The Issue Whether Petitioner willfully violated Section 106.021(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits a candidate from making an expenditure except through the campaign treasurer on 66 separate occasions, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony, documentary evidence, entire record of the proceedings, and facts admitted to in the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, was the incumbent candidate for Public Defender, 17th Judicial Circuit, in the 2000 election. Petitioner was unopposed for reelection when qualifying ended on July 21, 2000. Petitioner is an experienced politician serving his seventh term as Public Defender. During the 2000 campaign qualifying period, Petitioner made sixty-six expenditures for which he submitted receipts and received reimbursement from his campaign account. The expenditures for which Petitioner was reimbursed are as follows: Date Merchant Amount 05-01-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $261.00 04-04-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $225.61 12-13-99 Bar Amici/ Cathode Ray $50.40 10-29-99 Bar at Embassy Suite $51.41 06-30-00 Big Louie's $265.01 06-20-00 Big Louie's $145.72 06-27-00 Bimini Boatyard $64.82 05-31-00 Bimini Boatyard $316.49 05-21-00 Bimini Boatyard $70.08 05-18-00 Bimini Boatyard $43.26 12-08-99 Bimini Boatyard $71.66 10-20-99 Bimini Boatyard $47.92 05-04-00 Bravo Italiano $63.86 02-24-00 Bravo Italiano $232.43 02-15-00 Bravo Italiano $52.79 01-31-00 Bravo Italiano $62.86 01-27-00 Bravo Italiano $86.83 06-19-00 Café de Paris $113.34 05-24-00 Café de Paris $70.04 05-16-00 Café de Paris $154.99 05-12-00 Café de Paris $160.94 05-06-00 Café de Paris $136.11 04-13-00 Café de Paris $146.65 03-18-00 Café de Paris $113.09 03-04-00 Café de Paris $144.47 02-23-00 Café de Paris $280.10 02-07-00 Café de Paris $73.27 01-17-00 Café de Paris $193.51 12-27-99 Café de Paris $66.47 11-29-99 Café de Paris $145.60 11-26-99 Café de Paris $230.51 11-24-99 Café de Paris $133.57 11-15-99 Café de Paris $183.97 10-31-99 Café de Paris $105.68 10-22-99 Café de Paris $99.43 10-19-99 Café de Paris $130.76 03-31-00 Café de Paris $182.64 03-15-00 Costco Wholesale $140.96 12-14-99 Costco Wholesale $267.61 10-27-99 Costco Wholesale $231.02 Costco Wholesale $256.87 05-23-00 French Quarter $499.24 11-09-99 French Quarter $81.25 11-09-99 French Quarter $85.02 06-08-00 Georgio's Food and Spirits $193.14 05-11-00 Greek Islands $89.73 06-03-00 Greek Islands $75.25 01-04-00 Greek Islands $70.49 10-29-99 Heavenly Ham $349.66 03-22-00 Houston's $75.54 10-28-99 Mayhue's Liquors $70.02 06-14-00 Mezzanot $102.02 12-01-99 Padrino's Restaurant $61.21 03-17-00 Publix $235.32 12-16-99 Publix $235.32 10-29-99 Publix $212.00 Publix $149.41 05-07-00 Restaurante Botin $146.39 01-04-00 Sage $79.85 12-28-99 Sage $107.89 10-29-99 Salute-Embassy Suites $211.26 03-01-00 TGI Fridays $47.08 05-25-00 Things Remembered $79.49 05-24-00 Things Remembered $296.69 05-21-00 Things Remembered $386.22 01-03-00 Wolfgang Puck Café $138.87 While Petitioner's personal decision to "wine and dine potential donors, supporters and campaign volunteers" at upscale restaurants may have been the genesis of the complaint that caused the Commission's investigation, no evidence was offered that suggested this to be an inappropriate expenditure of campaign funds. Sixteen checks were written by the campaign treasurer from the campaign account to Petitioner to reimburse him for the above expenditures. The campaign treasurer acknowledged that he had misdated one of the sixteen checks. Each check was written on the campaign accounts, was dated, was made payable to Petitioner, and each check listed that the purpose of the expenditure was to reimburse for non- specific campaign expense(s) as follows: Date Check No. Purpose Amount 10-29-99 1003 Reimb.-Campaign party expenses 11-02-99 1004 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches 11-16-99 1005 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches $968.38 $536.68 $350.24 11-30-99 1006 Reimb.-misc. campaign dinners 01-06-00 1008 Reimb.-camp. party expenses $509.68 $502.93 01-07-00 1009 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $496.50 03-03-00 1015 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $566.81 04-04-00 1019 Reimb.-camp. meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 1020 Reimb.-camp. party exp. $376.28 04-27-00 1021 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $799.23 5-16-00 1023 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $679.69 5-18-00 1024 Reimb.- misc. camp. lunches $462.58 5-22-00 1025 Reimb.-novelty items $368.22 5-24-00 1051 Reimb.-misc. camp. lunches $612.58 5-26-16 1054 Reimb.-camp. novelty items $376.16 06-09-00 1055 Reimb.-camp. meals/lunches $386.53 Each of the above-noted reimbursements to Petitioner was listed as an expenditure on Petitioner's campaign treasurer's reports filed with the Division of Elections as follows: Date Name and Address of Purpose Amount Person Receiving Reimbursement 10-29-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $968.38 11-02-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $536.68 11-16-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $320.24 11-30-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $509.68 01-06-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $502.93 01-07-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $496.50 03-03-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $566.81 04-04-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $376.28 04-27-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $799.23 05-16-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $697.69 05-18-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $462.58 05-22-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign novelty items $386.22 05-24-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $612.58 05-26-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign novelty dinners $376.16 06-09-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $386.53 While the campaign treasurer's report accurately reports reimbursements to Petitioner, because the reimbursements are non-specific and aggregated, it is impossible to determine the actual expense for which reimbursement is made. Stephen Michaelson served as the campaign treasurer for Petitioner's 2000 reelection campaign and had served as deputy treasurer of Petitioner's 1996 campaign. Mr. Michaelson has served a number of candidates in a similar fashion. Prior to filing papers to open the 2000 reelection campaign account, Mr. Michaelson and Petitioner discussed whether it was permissible under Florida law for a candidate to be reimbursed from his campaign account for legitimate, campaign-related expenditures made by him personally in the course of the campaign. Petitioner had experienced difficulty writing campaign checks at restaurants during the 1996 campaign. After the 1996 campaign, Mr. Michaelson had researched the issue and informed Petitioner that he had discovered a "reimbursement statute." Mr. Michaelson also found a 1994 Division of Elections opinion that he believed "to be right on all fours," i.e., the opinion dealt specifically with the issue. The 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] referred to by Mr. Michaelson provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It is also permissible for a candidate to make a purchase with his own personal check or currency if the candidate intends to seek reimbursement from his campaign. However, the purchase does not become a campaign expenditure until such time as the reimbursement is made by campaign check or petty cash through the candidate's campaign treasurer. In 1999, prior to opening his campaign account, Petitioner and Mr. Michaelson again discussed the "reimbursement issue." Mr. Michaelson checked Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, that had been in effect when the 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] had been issued and noted no changes in the statute. In addition, he did a computer search on Florida Statutes Annotated of District and Supreme Court cases and found nothing dealing with the subject that, in his opinion, would warrant a change in the Division of Elections opinion. He checked the Division of Elections website to see if the 1994 opinion was still there and concluded that it was. He did a computer check to see if there were any subsequent Division of Elections opinions that referred to expenditures; finding none, he concluded that the 1994 opinion was still in effect. Based on his review, he advised Petitioner that Petitioner could seek reimbursement from the campaign account for legitimate campaign expenditures that he paid with personal funds. Mr. Michaelson has been a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer on seven occasions, has, himself, been a candidate, is a lawyer who has practiced criminal defense law for 23 years, and, during his testimony at this formal hearing, demonstrated competency and understanding of the Florida election law/campaign financing law. He gave Petitioner advice on Florida election law/campaign financing law knowing that Petitioner would rely on his advice. Petitioner's reliance on Mr. Micahelson's advice was warranted. In the same general time period during which he opened his reelection campaign account, Petitioner spoke to David Bogenschutz, an attorney in Fort Lauderdale, and asked whether a candidate could incur campaign expenses and then seek reimbursement from his campaign account. Mr. Bogenschutz is a lawyer who has known Petitioner since 1971, whose practice is devoted largely to criminal defense, who had previously advised and represented candidates and public officials in proceedings related to the Florida's election law/campaign financing law, had himself been a candidate, and was believed by Petitioner to be knowledgeable regarding Florida election law/campaign financing law. While Mr. Bogenschutz was reluctant to acknowledge that he was an "expert" in Florida election law, his testimony at this formal hearing demonstrated a satisfactory working knowledge of Florida election law/campaign financing law; it was appropriate for Petitioner to seek his counsel and to be guided by his advice. Mr. Boganschutz advised Petitioner that he saw nothing wrong with his reimbursing himself from his campaign treasury for authorized campaign expenses. He further advised that he would research the matter and advise if he saw anything wrong. Mr. Boganschutz reviewed Section 106.021(3) and Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, and Florida Statutes Annotated. He concluded that Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, permitted a candidate to be reimbursed for authorized campaign expenditures from the campaign account and so advised Petitioner. In giving his advise, he did not review Division of Elections Opinion DE 94-07 or a later opinion, DE 97-06, because, while other Division of Elections opinions are found in Florida Statutes Annotated, neither of the referenced opinions is listed in Florida Statutes Annotated. In addition, he felt that the statute regarding reimbursement was so clear that there was no need to do further research. In addition to his discussions with Mr. Michaelson and Mr Bogenschutz, Petitioner conducted his own research and concluded that it was appropriate to pay vendors personally for campaign-related expenses and then be reimbursed from his campaign account for those campaign-related expenses. The qualifying period ended on July 21, 2000, with Petitioner having drawn no opposition. At about the same time, a local newspaper article questioned Petitioner's campaign spending habits and quoted a Division of Elections official saying Petitioner should have been using campaign checks. After reading the newspaper article, Mr. Michaelson called the local Supervisor of Elections who advised him that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded by Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06. This caused Mr. Michaelson obvious concern; the qualifying period had ended and, for Petitioner, the election was over. It appeared that he had incorrectly advised Petitioner regarding the propriety of paying campaign-related expenses personally and then seeking reimbursement. Mr. Michaelson then checked his research in an effort to understand how he had missed the rescission of Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 and discovered that the Division of Elections website did not indicate that opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded. The Division of Elections, Department of State, maintains a website which includes "Formal Opinions of the Division of Elections." This website lists all opinions from 1987-2000. Intermittently throughout the list of opinions is the notation "rescinded" in highlighted type, indicating that the particular opinion has been rescinded. No such notation appeared in reference to opinion DE 94-07. The 1997 Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 indicates "Rescinding DE 76-16, 78-2, 88-32, 90-16, and 94-7." This is presented in the same type as the rest of the text and is not highlighted. Mr. Michaelson then used his web browser to search the Division of Elections website that lists these advisory opinions for the words "expenditure" or "reimbursement," the website did not direct him to the 1997 opinion DE 97-06. Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, which, in part, rescinds Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07, provides in pertinent part, as follows: We held that candidates could make unlimited purchases by personal check as long as they intended for such expenditures to be reported as in-kind contributions. The opinion also stated that the "candidate cannot make such purchases as a campaign expenditure except by means of a campaign check . . . made through the candidate's campaign treasurer." This reasoning has resulted in some confusion as to when and under what circumstances a campaign expenditure or in-kind contribution occurs. Therefore, we rescind DE 94-07. Except for petty cash expenditures allowed under section 106.12, Florida statutes (1995), the only way that a candidate may make a campaign expenditure is by means of bank check drawn on the primary campaign depository, pursuant to section 106.11(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Having said this, we recognize the applicability of section 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes (1995), which requires that candidates report any reimbursements of authorized expenses from the campaign accounts to themselves. We believe that the purpose of this provision is to cover rare occurrences where the campaign must make an expenditure, but the campaign check book is not available. Such a situation could occur when a bill must be paid and the campaign has not received its first order of checks from the bank, or where, during the course of campaign travel, tolls or other miscellaneous expenses must be paid in cash and the candidate has failed to take the money out of his petty cash fund for such purposes. During the 2000 campaign, Mr. Michaelson maintained possession of the campaign checkbook which was usually kept at his home. On occasion, he would have one or two campaign checks on his person. If Petitioner asked for a campaign check, and Mr. Michaelson had one on his person, he would give it to Petitioner. On occasion, Petitioner would return a campaign check to Mr. Michaelson, indicating that the check was not accepted by a particular vendor. Most of the reimbursements at issue are a result of Petitioner's not having a campaign check with him at the time of a transaction or the vendor's unwillingness to accept a check or campaign check. In most instances the transaction involved purchases by Petitioner at restaurants. TGI Friday's located in Plantation, Florida, does not accept checks. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at TGI Friday's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bimini Boatyard does not generally permit patrons to pay with checks, although exceptions have been made. Petitioner made six campaign related-purchases at Bimini Boatyard for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. During his 1996 campaign, Petitioner wrote 15 checks directly to Bimini Boatyard for campaign expenditures from the campaign account. Café de Paris and French Quarter have a policy of not accepting checks except when personally approved by the owner or for a special party. The owner indicated he would not accept a campaign check. Petitioner made 20 campaign related-purchases at Café de Paris and three campaign-related purchases at French Quarter for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. The Sage Restaurant accepts only cash, MasterCard and Visa from restaurant patrons; checks are accepted for catering. The owner opined that had Petitioner called ahead and advised that campaign laws required him to pay by campaign check, she would accept that form of payment. Petitioner made two campaign-related purchases at Sage Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bar Amici and Cathode Ray do not accept checks; however, if a candidate advised that the law required payment by campaign check, a check would be reluctantly accepted. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at Bar Amici and Cathode Ray for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Greek Island Taverna does not accept checks. Petitioner sought reimbursement for three campaign-related expenditures at Greek Island Taverna for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Padrino's Restaurant does not accept checks. The owner, who is seldom at the restaurant, indicated that he would accept Petitioner's check. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at the Padrino's Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Andrew's, a Tallahassee restaurant, does not accept checks from restaurant patrons. The manager opined that, if prior arrangements were made, a campaign check might possibly be accepted, but an out-of-town campaign check made it more problematic. Petitioner made two campaign-related expenditures at Andrew's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Connie Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records, Division of Elections, Department of State, who has been employed by Division of Elections for 22 years and a bureau chief for five years, was qualified as an expert witness "in the area of Chapter 106 of Florida Statutes," without objection. She opined that Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, requires full disclosure of all contributions and expenditures for the public benefit. Ms. Evans further opined that Division of Elections advisory opinions are only binding on the candidate or organization who sought the opinion. Ms. Evans further opined that the Division of Elections, in applying Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, considers that it is appropriate for a candidate to seek reimbursement for personal payment of a campaign-related expense at a restaurant when the restaurant refuses to take a check, but that the candidate should not return to the same restaurant knowing that the restaurant will not accept a campaign check in payment. She acknowledged that there is no statutory authority in Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, for this opinion. Ms. Evans further acknowledged that Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 refers to Subsection 106.07(4)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (which allows reimbursement for campaign- related expenses), and that both DE 97-06 and DE 94-07 advise that it is permissible for candidate to reimburse himself for campaign-related expenses. Ms. Evans opined that the Division of Elections website should have indicated that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded in bold type, as is done with the other rescinded opinions. Ms. Evans further opined that, if a candidate were to reimburse himself or another person for authorized campaign- related expenses, it is the position of the Division of Elections that the reimbursement must be made by a campaign check, must be reported on the campaign treasurer's report as an expenditure, and the amount, date, and the purpose of the expenditure must be reported.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, did not violate the Florida Campaign Financing Law as alleged and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herron, Esquire Mark Herron, P.A. Post Office Box 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1701 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Recommendation Based upon Petitioner's failure to appear, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Administrative Hearing filed herein and issuing to Respondents Clarence and Jacqueline Keevan the permit sought by them in accordance with the conditions set forth in the Intent to Issue of October 18, 1984. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of April, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer The Oakland Building Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas MacLaughlin, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Captain Ed Davidson and Commander William H. Westray 1401 Sunset Drive Key West, Florida 33040 Michael Egan, Esquire Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee Florida 32302 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA09-GM-383 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and corre copies have been furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this Ve Paula Ford Agency Clerk Florida Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 day of December, 2009. U.S. Mail: The Honorable D. R. Alexander Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 Timothy J. McFarland, Esquire Gulf County Attorney 326 Reid Avenue Port St. Joe, Florida 32456-1826 Hand Delivery: Matthew Davis, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida. The Respondent has adopted a "Departmental Forms Index", which, if it ultimately becomes effective, would be codified into Chapter 10-2.80, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed rule purports to set out a list of all forms used by the Respondent in its dealings with the public. By its terms, the rule will not be published in the Florida Administrative Code. Instead, the index would be referenced in the Code as follows: The Departmental Forms Index is hereby incorporated by this rule and made a part of the rules of the Department. Copies of this document and any amendments thereto are available at no more than cost pursuant to the Florida Administrative Code 10-2 and may be obtained from the Office of Assistant Secretary for Administrative Services. The complete Departmental Forms Index would thus not appear in the Florida Administrative Coda. Copies of the index could be obtained from the Department by request at a cost of ten cents per page. The Index would not otherwise be available to members of the public, and no general distribution of the proposed rule will be made. The Petitioner, Norma Richardson, is a recipient of benefits under the "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" program and the food stamp program. Both of these programs are administered by the Respondent. Forms are routinely used in the Respondent's dealings with the Petitioner Richardson. Forms are utilized to advise her of any action intended by the Respondent, to solicit information, to apply for further benefits, and for many other purposes. As a recipient of benefits under the programs, the Petitioner Richardson has an interest in having the Forms Index available to her. If the Forms Index were published in the Florida Administrative Code she could obtain access to it at various libraries. If the Index is published by reference, obtaining access to it would be more difficult, and, could cost her ten cents per page. The Petitioner Florida Project Directors Association is an association composed of the directors of legal services programs in Florida. The Association has represented its members in this proceeding. The Association, and its members, are subscribers to the Florida Administrative Code. The Association's members represent many persons in connection with welfare disputes with the Respondent. The Departmental Forms Index contains forms which the Association's members would need to utilize in representing its clients. If the Index were published in the Florida Administrative Code, the Association's members would have the Index available to it, and any amendments to the Index would regularly be distributed. If the Index is published only by reference, the Associations members would need to purchase copies from the Respondent, and would not regularly receive amendments without making specific requests therefor and paying for them. It is not a matter of mere speculation that the Association's members will be representing clients who have disputes with the Respondent. One of the Association's members, Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., employs forty lawyers and several paralegals, and has represented welfare recipients in many cases.
The Issue Whether Petitioners violated provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order of Probable Cause filed August 23, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Chapters 97 through 106, Florida Statutes, comprise the Florida Election Code (Code). Pursuant to the Code, the Commission is empowered specifically to enforce the provisions of Chapters 104 and 106, Florida Statutes. Mary McCarty was elected to the City Commission of Delray Beach, Florida in 1987. She was elected to the Palm Beach County Commission in 1990. She has been returned to that office in each subsequent election and she is currently a member of the Palm Beach County Commission. In November of 2002, she was elected to her fourth term as Chairman of the Palm Beach County Republican Executive Committee. The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary was an unincorporated entity. It was a de facto committee, which, for reasons addressed herein, did not ever become a "political committee" as defined in Section 106.011(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. McCarty has run for public office six times and was successful on each occasion. Prior to each election she received from the Florida Secretary of State a handbook addressing campaign financing. She is familiar with the statutes and rules with regard to financing an individual campaign. Sometime before the Thanksgiving Holiday in 2000, Ms. McCarty received a telephone call from Roger Stone of Washington, D.C. Ms. McCarty knew Mr. Stone, who at various times had been a campaign operative for Senator Arlen Specter, had been involved in opposing the sugar tax amendment in Florida, and had been a consultant to Donald Trump, during his short-lived presidential campaign. Ms. McCarty was aware that Mr. Stone and Craig Snyder were principals of IKON Public Affairs, a business entity with offices in Washington, D.C., and Miami Beach, Florida. Roger Stone informed Ms. McCarty that he was forming a committee to raise funds for the purpose of taking action against the Florida Supreme Court. Mr. Stone stated that he had formed The Committee and that he wished for her to be the chairperson. She did not initially commit to undertake this responsibility. A few days after the conversation with Mr. Stone, Ms. McCarty received a facsimile draft of a fundraising letter that The Committee proposed to post. The facsimile was sent by Roger Stone from Washington. She made some suggested changes and returned it to the address in Washington from whence it came. Subsequently, she had a telephone conversation with Lora Lynn Jones of Unique Graphics and Design in Alexandria, Virginia. Ms. Jones was in the business of making mass mailings. Ms. McCarty told Ms. Jones that her name could be used on the fundraising letter although Ms. McCarty did not sign the fundraising letter. Nevertheless, the document was mailed to a large number of people and it bore the printed name, "Mary McCarty, Palm Beach County Commissioner." The first time Ms. McCarty saw The Committee's finished product it was in the form of a "Telepost, high priority communication." She first saw the "Telepost" when it arrived in her mailbox in early December 2000. The wording of the letter was different from the draft Ms. McCarty had seen earlier. Unlike the draft, it targeted specific justices on the Florida Supreme Court. It cannot be determined from the evidence the date the December "Telepost" was posted, but it was posted before Ms. McCarty determined that she had become Chairperson of The Committee. The "Telepost," dated December 2000, solicited funds so that The Committee could, ". . . send a clear message to the Florida Supreme Court that we will not tolerate their efforts to highjack the Presidential election for Al Gore." Later in December 2000, Mr. Stone called Ms. McCarthy and told her that she should be the chairman of The Committee. She agreed. Ms. McCarty signed a "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," which was dated December 19, 2000. This is a form provided by the Division of Elections, which, if properly completed and filed, officially establishes a political committee. She also signed a form entitled "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee." Mr. Stone, or his operatives, provided these forms to Ms. McCarty. She signed them and mailed them to Mr. Stone's address in Washington, D.C., which was the headquarters of the IKON Public Affairs Group. The "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," dated December 19, 2000, was received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. It listed Amber McWhorter as Treasurer. Inez Williams, who works in the document section of the Division of Elections, processed the form. When Ms. Williams received it, she recognized that the form was incomplete because on the face of it the reader could not determine if the committee was an "issue" committee, or a "candidate" committee. Ms. Williams noted that the mailing address on the form dated December 19, 2000, was "c/o VisionMedia," 1680 Michigan Avenue, Suite 900, Miami Beach, Florida. Ms. Williams found a telephone number for that business and dialed it, on December 27, 2000. No one answered so she left a message on VisionMedia's answering machine. In addition to the telephone call, Ms. Williams prepared a letter with the address of, "Mary McCarty, Chairperson, The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary, 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, Miami Beach, Florida." This letter was dated December 27, 2000, and was signed by Connie A. Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records. This is the address found on the "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee," which had also been received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. The letter signed by Ms. Evans on December 27, 2001, informed Ms. McCarty that items 3 and 7 needed to be "rephrased." It further informed Ms. McCarty, that upon receipt of the requested information the committee would be included on the "active" list. The message recorded on The Committee answering machine on December 27, 2001, generated a response from a person who identified himself as Mr. Snyder, on January 2, 2002. Mr. Snyder engaged in a telephone conversation with Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams explained to Mr. Snyder that items 3, 5, 7, and 8, would have to be completed properly as a condition of The Committee's being recognized. A letter dated January 4, 2001, bearing the letterhead of "The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary," and signed by Amber Allman McWhorter, was faxed to the Division of Elections on January 4, 2001, and received that date. This letter referenced the telephone call between Ms. Williams and Craig Snyder, who was further identified as The Committee's attorney. The letter stated that a corrected Statement of Organization of Political Committee, and a designation of treasurer, would be forwarded to the Division of Elections within the next 72 hours. On January 8, 2001, a filing was received by the Division of Elections that was deemed by the Division to be complete. Subsequently, in a letter dated January 10, 2001, and signed by Connie Evans, informed Ms. McCarty and The Committee that the Statement of Organization and the Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for The Committee complied with the Division of Elections' requirements. The Committee was provided with Identification No. 34261. Posted with the letter was a copy of the "2000 Handbook for Committees," which is published by the Division of Elections. The letter and the handbook were sent to The Committee operation in Miami, not Ms. McCarty, and no one in the Miami Beach operation ever forwarded it to her. Connie Evans, Bureau Chief of Election Records, the entity that supervises the filing of the forms mentioned above, believes that due to a court ruling in Florida Right to Life v. Mortham, Case No. 98-770-Civ-Orl-19A, the language in Section 106.011, Florida Statutes, which defines a "political committee," has been found to be unconstitutional. She believes that a political committee is not required to register with the Division of Elections but that if a committee does register, it must abide by the statutes regulating political committees. Ms. Evans has informed numerous entities of this interpretation of the law in letters. The efficacy of that case, and Ms. Evans' interpretation of it, will be discussed further in the Conclusions of Law, below. Ms. McCarty signed a "Campaign Treasurer's Report Summary"(CTR-Q1) which was filed with the Division of Elections on April 10, 2001. This addressed the period January 1, 2001 until March 31, 2001. Under the certification section of the CTR-Q1 are the words, "It is a first degree misdemeanor for any person to falsify a public record (ss. 839.13, F.S.)." Immediately above her signature are the words, "I certify that I have examined this report and it is true, correct, and complete." The box found immediately above and to the right of her signature, was checked to signify that Ms. McCarty was the chairperson of The Committee. According to Ms. Evans, The Division of Elections regulates several kinds of committees. There are "issues" committees, "candidate" committees," "party executive" committees, and "committees of continuing existence." Depending on the nature of the committee, different rules apply. The Committee was a "candidate" committee so the contribution regulations of a political candidate applied to the committee. That meant that the maximum contribution per person was $500. The CTR-Q1 indicated in the "Itemized Contributions Section" that seven people contributed $1,000 and one person contributed $2,000. Walter Hunter, Neda Korich, Arthur Allen, William Shutze, Caroline Ireland, Henry Allen, and Honore Wansler, contributed $1,000, each. Robert Morgan contributed $2,000. The amounts in excess of $500 were eventually returned to the $1,000 contributors, except that in the case of Henry Allen, the refund was made to Allen Investment corporation. The sum of $1,500 was returned to Robert Morgan, the $2,000 contributor, but the CTR-Q1 listed only a $500 repayment. Therefore, the CTR-Q1 in its expenditures section was incorrect with regard to Mr. Morgan. The CTR-Q1 also listed in the "Itemized Contributions Section" the receipt, on January 2, 2001, of $150,000 for "LOA/INK extension of credit for direct mail services." These words may be interpreted to mean that a loan in the form of an "in kind" service had been provided. This was reported under the name of Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The Committee had a bank account at CityBank of Miami, Florida. The sole authorized signatory on the account was Diane Thorne. The Account No. was 3200015694. There was no entry in the bank account of the receipt of $150,000. This indicates that the item was not processed through the bank and it would not have been processed through the bank if it were really an "in kind" contribution. Because the beginning balance was zero on February 8, 2001, it is concluded that the inception date of Account No. 3200015694 was February 8, 2001. Lora Lynn Jones, is the principal of Unique Graphics and Design, which is located in Suite 253, at an address in Alexandria, Virginia, which is not further identified in the evidence of record. Ms. Jones prepared and posted the fundraising letter of December 2000, at the direction of Mr. Stone. Ms. Jones talked on the telephone with Ms. McCarty prior to mailing the fundraising letter and determined that the language in the letter was agreeable to Ms. McCarty. At the direction of Mr. Stone, Ms. Jones requested payment and received payment for her work, but from whom she cannot remember, except that she is sure that Creative Marketing did not pay it. The money for this production was paid in advance by wire transfer. There is no evidence in the record that this was paid from the account of The Committee. In fact, because the payment was made sometime in early December 2000, it could not have been paid from the account because it had not been opened. Ms. Jones is aware of an entity by the name of Creative Marketing Company and she believes it may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. It is found by clear and convincing evidence that the fundraising letter was not paid for by Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The bank records of The Committee reflect a $50,000 expenditure made to Unique Graphics and Design, paid with a check dated May 9, 2001. This represents a payment for something other than the fundraising letter dated December 2000. The $50,000 item was reported as an expenditure on the CTR-Q1 that was reported to have been made on March 12, 2001. It was reported as having been made to Creative Marketing as payee. The only check in the amount of $50,000, reflected in The Committee checking account for the period February 8, 2001, to June 30, 2001, was payable to Unique Graphics and Design and was dated May 9, 2001. Therefore, it is found that the CTR-Q1 is incorrect when it was reported as having been made on March 12, 2001, to Creative Marketing. Ms. Jones believes there is a company by the name of Creative Marketing Company, which she believes may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. Contributions remitted in response to the fundraising letter were forwarded to one of Mr. Stone's two addresses. Because the address of 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, in Miami Beach, Florida, is the address listed on the fundraising letter, it is likely that contributions in response to the fundraising letter went to Mr. Stone's Miami Beach operation. In any event, it is found as a fact that Ms. McCarty did not personally receive or have any contact with any of the contributions remitted to The Committee. The people handling the receipt of funds and the deposits were Roger Stone and people paid by his organization, including Diane Thorne, the secretary; Amber McWhorter, the treasurer; and Craig Snyder. Just as Ms. McCarty was not involved in the receipt of income to The Committee, she was also not involved in the disbursement of funds. The CTR-Q1 was completed by The Committee's staff in either Miami Beach or Washington, D.C., but Ms. McCarty had no input into its preparation. When Ms. McCarty signed the CTR-Q1 she was without knowledge as to whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. It is further found that she made no effort to ascertain whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. She believed it to be true and correct because she trusted Mr. Stone's operatives to accurately prepare the report. Ms. McCarty, excepting the current litigation, has never been the subject of a Commission action. Ms. McCarty has an income of approximately $80,000. She owns a residence jointly with her husband which is valued at approximately $300,000 and which is subject to a mortgage of approximately $200,000. She owns a vacation home in Maine jointly with her husband that is valued at approximately $25,000. She and her husband own three automobiles. She owns stocks, annuities, mutual funds or certificates of deposit of an indeterminate value.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Orders of Probable Cause entered in the case of both Mary McCarty and The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kendall Coffey, Esquire Coffey & Wright, LLP 2665 South Bayshore Drive Grand Bay Plaza, Penthouse 2B Miami, Florida 33133 J. Reeve Bright, Esquire Bright & Chimera 135 Southeast 5th Avenue, Suite 2 Delray Beach, Florida 33483-5256 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Ruching, Clerk Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact Based on the Stipulation of counsel, the exhibits, and the pleadings filed herein, the following findings of fact are made: On December 11, 1998, Ms. Morro, who is the wife of Michael J. Morro, the developer of the property, filed her application with the District for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP), which would authorize the construction of a surface water management system (including one wet-detention pond) to serve a 12-lot, single-family residential subdivision known as Tranquility on Lake Brantley in Seminole County, Florida. In more specific geographic terms, the project is located on the south side of Wekiva Springs Road, on Cutler Road, and on the north side of Lake Brantley near the City of Longwood. The application was assigned number 40-117-0567A-ERP. The exhibits filed herein suggest that Ms. Morro, and not Mr. Morro, owns the subject property. After determining that the Applicant provided reasonable assurance that the proposed activities met the conditions for issuance of a permit and the system was consistent with its review criteria, on July 14, 1999, the District approved the application and issued Permit Number 40- 117-51722-1 (1999 Permit). However, the Permit did not authorize the construction of a retaining wall on Lot 10 of the Applicant's property. There is no record of any third party challenging the issuance of the 1999 Permit. On February 19, 2002, the Applicant submitted "as built drawings" to the District, as required by Condition 10 of the 1999 Permit, to enable the District to verify that the work was completed in compliance with the approved plans and specifications. These as-built drawings did not reflect a retaining wall on Lot 10. Mr. Adley resides and owns property at 880 Lake Brantley Drive, Longwood, Florida, which is "next to" the Morro property. It is fair to say that a less-than-harmonious relationship exists between the two neighbors. Indeed, the exhibits reflect that Mr. Adley, the Applicant, and the Applicant's surveyor "have been involved in several causes of action between them over details of development on this property," and that over the years Mr. Adley has filed numerous complaints with the District regarding alleged violations by the Applicant while she performed work under the 1999 Permit. Mr. Adley is familiar with ERPs and the process for obtaining one, having had ownership interests in businesses that have obtained ERPs from the District, and having participated in the activity undertaken to obtain the permits and then implement the activities authorized by the permits. On May 16, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a letter to Kirby A. Green, III, Executive Director of the District, citing seven issues regarding Ms. Morro's proposed subdivision and asking that he be notified, in writing, "of any modifications to the permit, request for modifications of the permit, notice of violations, change to the approved plan, changes to the Covenants and Articles of Incorporation, any other changes to the proposed construction activities and any public notices that would effect [sic] [his] right to file for an administrative hearing." Mr. Adley also indicated that he had scheduled a meeting with William E. Carlie, Jr., District Compliance Manager, to be held on May 19, 2003, "to discuss these issues with him in person." On May 29, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a letter to Duane Ottenstroer, then Chairman of the District's Governing Board, regarding "the subdivision being constructed next to [his] home." In his letter, he voiced concerns about the recorded conservation easement on the Morro property being significantly different from the easement approved by the 1999 Permit. He also complained that the Applicant had submitted false information with an application submitted to the District in 1991. Finally, he enclosed a copy of the letter previously sent to Mr. Green. On June 6, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a second letter to Mr. Carlie advising that the Applicant was violating the conditions in the 1999 Permit in five respects. The letter confirmed that Mr. Adley would again meet with District staff concerning this matter on June 11, 2003. After conducting an investigation regarding Mr. Adley's allegations of violations by the Applicant, on September 12, 2003, K. Wilford Causseaux, an engineer in the Department of Water Resources, sent a letter to the Applicant's surveyor, Michael W. Solitro (who Mr. Adley says is the former Seminole County Surveyor who loaned the Applicant money in April 1998 to develop the land and then purchased a discounted lot from the Applicant in return for "development services"), affirming the staff's finding that the "construction on [Morro's] residential property on Brantley Drive has encroached on the 100-year flood plain in the rear yard of Lot 11." Also, the letter identified the remedial steps that must be undertaken to correct three "issues associated with [the] residential construction." Finally, the letter noted that Mr. Morro had agreed to remove fill on Lot 7 that violated the "limits of construction" and return the rear-lot grading to its pre-development condition. On September 29, 2003, Mr. Adley sent a third letter to Mr. Carlie confirming that the District had not allowed the Applicant to construct a retaining wall in lieu of a swale on Lot 11 and that if the Applicant wished to construct a wall, she must apply for a modification to the 1999 Permit. The letter also noted that Mr. Carlie agreed to notify Mr. Adley "in writing of any modification to the permit," including "minor" modifications. Finally, Mr. Adley requested the status of the incorrect conservation easement recorded on the property. Apparently in response to that letter, by email dated October 10, 2003, Mr. Carlie notified District counsel that Mr. Adley "has submitted a written request for actual notice of any proposed modification of this permit, will likely object, and potentially will challenge any agency action in this regard to a 120 hearing." On October 24, 2003, Mr. Carlie responded to Mr. Adley's letter of September 29, 2005, and advised him that the staff had determined that "portions of the fill placed for development of [Lot 11] are waterward of the limits of construction" and that this action "is a violation of the permit subject to enforcement action." The letter confirmed that the District understood Mr. Adley's "request to be noticed of any modifications of the reference permit" and promised that "actual notice (mailed notice to your residence) of any action this agency undertakes in this regard" would be given. Mr. Carlie further explained that some modifications to a permit could be issued by letter, while other modifications required an application, fee, and formal agency action. He indicated that the remedial steps outlined in his letter dated September 12, 2003, to Mr. Solitro "may qualify for a permit modification by letter under the provisions of section 40C-4.331 F.A.C." Finally, Mr. Carlie stated that the "District continues to understand your concern about this project and request to be noticed of any modifications of the reference permit. You will be provided actual notice (mailed notice to your residence) of any action this agency undertakes in this regard." Also on October 23, 2003, Mr. Carlie sent a second letter to Mr. Adley outlining in detail the results of the District's investigation of Mr. Adley's concerns expressed in various letters and at least two meetings with staff. On May 3, 2004, Frank J. Meeker, the District's Ombudsman, sent Mr. Adley a letter regarding a Verified Complaint dated April 1, 2004, that Mr. Adley had filed with the Executive Director. (The Verified Complaint was not included in the exhibits which accompanied the Stipulation, but a copy is attached to the Motion.) The letter responded to "six specific objections" Mr. Adley had raised concerning work on the Morro property. It also instructed the District staff to prepare, within thirty days, a letter of modification to the 1999 Permit which addressed the conservation easement, monuments, and 100- year flood elevation issues, together with a recommendation for approval or denial, and to submit the modified conservation easement to the Executive Director for approval or denial. Finally, the letter noted that Mr. Adley would receive "written notice of these actions" and an opportunity to object to these modifications. The record is unclear whether Mr. Meeker's instructions to staff resulted in a letter of modification to the 1999 Permit without further action by the Applicant, or whether it triggered an application by the Applicant to modify her 1999 Permit based upon the staff recommendations. More than likely, the latter occurred. On May 26, 2004, Mr. Meeker provided a follow-up letter to Mr. Adley in which he confirmed that Mr. Adley had been given a copy of the project plans dated June 17, 1999, used by Ms. Morro in securing the 1999 Permit. He further advised that until he received a staff survey "to determine the size of the dock [for purposes of determining if a permit was required] and the location of the red wall and retaining wall," no disposition of those issues could be made. Finally, he advised that no formal request for modification of the 1999 Permit had been filed, but if and when one was filed, he was "directing staff to supply you with a copy of such application." On July 6, 2004, Ms. Morro filed an application with the District seeking to modify her 1999 Permit. (The application noted that Mr. Morro would serve as Ms. Morro's authorized agent to secure the permit.) In the application, Ms. Morrow described the proposed activity as follows: "Alteration of permitted conservation easement[,] to remove easement from lot 11[,] and provide reserved rights for construction of 2 single family docks." This application was assigned number 10-117-51722-2. As noted above, the application did not include a provision for a retaining wall on Lot 10. However, sometime between the time the application was filed in July 2004 and January 21, 2005, the Applicant amended her application to add a request for a retaining wall. By email dated July 12, 2004, counsel for the District notified the reviewer of the application, Anthony Miller, that "I told Mr. Adley to call PDS [Permit Data Services]. Who should I contact there to see what notice was sent? Mr. Adley is going to challenge this so we need to make sure everything is done right." Mr. Miller emailed back the following response: "I have no idea. I assume it was noticed as usual through PDS to those listed to receive notices. Should we do anything more, like contacting Mr. Adley directly?" By letter dated July 15, 2004, Mr. Carlie forwarded a "complete copy" of Ms. Morro's application to Mr. Adley. The letter noted that Mr. Adley's receipt of the letter, attached materials, and notice of rights "shall serve [as] the notice you requested for the purposes of timeframes under Chapter 120, F.S." (A copy of Notice of Rights was enclosed; it set out in detail the process by which Mr. Adley could request a formal hearing.) The enclosed construction drawings did not indicate the inclusion of a retaining wall. During the staff's review process of the application, two Requests for Additional Information (RAI) were sent by the District to Mr. Morro on August 3, 2004, and January 21, 2005. Significantly, item 4 on page 2 of the RAI dated January 21, 2005, noted that "[t]he plans indicate that a retaining wall is proposed. Please provide detailed calculations, and a revised wall detail as necessary, to demonstrate that this portion of the surface water management system will function as intended." (Emphasis added) Copies of both RAIs were sent to Mr. Adley. On February 28, 2005, the Applicant filed a letter and attachments in response to the January 21, 2005 RAI, which included, among other things, plans and details prepared by a professional engineer for a retaining wall to be located landward of the 100-year floodplain, the limit of construction. The Stipulation and exhibits do not indicate whether these documents were ever provided to Mr. Adley at that time.1 However, on March 9, 2005, they were provided to his counsel for review. See Finding of Fact 21, infra. By letter dated January 21, 2005, Mr. Adley's former counsel (Timothy A. Smith, Esquire) made a public records request for inspection of "the district files relating to permit numbers 40-117-51722, 40-117-0567, and any other district permits or applications for such permits relating to the property owned by Frances and Michael Morro on Brantley Drive along the northern shore of Lake Brantley." (The letter indicates that Mr. Smith would meet District counsel in Palatka on January 25, 2005, to review this part of the records request.) The letter also requested that Mr. Smith be allowed to review all files of eleven District employees which related to the various iterations of the Morro project in 1990-1991, 1997-1998, and 1999 to present. The records pertaining to the second part of the request were apparently located in another office and were to be inspected at a later time. According to the Stipulation, in response to the public records request, on March 9, 2005, Mr. Smith reviewed all requested files in the District's main office in Palatka and the District's field office in Altamonte Springs. (As noted above, part of the records were inspected on January 25, 2005, in Palatka.) It is fair to infer that on March 9, 2005, Mr. Smith would have had the opportunity to review the Applicant's plans and details for a retaining wall filed with the District on February 28, 2005. By this time, then, Mr. Adley should have been on notice that the Applicant had modified her application and now sought to build a retaining wall. On March 30, 2005, the District, through its Altamonte Springs field office, approved Ms. Morro's application and issued Permit No. 40-117-51722-2 (2005 Permit). The 2005 Permit authorized the modification of the 1999 Permit "to include the construction of a retaining wall along the rear of Lots 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and the 'lot split' lot, and to amend the easement on Lots 9 and 10, to allow selective clearing and trimming of the conservation easement in accordance with a District approved landscape plan, and to exclude lands no longer under the applicant's control." On April 10, 2005, notice of the issuance of the 2005 Permit was published by Ms. Morro in the Sanford Herald, a newspaper of general circulation in Seminole County. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 40C-1.1007(1). The Notice provided that "[p]etitions for administrative hearing on the above application must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of publication of this notice or within twenty-eight (28) days of the District depositing notice of this intent in the mail for those person to whom the District made actual notice. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right(s) such person(s) may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. concerning the subject permit." Therefore, if notice was received by publication, petitions objecting to the issuance of a permit were due no later than May 1, 2005, or if written notice was given, petitions were due no later than May 8, 2005. The District did not send Mr. Adley written notice of its intent to issue the 2005 Permit. There is no indication in the Stipulation, exhibits, or Motion as to why notice was not sent, particularly since Mr. Adley had made numerous requests for written notice of any District action on the property, and he had been promised such notices by various District personnel since at least October 2003. On April 25, 2005, Ms. Morro began construction of the retaining wall authorized by the 2005 Permit and construction continued over the next thirty calendar days. It is fair to assume that the wall was completed on or about May 25, 2005. Also on April 25, 2005, or the day construction began, at Mr. Adley's direction, Mr. Smith (his former counsel) telephoned Mr. Carlie to inform him that construction activity on Lot 10 was taking place. Therefore, it is clear that on that date, Mr. Adley had observed that construction on the Morro property had begun. In response to Mr. Smith's telephone call, Mr. Carlie then requested that two District employees, Mr. Casseaux and David Eunice, investigate what was occurring on the Morro property. On the same date that Mr. Smith telephoned Mr. Carlie, Casseaux and Eunice inspected the Morro property and observed that a retaining wall authorized by the 2005 Permit was under construction. It is fair to infer from the stipulated facts that Mr. Carlie reported these findings to Mr. Smith within a short period of time. On an undisclosed date, but presumably within a day or so, Mr. Smith reported to Mr. Adley that he had spoken with Mr. Carlie and was told the construction was in conformance with "the Permit" but that Mr. Carlie did not specifically refer to either the 1999 Permit or the 2005 Permit as authorizing the work. The Stipulation and exhibits do not indicate whether Mr. Carlie advised counsel that the 2005 Permit had been approved. However, given the history of this dispute, it would be highly unusual for counsel not to make inquiry about the disposition of the application, or for Mr. Carlie not to provide this information during the course of their telephone conversations, particularly since Mr. Carlie was well aware of Mr. Adley's long-standing interest in the Morro project. Mr. Adley could not tell from his view of the property whether the exact location of the construction was lakeward of the limits of construction, which was the 100-year floodplain, and therefore could only rely on the District staff. Mr. Adley asserts that he did not learn of the 2005 Permit modification until July 25, 2005, through a conversation with an unidentified neighbor. Whether Mr. Adley (or his counsel) then called the District to verify the accuracy of the neighbor's information is not of record. (The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing simply alleges that "petitioner received notice of the District's action on July 25, 2005, through a conversation with a neighbor.") On August 15, 2005, or twenty-one days later, through counsel, Mr. Adley filed his initial Petition for Administrative Hearing with the District challenging the issuance of the 2005 Permit. (The Amended Petition was later filed on October 12, 2005, as a result of the striking of certain allegations in the first filing.) The District's Motion was then filed on November 16, 2005. (Action on the Motion has been delayed because of substitution of Petitioner's counsel, and delays by the parties in taking discovery and preparing the Stipulation.)
The Issue Whether the South Florida Water Management District’s (“District”) intended award of a contract for aerial spraying services, granular application services, and aerial transport services, to Coastal Air Services, Inc. (“Coastal”), is contrary to the District’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the decision was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The District is an independent taxing authority created pursuant to section 373.069, Florida Statutes, with the authority to contract with private entities to maintain real property controlled by the District. See § 373.1401, Fla. Stat. HAI is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 1090 Airglades Boulevard in Clewiston, Florida. Coastal is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 7424 Coastal Drive in Panama City, Florida. The RFB On February 7, 2018, the District issued the RFB, soliciting bids for qualified respondents to provide the following: [F]urnish all labor, equipment, perform data entry and perform all operations for spraying of aquatic, ditchbank and invasive vegetation by helicopter and provide aerial flight services for site inspection and plant surveys. Both HAI and Coastal submitted timely bids, which the District deemed responsive and responsible under the terms of the RFB. The District deemed Coastal the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for aerial spraying, granular application, and aerial transport services. The District deemed HAI the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for spot spraying services. On May 11, 2018, the District posted its Notice of Intent to Award the respective contracts to Coastal and HAI. HAI challenges the award to Coastal because it is not a responsible bidder under the terms of the RFB. HAI’s challenge focuses on two items required to document the bidder’s responsibility to perform the requested services. First, the RFB requires the bidder to provide at least two helicopters certified pursuant to 14 CFR Part 133, Rotocraft External-Load Operations; and 14 CFR Part 137, Agricultural Aircraft Operations (Part 137 Certificate). Second, the RFB requires the bidder to demonstrate its ability to obtain required insurance coverage. Part 137 Certificate HAI contends that Coastal’s bid does not meet the responsibility provisions of the RFB because it did not include sufficient Part 137 Certificates for its subcontractor, HMC Helicopters (“HMC”). HAI contends the Part 137 Certificates are required to expressly state that aircraft are certified to dispense economic poisons. Petitioner’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the RFB does not require the bidder’s Part 137 Certificate to expressly endorse aircraft to dispense economic poisons.3/ Second, assuming the express endorsement was required, the requirement does not apply to HMC. The RFB defines the term “Bidder” and “Respondent” as “[a]ll contractors, consultants, organizations, firms or other entities submitting a Response to this RFB as a prime contractor.” (emphasis added). In its bid, Coastal is listed as the prime contractor, and HMC as a subcontractor. The RFB requires each Respondent to list at least two aircraft which are Part 133 and 137 certified. The requirement applies to Coastal as the primary contractor, not to its subcontractor. Coastal’s bid listed five aircraft with both Part 133 and 137 Certificates, actually exceeding the requirement for two such certified aircraft. Third, assuming an express endorsement for dispensing economic poisons was required, and that the requirement applied to HMC, HMC’s Part 137 Certificate documents HMC’s authority to dispense economic poisons. Pursuant to 14 CFR 137.3, “Agricultural aircraft operation” is defined as follows: [T]he operation of an aircraft for the purpose of (1) dispensing any economic poison, (2) dispensing any other substance intended for plant nourishment, soil treatment, propagation of plant life, or pest control, or (3) engaging in dispending activities directly affecting agriculture, horticulture, or forest preservation, but not including the dispensing of live insects. To obtain a Part 137 Certificate, the operator must pass a knowledge and skills test, which includes the safe handling of economic poisons and disposal of used containers for those poisons; the general effects of those poisons on plants, animals, and persons and precautions to be observed in using those poisons; as well as the primary symptoms of poisoning in persons, appropriate emergency measures in the case of poisoning, and the location of poison control centers. See 14 CFR § 137.19. However, if the operator applies for a Part 137 Certificate which prohibits dispensing of economic poisons, the applicant is not required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills listed above. See Id. HMCs’ certificates do not contain an express prohibition against dispensing economic poisons. The authorization for HMC’s aircraft to dispense economic poisons is inherent in its Part 137 Certificate. Coastal’s bid meets the solicitation requirement for at least two aircraft with Part 137 Certificates. Insurance Requirements The RFB requires each Respondent to “provide evidence of the ability to obtain appropriate insurance coverage.” Respondents may meet the insurability requirement by having their insurance agent either (1) complete and sign an insurance certificate which meets all of the requirements of Exhibit H to the RFB; or (2) issue a letter on the insurance agency’s letterhead stating that the Respondent qualifies for the required insurance coverage levels and that an insurance certificate meeting the District’s requirements will be submitted prior to the execution of the contract. In response to this requirement, Coastal submitted a letter from Sterlingrisk Aviation, dated March 6, 2018, stating, “All required coverage amounts are available to Coastal Air Service, Inc. to fulfill the requirements of this contract.” In the Re: line, the letter refers to the specific RFB at issue in this case. Coastal also submitted a certificate of insurance from Sterlingrisk Aviation demonstrating the levels of insurance coverage in effect at the time the bid was submitted, although the coverages are less than the amounts required under the RFB.4/ HAI takes issue with Coastal’s evidence of ability to obtain the required coverage because the letter from Sterlingrisk does not state “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned infers that Sterlingrisk’s letter omits the language that a certificate “will be provided” prior to contract execution, because Sterlingrisk will issue an insurance certificate only when Coastal applies, and pays the premium, for the increased coverage limitations. The letter from Sterlingrisk substantially complies with the insurance requirements of the RFB, and constitutes competent, substantial evidence of Coastal’s ability to obtain the required insurance coverage. HAI introduced no evidence that Coastal obtained an economic advantage over HAI by failing to include language from its insurance agent that “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Instead, HAI argued that by failing to enforce that provision of the RFB, the District cannot ensure the winning bidder will be responsible to undertake the contract. HAI argued that the District’s failure to adhere to this RFB requirement may create inefficiencies that “would result in the event that Coastal were unable to obtain the required insurance coverage” before execution of the contract. Coastal’s bid documents its eligibility for insurance coverage in the amounts required by the RFB. If Coastal does not provide said certificates, it will not be qualified for final execution or issuance of the contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing Helicopter Applicator, Inc.’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2018.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA10-GM-109 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this //L% day of May, 2010. U. S. Mail: The Honorable Donald R. Alexander Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 Lynn Porter-Carlton Orange County Attorney’s Office 435 North Orange Avenue, Suite 300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Hand Delivery: Matthew Davis, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399 pt, ) 4 Paula Ford Agency Clerk Florida Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard ‘ Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
