The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhoni"), a Jewish woman who identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin, at all times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium"), which is located in Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased this unit in 2009 and a second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least as of the final hearing, was in New York City. The Condominium is a relatively small community consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and, specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property. Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"), a representative body whose three members, called "directors," are elected by the unit owners. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years. From July 2010 until April 2011, she held the office of vice- president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was the president of the Board. Simhoni's term as president was cut short when, in May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Carmen Duarte be removed from office, effective immediately. The run-up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused friction between neighbors. Without getting into details that aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critics were not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which—— understandably——led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten over her recall election defeat, which she blames on false, unfair, and anti-Semitic accusations against her. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the "Act"). Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." (Emphasis added). The applicable law will be discussed in greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of fact that follow. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus. Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in fact, a homeowner. Contrary to what some might intuit, the Act is not an all-purpose anti-discrimination law or civility code; it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g., racial or religious hostility. To the extent the Act authorizes charges based on alleged post-acquisition discrimination, such charges must involve the complete denial of services or facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term or condition of ownership——the right to use common areas, for example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover, the denial of access to common services or facilities logically must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access to the services or facilities in question. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that she was subjected to anti-Semitic slurs during her tenure as Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors——none of whom then held an office on the Board——were in no position to (and in fact did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and facilities under the Association's control, even if their opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board, Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil and insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly to dislike her. Simhoni was hurt by this. That impolite, even mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval; it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination under six categories. Most of these allegations do not implicate or involve the denial of common services or facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of detail at which the charges were made. The Mastercard Dispute. As Board president, Simhoni obtained a credit card for the Association, which she used for paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as repair costs. In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an agreement with the issuer to personally guarantee payment of the Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions in procuring this credit card were undertaken in accordance with the Condominium's By-Laws, but there is no evidence suggesting that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co-sign the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have volunteered. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to reimburse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this nonpayment to anti-Semitism. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much money, if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Association has withheld payment based on Simhoni's religion or national origin. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing "service" or "facility" available in common to the Condominium's owners and residents. Nonpayment of the alleged debt might constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of action at law or in equity, but these would belong to Simhoni as a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the Condominium. In short, the Association's alleged nonpayment of the alleged debt might give Simhoni good legal grounds to sue the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and received——but not for housing discrimination. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate, pursuant to section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. By statute, the Association was obligated to issue the certificate within ten business days——by October 4, 2017, in this instance. Id. The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and delivering the certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the certificate one-week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the delay to anti-Semitism. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if based on religion, national origin, or another protected criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake that it is such a service. Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to the complete deprivation thereof; and (iii) there is, at any rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in issuing Simhoni a certificate was the result of discriminatory animus. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the Association is required to provide but, rather, one that may be provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of the units for roaches, as a common expense, and the apartments were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the door, and the owner would be billed individually for this extra service. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled, the new Board decided, as a cost-control measure, to discontinue the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open his door for the exterminator. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during the phaseout. Simhoni blames anti-Semitism for the missed pest control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover, Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pest control, which would have been provided to her if she had simply made arrangements to permit access to her unit. Short-term Rentals. Article XVII of the Condominium's Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and Use Restrictions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8 of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium, which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In other words, the Declaration prohibits short-term, or vacation, rentals, which are typically for periods of days or weeks. Short-term rentals can be lucrative for owners, especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel lodgings. On the flip side, however, short-term rental activity is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in preserving the peace, quiet, and tidy appearance of the neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whether or not to permit short-term rentals has divided the owners into competing camps. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short-term rentals. Accordingly, while she was Board president, the Association did not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a blind eye to short-term rentals even before Simhoni became a director.) This laissez-faire approach did not sit well with everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short-term rentals provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaration's ban on short-term rentals. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short-term rentals was an act of religion-based housing discrimination. Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners are being forced to stop engaging in short-term rental activity; that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making complaints about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal restrictions on short-term rentals. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such as the prohibition of short-term rentals conceivably could be enforced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treatment, selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in connection with the Association's restoration of the short-term rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Association is trying to stop short-term rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason, namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the Declaration to be given full force and effect. The Feud with Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and Ms. Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors. As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami Beach for engaging in short-term rentals without the required business tax receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger. None of this, however, amounts to housing discrimination because the Floreses' actions did not completely deprive Simhoni of common facilities or services, even if such actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, which the greater weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over the Condominium's facilities or services that they could have denied Simhoni access to them. Simhoni argues in her proposed recommended order, apparently for the first time, that the Floreses' conduct created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Floreses' conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is there sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Floreses' conduct. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association failed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof leaks. Simhoni asserts that, using Association funds, the Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of non-Jewish owners. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows, however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and that the Association never instructed the roofing contractor not to make needed repairs. Simhoni, in short, was not denied the service of roof repairs. As for the alleged damage to Simhoni's unit, section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains falls outside of her duty to repair. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the question of whether the Association is obligated to repair Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, it is sufficient to find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason to refuse, as it has, to perform the interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact At times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, a female born in October 1953, received housing assistance from a federally funded assistance program referred to as the Section 8 Choice Voucher program (the Section 8 program). The Section 8 program relevant to this proceeding is administered by Respondent and has eligibility criteria that a participant must meet. A participant receives a voucher from the Section 8 program that pays part, but not all, of the participant’s rent. Petitioner has also received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at all times relevant to this proceeding. Respondent knew that Petitioner received SSI, but it had no information as to why she qualified to receive SSI. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner’s landlord was named Rupert Phipps. On May 27, 2007, Mr. Phipps issued to Petitioner a notice styled “Three-day Notice for Non- payment of Rent pursuant to Florida Statutes" (Notice). After stating the amount owed and the address of the rented premises, the Notice demanded “. . . payment of the rent or possession of the Premises within three days (excluding Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays). ” Petitioner was evicted from her apartment. The date of the eviction was not established. After being advised by Mr. Phipps that Petitioner had failed to pay her rent, Ms. Smith mailed to Petitioner a certified letter dated July 6, 2007, stating that she would be terminated from the Section 8 program effective August 6, 2007. The stated reason for the termination was Petitioner’s failure to pay rent to the landlord, which is considered a serious violation of the lease and, therefore, a violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982,511(4)(c), which prohibits a participant in the Section 8 program from committing any serious or repeated violation of the lease with the participant’s landlord. Ms. Smith’s letter also contained the following statement: . . . If you wish to appeal this decision, you have the right to an informal hearing. The request must be submitted to this agency in writing within 10 days from the date of this letter. Your request should be directed to Alex Morales, Executive Director. The ten-day period for the appeal is part of Respondent’s written policies and is consistent with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.554(a), that require an agency such as Respondent to have a written appeals process. Respondent has consistently treated the failure of a participant to pay his or her share of the rent as a serious violation of a lease. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent’s appeal process because she had successfully appealed a prior notice of termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Ms. Smith’s letter was received by Petitioner on July 7, 2007. At some undetermined time between July 7 and July 19, 2007, Ms. Tennie called Ms. Smith and told Ms. Smith that she was sick. Ms. Smith told Ms. Tennie that she would have to follow the instructions set forth in the letter and respond in writing if she wanted an informal appeal. On July 19, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to the attention of Ms. Smith and Mr. Morales: Would you give me Mae Tennie another hearing because I got the letter to [sic] late and I was in the hospital due to an anurism [sic] stroke at the brain their [sic] was blood on my head and I’m still rehabilitating the after affects [sic] of this serious condition. In the case of my Section 8 voucher being terminated I plead for another hearing due to the terms [sic] of my hospitalization. Respondent received Petitioner’s letter on July 23, 2007. Petitioner’s written request for an appeal was after the ten-day deadline for filing the request. By letter signed by Mr. Morales and dated July 25, 2007, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request contained in her letter dated July 19 as follows: I am in receipt of your letter requesting a hearing. Please be advised that your request for a hearing cannot be granted because your request was not made within the required 10 day period. For this reason, your case will remain closed. No further action was taken by either party to this proceeding until December 2007, when Petitioner sought the services of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. On December 20, 2007, Mr. Lewis, as counsel for Petitioner, sent the following letter to Mr. Morales: This office represents Ms. Mae Tennie regarding her participation in the Section 8 program administered through the Hialeah Housing Authority (“HHA”). Ms. Tennie has been a participant of Section 8 through HHA for the past 25 years. On July 6, 2007, HHA served Ms. Tennie with notice of its intent to terminate her Section 8 assistance on the basis that she violated one of her obligations under the program. The notice informed Ms. Tennie of her right to appeal the decision and to attend an informal hearing. The written request was to be submitted to HHA within 10 days of the date of the letter. Ms. Tennie faxed her written request for an appeal on July 19, 2007. A copy of Ms. Tennie’s letter is attached as “Attachment A.” In her request, she notified HHA that she was unable to submit her request within the time required because she [had] been, and still was, recovering from a brain aneurism.[2] On or about July 31, 2007, HHA notified Ms. Tennie that her request was denied because it was submitted too late. Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie with an informal hearing to appeal the termination. Ms. Tennie is an elderly woman in failing health. In June 2007, Ms. Tennie was hospitalized twice at Jackson South Community Hospital as a result of suffering an “intracranial hemorrhage.”[3] I have attached copies of supporting medical documentation as “Attachment B.” As a result of this very serious medical condition, Ms. Tennie’s cognitive abilities were significantly diminished. Ms. Tennie was bed-bound and only able to communicate under great strain. The Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits [sic] any agency or landlord receiving federal funds to deny equal access for individuals with disabilities to housing or other program benefits and services. To ensure individuals with disabilities have equal access to those services and benefits, an agency or landlord is required to provide reasonable accommodations to that person’s disability. One form of reasonable accommodations is the modification of a program rule or policy. The right to a hearing to appeal the termination of Section 8 assistance is a benefit that Ms. Tennie, as a participant, was entitled to. Ms. Tennie made clear in her letter to HHA that she was unable to comply with HHA’s time requirement because of her disabling medical condition. Ms. Tennie also asked that the policy be modified to accommodate her disability. HHA should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Tennie’s disability by simply modifying the time period by adding 3 extra days for her to submit her request for a hearing. By failing to do so, HHA effectively denied Ms. Tennie equal access to federal benefit under the Section 8 program, that of having a hearing to appeal her termination. Ms. Tennie is therefore renewing her request to HHA for reasonable accommodations to her disability by modifying the time limit to request a hearing. For the above reasons, Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie a hearing to challenge her termination from Section 8. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or additional information at ... . [telephone number omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] By letter dated December 26, 2007, Respondent denied the request set forth in Mr. Lewis’s letter. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the complaint with HUD that culminated in this proceeding as described in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Ms. Tennie was hospitalized June 7, 2007, and discharged June 14, 2007. Mr. Lewis attached to his letter a discharge summary from Jackson Memorial Hospital, which contained the following diagnoses on discharge: Intracranial hemorrhage with intraventricular extension secondary to uncontrolled hypertension. Diabetes. The discharge summary reflects that Petitioner had fallen the Saturday before admission and had hit her head on a doorknob. The discharge summary reflects that on discharge she was awake, alert, and oriented times three. She had fluent speech and she was able to ambulate without difficulty. She was instructed to make an appointment with her primary care doctor in one week and to follow up in the Jackson Memorial’s Stroke Clinic in 4 to 8 weeks. Petitioner was discharged to home in a stable condition. Petitioner scheduled an appointment with Milton R. Bengoa, M.D., and on June 18, 2007, she kept that appointment. No finding is made as to Petitioner’s physical status as determined by Dr. Bengoa because nearly all of his notes of that meeting are illegible. In response to questions from her attorney, Petitioner testified as follows beginning at page 27, line 12: Q. And Ms. Tennie, can you please describe what your current health conditions are? A. Right now it’s not very good, because after I had the aneurism I have been having problems walking and problems breathing and I have seizures that I never had before until I had the aneurism and I take all kinds of medicines. And I just found out last week I have a brain mass and they don’t know if it is cancer or what, because the blood that was left in my head was still there so I have excruciating headaches. Q. And could you please explain what your health condition was at or about the time you suffered the stroke or shortly after you had suffered the stroke? A. Well, shortly after I suffered the stroke I had to try and walk all over again, because my memory where I had the stroke at, the neurologist said that it was so deep in my brain that they couldn’t do surgery and that it was going to mess my motor skills up. So I had to learn how to swallow. I forgot how to swallow meat and stuff, so I started eating soft food. I had problems breathing, so when I come [sic] home I had a breathing machine – oxygen machine there. My daughter had to help me try to walk all over again. Q. And so I take it you had someone helping you? A. Yes. My daughter. I moved home with my daughter, because they wanted to put me out at Purdue, it is a nursing facility, but she wanted me to come home with her, so that is what I did. I went home with my daughter and I stayed there for six months. Then I found the place down the street, close to her, which was a two bedroom. Q. Now, prior to suffering the stroke, how was your – can you describe what your health condition was. A. Before I had the stroke, I was sick too. I have congestive heart failure, so I kept going back and forth into the hospital because of my breathing. When the water built up around my heart it had [sic] me to where I can’t breathe. So I have to go in and let them pull the water off. And I was sick before I had the stroke. Petitioner also testified that she could not timely request a hearing and blamed that inability on her general medical condition. Petitioner’s testimony as to her medical condition shortly after the hospitalization is unconvincing because it contradicts the description of her medical condition as described by her treating physician in the discharge notes. The evidence established that Petitioner received Ms. Smith's letter dated July 6, 2007, and understood its contents. Petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to establish that her medical condition caused her failure to timely request an informal hearing to appeal of the termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Petitioner failed to establish that she required an extension of the expired deadline to request an informal hearing as a “reasonable accommodation” of her condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not liable for the acts of discrimination alleged in the subject Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's race, African-American, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Miguel Johnson is an African-American male and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2009). He filed a complaint for housing discrimination against Riviera Towers at 6896 Abbott Avenue in Miami Beach. Respondent Riviera Terrace Apartments (Riviera Terrace) was apparently erroneously named Riviera Towers in the complaint and in the style of this case. Notice of that error was given by the owner, Arie Markowitz, and in the absence of any indication that Riviera Terrace is a corporate entity, Mr. Markowitz is also added as a Respondent. The style has been corrected to reflect these corrections. Riviera Terrace, 6890 Abbott Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, 33141, is a 20-unit apartment complex. Mr. Johnson thought that the complex has 22 units, but there is no evidence to support his thinking. Contrary to his request, the undersigned has no independent investigative powers and must accept the evidence in the record. According to his records, Mr. Johnson, on March 17, 2009, telephoned a number he saw on a "For Rent" sign at Riviera Terrace. A woman identified as Diana Miteff answered the telephone. Mr. Johnson said Ms. Miteff identified herself as the manager of the complex. The telephone records indicate that the conversation lasted one minute. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him to call back later. Mr. Johnson telephoned Ms. Miteff again on March 21, 2009, and his records indicate that they talked for 8 minutes. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him about the security deposit, that the rent for a one bedroom apartment was $900 a month, and that she had some vacant efficiencies. Mr. Johnson testified that a friend of his, Pedro Valdes, lives in the same complex and that together they met with Ms. Miteff the day after Mr. Johnson talked to her on the telephone, and saw a vacant efficiency apartment. According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Miteff told him, after seeing him, that there were no vacancies. Ayesha Azara, Mr. Johnson's wife, testified that she made another unsuccessful attempt to rent a unit in Riviera Terrace in May 2009. She had no information in March 2008, except to say tht Ms. Miteff claimed to be the manager and told her the building was for elderly people. Pedro Valdes testified that he lives in Riviera Towers and gave his address as 6896 Abbott Avenue. He said that the "For Rent" sign for Riviera Terrace is not always posted in front of the complex. Mr. Markowitz is the owner of Riviera Terrace at 6890 Abbott Avenue. He testified that he is also the manager and that Ms. Miteff is a tenant. He uses her telephone number on the "For Rent" sign because he does not speak Spanish. The apartments are government-subsidized Section 8 housing. The only vacant efficiency in March 2008 was a unit for which he already had a written lease, but the tenant could not move in until after a government-required inspection. He also testified that his tenants are not all Caucasians and not all elderly. Ms. Miteff confirmed that she has been a resident of Riviera Terrace for 20 years. She concedes that she told Mr. Johnson's wife that the people in the complex are very quiet and mostly old people. Mr. Johnson's claim of discrimination based on race is not supported by the evidence, which is contradictory with regard to the name and address of the property, and because there were no vacant apartments at Riviera Terrace in March 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Supraski, Esquire Louis A. Supraski, P.A. 2450 Northeast Miami Gardens Drive 2nd Floor North Miami Beach, Florida 33180 Miguel Johnson 916 West 42nd Street, Apt. 9 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Miguel Johnson C/O Robert Fox 1172 South Dixie Highway Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Diana Mittles Riviera Terrace Apartments 6896 Abott Avenue Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's national origin, Puerto Rican, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rosa M. Cabrera is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination based on national origin under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2009). On September 17, 2009, she filed a complaint for housing discrimination against the management of Costa del Sol, LLC. Respondent, Monica Londono, is employed by Morgan Whitney, Inc., the company that manages Costa del Sol, a sixteen-unit apartment complex at 7425 Byron Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Ms. Cabrera lived at Costa del Sol for 4 years. In her complaint, she alleged discrimination in the conditions and services provided to her as a tenant based on her national origin. The Housing Authority of Miami Beach inspected Ms. Cabrera's unit annually as required for units subsidized under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 8. On March 23, 2009, a notice was mailed to Ms. Cabrera to inform her that her annual inspection was scheduled for April 10, 2009, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Mr. Cabrera was not there, on April 10, 2009, when the inspector arrived, so a door handle notice and a letter mailed the same day notified her that the inspection was rescheduled for April 13, 2009. About the same time, Ms. Cabrera said she had trouble with her hot water heater. On April 13, 2009, the unit failed inspection. The inspector found that a bedroom air conditioner was not cooling properly, that a sink stopper was missing, and that a closet door mirror was cracked. A re-inspection was scheduled for May 11, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Cabrera was offended and apparently turned away, what she said was, a group of six people who came to make repairs without giving her prior notice. On May 11, 2009, the same defects were noted and, on May 29, 2009, the Housing Authority abated the rent and terminated its contract for the unit with Costa Del Sol effective June 30, 2009. Ms. Cabrera was scheduled to meet her Section 8 case worker, Housing Authority Specialist Felipe Roloff, to "start the moving process" at 4:00 p.m., on June 5, 2009. Ms. Cabrera did not keep the appointment and it was rescheduled for June 16, 2009. On June 9, 2009, however, an "abate-cure" inspection was conducted and the unit passed. On July 21 and 23, 2009, Ms. Cabrera contacted Mr. Roloff to tell him that her refrigerator was not working and the landlord was given 24 hours to repair or replace it. When a handyman came alone to make repairs, Ms. Cabrera was afraid to let him in her apartment fearing sexual battery. So Ms. Londono accompanied the handyman when they attempted to deliver a refrigerator. They were unable to exchange the refrigerators because Ms. Cabrera had changed the locks without giving the manager a new key a violation of the terms of her lease, and she would not unlock the door. Ms. Cabrera's son arrived home at the same time and he also did not have a new key. At his suggestion, the refrigerator was left in the hallway for him to exchange it with the one in Ms. Cabrera's apartment later. Ms. Cabrera claimed, without any supporting evidence, that Ms. Londono publicly embarrassed her by calling her a "fucking Puerto Rican bitch" and a "ridiculous old lady." Ms. Londono, who is also of Puerto Rican descent, denied the allegation. Someone, Ms. Londono believes it was Ms. Cabrera, called the Miami Beach Code Compliance Division, to report that the refrigerator was left in the hallway and it was hauled away as household waste. Ms. Cabrera said the refrigerator left in the hallway was in poor condition. Ms. Londono, according to Ms. Cabrera, called the police and accused her of stealing the refrigerator. There is no supporting evidence of their accusations and suspicions about each other. When she finally got a replacement refrigerator, Ms. Cabrera said it was missing one of the crisper drawers. Ms. Cabrera believed she was being discriminated against in receiving poor services and also when Ms. Londono required her to move a plant from the hallway, but did not make another tenant move his motorcycle from the area where it was parked. Ms. Londono notified Mr. Roloff of Ms. Cabrera's lack of cooperation, and that she intended to collect August rent and to withhold a portion of the security deposit to cover the cost of the missing refrigerator. On August 5, 2009, the Housing Authority issued to Ms. Cabrera a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance effective September 30, 2009. The Notice cited her failure to allow the landlord to enter to make necessary repairs and her failure to report the income of her son who was living with her. When the rent was not paid on August 5, 2009, Ms. Londono delivered a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate to Ms. Cabrera's unit. Ms. Cabrera did not vacate. Eviction proceedings were begun in September. Ms. Cabrera was evicted on November 22, 2009. After Ms. Cabrera moved the report of the inspection of the unit indicated that, among other damage, it was infested with fleas, supporting Ms. Londono's previous claim that Ms. Cabrera was leaving her window open to allow cats to come and feed in her unit, in violation of Section 8 rules. Ms. Cabrera's claim of discrimination based on national origin is not supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Face and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rosa M. Cabrera 7851 Northeast 10th Avenue, Apt. 26 Miami, Florida 33138 Monica Londono Morgan Whitney, Inc. Costa del Sol, LLC 1385 Coral Way, Penthouse 403 Miami, Florida 33145
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner in the provision of housing, or services in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pedro Tamayo, suffers from anxiety, depression, memory loss, and complex regional pain syndrome (“RPD”). Respondent, Avtec, is a residential construction contractor, doing business in Palm Bay, Florida. On November 10, 2018, Petitioner executed a Contract for Sale and Purchase (“Contract”) with Avtec to construct a residential structure on property owned by Petitioner on Raleigh Road Southeast in Palm Bay, Florida. The specific floor plan chosen by Petitioner was the Citation 4 Plus. Avtec executed the Contract on November 12, 2018. The Contract covers clearing of property for construction, materials and color selections by the buyer, and the buyer’s right to reverse the floor plan, among other terms. When Petitioner entered into the Contract, he simultaneously chose many of the options available to customize the Citation 4 Plus, such as impact windows, an exterior pedestrian door in the garage, and a front septic system. Among the options Petitioner chose was 36-inch (36”) doors for the master bedroom entrance, closet, and master bathroom entrance. Petitioner has no obvious physical disability and does not require use of a wheelchair or walker. Construction Setback The Contract does not address the construction setbacks from the property lines. Setbacks are governed by local government codes and Avtec is required to follow those codes. On November 30, 2018, Petitioner met with his sales agent, Sean McCarry, at the Avtec showroom, to discuss some of the options he had chosen for his new home. They specifically discussed plumbing issues for the master bathroom, 36” wide doors in the master bedroom, placement of the septic tank, the concrete culverts for the driveway, and a 45-foot (45’) setback of the home from the property line. While the standard setback for a home with a front septic tank is 38’ to 40’, Petitioner indicated he wanted to build an aluminum carport, which required additional setback footage. Respondent Amicucci stepped into the meeting with Petitioner and Mr. McCarry to address Petitioner’s request for mitered ends on the culvert pipe. Mr. Amicucci was not present when Petitioner requested a 45’ setback. Mr. McCarry verbally agreed to “take care of” the setback requested by Petitioner. Petitioner’s selection of 36” doorways for the master bedroom, and a front septic system were reduced to writing and included in the Contract, signed by both parties, as an Option to Sales Agreement. Petitioner executed five addenda to the Contract between November 30, 2018, and May 1, 2019, including optional upgrades and a modification to the design of the sidewalk. On July 23, 2019, Petitioner and Avtec executed a change order to include the mitered ends of the culvert pipe. No part of the Contract, any addenda thereto, or any change order, addresses Petitioner’s request for a 45’ setback. Section 28 of the Contract provides that “NO OTHER AGREEMENTS exist between the BUYER and SELLER except as set forth in this Agreement. This Agreement shall not be modified except by an instrument in writing executed by both BUYER and SELLER.” Section 29 of the Contract contains the following statement in red underlined text: No representative of Seller has authority to make any verbal statements that modify or change the terms or conditions of this contract. Buyer represents that buyer has read and understands this entire contract. Buyer also represents that buyer is not relying on any verbal statement, promise, or condition not specifically set forth in this contract. It is acknowledged that builder is relying on these representations and would not enter into this contract without this understanding. Section 20 of the Contract specifically provides, “Once the rough plumbing is installed, absolutely NO CHANGES will be allowed.” Petitioner’s new home was built 40’ from the property line, rather than 45’ as Petitioner requested. Sometime after the rough plumbing was installed and the foundation was poured, Petitioner complained to Avtec that his home was not built with a 45’ setback as promised by Mr. McCarry. On August 22, 2019, Avtec, through its Director of Corporate Development, responded in writing to Petitioner’s complaint. Avtec apologized that the home was not built to the setback he had communicated to Mr. McCarry, and referred to the Contract terms that exclude any verbal agreements. Avtec offered to release Petitioner from his contract, refund his deposit of $6,250, and give Petitioner $30,000 for the property after selling it to another buyer. On November 13, 2019, Petitioner signed a “Final Acceptance of Completion” of the construction of his home. Fill Dirt On March 8, 2019, Petitioner drove by the construction site and noted that the fill dirt being used was “contaminated” with tree branches and other material. He drove to the model home to discuss the issue with Mr. McCarry. Mr. McCarry contacted Mr. Amicucci, who agreed to meet Petitioner at the property to inspect the fill and address Petitioner’s concerns. Petitioner and Mr. Amicucci testified to two very different versions of the events at the construction site that day. Petitioner testified that, when Mr. Amicucci arrived, he got out of his vehicle, visibly upset, and raised his voice and cursed at Petitioner regarding his lack of knowledge of proper fill material. Petitioner testified, specifically that: I feared that [Mr. Amicucci] would physically attack me by his aggressive demeanor and I immediately froze. I could not comprehend how a paying customer could be treated this way by raising concerns for the foundation of my home. I am not a builder. [Mr. Amicucci] simply needed to explain the common practice of standard fill. Since March 8th, 2019, my quality of life has not been the same. I have severe anxiety due to the memories of that day and suffer constant nightmares. I feel as [sic] my life can be in danger and, therefore, live in a state of high alert. My daily life has been disrupted. Simply having to drive by Avtec showroom due to my normal routine routes triggers flashbacks of that day. Mr. Amicucci testified that when he arrived at the property, Petitioner was upset and aggressive toward him, demanding that the fill be removed from his property. Mr. Amicucci reassured Petitioner that the fill was all good soil and that it would be root-raked before it was spread for the foundation. Mr. Amicucci explained the root-raking process and the equipment used therefor. Nevertheless, Petitioner insisted that Mr. Amicucci go with him to another construction site to show him the type of fill he wanted used on his property. Mr. Amicucci accompanied Petitioner to the specific construction site, which was not an Avtec project, and Mr. Amicucci identified the fill being used there as a hard white shell material. Mr. Amicucci assured Petitioner that the brown sandy soil imported to his property would be better for the sod and plants Petitioner would be using to landscape the property. Mr. Amicucci testified that, at the end of the meeting, Petitioner extended his hand and said, “[l]ook, that all sounds good. I just want to start back over. Are we good?” Mr. Amicucci shook Petitioner’s hand and assured him that they “were good.” Mr. Amicucci’s testimony regarding the events that occurred on March 8, 2019, is accepted as more credible and reliable than Petitioner’s. Knowledge of Petitioner’s Disability Mr. Amicucci testified that he was not aware that Petitioner had any kind of disability until the Complaint was filed against him and Avtec. Petitioner testified that his disability was revealed to Mr. Amicucci on November 30, 2018, during a meeting at the Avtec showroom to discuss the various options selected by Petitioner when he signed the contract. Petitioner testified that Mr. Amicucci asked him what he did for a living and Petitioner told him that he was retired and disabled from the City of Hialeah. He testified that Mr. Amicucci was further on notice because Petitioner always wears a glove to improve circulation in his right hand and that he can hardly sign his name, which would have been apparent to Mr. Amicucci at the November 30, 2018 meeting. Finally, Petitioner alleges Mr. Amicucci should have been aware of his disability because he requested 36” ADA-compliant door widths for the master bedroom. Mr. Amicucci did not recall Petitioner telling him he was disabled or seeing Petitioner wearing a glove. He did recall seeing Petitioner wearing a sling of some sort and inquiring whether he had been injured. He recalled Petitioner telling him it was related to an old injury. Mr. Amicucci was not present for any discussion about the 36” doorways. Assuming, arguendo, that he was present for that discussion, a request for 36” doorways alone is not proof of a disability. Many buyers upgrade to larger doorways to accommodate larger furniture or in anticipation of needing a walker or wheelchair access in the future. Furthermore, requesting ADA-compliant doorways is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim that he has emotional disabilities and chronic pain. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Amicucci knew of Petitioner’s disabilities of anxiety, depression, memory loss, and RPD. No other witness was offered on behalf of Avtec. There is no evidence to support a finding that Avtec had knowledge of Petitioner’s disability through any other employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202022149. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Mike Amicucci Suite 3 590 Malabar Road Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Pedro Tamayo 987 Raleigh Road Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 (eServed) Rebecca E. Rhoden, Esquire Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. 215 North Eola Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Lawrence F. Sietsma Avtec Homes, Inc. et al 2860 North Riverside Drive Indialantic, Florida 32903 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners on the basis of race, or retaliated against them for exercising a protected right, or both, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was admitted into the record at the final hearing, the undersigned cannot make any findings of fact. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (“Findings of fact shall be based … exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.”).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Petitioners no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Antonio Carraway Whang Carraway 1406 Southwest Osprey Cove Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 (eServed) Jillian Sidisky, Esquire Stefanie S. Copelow, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Cordell John, (Landlord) discriminated against Petitioner, Denise Johnson- Acosta (Johnson) on the basis of her or her daughter’s alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Johnson is a Hispanic woman. She has asthma and other medical conditions. Johnson has a teenage daughter, Ashley Denise Rivera. Ashley has a seizure disorder and has bipolar disorder. Johnson is engaged to Alexis Pons. The Landlord is an African-American male. He owns the property located at 13847 Beauregard Place in Orlando, Florida (the Property). The Property is a single-family residential townhouse. At some unspecified time during calendar year 2012, Johnson approached the Landlord expressing an interest in leasing the Property. At that time, another tenant was living in the Property but was in the process of moving out. The Landlord showed Johnson the Property. Johnson expressed her complete satisfaction with the Property and that she would like to lease it (and possibly buy it in the future). At first sight, Johnson liked everything about the Property except for the back yard. On September 10, 2012, the Landlord emailed a Rental Application to Johnson. The email advised Johnson that there would be a $50 application fee which must be paid when the application was delivered. In response to the email, Johnson confirmed that she wanted to view the Property on the upcoming Thursday. On September 11, 2012, Johnson filled out the Rental Application and provided it to the Landlord for review. The application listed Johnson as the primary tenant and Ashley and Pons as additional residents. The application also noted that Johnson had a pet, a petite Chihuahua, which would be living in the unit. After reviewing the application, the Landlord notified Johnson via email that he would need pictures of the Chihuahua. He also asked how much the dog weighed. The Landlord also told Johnson that the rent would be $1,250 per month and that a $200 nonrefundable pet fee must be paid. Johnson replied that the dog weighed four pounds. She was concerned that the Landlord was now quoting $1,250 per month when earlier discussions had indicated the rent would be $1,200 per month. Johnson thanked the Landlord and agreed to provide a picture of the dog. The Landlord replied to Johnson that when pets are involved, the rent is increased slightly. Johnson and the Landlord had a conversation on September 17, 2012. By email dated September 18, 2012, Johnson told the Landlord that she had decided to withdraw her application because of “multiple misunderstandings” between the parties. At some point thereafter, Johnson decided to go through with the lease after all. On October 20, 2012, Johnson did a walk-through inspection of the Property. By way of her signature on the walk-through check list, Johnson agreed that the living room, kitchen, dining room, both bathrooms, both bedrooms, and all other portions of the Property were satisfactory. The only caveat was that there was stain on a counter in the kitchen area. Johnson said she would “advise at time of move” as to her feelings about the parking areas and the patio/terrace/deck area. On November 2, 2012, Johnson and the Landlord entered into a binding Residential Tenancy Agreement. Johnson initialed each page and signed the agreement. The agreement was witnessed by two individuals. On or about that same date, Johnson gave the Landlord several money orders: A $250 money order for the pet deposit; $50 for Pons’ application fee, and $880 for prorated rent for November. Johnson did not complain about the pet deposit at that time. Johnson moved into the Property on or about November 2, 2012. About two months later, on January 1, 2013, Johnson mailed a letter to the Landlord via certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter advised the Landlord that Johnson would be moving out of the Property on or before January 14, 2013. The letter cited several bases for the decision to move out, including: Air condition vents were “visibly covered with dust and dark surroundings”; Johnson and her daughter have severe allergies; Johnson has acute asthma and bronchitis; and The dwelling is unlivable. Johnson also claimed many violations of Florida law by the Landlord concerning the lease, including: Taking a deposit for a pet when that pet was in fact a companion dog. (Johnson submitted a letter into evidence from a behavioral health care employee. The letter, dated some five months after Johnson vacated the unit, said that Ashley would benefit from having a companion dog as she did not have many friends. There was no evidence that the Chihuahua was ever registered or approved as a companion dog.); Smoke alarms which were not in working order; Electrical breakers tripping throughout Property; Unreimbursed expenses, e.g., for changing locks; Failure to put Pons on the lease agreement despite doing a background financial check on him; and Harassment from Bank of America employees trying to collect the Landlord’s mortgage payment for the Property. In the letter stating she would be moving, Johnson expressed her sorrow that the housing situation did not work out. She then set forth the amount of deposit money she believed should be returned to her. In response, she received a letter from the Landlord’s counsel advising that her security and pet deposits had been forfeited. On January 4, 2013, the Landlord posted a notice on the Property door demanding payment of outstanding rent within three days. In lieu of payment, Johnson could vacate the premises within three days. Johnson vacated the premises. On January 14, 2013, Johnson did an exit walk-through of the Property, along with the Landlord, his mother, and Pons. At the completion of the walk- through, Johnson turned over the keys for the Property to the Landlord. Johnson claims discrimination on the part of the Landlord because he failed to recognize or accept the companion dog, failed to put Pons on the lease agreement, and failed to make accommodations for Johnson’s claimed health conditions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Denise Johnson-Acosta in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cordell John 2921 Swoops Circle Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Denise Johnson-Acosta Post Office Box 453347 Kissimmee, Florida 34745 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent Perry Carrell ("Respondent") failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Petitioner Jean Rath’s ("Petitioner") disability and discriminated against Petitioner because of her disability in violation of Florida’s Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact In 2005, Respondent purchased condominium unit 604 in Tiara Towers, located at 3120 North Highway A1A, Fort Pierce, Florida 34949. Respondent purchased the condominium unit as his primary residence. In 2013, Respondent decided to rent the unit to Petitioner. In May 2013, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written residential lease agreement for Petitioner to lease the premises from Respondent from July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2015. Pursuant to the lease, Petitioner was obligated to pay monthly rent to Respondent in the amount of $1,850.00. Petitioner’s tenancy was subject to the rules and regulations of the condominium association. The association’s rules do not allow for tenants to have pets. In addition, the association requires all leases be in writing. The written lease between Petitioner and Respondent expired on June 30, 2015. A properly executed second written lease was never executed by Petitioner and submitted to the association. Nevertheless, Petitioner continued residing at the premises on a month-to-month basis. Petitioner is disabled and requires a service animal because of her disability. Over the course of the tenancy, the association became concerned about Petitioner’s violation of its rules, including the lack of documentation of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal, and the lack of a new written lease after the initial lease expired on June 30, 2015. In an effort to assist Petitioner in keeping the dog, Respondent gathered information to demonstrate the qualifications of Petitioner’s dog as a service animal and provided the documentation to the association on Petitioner’s behalf. Based on the lack of a new written lease and the absence of sufficient documentation as to the service animal, the association fined Respondent $2,000.00. Respondent provided Petitioner with a termination of lease and demand to vacate notice on May 28, 2016. The notice of termination was based on the fines by the association against Respondent for not having a timely signed lease in place, and the association’s belief that sufficient documentation had not been presented to support the dog as a service animal. Petitioner vacated the unit on or about July 1, 2017. Respondent did not re-lease the unit and sold the unit on March 22, 2017. During the appeal process, the fine of $1,000.00 related to the service animal was rescinded by the association. Respondent paid the $1,000.00 fine related to the lack of a written lease, and has not requested reimbursement from Petitioner. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged Respondent did not discriminate against her on the basis of her disability, and that Respondent advocated to the association on her behalf. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Respondent did not fail to reasonably accommodate Petitioner’s disability or discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Jean Rath 422 Southeast Naranja Avenue Port St. Lucie, Florida 34983 Glenn J. Webber, Esquire Glenn J. Webber, P.A. 101 Southeast Ocean Boulevard, Suite 203 Stuart, Florida 34994 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
