Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint filed against H. Ernest Morris, Sr. be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Carmine M. Bravo, Esquire 1450 State Road 434 Longwood, Florida 32750 Steven H. Coover, Esquire P. O. Drawer H Sanford, Florida 32771 Fred M. Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold R. Huff, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 0034049 DOAH NO. 83-3273 H. ERNEST MORRIS, SR. Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Respondent, at all times pertinent, was a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0314085. This license is currently under suspension as a result of disciplinary action by Petitioner. Respondent was, at all times pertinent, the President and a stock holder in D.S.A.E., Inc. D.S.A.E., in turn, was the owner (or co-owner with another corporation) of a tract of land located adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Broward County. Respondent, acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, sought buyers for segments 1/ of the U.S. 27 property. He had made earlier sales of other property to Mrs. Lottie Kay and her son Michael Kay, and contacted the former in October, 1980, regarding the U.S. 27 property. The D.S.A.E. tract was zoned B-3 (business) on that portion which fronted U.S. 27. The rear segments were zoned A-1 (limited agriculture) and did not front U.S. 27. Initially, Respondent mentioned segments being offered for $60,000 and $24,000. However, Lottie Kay indicated that she could not afford the higher priced segments (which were zoned B-3). Lottie Kay asked Respondent to show her the property, and a visit to the general area was made. However, Respondent told her they could not get to the property which he said was located "on the other side of the construction." After visiting the area, she was not aware of the actual location of her property or of its character. 2/ She continued to believe that the property was "right on" U.S. 27. She based this belief on Respondent's original sales presentation rather than her visit to the area. The segment she purchased is about one quarter of a mile from U.S. 27. Lottie Kay was also confused as to the zoning on the property. She believed it was "commercial" and does not recall being told of the agricultural zoning by Respondent until about a year after the purchase. Her son, Michael Kay, who was present during a part of Respondent's initial sales presentation, heard only the B-3 zoning mentioned. Since he was not present throughout the discussion, he could have missed Respondent's reference, which he claims to have made, to the agricultural zoning on the back segments. On October 8, 1980, Lottie Kay, as buyer, contracted with Respondent on behalf of D.S.A.E. and a third party corporation, as sellers, to purchase "Tract 14" for $24,000 on an "agreement for deed." Under the terms of the contract, Lottie Kay paid $4,000 down and was to pay $215.59 per month thereafter beginning in November, 1980. Lottie Kay made the monthly payments through 1983. When she missed her first two payments in 1984, Respondent offered to reduce the contract price by $2,000 if she would resume monthly payments and make up the missing payments. Lottie Kay agreed to this modification of the contract, but discontinued further payments in April, 1984. Lottie Kay bought this property for speculation in reliance on Respondent's claim that its value would increase substantially in the immediate future. Respondent showed her newspaper clippings which supported his claim that the general area was one of future growth. He predicted her segment would be worth at least $30,000 in one year and stated that as to possible appreciation, "The sky's the limit." Respondent did not, however, point out that Lottie Kay's property could not be resold for any use other than agriculture since her segment was too small for even a home site under the existing zoning. Respondent also neglected to advise her that the property was underwater much of the year, and would have to be filled and probably permitted before any development could take place. The testimony of a real estate appraiser called by Petitioner established that the property was worth about $750 when purchased by Lottie Kay in October, 1980. 3/ This valuation was based on the witness' study of nearby land sales over a period of years as well as his inspection of the area in which the Kay segment is located. Respondent attempted to establish a higher market value by producing various warranty deeds whereby he or his affiliates had sold similar segments to other buyers for amounts approximating that agreed to by Lottie Kay. These sales do not establish value but, rather, indicate the gullibility of other buyers in making such purchases. After she fell behind in her payments, Lottie Kay tried to resell her property through Respondent in reliance on his claim at the time of his initial sales presentation that he could resell it for her in one week. When requested to do so he was unable to produce any prospective buyer. Thus, there appears to be no real market for this property, other than that generated by Respondent in his initial sales campaign. Lottie Kay did not consult an attorney or have the land surveyed or appraised prior to contracting for the purchase. Rather, she trusted Respondent who she knew to be a real estate professional. She was also aware that he was an owner of the property, but still believed she could rely on his statements that the current market value of her segment was at least $24,000 and that future profits were assured. Respondent attacks the fairness of these proceedings on the alleged misconduct of Petitioner's investigator, who encouraged Lottie Kay to come forward after she (with the help of her son) had filed a complaint with Petitioner. The investigator made statements to the Kays which indicated his belief that Respondent was engaged in fraudulent land sales, and was a menace to the public. Although the investigator's statements to the Kays were gratuitous and inconsistent with his fact finding role, there is no indication that such statements resulted in any false testimony or other unreliable evidence. Respondent notes that Lottie Kay continued to make payments on her contract with Respondent even after she had filed a complaint with Petitioner and reasons that she must have considered the property a worthwhile investment. Lottie Kay demonstrated through her testimony and recitation of her dealings with Respondent that she is gullible and imprudent in financial matters. Thus, her continued investment of funds in this property indicated lack of prudence rather than an informed belief that the property had any substantial value.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of misrepresenting property value as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years to begin upon completion of his current license suspension period. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1984.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' applications for reimbursement from the Securities Guaranty Fund should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: These cases involve claims by Petitioners, Clyde and Patti Gallo (Case No. 98-3765) and Richard and Belinda Morin (Case No. 98-3766), for payment from the Securities Guaranty Fund (Fund) for monetary damages suffered as a result of violations of the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act by William Anthony McClure (McClure). When the violations occurred, McClure was a registered associated person employed by Schneider Securities, Inc. (Schneider), a Colorado corporation registered as a securities dealer in the State of Florida. The Fund is administered by Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance (Department), which must approve all applications for payment from the fund. Undisputed Facts Regarding the Gallo's Claim McClure served as manager for Schneider's branch office in Gainesville, Florida. On February 26, 1993, the Gallos deposited the sum of $213,978.10 with Schneider to open an account for investment purposes. McClure executed a Letter of Authorization dated March 18, 1993, for the transfer of $30,000.00 from the Gallo's brokerage account without the Gallo's authority. This money was then transferred to Buddy Miller, who paid McClure $5,000.00 for the delivery of the money. McClure subsequently obtained ratification of the transfer of monies from the Gallo's account by representing to Mr. Gallo that the transaction was a "factoring arrangement" and that the investment of monies would be "secure." McClure made the foregoing representations at a time when he knew that Miller was insolvent, that he was paying him a kickback, and that the money had already been transferred from the Gallo's account. McClure did not disclose this information to the Gallos. The Gallos lost the entire $30,000.00 appropriated by McClure from their account with Schneider. In February 1995, the Gallos filed a five-count complaint with the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit against McClure and Schneider. They also served a treble damage notice to McClure under Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. McClure did not make restitution within 30 days from receipt of notice in order to avoid liability for treble damages. In April 1996, the Gallos received the sum of $40,000.00 from Schneider in a mediated settlement. This amount covered their loss of principal. On August 19, 1996, an Amended Final Judgment awarded the Gallos the sum of $30,000.00 in compensatory damages. This amount was then trebled to $90,000.00 pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. The Amended Final Judgment subtracted the sum of $40,000.00 received from Schneider from the $90,000.00 in trebled damages for a total of $50,000.00 plus statutory interest of $9,999.00, or a total of $59,999.00 against McClure. On December 4, 1996, a Final Judgment awarded the Gallos the sum of $20,878.50 in attorney's fees and the sum of $1,312.06 in court costs against McClure. The parties agree that these amounts are not recoverable from the Fund. On July 11, 1998, the Gallos submitted a claim to the Department seeking to recover $10,000.00 of the treble damages they were awarded pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. This claim was denied by the Department on July 28, 1998, on the ground that a claimant cannot recover treble damages from the Fund. Undisputed Facts Regarding the Morin Claim In January 1993, Richard and Belinda Morin deposited the sum of $231,862.59 with Schneider to open an account for investment purposes. McClure was the account executive for Schneider who handled the Morin's brokerage account. In mid-March 1993, McClure contacted Mr. Morin to suggest an investment that he represented as being "secure" and "short-term." McClure described the investment to Morin as a "factoring security" of an account receivable of a major manufacturing concern that was secured by the guaranteed payment of the invoice. The investment suggested by McClure to Morin was really an unsecured loan to a small outdoor furniture manufacturer in Central Florida known as Cypress Originals (Cypress). Cypress was then in severe financial distress which fact was not disclosed to Morin by McClure. On March 5, 1993, or prior to the above discussion, McClure had forged Morin's signature on a Letter of Authorization for the transfer of $25,000.00 from the Morin's brokerage account with Schneider and forwarded the money to Cypress. In June 1993, McClure appropriated an additional $20,000.00 from the Morin's brokerage account into his own personal account or to an account owned and controlled by him. The Morins lost the entire $45,000.00 appropriated from their account. In February 1995, the Morins filed a five-count complaint in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit against McClure and Schneider. They also served a treble damage notice to McClure under Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. McClure did not make any restitution within thirty days after receipt of the notice in order to avoid liability for treble damages. In February 1997, the Morins received $45,000.00 from Schneider in a mediated settlement. This amount covered their loss of principal. On July 2, 1997, the Morins were awarded the sum of $45,000.00 in compensatory damages. This amount was trebled to $135,000.00 pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. The Final Judgment awarded the Morins the sum of $90,000 ($135,000.00 in trebled damages less $45,000.00 received from Schneider), prejudgment interest of $48,397.20, court costs of $9,001.67, and attorney's fees of $32,410.00 against McClure. The parties agree that the court costs and attorney's fees are not recoverable from the Fund. On June 11, 1998, the Morins submitted a claim with the Department seeking to recover $10,000.00 of the prejudgment interest award. On July 28, 1998, the Department issued its proposed agency action denying the claim on the ground that prejudgment interest cannot be recovered from the Fund. The Department's Interpretation and Practice The Department interprets the term "actual or compensatory damages," as used in Section 517.141(1), Florida Statutes, to mean only the principal amount of the loss by the investor. The Department has never approved a claim against the Fund for any damages other than the actual loss of principal. Under the Department's interpretation of "actual or compensatory damages," prejudgment interest and trebled damages would be excluded from being recovered from the Fund.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a Final Order denying the applications of Clyde and Patti Gallo and Richard and Belinda Morin for reimbursement from the Securities Guaranty Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Steven D. Spivy, Esquire 230 Northeast 25th Avenue Suite 200 Ocala, Florida 34470-7075 Margaret S. Karniewicz, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Suite 526, Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, III, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed August 30, 1990, and assigned DOAH Case No. 90-6107, Respondent alleged that Petitioner, as a licensed auction business, accepted the consignment of property from Ms. Erma Grant in April, 1988. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Petitioner failed to provide Ms. Grant a written agreement evidencing the consignment, as required by Section 468.388 for consignments involving property whose estimated value is over $500. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Petitioner failed to pay Ms. Grant the auction proceeds within 30 days of the auction. Based on the factual allegations set forth above, the Administrative Complaint charges that Petitioner violated Section 468.389(1)(j), which prohibits a violation of any statute, through the violation of Section 468.388 by failing to obtain a written consignment agreement; Section 468.389(1)(c), which prohibits the failure to account for or to pay, within a reasonable time not to exceed 30 days, money belonging to another which has come into the control of an auctioneer or auction business through an auction; and Section 468.389(1)(e), which prohibits conduct in connection with a sales transaction which demonstrates bad faith or dishonesty. Based on the alleged violations set forth above,the Administrative Complaint requests the Board of Auctioneers to enter a final order revoking or suspending Petitioner's license, imposing an administrative fine, issuing a reprimand, placing Petitioner on probation, and awarding other appropriate relief. Respondent predicated its allegations largely on a complaint that it received from Ms. Grant. By letter dated April 23, 1990, Ms. Grant recounted that she had advertised a moving sale in March or April, 1988. She reported that Petitioner contacted her and asked that she let him take everything to sell at an auction. Following the sale, she stated that she called Petitioner and consigned to him several items, including a davenport, china cabinet, a still- life picture, and two padded chairs. Ms. Grant charged in her letter that she did not hear from Petitioner following the consignment. Residing in Vermont, she returned to Florida in November, 1988, and immediately contacted Petitioner. She charged that Petitioner explained that he did not have the money, but thought that he had sent her a check. He reportedly promised to examine his records. Ms. Grant letter states that Ms. Grant returned to see Petitioner on March 6, 1989. The letter reads: "[Petitioner] had already told a cousin of mine that he had sent a check to me for $227. Some of my boys must have cashed it on me." It is unclear to whose "boys" the letter refers. Ms. Grant continued to pressure Petitioner for payment, according to the April 23 letter, but Petitioner refused to pay or show herrecords that he had already sent a check. Ms. Grant alleged that on April 11, 1989, Petitioner offered her $100. About a week later, Petitioner told her that he would be sending her a check for $50 and allegedly admitted that he had no copy of any prior check. Ms. Grant, who was 75 years old at the time and had recently been in poor health, ended her letter with a request for assistance and provided Respondent with her address in Vermont, to which she was returning in the next few days. Respondent opened a formal investigation shortly after receiving Ms. Grant's complaint. On June 4, 1990, Respondent's investigator contacted Ms. Grant, who stated that she had still not received anything from Petitioner. The following day, the investigator contacted Petitioner, who said that he could not remember accepting any property from Ms. Grant on consignment. They set up an appointment for June 6. On June 6, Ms. Grant telephoned the investigator and informed him that a friend of hers in Cocoa, Mr. Alcide Quesnel, had received a call from Petitioner, who offered him the sum of $200 to send to Ms. Grant. The investigator contacted Mr. Quesnel on the same day, and he confirmed that he had received from Petitioner the sum of $200 the prior evening to send to Ms. Grant. Mr. Quesnel explained that he had introduced Ms. Grant to Petitioner. Mr. Quesnel later tried to change his story by telling the investigator that Petitioner did not give him themoney. Instead, someone unknown to him put the money in his pocket and he assumed that it was for Ms. Grant because he had known that she and Petitioner had been having some problems. By letter dated June 9, 1990, Ms. Grant provided Respondent's investigator with a copy of the $200 check that she had received from Mr. Quesnel. She added that Mr. Quesnel had telephoned her on the evening of June 5 and informed her that Petitioner had given him the $200, she was to call the investigator and tell him that she had received the money, and Petitioner did not want a receipt. In addition to the interviews of Ms. Grant, Petitioner, and Mr. Quesnel, the investigator received an affidavit from Ms. Grant's sister, who swore that she witnessed Petitioner pick up the furniture from Ms. Grant's house in April, 1988. By internal memorandum dated December 31, 1990, a law clerk of Respondent advised the attorney handling DOAH Case No. 90-6107 that she did not believe that Respondent could prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was guilty of any violations of Chapter 468. Respondent served the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal the same day. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, Respondent is a state agency and initiated the underlying case giving rise to the present claim for attorneys' fees; Petitioner is a prevailing small business party; and the attorneys's fees and costs are reasonable as to those expended in connection with theunderlying case. The fees in connection with DOAH Case No. 90-6107 are $1920. There is no indication that Petitioner incurred any costs in connection with DOAH Case No. 90-6107.
The Issue The issues in this case are: Did the Respondent, Alix Aldonis (Mr. Aldonis), commit fraud; misrepresentation; concealment; false promises; false pretense; dishonest dealings by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence; or breach of trust in a business transaction by: (a) misrepresenting the sales price of real estate in a sale and purchase contract, (b) misrepresenting a commission amount in a sales and purchase contract, and (c) misrepresenting receipt by an escrow agent of a $5,000 deposit? Did Mr. Aldonis fail to obtain and retain written confirmation from the escrow agent of delivery of the Buyer's funds for purchase of the property?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the real estate industry in the State of Florida, under the authority of section 20.165, Florida Statutes (2010), and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes (2010). At all times material to this proceeding, the Department licensed Mr. Aldonis as a State of Florida real estate sales associate. He holds License Number SL-3117116, which is in effect until March 31, 2011. At all times material to this proceeding, Total Stop, Inc., d/b/a Total Stop Real Estate (Total Stop Real Estate), contracted with Mr. Aldonis to affiliate with it as a sales associate. At all times material to this proceeding, Lawrence Ligonde, of Total Stop Real Estate, was the licensed real estate broker with whom Mr. Aldonis was affiliated. Mr. Ligonde did not employ Mr. Aldonis. Currently, Mr. Aldonis is affiliated with Tropical Springs Realty, Inc. The agreement between Mr. Aldonis and Total Stop Real Estate did not provide for Total Stop Real Estate or Mr. Ligonde's receiving a percentage commission based on the price of sales that Mr. Aldonis made. Mr. Aldonis paid a flat fee of $495 to be affiliated with Mr. Ligonde. In 2006, Joseph Phen and Cheryl Phen listed a home that they owned, located at 3500 S.W. Viceroy Street, Port St. Lucie, Florida, for sale. They listed the property for $330,000. Ms. Phen was a real estate sales broker. She was the listing agent for the property. Mr. Aldonis represented a buyer in the sale of the Viceroy Street property. The buyer, Manuela Celestin, signed a Residential Sale and Purchase Contract for the property on August 2, 2006. Mr. and Ms. Phen signed the contract on August 3, 2006. They also initialed each page. The contract set forth a purchase price of $272,000. The contract also indicated that the buyer was providing a $5,000 deposit. Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of the contract and a copy of a deposit check by facsimile transmission. The record does not reveal the sequence of contract signing, contract transmission, check transmission, the date of the check transmission, or whether the contract was transmitted more than once to Ms. Phen. Due to conversations with Ms. Augustine at Premier Choice Title & Escrow, the escrow agent identified in the contract, Ms. Phen grew concerned about whether the deposit had been placed in escrow. She spoke to Ms. Augustine about her concerns. Ms. Phen also told Mr. Aldonis she was concerned that the deposit check may not have been deposited in an escrow account. After the conversation, Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of a check payable to Total Stop Real Estate from Charassard & Associates, P.A., for $5,000. "Phen/Celestin" is written in the "Memo" section of the check. The check bears the date August 6, 2006. Persuasive evidence does not establish if this was a copy of a second check or another copy of the check Mr. Aldonis transmitted earlier. Ms. Phen requested and received a copy of the Residential Sale and Purchase contract from the title company. The first page of this copy listed the sale price as $330,000. Although Ms. Phen testified about two HUD closing statements, the Department did not offer a copy of a HUD closing statement into evidence. The sale of the property occurred. The closing sale price was $272,000. The Department entered a second copy of the contract signed by the Phens and Ms. Celestin into evidence. The first page of the second contract reflected a sales price of $330,000. The initials at the bottom of the first page are not the initials of the Phens. The rest of the contract is identical to the contract signed by the Phens on August 3, 2006. Nothing in either contract provides for a four percent commission to be paid to any person or entity. There is no persuasive evidence indicating who created the second contract or how the title company obtained it. Mr. Ligonde testified that the contract with the higher purchase price "looks like" the one Mr. Aldonis provided him. The contracts "look" the same. Only a very close examination would identify the differences in the initials on the first page. The difference in amounts is more obvious, but it still requires a reading of the contract, not just looking at it, to note the different amount. Mr. Ligonde did not testify that the second contract entered into evidence came from his files. He also did not provide any information about how files are maintained at his business or who has access to them. He did not know when the contract arrived at his office or how. In addition, Mr. Ligonde's statement that a document "looks like" one provided him by Mr. Aldonis does not equate to testimony that the document is in fact the document Mr. Aldonis provided. At some point in the transaction, the employees of Mr. Ligonde's office, the employees of a title insurance company, and the employees of a mortgage broker had possession and control of the sales contract or a copy of it. The Department did not present credible, persuasive evidence that ruled out any of those individuals having created the new page one with the $330,000 sales price.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S John D. C. Newton, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2011.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Juan C. Chavarriaga, committed the violations alleged in a four-count Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, on January 17, 2008, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his Florida real estate broker associate license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the “Division”), is an agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, and charged with the responsibility for the regulation of the real estate industry in Florida pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Juan C. Chavarriaga, is, and was at the times material to this matter, the holder of a Florida real estate broker associate license, license number 3130017, issued by the Division. At all times relevant, Mr. Chavarriaga was employed as a real estate associate with Ocampo & Alvarez Realty LLC. On or about March 30, 2006, Mr. Chavarriaga rented real property (hereinafter referred to as the “Subject Property”) to Carlos Alvarez for an annual lease amount of $18,000.00 or $1,500.00 per month (Pre-hearing Stipulation). The Subject Property was rented pursuant to a Residential Lease for Single Family Home and Duplex agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Lease”) which was entered into on or about March 30, 2006 (Petitioner’s Exhibit 5). Mr. Chavarriaga, according to an admission he made to Veronica Hardy, a Division investigator, received rent paid for the rental of the Subject Property pursuant to the Lease. According to an admission of Mr. Chavarriaga, the Subject Property was owned by Claudia Mejia. Mr. Chavarriaga’s real estate broker employer was unaware of the Lease or Mr. Chavarriaga’s involvement therein. The Lease was entered into without written permission from Ms. Mejia, according to another admission of Mr. Chavarriaga. The evidence failed to prove, however, that Ms. Mejia was unaware of the Lease or that she had not verbally authorized Mr. Chavarriaga to rent the Subject Property on her behalf. Mr. Chavarriaga also admitted to Ms. Hardy that he received rents pursuant to the Lease which were deposited with a company named Maux Management. What Maux Management is was not proved. Nor was it proved that Mr. Chavarriagag owned Maux Management. As to what was done with moneys received pursuant to the Lease, the only competent substantial evidence again consists of an admission by Mr. Chavarriaga: he told Ms. Hardy that the rents were deposited with Maux Management, which then paid part of the proceeds for reasonable expenses related to the Lease and deposited the remainder in the account of Ms. Mejia.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate: Dismissing Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint; Finding that Mr. Chavarriaga is guilty of the violation alleged in Counts III and IV of the Administrative Complaint; and Suspending Mr. Chavarriaga’s real estate associate license for a period of one year and requiring that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this day of 8th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Alan A. Glenn, Esquire 14629 Southwest 104 Street, No. 432 Miami, Florida 33186 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N802 Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact On September 19, 1974 Eleanor Van Treese, as agent for Futrell Company, obtained a listing on a residence located at 12250 S. W. 67th Avenue in Miami, Florida from Newton J. Mulford and Elizabeth N. Mulford, the record owners of said property. A copy of this sales management agreement was admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 1. Thereon was shown one existing mortgage with Coral Gables Federal, with a balance of approximately $47,500. At the time the Mulfords executed Exhibit number 1, a second mortgage in the amount of some $25,000 was also recorded against this property and foreclosure proceedings had been instituted. The holder of the second mortgage was James V. O'Connor. George Bender, a Miami attorney, was aware that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against this property prior to the time that Futrell obtained the listing agreement. He called Mulford to inquire about purchasing the property, but apparently his offer was not high enough to interest Mulford. After the Futrell sign was placed in front of the house, Mrs. Capps met Mrs. George Bender at a social affair. When Mrs. Bender learned that Mrs. Capps was a real estate salesperson working for Futrell Company, she asked if she would show her the Mulford house. In late November or early December Mrs. Bender was shown the house and thereafter her husband also was shown the premises. On January 2, 1975 a final judgment of foreclosure was entered in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial District of Florida. Therein the court found that James V. O'Connor was the holder of a second mortgage on the premises in the principal sum of $25,000 together with interest accrued thereon from August 15, 1970 in the amount of $12,976.34. The court also awarded O'Connor $500 as a reasonable attorney's fee. The judgment further provided that the defendant, O'Connor, or any of the parties to the suit, may become bidders for purchase of the premises at the forthcoming sale thereof; and that the court would retain jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of entertaining a Motion for Deficiency Judgment and "settle all other questions under the proceedings not settled by this order." O'Connor thereafter called Eleanor Van Treese to advise her that he had obtained the foreclosure order and that he would bid on the property when the judicial sale was held on the 15th of January. He further advised that he was anxious to turn over the property and get his money out of it. Mrs. Van Treese telephoned Mary Capps on January 10, 1975 to advise her of the information she had received from O'Connor. Not understanding the legal implication thereof Mrs. Capps decided that she should come to Mrs. Van Treese's house and the two of them talk to O'Connor regarding the property. This was done; and, with the two salespersons on the telephone with O'Connor, he read to them the judgment that he had obtained; advised them that he would be bidding on the property on January 15th and expected to purchase same; and that he would consider offers to purchase the property from him. Mrs. Capps, that same evening, called Mrs. Bender to advise that O'Connor was going to bid on the property on January 15th and was interested in selling the property. When Mr. Bender came home, Mrs. Bender and he discussed the purchase of the property and decided to submit an offer. Mrs. Bender so advised Mrs. Capps. The following morning, on Saturday, January 11th, Mr. and Mrs. Bender sent to the Futrell Company office and Mrs. Capps typed an offer to Purchase the property which the Benders executed. This was the deposit receipt and sales purchase agreement dated January 11, 1975 admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 2. While at the office Mr. Bender called another attorney, William A. Friedlander, who he considered to be more knowledgeable in real estate transactions than himself, for legal advice in the premises. Friedlander advised him that it was proper to submit an offer to O'Connor although O'Connor did not have present title and was therefore unable to execute a valid deed for the property until after he purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Friedlander considered the contract would be based upon a condition subsequent, viz: the acquisition of title by O'Connor, and such contract would be enforceable. Friedlander was also aware that several judgments had been entered against Mulford and that Mulford would be unable to execute a contract and deliver clear title at the amount Bender was offering. This was so because the sum of first mortgage, second mortgage, real estate commission, and other judgments that had been entered against Mulford exceeded the amount Bender was offering to pay for the residence. He advised Bender that, if the foreclosure suit had joined all necessary parties, the deed obtained by O'Connor at the foreclosure sale would be good and O'Connor would be able to give a good and merchantable title. He further advised Bender that a contract with Mulford would have been futile due to the amount of the offer and unworkable due to the short period of time before the foreclosure sale in which to obtain the cash necessary to provide Mulford sufficient funds to pay off all his creditors and the mortgages. At the time the Benders executed the contract for the purchase of the residence in question it was their intention that the offer be presented only to O'Connor. Mary Capps presented this offer by the Benders (Exhibit 2) to O'Connor who accepted same on January 11, 1975. The $6,000 earnest money deposit was delivered by Mrs. Capps to the Secretary of the Futrell Company for deposit in the Futrell Escrow Account. No evidence was presented that the earnest money deposit has ever been refunded to the Benders or that they have requested this earnest money deposit to be refunded. Mr. and Mrs. Mulford were not advised of the existence of the offer to purchase dated January 11, 1975 until long after O'Connor purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, including the admissions made by Respondent in the Joint Response to Pre-Hearing Order, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent was a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson. Since June of 2002, Respondent has been a Florida- licensed real estate broker. Respondent is a convicted felon as a result of a single felony conviction. 3/ In 2000, Respondent was involved in a real estate transaction in which he was the buyer. The property that was the subject of the transaction was located at 119 Hammocks Drive in West Palm Beach, Florida. The transaction was closed through a title company, Cypress Title Company (Cypress). The closing took place on May 15, 2000. Cypress was represented at the May 15, 2000, closing by Susan Anderson, a marketing representative with Cypress who conducted closings (approximately five or six a month) as part of her job responsibilities. Ms. Anderson had two years experience conducting closings at the time of the May 15, 2000, closing. At each closing at which she represented Cypress, Ms. Anderson was responsible for, among other things, collecting the funds necessary to effectuate the closing and making the appropriate disbursements. It was Ms. Anderson's routine practice, before turning a closing file over to Cypress' "post closer" following a closing, to "make sure [that] everything [that needed to be in the file was] there." Prior to the May 15, 2000, closing, Respondent was contacted by "someone from Cypress" and instructed to bring to the closing a cashier's check in the amount of $3,684.64 made payable to himself. Respondent was advised that the $3,684.64 represented an "estimate" of the amount he needed to pay from his own funds to close the transaction. On May 15, 2000, prior to the time of the closing, Respondent went to Bank United, where he had an account, and purchased a cashier's check in the amount of $3,684.64 made payable to himself, as he had been instructed to do. Respondent brought the cashier's check to the closing. At the closing, Respondent endorsed the check with his signature, underneath which he wrote, in accordance with his routine practice when endorsing checks, the number of his account at Bank United. He then handed the cashier's check to Ms. Anderson. The actual amount due from Respondent was $3,670.04, $14.64 less than the amount of the cashier's check. Accordingly, Ms. Anderson gave Respondent a check for $14.64. Following the closing, Ms. Anderson examined the closing file (in accordance with her routine practice). In doing so, it did not "come to [her] attention that the [cashier's] check [that Respondent had brought to the closing] was not there." After conducting such an examination, she gave the closing file to the "post-closer." The cashier's check that Respondent had given to Ms. Anderson at the May 15, 2000, closing was cashed at Bank United on May 17, 2000, by someone other than Respondent or Ms. Anderson. Pursuant to Bank United policy, "[o]nly the payee can cash [a cashier's] check." Bank United tellers are supposed to ask for a "picture ID" when a cashier's check is presented for cashing. There have been tellers at the bank, however, who have not followed this policy and, as a result, have been counseled or disciplined. 4/ Approximately, two months after the May 15, 2000, closing, Cypress' owner approached Ms. Anderson and told her that there was no proceeds check from Respondent in the closing file. Ms. Anderson was asked to contact Respondent to inquire about the matter, which she did. Respondent was initially "very cooperative." He gave Ms. Anderson his "account number [at Bank United] and [the name of a person] to call at the bank." Using the information Respondent had provided, Ms. Anderson was able to obtain a copy of the cashier's check that Respondent had given to Ms. Anderson at the closing and that subsequently had been cashed at Bank United. Kevin Wilkinson, an attorney acting on behalf of Cypress, also contacted Respondent. Mr. Wilkinson's tone, in Respondent's view, was accusatory and threatening. Respondent's response to Mr. Wilkinson's "aggressive[ness]" was to stop cooperating with Cypress.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the instant Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2003.
