The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's decision to reject all bids in DJJ Solicitation Number: RFP# P2043 was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Findings Of Fact Parties DJJ is a state agency whose mission is to reduce juvenile delinquency. One of the methods used to attempt to attain this goal is through the provision of community-based intervention services programs for boys and girls. EYA and the White Foundation, both of whom are not-for- profit foundations, are contractors who are in the business of providing community-based intervention services for boys and girls. There are about 320 to 360 contracts between DJJ and private contractors. Both EYA and the White Foundation, at all times pertinent, had contracts with DJJ. The White Foundation operates only non-residential programs. EYA operates both non- residential and residential programs. Background In RFP#R2043 dated April 30, 2008, DJJ solicited requests for proposals for a contract to provide, "A 120-slot community based intervention program for boys and girls in Circuit 5 (Marion, Citrus, Hernando, Sumter, and Lake Counties, as described in the Scope of Services (Exhibit 1)." EYA is the current operator of the program and continues to operate the program pursuant to an extension of their current contract. That extension is set to expire December 31, 2008. The program sought can be further described as a nonresidential, service-oriented intervention program with comprehensive case management services for department-served youth through the development of a provider designed, developed, implemented, and operated intervention program for youth. The program is to serve youth on probation, conditional release, or post-commitment probation, and is to include supervision of youth transitioning from a residential commitment program, released from residential commitment program for post-commitment services, or placed on probation. The RFP provided that "The Department reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, . . . if the Department determines that doing so will serve the State's best interests." EYA and the White Foundation submitted timely, responsive proposals. Proposals were also submitted by Gulf Coast Treatment Center, Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Silver River Mentoring & Instruction, Community Action Foundation of Citrus County, and Taylor Human Services. No responder availed themselves of the opportunity to ask questions about the RFP. On June 20, 2008, DJJ published its notice of intent to award the contract to EYA. On June 25, 2008, DJJ published a notice of its withdrawal of its previous decision on the RFP and its intended decision to re-issue the solicitation for the program. On June 26, 2008, the White Foundation timely filed a notice of intent to protest DJJ's intended decision. On July 9, 2008, the White Foundation timely filed a formal bid protest challenging DJJ's intended decision. Evaluation generally The language contained in the RFP is boilerplate language that is repeated with little change in all solicitations for both non-residential and residential programs, with the exception of the scope of services portion. Attachment D of the RFP is entitled, "Evaluation Criteria." It provides that the proposals are to be evaluated and scored in three categories: technical proposal (referred to as "Volume 1"), financial proposal (referred to as "Volume 2"), and past performance (referred to as "Volume 3"). Generally, at DJJ, an evaluation panel of three to five evaluators reviews Volume 1, the programmatic elements, or the technical proposal. In this case, three evaluators scored Volume I. The financial proposal, or Volume 2, was a mathematical formula that essentially required no subjective analysis. A single evaluator simply determined the lowest price that was under the maximum amount the RFP permitted. The evaluation of the third part or Volume 3, past performance, was accomplished by Senior Management Analyst II, Paul Hatcher, acting alone. Mr. Hatcher has been an employee of DJJ for 23 years and has been an evaluator of RFPs for seven years. His role in evaluating the RFP was intended to be objective. In other words, he was tasked with reviewing the information provided and ensuring that it met the requirements of the RFP. His evaluation was not supposed to be subjective or judgmental. Typically, and in this case, subsequent to the evaluation of the parts, the DJJ Contract Administrator enters the various scores into a bid tabulation sheet to determine the high scorer. It is DJJ's intention in all cases to award the contact to the prospective provider whose proposal receives the most points. In this case, on June 19, 2008, the contract administrator determined that EYA received 817.22 points and the White Foundation received 785 points. Other responders scored lower. To the extent the controversy is concerned with which party should have been awarded the most points, the focus is on the past performance evaluation. The past performance category addresses the prospective provider's knowledge and experience in operating non-residential juvenile justice programs. The criteria related to the past performance category, Volume 3, are contained in Attachment C to the RFP. Attachment C consists of three parts: Part I - Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs; Part II - Evaluation for Past Performance in the United States Outside of Florida; and part III - Evaluation for Professional Accreditation in the United States. Attachment C further states that if the prospective provider has received DJJ Quality Assurance (QA) reviews and recidivism rate results for its non-residential programs, the provider should complete only Parts I and III. Both the White Foundation and EYA had QA reviews and thus were required to address only Parts I and III. This information was available to all parties through access to DJJ databases. Part I of Attachment C - Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs Part I of Attachment C permitted the assignment of 100 points for "Average QA." For programs receiving a quality assurance review prior to 2007, responders could receive up to 75 points for performance scores and up to 25 points for compliance scores. Part I provided a grid entitled, "Attachment C-1 Part I, Data Sheet: Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs." (past performance data sheet). The past performance data sheet has columns labeled "Contract Number," "Program Type," "Contract Begin Date," "Contract End Date," "Most Recent QA Performance Percentage Score," "Most Recent QA Compliance Percentage Score (if evaluated prior to 2007)," and "Failure to Report." There is also a column entitled "Number of Completions during FY 2005-2006" in which is recorded the number of youths who complete the programs. A final column is labeled, "2005- 2006 Recidivism Rate." The "Most Recent QA Performance Percentage Score," "Most Recent QA Compliance Percentage Score (if evaluated prior to 2007)," "Failure to Report," "Number of Completions during FY 2005-2006," and "2005-2006 Recidivism Rate," are found in databases available from DJJ. This form is quite similar to the forms in RFPs for the residential programs. Ashley Nevels, an accountant, and vice-president of administration for the White Foundation, reviewed all of the records pertaining to the responses to the RFP. Mr. Nevels found Volumes 1 and 2 to be essentially correct. He found errors in Volume 3. Though not qualified or considered as an expert witness, his testimony was helpful in illuminating the forms and procedures used in evaluating the responses. Mr. Nevels carefully reviewed responses in Volume 3 submitted by the White Foundation and EYA. With regard to the past performance data sheet, he found that there was information provided by EYA that was erroneous and information that was omitted. He found that Mr. Hatcher had corrected the erroneous information supplied by EYA, but did not consider whether or not it was complete. Mr. Nevels concluded that the White Foundation was correct in its report as presented on the past performance data sheet. Laura Moneyham, an employee of DJJ, working in its purchasing section, also reviewed the past performance data sheet. She found that EYA should have been awarded only 813.04 total points instead of the 817.22 that Mr. Hatcher awarded. In other words, EYA received 4.18 more points than it should have received. Her findings generally comported with Mr. Nevels, except he believed EYA received slightly more underserved points than reported by Ms. Moneyham. Based on the testimony of Mr. Nevels, the figures derived by Ms. Moneyham, and a review of the data contained in the exhibit, it is found as a fact that EYA should have received at least 4.18 fewer points on the Attachment C-1 Part I, Data Sheet, than was awarded by Mr. Hatcher. It is further found that the White Foundation's data was correct. The errors found on the past performance data sheet would have not affected the outcome of the award. After corrections, EYA would still have enough points to prevail. However, there was also an error in scoring the Part III accreditation portion of Attachment C. As Ms. Moneyham found on her re-scoring, and as Mr. Nevels had found, the White Foundation was entitled to 30 more points than it received in that category. Part III of Attachment C - Evaluation for Accreditation It was DJJ's policy, through the accreditation section that was denominated in Part III, to reward providers with points in the procurement process for achieving accreditation status. This was DJJ's policy because accreditation is a qualified endorsement by an outside, objective party that confirms that an organization conforms to recognized service standards. Ten points were to be awarded for each accredited program submitted in the response to the RFP. Both EYA and the White Foundation submitted information on three accreditations. Both responders were eligible to receive 30 points in this category. Attachment C provides, with regard to Part III - Evaluation for Professional Accreditation in the United States, found at page 16 of 63 of the RFP, as follows: All documentation provided . . . must include the start and end dates, be current dated and valid at least through the start date of the Contract that results from this RFP. The documentation shall also state that the program cited is a non-residential juvenile program and that it is run by the prospective Provider. The Department will verify all information received but is not responsible for research to provide information not submitted and documented by the prospective Provider. Failure to provide the required supporting information for Parts II or III of the attachment shall result in a score of zero (0) for that section. EYA responded to Part III by providing a copy of page 24 of the RFP and providing copies of three certificates from the Council on Accreditation (COA) indicating that EYA was accredited in Circuits 6, 7, and 11; a letter from the copies of Bureau of Quality Assurance Performance Rating Profiles; and an explanation that the three programs are operated in the United States under DJJ contract, are non-residential programs, and are operated under the CBIS program model. The EYA certificates did not indicate start dates. Nevertheless, Mr. Hatcher awarded 30 points to EYA. The White Foundation responded to this section by providing copies of pages 20-23 of the RFP and three certificates from the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF) that indicated that the White Foundation was accredited. Mr. Hatcher awarded no points to the White Foundation in the accreditation category. Mr. Hatcher arrived at the White Foundation's score, or non-score, by referring to Part III of Attachment C of the RFP. In that section there appears a list of four accreditation organizations. Accreditation by one or more of these organizations can result in a responder receiving points for the section. Following the list of acceptable accreditation organizations, the form inquires, "Does the prospective provider currently operate or perform a non-residential juvenile justice organization/program/facility/service ('accredited entity') in the United States which is being offered as a part of its RFP proposal, and is that accredited entity in good standing and without restrictions by: . . . " and lists four accreditation agencies. The evaluator is to check "yes" or "no." Immediately following this language, the form recites 12 standards to be addressed if the responder answers "yes." These standards serve as the base requirements for a responder to have an acceptable "yes." Mr. Hatcher found that the White Foundation had not complied with standard eight of the 12 standards, which states, "Must provide documentation that establishes the accredited entity is offered as part of the prospective provider's proposal (i.e. RFP) proposal page and/or section reference)." Mr. Hatcher believed standard eight required documentation of the specific page and section of the RFP to which the accreditation would apply, and that was not provided by the White Foundation in Part III. He believed the White Foundation was required to provide a reference to a specific portion of Volume 1. Because the accreditations supplied did not provide a reference to a proposal page or section, Mr. Hatcher, using a strict interpretation of the requirement, found it to be noncompliant. Mr. Hatcher could have looked at Volume 1 of the White Foundation's response and found the information that was required. He did not look at Volume 1 because he believed that would be "research" of the type prohibited by the guidance found at page 16 of 63 of the RFP. Subsequent to the announcement of the agency decision revealing that EYA had prevailed, as noted, Mr. Nevels and Ms. Moneyham reviewed the evaluations for past performance. Lisa J. Eaton, a Senior Management Analyst II, who is employed by DJJ, also reviewed the evaluations for past performance. Interpreting the same language Mr. Hatcher used for guidance, they all arrived at the opposite conclusion with regard to accreditation and determined that the White Foundation should have been awarded 30 points. It is found as a fact that standard eight of the 12 standards, when read in conjunction with the guidance provided in the first paragraph of Attachment C, Evaluation of Past Performance for Non-Residential Programs, at page 16 of 63, provided guidance that could confuse an evaluator and could result in a decision with regard to accreditation that was contrary to DJJ policy that DJJ attempted to express in the RFP. Agency deliberations with regard to the decision to reject all bids It was brought to the attention of DJJ in December of 2007, by the Recommended Order in Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc. v. Department of Juvenile Justice, Case No. 07-4610BID (DOAH December 14, 2007), that the past performance portion of their RFP was infused with ambiguity. As a result, an attempt was made to clarify the type of information that was desired to satisfy the accreditation portion of the past performance part of the RFP. After the responses to RFP# P2043 were received and scored, the contract section of DJJ determined that Mr. Hatcher's scoring was inconsistent with the scoring that had been done on residential RFPs even though the two were 99 percent congruent. The evaluators of the residential programs would provide information omitted by a response, and correct information that was incorrect when submitted. Then they would score the response. Unlike the residential scorers, Mr. Hatcher did not count QA programs that were missing, but did correct information that was incorrect when submitted, if the contract numbers were correct. This meant that a potential vendor could choose to include their well-performing programs and not report programs that were performing poorly, and thereby gain an advantage. This did not comport with the desires of DJJ. DJJ staff also determined that Mr. Hatcher failed to score the accreditation portion in accordance with their policy objectives. Amy Johnson, Chief of the Bureau of Contracts, believed that Mr. Hatcher was confused by the language of the RFP and that accounted for his incorrect scoring. Upon reviewing the situation, Deputy Secretary Rod Love and Assistant Secretary Darryl Olson determined that all bids should be rejected and the process begun anew. It cannot be determined from the evidence whether that decision was made before the White Foundation protested, or after. As a result of the difficulties experienced in RFP# P2043, DJJ staff have attempted to further clarify that information that is omitted or inaccurate will be corrected and used. They have removed standard eight of the 12 standards that referred to the need to cross-reference. It was DJJ's intent to have consistent interpretations and scoring of proposals throughout the Department, and in particular, between bids for residential and non-residential programs. In order to carry out that intent, DJJ decided to reject the bids and initiate a new RFP for the desired project. There was no evidence that the actions of DJJ were illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent. For reasons that will be addressed below, the decision to reject all bids also was not arbitrary.
Recommendation it is Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice issue a final order dismissing the Petition and Formal Protest filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna Holshouser Stinson, Esquire M. Stephen Turner, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1300 Tonja V. White, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Room 312L 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Martha Harrell Chumbler, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue Whether the Respondent should grant the Petitioner an exemption from disqualification from employment in positions of special trust.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Thomas seeks employment at the Everglades Youth Development Center, which is a 102-bed residential treatment facility for high-risk male juvenile offenders aged 13 to 18 years. Because of Mr. Thomas's criminal background, he is disqualified from working in positions of trust with the Department and can only work in such positions if he is granted an exemption from the disqualification. Criminal History Mr. Thomas was arrested in August 1987 and charged with lewd and lascivious behavior with a minor. In an Information dated October 7, 1987, issued by the State Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pinellas County, Florida, Mr. Thomas was charged with three counts of handling and fondling two girls under the age of 16 years in or about July or August 1987, in violation of Section 800.04(1), Florida Statutes (1987).1 At the time, Mr. Thomas was known as Anthony Lee Sanders, "Sanders" being his father's surname. Count I of the Information named Carolyn Coston, a/k/a Carolyn Gordon, as an alleged victim, and Counts II and III of the Information named Lonnette Frazier as an alleged victim. Mr. Thomas first met Ms. Frazier when he played basketball at Gibbs High School in St. Petersburg, Florida; she used to attend the games. Mr. Thomas also knew Ms. Frazier's parents. At the times set forth in the Information, Mr. Thomas was a counselor in the summer recreation program of the Police Athletic League, where he was responsible for supervising and working with children enrolled in the program. Ms. Coston and Ms. Frazier were enrolled in the program and under Mr. Thomas's supervision. Mr. Thomas and Ms. Frazier had dated more than six months before the incident in August 1987 that resulted in his arrest. At the time, Ms. Frazier was 14 or 15 years of age; Mr. Thomas was 19 years of age and a student at Manatee Junior College. Mr. Thomas admits that he and Ms. Frazier had one encounter of a sexual nature in August 1987, but he denies that he and Ms. Frazier had a second such encounter. Mr. Thomas knew Ms. Coston only as a client in the Police Athletic League summer recreation program. He denies ever having had an encounter of a sexual nature with her. After his arrest, Mr. Thomas was jailed for two weeks, then released on his own recognizance. He was represented by a public defender, who advised him and his mother that, if he were convicted of any one of the charges, he could be sent to prison for 25 years. Mr. Thomas was afraid of being sentenced to prison, and he agreed to accept a plea bargain offered by the State Attorney's office. It was his understanding that his attorney tried to convince the State Attorney to dismiss the count in the Information involving Carolyn Coston but was unsuccessful. As a result, Mr. Thomas pleaded guilty to all three counts of the Information, although he insists that he was actually guilty of engaging in only one sexual encounter with Ms. Frazier and that he never had a sexual encounter with Ms. Coston. In an Order Withholding Adjudication of Guilt and Placing Defendant on Probation, dated January 15, 1988, the court found that Mr. Thomas was "not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct, and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that [he] should presently be adjudged guilty and suffer the penalty authorized by law." Accordingly, the court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed Mr. Thomas on two years of community control and five years of probation. Mr. Thomas was permitted to continue attending classes and athletic games and practices, and he was allowed to travel with his athletic team. He was also required to pay for the duration of his community service and probation $12.00 per year to First Step, Inc., an organization whose function is not explained in the order. In an order entered May 12, 1988, the court modified the terms of Mr. Thomas's community control by changing the remainder of the community-control period to probation, with the sentence of five years of probation previously imposed to follow. Supervision of Mr. Thomas's probation was transferred to Sioux City, Iowa, where Mr. Thomas had received a scholarship to attend Morningside College. The May 12, 1988, order further provided that, "upon the Defendant's arrival in Sioux City, Iowa, he shall be evaluated to determine whether counseling as a sex offender is needed and, if needed, sex offender counseling shall be made a condition of Defendant's probation." Mr. Thomas did not graduate from Morningside College, but transferred to Bethune Cookman in Dayton Beach, Florida. In an undated affidavit prepared on or around August 25, 1992, Mr. Thomas's Florida probation officer stated that Mr. Thomas had violated the terms of his probation in the following respects: Violation of Condition (8) which states: "You will promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries directed to you by the Court or the Probation Officer, and allow the Officer to visit your home, at your employment site or elsewhere, and you will comply with all instructions he may give you." In That, the aforesaid has violated this condition by willfully refusing to attend and successfully complete a Sexual Offender Treatment Program as instructed by his Probation Officer throughout his probation and as ordered by Judge Crockett Farnell on 5-12-88.[2] Violation of Condition (9) which states: "You will pay to First Step, Inc. the sum of Twelve Dollars ($12) per year for each year of probation ordered, on or before ninety days from the date of this order." In That, the aforesaid has violated this condition by willfully refusing to pay to First Step, Inc. the sum of $84 or $12 per year as evidenced by a balance of $84.00 as of 8-12-92. Mr. Thomas was at the time attending Bethune Cookman College. He did not enroll in sex offender counseling because he could not afford the fee; he did not make the payments to First Step, Inc., because he believed that these payments were waived because all of the other fees related to his probation had been waived. Mr. Thomas sold his car, paid the monies owing First Step, Inc., and enrolled in the counseling program. On November 6, 1992, Mr. Thomas entered a plea of guilty to the charges that he had violated the terms of his probation. An order was entered in which Judge Grable Stoutamire accepted the plea, continued Mr. Thomas on probation, and imposed the conditions that Mr. Thomas would "[s]uccessfully complete sex offender counseling now enrolled in" and that Mr. Thomas's "[f]our years DOC [Department of Corrections] suspended sentence is reinstated and will be imposed if defendant deliberately fails to complete sex offender course." Mr. Thomas successfully completed counseling, and he was granted early termination of probation on July 26, 1994. Employment history since 1994. Todd Speight, who is currently the Program Director of the Everglades Youth Development Center, has known Mr. Thomas since they met in 1989, when they both attended Morningside College in Iowa. Mr. Speight observed Mr. Thomas work with children when he was in college, and, in 1994, Mr. Speight recruited Mr. Thomas to work as a youth care worker at the Victor Cullen Academy, which is a residential treatment facility for high risk juveniles located in Maryland. At the time he recommended Mr. Thomas in 1995 for employment at the Victor Cullen Academy, Mr. Speight was aware that Mr. Thomas had pleaded guilty to charges of inappropriate sexual conduct with a girl who was a client of an agency that employed him.3 Mr. Speight was also aware that Mr. Thomas, nonetheless, successfully passed the Maryland employee screening process after he was hired at the Victor Cullen Academy. Mr. Thomas ended his employment at the Victor Cullen Academy when he moved back to Florida in 1995. In 1995 and 1996, Mr. Thomas worked briefly for Bridges of America, a drug and alcohol treatment program that was under contract with the Department of Corrections. He left his position with that organization because the Department of Corrections required that employees of the program be released from probation for at least three years. In the latter part of 1996, Mr. Thomas began working as a residential instructor at the Hope Center, which is a residential center for persons with developmental disabilities that operates under contract with the Department of Children and Families. The Hope Center serves males and females from the age of 12 years to the age of 70 years. Most of the residents are adults, but the Hope Center also serves children. Mr. Thomas disclosed his criminal background when he applied for the job at the Hope Center, and he discussed his background during his employment interview. Mr. Thomas worked at the Hope Center for a short time but was let go when the background screening done by the Department of Children and Families confirmed his criminal background. Mr. Thomas requested an exemption from disqualification from employment, and the exemption was granted in May 1997. Mr. Thomas was rehired by the Hope Center, where he worked from 1997 until the summer of 2002, when he was laid off due to budget cuts. At the time of the final hearing in January 2003, Mr. Thomas was employed at the Bayview Center of Mental Health, a residential program for mentally ill persons aged 18 through 60 years that is funded by the Department of Children and Families. Mr. Thomas was hired as a horticulture assistant, but, after six months of employment, he was promoted to a residential supervisor, effective January 20, 2003. First request to the Department for an exemption from disqualification from employment. In 1995, a request was made to the Department for a background check on Mr. Thomas, and, in July 1995, Mr. Thomas submitted to the Department an Affidavit of Good Moral Character in which he failed to disclose his criminal record. The Department learned through its background investigation that Mr. Thomas had pleaded guilty to three counts of lewd and lascivious behavior with two girls under the age of 16 years, offenses that disqualified him from working in positions of trust and responsibility. The Department also determined that Mr. Thomas did not have good moral character based on the submission of the false affidavit. Mr. Thomas did not request an exemption from disqualification. In 1996, Mr. Thomas was offered a job of trust and responsibility at the Everglades Youth Development Center, and Outreach Broward, Inc., submitted a request to the Department for a background check of Mr. Thomas. A form entitled Consent to Background Screening that was signed by Mr. Thomas on October 8, 1996, accompanied the request, and Mr. Thomas completed an Affidavit of Good Moral Character on October 8, 1996, in which he disclosed that he had a disqualifying criminal offense. The screening resulted in a determination that Mr. Thomas had an unfavorable/disqualifying sex offense of fondling a child. Mr. Thomas requested an exemption from disqualification from employment, and, after he was notified of the Department's intent to deny his request for an exemption, he requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on May 5, 1998, and a Recommended Order was entered in which the administrative law judge found that Mr. Thomas had established by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of trust. The administrative law judge accordingly recommended that the Department grant Mr. Thomas an exemption so that he could work at the Everglades Academy with youthful male offenders. The Department entered a Final Order dated July 1998, in which it disagreed with the administrative law judge's recommendation and denied the request for an exemption. Second request to the Department for an exemption from disqualification from employment. In or around June 2002, Mr. Thomas wrote to Governor Jeb Bush regarding his efforts to obtain an exemption from disqualification from employment. In a letter dated June 7, 2002, the Secretary of the Department, W.G. Bankhead, responded to Mr. Thomas and advised him that, because more than three years had passed since his 1996 exemption request was denied, he would be allowed "to request an exemption via the desk review process." Secretary Bankhead directed Ray Aldridge, supervisor of the Background Screening Unit, to notify Mr. Thomas in writing of the requirements of the desk review process. Mr. Thomas was further advised that he would be required to undergo a criminal history background and driver's license screening. In early July 2002, Mr. Thomas submitted a Request for Desk Review on Disqualification, in which he checked the statement: "I request a Desk Review of my request for an exemption from disqualification based on the fact that I have clear and convincing evidence to support a reasonable belief that I am of good moral character." As part of the desk review, persons requesting exemptions are required to submit a letter describing the nature of their criminal offenses and their life since they committed the offenses. The following paragraph is contained in a letter to Mr. Aldridge dated July 28, 2002, and signed by Mr. Thomas: On August twenty second, nineteen eighty- seven, I Anthony L. Thomas was charged with sex offenses: two counts against a child, fondling/lewd and lascivious acts. On January fifteenth, nineteen eighty-eight I was found guilty of the two counts against a child, fondling/lewd and lascivious acts. I was sentence to complete seven years probation, which included attending counseling for sex offenders. In the next paragraph of the letter, Mr. Thomas refers to a single victim.4 The results of the Department's background screening were sent to the Department's Inspector General in a memorandum dated August 13. 2002. In the memorandum, Mr. Thomas's criminal history is described as "Sex offense - Against Child Under 16 - Lewd and Lascivious Act," with an arrest date of August 22, 1987. The false Affidavit of Good Moral Character submitted July 10, 1995, was noted in the memorandum as "Other history, which is not disqualifying." On September 9, 2002, the Department's Inspector General indicated on the memorandum that Mr. Thomas's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment was again denied. Subsequent to notice of the intent to deny the exemption request, Mr. Thomas requested the instant administrative hearing. Work record and character of Mr. Thomas. Mr. Speight was a team leader at the Victor Cullen Academy in 1994-1995, and Mr. Thomas worked on his team. Mr. Speight observed Mr. Thomas's job performance and found that the children in his charge were comfortable with Mr. Thomas and that Mr. Thomas did an excellent job with the children. Mr. Speight did not observe Mr. Thomas engage in any inappropriate conduct during his time at the Victor Cullen Academy. During the years he was employed at the Hope Center, from 1997 until the fall of 2002, Mr. Thomas worked in both the residential program supervising the residents and as an assistant in the social services program, arranging for services to residents, planning and supervising residents on outings and field trips, and communicating with residents' families. Aileen Phelan and David Chiverton, two of his supervisors at the Hope Center, consider Mr. Thomas an exemplary employee: He worked exceptionally well with the residents of the Hope Center, was attentive to the needs of the residents, was very caring, had a good work ethic, and was always willing to help where help was needed. Neither Ms. Phelan nor Mr. Chiverton observed Mr. Thomas engage in any inappropriate behavior during the seven years he worked there. Both were aware of his criminal background, including the charges of sexual misconduct with a minor client while he was a counselor in the Police Athletic League and the violation of probation for failing to complete sex offender counseling. They were not, however, aware that Mr. Thomas had pleaded guilty to charges involving two girls under the age of 16 years; Mr. Thomas had told them he had sexual contact with one girl. The knowledge that the criminal charges involved two girls did not alter Ms. Phelan's and Mr. Chiverton's opinions, based on their long association with Mr. Thomas and their familiarity with him as a person and as an employee working with developmentally disabled persons, that he is suitable for employment in a position of trust and that he should be granted an exemption from disqualification from such employment. Mr. Chiverton has such a high opinion of Mr. Thomas and his contributions to the community that, in April 2000, he extended an invitation to Mr. Thomas to serve as a trustee of the Foundation of Community Assistance and Leadership, of which Mr. Chiverton is the Executive Director. As the Program Director of the Everglades Youth Development Center, Mr. Speight would hire Mr. Thomas in an appropriate position at the Everglades Youth Development Center were the Department to grant him an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of trust. In addition to being familiar with Mr. Thomas's work with children at the Victor Cullen Academy, Mr. Speight has spoken with some of Mr. Thomas's supervisors and co-workers over the past seven or eight years. Although Mr. Speight is aware that Mr. Thomas engaged in a sexual act with a minor in 1987, Mr. Thomas has been a good citizen during the years Mr. Speight has known him. In Mr. Speight's opinion, based on his personal knowledge of Mr. Thomas's character and of his work with high-risk juveniles and on the references from his co-workers, Mr. Thomas would be a highly desirable employee at the Everglades Youth Development Center, and he should be granted the exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of trust that will enable him to work at the Everglades Youth Development Center. Mr. Thomas acknowledges that, even though they had been dating for some time and he cared for her, he was wrong to engage in sexual behavior with Lonnette Frazier. He has been in touch with Ms. Frazier over the years and understands that she has been to college and is doing well.5 Mr. Thomas has been married since November 1999 to Francia Thomas, whom he met when he attended Bethune Cookman College in 1990-1991. Ms. Thomas is a high school business education teacher, and she and Mr. Thomas have a four-year-old son. Ms. Thomas has been aware of her husband's criminal history since shortly after they met. Mr. Thomas is currently attending college to complete his bachelor's degree. He believes that he can be a good example to youthful offenders and can show them that life does not end when you get in trouble as long as you change and use your life to do good. Summary The credible and persuasive evidence submitted by Mr. Thomas is sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that he is rehabilitated, that he is of good moral character, that he is currently fit for employment in a position of trust and responsibility with the Department, and that he should be granted an exemption from disqualification from employment: Mr. Thomas was 19 years of age when he was arrested and charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious behavior with two girls under the age of 16 years, and 15 years have passed since he pleaded guilty to these offenses. At the time, the criminal court judge believed that Mr. Thomas was unlikely to engage in criminal behavior in the future, and he withheld adjudication of guilt. The only subsequent criminal violation in Mr. Thomas's background is the violation of probation in 1992. Mr. Thomas's failure to comply with two conditions of his probation was not the result of a bad and purposeful disobedience. Rather, Mr. Thomas's failure to attend sex offender counseling was the result of a lack of money to pay for the counseling, and his failure to pay a total of $84.00 to First Step, Inc., was the result of a misunderstanding of his obligation to pay the $12.00 per year fee. Mr. Thomas was granted early release from probation in July 1994, having successfully completed all of the conditions of his probation. Mr. Thomas long ago fulfilled the requirements imposed on him by Florida's criminal justice system, and he has no criminal history since the probation violation in 1992 but has, by all accounts, lived a good and productive life. Mr. Thomas has worked in positions of special trust with young people and with developmentally disabled children and adults since his release from probation in 1994: He worked with juveniles in a high-risk treatment facility in Maryland before returning to Florida in 1995; he was employed for seven years at the Hope Center as a residential instructor; and he is currently working as a residential supervisor at a center in Pembroke Pines that serves mentally ill residents. Mr. Thomas has the respect and loyalty of former supervisors and co-workers in these programs, and they describe a man who was an exemplary employee and a caring social service worker with whom adults and children were comfortable. The evidence is, therefore, sufficient to support a firm and unhesitating belief that Mr. Thomas would not pose a threat to children were he permitted to work with juveniles committed to the care of the Department.6 Mr. Thomas is married, he has a child and a stable home life, and he is completing his college education. Mr. Thomas admits that, in 1995, he submitted a false Affidavit of Good Moral Character in which he failed to disclose that he had pleaded guilty to a disqualifying offense. Although the false affidavit Mr. Thomas prepared in 1995 could reasonably serve as a basis for denying his 1996 request for an exemption from disqualification from employment, seven and one-half years have elapsed and Mr. Thomas has fully disclosed and discussed his criminal history with the Department. In light of his personal and employment history since 1995, Mr. Thomas's failure to disclose this criminal history in 1995 is not sufficient to support a finding of fact that Mr. Thomas lacks good moral character. Mr. Thomas's failure to state in the July 28, 2002, letter to Mr. Aldridge that he was charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious behavior with two separate girls under the age of 16 years is, likewise, not sufficient to support a finding of fact that Mr. Thomas lacks good moral character. Although Mr. Thomas pleaded guilty to the three counts of lewd and lascivious behavior in 1987, when he was 20 years old, the credible and persuasive evidence establishes that he did so as part of a plea bargain to avoid what he feared could be a prison sentence of 25 years. Throughout the hearing, Mr. Thomas proclaimed his innocence with respect to the charge that he engaged in lewd and lascivious conduct with Carolyn Coston, and he repeatedly asserted that he had actually engaged in conduct of a sexual nature only with Lonnette Frazer, and the omission in the letter of reference to the third count of and the second girl named in the Information is a minor error of omission that is insufficient to outweigh Mr. Thomas's personal and employment history during the past nine years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order granting Anthony L. Thomas an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of trust or responsibility with the Department of Juvenile Justice. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2003.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the evaluators of the subject request for proposals (RFP) were qualified under the applicable law and RFP criteria to evaluate the proposals.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida and is the procuring agency in this proceeding. On November 23, 2009, the Department issued RFP #P2062 (the RFP), requesting proposals from prospective providers to operate 16 IDDS programs in 16 different judicial circuits in Florida: Circuits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, and 20. The RFP's Statement of Services provided that proposers would be responsible for designing, implementing, and operating an IDDS program in each of the 16 listed judicial circuits. The RFP described an IDDS program as a diversion program targeting a specific population of juvenile offenders determined to be at risk of becoming serious and chronic offenders. The goal of IDDS is to facilitate a positive change in youth behavior and criminal thinking and provide the youth with the tools necessary to avoid recidivism or future criminal involvement. Prospective providers were instructed to propose services that included specified minimum components, including scheduling, supervision, and monitoring of compliance with court-ordered sanctions, such as community service, curfew, and restitution; random urinalysis monitoring; provision of counseling, anger management education, educational training, and vocation services to age-appropriate youth; and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. The RFP provided that proposers were to submit a single response to address one or more circuits in which they intended to propose operating an IDDS program. However, if a prospective provider proposed to operate IDDS programs in more than one circuit, its response had to include separate sections on staffing, prices, and budgets for each circuit/program proposed. The deadline to file challenges to the specifications of the RFP was within 72 hours of its posting. No challenges to the RFP's specifications were filed within the required 72-hour window. Petitioner, Intervenor, and two other proposers' timely submitted proposals to operate an IDDS program in Circuit 17, in response to the RFP. Following its evaluation of proposals, on March 2, 2009, Respondent posted its notice of agency action, indicating its intent to award the contract in Circuit 17 to Intervenor, whose proposal received the highest score of 1549.78 points. Juvenile Services Program, Inc., was ranked second, with 1454.01 points. Petitioner was ranked third, with 1327.57 points. Lutheran Services of Florida, Inc., was ranked fourth, with 986.43 points. Petitioner's timely challenge to Respondent's intended agency action in Circuit 17 is limited to the issue of whether the evaluators were qualified under the applicable law and RFP criteria to evaluate the proposals. The standard established by "the applicable law," section 287.057(17), Florida Statutes, is that the agency must appoint "[a]t least three persons to evaluate proposals and replies who collectively have experience and knowledge in the program areas and service requirements for which commodities or contractual services are sought." The RFP criteria contain the following in the RFP Addendum, in the form of a question from a prospective provider and Respondent's answer: Q: Who will be evaluating the proposals[?] Will they be fully knowledgeable about IDDS programs and how they are run[?] A: The proposal will be evaluated by a team of DJJ staff who are fully knowledgeable about IDDS programs and how they are run. These people are chosen for their particular skills, knowledge and experience. They have also been chosen because of the Department's confidence in their ability to score proposals both independently and fairly. Amy Johnson, Respondent's chief of contracts, has the responsibility for supervising the Department's contracting and procurement process and ensuring compliance with section 287.057. The Department goes beyond the statutory requirements by specifically training potential evaluators in the competitive procurement process with a focus on the process itself, including evaluation and scoring of proposals. Ms. Johnson has in the past conducted this training and remains responsible for ensuring that evaluators are trained. A number of years ago, Ms. Johnson developed an internal means of identifying potential evaluators who were considered qualified to evaluate specific program areas and services that might be the subject of competitive procurements. This process involved identification by persons in charge of the various program areas of individuals they believed had sufficient experience and knowledge to evaluate certain types of programs and services. The program area representatives would submit names of individuals considered qualified to evaluate the various programs and services within their program area, along with a brief biographical statement describing the individuals' background and experience. Added to this substantive or programmatic categorization of potential evaluators was the qualification of having been trained in the competitive procurement process. Ms. Johnson developed a spreadsheet to maintain the results of the two-step qualification process. The spreadsheet lists individuals with a summary of the information obtained from the program area representatives, including the categorization of the types of programs and services the individuals are considered qualified to evaluate based on their background and experience. The spreadsheet also identifies the most recent date on which each individual completed training in the competitive procurement process. The spreadsheet document has been maintained over time to keep the running results of the pool of evaluators identified through the two-step qualification process. Elaine Atwood is the Department's contract administrator. She has assumed responsibility for conducting the training sessions for potential evaluators in the competitive procurement process, as well as the responsibility for maintaining the spreadsheet of the evaluator pool. Ms. Atwood served as the procurement officer for RFP #P2062. Her duties included working with the program area to put the RFP together, posting the RFP on the Department's website, receiving the proposals, and conducting all other activities that were part of the procurement process. The "program area" for RFP #P2062 is the Office of Probation and Community Intervention, and Paul Hatcher was the designated program area representative. IDDSs are one category of services within the Probation and Community Intervention program area. Ms. Atwood worked with Mr. Hatcher to address programmatic issues for this RFP. Mr. Hatcher identifies individuals who are considered qualified to conduct evaluations for RFPs involving programs or services falling under the umbrella of his program area. For the current pool of potential evaluators, Mr. Hatcher submitted names of individuals who were substantively qualified for programs and services falling under his program area and who could be placed on the evaluator pool spreadsheet for those categories of programs and services. However, Mr. Hatcher does not select the individual evaluators for a particular RFP. That is because selection of evaluators for a particular RFP is, by design, a random process, using the information about evaluator qualifications that is maintained on the spreadsheet.4/ Responses to RFP #P2062 were submitted in three volumes: Volume One was the "technical" proposal setting forth the prospective provider's organizational structure and management capability, the proposed program services, and proposed staffing; Volume Two was the "financial" proposal, including the proposed price sheet and budget and the provider's Supplier Qualifier Report prepared by Dun & Bradstreet; and Volume Three was the "past performance" section to demonstrate the provider's knowledge and experience in operating similar programs. Ms. Atwood conducted the review and scoring of the financial proposals in a fairly mechanical process of pulling out numbers from each cost proposal and, also, pulling Dun & Bradstreet numbers for the prospective providers and putting them on a spreadsheet. No evidence was presented that Ms. Atwood was not sufficiently qualified to conduct this review. Mr. Hatcher conducted the evaluation of prospective providers' past performance. No evidence was presented that Mr. Hatcher was not sufficiently qualified to conduct this review. Three evaluators were randomly selected from the pool of potential evaluators designated for IDDS reviews to evaluate and score the "technical" component of responses to RFP #P2062: Karen McNeal, Jeffrey Balliet, and Cheryl Surls. Of these three evaluators, Petitioner presented the testimony of only the first two, and Petitioner directed its qualification challenge to only one, Ms. McNeal. Ms. McNeal is employed in the Department's Probation program area. She is responsible for the oversight of the Duval Assessment Center that screens youth to determine their detention or release. She has held that position since July 1, 2009. Before that position, she was detention superintendent for the St. John's Juvenile Detention Center. She has been with the Department since October 2001. Before joining the Department, Ms. McNeal was a program analyst for ten years with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Ms. McNeal went through a four-week juvenile probation officer certification course before assuming her current position in Probation. That Probation training course included a review of the various prevention programs falling under the probation program area umbrella, including IDDS. However, Ms. McNeal does not have specific programmatic experience with IDDS. Ms. McNeal had not previously served as an evaluator on an RFP, before this experience. In accordance with the Department's internal procedure, Ms. McNeal underwent training by Ms. Atwood in the competitive procurement process on November 17, 2009. Mr. Balliet, the other member of the technical component evaluation team who testified, has held the position of contract manager for the Department since 2006. Before that time, he supervised a contract management unit at the district level and, also, served as assistant chief probation officer for Circuit 5, where he monitored compliance of IDDS programs in that circuit. Mr. Balliet has undergone training in the competitive procurement process multiple times. Although Mr. Balliet has had specific experience with IDDS programs, he did not think that such specific experience was necessary to evaluate an RFP dealing with IDDS programs, if one had a background that would otherwise allow for an understanding of the process. As noted above, the third evaluator on the three-person evaluation team for the technical component was Ms. Surls, who did not testify. Petitioner did not present any evidence to establish that Ms. Surls was not qualified to serve as an evaluator. Beyond the sheer difference in name of the particular services addressed by this RFP--IDDS versus other programs and services falling under the umbrella of the Probation and Community Intervention program area, Petitioner failed to establish that the experience and training Ms. McNeal has obtained over the years and, particularly, since assuming the oversight position for Duval Assessment Center, is not appropriate or sufficient to qualify her to evaluate proposals for IDDS. Petitioner presented no evidence that the components of an IDDS program are substantively dissimilar from the components of the services and programs in which Ms. McNeal has attained direct experience and training or that staffing considerations are dissimilar. Petitioner's case began and ended with the fact that Ms. McNeal has no direct experience, specifically with IDDS programs, and that Ms. McNeal had not previously evaluated proposals submitted in response to an RFP. The record does not reveal whether there would be any other Department employees, besides Mr. Balliet, who had direct experience specifically with IDDS programs and who, also, had evaluated proposals for an RFP before. Imposing either or both of these requirements for potential evaluators could serve as an impossibly restrictive hindrance to an agency trying to follow the competitive procurement process while also carrying out the agency's functions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice, dismissing the Petition filed by Petitioner, Psychotherapeutic Services of Florida, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2011.
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, in which Petitioner claims to be substantially affected by an agency statement that allegedly violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The subject matter at issue here concerns two sentences at page 11 of a pamphlet generated by Respondent, which is entitled "Florida's Educational Opportunities for Students with Sensory Impairments (2000)(the DOE Pamphlet)." The two sentences state that the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind (FSDB) is an available educational option for sensory-impaired children in Florida.
Findings Of Fact Background Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 (d)(1)(A). As a condition to IDEA funding, each state must have a policy in effect that executes the principal goal of the Act, which is to assure "all children with disabilities [have] the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Section 1412(1). In 1997, Congress substantially amended IDEA. On March 12, 1999, regulations were published at Part B of Part 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), implementing the 1997 IDEA amendments. The IDEA, as amended, is implemented in Florida at Section 230.23(4)(m), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 6A-6, Florida Administrative Code. IDEA’s centerpiece is the "individualized education program" (IEP), which is a detailed statement "summarizing the child’s abilities, outlining the goals for the child’s education and specifying the services the child will receive." Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988). The IEP provides special education and related services tailored to the child’s unique needs and designed to provide the child with a "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Sections 1401(8), 1414(d); 34 CFR Sections 300.13, 300.15, 300.344-300.347; Section 230.23(4)(m)5, Florida Statutes; Rule 6A-6.03028, Florida Administrative Code. A team including the child’s teachers, local education agency representatives and the child’s parents creates the IEP; 20 U.S.C. Section 1414(d)(1)(B); 34 CFR Section 300.344; Rule 6A-6.03028, Florida Administrative Code. Both IDEA and the parallel Florida Statute state that special education students should be educated with non-disabled peers "to the maximum extent appropriate," and that separate classes or schooling should be used if "the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." See 34 CFR Section 300.550 and Section 230.23(4)(m)6, Florida Statutes. Placement must be determined on a child-by-child basis. Section 230.23(4)(m), Florida Statutes, generally identifies the educational options available for sensory- impaired children in Florida, including FSDB. That statute is implemented in pertinent part by Respondent at Rules 6A-6.03014, and 6A-6.03022, Florida Administrative Code, which set school district admissions criteria for visually impaired and dual- sensory impaired children, respectively. One of the options listed in the statute is FSDB. Section 230.23(4)(m)3, Florida Statutes. Section 242.3305, Florida Statutes, states the "responsibilities and mission" for FSDB. In pertinent part, it provides that FSDB educates "hearing-impaired and visually impaired students in the state who meet enrollment criteria." Rule 6D-3.002, Florida Administrative Code, implements that statute by setting forth the "Admission and Enrollment Requirements" for FSDB. The DOE Pamphlet was generated in 1997, and amended in 2000, to explain the special education options available to parents of sensory-impaired school-age children in Florida. The Parties Petitioner is a nine-year-old student who is legally blind and otherwise developmentally impaired. He resides in St. Johns County, Florida, and attends classes for the sensory- impaired offered by the St. Johns County School District. His parents moved from Belize in September, 1999, for the express purpose of enrolling Petitioner at FSDB. Respondent is the head of the state agency that published the DOE Pamphlet. FSDB is a state school that, pursuant to Section 242.3305, Florida Statutes, maintains a residential program for educating sensory-impaired children in Florida. The Factual Background The Petition asserts that Petitioner’s parents moved to St. Johns County in 1999, where they "chose to enroll the Petitioner in the . . . FSDB . . . as described in the DOE Pamphlet." The Petition notes that FSDB declined to accept Petitioner. The Petition further states Petitioner then filed multiple due process petitions pursuant to Section 232.23(4)(m), Florida Statutes, which "yielded an offer by FSDB that the Petitioner be evaluated over an extended period in a temporary assignment at FSDB." Thereafter, "As the parents’ choice of enrollment was denied by FSDB, Petitioner’s parents enrolled the Petitioner in the local St. Johns County School District." The Petitioner further states that he later sought County support for placement at FSDB, which was rejected because the County believed it could adequately educate Petitioner. The records of DOAH adequately set forth the factual background. Petitioner was denied admission to FSDB when he applied in 1999. Thereafter, his parents filed a due process petition to contest the FSDB denial (DOAH Case No. 99-493OE). Petitioner and FSDB entered into a Settlement Agreement, which allowed Petitioner to enroll at FSDB on a "temporary assignment basis for extended evaluation [in] accordance with Rule 6D- 3.002(4) . . ., for a period of 90 school days within which time [Petitioner] will participate in the educational program as established by the IEP team." The Petitioner dismissed his case, however, for reasons not apparent in this record, the child’s parents opted not to enroll their son in the school. On January 19, 2000, Petitioner’s parents again filed a request for a due process hearing, alleging that they made a "unilateral mistake" in entering into the first Settlement Agreement. (DOAH Case No. 00-0348E). On March 1, 2000, Petitioner and FSDB entered into another Settlement Agreement (the Second Settlement Agreement). The Second Settlement Agreement provided for the same 90-day temporary assignment, which would commence on the first day of the 2000-2001 school year. That agreement also provided that Petitioner could contest any decision made by FSDB after the temporary assignment. The Petitioner then dismissed his petition. On July 9, 2000, Petitioner filed a third request for due process hearing against FSDB (DOAH Case No. 00-2871E). It alleged that both settlement agreements denied rights under the IDEA, violated FSDB’s admissions rules, and the Second Settlement Agreement was an attempt by FSDB to "circumvent the requirements of law." Petitioner requested a hearing to determine "their conformity to both IDEA and FSDB Rule 6D." On August 8, 2000, DOAH dismissed the case on two grounds. First, Petitioner failed to allege a dispute subject to DOAH review, because Petitioner "clearly stated his intent to continue his enrollment in the public schools of St. Johns County . . .," and further stated his satisfaction with that school system. Final Order in N.H. v. F.S.D.B., Case No. 00- 2871E at p. 3. Second, it was dismissed because the Second Settlement Agreement barred the action. Id. at p.3, et seq. That order was not appealed, and became final. Petitioner filed a fourth due process petition on August 1, 2000 (DOAH Case No. 00-3129E), opposing FSDB’s IEP meeting set for August 8, 2000, which was set by FSDB to implement the Second Settlement Agreement. Petitioner later withdrew that request. FSDB has repeatedly stated, and continues to maintain, that it will excuse the terms of the Second Settlement Agreement to allow Petitioner to remain in the St. Johns County School District. Alternatively, FSDB continues to state Petitioner may temporarily enroll at FSDB pursuant to the Second Settlement Agreement. The Current Case Petitioner filed the instant rule challenge on January 21, 2001. His father received a copy of the predecessor 1997 version of the DOE Pamphlet in August 2000, from a representative of the Dade County School District. He asserts the following two sentences constitute an unpromulgated rule in violation of Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes: Parents in Florida have the right to choose the educational setting they consider most appropriate for their child who has a hearing or visual impairment. FSDB is an option in the continuum of placement for the education of students with sensory impairments. The Petition claims Petitioner is adversely affected by the two sentences due to the following three injuries: (1) his "parents were denied the right to choose the educational setting they feel most appropriate for their child"; (2) his sensory-impaired peers attend FSDB; and (3) the St. Johns County School District loses funding for special education of sensory- impaired children because most local parents of sensory-impaired children choose FSDB over the District. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of two employees of the Respondent, Shan Goff and Margot Palazesi. Both testified that the Respondent promulgated the DOE Pamphlet as an informational document for parents and others dealing with sensory-impaired children in Florida. Ms. Goff testified that DOE generates a multitude of similar brochures and pamphlets. She further stated that there is no relation between funding of FSDB and funding of local school districts’ special education programs. The DOE Pamphlet is clear. At page 3, the DOE Pamphlet distinguishes between mandatory education of sensory- impaired children in school districts and discretionary admissions at FSDB: School districts must provide educational programs to each eligible student who has a sensory impairment, beginning on the student’s third birthday and continuing until the student’s 22nd birthday or until the student graduates with a standard diploma, whichever comes first. * * * For students between the ages of 5 and 22 who have sensory impairments and who meet enrollment requirements, the FSDB provides educational and co-curricular programs, support services, day school and residential programs. Immediately following the two challenged sentences, the DOE Pamphlet advises: Interested parents may contact the School’s Parent Information Office for information regarding admission . . . There is no evidence that the DOE Pamphlet, read in pari materia, is inconsistent with the laws, regulations, or policies of the federal government.
The Issue The matter for consideration in this case concerns Petitioner's challenge to the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services', award of a contract for services to provide treatment of youth in the Juvenile Alternative Services Projects (JASP) for Hillsborough and Manatee Counties. In particular, Petitioner contends that it did not receive due and fair consideration in accord with the criteria established by law. Petitioner stipulated, during the hearing, that it was not challenging the sufficiency of the Request for Proposal (RFP) pursuant to which bids were submitted nor the sufficiency or propriety of the criteria contained within the RFP. WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS Petitioner presented as witnesses Dr. Peter Parrado, Executive Director of Juvenile Services Program, Inc.; Mr. Jack F. Wood, Program Supervisor, Children, Youth & Families (HRS); Mr. Patrick Keefe, District VI Intake Supervisor for HRS; Judge James P. Calhoun, Circuit Judge for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; Mr. John Benito, Assistant Public Defender for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit; and Mr. Andrew Alexandre, District VI Intake Supervisor for Respondent (HRS). By stipulation of counsel, the direct testimony of Mr. Benito and Mr. Alexandre were presented by deposition and counsel for Respondent had the opportunity to cross examine those two (2) witnesses during the hearing. Respondent called as its witnesses Mr. Larry Lumpee, an employee of Respondent and Mr. William F. Bowman, Director of Bay Area Youth Services, Inc. The parties presented twelve (12) joint exhibits. Joint Exhibit I was the Request for Proposal for the Manatee County JASP and Joint Exhibit 2 was the Request for Proposal for the Hillsborough County JASP. Joint Composite Exhibits 3 and 4 were the proposals or bids of Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., for Manatee and Hillsborough Counties respectively. Joint Composite Exhibit 5 was the proposal or bid of Boy's Club of Manatee County, Inc., for the Manatee County JASP. Joint Composite Exhibits 6' and 7 were the proposals or bids of Juvenile Services Program, Inc., for Manatee County and Hillsborough County respectively. Joint Composite Exhibit 8 was the rating sheets of the selection committee for Hillsborough County and Joint Composite Exhibit 9 was the rating sheets for the selection committee for Manatee County. Joint Exhibits 10, 11 and 12 were the letters of notification of action dated May 28, 1982, from the Respondent to Boy's Club of Manatee County, Inc., Juvenile Services Program, Inc., and Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., respectively. Those exhibits were admitted. Petitioner also offered the depositions of Mr. John Benito and Mr. Andrew Alexandre and with agreement of counsel for Respondent, these were admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2. Petitioner had marked for identification its letter of protest dated June 10, 1982. This was not admitted as an exhibit. Respondent offered no exhibits other than the Joint Exhibits listed above. Counsel for both Petitioner and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that such findings of fact are not adopted in this Recommended Order, they have been rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has, since 1979, operated the Juvenile Alternative Services Project. The program provides diversion and treatment for first-time less serious juvenile offenders prior to an adjudication of delinquency by the courts. The JASP program came into existence in 1979, through a pilot program in HRS Districts V, VI and VII. The pilot program in District VI was operated by Youth Program Services, Inc., based in Orlando, Florida. The JASP pilot program in District V was operated by Juvenile Services Program, Inc., the Petitioner in this case. The contract for District VI, which consists of Manatee and Hillsborough Counties, was re-bid annually. The Requests for Proposal used in the years 1980, 1981, and 1982, except for very minor changes, were virtually identical. The contracts which are the subject of this case were let for bid pursuant to two (2) Requests for Proposals (hereafter RFP) dated April 23, 1982. (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2) These two (2) RFPs advertised for two (2) separate contracts for the Manatee County JASP and Hillsborough County JASP. Proposals under both RFPs were required to be submitted no later than May 14, 1982, at 5:00 P.M. The Boys' Clubs of Manatee County, Inc.; Juvenile Services Program, Inc., and Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., submitted timely proposals for the Manatee County program. (Joint Exhibits 3, 5 and 6) Timely proposals for the Hillsborough County program were received from Juvenile Services Program, Inc., and Bay Area Youth Services, Inc. (Joint Exhibits 4 and 7) The proposals were evaluated by selection committees for each county. Members of the selection committee for Hillsborough County were Judge James Calhoun, Marcia Leonard Bailey, John Benito, Jack Wood, Patricia Moran, Andrew Alexandre and Patrick Keefe. These persons included a Circuit Judge, Assistant State Attorney, Assistant Public Defender, a citizen at large, and three (3) HRS employees. A similar committee performed the evaluation for Manatee County. In addition to reviewing the written proposals, the committees heard oral presentations from those parties which had submitted written proposals. Following the oral presentations, the committee members rated the various proposals by filling out rating sheets containing the various criteria contained in the RFP and used by the selection committee in arriving at a recommendation. (Joint Exhibits 8 and 9) The criteria were: A programmatic expertise; Prior experience--personnel history; Organization abilities; Qualifications of personnel--abilities to hire qualified personnel; Budget in cost effectiveness program; and Overall adequacy of personnel. The committee for Hillsborough County rated the Petitioner and Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., very closely, with Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., receiving 677 total points and Juvenile Services Program, Inc., receiving 668 points. Following their evaluations, the committees recommended Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., as the entity to provide JASP programs for both Hillsborough and Manatee Counties. Thereafter, Juvenile Services Program, Inc., timely and properly filed its protests and requested a formal hearing pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 120.57(1). Both Juvenile Services Program, Inc., and Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., were qualified to perform the services requested by the RFPs. No evidence was presented relating to the selection process in Manatee County and there was no evidence that the Petitioner did not receive a full, fair, and proper evaluation of all criteria in the RFP for the Manatee County program. All five (5) committee members from the Hillsborough County selection committee who were called as witnesses testified that both the Petitioner and Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., were well qualified. The major contention of the Petitioner focused on the fact that Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., was a new corporation and would not be able to perform the administrative and financial functions of the JASP programs as well as Juvenile Services Program, Inc., which had been in existence since 1976. There was no evidence presented which showed that the selection committees failed to evaluate each and every criterion established by the RFP. This was borne out by the rating sheets as well as the five (5) committee members called as witnesses by Petitioner. Dr. Peter Parrado, Executive Director of Juvenile Services Program, Inc., also testified about the inquiry by the committee into the various criteria during the oral presentations. Both the Petitioner and Bay Area Youth Services were evaluated by the committee in all criteria areas. The committee specifically inquired into the fact that Bay Area was a new organization, incorporated in April, 1982, and was satisfied that that would not interfere with the proper performance of the services requested by the RFP. Mr. William F. Bowman, Director of Bay Area Youth Services, Inc., and one (1) of the members of its Board of Directors appeared before the selection committee. The entire existing District VI staff of Youth Programs, Inc., was to continue in place with Bay Area Youth Services. Both Dr. Parrado and Mr. Bowman had been involved in the JASP program since its inception in 1979. Dr. Parrado was executive director of the Petitioner which had had the JASP contract for District V since the pilot program in 1979. Mr. Bowman, as a former employee of Youth Program Services, Inc., was the program director for the JASP program in District VI and had performed that function since the pilot program in 1979. Both men were well qualified to supervise the JASP programs for District VI. There was a specific requirement that the providers submitting proposals be able to have the projects operational by July 1, 1982. The committee was concerned with the ability of Juvenile Services Program, Inc., to step inland take over a program with which it was not familiar. The JASP program in District VI operated differently than the program in District V where Juvenile Services Program was already operating JASP. Mr. Bowman and the staff of Bay Area Youth Services were the same staff that had previously operated the JASP program in District VI for Youth Programs, Inc. Mr. Bowman and his staff were thoroughly familiar with the operation and procedures of the JASP program in District VI. The Committee was also concerned with continuity of the existing JASP operations in District VI and Dr. Parrado had not given assurance as to what, if any, of the existing staff would be retained if Juvenile Services Program, Inc., was awarded the contract. Bay Area Youth Services already had its staff and physical operation in place and would be less disruptive of the program'5 continuity if awarded the contract. The key individuals in the supervision and operation of JASP in District VI by the two (2) bidders would have been Dr. Parrado and Mr. Bowman. JASP in District VI would be the only program operated by Bay Area Youth Services and Mr. Bowman would be giving one hundred percent (100 percent) of his time to that program. On the other hand, Dr. Parrado's organization would have been operating JASP in three (3) other districts as well as several other youth programs in other counties. The budget submitted by Juvenile Services Program reflected that Dr. Parrado would spend fifteen percent (15 percent) of his time supervising the District VI JASP. Dr. Parrado testified that he would give as much time to District VI required but gave the committee no firm estimate as to how much of his time he would be able to be personally involved in District VI. The witnesses rated the performance of Mr. Bowman and his staff as excellent for the previous years they had operated JASP in District VI. Some administrative problems had developed while Youth Programs, Inc., provided JASP services in District VI. These were in the nature of late payrolls and delays in paying bills. The problems emanated from the Orlando office and were not attributable to Mr. Bowman and the staff in District VI. Because of the problems which had occurred with the large organization of Youth Programs, Inc., the committee was concerned that the same types of problems might arise with Juvenile Services Program, Inc., which is also a large organization. To aid in handling the administrative details of JASP, Bay Area Youth Services had retained an outside firm to do the payroll and tax and other payroll-related functions. A local accounting firm had been retained to monitor and take care of accounting and bookkeeping functions. The committee was satisfied that Mr. Bowman's organization would be able to adequately handle the administrative details of JASP in District VI. Although much of the administrative and personnel matters under Youth Programs, Inc., were handled out of the Orlando Central Office, Mr. Bowman had for three (3) years been responsible for all hiring, firing, and supervision of personnel in the District VI JASP. He also did all local buying of supplies and related items. He also was responsible for locating and obtaining office space and equipment. The director of the program in District VI performs a liaison function between the provider and those entities using the services such as the State Attorney's office, Public Defender's office, and the Circuit Judges responsible for juvenile matters. Mr. Bowman had developed good rapport and credibility with each of these entities as well as HRS counselors in District VI and had done an excellent job in selling the JASP program to these agencies.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female. She has been continuously employed by Respondent since February 14, 1972. Respondent has at all material times employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks. For several years, Petitioner was classified as a Public Assistance Specialist I and worked as a certification worker in the food stamp program administered by Respondent. In December 1984, Petitioner agreed with her supervisor, Dewey DeLoach, to serve as a second party reviewer for six months. The position required someone with superior experience and knowledge of food stamp eligibility criteria. In addition to selecting Petitioner on these grounds, Mr. DeLoach sought to make the assignment in order to remove Petitioner from client contact. On a number of occasions, she had been abrasive and rude to her clients. The second party reviewer is responsible for monitoring the work of all other food stamp certification workers in the office. Although somewhat prestigious, the job was stressful due to the monitoring duties. Employees generally did not want to be assigned to the job for more than six months, especially because, at the time, the pay was the same as that for a food stamp certification worker. Although Petitioner was competent as a food stamp certification worker, she had recurring problems with client relations. In one case, she asked a client seeking public assistance whether she was Jewish and, learning that she was, told her that Petitioner had never met a Jew who needed help. Petitioner then advised the client to get help from "her own" people. In July 1985, Petitioner returned to her certification duties, but four months later Mr. DeLoach reassigned her to the position of second party reviewer due to her continued difficulties in dealing with the public. In the same month, Petitioner was evaluated for a pay raise under the then new merit pay program. She was eligible for the raise as a result of the evaluations and recommendations from her immediate supervisor, her supervisor's supervisor (Mr. DeLoach), and the department head. Complicated administrative rules governed the merit pay program in 1985. Notwithstanding the favorable evaluations and recommendations, Petitioner's eligibility for a merit pay raise did not guarantee her a pay hike due to limited funds. As was the case with all other similarly situated employees, Petitioner was next placed on a prioritized list with other employees eligible for a merit pay raise. Each month, priorities on the list changed as a result of the addition of new persons, who, under uniformly applied rules, might receive a higher priority than persons already on the list. Each month, Respondent awarded the available merit pay to eligible employees based on their priority on the list. Pursuant to the merit pay rules, Petitioner was duly awarded a merit pay increase about one year after she had applied. As with other employees receiving merit pay hikes, Petitioner's raise was retroactive only one or two months prior to the award and not to the date of the application. In December 1985, and January 1986, Respondent refused to pay a travel voucher submitted by Petitioner for expenses incurred while she was on a temporary disaster assignment in Tallahassee. This decision, which was made by Deputy District Administrator Sidney McAllister, was consistent with Respondent's policies requiring advance approval of such expenses. There was no evidence that other employees were treated differently than Petitioner in this regard. Mr. McAllister rejected the travel voucher prior to his having learned that Petitioner had filed charges of racial discrimination in her employment with Respondent. At the time, Petitioner had filed a union grievance alleging a violation of the union contract in a manner that did not involve Petitioner's race; she had not filed any charges of race discrimination. In December 1985, Petitioner filed with Respondent a request-for- promotion form expressing interest in being considered for vacancies within Respondent as they arose. The purpose of the form was to simplify the application process for Petitioner by relieving her, for a period of one year, of the obligation of filing applications for specific job openings. The form that Petitioner originally filed with Respondent was returned to her on January 2, 1986, because it was improperly filled out. She added the missing information and returned the form to Respondent. Petitioner was seeking a position as a child support enforcement investigator. Respondent had recently obtained funding for 22 new positions in the Orlando office. Certain of these positions were to be filled effective the beginning of 1986, but most of them were not filled until later in 1986. Closing dates for applications for the first several positions to be filled were in October and November 1985, which had passed prior to Petitioner's filing of the incomplete request-for-promotion form. Filing the request-for-promotion form made Petitioner eligible to be considered for positions for which the closing date had not yet passed. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, the form did not obligate Respondent to interview her, especially for positions for which the closing date had passed prior to the filing of the form. The next applicable closing date for applications for child support enforcement investigators was May 1986. Petitioner was notified by letter dated July 21, 1986, that she had been selected to fill one of the next available positions as a child support enforcement investigator. She began work on August 8, 1986, and occupies this job at present. Petitioner's initial rate of pay was $589.39 biweekly, which was what she was making at the time of the change in duties. However, this rate of pay was the third highest of those persons hired to fill the 22 newly created child support enforcement investigator positions. There was no evidence of racial discrimination in the hiring practices of Respondent in 1986 with respect to child support enforcement investigators for the Orlando office, which hired Petitioner. Four of the 22 persons hired in 1986 were black, one of whom received the highest rate of pay among the 22 new hires. There was no evidence that the procedures employed by Respondent to contact persons who had expressed interest in these positions were intended to discriminate on the basis of race or in fact discriminated on the basis of race. Child support enforcement investigators were first hired in the Orlando office in 1976. The evidence failed to establish the number of initial investigators, which was considerably less than the 22 new positions filled in 1986. The evidence failed to establish how many of the initial investigators were black, although at least one was. There was little if any turnover among those persons initially hired. The first significant openings occurred in 1986 when the 22 new positions were created. Following her employment as a child support enforcement investigator, Petitioner's son was involved in a child support enforcement matter that had apparently been pending at the time of her employment. He was eventually taken to court where the judge required that he purge himself of contempt by paying the entire child support arrearage of over $3000. In connection with this matter, Petitioner's son had to serve 172 days in jail. The substantial period of incarceration, together with the enforcement of the arrearage, negate Petitioner's testimony that Respondent participated in the prosecution of her son in retaliation for her filing a Charge of Discrimination with the Orlando Human Relations Department in February 1986. The Determination: Cause, dated June 28, 1988, cited as evidence of discrimination the hiring of Ms. Jane Downs, who is white, on or about January 17, 1986, for a position for which Petitioner was denied an interview. The failure of Petitioner to timely file a request-for-promotion form, with respect to the opening for which Ms. Downs was hired, precluded Petitioner from consideration for this opening, by operation of law. The Determination: Cause cited as additional evidence of race discrimination the failure of Respondent to hire any blacks for three other child support enforcement investigator positions or even interview a significant number of blacks for these positions. The failure of Petitioner to timely file the request-for-promotion form explains her exclusion from the interviews for these positions, which were among the first to be filled. Persons interviewed for these positions were selected without regard to race and, in most cases, without knowledge of the applicant's race. Moreover, when the race of the persons hired for all 22 persons is considered, there is no evidence of race discrimination.
The Issue The issue is whether the proposed award of the contract for Request for Proposals (RFP) No. P2032 to Daniel Memorial, Inc. (Daniel), is contrary to the specifications of the RFP.
Findings Of Fact DJJ issued RFP No. P2032 on April 2, 2007. The RFP solicited proposals for a “20-slot day treatment program for youth placed on Probation, being released from a residential program, transitioning back into the community or classified as minimum risk, and a 100-slot service- oriented Intervention program with comprehensive case management services for youth which the programs are currently located in Pinellas and Pasco Counties ” The contract resulting from the RFP will be for a three-year term -- July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2010 -- with a renewal option for up to an additional three years at DJJ’s sole discretion. The RFP states that the maximum annual contract amount is $948,308, and prospective providers were required to propose a price at or below that amount EYA and Daniel submitted timely, responsive proposals in response to the RFP. Daniel’s proposal offered a slightly lower price than EYA’s proposal.1 On June 11, 2007, DJJ posted notice of its intent to award the contract to Daniel. Thereafter, EYA timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest challenging the proposed award of the contract to Daniel. The RFP provides that the proposals were to be evaluated and scored in three categories: technical proposal, financial proposal, and past performance. The past performance category focuses on the prospective provider’s knowledge and experience in operating non-residential juvenile justice programs. The criteria related to the past performance category are contained in Attachment C to the RFP. Attachment C consists of three parts: Part I - Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs; Part II - Evaluation for Past Performance in the United States Outside of Florida; and Part III - Evaluation for Professional Accreditation in the United States. The focus of the dispute in this case is on Part III. A proposal could receive a total of 1,000 points if, as is the case with both EYA and Daniel, the prospective provider operated other DJJ-contracted non-residential programs in Florida. The proposals could receive up to 240 points for Attachment C, with a maximum of 40 points for Part III. The RFP provides that the proposal that receives the highest total points will be awarded the contract. Daniel’s proposal received a total of 600.13 points, which was the highest overall score. Daniel received 176 points for Attachment C, including 30 points for Part III. EYA’s proposal received a total of 573.46 points, which was the second highest overall score. EYA received 143.7 points for Attachment C, including zero points for Part III. EYA contends that Daniel should not have received any points for Part III, which would have resulted in Daniel’s overall score being 30 points lower, or 570.13, and would have given EYA the highest overall score. Part III of Attachment C asks whether the prospective provider currently operates non-residential juvenile justice programs that are accredited and in good standing with certain accrediting agencies, including the Council on Accreditation (COA). If so, the RFP requires the prospective provider to include supporting documentation. The prospective provider receives 10 points for each accredited program listed in Part III of Attachment C. The RFP states multiple times that the supporting documentation “must include the start and end dates [of the programs], be current dated and valid at least through the start date of the Contract that results from this RFP,” and that it must state that “the program cited is a non-residential juvenile program and that is run by the prospective Provider.” The RFP also states multiple times that a prospective provider’s failure to provide the required supporting documentation “shall” result in zero points being awarded for Part III of Attachment C, and that DJJ “is not responsible for research to clarify the prospective Provider's documentation.” EYA did not list any programs in its response to Part III of Attachment C. Its wilderness programs are accredited by COA, but its non-residential juvenile justice programs are not accredited. EYA is currently seeking COA accreditation for the services provided in its non-residential programs based, in part, on DJJ’s scoring of Daniel’s proposal in this proceeding. Daniel listed three programs in its response to Part III: a behavioral management program in Circuit 4; a conditional release program in Circuits 6 and 13; and a behavioral management program in Circuit 7. The documentation provided by Daniel to show that the listed programs are accredited was a letter from COA dated August 18, 2006. The letter confirms that Daniel is accredited by COA; that the accreditation runs through September 30, 2010; and that the accreditation includes “the following programs:” Mental Health Services Psychosocial and Psychiatric Rehabilitation Services Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Services Case Management Services Foster and Kinship Care Services Supported Community Living Services Residential Treatment Services The letter does not on its face refer to the three programs listed by Daniel in its response to Part III. The letter does not on its face reflect whether the listed services were accredited in non-residential programs (as compared to residential programs) or in juvenile justice programs (as compared to adult programs or juvenile programs that do not involve the juvenile justice system). Each of the three programs listed by Daniel in its response to Part III is a non-residential program operated under contract with DJJ. Those programs were also listed by DJJ contract number in Daniel’s response to Part I of Attachment C. Paul Hatcher, the DJJ employee who evaluated the responses to the RFP with respect to Attachment C, was familiar with the three programs listed in Daniel’s response to Part III. He knew from his experience and his review of Part I of Attachment C that the programs were non-residential juvenile justice programs and he knew that the programs provided case management services and mental health services. Mr. Hatcher acknowledged that the COA letter does not specifically mention the three listed programs. He nevertheless considered the letter to be sufficient documentation of accreditation for the three programs because the letter indicated that Daniel, as an organization, was accredited and that it had specific accreditation for the services provided at the three listed programs. COA accredits organizations and services, not specific programs.2 On this issue, Dr. Hilda Shirk, a member of the COA Board of Trustees and an experienced COA peer reviewer, testified that “COA accreditation applies to the entire organization and the services that it provides” and that Daniel’s accreditation includes all of its programs that fall under the service areas listed in the COA letter, which is consistent with Mr. Hatcher’s interpretation of the letter. COA does not separately accredit services provided in residential and non-residential settings, nor does it separately accredit services provided to adults or juveniles. The standards used to evaluate case management services and mental health services, for example, are the same notwithstanding the setting or the type of client being served. COA performed its on-site accreditation review of Daniel in April 2006. It is unlikely that two of the three programs listed by Daniel in response to Part III -- the conditional release program in Circuits 6 and 13 (DJJ Contract No. P2013 and the behavior management program in Circuit 7 (DJJ Contract No. G8101 -- were evaluated by COA as part of that review because those programs had just started. That does not mean, however, that those programs are not accredited. Indeed, Dr. Shirk testified that an organization is not required to submit each new program to COA for review if the services offered in the program fit within a service area for which the organization has been accredited.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that DJJ issue a final order dismissing the EYA’s protest and awarding the contract for RFP No. P2032 to Daniel. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2007.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, a child care facility operating under a probation-status license, violated the terms of probation by committing three Class II Violations, as Petitioner alleges, and if so, whether the license should be suspended or revoked; and, alternatively, whether, if Respondent committed the alleged Class II Violations (or any of them), Petitioner should deny Respondent's application for renewal of license.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Wiz Kidz Learning 2, Inc. ("Wiz Kidz"), holds a probation-status Certificate of License, numbered C11MD1914, which authorizes the company to operate a child care facility in Palmetto Bay, Florida, for six months, from September 2, 2017, through March 1, 2018. The licensee does business under the name Wiz Kidz Learning 2. As the operator of a licensed child care facility, Wiz Kidz falls under the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner Department of Children and Families ("DCF"). At the time of the final hearing, Wiz Kidz had been a probation-status licensee for more than six months. DCF had converted Wiz Kidz' license to probation status effective June 29, 2017, after finding Wiz Kidz guilty of violating the staff-to-child ratio rules four times in a two-year period, as charged in an Amended Administrative Complaint dated May 25, 2017, which Wiz Kidz had not contested. The conditions of probation were that Wiz Kidz would pay all outstanding fines, not violate the staff-to-child ratio rules again, not commit any other Class I or Class II Violations while on probation, and submit to biweekly inspections. Wiz Kidz' initial probation-status license had been due to expire on September 1, 2017. Shortly before that date, however, Wiz Kidz had submitted a renewal application, which meant that, by operation of law, the probation-status license would not expire until DCF had finally acted upon Wiz Kidz' application for renewal.2/ Instead of simply allowing Wiz Kidz to operate on the "unexpired" license, however, DCF issued a new probationary license to Wiz Kidz effective from September 2, 2017, to March 1, 2018, which essentially renewed the initial probation-status license for another six-month period of probation.3/ On August 17, 2017, DCF employees Claudia Alvarado Campagnola and Quendra Gomez conducted an inspection of the Wiz Kidz facility between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., during which they observed three alleged incidents of noncompliance with "Class II" (mid-level) licensing standards, namely: (1) storing a toxic substance in a place accessible to children; (2) failing to provide adequate direct supervision; and (3) failing to possess a current attendance record during a fire drill. On September 26, 2017, DCF issued to Wiz Kidz a Notice of Intent to Deny Child Care Facility Licensure, which gave notice that DCF planned to deny Wiz Kidz' pending application for renewal of license because, on August 17, 2017, Wiz Kidz had been "cited for 3 class II violations and 7 class III violations in direct violation of [its] probationary license terms." The "toxic substance" seen on August 17, 2017, was an alcoholic beverage. Upon entering the facility, Ms. Gomez noticed two unopened bottles of champagne at the back of a shelf, behind (and partially obscured by) a large plastic toy and other items. There is no photograph of the shelf in evidence, and the descriptive testimony lacked precision; as near as the undersigned can tell, this shelf was several feet long, about one foot deep, and mounted about five feet high on one of the classroom walls. One detail is not disputed: the shelf was above the heads of even the oldest children in care (between the ages of six and seven years). Thus, even if a child could have seen the bottles, he would not have been able to take possession of them without deliberate effort; because the bottles were well out of reach, the child would have needed to stand on a stepladder or its equivalent (e.g., a suitable chair) to get his hands on them. There is no evidence that a stepladder was available. Ms. Gomez testified that a child could have pulled over a chair and climbed on it to reach the champagne bottles. Perhaps so. On the other hand, while the undersigned can reasonably infer that there were chairs in the classroom, he cannot reasonably infer that any of them would have been fit to enable a child to access the bottles. To establish the element of "accessibility" based on the theory that a chair could be used as a stepladder, DCF needed to prove that a suitable chair was actually there for a child present in the classroom to use. This it failed to do. There is no evidence regarding the dimensions of the available chairs, nor any evidence concerning the heights of the children. The witnesses provided only a rough idea of the height of the shelf; their reasonably consistent accounts constitute clear and convincing evidence of the general fact that the shelf was higher than the kids' heads, but not of the actual measurement. Absent proof of these material facts, Ms. Gomez's testimony regarding the way a child could have gotten hold of the champagne bottles is too speculative to support a finding that these items were, in fact, physically accessible to the children. In addition, there is no evidence suggesting that a child could have dragged a chair over to the shelf and clambered up without attracting the attention of an adult. Given that the shelf was located in the classroom, the undersigned infers that no child reasonably could have pulled this off, unless the adult in the room were asleep at the switch. Finally, it is worth mentioning that if a child were able to stand on a chair and grab a champagne bottle without being caught, he still would not have access to the "toxic substance" in the bottle unless he could somehow pour it out. There is no evidence in the record concerning how one opens a champagne bottle, but common experience teaches the undersigned that a young child (the children in care were less than eight years old) likely would have difficulty twisting out the cork. In any event, DCF failed to prove that any of the children at Wiz Kidz reasonably could have popped the cork on the champagne, and therefore it failed to prove that the champagne was accessible to a child. The other two alleged violations occurred during a fire drill, which the inspectors required Wiz Kidz to conduct, in their presence, during the children's nap time. Three children exited the facility in their bare feet. The area where the children were assembled after evacuating the "burning building" was near a dumpster; some litter and tree branches were on the ground. From these facts, which were not seriously disputed, DCF infers that the children were not adequately supervised. The undersigned rejects this inference, which does not reasonably and logically follow from the basic facts. To begin, there is no rule that requires children always to wear shoes. Thus, that some of the children had removed their footwear before taking a nap is of no concern. When the alarm went off, staff evidently did not make these children pause to put their shoes back on, which would have protected their feet——but delayed their exit. To be sure, it is probably a good practice, generally speaking, to prevent young children from going outside barefoot. Clearly, however, it is best not to let them perish in a fire; in an emergency, getting to safety is the highest priority. Because the purpose of a fire drill is to simulate an actual emergency, the fact of the barefoot children prompts undersigned to infer, not that staff failed to provide adequate supervision, but that staff facilitated the speediest escape under the circumstances. During the fire drill, one of the teachers failed to take along a current attendance record when leaving the building, which (unlike the wearing of shoes) is mandated by rule. Ultimate Factual Determinations Wiz Kidz is not guilty of storing a toxic substance in a place accessible to children because the evidence failed to establish an incident of noncompliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.002(1)(f). Wiz Kidz is not guilty of failing to provide adequate direct supervision because the evidence failed to establish an incident of noncompliance with rule 65C-22.001(5)(a). The undersigned determines, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a staff member failed to possess a current attendance record during a fire drill, which constitutes an incident of noncompliance with licensing standard No. 33-12, which implements rule 65C-22.002(7)(e). This was Wiz Kidz' first occasion of noncompliance with licensing standard No. 33-12.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding Wiz Kidz not in violation of the terms of probation. It is further RECOMMENDED that Wiz Kidz' application for renewal of license not be denied based on the commission of a Technical Support Violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2018.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Chester R. Cooper, is an African-American male. He was employed by Respondent, Gulf Coast Treatment Center, on May 19, 1998, as a youth care worker at its facility in Fort Walton Beach, Florida (assignment center). Petitioner was terminated on November 5, 1998. During his employment, Petitioner worked the "midnight shift" from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. His supervisor was Ollie Rainwater. Respondent operated its facility under a contract with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The Fort Walton Beach facility performs behavioral, medical, educational, and psychological assessments and completes a 21-day report to DJJ prior to the assignment of a each youth to a residential commitment facility. The program director of the Center was Mikel Currie. In November 1998, four of the five shift supervisors were African-Americans, and approximately 50 percent of the youth care workers at the Center are African-Americans. Pursuant to the requirements of the DJJ, the Center promulgated and briefed all employees on a Use of Force Policy, which provided in relevant part, that mechanical restraints, such as handcuffs or leg cuffs, may be used upon the youths only to prevent injury or property damage. The policy prohibits the shackling of youths together and the practice of hog-tying. Hog-tying is securing a youth's legs and hands together behind the youth's back. The policy also required that any use of mechanical restraints be reported in writing by the staff member involved within two hours of the incident. All youth care workers are provided with some training in this area. The Employee Conduct Policy expressly prohibits the "shielding" of any employee from the consequences of misconduct and imposes a duty upon all employees to report any misconduct. The language of this policy does not limit these reporting obligations to one's immediate supervisor. Such reports may be made to the program director or any member of the administration. Petitioner was aware of the policy to report misconduct, but believed that he was supposed to report the misconduct to his immediate supervisor, who was the person who was actually perpetrating the misconduct involved in this case. On November 4, 1998, Petitioner was assigned to the Boys' Unit of the Assignment Center. His shift began at 10:00 p.m., on November 4, 1998, and ended at 6:30 a.m., on November 5, 1998. Ollie Rainwater (African-American), shift supervisor, and Jimmy Coleman (African-American), youth care worker, were the only other employees assigned to the Boys' Unit on Petitioner's shift. Jesse Mathews (Caucasian) worked on November 3 and 4, 1998, on the second shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. On November 3, 1998, Annette Whittlesay, a youth care worker on the female side of the facility observed Ollie Rainwater and Jesse Mathews, handcuff two youths together. However, she never reported this information to anyone in the administration. The Boys' Unit is comprised of two residential sides, each of which is approximately 75 to 80 feet long. The residential sides form a hallway divided by double doors. When Petitioner arrived at work on November 4, 1998, he observed Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets handcuffed together. The handcuffing occurred when Petitioner was at the other end of the hall. The doors were closed and Petitioner did not see the actual handcuffing. The youths told Petitioner that Mr. Rainwater, along with Jimmy Coleman, handcuffed them. It took a while for Petitioner to obtain this information because the two youths were fighting each other while cuffed. During this time Petitioner sat down. Petitioner then went to find the key to the cuffs to uncuff the boys. Upon the program director's arrival at the Center, around 5:00 a.m., on November 5, 1998, one of the youths, Quentin Williams, reported to him that he had been handcuffed together with another youth, Ricky Sheets, by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman. Quentin Williams reported that one of his wrists and one of his ankles had been shackled to the wrist and the ankle of Ricky Sheets, and that they had fought with each other while shackled together. During this struggle, Quentin Williams had been bitten on his finger by Sheets. Quentin Williams also told Mikel Currie that Petitioner had sat in a chair and laughed at them while they struggled. Mikel Currie sent Quentin Williams to the nurse for treatment of his finger and immediately commenced an investigation of the matter. Mikel Currie determined that no report of any use of mechanical restraints had been made by anyone from the night shift. Mikel Currie directed each of the youths who had been shackled or had witnessed the shackling or hog-tying to prepare a written statement in their own words. In order to avoid any collusion, the youths were separated from each other as they prepared their written statements. After the youths completed their written statements, each one was interviewed separately by Mikel Currie and Keith Williams (African-American), the first shift supervisor. Quentin Williams told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that he had been shackled to Ricky Sheets by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman on two consecutive nights. He also told them that "Mr. Cooper was sitting in a chair laughing" while he and Sheets were fighting. The youth did not state that any other employee was involved in the incident. Ricky Sheets' report was consistent with that of Quentin Williams. He identified Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman as the two staff members who had shackled him to Quentin Williams and did not state that any other employee was involved in the shackling. Youth, Frederick Alls, confirmed that Jimmy Coleman and Ollie Rainwater had shackled Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets together on two nights and that Ollie Rainwater had hog- tied Alls with a set of leg cuffs earlier that morning. Alls did not state that any other employee was involved in the shackling or hog-tying. Youth, Brandon Mason, told Mikel Currie and Quentin Williams that two youths had been shackled together by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman. He also told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that Petitioner sat in a chair watching while Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman shackled Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets together. Mason identified Ollie Rainwater, Jimmy Coleman, and Petitioner as the only employees involved in the shackling incidents. Two other youths, Edward Roberson and John Croshat, were interviewed and identified Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman as the staff members who shackled the two youths together. During the investigation, none of the six youths who were interviewed ever told Mikel Currie or Keith Williams that Jessie Mathews, a white youth care worker assigned to the evening shift (2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.) had participated in any mechanical restraints or misconduct of any nature. From the youths, Mikel Currie determined that the shackling incidents occurred around 1:00 a.m., several hours after Jessie Mathews had left the Center. Neither Mikel Currie nor Keith Williams had any reason to suspect Jesse Mathews was involved. Mikel Currie and Keith Williams interviewed Ollie Rainwater on the afternoon of November 5, 1998. Ollie Rainwater admitted his involvement in the shackling and hog-tying incidents of November 4 and 5, 1998. He was terminated for violations of the Center's Use of Force and Employee Conduct policies. Ollie Rainwater never claimed that Jessie Mathews, or any other white employee, had been involved in misconduct. Mikel Currie and Keith Williams also interviewed Jimmy Coleman that same afternoon. Jimmy Coleman admitted that he was involved in the incidents on November 4 and 5, 1998. His role had been to bring the restraints to Ollie Rainwater when he ordered him to do so. Jimmy Coleman was terminated from employment. At hearing Jimmy Coleman testified he told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that Jesse Mathews had participated in a similar incident the day before. However, the assertion is not credible because Mikel Currie and Keith Williams both testified unequivocally that Jimmy Coleman never mentioned that Jesse Mathews, or any other white employee, had been involved. This testimony is bolstered by the interviews given by the various youths. Mikel Currie attempted to reach Petitioner several times by telephone on November 5, 1998, but was unsuccessful. Keith Williams reached Petitioner by telephone around 1:00 p.m. on that date, as detailed in his contemporaneous memorandum of this conversation. Keith Williams asked Petitioner if he was aware of the shackling incidents and Petitioner denied any knowledge. Petitioner repeated several times that he knew nothing about the incidents. He made that statement because he did not directly see the handcuffing of the youths. He did not reveal his knowledge regarding events after the act of handcuffing. Mikel Currie and Keith Williams did not believe Petitioner's claims that he knew nothing about the incident because the Boys' Unit is a relatively small area (150 feet in length), Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman admitted their involvement and several of the youths had stated that Petitioner had observed the shackling incident. Accordingly, Mikel Currie and Keith Williams decided to terminate Petitioner for knowingly attempting to mislead Keith Williams during the course of the investigation, failure to report the improper restraint of the youths, and humiliating the youths by laughing at them while they were shackled. Petitioner was terminated on November 7, 1998. Contrary to his testimony, Petitioner never advised Mikel Currie, Keith Williams, or any other member of management that Jessie Mathews had any alleged involvement in the improper use of restraints. In his "Letter of Rebuttal" submitted to the Center four and one-half months after his termination, Petitioner never mentioned any involvement on the part of Jessie Mathews. He did, however, admit in this letter that he did observe the two youths shackled together while they fought. Since Respondent did not know of Jessie Mathews' similar behavior, Jessie Mathews was not terminated or otherwise disqualified. Later, however, Jessie Mathews, the white employee involved in the November 3, 1998, handcuffing was involved in an argument with another shift supervisor. Mr. Mathews used profanity and acted unprofessionally. He was suspended and demoted as a result of his misconduct. During the two months following the termination of Ollie Rainwater, Jeremy Coleman, and Petitioner, a majority of the individuals hired as youth care workers at the Center were minority group members (7 African-Americans and 1 Hispanic out of 15 hirees). Robert Cannon, a white youth care worker, was terminated by Mikel Currie on October 16, 1998, for suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol and refusing to take a drug/alcohol test. Neither Mikel Currie nor Keith Williams had any knowledge of any prior misconduct of this nature on the part of Robert Cannon. Tammy Curry, a white female youth care worker, was subject to an assault by a female youth on December 13, 1998. Mikel Currie placed Tammy Curry on leave while he investigated the incident. Based upon his investigation, Mikel Currie reinstated Tammy Curry because he determined that she had been punched in the face and pulled down the hallway by her hair by a youth in an unprovoked attack. Mikel Currie concluded that she had acted properly in self-defense. The youth was charged with battery and Tammy Curry was reinstated. Additionally, the Inspector General at the Department of Children and Family Services conducted its own investigation and cleared Tammy Curry of any wrongdoing. The Robert Canon and Tammy Curry incidents are not similar to Petitioner's circumstances. Respondent, including the unit presently known as the Okaloosa Youth Academy, actively pursues a policy of affirmative action designed to recruit minorities. As of the spring of 2000, the Center employed 138 individuals, the majority of whom (72 employees ) were African-American. After Petitioner's termination from the Center, Petitioner sought employment to replace the income he lost from this employment. On February 21, 2000, Petitioner began working for Correctional Services Corporation as an on-call youth worker. His earnings through the date of the hearing are $8,013.56. He earns $8.30 per hour. He averages approximately 24 hours per week.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.L. 1108-A North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501-3308 Kevin L. O'Dea, Esquire McGlinchey Stafford 643 Magazine Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Azizi Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ or Department) acted illegally, arbitrarily, dishonestly or fraudulently in the rejection of all proposals for the Better Outlook Center request for proposals.
Findings Of Fact The Department has responsibility for the custody and treatment of delinquent youth in the State of Florida. As part of that responsibility, the Department sought proposals for a halfway house program to be located in Dade County, Florida (District 11). This program, also known as the Better Outlook Center (BOC), will provide residential beds for twenty-eight male juveniles who are considered a moderate risk to public safety and require a structured residential community. The Department advertised a request for proposal (RFP) for the BOC project, RFP #K6P07, on January 24, 1997. Subsequent to the general mailing of the RFP packet, the Department received twelve proposals for the BOC project. Among those proposals, the Petitioner, Haynes Services Corporation, was awarded the highest score. In a telephone conference call conducted in February, 1997, the Petitioner’s CEO was advised of his apparent highest ranking but was asked to lower the per diem rate. Petitioner agreed to the amendment. Subsequently, upon further review of the matter, the Department determined it had not included criteria which would consider quality assurance performance on similar programs, third party reviews, or past performance. The Department determined that these criteria should be included in all RFP evaluations and set about to draft language incorporating these provisions into new RFP instructions. These new criteria would be applicable throughout the state and would be applied to review all applicants for programs awarded through the DJJ. Concern over the new criteria arose because the Department was advised that Petitioner had failed quality assurance requirements at another project. Thus, while the Department had considered Petitioner’s proposal for the subject project well articulated, it became concerned regarding Petitioner’s ability to perform as represented. In order to place all applicants on an even playing field for consideration of this project as well as others where this issue might arise, the Department determined that all applicants should submit records of past performance. The results of past performance and quality assurance ratings would then be a factor to consider before awarding future projects. Accordingly, all proposals which had been submitted for the BOC RFP at issue were rejected. On or about March 7, 1997, all applicants who had submitted proposals for the BOC project were notified that the Department intended to re-advertise the RFP with new criteria. The Petitioner was not awarded a contract for the subject RFP.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order dismissing the challenge to the rejection of all bids for RFP #K6P07. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Calvin Ross Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Kaydell Wright-Douglas, Esquire The Wright Building 110 North Armenia Avenue, Suite A Tampa, Florida 33609 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
