to stay in service if the acceptable range were lowered to the 3% standard. Dr. Kirkland noted that the 5% standard is recommended as the acceptable range by the federal National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and by the International Organization of Legal Metrology, a treaty organization that sets international standards for measuring devices. Dr. Kirkland was unaware of any other state that uses an acceptable range criterion of less than 0.005 or 5%. Dr. Kirkland testified that FDLE looks to the federal regulations promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for guidance as to whether the acceptable range defined in rule 11D-8.002(1) should be amended. FDLE also stays apprised of the scientific literature produced by individual laboratories and educational institutions. Dr. Kirkland testified that the 5% standard remains the consensus acceptable range of federal and state governments and of the scientific literature. Ms. Barfield, the former manager of the Alcohol Testing Program, agreed that the “acceptable range” includes not only the instrument specifications, but also the accuracy of the simulators, the environment, and the uncertainty of the dry gas standards. However, she disagreed that the specification sheet for the Intoxilyzer 8000 excludes factors external to the instrument’s analytical capability. Ms. Barfield stated that the 3% standard of the specification by necessity incorporates all of the listed variables. Ms. Barfield explained that in order to establish the accuracy standard for the Intoxilyzer 8000, the manufacturer had to make measurements using external devices and had to account for the environment in which the instrument was used. She testified that “You don’t change the accuracy standard of an instrument because it’s going to be used in a messy room. You need to account for that, control that, limit it, and then use the device.” Ms. Barfield opined that the rule should employ the manufacturer’s accuracy specification because the manufacturer has established the 3% standard as the capability of its device, accounting for all the other variables. She had intended to change the rule to a 3% or 4% standard as part of her overall plan to automate the breath test instrument inspection process, but she left her position as manager of the Alcohol Testing Program before her plan could be enacted. Ms. Barfield believed that the lower standard would increase public confidence in the accuracy of the tests. Mr. Malhiot testified that during the switch from the Intoxilyzer 5000 to the Intoxilyzer 8000 in 2006, FDLE had internal discussions about dropping the calibration of the instrument down to a 3% standard for purposes of the “accepted range” in the rule. He stated that the decision was made to wait two years in order to collect data to establish how many more instruments would fail inspection under a 3% standard. He stated that the budget crisis of 2008 put an end to any ideas of wholesale rule changes at FDLE. Mr. Malhiot could not name another state that uses the 3% standard, but stated that in his experience he believed that the Intoxilyzer 8000 could meet the 3% standard in the field.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.56120.68316.193316.1932316.1934
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RUSSELL MICHAEL, JR. vs. DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 83-001901 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001901 Latest Update: Oct. 10, 1984

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. On February 23, 1983, the horse "Rock Steady" owned by Petitioner, Russell Michael, Jr., and trained by Ronnie Warren, ran in the seventh race at Gulf Stream Park. The horse finished first. Subsequent to the running of the aforementioned race, and in accordance with standard procedure, "Rock Steady" was led over to the state detention barn for the taking of a urine specimen. The specimen was placed in a sealed container and transported to the Division's laboratory with other specimens. Upon reaching the Division's laboratory, the specimen was logged in, assigned a number and subjected to various preliminary tests. Based on those preliminary tests, further tests were made and on March 3, 1983, the Division's laboratory reported that the specimen taken from "Rock Steady" contained at least 182 micrograms of phenylbutazone and/or its derivatives per milliliter of urine. (Respondent's composite Exhibit 1) "Rock Steady" was administered phenylbutazone in oral paste form at some time prior to the seventh race on February 23, 1983. (Post-hearing stipulation of the parties entered pursuant to a joint telecon on July 25, 1984) On April 28, 1983, Dr. Wayne C. Duer, 3/ Chief of the Division's Bureau of Laboratory Services, sent a split sample from the urine specimen taken from "Rock Steady" to Dr. Thomas Tobin in accordance with instructions of Respondent's counsel. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) On or about that same date, Dr. Duer sent another split sample from "Rock Steady" to Dr. George A. Maylin, Director of the New York State Racing and Wagering Board Drug Testing and Research Program. Dr. Tobin reported an average amount in the sample of 125.1 micrograms of phenylbutazone per milliliter of urine. Dr. Maylin reported a sum total of 154.4 micrograms of phenylbutazone per milliliter of urine. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10) The methods employed by the Division laboratory, and which were utilized by Chief Duer, liquid chromatography, thin laver chromatography and ultraviolet spectrophotometry, are methods recognized as the "state of the art" for quantitating phenylbutazone in urine. Based on analysis of the specimen here in question on March 1 by Dr. Duer, an average amount of 182 micrograms of phenylbutazone per milliliter of urine was indicated. In reporting his results, Dr. Duer reported his findings by factoring in the various results and averaging to report the concentration of phenylbutazone in "Rock Steady's" urine specimen. All of the Division's analyses were conducted under Dr. Duer's direction and supervision. Dr. Duer has noted a variance of approximately 3 - 4 percent when analyzing any given sample. Samples can vary based on the exposure to air for long periods of time; samples left unsealed for long periods of time; samples analyzed over various time periods; the amount of alkaline in a urine sample and the physiology of an animal - all of which may fluctuate the phenylbutazone levels in the blood plasma of a given animal. However, as noted, a specimen analyzed soon after a race is apt to be more reliable than subsequent analyses. THE PETITIONER'S DEFENSE Petitioner takes the position that it should not be required to return the purse money because the sample analyzed is different from the sample taken from the horse owned by Petitioner, "Rock Steady"; that the testing procedures utilized by the Respondent are unreliable and the analyses show widely varying concentrations of the drug phenylbutazone and based on the varying calculations, there is no competent and substantial evidence upon which a finding or a requirement can be made herein requiring Petitioner to return the purse money for using the drug phenylbutazone. Respecting Petitioner's claim that the sample analyzed was not the sample taken from the Petitioner's horse "Rock Steady" or that somehow the samples were mishandled or otherwise confused, the evidence herein reveals that Dr. Duer analyzed the urine sample taken from the horse "Rock Steady" and it remained under his custody and control until he personally apportioned the sample such that it could be analyzed by independent laboratories at Cornell University in New York and at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, Kentucky. The analytical methods employed by the Respondent, under the direction of Dr. Duer, appear reliable and are generally recognized as the state of the art in analytical procedures for measuring the drug phenylbutazone. Based on the methods utilized and the fact that the urine sample was analyzed within a short period after "Rock Steady" ran in the seventh race on February 23, 1983, I find that the testing procedures and the results of the analysis were reliable. Finally, as to Petitioner's claim that the methods employed by Respondent lend to varying results, all of the experts herein related that the calculations may vary from one laboratory to the next in a range of approximately 3 - 4 percent. Given that degree of variance as the range within which a given sample may vary, that degree of variance does not alter the conclusion herein by Respondent that the Petitioner's horse competed with an excessive amount of a permitted drug in its system in violation of Rule 7E- 1.0612, Florida Administrative Code. It is so found.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs B.J. WALPER PENANSKY, A.R.N.P., 07-001914PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida May 01, 2007 Number: 07-001914PL Latest Update: May 16, 2008

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsection 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2006),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Ms. Penansky has been licensed as an A.R.N.P. in Florida, having been issued license number ARNP1302962 in 1982. From 1993 through August 2006, Ms. Penansky was employed as an A.R.N.P. at the Dover Clinic of Suncoast Community Health Centers, Inc. (Suncoast). She was the primary certified nurse midwife at the facility and saw the obstetric/gynecology patients. During 2004, Carmen Laguerra, who was the office manager at the Dover Clinic, smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath at work and observed Ms. Penansky’s hands trembling. A couple of times, Ms. Laguerra observed that Ms. Penansky was having trouble walking at work and would put her hand on the walls to support herself. Ms. Penansky came to work at times with bruises on her arms and face. In the fall of 2004, the coordinator of medical records at the Dover Clinic asked Ms. Laguerra to observe Ms. Penansky in the medical records room. Ms. Laguerra observed Ms. Penansky murmuring to herself. Prior to 2004, Ms. Penansky had demonstrated a quiet demeanor. In 2004, Ms. Laguerra observed a change in Ms. Penansky’s demeanor. Ms. Penansky became more outspoken and opinionated. In 2004, Yolanda Guzman, the supervisor of nurses at the Dover Clinic, noticed the smell of alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and body while at work. Ms. Guzman also noticed that Ms. Penansky’s hands were trembling and that Ms. Penansky’s speech was not clear. Ms. Guzman observed bruises on Ms. Penansky’s arms and face. Ms. Guzman reported her observations to Ms. Laguerra and to Subhakrarao Medidi, M.D., who was the associate medical director at the Dover Clinic. Dr. Medidi smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath one time in 2004. On multiple occasions, he observed Ms. Penansky’s hands shaking. After receiving patient complaints, Dr. Medidi confronted Ms. Penansky about the smell of alcohol. Ms. Penansky denied the use of alcohol, claiming that the smell resulted from the use of mouthwash. Dr. Medidi also recalled one time, in particular, when Ms. Penansky came to work with bruises. George Hammond, the chief administrative officer at Suncoast, met with Ms. Penansky to discuss the observations of employees at the Dover Clinic. Ms. Penansky denied the use of alcohol at work. He directed Ms. Penansky to get a blood- alcohol test. She did as directed, and the result of the test was negative. Mr. Hammond directed Ms. Penansky to contact the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN), which is the impaired practitioner program for the Board of Nursing. IPN is an independent program that monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired nurses. IPN oversees random drug screens and provides for the exchange of information between treatment providers, evaluators, and the Department. Ms. Penansky contacted IPN and was referred to Martha E. Brown, M.D., for an evaluation. As part of the evaluation, Ms. Penansky underwent a drug test, which was negative for drugs and alcohol, but was considered dilute. When a drug test is dilute, it usually means that the individual tested consumed a significant amount of fluids prior to the test. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that she averaged drinking almost every day, but had stopped drinking about ten days prior to the evaluation. As a result of abstinence, Ms. Penansky told Dr. Brown that she felt better and was able to stay up later and get up earlier. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that her brother had a problem with alcohol and had not had a drink in 20 years. In a report dated November 8, 2004, Dr. Brown opined that there was suspicion for Ms. Penansky having a substance abuse problem. She recommended that Ms. Penansky enter into an abuse contract with IPN for two years with a one-year review. Ms. Penansky entered into an IPN contract in December 2004. Her participation in the program included random drug screening, joining a support group, attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and being evaluated by her supervisor. During her participation in the program, she was tested for alcohol 17 times, and each time the test was negative. Ms. Penansky completed the program in one year. While Ms. Penansky was participating in the IPN program, employees at Suncoast observed positive changes in her. Ms. Penansky’s appearance and mood improved, and the tremors in her hands disappeared. On July 31, 2006, Ms. Penansky was involved in an automobile accident. As a result of the accident, she sustained some bruises to her body, which were visible to employees at the Dover Clinic. In August 2006, while Ms. Penansky was at work, Ms. Guzman again smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and noticed Ms. Penansky’s hands were shaky, and her speech was not normal. Ms. Laguerra also smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky while Ms. Penansky was at work during the same time period. In August 2006, Dr. Medidi noticed that Ms. Penansky’s hands were shaking again. Ms. Penansky denies that she had alcohol on her breath at work in either 2004 or 2006. However, both Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra testified credibly that they smelled alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath and that the smell was different from the smell that would come from the use of mouthwash, which has a medicinal smell. Additionally, Ms. Penansky testified that in 2006 she was not using the mouthwash prior to going to work because she felt that in 2004 her fellow employees had mistaken the smell of the mouthwash for the smell of alcohol. Thus, the smell could not have come from mouthwash in 2006 because Ms. Penansky was not using it. Ms. Penansky commenced a change in her eating habits in which she had lost 50 pounds. In 2006, she was still losing weight, but not at a very rapid pace. At the final hearing, there were some allegations that the odor that Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra smelled was a result of a release of ketones due to Ms. Penansky’s diet. However, the smell caused by ketones is a “sweet smell,” which is different from the smell of alcohol. Another allegation at the final hearing was that the smell could be a result of Ms. Penansky’s periodontal disease, but the smell that would result from a periodontal disease would be different from the smell of alcohol. Neither Ms. Guzman nor Ms. Laguerra had any conflict with Ms. Penansky that would cause them to make false allegations against her. In fact, both Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra were highly complementary of Ms. Penansky’s work, aside from the use of alcohol and the hand tremors. The evidence is clear and convincing that in 2004 and in 2006, Ms. Penansky came to work at the Dover Clinic with alcohol on her breath while she was practicing as the primary midwife at the facility. In August 2006, the observations of Ms. Guzman and Ms. Laguerra were made known to the management at Suncoast. Suncoast elected not to require Ms. Penansky to undergo a drug screening to determine whether she had ingested alcohol. On August 3, 2006, Ms. Penansky was terminated from her position with Suncoast for her use of alcohol and directed to contact IPN. After Ms. Penansky was terminated from Suncoast, she went to work for a private physician. Her employment was uneventful, and she continued in his employ until the Department suspended her license by emergency order. Ms. Penansky did not contact IPN, and Suncoast filed a complaint with the Department. An investigation ensued. The Department required Ms. Penansky to be evaluated. In January 2007, Ms. Penansky was again evaluated by Dr. Brown. Ms. Penansky advised Dr. Brown that she had returned to drinking occasionally after she completed her program with IPN, but denied drinking on the job or drinking in large amounts. A drug screen was performed on Ms. Penansky, and the result was negative. Dr. Brown diagnosed Ms. Penansky with alcohol abuse, "rule out alcohol dependency." Credibly, Dr. Brown opined that Ms. Penansky appeared “to be either in denial or minimizing the impact alcohol has had on her life and the problems she has had at work with others smelling alcohol on her breathe [sic] multiple time [sic].” It was Dr. Brown’s opinion that in order for Ms. Penansky to be able to practice with reasonable safety and skill that she should minimally complete an intensive outpatient program and have monitoring through IPN. Ms. Penansky was also evaluated by Raymond A. Johnson, M.D., who came to the conclusion that Ms. Penansky did not have an addiction and alcohol problem. He felt that she was safe to practice nursing without treatment or monitoring by IPN. In his report dated January 22, 2007, he stated that Ms. Penansky used mouthwash multiple times a day because of periodontal disease, and he concluded that the use of the mouthwash was the reason for the smell of alcohol on her breath. His argument loses plausibility based on Ms. Penansky’s testimony at final hearing that she was not using the mouthwash in 2006 prior to going to work so that people would not mistake the smell of mouthwash for the smell of alcohol. Dr. Johnson had a psychological evaluation performed on Ms. Penansky by Nicholas Anthony, Ph.D. In his report, Dr. Anthony stated that Ms. Penansky told him that her brother was no longer allowed to use alcohol because he had been diagnosed with diabetes. Based on Ms. Penansky’s representations, he concluded that she did not have a family history for addiction. Ms. Penansky’s account of her brother’s abstinence differed when she related her family history to Dr. Brown. She did not tell Dr. Brown that her brother had stopped drinking because he was a diabetic. At the final hearing, she did not mention that her brother refrained from drinking because of diabetes. At the final hearing, Ms. Penansky testified: Well, what he [her brother] told me, in fact, what he told the whole family was, at one point he said he just felt like he was drinking too much and decided to stop. That was it. He never said anything about being an alcoholic. He never said he was diagnosed by a physician. He made a personal choice. Dr. Anthony tested Ms. Penansky using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI), The Rorschach, and the Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI). The Rorschach, otherwise known as the “ink blot” test, is not commonly used in the field of addiction psychiatry to look at substance abuse diagnoses. In the field of psychiatry, alcohol abuse and alcohol dependency are considered Axis I, or primary, diagnoses. The MMPI and the MCMI are more accurate and effective in diagnosing other Axis I disorders such as psychosis than in diagnosing substance abuse or dependency. This is due to the fact that individuals with substance abuse or dependency problems often attempt to present themselves in the best possible light when answering the test questions. The test results themselves for these individuals are often invalid because the test either misses the substance abuse or dependency diagnosis or identifies the individual’s denial or minimization tendencies. The Adult Clinical Interpretive Report for Ms. Penansky’s MMPI test states: [Ms. Penansky] approached the test items in a somewhat defensive manner. Her overcautious approach to the items suggests that she is concerned with making a good impression and is reluctant to disclose much about her personal adjustment. Interpretations of the clinical and content scale profiles should allow for her possible minimization of problems. The Adult Clinical Interpretive Report for Ms. Penansky’s MCMI test states: Unless this patient is a well-functioning adult who is facing minor life stressors, her responses suggest an effort to present a socially acceptable appearance or a resistance to admitting personal shortcomings. Inclined to view psychological problems as a sign of emotional or moral weakness, the patient may protectively deny any unseemly traits or symptoms. This probably reflects either a broad-based concern about being appraised unfavorably by others or an active suspicion of the arcane motives of psychological inquiry. Her MCMI-II scores have been adjusted to compensate for her defensiveness, but the overall profile may remain partially distorted. An interpretation based on standard interpretive procedures is likely to be reasonably valid but may fail to represent certain features of either the patient’s disorders or her character. The BR scores reported for this individual have been modified to account for the defensiveness suggested by the prominence of Personality Patterns Scale 7 (Compulsive). Dr. Anthony interpreted the results of Ms. Penansky’s test scores as being negative for a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependency. Dr. Johnson relied on Dr. Anthony’s interpretation of test results in forming his opinion that Ms. Penansky was negative for a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependency. Dr. Brown reviewed the Adult Clinical Interpretive Reports of the MMPI and the MCMI performed on Ms. Penansky by Dr. Anthony and opined that the tests are bordering on invalid and that, given Ms. Penansky’s defensiveness on the test in answering questions, she would not use the test results as a total basis for concluding that Ms. Penansky did not have a problem with alcohol. Given Dr. Johnson’s reliance on the use of mouthwash as the explanation for the smell on alcohol on Ms. Penansky’s breath, the lack of credibility in Ms. Penansky’s account of her family history, and the defensive answers given by Ms. Penansky on her psychological testing, Dr. Johnson’s opinion concerning Ms. Penansky’s alcohol abuse lacks credibility. Current and former employees of Suncoast highly regarded Ms. Penansky’s work. Her evaluations were very good. She worked very hard, and the quality of her work was excellent. However, alcohol abuse can affect a nurse’s judgment and ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. Alcohol may slow concentration and thinking and thereby cause a nurse to miss a diagnosis or symptom while treating a patient. Alcohol abuse may cause tremors, such as those experienced by Ms. Penansky. Although Ms. Penansky’s alcohol abuse may not have resulted in patient harm, it does not mean that it will not result in harm in the future. It is not necessary to wait for a patient to be harmed to determine whether a nurse can practice with reasonable skill and safety by reason of use of alcohol.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that B.J. Penansky, A.R.N.P., violated Subsection 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $250; requiring her to undergo an IPN evaluation; suspending her license until such time as she undergoes an IPN evaluation; requiring compliance with all IPN recommendations, if any; and placing her on probation for three years with direct supervision. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2007.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.5720.43464.018
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JOHN T. LEGOWIK, M.D., 12-004021PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 17, 2012 Number: 12-004021PL Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2024
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