The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner as alleged in the Petition for Relief dated September 15, 2005, and if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations provide.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was offered at the final hearing held in the instant case, no findings of fact are made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether the Petition for Relief was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact In January 2008, Petitioner filed a “Housing Discrimination Complaint” with FCHR and/or the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint alleged that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon her race (black) and religion (Christian) in its servicing of her home mortgage loan. On or about March 27, 2008, a “Determination” was issued finding no reasonable cause to believe that Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner. On April 18, 2008, FCHR sent a “Notice of Determination of No Cause” to Petitioner by certified mail No. 7007 1490 0002 5958 0931. Petitioner received the Notice on April 22, 2008, according to the certified mail receipt included in the case file. The Notice advised Petitioner that “FCHR has determined reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.” The Notice further advised Petitioner that she could request an administrative hearing, and clearly stated that any such request “must be filed with the FCHR within 30 days of the date of mailing of this Notice.” A “Petition for Relief, in blank” was sent to Petitioner along with the Notice. On May 23, 2008, FCHR received a completed “Petition for Relief” form from Petitioner. The form was signed by Petitioner and dated May 20, 2008. Petitioner stated in her response to the Order to Show Cause that she “never received any paperwork on the above case” and that “the only paperwork that [she] received was on or a about June 9, 2008.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2008.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subject to discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, based on her gender, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lyric Black, is an adult female currently residing in Marietta, Georgia. Respondent, Holmes County Housing Authority, administers federal housing-assistance programs, including the HUD Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. Respondent is located at 107 East Montana Avenue, Bonifay, Florida 32425. Respondent maintains a local preference for housing assistance. The local preference is reflected in two policies. First, Respondent’s waiting list policy affords highest priority to local residents. While applicants from other states or counties may apply for a voucher, local applicants enjoy higher priority on the waiting list. Second, Respondent’s portability policy authorizes recipients to port their voucher (i.e., use their voucher in another state or county) only if they have participated in the program for 12 months. Participation means residing in the local jurisdiction on the housing voucher. Petitioner applied, in person, for a housing choice voucher from Respondent on May 28, 2014. On her application, Petitioner represented her residence as an undisclosed local shelter for victims of domestic violence. Petitioner represented that she had lived at the shelter for the past four months and had previously resided in Marietta, Georgia. Petitioner listed the names and ages of four minor children living with her, ranging in age from 5 months to 14 years old. Petitioner also disclosed that she was pregnant. Petitioner received a preferential position on Respondent’s waiting list based on her residence in the area (at the local domestic violence shelter). At some point after filing her application with Respondent, Petitioner “returned” to Georgia. The record does not clearly establish where in Georgia to which she “returned” after making application. Respondent was unaware that Petitioner had “returned” to Georgia after applying for the housing choice voucher in May 2014. Respondent understood Petitioner had continued to reside locally, in the domestic violence shelter or otherwise in the county, between May and October 2014. In October 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner that Petitioner’s name had advanced on the waiting list and would shortly be at the top. Petitioner testified that she moved to Bonifay in October 2014 “seeking to flee domestic violence.” Petitioner’s testimony on this point conflicted with her testimony on cross- examination that she moved to Bonifay in October because she received word that her name was close to the top of the waiting list for a housing voucher. On October 29, 2014, Petitioner submitted most of the documentation required to receive her housing voucher from Respondent. Petitioner needed to submit a few outstanding documents and sign her voucher form. On November 4, 2014, Petitioner notified Respondent that she would be delayed in submitting the last of her paperwork and coming in to sign her voucher because she was having a baby. Catrina Carroll allowed Petitioner until November 12, 2014, to come in to complete her paperwork and sign her voucher. Petitioner gave birth to a baby girl on November 4, 2014, in Georgia. According to Petitioner, she returned to Holmes County with the new baby and her other children “two or three days later.” Petitioner completed her paperwork and signed her voucher at Respondent’s office on November 12, 2014. After issuing a voucher, Respondent requires recipients to identify a local rental unit, request Respondent to inspect and approve the unit, and connect utilities and occupy the unit within 60 days. Petitioner was given the same amount of time to complete the required steps to become a participant in the voucher program. Respondent had no contact from Petitioner between November 12, 2014, and December 30, 2014. On December 30, 2014, Petitioner faxed a letter to Respondent titled “Portability Request.” Petitioner’s letter read as follows: I have experienced a recent severe domestic violence incident and seek to move with continued tenant-based assistance (proof attached). In reference to the initial 12- month residency requirement, I do understand that according to the Violence Against Women and Justice Department and Reauthorization Act 2005 (VAWA 2005) amended section 8(r) of the U.S. Housing Act to provide an exception to the prohibition against a family moving under the Portability provisions in violation of the lease. Furthermore, Denying [sic] the move would violate VAWA, which provides that an applicant may not be denied admission or assistance, terminated from participation in or evicted because the victim is or has been a victim of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault or stalking. Denying such a request to port is also inconsistent with HUD’s directive regarding other portability rules. In closing, I respectfully request HCHA to consider this exception to the initial 12- month residency requirement and allow me to port my voucher to: 4273 Wendell Drive Atlanta, Georgia 30336 Office: (404) 588-4950 TTY Line: (404)696-0449 Fax: (404) 472-3431 This letter also include [sic] a portability request to address an emergency situation over which I have no control. Attached with this letter to serve as proof of domestic violence: Police Report; ER medical record of injuries; and TPO. I’ve also included previous police reports of documented domestic abuse. Petitioner attached to the letter the following: an ex parte family violence protective order filed December 8, 2014, by the Superior Court of Clayton County, Georgia, against C.H. (whom Petitioner identified as her ex- boyfriend); a police report documenting an arrest of C.H. for aggravated assault on Petitioner during an incident on December 3, 2014, at 7007 Richmond Court, Apartment C, Jonesboro, Georgia 30236; a single-page printout from Southern Regional Medical Center Emergency Services dated December 4, 2014, documenting an evaluation and treatment of Petitioner for injuries associated with an alleged assault; and, a letter to Petitioner from the Clayton County State Attorney dated December 12, 2014, offering the services of the Victim Family Assistance Program. On December 30, 2014, by letter from Catrina Carroll, Respondent’s Executive Director, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s voucher and denied Petitioner’s request to port her voucher. In the termination letter, Ms. Carroll stated, “[I]t seems that you have relocated back to Jonesboro or Marietta, GA and have therefore invalidated your preference status with our PHA. We are revoking your local status and terminating your Voucher effective immediately.” Ms. Carroll added, “You are not being denied assistance because of VAWA criteria. Special accommodations are not given for VAWA, and our policy only gives preference for local applicants.” Petitioner argues that she and her minor children were forcibly taken from the parking lot of the domestic violence shelter in Panama City and removed to Georgia on November 18, 2014, by her ex-boyfriend. Petitioner maintains that she was held captive in Georgia for three weeks, until December 4, 2014, when she was able to escape and call the police for assistance. Petitioner gave a lengthy statement to police when her ex-boyfriend was arrested on December 4, 2014. The statement police report does not include anything about being forcibly removed from Florida and held against her will in Georgia between November 18 and December 4, 2014. Petitioner produced a document at final hearing purporting to be a copy of her bank statement showing debit and ATM transactions made in Bonifay, Florida, during the months of October and November 2014. Petitioner produced no witness to authenticate the document and the document is not self- authenticating pursuant to section 90.902, Florida Statutes (2015). Apparently, Petitioner believes her personal family violence circumstance is sufficient grounds for an exception to Respondent’s portability policy. On cross-examination, however, Petitioner admitted her effort to obtain portability of her voucher was “a gamble.” Nevertheless, Petitioner expressed dismay that Respondent revoked her voucher.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2015H0187. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 2015.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that Ms. Ndimbie is handicapped for purposes of the Fair Housing Act. She has more than one mental illness diagnosis, including Schizoid Personality Disorder, Schizotypal Personality Disorder, Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder, with two of her symptoms being that she “relates poorly with others” and that she “lacks insight into the feelings of others and when she feels accosted, she becomes angry and reacts, often inappropriately.” BCCD was a Florida not-for-profit organization. Its mission was to provide affordable housing for individuals with mental illnesses. BCCD acts as a landlord for its tenants, who have difficulty finding affordable housing due to having a mental illness. A prerequisite to being a tenant at BCCD was to have a mental illness, and, therefore, all of BCCD’s tenants had a mental illness. On an annual basis, BCCD contracted with and received funds from the Florida Department of Children and Families, hereinafter DCF. The funding from DCF supplements rent received from the tenants. On June 29, 2001, the Executive Director of BCCD, Nancy Merolla, entered into an annual contract with DCF for the period of July 1, 2001, through June 30, 2002, hereinafter Annual Contract. Exhibit A of the Annual Contract provided in pertinent part: The [BCCD] will provide housing stipends to ensure safe, accessible and affordable housing opportunities to low income individuals of Broward County, who are disabled with a mental illness and/or co- occurring disorders. . . . Each tenant, who resided in housing provided by BCCD, was required to receive case management. However, BCCD did not provide case management services for its tenants. The tenants received case management services from sources outside of BCCD. DCF assigned case managers and, therefore, assigned case managers for Ms. Ndimbie. Case management services were provided to Ms. Ndimbie by Henderson Mental Health Clinic Even though Ms. Ndimbie maintains that BCCD was required to provide case management services, the evidence demonstrates that BCCD was not required to provide such services. DCF was having difficulty finding housing for Ms. Ndimbie due to her mental challenges and requested the assistance of BCCD. On October 30, 2001, Ms. Ndimbie and Ms. Merolla, on behalf of BCCD, executed a month-to-month lease agreement, hereinafter Lease, for an apartment unit at 334 Northwest 43rd Street, Oakland Park, Florida. The Lease provided, among other things, that the total rent payable was $570 per month; that Ms. Ndimbie’s portion of the rent was $115 per month; and that the portion paid by the Public Housing Agency, under the Shelter Plus Care Program of HUD was $455. The Lease, which identified Ms. Ndimbie as the Tenant and BCCD as the Landlord, was effective November 28, 2001. An addendum to the Lease was a Tenant Agreement. Ms. Ndimbie was under the Shelter Plus Program, which provided for a single occupant to be entitled to a one-bedroom unit. However, BCCD only had a two-bedroom unit available. The Tenant Agreement provided, among other things, that Ms. Ndimbie was “being temporarily allowed to stay in [a two-bedroom unit] until a one bedroom unit [became] available with [BCCD].” On or about November 28, 2001, Ms. Ndimbie moved into the two-bedroom unit. At some point in time after Ms. Ndimbie moved into the two-bedroom unit, BCCD and the other tenants, who were Ms. Ndimbie’s neighbors, began to have problems with her behavior. The other tenants filed complaints with BCCD regarding her behavior. In March 2002, after input from Ms. Ndimbie, her case manager, and DCF, BCCD conducted a meeting with Ms. Ndimbie and the complaining tenants in an effort to reconcile the differences. An agreement was reached regarding resolution of the differences. However, the problems, regarding Ms. Ndimbie’s behavior, continued. The tenants were filing petitions for injunctions for protection against her, and she was filing the same petitions against the tenants. In particular, the continuous problems resulted in one neighbor, Luis Colon, obtaining an injunction for protection against Ms. Ndimbie on May 2, 2002.3 A circuit court ordered, among other things, that she was not to have any contact with Mr. Colon and not to go within 15 feet of Mr. Colon’s unit (apartment). Ms. Ndimbie contends that BCCD represented Mr. Colon at the injunction hearing as his case manager. However, the evidence demonstrates that BCCD was not his case manager at the injunction hearing, but only responded to the presiding judge’s inquiries. Subsequently, on May 23, 2002, the injunction for protection was amended. The circuit court ordered, among other things, that the Ms. Ndimbie was not to go within 500 feet of Mr. Colon’s unit. The amended injunction for protection was effective on midnight, May 31, 2002. Ms. Ndimbie’s unit was less than 500 feet from Mr. Colon’s unit, and, therefore, the effect of the amended injunction for protection was to prevent Ms. Ndimbie from residing in her unit after midnight, May 31, 2002. BCCD offered Ms. Ndimbie an alternative unit at another location. Ms. Ndimbie viewed the apartment building where the alternative unit would be located and found that it was being renovated. She did not believe that it would be timely completed. Further, Ms. Ndimbie inquired of law enforcement regarding criminal activity within the surrounding geographical area of the alternative unit. It was reasonable for her to gather such information. She was informed by law enforcement that there was drug activity in the surrounding area. Based upon the construction activity at the alternative unit, coupled with her belief that the alternative unit would not be timely completed, and upon the history of drug activity in the surrounding area, Ms. Ndimbie decided that she would not accept the alternative unit. Even though the alternative unit was being renovated, the evidence demonstrates that it was to be completed before the effective date of the amended injunction for protection, i.e., midnight, May 31, 2002. Consequently, Ms. Ndimbie’s belief that the alternative unit was not going to be timely completed was not reasonable. Additionally, even though the surrounding area of the alternative unit had a history of drug activity, no evidence was presented that the alternative unit had been determined to be not suitable for leasing under the Annual Contract between DCF and BCCD. As a result, the alternative unit remained an available unit under the Annual Contract. Ms. Ndimbie refused to accept and move into the alternative unit. No other housing was found for Ms. Ndimbie by midnight, May 31, 2002. Her belongings were placed in a storage unit. Another tenant with mental illness moved into the alternative unit. Subsequently, Ms. Ndimbie moved into a hotel. With DCF’s approval, BCCD provided her with $1,000 to assist her with the cost of the hotel room.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Broward County Community Development Corporation, Inc. did not commit a discriminating housing practice against Joyce Ndimbie in violation of the Fair Housing Act. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondents, Housing Authority of Flagler County and Chris Beyrer, Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Flagler County (collectively, the Authority); and Advantage Realty and Management, Inc. and Dymitri Belkin (collectively, Advantage), discriminated against Petitioner Jennifer Nichole King (Petitioner) based on her race by engaging in discriminatory terms and conditions, discriminatory statements, and steering, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who is a participant in the Authority’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8 Program). On April 8, 2013, Petitioner moved from the Pinellas County Housing Authority’s Section 8 Program to the Authority’s Section 8 Program. The Authority did not transfer Petitioner into its Section 8 Program, but rather administers Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher for the Pinellas County’s Housing Authority in accordance with the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations. The essence of Petitioner’s claim against the Authority is that, because of her race, the Authority, and its executive director, Chris Beyer, steered her away from homes in predominately white areas and told her she needed to look for homes in the “projects.” According to Petitioner, when she inquired about certain homes in nicer, predominantly white areas, Chris Beyer told her that people like her did not qualify for that type of housing. She also suggested that, because of discrimination based on her race, the Authority allowed Advantage, and/or the owners of the housing units that she rented under the Section 8 Program, to continue to receive rent and raise rental rates, even though the Authority knew that repairs required for habitability were not being made. The evidence, as outlined in the Findings of Fact below, does not support Petitioner’s claims against the Authority. During her orientation process for Section 8 services in Flagler County, Petitioner completed the Authority’s voucher briefing process, which included both an oral briefing and an information packet. The subjects covered by the briefing information and documentation included family and owner obligations and responsibilities; the housing selection process; a list of the Authority’s resources for locating housing, which included areas outside of poverty or minority concentrated areas; the Authority’s process for determining the amount of housing assistance payment for the family and maximum rent; and a list of participating realtors that manage properties for various owners participating in the Section 8 Program. After Petitioner completed the voucher briefing process, on April 18, 2013, the Authority issued Petitioner a Housing Choice Voucher. In July 2013, Petitioner independently, and voluntarily, located a potential rental unit at 49 Raintree Place, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Raintree Place unit), and submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for the unit. The Raintree Place unit was a four bedroom, detached single-family home constructed in 2006. The proposed rent for the unit was $1,000.00 per month, with a required security deposit of $1,500.00. The Authority inspected the unit, determined that it passed the housing quality standards, and that the rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract with the owner, or owner’s agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on behalf of Petitioner. On May 29, 2014, the owner of the Raintree Place unit filed an eviction action against Petitioner for nonpayment of rent. At a subsequent mediation, the parties to the eviction action entered a stipulation agreement on July 2, 2014, which required Petitioner, among other things, to vacate the unit by July 31, 2014. The stipulation agreement also provided that if Petitioner timely performed all of the terms and conditions of the stipulation agreement, then the owner agreed to dismiss the eviction case. On July 31, 2014, Petitioner timely vacated the Raintree Place unit as agreed, thereby avoiding a judgment for possession against her. Thereafter, on August 6, 2014, the Authority issued Petitioner a new Housing Choice Voucher to locate another rental unit. In August 2014, Petitioner independently, and voluntarily, located another potential unit located at 92 Ulysses Trail, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Ulysses Trail unit). Petitioner submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease. This unit was a four bedroom, detached single- family home constructed in 2002. The proposed rent for the unit was $1,200.00 per month, and the security deposit was $1,500.00. The Ulysses Trail unit was owned by Serghei Potorac. Mr. Potorac hired Advantage to manage the unit. Advantage managed the Ulysses Trail unit until September 6, 2017. The Authority inspected the Ulysses Trail unit and determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or the owner’s agent, Advantage, to pay housing assistance to the owner on behalf of Petitioner. Petitioner and her family moved into the Ulysses Trail unit on September 1, 2014. During Petitioner’s tenancy, the owner of the Ulysses Trail unit received various notices for city code violations because of Petitioner’s failure to maintain the property in accordance with local city codes or ordinances. The alleged violations included overgrown lawn, failing to screen outside trash containers, and accumulation of trash on the property. As a result, the city assessed fines against the owner totaling over $800.00. On July 8, 2015, Advantage sent Petitioner a seven-day notice to cure, demanding that she pay the outstanding fines. Petitioner ultimately either corrected, or agreed to correct, the violations. As a result, the city waived the outstanding fines. After conferring with the owner, Petitioner and Advantage advised the Authority that the owner would not proceed against Petitioner. On July 13, 2015, the Authority conducted an annual inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. The unit passed the inspection but there were some issues that the Authority felt needed to be addressed. Therefore, on July 13, 2015, Robert Beyrer, the Petitioner’s housing counselor at the Authority, sent Advantage an email regarding those issues. The next year, on July 12, 2016, the Authority conducted its next annual inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. Because of some noted deficiencies, the unit did not initially pass inspection. The Authority sent correspondence to Advantage detailing the deficiencies that needed correction by August 12, 2016. Thereafter, Advantage provided the Authority with an invoice from VK Services showing that the deficiencies had been timely corrected. During the time period from July 2015 through October 2016, the Authority received copies of at least four three-day notices that Advantage had delivered to Petitioner for failing to timely pay rent. With respect to a three-day notice delivered to Petitioner on October 11, 2016, the owner subsequently filed an eviction action on October 20, 2016. During a court-ordered mediation, the parties entered into a Stipulation Agreement dated November 10, 2016. When Petitioner failed to comply with the November 10, 2016, Stipulation Agreement, Advantage filed an affidavit on February 2, 2017, on behalf of the owner, seeking a judgment for possession. That same day, without advising the Authority of the ongoing eviction action, Petitioner asked the Authority to conduct a special inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. During the Authority’s inspection, the Authority found that the unit failed the inspection as a result of various deficiencies attributed to both the owner and Petitioner. The next day, on February 3, 2017, the court entered a final judgment for possession against Petitioner, and the court clerk issued a writ of possession. In response, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the execution of the writ, claiming, among other things, that Advantage failed to repair items as agreed in the November 10, 2016, Stipulation Agreement. In the meantime, the unit was re-inspected by the Authority on February 27, 2017, and the inspector found that some of the deficiencies had been addressed but there remained some that still needed to be corrected. On March 14, 2017, the Authority did a final inspection of the unit and determined that the remaining deficiencies had been addressed by both Advantage and Petitioner. Following two hearings on Petitioner’s motion in the eviction case, the court granted Petitioner’s motion to stay and vacated the final judgment. The court also reduced Petitioner’s portion of the rent due for the months of January and February 2017 based on its findings regarding the outstanding repairs. Further court orders reflect that Advantage ultimately addressed the disputed repairs and that Petitioner was ordered to pay full rent for the months of March and April 2017. The Authority was not a party and did not appear in the eviction proceedings. Thereafter, the owner gave Petitioner notice and advised the Authority that Petitioner’s lease would not be renewed, and that Petitioner would need to vacate the unit by August 31, 2017. The Authority subsequently sent correspondences to Petitioner explaining what she needed to do in order to be eligible to move to another location with continued housing assistance from the Authority. Petitioner timely vacated the Ulysses Trail unit and was issued a new voucher by the Authority on September 1, 2017, that could be used for a new rental unit. On October 13, 2017, Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer an email stating: Good Morning, Can you email the list of realtors that you have. I misplaced ours with all the moving about. Also I am going to need to request an[] extension of my voucher. Do we need to sign anything? Thank, Jen King In response, Robert Beyrer sent Petitioner another copy of the list of participating realtors in Flagler County previously provided to her by the Authority during her initial voucher briefing. The Authority, through Robert Beyrer, also granted Petitioner’s request for an extension of her voucher until December 1, 2017. On October 30, 2017, Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer another email advising that she was having difficulty finding another unit. By email, Robert Beyrer responded by further extending the expiration date of her voucher until December 31, 2017, and counseling her on various sources where she might find available units, stating: There are rentals out there. I am not sure who you are speaking with. I would continue to contact the landlords on the participating realtors list, check the local newspaper weekly, and check Zillow.com for reputable property management companies. We have been leasing people up with your voucher size in your price range. I will continue to keep my eyes open for you! Petitioner independently and voluntarily located a potential rental unit located at 10 Pier Lane, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Pier Lane unit) and, on December 27, 2017, submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for the unit. The Authority inspected the Pier Lane unit and determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or owner’s agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on Petitioner’s behalf. On February 1, 2018, Petitioner moved into the Pier Lane unit. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was residing at the Pier Lane unit and the Authority was paying HAP payments to the owner on behalf of Petitioner under a HAP Contract with the owner. At the hearing, Petitioner maintained that the crux of her housing discrimination complaint was actually based on racially discriminatory statements allegedly made to her by Chris Beyrer. Petitioner alleged that Chris Beyrer said to her, among other things, “You cannot live by the canals; they do not rent to people like you.” Petitioner testified that she took Chris Beyrer’s statements to mean that she could not rent a unit by the canals because they do not rent to black people or people of color. Petitioner admitted, however, that Chris Beyrer never referenced or otherwise indicated that race was the underlying reason or motive when he made the alleged statements. Chris Beyrer denied making the alleged discriminatory statements attributed to her by Petitioner, or any other racially discriminatory statements. Ms. Beyer explained that any housing suggestions to Petitioner would have been on the type of unit Petitioner could afford to rent based on the amount of her reported household income and rental subsidy. Ms. Beyer’s testimony was credible and is accepted. Rather than showing racial discrimination against Petitioner in the Authority’s administration of the Section 8 Program, the evidence showed that, as a Section 8 participant in Flagler County, Petitioner was and is free to locate or choose an eligible rental unit anywhere in the Authority’s jurisdiction and submit the proposed rental unit to the Authority for approval. Further, at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew any claim that Advantage had unlawfully discriminated against her because of her race by failing to make requested repairs or by providing false repair records for the Ulysses Trail unit to the Authority. Specifically, Petitioner stated at the hearing that she did not believe Advantage had engaged in any discriminatory conduct towards her, and was rescinding her housing discrimination complaint against Advantage. Nevertheless, near the close of the hearing, one of Advantage’s witnesses, a repairman from VK Services, provided brief testimony confirming that he had personally made the repairs at the Ulysses Trail unit, as indicated in the various invoices provided by Advantage to the Authority. The testimony is credited. Finally, despite Petitioner’s claims that the Authority also discriminated against her by allowing Advantage to raise rents and continuing to pay HAP to the owner during the years of her tenancy at the Ulysses Trail unit while unaddressed deficiencies existed, Petitioner admitted that she voluntarily chose to accept the owner’s proposed rental increases and repeatedly renewed her lease with the owner. The evidence further showed that Petitioner was always free under the Section 8 Program to reject lease rental increases and relocate to a new unit of her choice with continued housing assistance from the Authority. In sum, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s claim that, because of racial discrimination, the Authority steered her to only certain rental units, that the Authority allowed rent increases despite lack of repairs, that there were discriminatory statements made against her, or that Advantage was complicit in the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition and Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2018.
