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PATRICIA MCDONOUGH vs OSCEOLA COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, 03-004845 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Kissimmee, Florida Dec. 24, 2003 Number: 03-004845 Latest Update: Jun. 03, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, on the basis of her race, violating Subsections 760.23(1), (2), or (4), Florida Statutes (2002). If discriminatory conduct has been proven, whether quantifiable damages, or other allowable remedies, have been proven under Section 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2002).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, is a Caucasian female who, at one time, qualified for housing assistance under the Section 8 Rental Voucher (Voucher) Program and is a protected person under the FHA. Respondent, Osceola County Housing Authority, is a department of the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and is the local housing authority (HA) under the Federal FHA. In 1997, Petitioner participated in the Voucher program, which is administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Vouchers are portable, which allows a participant to move to another jurisdiction and request a transfer from one local HA to another. A portability packet of necessary paperwork is prepared by the originating HA and mailed directly to the receiving HA to facilitate the transfer and to prevent fraud. If the receiving HA accepts the transferred Voucher to administer, the originating HA pays the receiving HA 80 percent of the administrative fee it receives from HUD, in addition to the rental and utility assistance payments. Petitioner had a valid Voucher in 1997 that was administered at the local level by the Maryland Housing Opportunity Commission located at 10400 Detrick Avenue, Kensington, Maryland 20895 (Maryland). Petitioner requested Maryland to transfer her Voucher to the City of Kissimmee, Florida (Kissimmee), in 1997, which was the local HA for Osceola County, Florida, at that time. Kissimmee accepted the Maryland Voucher on August 28, 1997, and agreed to administer it on behalf of Maryland. Respondent assumed responsibility for the Voucher program from Kissimmee on October 1, 2000. From 1997 to the present, Kissimmee and Respondent contracted with HUD for a total of 193 Vouchers. This does not include any transferred Vouchers administered through the portability requirements of the HUD program. Kissimmee created a waiting list in 1998 that contained more than 500 names of eligible participants for the 193 Vouchers. The waiting list has not been reopened since it was created. The list was created and is administered in a nondiscriminatory and race-neutral manner by the HA. Respondent accepts and administers transferred Vouchers and currently administers in excess of 700 such Vouchers. A transferred Voucher does not affect the 193 contracted Vouchers. A participant must be recertified annually to keep one of the 193 Vouchers. As participants surrender one of these 193 Vouchers, a new participant is awarded the Voucher from Respondent's waiting list. As participants surrender one of the 700 transferred Vouchers, Respondent has no authority to award it to anyone, whether on the waiting list or not. Petitioner was never on Respondent's waiting list, since Petitioner's Voucher was a transferred Voucher from Maryland. On or about July 13, 2000, Petitioner requested Kissimmee to transfer her Voucher to the County of Fairfax, Department of Housing, Fairfax, Virginia (Virginia). Kissimmee prepared the transfer packet and mailed it to Virginia at Petitioner's request. Petitioner moved from Virginia back to Osceola County in early May 2001. Petitioner testified that when she moved back to Osceola County, she brought her paperwork with her. She then requested Respondent, in a letter dated May 10, 2001, to reinstate her transfer Voucher from Virginia. Petitioner testified that she included her paperwork with the letter. However, there is no credible evidence to support her position. Petitioner has not shown that she had a valid portable Voucher from another HA to transfer to Respondent when she returned from Virginia in May 2001, nor did she offer proof that she requested Virginia to mail her voucher and transfer request directly to Respondent, as HUD policy requires. Respondent has never received paperwork for a transfer Voucher for Petitioner from another jurisdiction, including Maryland or Virginia, after Kissimmee transferred Petitioner's Voucher to Virginia in 2000. Respondent cannot reinstate a Voucher from another HA. Respondent has policies and procedures in place to prevent racial discrimination. Respondent denied Petitioner's request based upon its policies and procedures. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner based upon her race. Petitioner is not eligible for one of the 193 Vouchers Respondent is contracted for through HUD. Respondent does not have any Vouchers available to award to Petitioner and has not reopened the waiting list since it was created in 1998. Petitioner has failed to produce any evidence that Respondent racially discriminated against her in regard to the administration of the Voucher program or failed to rent her a dwelling unit for which she was eligible.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patricia McDonough 5121 Violet Lane Kissimmee, Florida 34758 Scott Polodna, Esquire Osceola County Housing Authority One Courthouse Square, Suite 4200 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.23760.3590.803
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ANTHONY G. SAGER, JR. vs HUBERT AND MARTHA DAWLEY, 12-002876 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Milton, Florida Aug. 28, 2012 Number: 12-002876 Latest Update: Jan. 22, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act. Based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, no act of discrimination occurred in this matter.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner resided in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, in April 2012, when he responded to an advertisement on ApartmentsOnline.com. He found an apartment that interested him, a one-bedroom furnished unit in Milton, Florida, that was offering a move-in special of three weeks off the first month's rent. The property qualified as Section 8 HUD housing, the classification of housing in which he currently resided, so he sought a transfer of his status from Pennsylvania to Florida. Respondent, Hubert Dawley, told Petitioner that the apartment would be available May 15, 2012. Petitioner was determined to be disabled by the Social Security Administration as of March 13, 1996, and has been receiving benefits since April 28, 1998 (retroactive to March 13, 1996), the date of his determination of disability by a federal administrative law judge entered on that date. Petitioner has a service animal, which helps with his depression. His physician in Milton believes the animal will help him better function in his daily life. Petitioner claims he told Mr. Dawley about his service animal and that he would be bringing the dog with him when he moved to Milton. Respondents have a firm "no pets" policy for their apartments, and Mr. Dawley denied ever knowing about the dog prior to Petitioner's move to Milton. On May 5, 2012, prior to his move to Milton, Petitioner signed an "Application to Rent" Respondents' available apartment in which he answered "NO" (in capital letters) to the question "Do you have any dogs, cats, or other pets?" Petitioner acknowledged signing the application and writing "NO" in response to the question about pets. Petitioner signed a residential lease agreement along with Mr. Dawley on May 5, 2012. The lease contained the following paragraph: (J.) Pets shall not be permitted. Initial here, to indicate your agreement that no pets will be allowed on the premises. Failure to adhere to this agreement shall cause forfeiture of deposits and a $200.00 non-refundable pet damage fee to be immediately due to cover damage/flea infestation. Additionally it shall be at Managements [sic] discretion to immediately terminate this lease and demand possession of residence. Additionally pet shall be immediately removed from the premises. Initial here to indicate your agreement to this provision. (Bold type in original) Petitioner signed the lease and initialed it in the two places indicated in the "no pets" provision. Petitioner gave Mr. Dawley a check for $500 at the time he signed the lease. The amount represents $225 for two weeks' rent (May 15-31) and a $250 security deposit for a total of $475. Respondents did not give Petitioner his $25 change. After Petitioner moved in, Mr. Dawley learned about Petitioner's dog when he went over one night to fix a plumbing issue and saw the pet on the couch. He informed Petitioner that the lease specifically did not allow pets. Petitioner testified that the apartment was filthy and in disrepair when he moved in. Mr. Robert Youngblood, the HUD inspector failed the apartment on a Housing Quality Services inspection due to a broken bathroom fan and requested that the fan be repaired by May 22, 2012. Mr. Dawley told Petitioner the dog would have to go. Petitioner said he would move out, but wanted a return of all his rent and deposit money. Petitioner called the Milton Police Department on May 27, 2012, to have an officer present when he moved out "to avoid any trouble." An officer and Mr. Dawley were present on May 28 when Petitioner moved out, which occurred without incident. Mr. Dawley returned $58 to Petitioner, keeping $14.51 per each day of Petitioner's tenancy (the prorated amount of $500 per month rent) and $200 to have the apartment cleaned due to the pet having been present. Petitioner claims that Respondents never had the apartment cleaned after he moved out to which Mr. Dawley produced a receipt for a carpet cleaning machine rental on June 6, 2012. Petitioner disputes the rental as having been made, if at all, for cleaning other apartments. He has no direct evidence that Mr. Dawley did not clean the apartment upon his moving out. Petitioner is seeking the return of the entire $500 he gave Respondents as the first two weeks' rent and security deposit. Petitioner acknowledges he received a $58 refund. Petitioner produced no evidence of discrimination by Respondents on the basis of his disability. His entire claim is based upon the fact that he needs the service animal to help with his depression and that Respondents were aware of the presence of the dog prior to Petitioner moving into the apartment and accepted him as a tenant with a pet.

Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the claim for relief brought by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Anthony Sager 6665 Magnolia Street Milton, Florida 32570 Hubert and Martha Dawley 4661 Keyser Lane Pace, Florida 32571 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.68413.08760.20760.23760.37
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JAMES E. TOWNSEND SR., CONTESSA IDLEBURG vs ASSAD F. MALATY, 18-004634 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Sep. 04, 2018 Number: 18-004634 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 2020

The Issue Whether Respondent, Assad F. Malaty, discriminated against Petitioners, Dr. James E. Townsend and his niece, Contessa Idleburg (formerly, Ms. Rogers), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the appropriate remedy therefor.

Findings Of Fact Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Dr. Townsend has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. He suffered a stroke in May 2014, upon which the requested modifications and accommodations were based. The stroke substantially limited one or more major life activities, given his need for using a wheelchair and walker. § 760.22(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Mr. Malaty conceded as much at the hearing.3/ Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Ms. Idleburg has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. She has a shunt to drain fluid from her brain, has received Supplemental Social Security Income since at least 2014, and also has used a walker. That said, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodations solely to assist Dr. Townsend after he suffered the stroke. Thus, Ms. Idleburg’s handicap is not relevant to the claims at issue. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Petitioners informed Mr. Malaty in May 2014 that Dr. Townsend suffered a stroke and requested that he make several modifications to the Unit, including handrails in the bathroom, and handrails and a ramp at the front door, and to accommodate them by assigning them a parking spot outside the Unit. There is no dispute that the requested modifications and accommodation were never made. Importantly, however, the evidence does not establish that Petitioners’ renewed those requests again before they filed complaints with the Department of Justice in late 2016 and HUD in early 2017.4/ Although Dr. Townsend reminded Mr. Malaty in a December 2016 letter that he had failed to make the requested the modifications, the undersigned finds that letter to be more in the nature of a response to Mr. Malaty’s threat of eviction rather than a renewed request to accommodate them. The weight of the credible evidence also confirms that Petitioners never offered to pay for the handrails, ramp, or signage for the requested parking spot. Indeed, Dr. Townsend testified that he believed Mr. Malaty was responsible for making such modifications as the owner of the Unit. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Malaty did not evict Petitioners because of their handicaps or their requests for modifications or an accommodation. Mr. Malaty initially threatened to evict them for failing to pay rent in January 2013, reducing their rent in September and December 2016, and failing to take care of the lawn as required in the lease. It had been three years since Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodation due to Dr. Townsend’s stroke and they did not re-raise those issues again until after Mr. Malaty threatened to evict them for failing to pay the rent. The evidence also is clear that Petitioners could have avoided eviction by paying the missed rent by December 29, 2016. But, they failed to do so and then did not pay their rent in January 2017, which ultimately led to Mr. Malaty filing the eviction action.

Conclusions For Petitioners: James E. Townsend, Sr., pro se Contessa Idleburg, pro se Apartment 2101 140 Aida Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 For Respondent: Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esquire Law Office of Charlann Jackson Sanders 2225 East Edgewood Drive, Suite 8 Lakeland, Florida 33803

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2019.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.22760.23760.32760.34760.35760.37 DOAH Case (1) 18-4634
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REGENCY PLACE APARTMENTS AND CAROLE NAYLOR vs HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, 98-003449F (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 27, 1998 Number: 98-003449F Latest Update: Aug. 26, 1999

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency as provided under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Whether the amount claimed by Petitioner for attorney's fees and costs is reasonable.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent agency is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.30, Florida Statutes (1995). If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with Sections 760.20 - 760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, the Respondent agency may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statues, on behalf of the aggrieved party. On February 3, 1993, Polly Leggitt filed a complaint with the Respondent agency and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Complaint named Carole Naylor, Property Administrator, as the person who discriminated against her. On March 24, 1993, the Respondent agency notified Regency Place Apartments and Carole Naylor that the Complaint had been filed, and stated that within 100 days, the Respondent agency would investigate the Complaint and give notice whether there was or was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The notice further provided that final administrative disposition of the Complaint would be completed within one year from the filing of the Complaint, which would be on or about February 3, 1994. A Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge was made and issued and served on August 28, 1996. It named Regency Place Apartments; Carole Naylor, Frank Cutrona, Property Manager; and Robert Stitzel, owner. The notice was issued more than one year after the filing of the Complaint. Following the formal hearing, this Administrative Law Judge made certain findings of fact which were incorporated in the Recommended Order. Those findings held, inter alia: Robert Stitzel was the developer and owner of Regency Place Apartments. Carole Naylor, at the direction of the manager Frank Cutrona, sent Ms. Leggitt letters rejecting her application for an apartment unit at Regency Place Apartments because there was no apartment of the kind she wanted that was available and further that her income was insufficient to qualify her for housing at that place. Cutrona died on December 26, 1996. Carole Naylor did not work in the rental office. She made no judgments regarding the rental of the apartment, nor the creditworthiness of the prospective tenants. Robert Stitzel made no judgments regarding the tenants. Regency Place Apartments had a policy which requires income equaling three times the gross rental. The creditworthiness and the determination of who would rent apartments was left solely with the resident manager. Stitzel demonstrated that many disabled people had lived in the apartment complex. Accommodations were made for people with disabilities by the manager and such costs for these accommodations were paid by Regency Place Apartments. The agency made a prima facie case of discrimination in that Leggitt is a handicapped person, who is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment, and suffered a loss of a housing opportunity, under circumstances which lead to an inference that Stitzel based its action solely upon her handicap. Evidence was presented that Regency Place Apartment's requirement of gross income equaling three times the monthly rent had not been satisfied by Leggitt's mother's agreement to contribute $550 per month. Leggitt's income was $281.34 per month. Three times the monthly rent was $1,140.00, thus rendering her income short by $308.66 per month. The motivation for rejecting the application was that the apartment which Leggitt wanted was not available and Leggitt did not have sufficient income to qualify. There was no evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of Cutrona, Naylor, Stitzel, or Regency Place Apartments, other than conjecture. There was no evidence that suggests the reasons given were not true at the time the letters were written or that they were merely pretextual. Further, it did not appear from the evidence that any discriminatory motive was proven. There was nothing in the evidence that proves that Leggitt's legal blindness was a cause of the rejection of her application. There was no evidence of any act or conduct which would suggest discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory animus by any of the persons named as Respondents in the Administrative Charge. Taken as a whole, the credible evidence indicated that the sole basis for rejecting Leggitt's application was the unavailability of the unit that she requested, and her failure to satisfy management of her financial ability to meet the financial requirements of Regency Place Apartments. Although Leggitt testified as to her inconvenience caused by the denial of her application, there was no evidence of any quantifiable damages presented at the hearing. In the Conclusions of Law, it was determined that the Motion to Dismiss should have and was granted on the grounds that the Respondent agency failed to comply with the statutory time requirements: Under the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, "the Secretary shall make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and complete such investigation within 100 days after filing of the Complaint . . . unless it is impracticable to do so." 42 U.S.C. s 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). The statute also provides that if "the Secretary is unable to complete the investigation within 100 days" after complainant files the complaint, the Secretary "shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." 42 U.S.C. s. 3610(a)(1)(c). This same provision is found in the Florida Fair Housing Act. See Section 760.34, Florida Statutes (1995), and Chapter 60Y-7, Florida Administrative Code. The Florida Administrative Code provides as follows: "Section 60Y-7004(8)(b) If the Commission is unable to complete its investigation within 100 days, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." Section 60Y-7.004(10) The Commission will make final administrative deposition of a complaint within one year of the date of receipt of the complaint, unless it is impracticable to do so. If the Commission is unable to do so, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." It is undisputed in this case that the Respondent agency did not file its determination until August 28, 1996, over three and one-half years from the time Leggitt filed her complaint. It is also undisputed that the Respondent agency never notified Petitioner, or the other parties, that it would be unable to complete the investigation within 100 days as required by statute. Nor did it notify Stitzel in writing why an administrative disposition of a Complaint had not been made within one year of receipt of the Complaint. Petitioner established that the Respondent agency violated the statutory time limits and that the three and one- half year delay in filing the Respondent agency's Notice of Probable Cause caused the proceedings to be impaired and was to Petitioner's extreme prejudice. At the attorney's fee hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to the cause for the extreme delay in the filing of the Administrative Charge, or the rationale for filing the Charge two and one-half years after the expiration of the statutory deadline for filing said charges. At the attorney's fees hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to why it claimed to be substantially justified in finding probable cause and filing the Administrative Charge. The Petitioner, demonstrated that, at the time the matter was initiated, Regency Place Apartments was a business operating as a limited partnership and that Robert Stitzel was the general partner; that the principal place of business was in Florida; and that it did not have more than 25 full-time employees. Petitioner retained counsel to defend it on the charges contained in the Notice of Determination, Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge, and Petitioner was the prevailing small business party. Counsel for Petitioner expended 76 hours on this matter, not including time expended on the Petition for Attorney's Fees or time expended following his appearance before the Commission prior to the issuance of the final order. Counsel's billing for Petitioner's time at an hourly rate of $200 is reasonable in this case. The Petitioner's billable costs of $609.75 are reasonable.

USC (1) 5 U.S.C 504 Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.6857.10557.111760.20760.30760.34760.37 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-7.004
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LARRY WILLIAMS AND MONICA WILLIAMS vs OCALA HOUSING AUTHORITY, 03-001627 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida May 05, 2003 Number: 03-001627 Latest Update: Mar. 12, 2004

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners have been subjected to illegal discriminatory treatment by Respondent in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners' complaint, which was dismissed by FCHR on March 24, 2003, resulted from a Housing Discrimination Complaint dual-filed with FCHR and HUD. Petitioners seek to become landlords under the Federal government's Section 8 Program, administered in the Ocala area by Respondent. It is the responsibility of Respondent to receive applications from owners of properties, like Petitioners, who are willing to rent those properties to economically adversely-affected individuals. Respondent then inspects the properties and determines a rental allowance or the amount of supplemental Federal money to be paid the landowner for the rental of a specific property, thereby allowing the economically deprived person a place to live. Petitioners claim that Respondent has discriminated against them by refusing to allow Petitioners to participate in the Section 8 program; specifically, by not making reasonable rent determinations and delaying inspections which are preliminary to a determination of a rental rate. Petitioners did not offer evidence of any specific acts of race-based discrimination. Nor did Petitioners cite any specific information concerning disparate treatment of landlords in the Section 8 program based on race. Further, Petitioners were unable to cite any statistical information that could reasonably lead to the inference that Respondent engaged in wide-spread discrimination. Petitioners’ race-based claims were not supported by any specific information about disparate treatment by Respondent. Petitioners contested the amount of rent which Respondent determined to be applicable to the subject property. As long as the amount of rent was contested, Respondent could not make a rent determination for the Petitioners' properties. A letter to Petitioners from Respondent, dated October 9, 2002, provided Petitioners with notice that Respondent had been advised by its attorney that it could not make a rent determination while the HUD complaint was pending. The letter further stated that should Petitioners withdraw their complaint, their application would be processed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David E. Midgett, Esquire Ocala Housing Authority 2800 East Silver Springs Boulevard Suite 205 Ocala, Florida 34470 Larry Williams Monica Williams Post Office Box 01322 Miami, Florida 33101-3221 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.57760.20760.23760.35760.37
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INGRID GOMEZ AND LUIS MORAN vs JIM HILL, JUDY HILL, AND DEMARCO INVESTMENTS, 04-001969 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jun. 04, 2004 Number: 04-001969 Latest Update: Dec. 09, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioners have been subjected to an unlawful housing practice by Respondents, as alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed by Petitioners on March 13, 2004.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Ingrid Gomez and Luis Moran, are married. They and their son moved into Coral Gardens Apartments in early 2000. Petitioners entered into a one-year lease on January 13, 2000. The lease was not renewed at the end of one year, and Petitioners, thereafter, lived in their apartment as month-to- month tenants. Coral Gardens Apartments is a 36-unit apartment complex located in Naples, Florida. Many of the residents are minorities. Respondent DeMarco Investments is the absentee owner of the complex, which is managed through a Fort Myers company called Services-Taylor Made, Inc. Respondents Jim and Judy Hill were hired to manage the complex in March 2003. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill sent a notice to all tenants that stated as follows, set forth verbatim:1/ Now we have [sic] ask you to please make sure that when you give your children snacks, drinks, or what ever [sic] to eat that you the parent would make sure your children discard the trash inside the unit or in the dumpster. Apparently this went in one ear and out the other. Now all unit [sic] has to suffer this price because no one wants to help keep the trash up by disposing of it yourself [sic]. The adults are getting just as bad. So every unit is going to pay an additional $35.00 a month trash clean up fee. You want to live trashy MOVE across the street. So when you pay your July Rent pay an extra $35.00 to pay for the person that has to clean up YOUR trash. I sent out letters to everyone that it was $25.00 and if it didn't improve I would raise it. Well I didn't inforced [sic] the $25.00 and it hasn't changed at all. So it [sic] in effect for sure now [sic]. YOU WILL PAY $35.00 WITH JULY'S RENT. Now you don't want to pay it next month then start picking up the TRASH! Also from now on you put furniture out at the dumpster it will cost you $50.00 first piece and $15.00 per piece after that. They charge me to come and get the stuff then I charge you. The camera's [sic] will be watching and don't get caught. I hate to inform all of you we are not the old managers, the old owners, the old maintenance personal [sic]. We are new and we are the LAW here. We are working to improve this place and if you can't help with keeping this place clean then I DON"T [sic] want to here [sic]. I AM NOT GOING TO LIVE IN A TRASHY PLACE! After receiving this notice, Mr. Moran and Mr. Novarro went to the manager's office to discuss the propriety of the proposed $35.00 trash pick-up fee. Mr. Moran stated to Ms. Hill that he believed an imposition of such a fee on tenants was against the law. Mr. Moran testified that Ms. Hill stated, "I am the law." Mr. Moran demanded that Ms. Hill give him the phone number of Mr. DeMarco. He told her, "I want to talk to the owner of the circus, not the clowns." Mr. Moran testified that at this point, Ms. Hill became apoplectic. She called Mr. Moran "a fucking nigger Latino." Mr. Novarro, whose English was very sketchy, confirmed that Ms. Hill used those words. Ms. Gomez, who speaks relatively fluent English, testified that on another occasion Ms. Hill stated that she was "tired of the fucking negros Latinos." This raised a question whether Ms. Hill also used the term "negros" in her confrontation with Mr. Moran and whether it became "nigger" only in the imperfect translation. In any event, Ms. Hill's use of the word "fucking" was unambiguous and certainly indicated a racial animus against Mr. Moran, who is indeed a black Latino. In a second notice to all tenants dated June 22, 2003, Ms. Hill acknowledged tenant complaints about the $35.00 fee. She had "consulted the Florida Landlord/Tenant Act and state officials in Tallahassee," and concluded that she was required to rescind the $35.00 trash fee. Thus, the controversial fee was never collected. Dennis Gomez, Petitioners' middle-school-aged son, testified that Ms. Hill told him she would pay him $5.00 per week to pick up trash on the property. Mr. Moran told Dennis not to accept, because tenants paid Ms. Hill $10.00 per month to clean up the property. Dennis testified that after he refused the offer, Ms. Hill told him that he had to pick up the trash anyway because he "was a slave." When Dennis asked why he was a slave, Ms. Hill stated that Dennis' father was a "nigger and a slave," and that made Dennis a "slave, too." Dennis Gomez' testimony is not credible. There is undoubtedly a kernel of truth in his story, but Dennis' obvious embellishments of his conversations with Ms. Hill render his testimony of doubtful probative value. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill served Petitioners with a seven-day notice to vacate the premises, because of her confrontation with Mr. Moran. However, the notice was never enforced and the Petitioners stayed on until August 1, 2003, when they voluntarily terminated their tenancy. There was a problem with the return of Petitioners' deposit. Ms. Gomez contacted Mr. DeMarco, who returned the deposit to Petitioners after a two-month delay caused by cash flow problems with his businesses. Mr. DeMarco credibly testified that he knew nothing of the controversy between Petitioners and Ms. Hill until he received the Housing Discrimination Complaint. His only contact with Petitioners was the telephone conversation with Ms. Gomez in August 2003 concerning the Petitioners' deposit. From the weight of the testimony, it is apparent that there was a great deal of animosity between Petitioners and the Hills. The notices authored by Ms. Hill were crude and insulting, but were not directed toward Petitioners in particular. There is credible evidence that on at least one occasion Ms. Hill uttered a derogatory and insulting racial comment to Mr. Moran. However, the record evidence does not demonstrate that Ms. Hill took any action against Petitioners on the basis of their race or familial status. The $35.00 trash fee notice was provided to all tenants. The fee itself was never collected. Petitioners were given a seven-day notice, but it was never enforced. Petitioners chose to vacate their tenancy. No adverse action whatever was taken against Petitioners. DeMarco Investments was unaware of the hostile situation between Petitioners and the Hills. Mr. DeMarco's delay in returning Petitioners' deposit was due to legitimate business reasons.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.23760.34
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YVONNE MALONE vs BEACON HILL, LTD, 13-003703 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 24, 2013 Number: 13-003703 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2014

The Issue The issue is this case is whether the Respondent, Beacon Hill, Ltd., discriminated against Yvonne Malone (Petitioner) based on her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act).

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a resident at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Respondent. At the hearing, the Petitioner recited a litany of complaints related to her apartment unit and to the services she has received from the Respondent's staff. Although the Petitioner has previously asserted that the Respondent has discriminated against her based on her religion, the Petitioner testified at the hearing that she had been "harassed" and "abused" by the Respondent's employees and that she did not know the basis for her treatment. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has discriminated against the Petitioner based on her religion. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has treated the Petitioner any differently than any other resident of the apartment complex has been treated. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has "harassed" or "abused" the Petitioner in any manner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Yvonne Malone. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.37
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JAMES WERGELES vs TREGATE EAST CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC., 09-004204 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Aug. 06, 2009 Number: 09-004204 Latest Update: Jun. 25, 2010

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by allegedly excluding Petitioner from participating in a homeowner’s meeting on January 14, 2009, or ejecting Petitioner from the meeting, based on Petitioner’s religion and alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.37 and Subsections 760.23(2), 760.23(8), 760.23(8)(2)(b), and 784.03(1)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if not, whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009).

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a condominium association defined in Section 718.103, Florida Statutes. Respondent manages a condominium development, identified in the record as Tregate East Condominiums (Tregate). Tregate is a covered multifamily dwelling within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Jewish male whose age is not evidenced in the record. A preponderance of the evidence presented at the final hearing does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, medical, or mental disability, or perceived disability. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner in the association meeting on January 14, 2009. In particular, the fact-finder reviewed the videotape of the entire meeting that took place on January 14, 2009. The meeting evidenced controversy, acrimony, and differences of opinion over issues confronting the homeowners present. However, the video tape did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on Petitioner’s religion, ethnicity, or alleged handicap. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), this Recommended Order finds that Petitioner has participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009). The evidence submitted by Petitioner presented no justiciable issue of fact or law. Petitioner provided no evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a handicap defined in Subsection 760.22(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claims to have a disability based on migraine headaches but offered no medical evidence to support a finding that Petitioner suffers from migraine headaches or any medical or mental disability. Petitioner’s testimony was vague and ambiguous, lacked precision, and was not specific as to material facts. Petitioner called four other witnesses and cross-examined Respondent’s witnesses. Petitioner’s examination of his witnesses and cross-examination of Respondent’s witnesses may be fairly summarized as consisting of comments on the answers to questions and argument with the witnesses. Petitioner repeatedly disregarded instructions from the ALJ not to argue with witnesses and not to comment on the testimony of a witness. Petitioner offered no evidence or legal authority that the alleged exclusion from the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, was prohibited under Florida’s Fair Housing Act.3 Petitioner offered no evidence that he is a “buyer” or “renter” of a Tregate condominium within the meaning of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner is not a buyer or renter of a Tregate condominium. Petitioner attended the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, pursuant to a power of attorney executed by the owner of the condominium. If a preponderance of the evidence were to have shown that the owner’s representative had been excluded from the meeting, the harm allegedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would have been suffered vicariously by the condominium owner, not the non-owner and non-renter who was attending the meeting in a representative capacity for the owner. The condominium owner is not a party to this proceeding. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has standing to bring this action. Petitioner was neither an owner nor a renter on January 14, 2009. Petitioner’s only legal right to be present at the meeting was in a representative capacity for the owner. The alleged exclusion of Petitioner was an alleged harm to the principal under the Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding, and Petitioner is the non-prevailing party. Petitioner has participated in two or more similar proceedings involving Respondent. The parties resolved those proceedings through settlement. The resolution is detailed in the Determination of No Cause by the Commission and incorporated herein by this reference. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees totaling $3,412.00 and costs totaling $1,001.50. No finding is made as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees costs because Respondent did not include an hourly rate and did not submit an affidavit of fees and costs. However, the referring agency has statutory authority to award fees costs in the final order pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and requiring Petitioner to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts to be determined by the Commission after hearing further evidence on fees and costs in accordance with Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.595718.103760.11760.22760.23760.26760.37
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EMMANUEL AGBARA vs ORCHID SPRINGS VILLAGE, NO. 200, INC. AND JOHN CARROLL, PRESIDENT, 09-006516 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Nov. 25, 2009 Number: 09-006516 Latest Update: Feb. 09, 2011

The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondents engaged in prohibited conduct against Petitioner by discriminating against him based on his race and/or national origin in the terms and conditions, privileges, or provision of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2009).

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Commission on Human Relations is the state agency charged with investigating complaints of discriminatory housing practices and enforcing the Fair Housing Act. It is also charged with investigating fair housing complaints filed with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601, et seq. Petitioner, Emmanuel Agbara, is an adult, black male, who is of Nigerian decent. On or about September 18, 2008, Petitioner submitted an offer to purchase Condominium 406 in Orchid Springs Village. Because the real property sought to be purchased was a part of a condominium, there were several contingencies imposed by the declaration of condominium and associated house rules. Respondent, Orchid Springs Condominium, No. 200, Inc., is a non-profit corporation charged with the management of the condominium. Incidental to this responsibility, in conjunction with Bay Tree Management Company, the board of directors has the responsibility to approve or disapprove of the sale of a condominium to a third party. In the event the board of directors or Bay Tree Management Company disapproves of the sale, the condominium documents outline a procedure wherein the proposed sale can be pursued by the property owner and prospective buyer (Petitioner herein). After Orchid Springs advised Petitioner that it had not approved his sale, this alternative was not pursued. Orchid Springs is a part of a mixed-use development of condominiums, patio homes, and private [single-family] residences and is diverse in terms of religion, national origin and income. Prospective buyers, and the Petitioner herein, were required to complete an application that inquired into the prospective buyer's background, intended use of the property, and required three character references. In addition, prospective buyers were required to pay for a "background" check. On September 20, 2008, Petitioner traveled from his home in Maryland to meet with Respondent, John Carroll, president of the condominium board of directors. As they met, an inspection of the condominium unit was being conducted by a home inspection professional. Petitioner anticipated that he would meet with Carroll and two other board members for the personal interview required by the condominium documents as a prerequisite for board approval. The two board members were not available to meet with Petitioner during his September 20, 2008, visit. During the course of the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, it became apparent that Petitioner anticipated being an "absentee landlord." Carroll advised Petitioner that the owner/residents had various problems with renters, including recent police activity incidental to a drug laboratory in one of the rented condominium units. Carroll also related that four of the absentee owner units were in foreclosure and that placed an economic burden on the remaining owners. During the discussion between Petitioner and Carroll, Petitioner inquired as to whether he could do the three-board member interview by telephone. Mr. Carroll advised him that a telephone conference might be arranged, but that one board member could not do it alone. On October 8, 2008, Petitioner submitted his Association Application. As a part of the application process, Petitioner certified that he had been supplied copies of the Articles of Declaration of Condominium Ownership and By-Laws of Orchid Springs Village, No. 200, Inc.; the Service and Maintenance Agreement; and the manual, "Condominium Living--The Seville." The Association Application includes the following language: "[A]pplicant purchasing Condominium certifies that he/she has . . . read [and] agrees to abide by" the foregoing documents. The Association Application states that "[i]mmediately after submission of the application, Applicant is requested to arrange with the President for a personal interview with at least [three] Board Members present. Such personal interview is a firm requirement [and] may not be waived." Following receipt of a prospective buyer or renter's Association Application, the tasks of conducting the customary background and criminal checks are divided among board members. In this instance, Mrs. Thibodaux, now deceased, did the background check; and Mrs. Douglas did the criminal background check, which, apparently, was a local records check utilizing the county records available through the internet. Testimony reveals that Mrs. Thibodaux reported that she had some problems with two of Petitioner's character references and that the Social Security number he provided was incorrect. This testimony is discounted as Mrs. Thibodaux is dead and not available to testify, and there is no indication that Petitioner's Social security number is incorrect. In addition, two of Petitioner's character references testified at the final hearing. Mrs. Douglas' local criminal background check revealed a January 13, 1997, arrest for battery--domestic violence. The case was "nolle prossed" after the Petitioner was placed in pre-trial diversion. Orchid Spring's critical examination and appraisal of prospective buyers and renters is apparently "slipshod," but not atypical when the prospective cost of a thorough examination that would involve an investigation of an individual's credit history and a thorough criminal and background check. Concern raised by the background and criminal check prompted Carroll to contact Petitioner and request that he come to Florida and meet with three board members for the interview required by the condominium documents. Petitioner was unable to meet with the interview committee. On November 7, 2008, Petitioner was advised by Respondents that his application had been denied. No evidence of damages was advanced by Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Emmanuel Agbara 1822 Metzerott Road, No. 206 Adelphi, Maryland 20783 Rex P. Cowan, Esquire Post Office Box 857 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-0857

USC (3) 42 U.S.C 360142 U.S.C 360442 U.S.C 3610 Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.22760.23760.35760.37
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CHARLENE CINTRON vs DELAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, 15-007307 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Dec. 22, 2015 Number: 15-007307 Latest Update: Aug. 14, 2017

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an act of discrimination against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deland Housing Authority, is a “public housing authority” as defined by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, serving the City of Deland, Florida, and surrounding areas, which is where Petitioner resides and receives housing benefits. Petitioner, Charlene Cintron, is a recipient of housing benefits from Respondent, in the form of a housing choice voucher, which allows her to receive housing at a reduced or subsidized rate, also known as “Section 8 Housing.” On July 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a complaint with FCHR, alleging that a discriminatory housing practice had been committed by Respondent through its denial of an accommodation for Petitioner’s nine-year-old daughter’s disability. On November 16, 2015, FCHR issued a Notice of Determination of No Cause dismissing the complaint of discrimination. Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief dated December 2, 2015, alleging that Respondent had failed to provide her daughter, Chevonne Barton, a reasonable accommodation in the form of a housing voucher for a four-bedroom unit. After the matter had been referred to DOAH, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Relief in which she specified that the discriminatory act committed by Respondent was “the DELAY for not issuing a four-bedroom voucher in regards to a Reasonable Accommodation for my minor daughter C.E.B. [Chevonne E. Barton].” Petitioner alleged that Respondent was responsible for discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges, or services and facilities, including the failure to make reasonable accommodation for her minor daughter as the result of a handicap. She alleged that the discrimination began on October 23, 2014, and is continuing. Petitioner alleged that Respondent’s actions would constitute a violation of sections 804(b) or (f) and 804(f)(3)(B) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988. The evidence showed that Respondent received three separate requests from Petitioner: on December 16, 2013, requesting her own bedroom due to her disabilities; on September 4, 2014, requesting an additional bedroom, as medically needed for her disabled daughter, Chevonne Barton; and on November 1, 2014, requesting a separate bedroom for her adult daughter, Jolene Barton, based upon her needing privacy following a sexual battery she suffered while she was still in high school. Following these requests, on November 25, 2014, Respondent wrote Petitioner a letter stating, “This letter is to notify you that you have been approved for an additional bedroom for Jolene Barton; however, this approval will only benefit you when and/or if you move to a four bedroom unit.” Neither party disputes or denies that Petitioner provided the three written requests for reasonable accommodations, including the request that Petitioner’s daughter, Chevonne Barton, have an additional bedroom as “medically needed” to provide her sufficient room for her exercise and physical therapy equipment. The evidence revealed that Respondent granted each of Petitioner’s requests for reasonable accommodation. On December 1, 2013, Petitioner moved into a three-bedroom unit located at 613 Anderson Drive, Deltona, Florida. At the time, Petitioner’s household consisted of four people: herself; her 18-year-old daughter, Jolene Barton; her eight-year-old daughter, Chevonne Barton; and her five-year-old daughter, Janessa Barton. Prior to moving into the three-bedroom unit, Petitioner had been given the option of moving into either a three- or four-bedroom unit. Petitioner chose the three-bedroom unit “as that is all my family requires to live on section 8 a room for myself a disabled adult, a room for my 18 year old adult daughter, and one room for my two children ages 8 and 5 years old.” Pursuant to section 5-II.B of Respondent’s Housing Choice Voucher Administrative Plan (the Plan), Respondent determines the appropriate number of bedrooms under the subsidy standards and enters the family unit size on the voucher that is issued to the family. However, “[t]he family unit size does not dictate the size of unit the family must actually lease, nor does it determine who within the household will share a bedroom/sleeping room.” Nonetheless, when determining the family unit size, the “subsidy standards must provide for the smallest number of bedrooms needed to house a family without overcrowding. The living room considered [sic] a sleeping room per 24 CFR 982.402.” Respondent “will assign one bedroom for each two persons within a household. . . . Two heartbeats per bedroom/sleeping area. 24 CFR 982.402.” Petitioner was expressly notified of the “two heartbeats per bedroom” in an email dated December 18, 2013. The Plan also provides that Respondent must use the “Voucher Size” chart when determining the appropriate voucher size. That chart provides that when four persons are in the household, the appropriate voucher size is two bedrooms. Despite the policies established by the Plan, a family may request a reasonable accommodation in writing. The evidence shows that Petitioner made several requests for reasonable accommodations, all of which were granted by Respondent. Soon after Petitioner and her daughters moved into the three-bedroom unit on Anderson Drive, Petitioner requested a reasonable accommodation on December 16, 2013. Specifically, Petitioner requested her own bedroom due to her statement that she suffered from “back issues; I am bipolar. I require my own bedroom – not to be shared with my 18-year-old daughter.” Shortly thereafter, on January 3, 2014, Respondent approved Petitioner’s request for her own bedroom. In that approval letter, Respondent stated that Petitioner was approved for an “additional bedroom.” The letter noted that Petitioner was already receiving credit for a three-bedroom unit and, accordingly, would not have to move to benefit from Respondent’s approval. Petitioner now had a bedroom for herself, and her three daughters had two bedrooms to share, which complied with Respondent’s policy of “two heartbeats per bedroom,” not taking the living area into consideration. Thereafter, on September 9, 2014, Petitioner requested a reasonable accommodation for her minor daughter, Chevonne Barton. Specifically, Petitioner requested a “bedroom (extra) for Chevonne.” That same day, Respondent issued its approval for an “Additional Bedroom – Medically Needed for Chevonne E. Barton.” Petitioner now had a bedroom for herself, a bedroom for Chevonne, and a bedroom for her two other daughters to share pursuant to the “two heartbeats per bedroom” (again not taking into consideration the living area that also was available to Petitioner). Based upon an email dated October 18, 2014, Petitioner informed Respondent she was looking for a four-bedroom unit. She further stated that she was aware of the moving process, that she understood she must let Respondent know of her intent to move, and that she must give her landlord 30-days’ notice. She also asked how much the four-bedroom voucher would pay. Respondent replied to the October 18 email on October 23, 2014, by stating “[y]ou only have a 3 bedroom voucher. Reasonable Accommodation for you and Chevonne. Then a bedroom for Jolene and Janessa. A 3 bedroom voucher is about $875.00.” Petitioner responded that same day, confirming she has a three-bedroom voucher; however, she believed that the reasonable accommodation for Chevonne would provide her with a four-bedroom unit. This email exchange is the basis for Petitioner’s claim that her reasonable accommodation for Chevonne had not been honored. Shortly after this email exchange, on November 1, 2014, Petitioner requested reasonable accommodation for her adult daughter, Jolene Barton. Specifically, Petitioner requested that Jolene be provided with her own bedroom due to her status as a victim of sexual battery. On November 25, 2014, Respondent approved the request for an “Additional Bedroom” for Jolene Barton. Upon the approval of the request for reasonable accommodation for Jolene Barton, the testimony is undisputed, and the parties agree that Respondent at that time had approved Petitioner for a four-bedroom unit as the result of the reasonable accommodations that had been given to Petitioner, her minor disabled daughter (Chevonne Barton), and her adult daughter (Jolene Barton), which left the youngest daughter, Janessa Barton, in a room by herself. In order to further clarify matters, Respondent wrote to Petitioner, on November 25, 2014, explaining what Petitioner must do in order to receive the benefit of the four-bedroom voucher while she was still living in the three-bedroom unit. The letter stated, in relevant part: [Y]ou have been approved for an additional bedroom for Jolene Barton; however, this approval will only benefit you when and/or if you move to a four bedroom unit. If you wish to move (since the extension of the lease shows it is month to month, copy provided 9/11/2014 from Benjamin Pinson shows you both agreed to this), you must give a proper 30-day notice and provide us a copy. You will be required to come to the office (with an appointment) to complete and sign forms needed to process a unit transfer. If you wish to move out of our jurisdiction, you will need to complete a request for portability form stating the agency name and contact information. As of the date of the hearing, and despite the clear direction provided by Respondent in the November 25, 2014, letter, Petitioner voluntarily continues to remain in the three-bedroom unit at 613 Anderson Drive. Respondent has made clear the fact that it will not issue a voucher for a four- bedroom unit until Petitioner fully complies with the requirements of the Plan as reiterated in the November 25, 2014, letter. At hearing, Respondent confirmed that it remains willing to move Petitioner to a four-bedroom unit upon completion of the documentation necessary for transfer. In fact, Petitioner disclosed at the hearing that she had requested the paperwork for a transfer to a property within the jurisdiction of the Ormond Beach Housing Authority. Upon receiving the request to transfer from Petitioner, Respondent sent the moving paperwork to Petitioner, asking her to complete that paperwork in order to move to a new four-bedroom unit. At hearing, Petitioner admitted she had neither completed the required paperwork to move to Ormond Beach, nor had she notified her landlord of her intent to move in 30 days. By not having taken the required steps to move from a three-bedroom unit to a four-bedroom unit, Petitioner has voluntarily chosen to remain in her three-bedroom unit. The credible evidence does not support her contention that Respondent has prevented Petitioner and her family from moving to a four-bedroom unit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order determining that no act of housing discrimination was committed by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Charlene Cintron 613 Anderson Drive Deltona, Florida 32725 (eServed) Rachael Spring Loukonen, Director Cohen & Grigsby, P.C. 9110 Strada Place, Suite 6200 Naples, Florida 34108 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

CFR (1) 24 CFR 982.402 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.68760.20760.23760.37
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