The Issue This hearing officer appeal under Section 4-505 of the City of Clearwater Community Development Code (Code) is the second of two administrative appeals available to and taken by Appellant, Deborah Groen Sobeleski (Sobeleski) under the Code. The issue in this second appeal is whether to sustain the decision of the City of Clearwater Community Development Board (CDB). The CDB's decision, made under Section 4-504 of the Code, was to allow Sobeleski's earlier Application for Administrative Appeal to the CDB from a Development Order (DO) issued by the City of Clearwater Community Development Coordinator (CDC) to remain on the CDB's consent agenda, which had the effect of denying the Application for Administrative Appeal and confirming the CDC's DO without a quasi-judicial hearing for receipt of additional evidence. The CDC's DO granted, with conditions, the Flexible Standard Development Application filed by Appellee, Christopher Mariani (Mariani, or Applicant), and subsequently amended, for a deviation to allow construction of a dock exceeding the 60-foot maximum length otherwise allowed by the Code.
Findings Of Fact On January 18, 2002, Appellee, Christopher C. Mariani (Mariani, or Applicant), filed a Flexible Standard Development Application for a deviation from Section 3-601.C.1.b.2 of the City of Clearwater Community Development Code (the Code) to allow construction of a 101-foot long dock (98 feet in length with a 3-foot step-down) where 60 feet would be the maximum otherwise allowed by the Code. The deviation from Code apparently was requested because a Pinellas County Department of Environmental Management Water and Navigation Report dated November 26, 2001, stated: Seagrass beds are located along this entire property, and extend out to a maximum of 65 ft. from the seawall in the area of the proposed dock although it becomes sparse at approximately 60 ft. It is the policy of this Department to limit structures over seagrasses to 4 ft. in width and to place the terminal platforms and boat slips beyond the limits of the seagrasses wherever possible. At the time the application was filed, Section 4-505 of the Code provided that, in an appeal to a hearing officer from a decision of the City of Clearwater Community Development Board (CDB), the record before the CDB could be "supplemented by such additional evidence as may be brought forward during the hearing"; and the appellant's burden was to show that the CDB's decision could not be "sustained by the evidence before the board and before the hearing officer." The "City of Clearwater Planning Department Staff Report for 2/14/02 DRC Meeting" recommended flexible standard development approval for a 92-foot long dock.3 The stated "Bases for approval" were: compliance with the flexible standard development criteria under Section 3-601.C.1.g.4 of the Code; compliance with the general applicability criteria under Section 3-913 of the Code; and compatibility with the surrounding area. The Staff Report noted: (1) "there are no navigational concerns with the proposed development"; and (2) "the proposal is more environmentally sensitive than the existing5 dock and constitute an improvement over existing conditions." The Report also stated that, since only one of the three criteria in Section 3- 601.C.1.g. need be met, similarity to surrounding dock patterns was not applicable but that "the proposed dock, as amended, will be similar to surrounding dock patterns." By letter dated March 5, 2002, Mariani amended his application to: decrease the length of the proposed dock to 95 feet; reduce the roof length over the larger capacity boat lift from 48 feet to 38 feet (to match the roof length over the smaller capacity lift); and reduce the total dock square footage to 476.25 square feet versus the 498 feet previously requested. On or about April 14, 2002, Mariani submitted to the City a set of "Dock Plans" for a 92-foot long dock.6 The document included "Diagram A Permittable Construction" and "Diagram B Proposed Construction." The apparent purpose was to contrast the dock Mariani would have been permitted to build in the absence of seagrasses with his proposed dock.7 On May 2, 2002, Section 4-505 of the Code was amended to provide that the appeal hearing before a hearing officer consists solely of reception of the record before the CDB and oral argument and that the burden on appeal to the hearing officer is for "the appellant to show that the decision of the [CDB] cannot be sustained by the evidence before the [CDB], or that the decision of the [CDB] departs from the essential requirements of law." Under the amendment, no other evidence is to be considered.8 By letter dated July 22, 2002, the CDC9 issued a DO stating concurrence with the DRC's "findings." Except for this reference, the record-on-appeal does not contain any evidence of the DRC's recommendation or any written findings by the DRC.10 But the CDC approved Mariani's application, as amended, upon the same "Bases for approval" contained in the "City of Clearwater Planning Department Staff Report for 2/14/02 DRC Meeting," with the following conditions: That a building permit for the proposed dock only be issued concurrently with, or subsequent to, building permit issuance for a principal, residential structure on the site; That the proposed dock be relocated farther east (with the dock head centered on the midpoint of the waterfront property line, as measured at the seawall) and constructed perpendicular to the waterfront property line; That the relocation of the dock meet all criteria under Section 3-601.C.1; and That revised plans reflecting conformance with condition #2 be submitted with the building permit application, to the satisfaction of staff. The DO then stated: "The approval is based on and must adhere to the site plan dated received April 15, 2002, or as modified by condition #2."11 On July 26, 2002, Sobeleski filed an Application for Administrative Appeal to the CDB from the CDC's decision. It included numerous exhibits. It appears that not all of the Application for Administrative Appeal and attachments were presented to the CDB for its consideration on August 20, 2002. One attachment was a letter dated March 27, 2002, from Sobeleski's attorney to the CDC and the City's Land Planner. This letter had 15 exhibits attached, but the CDC removed Exhibits 9-15 from the version of the letter presented to the CDB for its consideration. However, the letter stated that Exhibits 10-15 were attached for "ease of review," and the CDC separately presented copies of the documents contained in Exhibits 12-15 for the CDB's consideration. As for the other exhibits removed from the letter, Exhibit 9 was a computer diskette containing the photographs that were presented to the CDB for its consideration as Exhibits 1-8. Exhibit 10 was a letter dated March 6, 2002, from individuals named Blum to the City Planner stating no objection to the proposed dock. Exhibit 11 was a letter dated March 7, 2002, from Mariani to the CDC responding to opposition from Sobeleski and another individual to the proposed dock. While Exhibit 11 apparently was not presented to the CDB for its consideration, it clearly was adverse to Sobeleski's position and was addressed at length in the letter from Sobeleski's attorney dated March 27, 2002. In On August 20, 2002, the CDB considered the documents described in the immediately preceding Finding, together with a "City of Clearwater Planning Department Summary of Events," dated August 20, 2002, as well as oral presentations by the CDC, counsel for Sobeleski, and counsel for Mariani. The audiotape- recording of the oral presentations reveals that, upon the advice of the CDC and the Assistant City Attorney, the CDB attempted to limit the oral presentations to the question whether the CDB should remove Sobeleski's Application for Administrative Appeal from the CDB's consent agenda so as to cause a quasi-judicial hearing to be conducted, or should leave it on the consent agenda, which would result in upholding the CDC's decision. After being restricted by the CDB from addressing the merits, counsel for Sobeleski argued for a quasi- judicial hearing for reasons of "public policy." The CDB then allowed counsel for Mariani to address the merits in arguing that Sobeleski had made no showing as to why the CDC decision was incorrect so as to justify a quasi-judicial hearing.12 The Assistant City Attorney concurred that some such showing should be necessary to justify removal from the consent agenda. After the oral presentations, the CDB voted to leave Sobeleski's Application for Administrative Appeal on the CDB's consent agenda, thereby upholding the CDC's decision to issue the DO. On August 26, 2002, Sobeleski filed an Appeal Application from the CDB's decision. On September 20, 2002, the City referred the Appeal Application to DOAH under Section 4-505 of the Code. However, the referral letter from counsel for the City stated: Please note that I am not forwarding Exhibits 1-15 to the Appeal Application. Items 1-9 and 12-15 are already of record before the Board and are thus otherwise included. Items 10 and 11 were not of record below and are not being included, on that basis. Although the manner in which the record-on-appeal was prepared made it exceedingly difficult to ascertain, it appears that the referral actually failed to forward the entirety of Exhibit B to the Appeal Application, which consisted of letters from Appellant's counsel dated August 16 and March 27, 2002.13 The documents called "Exhibits" or "Items" in the referral letter actually were Exhibits 1-15 attached to the letter from Appellant's counsel dated March 27, 2002. As previously found, the CDC decided not to present to the CDB all attachments to the letter dated March 27, 2002. See Finding 9, supra. For that reason, the Assistant City Attorney "redacted" the Appeal Application by deleting the items not in fact presented (Exhibits 9, 10, and 11), as well as the items identical to documents separately presented (Exhibits 12-15), to the CDB for its consideration. See Finding 11, supra.14
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the application for a surface water management permit (permit no. 4-009-0077AM) filed by the Respondent, David A. Smith (Applicant), should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the prehearing stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Applicant is the owner of the subject property. The Applicant filed an application for a permit to construct a stormwater management system which was proposed to serve a residential and golf course development to be known as Sabal Hammocks. The site of the proposed project is approximately 720 acres in size and is located in township 24 south, sections 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, and 34, range 35 east, Brevard County, Florida. The entire project site for the Sabal Hammocks development is located within the boundaries of the St. Johns River Water Management District. To the west of the project site is an 140 acre public park that treats its own stormwater and releases pre-treated stormwater during some storm events into the canals on the Sabal Hammocks site. The Applicant's site is located adjacent to Lake Poinsett and prior uses of the land have included cattle grazing and the cultivation of rye and oats. The Applicant filed his application for the stormwater management permit (permit NO. 4-009-0077AM) on December 22, 1989. That application was deemed complete by the District on June 19, 1990. The District issued a notice of its intended action to approve the permit application on June 28, 1990. Save timely filed a petition challenging the proposed action. By law the District is the appropriate agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing applications for stormwater management permits within the subject area. Save is an association of individual persons and representatives from groups who utilize the waters of Lake Poinsett and its surrounding areas for recreational and business purposes. The receiving waters for stormwater discharge from the proposed Sabal Hammocks development will be Lake Poinsett. That water body is classified as Class III waters. Currently, a dike system exists along the southern boundary of the subject property. That dike system separates the internal grazing lands of the parcel from the lower marsh and flooded areas external to the dike. A series of ditches cross the parcel to drain the interior areas. Two agricultural discharge pumps are currently in use at the site. The operation of those pumps has been authorized pursuant to a consent order approved by the District's governing board on December 13, 1990. The dike system on the subject site has been in place since the 1970s. The original construction specifications of the dike are unknown. Sometime in the 1980s, several openings or breaches were cut in the dike system. Those breaches were opened pursuant to permits issued by the District and the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) . The breaches were cut to a sufficient width and depth to allow boats to navigate through to interior areas of the subject property during those times when the water levels outside the dike would allow such entrance. The breaches were not cut to ground level and the original dike remained intact and uncompromised by the breaches. That is, the dike has not failed to impede water movement and the integrity of the dike was not weakened by the breaches. The original outline, dimension of the dike, remained visible despite the breaches. In 1986, the Applicant requested permission from the District staff in order to close or restore the dike breaches. At that time, the District staff advised David Smith that a permit would not be required to restore the dike since such improvements would be considered a maintenance exemption. Subsequently, and in reliance upon the representations made by the District's director,, the Applicant closed the breaches and restored the continuity of the dike system of the subject property. The Applicant's work to close the breaches was performed in an open manner, would have been visible to persons using the adjacent marsh or water areas for recreational purposes, and was completed at least one year prior to the application being filed in this case. Neither the District nor DER has asserted that the work to complete the original dike in the 1970s, nor the breaches completed in the 1980s, nor the restoration of the breaches in 1986 was performed in violation of law. Further, the District had knowledge of the subject activities. Save contends that the restoration of the dike system was contrary to law and that it was not afforded a point of entry to contest the closure of the breaches. Additionally, Save infers that the original construction of the dike system in the early 1970s was without authorization from authorities. Save's contention is that the prior condition of the property, ie. the parcel with breached openings, must be considered the correct pre- development condition of the land. The District, however, considered the pre- development condition of the parcel to be that of a diked impoundment separated from Lake Poinsett. The same assumption was made regarding the pumping of water from the area enclosed by the dike via an existing 36 inch pump which discharges to Bass Lake (and then to Lake Poinsett) and an existing 12 inch pump that discharges into the marsh areas adjacent to the property (between it and Lake Poinsett). The District's consideration of the site and the application at issue was based upon the actual condition of the land as it existed at the time this application was filed. The pre-development peak rate and volume of discharge from the site was calculated based upon the maximum discharge capacity of the two existing pumps (described above). Accordingly, the maximum pre-development rate of discharge from the two existing pumps is in the range of 90-107 cubic feet per second. The pre-development volume of discharge, based upon actual pump records, was calculated as 710 acre-feet for a 25 year, 96 hour storm event. The total areas encompassed by the Applicant's proposal are the 720 acre site where the golf course and residential homes will be located together with 140 acres from an adjacent public park. The runoff entering the stormwater system from that public park will have already been treated in its own stormwater management system. The Applicant's proposed stormwater system will consist of a series of lakes and interconnected swales. This wet detention system will capture the runoff and direct its flow through the series of swales and lakes via culverts. The waters will move laterally from the northwestern portion of the parcel to she southeastern end of the site. From the final collecting pond, she waters will be pumped to Bass Lake and ultimately flow to Lake Poinsett. Wet detention systems generally provide greater pollutant treatment efficiencies than other types of stormwater treatment systems. The maintenance associated with these systems is also considered less intensive than other types of treatment systems. The wet detention system proposed for Sabal Hammocks accomplishes three objectives related to the flow of stormwater. The first objective, the collection of the. stormwater, requires the creation of several lakes or pools into which water is directed and accumulates. The size and dimension of the lakes will allow the volume of accumulated water to be sufficient to allow stormwater treatment. The capacity of the lakes will also provide for a sufficient volume to give adequate flood protection during rainfall events and storms. The second objective, the treatment of the stormwater, requires the creation of a littoral zone within the system. The littoral zone, an area of rooted aquatic plants within the lakes or ponds, provide for the natural removal of nutrients flowing into the system. The plants serve as a filtering system whereby some nutrients are processed. The proposed littoral zone in this project constitutes approximately 37 percent of the detention system surface area and therefore exceeds District size requirements. The depth of the treatment volume for the proposed system will not exceed 18 inches. A third objective accomplished by the creation of the series of lakes is the provision for an area where pollutants flowing into the detention system may settle and through sedimentation be removed from the water moving through the system. The average residence time estimated for runoff entering the Sabal Hammocks detention system is 48 days. The permanent pool volume will, therefore, be sufficient to assure the proposed project exceeds the District's requirements related to residence time. The design and volume of the Sabal Hammocks system will also exceed the District's requirements related to the dynamic pool volumes. In this case the Sabal Hammocks system will provide for approximately 65 acre-feet of runoff. Thus, the proposed system will adequately control and detain the first 1 inch of runoff from the site. The length to width ratio for the proposed lakes, 18:1, exceeds the District's minimum criteria (2:1). The final lake or pond into which the stormwater will flow will be 17 acres and will have 15 acres of planted wetland vegetation. Before waters will be released into Bass Lake, the site's runoff will pass through 3100 linear feet of this final lake before being discharged. The proposed project will eliminate the two agricultural pumps and replace them with one pump station. That station will contain four pumps with a total pumping capacity of 96 cubic feet per second. Under anticipated peak times, the rate of discharge from the proposed single station is estimated to be less than the calculated peak pre-development rate of discharge (90-107 c.f.s.). The estimated peak volume of discharge will also be lower than the pre-development discharge volumes for the comparable storm events. The proposed pump station is designed to be operated on electrical power but will have a backup diesel generator to serve in the event of the interruption of electrical service. Additionally, the pumps within the station will be controlled by a switching device that will activate the pump(s) only at designated times. It is unlikely that all four pumps will activate during normal rainfall events. The Applicant intends to relinquish maintenance responsibilities for the stormwater system including the pump station to Brevard County, Florida. Finished floor elevations for all residential structures to be built within the Sabal Hammocks development will be at a minimum of 18.2 mean sea level. This level is above that for a 100 year flood. The floor elevations will be at least one foot above the 100 year flood elevation even in the event of the dike or pump failure or both. Finished road elevations for the project will be set at 17.5 feet mean sea level. This elevation meets or exceeds the County's requirements regarding the construction of roadways. It is estimated that the Sabal Hammocks system will retain at least 26 percent of all storm events on site. If the lake system is utilized to irrigate the golf course the proposed system could retain 45 percent of all storm events on site. Of the 31.27 acres of wetlands within the proposed site, only 4.73 acres of wetlands will be disturbed by the construction of this project. Some of the wetlands are isolated and presently provide minimal benefits to off-site aquatic and wetland dependent species. No threatened or endangered species are currently utilizing the isolated wetlands. The areas of wetlands which are productive and which will be disturbed by the development will be replaced by new wetlands to be created adjacent to their current location at a lower elevation. The new wetlands should provide improved wetland function since those areas will be planted with a greater diversity of wetland plant species. Additionally, other wetland areas will be enhanced by the removal of invader species and increased hydroperiod in the area. The integrated pesticide management plan for the proposed project will be sufficient with the additional condition chat use of Orthene, Subdue, and Tersan LSR will be authorized when approved insecticides or fungicides have not been effective. In this case, the estimates regarding the water quality for the proposed project were based upon data from studies of multifamily residential projects. Data from single family/ golf course developments was not available. Therefore, based upon the data used, the projected runoff concentrations for this project should over estimate pollutants and are more challenging to the treatment system than what is reasonably expected to occur. In this regard, the overall treatment efficiencies are estimated to be good for all of the parameters of concern with the exception of nitrogen. The projected increase in nitrogen, however, will not adversely impact the receiving water body. The projected average concentration for each constituent which may be discharged is less than the state standard with the exceptions of cadmium and zinc. In this regard, the District's proposed conditions (set forth in the District's exhibits 4 and 9) adequately offset the potential for a violation of state water quality standards. More specifically, the use of copper-based algaecides in the stormwater management system should be prohibited; the use of galvanized metal culverts in the stormwater management system, or as driveway culverts, should be prohibited; and the use of organic fertilizers or soil amendments derived from municipal sludge on the golf course should be prohibited. Additionally, a water quality monitoring plan should be implemented by the Applicant. The monitoring plan mandates the collection of water samples from areas in order to adequately monitor the overall effectiveness of the treatment facility. The source of cadmium is not be expected to be as great as projected since the most common source for such discharge is automobiles. It is unlikely that the golf course use will generate the volume of discharge associated with automobile use that the multifamily data presumed. The projected quality of the discharges from this project should be similar to the ambient water quality in Lake Poinsett. In fact, the post- development pollutant loading rates should be better than the pre-development pollutant loading rates. The discharge from the proposed Sabal Hammocks project will not cause or contribute to a violation of state water quality standards in Lake Poinsett nor will the groundwater discharges violate applicable state groundwater quality standards. The floodways and floodplains, and the levels of flood flows or velocities of adjacent water courses will not be altered by the proposed project so as to adversely impact the off- site storage and conveyance capabilities of the water resource. The proposed project will not result in the flow of adjacent water courses to be decreased to cause adverse impacts. The proposed project will not cause hydrologically-related environmental functions to be adversely impacted The proposed project will not endanger life, health, or property. The proposed project will not adversely affect natural resources, fish and wildlife. The proposed project is consistent with the overall objectives of the District.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the governing board of the St. Johns River Water Management District enter a final order approving the application for permit number 4-009-0077AM with the conditions outlined within the District's exhibits numbered 4, 8, and 9 and as previously stated in the notice of intent. DONE and ENTERED this 2 day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2 day of July, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-5247 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE APPLICANT: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. Paragraph 4 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 7 is accepted the remainder is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 8 is accepted. Paragraphs 9 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as irrelevant. 8 Paragraphs 13 through 21 are accepted. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 23 through 25 are accepted. The last two sentences of paragraph 26 are accepted, the remainder is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 27 is accepted. Paragraph 28 is rejected as comment, irrelevant, or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. Paragraph 29 is accepted. Paragraph 30 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argumentative. Paragraphs 32 and 33 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 34 it is accepted that compensating storage was not required. Otherwise, unnecessary, irrelevant, or comment. With regard to paragraph 35, it is accepted the proposed system meets the first 1 inch of runoff requirement otherwise, unnecessary or irrelevant or comment. Paragraph 36 is accepted. Paragraphs 37 through 41 are rejected as irrelevant, argumentative or comment. Paragraphs 42 and 43 are accepted. With the deletion of the last sentence which is irrelevant, paragraph 44 is accepted. Paragraphs 44 through 49 are accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 50 is accepted, the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence. The first sentence of paragraph 51 is accepted, the remainder is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 52 through 56 are rejected as irrelevant, comment, or recitation of testimony. Paragraph 57 is accepted. Paragraph 58 is accepted. Paragraphs 59 and 60 are rejected as irrelevant, comment, or argumentative. Paragraphs 61 and 62 are accepted. The first sentence of Paragraph 63 is accepted. The remainder of the Paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The proposed project will benefit the wetland areas in an unquanitifiable measure due to the enhancements to prior wetlands and the creation of new wetlands. The first sentence of paragraph 64 is accepted. The remainder is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 65 is accepted. Paragraph 66 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 67 is accepted. Paragraphs 68 and 69 are accepted. Paragraph 70 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 71 through 73 are accepted. Paragraph 74 is rejected as irrelevant or unnecessary. Paragraphs 75 through 78 are rejected as argument, irrelevant, or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. Paragraphs 79 through 82 are accepted. Paragraph 83 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 84 and 85 are rejected as argument or comment. It is accepted that the Corp and DER are aware of the restoration of the dike and that neither has asserted such work was performed contrary to law. Paragraph 86 is rejected as comment on the evidence or irrelevant. It is accepted that the District advised Applicant that he could restore the dike system and that the District was apprised of the completion of that work. With regard to paragraph 87, it is accepted that the restoration of the dike entailed filling the breaches to conform to the dike's original design; otherwise, rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 88 and 89 and the first sentence of Paragraph 90 are accepted. The remainder of paragraph 90 and Paragraphs 91 through 93 are rejected as irrelevant, argument, or comment. Paragraph 94 is accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DISTRICT: Paragraphs 1 through 78 is accepted. Paragraph 79 is rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 80 is accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY SAVE: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary D. Hansen 1600 S. Clyde Morris Boulevard Suite 300 Daytona Beach, Florida 32119 Brain D.E. Canter HABEN, CULPEPPER, DUNBAR & FRENCH, P.A. 306 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wayne Flowers Jennifer Burdick St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about January 28, 1977, at approximately 2:00 P.M., respondent Spencer, Clarence Jones, and John Aaron were all on duty as employees of the petitioner. The three men were dressed in City work clothes and were riding in a small truck with a City of Clearwater emblem on the side. John Aaron was driving the truck. As the City truck approached the intersection of Jones Street and Garden Avenue in Clearwater at a speed of about 5 miles per hour, it came upon three teenage pedestrians -- two girls and a boy -- walking on the left side of the rode. Driver Aaron said "Hey, now" or "Hey baby" to one or both of the girls. One of the girls said something offensive in reply. At that point, respondent Spencer asked Aaron to stop the truck. After two or three such requests, Aaron stopped the truck and respondent Spencer got out. By this time, the three teenagers had begun to walk away from the truck into a vacant field. Respondent Spencer walked up to the teenagers and one of the girls called him a "nigger" and continued to walk away. Spencer testified that the same girl swung at him with her fist. Neither Aaron nor Jones saw the girl make any threatening gestures toward respondent. After respondent was called a "nigger," he removed his belt and hit the girl twice with the belt as she was walking away. Respondent then returned to the City truck and the three employees drove off. By a "termination and dismissal notice," respondent was advised that he was dismissed as an employee of the City of Clearwater for his activities occurring on January 28, 1977. As causes and reasons therefor, petitioner listed three violations of Rule 14 of the Civil Service Rules of Clearwater. (Exhibit 4) Respondent timely filed his answer and explanation to the charges, petitioner did not accept the same and respondent therefore requested a hearing pursuant to City Ordinance Number 1643, S2-38. Pursuant to a contract between the City of Clearwater and the Division of Administrative Hearings, the undersigned Hearing Officer was duly designated to conduct the hearing. By an Agreement between the parties dated June 7, 1977, the parties recognized the recent ruling of the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County (Civil Case No. 77-1023-7) which held invalid the referendum election amending the City's Civil Service System. Expressing doubt as to Whether the hearing should be held before the Civil Service Board or before a Hearing Officer appointed by said Board, the parties mutually agreed to waive any and all rights to a hearing before the Board, and to abide by the judgment rendered by the Board pursuant to the findings of the Hearing Officer pursuant to Ordinance Numbers 1643 and 1649, subject to the judicial review procedures established by law. (Exhibit 1)
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the respondent's dismissal by the City of Clearwater be upheld and AFFIRMED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frank X. Kowalski, Esquire Chief Assistant City Attorney Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Ronald E. Smith, Esquire 308 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Miami Yacht Divers, Inc., is entitled to reimbursement for cleanup costs.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering claims against the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund. Petitioner is a company located in Dade County, Florida, which performs commercial diving operations. Such operations include oil pollution containment and clean-up. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Dan Delmonico was the principal officer or owner for the Petitioner who supervised the operations of the company. In April of 1993, Mr. Delmonico discovered a fuel discharge next door to the premises of Defender Yacht, Inc., a company located on the Miami River in Dade County, Florida. The source of the discharge was an abandoned sunken vessel. This derelict vessel had no markings from which its ownership could be determined. Upon discovering the vessel, Mr. Delmonico did not contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the discharge. Instead, Mr. Delmonico contacted several colleagues whose help he enlisted to assist him to clean up the discharge. In this regard, Mr. Delmonico procured the services of a diver and a crane company to remove the vessel from the water. Additionally, Mr. Delmonico utilized a boom and oil absorbent clean-up pads to remove the discharged fuel from the water. In total, Mr. Delmonico maintains it took four work days to complete the removal of the discharge and the salvage of the derelict vessel. At no time during this period did Mr. Delmonico contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the foregoing activities. No official from any governmental entity supervised or approved the clean-up operation or salvage activity which is in dispute. After the fact Petitioner filed a reimbursement claim with the United States Coast Guard. Such claim was denied. Upon receipt of such denial, Petitioner filed the claim which is at issue in the instant case. In connection with this claim with Respondent, Petitioner submitted all forms previously tendered to the Coast Guard including the standard claim form, labor receipts, rental receipts, supply receipts, trailer and storage receipts, cash expenses, a job summary, and photographs. On or about September 20, 1996, Respondent issued a letter denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for expenses associated with the above-described salvage and clean-up activities. The grounds for the denial were the Petitioner's failure to obtain prior approval for the activities and the absence of "good cause" for the waiver of prior approval. Additionally, the Respondent maintained that Petitioner had failed to provide evidence that a pollutant discharge existed and that the removal of the vessel was necessary to abate and remove the discharge. It is undisputed by Petitioner that prior approval for the clean-up activities was not obtained. Petitioner timely disputed the denial and was afforded a point of entry to challenge such decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathelyn M. Jacques Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 N. Paul San Filippo, Esquire Seidensticker & San Filippo Parkway Financial Center 2150 Goodlette Road, Suite 305 Naples, Florida 34102
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner should terminate Respondent from his employment as a deputy sheriff for allegedly engaging in prohibited conduct pursuant to Chapter 89-404, Laws of Florida, as amended by Chapter 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act), and Petitioner's General Order Section 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.2--relating to loyalty, Rule and Regulation 5.4--relating to duties and responsibilities, and Rule and Regulation 5.6-- relating to truthfulness; General Order Section 3-1.3, Rule and Regulation 3.20--relating to reporting procedures for the use of force; and General Order 3-2--relating to ethical requirements.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the Sheriff of Pinellas County and a constitutional officer described in Article VIII, Section 1, Florida Constitution. From sometime in 1989 until the termination of Respondent’s employment on March 14, 2008, Petitioner employed Respondent as a deputy sheriff in the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (the PCSO). Respondent was last assigned to the courthouse security division of the PCSO. On Saturday, November 3, 2007, Respondent was off-duty and volunteering as one of a number of parents who were supervising several high school bands that were practicing at Clearwater High School (CHS). Three juvenile males on bicycles approached the band practice area. Respondent yelled at them to stop, but did not identify himself as a deputy sheriff. One juvenile stopped. The other two juveniles ignored the commands and proceeded toward the Tarpon Springs Band. One of the riders wore a back pack with a baseball bat attached to the pack. Respondent reasonably believed that the juveniles, who were approximately 16 and 17 years old,1 presented an imminent danger of running into and potentially injuring members of the nearby Tarpon Springs Band. Respondent ran after the juvenile with a bat attached to his pack, grabbed the bat, and separated the juvenile from the moving bicycle. The second juvenile stopped at the point of separation. The juvenile with the baseball bat struck Respondent with his fist, and Respondent delivered a knee-spike2 to the mid- section of the juvenile. The knee-spike disabled the juvenile. The second juvenile was preparing to strike Respondent, when another parent pulled that juvenile away. Petitioner notified Respondent of the charges against him in a memorandum dated March 14, 2008 (the charging document). In relevant part, the charging document alleges in a paragraph entitled “Synopsis” that, during the altercation, Respondent failed to act within the scope of his responsibilities as a deputy sheriff. If that allegation were properly construed to allege that Respondent used excessive force, the fact-finder finds that a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of that charge of misconduct. Respondent acted reasonably during the altercation. Respondent used reasonable force to protect band members from harm, and Respondent used reasonable force to defend himself from a juvenile. The exigencies of the moment did not afford time for Respondent to disclose his employment with the PCSO before taking action he reasonably believed to be necessary to protect members of the Tarpon Springs Band. Respondent cooperated with the police investigation at CHS. CHS is located within the jurisdiction of both the PCSO and the Clearwater Police Department. The Clearwater Police Department responded to the scene and conducted an investigation. The investigation was documented in Clearwater Police Report No. CW07-33468 (the police report). Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent was untruthful by deliberately or intentionally omitting or misrepresenting material facts outlining his involvement in the altercation, including a memorandum Petitioner authored on November 5, 2007. The fact- finder finds that a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of this charge of misconduct. It is undisputed that Respondent telephoned Corporal Victor Griffin, Respondent’s immediate supervisor on the evening of November 3, 2007, and reported the altercation in detail, including the attack by the juvenile and Respondent’s use of a knee-spike. Corporal Griffin instructed Respondent to inform Sergeant Edward Marshall, the next in command. Respondent telephoned Sergeant Marshall that night and informed him of the use of force and the details of the incident. At the hearing, Sergeant Marshall had little or no recall of the details of the conversation with Respondent on November 3, 2007. The only credible and persuasive testimony concerning that conversation is the testimony of Respondent. On the evening of November 3, 2007, Sergeant Marshall instructed Respondent to write a memorandum describing the incident and Respondent’s use of force when Respondent returned to work on Monday, November 5, 2007. Sergeant Marshall instructed Respondent to either reference the police report in the memorandum or attach a copy of the police report to the memorandum. Respondent drafted a memorandum on November 5, 2007. The memorandum referred to the police report, and Respondent submitted the memorandum to his supervisor. The police report included a handwritten, detailed description by Respondent of the use of force in the altercation. Petitioner had reasonable access to the police report. The Clearwater Police Department and the PCSO, by agreement, utilize a computerized joint records management system identified in the record as ACISS. Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent failed to document the use of force, as required by agency policy. The fact-finder finds that a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of this charge of misconduct. A complete description of the altercation and use of force was attached to the police report. That information fully documented the use of force and was available to Petitioner through ACISS.3 Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent compromised the criminal investigation of the altercation by “accessing unauthorized information” and by “interfering with an ongoing investigation.” This allegation is based in substantial part on two undisputed facts that occurred on or about November 5, 2007. First, Respondent obtained a copy of the police report and discovered that the police report listed Respondent as a “victim/suspect.” Suspects are not entitled to a copy of a police report, but law enforcement officers may access the report. Second, Respondent persuaded the property department to change the status of brass knuckles found in a back pack at the scene of the altercation from being held for destruction to being held as evidence, so that the brass knuckles would not be destroyed. The fact-finder finds that a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the undisputed actions of Respondent compromised the criminal investigation by accessing unauthorized information and intervening into an investigation in which Respondent was listed in the police report as a suspect. The undisputed actions of Respondent were consistent with the actions of the Clearwater Police Department, and neither action by Respondent compromised the investigation. The investigating officer for the Clearwater Police Department was off-duty on Monday and Tuesday, and she did not return to work until Wednesday, November 7, 2007. When the investigating officer returned to work, her sergeant instructed her to change the police report to list Respondent as a law enforcement officer, to delete his address from the report, and to change the designation of Respondent from a “victim/suspect”4 to a “victim” before finalizing the report. The investigating officer made those changes to the police report by computer entries on November 7, 2007, and those changes were available to the PCSO through ACISS. The sergeant also instructed the investigating officer to change the status of the brass knuckles from being held for destruction to being held as evidence, so that they would not be destroyed. The investigating officer contacted the property department of the PCSO to change the status of the brass knuckles to that of evidence and discovered the property department had already made that change at Respondent’s request. Respondent was entitled to a copy of the report because he was a law enforcement officer and was incorrectly listed on the report as a suspect. The actions of Respondent in changing the status of the brass knuckles so that they were listed as evidence was consistent with the actions of the Clearwater Police Department. Respondent did nothing on November 5, 2007, that the Clearwater Police Department did not do on November 7, 2007. If the investigating officer were to have returned to work on Monday, November 5, 2007, it is reasonable to conclude that the Clearwater Police Department would have provided a copy of the police report to Respondent, because Respondent would not have been listed as a suspect, and the Department would have changed the status of the brass knuckles so that they were being held as evidence. The investigating officer and her sergeant concluded the altercation was a matter of mutual combat and did not refer the case for prosecution by the state attorney. The nascence of the charges against Respondent emerged from two events. First, the mother of the two juveniles filed a complaint of excessive force against the PCSO. Second, when the investigating officer discovered that Respondent had already persuaded the property department to change the status of the brass knuckles, so that they would not be destroyed, the Clearwater Police Department complained to the PCSO about a deputy sheriff allegedly interfering with evidence. As a result, Petitioner initiated an administrative investigation that led to this proceeding. The penultimate allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent provided confidential information regarding an open criminal case to another suspect. It is undisputed that when Respondent discovered on November 5, 2007, that he was listed as a suspect in the police report, Respondent told the parent that had prevented the second juvenile from attacking Respondent that the parent was also listed in the report as a suspect. The disclosure by Respondent was immaterial and had no impact on a pending criminal investigation. The Clearwater Police Department classified the altercation as mutual combat and did not refer the case for prosecution. The final allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of material facts regarding his “involvement in the ongoing . . . criminal investigation” and “subsequent actions” that Respondent took. The distinction, if any, between “involvement in the ongoing investigation” and “subsequent actions” is unclear to the fact-finder because the charges deal with Respondent’s actions during a pending investigation. The charges of misconduct do not address Respondent’s “subsequent actions” after the investigation was completed and case was closed. The investigating officer did not inform Respondent when she responded to the scene on November 3, 2007, that she was listing Respondent as a suspect. She did not decide to list Respondent as a suspect until she prepared her report that evening, long after Respondent had completed his written report that was included with the police report and had left the scene. Respondent did not learn that he was a suspect until Respondent obtained a copy of the police report on November 5, 2007. After obtaining a copy of the police report, Respondent talked to Lieutenant Rachel Hughes of the Courthouse Security Division at the PCSO and another of Respondent’s supervisors. Significant variation exists in the separate accounts of the conversation between Respondent and Lieutenant Hughes. The testimony of Lieutenant Hughes is inconsistent, self- contradictory, and less than credible and persuasive. The only credible and persuasive testimony concerning the conversation is the testimony of Respondent. During the conversation between Respondent and Lieutenant Hughes, Respondent expressed his displeasure at being listed in the police report as a suspect, stated that he would like to complain to someone at the Clearwater Police Department, and asked if Lieutenant Hughes knew anyone there. Lieutenant Hughes suggested that Lieutenant James Steffens at the Clearwater Police Department is a “good guy.” Before contacting Lieutenant Steffens, Respondent called the property department and identified himself as “Milewsky from over at the courthouse.” Respondent did not disclose that he was a suspect in the case involving the brass knuckles. Respondent knew or should have known that the property department employee reasonably believed that the call and request was related to official business. Lieutenant Larry Smith was in charge of the property department at the time and testified at the hearing. The property department would not have enhanced the status of the brass knuckles at the request of someone who was listed as a suspect in the police report. The failure to disclose to the property department that Respondent was a suspect in the case is not alleged in the charging document, and the ALJ cannot find Respondent guilty of a charge not alleged in the charging document. The relevant language in the charging document is confined to an allegation that Respondent failed to advise his “supervisors” of his “involvement in the ongoing . . . investigation” and his “subsequent actions.” Those assigned to the property department are not “supervisors” of Respondent. Respondent next telephoned Lieutenant Steffens of the Clearwater Police Department to discuss the fact that Respondent was listed as a suspect in the police report. Respondent and Lieutenant Steffens disagree over material details of the conversation, including the issue of whether Respondent requested Lieutenant Steffens to change the police report to delete Respondent’s name as a suspect. The fact-finder resolves the disparity in testimony between Respondent and Lieutenant Steffens against Respondent. The testimony of Lieutenant Steffens is the only credible and persuasive testimony concerning the conversation between the two men. Respondent did not want to remain listed as a suspect, but denied that the purpose of his call to Lieutenant Steffens was to have the report changed to delete his status as a suspect. Respondent insisted that his telephone call to Lieutenant Steffens was “unrelated” to changing his designation as a suspect. The testimony of Lieutenant Steffens was plausible, credible, and persuasive. Lieutenant Steffens recalled that Respondent advised Lieutenant Steffens that a Clearwater Police Department investigation contained erroneous information, and Respondent sought to get the error corrected “as soon as possible.” After emphasizing Respondent’s seniority and the lack of experience of the investigating officer, who was a rookie, Respondent stated that he did not want to make a complaint against the investigating officer, but just wanted the report changed so that Respondent was listed solely as a victim in the report. Respondent asked Lieutenant Steffens if they could get that done as quickly as possible. Lieutenant Steffens sent a message by email in this regard to Sergeant Wilton Lee, the supervisor for the investigating officer, asking Sergeant Lee to telephone Respondent. Sergeant Lee did not return to work until Wednesday, November 7, 2007. Before Lieutenant Steffens heard from Sergeant Lee, Lieutenant Steffens received a voice mail from Respondent inquiring as to why nothing had been done yet on the case. Lieutenant Steffens also received a telephone call from another suspect. Lieutenant Steffens telephoned Sergeant Lee directly about the inquiries. When Sergeant Lee reported to work on November 7, 2007, the police report was waiting for his approval. Sergeant Lee telephoned Respondent, whom Sergeant Lee knew to be a deputy sheriff, and agreed that Respondent should not be listed in the police report as a suspect. Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of two forms of involvement in the investigation. First, Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of his involvement in the enhancement of the brass knuckles from that of waiting for destruction to that of evidence. Second, Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of his efforts to change the police report to delete his name as a suspect. A preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the failures described in the preceding paragraph violate requirements for loyalty and truthfulness. Those requirements are described in General Order 3-1.1 and Rules and Regulations 5.2 and 5.6. The Progressive Discipline Worksheet assigns 75 Progressive Discipline Points for violations of all of the charges in the charging document. However, a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Respondent is guilty of violating only two of the six charges of misconduct described in the synopsis in the charging document. The Worksheet does not delineate the points assigned to each charge, and Petitioner has not promulgated intelligible standards that enable the fact- finder to determine the points that should be allocated to the two violations committed by Respondent. No aggravating factors are evidenced in this proceeding. Respondent has no prior discipline during his 19 years of experience with the PCSO. The culpable actions of Respondent did not result in physical or financial harm to a member of the public or members of either the PCSO or the Clearwater Police Department. The culpable actions of Respondent did not compromise an ongoing criminal investigation. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that termination of employment is a reasonable penalty. Untruthfulness and disloyalty are serious offenses but, absent any aggravating circumstances, a reasonable penalty is suspension without pay beginning on March 14, 2008, and reinstatement to the former position of employment immediately upon the entry of a final order.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings of this Recommended Order; suspending Respondent’s employment without pay from March 14, 2008, to the date of the final order; and returning Respondent to his former position of employment as of the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner L. C. Prevatt is the owner and operator of the Riverview Speed Wash, Inc., a coin operated laundry which has been in existence for over ten years. The facility has twelve top load washers, four double load washers, one triple load washer and seven gas dryers. It is open from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., seven days a week. The facility is located in a shopping center in space which petitioner rents on a month-by-month basis. The facility utilizes a 0.0075 mgd waste treatment plant with effluent disposal to a county-owned drainage ditch which is connected and discharges to the Alafia River approximately 0.6 miles south of the facility. On or about May 29, 1981, petitioner submitted an application for a temporary operation permit for his Riverview laundry facility. Temporary operation permits are issued by the DER when a facility is not currently meeting State water quality standards and the applicant needs or desires a period of time to bring the facility up to the applicable standards. Here, the petitioner stated on his application that no upgrade of the waste treatment facility was planned. The application further stated that the facility would be connected to an area wide regional waste treatment system when that system became available. After numerous requests for further information from the applicant and various inspections of the facility, the DER issued its notice of intent to deny petitioner's application for a temporary operation permit. Reasons for the intended denial included failure to provide requested background water quality information, failure to provide a proposed water quality standards compliance schedule, failure to provide reasonable assurance that a municipal sewer would be available as an alternative means of disposal and improper and deficient operation and maintenance of the facility. Numerous inspections of the petitioner's facility by personnel from the DER and the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission revealed that the facility was not functional in terms of operating correctly and that the design of the plant was inadequate to meet State water quality standards. Specifically, these inspections revealed that the chlorination equipment was not operational, that the trickling filter was not operational, that the removal rates for BOD and suspended solids were consistently and significantly less than the State standard of 90 percent, that the discharge and effluent were of a milky color and would not meet the State standards for turbidity and color, that the water quality of the drainage ditch was extremely low and that the water quality results were actually worse after going through the existing system. It was determined that the discharge was degrading the quality of the receiving waters and that, even if the petitioner's operational and maintenance problems were solved, the design of the facility is not adequate to assure future compliance with State standards. Petitioner admits that his facility does not currently meet State water quality standards. In mitigation, it is contended that many other laundries in the area also do not meet State standards, that it is not economically feasible to redesign the facility to attain compliance, that he has no land available upon which to discharge effluent and that he would be willing to install a sand filter and did have the permission of the manager (not the owner) of the property to discharge effluent into the parking lot drain ponds. No written evidence of this agreement was adduced and there was no demonstration that such runoff ponds would be able to hold and/or treat effluent from the petitioner's facility. There was also no evidence offered to demonstrate that a municipal or regional sewer system would be available in the near future to serve the laundry facility.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a temporary operation permit for Riverview Speed Wash, Inc. be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 7th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: L. C. Prevatt Post Office Box 998 Gibsonton, Florida 33534 William W. Deane, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully dismissed from his employment with the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact On December 5, 1990, Truman Gooden was employed by the City of Clearwater as a truck driver and was assigned to pick up trash at Sand Key in Pinellas County. While driving the truck assigned to him on the beach below the high water line, the truck started to slide in loose sand, Gooden attempted to back and turn the truck away from the water, but was unsuccessful, and the truck slid into the water with the engine running. By the time Gooden extricated himself from the vehicle, the entire hood was under water (Exhibit X), the cab was full of water, and the engine was ruined. The total damage to the truck was approximately $22,000. Gooden reported the incident to his superior, and the vehicle was subsequently removed from the water by two tow trucks. Gooden testified that he had driven the truck in the same manner for several years performing the same tasks and had never encountered such a problem before. The tide was extremely low on December 5, 1990, and Gooden was driving the truck on the sand further seaward from the high water mark than normal. To perform the task, it was unnecessary for Gooden to drive very far seaward of the high water line, and Gooden's negligence in this regard was the proximate cause of the truck sliding into the water and becoming ruined. For this negligence, Gooden was assigned 20 disciplinary points. During the preceding two years prior to this incident, Gooden had received the following disciplinary actions for the following offenses: March 10, 1989 - counseling session: quitting work, wasting time March 23, 1989 - written warning: tardiness March 28, 1989 - 3 days suspension: unauthorized/ unexplained absenteeism April 4, 1989 - letter of reprimand: carelessness, vehicle accident June 20, 1989 - 4 days suspension: productivity not up to standards June 22, 1989 - less than satisfactory annual performance rating June 27, 1989 - letter notifying Gooden of accumulation of 60 points July 14, 1989 - letter of reprimand: vehicle accident Sept. 22, 1989 - less than satisfactory 3 month follow-up rating Nov. 13, 1989 - 6 days suspension: operating city vehicle without a license; failure to report lack of valid license April 16, 1990 - written warning: tardiness June 22, 1990 - less than satisfactory annual performance rating Aug. 10, 1990 - letter of reprimand: lack of personal hygiene Dec. 5, 1990 - current incident/recommendation for dismissal 10. At the time of the December 5, 1990 incident, Gooden had accumulated 60 disciplinary points and was given 20 disciplinary points for this incident. By letter dated January 27, 1989, Gooden was advised that he had accumulated 60 points since September 23, 1988, and any further disciplinary action within a 2-year time frame may be grounds for dismissal.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered sustaining the action of the City Manager in dismissing Truman Gooden from his position as truck driver for the City of Clearwater. ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: TRUMAN GOODEN 1144 ENGMAN STREET CLEARWATER, FL 33615 CYNDI GOUDEAU, CLERK CITY OF CLEARWATER POST OFFICE BOX 4748 CLEARWATER, FL 34618-4748 MILES A. LANCE, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4748 CLEARWATER, FL 34618-4748
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and DER have stipulated to the following facts: Petitioner is the owner and developer of real property in Franklin County, Florida. 2. DER has adopted Rules 17-4.28(2), 17-4.28(8)(a) and 17-4.242(1)(a)2, Florida Administrative Code, which: require a permit for dredge and fill activities under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes; prohibit permitting of dredge and fill activities in Class II waters approved for shellfish harvesting by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (now the Department of Natural Resources); and require an affirmative public interest showing of an applicant for a license to construct a stationary installation in "Outstanding Florida Waters." These rules substantially affect Petitioner for the following reasons: Petitioner applied to DER for a development permit to dredge a navigation channel from his private canal into Alligator Harbor in Franklin County. The navigation channel was proposed to be 40 feet wide and 400 feet long, and was to be dredged to a depth of minus four (-4) feet mean low water, which would entail removing approximately 3,890 cubic yards of material. On May 28, 1980, DER issued an intent to deny the requested permit in file No. 19- 28442-1E. On June 11, 1980, Petitioner filed a petition for administrative hearing on DER's intent to deny his permit application. On June 12, 1980, DER informed Petitioner it would take no action on its Intent to Deny letter of May 28, 1980, for 60 days and allow Petitioner to submit additional information on the merits of his permit application during that period. DER took no further action regarding the Intent to Deny or Petitioner's permit application, and, after Petitioner's request, on March 5, 1981, DER forwarded the petition for administrative hearing filed with it on June 11, 1980, to the Division of Administrative Hearings. DER's Intent to Deny Petitioner's permit application stated DER had permitting jurisdiction under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and under Rule 17-4.28(2), Florida Administrative Code, because the proposed dredging would be in waters of the state within the definition contained in Rule 17-4.28(2), Florida Administrative Code. DER's Intent to Deny Petitioner's application asserted that Petitioner's proposed project was located in Class II waters approved for shellfish harvesting and that dredging in such areas was prohibited by Rule 17- 4.28(8)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DER's Intent to Deny Petitioner's application stated that Petitioner had not "affirmatively demonstrated that the proposed activity or discharge is clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 17-4.242(2). . . . The parties have agreed that the reference in the aforementioned quote should have been to Section 17-4.242(1)(a)2. Counsel for each of the parties have submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact are not contained in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues involved in this proceeding, or as not having been supported by evidence of record.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this action is the City of Clearwater, Florida, a municipality in the State of Florida which provides governmental services to the citizens within that community, to include police protection. It has among other powers, the power to hire and dismiss employees and in keeping with that authority, the City has enacted Ordinance No. 1831, pursuant to Chapter 21153, Special Laws of Florida, 1941. This ordinance deals with a career civil service system for employees of the City of Clearwater and it sets forth the rights which an employee would have if that employee had been accused of misconduct. A subunit within the City of Clearwater is the Clearwater Police Department which has rules and regulations which would apply to the employees within that Department. This case concerns charges placed by the Petitioner, City of Clearwater, against the Respondent, Danny Fivecoat, who held the position of Sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department on July 25, 1980. Those charges placed under the terms and conditions of a "Termination Dismissal Notice" which may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence, set forth the accusations as alluded to in the Issues statement of this Recommended Order. The termination and dismissal notice was placed against the Respondent on December 15, 1980, when he was relieved as a police officer and dismissed from employment with the City of Clearwater. This action was taken in keeping with the authority of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831 and pursuant to Rule 14, Section 6, Civil Service Rules of Clearwater, Florida. Subsequently, the Respondent attempted to explain and answer the charges and specification placed against him, but the explanation and answer were found to be insufficient by the appointing authority, City Manager, City of Clearwater, Florida, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831, Section 2-38, the Respondent requested a formal hearing to be held before the Division of Administrative Hearings. That formal hearing was held in keeping with the terms of the aforementioned ordinance and the agreement between the City of Clearwater and the Division of Administrative Hearings to provide a Hearing Officer for these matters. See also Subsection 120.65(6), Florida Statutes. The hearing in this cause was conducted on March 25, 1981. In July, 1980, while employed as a sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department, the Respondent was assigned as supervisor of a TAC unit. Within that unit were five (5) or six (6) subordinate officers to the Respondent. One of the duties of the TAC unit in July, 1980, concerned an effort to ascertain the identity of a person or persons who were suspected of committing the felony offenses of burglary and arson at a commercial premises now known as Gulf Branch Saloon and formerly known as Bobby Sands 60. This bar was located on State Road 60 within the corporate limits of the City of Clearwater, Florida. To apprehend the offenders, Fivecoat established a surveillance network in the area of the bar location. The rough details of that network may be seen as Employee's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence, which is a sketch, not to scale, depicting surveillance locations in July, 1980, and in particular, on July 25, through July 27, 1980. The numbers 1, 2 and 3 depict surveillance points of members of the TAC unit who were on foot. The word van indicates the location of the command post of the surveillance unit and in addition, there were two unmarked automobiles that were east and west of the location of the bar. These locations are not depicted with any particularity. The primary surveillance was being conducted by the three individuals shown by the numbers on Employee's Exhibit No. 6, with the idea being that from the three locations, the entire bar area could be surveilled. The van served as a command post and a rallying point for the officers on the surveillance team and was used as a location for taking breaks and meals while on the surveillance assignment. Those persons in the outlying surveillance posts would come to the van to take breaks and to have their meals after being relieved by Respondent and an Officer Adamson. Officer Adamson was assigned to drive the van and to assist Sergeant Fivecoat. The van itself was not equipped as a police unit per se, it was unmarked and did not have police emergency lights or sirens or communications equipment and was not designed for pursuit responsibility, although it had been used as mobile surveillance and on occasion, Officer Adamson had attempted to use it as a pursuit vehicle. The Respondent did not find it to be an appropriate pursuit vehicle, he did, however, feel that it could be used as mobile surveillance and as an apparatus for blocking suspects who were fleeing a scene of a crime in an automobile. The van had two front seats and other additional seating that had been placed there by arrangement of members of the TAC unit and it contained bicycles to be utilized for transportation in the area of a surveillance setting. The van was not primarily used for the surveillance, but it did allow a view of the west side of the subject bar and this observation was principally the assignment of Officer Adamson. On the evening of July 25, 1980, prior to setting up the surveillance operation alluded to herein, the Respondent and members of his unit went to a local restaurant in Clearwater, Florida, to have dinner and to discuss the plans of operation for that evening. While at the restaurant, the Respondent and one Kim Dubois, an employee in the State Attorney's Office which has jurisdiction in Clearwater, Florida, engaged in a conversation through which the woman Dubois determined that the surveillance activities were ongoing, specifically that the Respondent could be found in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler on State Road 60 later on that evening. In the course of this conversation, Fivecoat let it be known that it would be acceptable for Dubois to come to the stakeout and carry on a conversation while the surveillance was ongoing. Between 2:45 A.M. and 3:00 A.M., on July 26, 1980, Kim Dubois and one Diana Scanlan, another employee of the same State Attorney's Office, went to the location of the van in the Western Sizzler parking lot. At that time, the surveillance operations had been underway for a period of approximately an hour and forty-five minutes. The two women sat in their automobile and talked to Sergeant Fivecoat and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van. Fivecoat was on the passenger side of the van. At times the women were outside their car talking to the officers who remained in the van. Other officers who were on the surveillance team came to the van while the women were present and Officers other than Adamson and Fivecoat entered into conversation with the women. The two women remained in the area of the van engaging in a conversation until around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M., at which point they left the area of the surveillance and the members of the surveillance team left shortly thereafter. Nothing other than the conversation between the women and Respondent and other members of his team took place and no burglary or other incident occurred which required police intervention. Neither Fivecoat nor other members of his team asked the women to leave the area of their surveillance. While these events were going on, cars were operating on State Road 60 and at times, other persons were in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler eating establishment. None of the officers were wearing police uniforms on this occasion nor were they in uniform on the night of July 26, 1980, in the early morning hours of July 27, 1980. Again, in the early morning hours, around 2:45 to 3:00 A.M., July 27, 1980, the women came to the location of the van in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler where the Respondent and Officer Adamson were located. The surveillance team members were located in approximately the same positions as depicted in Employee's Exhibit No. 6. Initially, the women sat in their car and talked to the Respondent and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van, until the police officers ran out of soft drinks and the women departed and brought soft drinks back to the police officers in the van. The drinks were given to the officers and the women were allowed in the van, into the back part of that vehicle. While they were inside, the side cargo door remained open and no other matters transpired between the women and the police officers other than conversation between them. Sergeant Fivecoat never indicated that the women should not be in the van and the women were lead to believe that it was acceptable for them to be inside. The women remained in the van for approximately an hour and left the scene of the surveillance around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M. and the Respondent and members of his team concluded the surveillance shortly thereafter. Again, the pattern of traffic on State Road 60 and in the Western Sizzler parking lot was essentially the same as the evening and morning before and no criminal violation occurred which required the action of the police officers in the TAC unit. Had such activity occurred as was the expectation of sergeant Fivecoat, the members of the TAC team outside the van proper would have been primarily responsible for enforcement and he and Adamson were mostly responsible for relieving those officers during breaks. Nonetheless, Sergeant Fivecoat was the overall supervisor and responsible for the surveillance operation in question. On the second night and morning, other officers came to the van and entered into conversation with the women. On the second morning and evening, neither Sergeant Fivecoat nor any members of the TAC unit asked the women to leave the area of the surveillance. Sergeant Fivecoat knew that the presence of the two women at the TAC command post was in violation of the prohibition against their presence as set out in Rule 23, Rules and Regulations of the City of Clearwater Police Department.
Recommendation The Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence, is a compilation of fitness reports and other items related to the Respondent's performance as a police officer. These items are taken from the personnel file of the Respondent as administered by the Petitioner. With the exception of the incident occurring in June, 1977, related to a liaison of a sexual nature between the Respondent and a female which occurred in the months of March or April, 1977, for which the Respondent was given a ten-day suspension, the Respondent has not been disciplined in the past and has an acceptable record. The details of the other disciplinary action may be found in the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The actions of Sergeant Fivecoat, as set forth in this Recommended Order, related to the incident involving the two civilian females is reprehensible and having occurred with the knowledge of Sergeant Fivecoat that he was committing a violation is inexcusable. Nonetheless, it is not of such magnitude that it would warrant the ultimate imposition of the penalty of dismissal as would be contended for by the City Manager, City of Clearwater. Likewise, the recommendation of demotion from Sergeant to patrolman and a five (5) day suspension as made by the interim Police Chief would seem too lenient. Under the circumstances, the recommendation herein would be that Sergeant Danny J. Fivecoat be reduced in grade to patrolman and be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days to run from the entry of a final order in this cause. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1981.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Environmental Regulation (hereinafter "DER") issued a letter of "intent to issue" a permit based upon an application submitted by Respondent John H. Voorhees for a weedgate and associated fences to be placed at the mouth of the Hollerich Subdivision canal in Big Pine Key, Monroe County, Florida. The majority of owners of lots in the Hollerich Subdivision are in favor of the gate. The Hollerich Subdivision canal is approximately 1,200 feet long. it is an east-west dead-end canal with its mouth facing east. Floating seaweeds, grasses and detritus (a/k/a wrack are blown into the canal by the prevailing east and southeast winds. Although some surface wrack may blow back out of the canal with the occasional west wind, the sunken weeds will not. The accumulation of windblown wrack results in a stench caused by hydrogen sulfide gas from rotting weeds. The odor causes nausea, sore throats, and sneezing. Water quality tests of dissolved oxygen (DO) taken both in April 1985 and in November 1986 show the water in the canal to be below state standards. The low DO levels found in the canal are primarily due to the rotting weeds although the nutrients leaching from the surrounding yards also contribute to those low levels. The area outside the canal is better able to diffuse and absorb the wrack problem than the area inside the carnal. Accumulations of wrack outside the canal are more temporary and therefore produce less navigational difficulty and less deterioration of water quality. The navigational problems caused by weeds choking the canal range from difficulty in steering to poor visibility. The decaying wrack also causes growth on boat bottoms, can damage boat cooling systems, and turns the water in the canal red. The amount of wrack entering the canal and accumulating there has been increasing over the last five years. The proposed structure will stop wrack from entering the canal and will function as a weedgate. The design of the gate will not cause any navigational hazards, although the weedgate should have navigational aids to assure safety. Although the weedgate will not improve water quality in the canal so as to meet state standards, it will result in an improvement. DER has no jurisdiction to resolve property disputes. The proposed weedgate is to be placed in front of the canal with no on-land attachments, and Respondent Voorhees has given reasonable assurances that the proposed gate is not on privately owned property. The proposed structure will be placed in Class III Outstanding Florida Waters. DER has balanced the positive public interest effects that will accrue to the owners of property along the canal against the' negative public interest effects that may accrue to owners of property at the mouth of the canal. Respondent Voorhees has given reasonable assurances that the project will be clearly in the public interest. Respondent Voorhees has given reasonable assurances that the proposed project will meet all applicable DER rules and standards.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered (1), granting Respondent Voorhees' permit application and (2), authorizing the issuance of a permit subject to all permit conditions contained in the Department's letter of Intent to Issue the permit and also including the condition that no trespassing occur on the property at the mouth of the canal attendant to either the construction or the maintenance of the weedgate and associated fences. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 86-0599, 86-0600, 86-0601, 86-0954, and 86-0955 l. Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-5, 9, 10, 12-15, 17-20, the first and last sentences of 21, 23, 28, and 29 have been adopted in this Recommended Order either verbatim or in substance. The remainder of the Department's proposed findings have been rejected as follows: 6-8, 11 and 16, as being unnecessary for determination herein; the remainder of 21 and 22 as being immaterial to the issues herein; and 24-27 as being subordinate. 2. Respondent Voorhees' proposed findings of fact numbered l, 3, 8, and 13 have been adopted in this Recommended Order. The remainder of Voorhees' proposed findings of fact have been rejected as follows: 2 and 16 as being subordinate; 9 and 10 as being unnecessary; and 11, 12, 14 and 15 as not being supported by the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John H. Voorhees Route 1, Box 612 F Big Pine Key, Florida 33043 H. Ray Allen, Esquire 618 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Dale Twachtmann Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
