The Issue Whether the Petitioner owes sales and/or use tax as set forth in the Respondent's Notice of Decision dated May 12, 2008, and, if so, the amount that is owed.
Findings Of Fact The following facts were included in the stipulation of facts included in the parties' Joint Prehearing Statement: Bests is a domestic corporation headquartered in Broward County, Florida. Bests is a cleaning and maintenance company. The company contracts with customers to clean non-residential buildings only. The majority of the customers are government agencies and state colleges. The company hires subcontractors for some of the services such as pressure cleaning, window cleaning, grounds maintenance and landscaping. The Department is the agency of state government authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. § 213.05, Fla. Stat. (2008).1 The Department is authorized to prescribe the records to be kept by all persons subject to taxes under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Such persons have a duty to keep and preserve their records, and the records shall be open to examination by the Department or its authorized agents at all reasonable hours, pursuant to Section 212.12(6), Florida Statutes. The Department is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers and to request information to ascertain their tax liability, if any, pursuant to Section 213.34, Florida Statutes. On October 3, 2005, the Department initiated an audit of Bests to determine whether Bests was properly collecting and remitting sales and use tax to the Department. The audit period was from September 1, 2002, through August 31, 2005. The audit determined liability existed in four areas2: Exhibit A01 - cleaning contracts for which documentation supporting the claimed exempt nature of the transaction could not be produced; Exhibit B01 - paper products and hand soaps purchased by Bests in performance of the facility custodial service contract with Florida Atlantic University; Exhibit B02 - items purchased by Bests for general use in the operation of its business, such as office supplies, automobile and truck expenses, repair and maintenance to equipment, computer services, etc. Only the amount assessed in Exhibit B01 is at issue. On July 26, 2006, the Department sent Bests its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes ("NOI"), with schedules, showing that Bests owed to the Department additional sales and use tax in the amount of $195,540.35, penalty in the amount of $41,885.11, and interest through July 27, 2006, in the amount of $41,514.08, making a total assessment in the amount of $285,939.54. Additional documentation was provided by Bests, resulting in revisions to the NOI. On January 16, 2007, the second and final revised NOI was issued. The amount of sales and use tax due had been adjusted to $47,473.46 and interest in the amount of $12,536.88. The penalty amount was waived in its entirety. On January 25, 2007, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment. Bests timely filed a written protest of the Department's proposed assessment. On May 12, 2008, the Department issued the Notice of Decision ("NOD") in response to the protest by Bests, sustaining the assessment in its entirety. By check dated July 9, 2008, Bests remitted $12,500.00 to the Department to be applied to the assessment found in Exhibits A01 and B02. The following facts are based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding: On May 1, 2003, Florida Atlantic University issued a Request for Proposal ("RFP") for facility custodial services at its Boca Raton, Florida, campus. Section 5 of the General Conditions of the RFP, advised that it was "a public corporation of the State of Florida [that] does not pay Federal Excise or Sales taxes on direct purchases of services."3 Florida Atlantic University has been considered a tax-exempt entity for the purposes of this proceeding. Section 3.0.0 of the RFP described the scope of work covered by the RFP, and, in general, required that the contractor be "fully responsible for providing services called for in this RFP."4 The scope of work described for restrooms and locker rooms included cleaning, polishing, washing, dusting, mopping, and scrubbing, and, pertinent to this case, the contractor was specifically required to "[e]mpty waste receptacles and change liner," and "[r]estock dispensers: soap, paper towel, toilet tissue and sanitary napkins."5 Section 4.4.8 of the RFP specified the supplies that were to be furnished by the contractor: Services shall include all equipment, supplies and materials to include liquid hand soap of a bactericidal type, paper towels, toilet tissue, toilet seat covers, sanitary napkins, wax bags, plastic bags for waste paper baskets, all cleaners, waxes, deodorants and other cleaning materials to perform the contract services. . . . * * * Contractor shall be responsible for keeping soap, paper towel, sanitary napkin and toilet tissue dispensers adequately filled at all times. * * * SUPPLIES AND MATERIALS All product selection and usage must be approved by the Director. Minimally, the following products are used (no equivalents without the approval of the Director): Johnson Softcare Multi-fold Natural Scott Towels JRT/JRT Escort Tissue Merfin paper towel rolls . . .[6] Section 4.5.0 of the RFP specified the cleaning standards that must be met by the contractor. Pertinent to this proceeding, general cleaning standards for restrooms included the following requirements: d. Dispensers & Receptacles - All supply dispensers shall be filled. . . . Waste receptacles shall be emptied and supply dispensers shall be refilled. . . . All toilet stalls shall be furnished with toilet seat cover dispensers. The Contractor shall be responsible for maintaining them and making certain that they are properly stocked at all times.[7] Finally, Section 1 of the "Special Conditions" portion of the RFP provides: Florida Atlantic University's Physical Plant Department ("Department") requires the services of a Facilities Services Contractor to provide Facility Custodial Services at a firm square foot price for cleaning services in designated buildings on FAU's Boca Raton Campus. FAU is also requesting unit prices to enable adding additional areas to the contract, and per man-hour prices for adding additional staffing services to the contract as needed.[8] Section 9(d) of the "Special Conditions" portion of the RFP provides with respect to contract service costs: "This RFP seeks firm pricing for facilities management services on both existing and future buildings. The fixed fee will be broken down as indicated on the forms. Charges for additional services will be provided on the forms as unit prices."9 The Contract Services Costs form to be submitted with proposals is found in Section 5.3.1 of the RFP, and the instructions provide: "The below listed annual fixed costs are quoted for the provision of necessary management, supervision, labor, material, supplies, equipment, vehicles, and all related items to perform the work described in the Scope of Work and Specifications contained herein and as related to the initial areas of coverage. "10 Bests was awarded the contract for custodial services at the Boca Raton campus, and Florida Atlantic University entered in the Agreement for Services, with services to begin on August 9, 2003, and end on June 30, 2006. In the agreement, Bests agreed to provide custodial services in accordance with the provisions of the RFP, and it agreed to be "responsible to provide all material, labor, equipment and supplies necessary to provide custodial and cleaning services for designated buildings on Florida Atlantic University's Boca Raton Campus."11 The agreement also provided that the total amount payable under the agreement would not exceed $3,500,000.00, with the amount "determined in accordance with the Vendor's price proposal dated May 29, 2003, incorporated and attached herein as Attachment A, and based on estimated usage." Bests calculated the total annual cost to include on the Contract Service Costs form, first, by examining the buildings included in the RFP and calculating the annual cost per square foot of providing the cleaning and maintenance services specified in the RFP. Bests separately calculated the annual cost of the paper products and hand soap to be used to fill the restroom dispensers by examining demographic data about the users of the restroom facilities, as well as the hours of usage, and added it to the annual cost per square foot of providing the services specified in the RFP to arrive at its total annual costs. Bests purchases the paper supplies and soap used to fill the restroom dispensers from a supplier, who delivers the supplies directly to the storage room at the Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton campus used by Bests to store their cleaning materials and supplies. These paper products are used by Bests to refill the restroom dispensers, as required by the RFP. The Department set forth the facts and legal grounds on which it based it assessment of use tax for the paper products and soap used to fill the restroom dispensers in the Notice of Decision dated May 12, 2008, in which it concluded "that the taxpayer is the ultimate consumer [of the paper products and hand soap] and therefore liable for use tax on all taxable cleaning supplies."12 The Department based this conclusion on the following reasoning: "As shown, the laws governing sales and use tax makes [sic] the purchaser obligated to pay a use tax at the moment taxable goods and services are purchased for its own use. Take toilet tissue, paper towels, feminine napkins and hand soap for instance. These items are purchased by the taxpayer, removed from their container by the taxpayer, then unwrapped from the original packaging and placed in service by placing them in paper towel holders or toilet tissue holders located in the area being cleaned (e.g. restroom) by the taxpayer. At no time during the term of the agreement does the taxpayer's customer know the quantity of items used, nor does the taxpayer's customer personally handle these items. The taxpayer takes issue with these items being subject to use tax because the taxpayer does not personally dispose of these items. . . . [I]t is not the ultimate act resulting in the disposal of the items that triggers the tax. It is the taxpayer's use during the cleaning process that makes the taxpayer the ultimate consumer.[13] Summary The evidence establishes that the services Bests agreed to perform under the Agreement for Services with Florida Atlantic University included cleaning the restrooms in the buildings covered by the agreement, refilling the restroom dispensers, and providing the paper products and soap to be used in refilling the restroom dispensers. The evidence establishes that, taken in the context of the RFP as a whole, the purchase of the paper products and soap supplies is incidental to the main purpose of Bests agreement with Florida Atlantic University, which is to provide custodial services. The Department's contention that the paper products and soap used to refill the restroom dispensers at the Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton campus are cleaning supplies taxable to Bests is rejected. The cleaning supplies taxable to Bests are such things as mops, brooms, sweepers, cleaning agents, chemical, solvents, and rags, that it uses and consumes in performing cleaning services for Florida Atlantic University, and Bests does not contest the tax assessment on such items. Bests did not use or consume the paper products and soap, or otherwise exercise the rights of ownership over these products, simply because its employees removed them from the room in which they were stored, removed them from their packaging, and placed them in the restroom dispensers. Bests never exercised any rights of ownership over the products at issue, and the Department's contention that the taxable event in this case occurred when "the items were delivered to Bests and Bests put those items into operation" is rejected.14 First, the evidence establishes that delivery of the paper products and soap was made to a storage room on the Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton campus and that Bests left in the storage room the paper products and soap remaining at the time the Florida Atlantic University contract was complete. Second, Bests did not consume or use the products simply by placing them in the restroom dispensers. Placing them in the dispensers was part of custodial service Bests provided under the agreement with Florida Atlantic University; the mere fact that Bests was required as part of its Agreement for Services with Florida Atlantic University to purchase the paper products and soap did not render Bests the user or consumer of the products. Rather, the evidence establishes that Florida Atlantic University provided the paper products and soap for the use of its students and staff, both for sanitation purposes and for the convenience and comfort of its students and staff. Florida Atlantic University, therefore, used the paper products and soap as part of the business of operating a university, and, were it not for its tax-exempt status, Florida Atlantic University would be responsible for paying Florida's sales and use tax on the paper products and soap. Finally, the Department's contention that Bests did not "sell" the paper products and soap to Florida Atlantic University because they were not separately priced in its proposal or separately listed in the invoices submitted to Florida Atlantic University is rejected. The RFP pursuant to which Bests submitted its proposal specifically required that the total cost of providing the cleaning services and supplies, including the paper products and soap used to fill the restroom dispensers, were to be included on the Contract Service Costs form, and the evidence establishes that Bests asked Florida Atlantic University if it could invoice the paper products and soap separately and was told that they could not.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order withdrawing the sales and use tax assessment against Bests Maintenance and Janitorial Services, Inc., for the audit period extending from September 1, 2002, through August 31, 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure by endorsement, pursuant to Section 489.115, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact On or about April 4, 2003, Petitioner applied for a certified plumbing contractor's license by endorsement. Applicants who seek a licensure by endorsement must have passed an examination that is substantially equivalent to the examination given in Florida or hold a license in another state or territory of the United States where the criteria for issuance of the license is substantially equivalent to Florida's criteria. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was licensed or certified as a plumber in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. For the purpose of his application for licensure by endorsement, Petitioner submitted information to the Board regarding the examination he took in Georgia. Petitioner was not precluded from submitting information regarding the examinations he took in Alabama and Tennessee. However, Petitioner submitted the information regarding the examination he took in Georgia because it was the one he had taken most recently. Georgia gives three different plumbing examinations and issues three different plumbing licenses. One examination is for a journeyman's license. Another examination is for a Class I restricted plumbing license. Still, another examination is given for a Class II unrestricted plumbing license. In order to obtain his plumbing license in Georgia, Petitioner successfully completed the Class I Restricted Georgia Examination (Georgia Examination). Florida issues only one certified plumbing contractor's license and that license is the equivalent of Georgia's Class II unrestricted plumbing license. To meet the examination requirement for licensure as a plumber in Florida, an applicant must successfully complete the Certification Examination for Plumbing Contractors (Florida Examination or Certification Examination for Plumbing Contractors). Stephen Allen, a psychometrician employed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, evaluated the Georgia Examination to determine if it were substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination. In determining whether the Georgia Examination and the Florida Examination were substantially equivalent, Mr. Allen considered and compared the material covered; the emphasis placed on various topics; the actual content of the examinations; the general characteristics of the examination; the number of questions; the amount of time allowed to complete the examination; the weight given to various areas or categories of the examinations; and the method of measuring knowledge in the various content areas. Based on a comprehensive review and analysis of the Georgia Examination and the Florida Examination, Mr. Allen properly determined that the Georgia Examination was not substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination. The area in which the examinations are significantly different is the isometric area or category. First, the relative weight on the isometric area of the examinations varies greatly. On the Florida Examination, the weight given to the isometric area is 31 percent. On the Georgia Examination, the weight given to the isometric area is, at most, only 6 percent. Second, the knowledge of isometrics is measured differently on the examinations. The Florida Examination requires that the candidate demonstrate knowledge of isometrics by having the candidate draw five different isometric drawings, which show the room's plumbing based on the fixtures to be installed. The five drawings are graded on legibility, orientation, flow, angles, piping, labeling, and vents. The Georgia Examination is a multiple choice examination and measures knowledge of isometrics by the candidate's selecting the correct answer from four possible answers. The Georgia Examination successfully completed by Petitioner to obtain his master plumber's restricted license is not substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination. Petitioner is ineligible for licensure by endorsement because the examination he took in Georgia is not substantially equivalent to the Florida Examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William Lantrip 927 Lakewood Drive Dunedin, Florida 34698-7218 Timothy Vaccaro, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Ms. Terry Vandell was presented by the Southwest Florida Water Management District and sworn as a witness. Ms. Vandell was qualified and accepted as an expert hydrogeologist employed by the District. Included within Ms. Vandell's responsibilities to the District were evaluation of the subject application. An application for consumptive use permit has been filed, in proper form by the City of New Port Richey and this application was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. The water source is am existing well located on 2 acres, Pasco County, Florida, as described in Exhibit 1. The water is to be used by the City of New Port Richey for their public water supply. The maximum daily withdrawal sought is 1,000,000 gallons and the average daily withdrawal sought is 500,000 gallons. Proper notice of this proceeding and application has been given to all persons entitled there to by statute and rule. Mr. Rick Pottberg, appearing in opposition to the application, testified that he had lived in the Pasco County area on a temporary basis from 1955 to 1961 and had lived in the area continuously from 1961 until 1975. Mr. Pottberg was President of Pottberg Agricultural, Enterprises, a large land owner immediately north of the well site. Mr. Pottberg is also a member of the Florida Cattlemen's Association Environmental Committee. Mr. Pottberg testified that over the last ten years there has been a reduction in flow of streams within the area and that many existing ponds had dried up or their water level had dropped during this period. The lack of water had caused the pasture grasses to become impoverished and lowered the number of cattle that could be supported on an acre of land. Mr. Pottberg testified that the few wells existing on his property were used for individual water requirements, but not used to water pastures or to water livestock raising therefrom. Ms. Vandell testified that none of the matters set forth in Subsection 16J-2.11(2), (3), and (4), F.A.C. except that the use exceeded the water crop of the land exist so as to require the denial of the permit. Ms. Vandell testified that during the last ten years there has been a climatic drought in which the average rainfall has been less in eight of the years than the average rainfall computed over a period of time beginning in the 1800's. Ms. Vandell further testified that the major concern with regard to granting the application was the possibility of salt water intrusion. To provide an early warning of such intrusion it was recommended that the applicant agreed to establish a salt water intrusion monitoring system as outlined in Exhibit 1. Ms. Vandell further testified that the intended purpose of this well was to meet peak needs and that as the City of New Port Richey's Starkey Well Field came on line, that this well would be used solely for that purpose. Ms. Vandell testified that the studies regarding the use of the well, however, had been based upon it continuous use. She also testified that recharge of waters `used at this time was economically not feasible with regard to the one well, but that it was good water management practice to shift the source of water for the City of New Port Richey to the east in the area of the Starkey Well Field and to abandon the wells currently in use near the coast. This practice would prevent salt water intrusion in the coastal region. The consumptive use of waters by the City of New Port Richey applied for would be reasonable and beneficial, would be consistent with the public interest, and would not interfer with any legal use of the water existing at the time of the application. A letter of objection from Mr. Ronald D. McCall representing Mr. Pottberg was received as Exhibit 2.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Board waive the provisions of Section 16J- 2.11(3), F.A.C., and further that Application No. 7500027 submitted by the City of New Port Richey, City Hall, 320 East Main Street, New Port Richey, Florida, be granted for a maximum daily withdrawal of 1,000,000 gallons and an average daily withdrawal of 500,000 gallons subject to the conditions recommended by the District Staff of a salt water intrusion monitoring system in Exhibit 1. Entered this 5th day of August, 1975, inn Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. T. Ahern, Esquire Staff Counsel Southwest Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33501 Ronald D. McCall, Esquire F0WLER, WHITE, GILLEN, HOGGS, VILLAREAL and BANKER, P.A. Post Office Box 143B Tampa, Florida 33601 Mr. William Maytum City Councilman City of New Port Richey New Port Richey, Florida
The Issue Whether existing Rule 21F-20.009, Florida Administrative Code, is, as a matter of law, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact There were no findings of fact to be made.
The Issue Whether Petitioner North Fort Myers Homeowners Association, Inc. (Homeowners) participated in DOAH Case No. 91-6436 for an improper purpose.
Findings Of Fact On September 11, 1991, Homeowners filed its Petition for Administrative Hearing and Request to Consolidate with Administrative Hearing set for November 7, 1991. The Petition alleged that Homeowners' interests would be adversely affected by Bradley's request for a permit for construction of a wastewater collection system that it planned to connect to Florida Cities Water Company's Sewage Treatment Plant. It was further alleged that Florida Cities current violations of federal water quality standards would increase as a result of such a connection. Bradley responded to the Petition by filing a Motion to Dismiss for failure to State a Claim/Or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 31, 1991, Hearing Officer Quattlebaum granted Bradley's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Hearing Officer found that the Petition did not allege that the application for a wastewater collection system permit failed to comply with the agency's relevant rules and criteria. The Hearing Officer also ruled that the Petition did not identify when such criteria would be unmet by the project. Homeowners was given leave of ten days to file an Amended Petition. Homeowners timely filed its Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing on November 13, 1991. This Amended Petition continued to focus upon whether Bradley's wastewater collection system should connect to Florida Cities Water Company's Sewage Treatment Plant and the federal water quality issue as it relates to discharge after treatment. After Bradley filed its Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition and Homeowners replied, Hearing Officer Quattlebaum entered a Recommended Order of Dismissal on December 12, 1991. The basis for the recommendation was that Homeowners had "failed to allege that the application for permit failed to comply with the relevant criteria as set forth in statute and rule which govern issuance of the permit." The Temporary Operating Permit under which Florida Cities was operating expressly allowed Bradley's wastewater collection system to connect to the sewage treatment plant upon satisfaction of the Department's permitting requirements for such a collection system. Homeowners lost its opportunity to address whether such a connection was proper when it failed to timely challenge this Temporary Operating Permit. The only agency action subject to challenge in this case was whether Bradley's application to construct the wastewater collection system complied with the Department's permitting requirements for the system. Florida Cities anticipated actions were irrelevant to this particular proceeding because final agency action had already been taken on the question of whether the connection could take place. Throughout this proceeding, Homeowners failed to comprehend that it had waived its opportunity to pursue a challenge to the connection of Bradley's wastewater collection system to the sewage treatment plant when it did not timely challenge Florida Cities' Temporary Operating Permit. The Order granting Bradley's Motion to Dismiss dated October 31, 1991, did not affirmatively set forth that the connection issue could not be pursued in DOAH Case No. 91-6436. Homeowners' lack of comprehension on this issue remains evident in the Amended Petition, the Motion for Reconsideration filed after the Recommended Order of Dismissal, the Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees and the testimony presented at hearing. Lack of comprehension is a neutral condition which neither proves nor disproves that the Petition and Amended Petition were filed for improper purposes, as defined by Subsection 120.59(6)(e), Florida Statutes. No direct evidence of Homeowners' participation in the proceeding for an improper purpose was established at hearing. The attorney for Homeowners at the time the Petition and Amended Petition were filed denied that Homeowners was motivated by an improper purpose. It was seeking to protect water quality in its locale and to assure the local sewer treatment system is adequate. There was no evidence presented as to whether Homeowners has participated in other such proceedings involving Bradley and the same project for an improper purpose.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Supplemental Final Order denying Bradley's request for attorney's fees and costs as Homeowners did not participate in this proceeding for an improper purpose as defined by Subsection 120.59(6)(e), Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-6436 Homeowners' proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See separate order on that issue. Rejected. Pleading amended accordingly. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See Preliminary Statement. The Department's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. See HO #1. 3. Accepted. See HO #2. 4. Accepted. See HO #3. 5. Accepted. 6. Accepted. 7. Accepted. See HO #4. 8. Accepted. See HO #4. 9. Accepted. See HO #5. 10. Accepted. See HO #6. 11. Accepted. 12. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #7 - HO #13. Bradley's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See HO #7 and HO #8. Accept that Homeowners failed to present any justifiable issue of law or fact that could be heard in relation to this permit. See HO #7 - HO #9. COPIES FURNISHED: HAROLD M STEVENS ESQ PO DRAWER 1440 FT MYERS FL 33902 FRANCINE FFOLKES ESQ ASST GENERAL COUNSEL DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2600 BLAIRSTONE RD TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 2400 GERI L WAKSLER ESQ PEPER MARTIN JENSEN MAICHEL & HETLAGE 2000 MAIN ST - STE 600 FT MYERS FL 33901 DANIEL H THOMPSON ESQ GENERAL COUNSEL DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2600 BLAIRSTONE RD TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 2400 CAROL BROWNER, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2600 BLAIRSTONE RD TALLAHASSEE FL 32399 2400
The Issue The issues in this case are the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rules 18-14.003(4) and 18-21.004(1)(g)-(h) and (7)(i),1 and an alleged unadopted rule prohibiting fish cleaning stations over sovereign submerged land (SSL); and Petitioner's claim to an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(3)-(4), Florida Statutes.2
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns land on Lake Talquin. In 2003, he obtained a joint permit and SSL consent of use to build a seawall, a boat dock and a covered but not walled boathouse there. In 2005 he obtained another joint permit and SSL consent of use to build another boat dock and another covered boathouse at another location on his property there. Both joint permit/authorizations had general and special conditions. Both had a general condition that limited the permit/authorization to "the specific processes and operations applied for and indicated in the approved drawings or exhibits" and required Petitioner to operate and maintain the facilities "to achieve compliance with the conditions of this permit." Both have a specific condition prohibiting "fish cleaning stations . . . on any structure that is located over the water." The 2003 joint permit/authorization has a specific condition prohibiting any walls and doors on the boathouse and another specific condition prohibiting the installation of water and electric lines. The 2005 joint permit/authorization omits those specific conditions. DEP has issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) against Petitioner for violating the 2005 joint permit/authorization's specific condition prohibiting water and electric lines, for exceeding the dimensions of the boathouse authorized by the joint permit/authorization, for adding a second story structure of livable space (with a kitchen, bathroom, shower, furnished seating area, flat-panel television, and window air conditioning unit) above the boathouse in the space between the roof rafters and the top of the authorized first story structure. DEP has not issued an NOV as to the 2003 joint permit/authorization although it also has electric and water lines. DEP has not issued an NOV as to either joint permit/authorization for having a fish cleaning station over the water. An inspector told Petitioner that the fish cleaning station on the newer facility was a violation of the 2005 permit but that it was not an issue anymore after a change in the law. Petitioner attempted but failed to prove that DEP or BOT prohibits fish cleaning stations over water as a general rule. It is not clear what change in the law has occurred with respect to fish cleaning stations. In any event, the evidence was that these facilities are prohibited when appropriate for protection of water quality, not as a general rule. Rule 18-14.003 states in pertinent part: It shall be a violation of this rule for any person or the agent of any person to knowingly refuse to comply with any provision of Chapter 253, F.S., willfully violate any provision of Chapter 253, F.S., or to willfully damage state land (the ownership or boundaries of which have been established by the state) or products thereof, by doing any of the following: * * * (4) Maintain, place or build permanent or temporary structures, including, but not limited to, additions to existing structures; all structures whose use is not water- dependent; sanitary septic systems; fences, docks and pilings; houses; oil rigs; and utility installations on or over state land without consent or authority from the Board or Department. Petitioner's rule challenge focuses on the part of the rule specifying: "structures whose use is not water-dependent; sanitary septic systems; . . . houses; . . . and utility installations on or over state land without consent or authority from the Board or Department." Rule 18-21.004 states in pertinent part: The following management policies, standards, and criteria shall be used in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands. General Proprietary. * * * Activities on sovereignty lands shall be limited to water dependent activities only unless the board determines that it is in the public interest to allow an exception as determined by a case by case evaluation. Public projects which are primarily intended to provide access to and use of the waterfront may be permitted to contain minor uses which are not water dependent if: Located in areas along seawalls or other nonnatural shorelines; Located outside of aquatic preserves or class II waters; and The nonwater dependent uses are incidental to the basic purpose of the project, and constitute only minor nearshore encroachments on sovereign lands. Stilt house, boathouses with living quarters, or other such residential structures shall be prohibited on sovereignty lands. * * * General Conditions for Authorizations. All authorizations granted by rule or in writing under Rule 18-21.005, F.A.C., except those for aquaculture activities and geophysical testing, shall be subject to the general conditions as set forth in paragraphs through (i) below. The general conditions shall be part of all authorizations under this chapter, shall be binding upon the grantee, and shall be enforceable under Chapter 253 or 258, Part II, F.S. * * * (i) Structures or activities shall be constructed, operated, and maintained solely for water dependent purposes, or for non- water dependent activities authorized under paragraph 18-21.004(1)(g), F.A.C., or any other applicable law. Petitioner's rule challenge focuses on the parts of this rule prohibiting non-water dependent uses over SSLs, unless in the public interest as determined by a case-by-case evaluation and prohibiting stilt houses, boathouses with living quarters, and other residential structures. Petitioner contends that these rules: exceed their legislative authority; enlarge, modify, or contravene the laws they implement; are vague, lack adequate standards for BOT decisions, and vest unbridled discretion in the BOT (particularly by use of the terms "structure whose use is not water dependent," "utility installations," and "public interest by a case by case evaluation"); and are arbitrary and capricious (for essentially the same reasons they allegedly are vague). See § 120.52(8)(b)- (e), Fla. Stat. The term "structure whose use is not water dependent" is not defined by rule, but Rule 18-21.003(68) states: "'Water dependent activity' means an activity which can only be conducted on, in, over, or adjacent to water areas because the activity requires direct access to the water body or sovereign submerged lands for transportation, recreation, energy production or transmission, or source of water, and where the use of the water or sovereign submerged lands is an integral part of the activity." DEP makes determinations of water-dependency on a case- by-case review of the facts and circumstances presented in each case. DEP does not have a list of factors used in making this determination in any rule, non-rule policy, or other document. According to the evidence, DEP considers docks and boathouses to be water-dependent structures. A roof over a dock may be considered water-dependent depending on the facts and circumstances and whether the roof is an integral and required part of the water-dependent activity. The same is true with respect to benches that are part of a dock structure. Boating- related paraphernalia such as boat paddles, life vests, and similar items can be stored in empty rafters under the roof of a permitted docking facility, but not rakes and shovels cannot, because boating-related paraphernalia are associated with transportation across water, while rakes and shovels are not. Cans of gasoline are related to transportation on water, but their storage on the rafters of a boathouse is not necessarily a water-dependent activity because this is not considered to be safe. Depending on the circumstances, DEP has authorized the installation of electrical and water lines and sewage pump-out systems on boat docking facilities. The installation of electrical and water lines and sewage pump-out systems can be an integral or required part of a public or private commercial marina or docking facility, but generally not a noncommercial dock. DEP once authorized the use of golf carts in connection with a long private pier. The evidence proved that reasonable people of common intelligence can disagree on the interpretation and application of the "not water-dependent" definition. Even experienced consultants are required to check with DEP to be sure they are interpreting and applying the definition correctly. DEP employees sometimes are required to check with DEP headquarters in Tallahassee to be sure they are interpreting and applying the definition correctly. But the evidence did not prove that the definition is vague, lacks adequate standards for BOT decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the BOT. The term "utility installations" is reasonably clear and is generally understood to mean the installation of water, sewer, and electricity. The evidence did not prove that the term is vague, lacks adequate standards for BOT decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the BOT. The evidence did not prove that the term "public interest by a case by case evaluation" is vague, lacks adequate standards for BOT decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the BOT. The evidence was that DEP interprets the definition in the sentence that immediately follows in Rule 18-21.004(1)(g) to limit the "public interest" exception to certain "public projects" (which BOT then broadly interprets to include privately-owned marinas that are open to the public). The evidence did not prove that the challenged parts of Rules 18-14.003 and 18-21.004 are unsupported by logic or the necessary facts, or were adopted without thought or reason or are irrational.
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are: Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued by the Petitioner; and Whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondent if Petitioner proves one or more of the violations charged in its Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Brian Vincent Burns ("Burns"), at all times material to this matter, was a certified general contractor subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Petitioner. Burns was first licensed on October 26, 1981. Petitioner issued Burns license number CGO 020464. Burns' license expires on August 31, 2012. Action Restoration Inc. ("Action"), is and was, at all times material in this matter, the company where Burns is qualified. On October 24, 2007, Brian Burns-Action Restoration entered a Contractor Agreement ("Contract") with owner, Donnell Bryant, to construct a bathroom addition at Bryant's residence located at 3314 NW 23rd Court, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33311. Burns admitted at the hearing that the Contract failed to include any written disclosure statement explaining consumer's rights under the Florida Homeowner's Construction Recovery Fund. The Contract provided a draw schedule detailing the amount of the payment and at which points during the project payments were to be made to Action. The total contract price was $36,000. Per Bryant's Contract, Bryant paid the first draw of $6000.00 down at contract signing and Action started the job. During the job, Burns followed the critical path method. The method consisted of each step of the job being completed before the next could take place because each built upon the other. Action applied for a permit to build the bathroom addition on the house under Burns' contractor's license and became the contractor of record for the project. Action began the job in November 2007. It included excavating, obtaining the soil test, forming up the plywood to form the concrete, putting the rebar in, and pouring. On November 26, 2007, Bryant paid Action $7,250 as draw two when the footing was completed. The next step of the project was the block. Burns hired three workers to pour the concrete block. On or about December 20, 2007, Action put the truss anchors in the wet concrete. On or about December 21, 2007, Action completed the tie beams and was paid $8000.00 for draw three of the contract. At some point, Burns and Bryant agreed to change the trusses to make them more energy efficient and structurally sound for windstorms. The design change delayed the job being finished by the deadline. During December 2007, there was a period when Burns did not return Bryant's phone calls. Bryant was very anxious for the bathroom addition project to be completed and became angry at Burns when he couldn't reach him. Bryant thought Burns had abandoned his job when he didn't see Burns from around the Christmas holiday until after the new year. After the new year, in January 2008, Bryant met with Burns and a third party, Walsh. At the meeting, Bryant determined that Walsh was the foreman for Action who oversaw the work. Walsh never worked for Burns or Action and has never been paid by either. Burns had only met Walsh in 2007 and worked on one previous project with him. Burns knew Walsh to be a mason. From the meeting, Bryant understood that the initial contract work had been transferred to Walsh to complete the bathroom addition project Action had contracted for originally. As a result, Bryant stopped paying Burns and agreed to pay Walsh the remaining sum of $14,000.00 on the contract. After the meeting, Burns continued to work on the Bryant contract off site. He worked to get the new trusses design approved so that the work could move forward at the residential site. Around January 17, 2008, Burns took the new trusses design to the truss shop professional engineers to do the drawings. After approval, Burns took the design to the architect, which was approved on February 1, 2008. Then, Burns processed the drawing though the City of Lauderdale, which approved them on February 18, 2008. After approval by the City of Lauderdale, Burns called Bryant several times, and Bryant never returned his call or responded. Burns never returned to the Bryant residence to work on the job because he thought a new contractor had been hired to complete the job in Action's place. Action had only completed 50% of the job on the contract at the time. Plumbing, electric, duct work, and stucco were left to be done for the bathroom addition to be completed. During the period when Burns was getting the new trusses design approved, Bryant paid Walsh $4000.00, with check number 5761 as a draw, on February 15, 2008. The Contract was amended and stated, "$Total owe $14,000-$4000.00 2/15/08>New Balance $10,000" Walsh's signature was by the total with "pd 5761 2/15"1 Burns admitted at hearing that Action was still the contractor of record because the permit remained open for the project in his name. Burns said, "I made an error in judgment in not going to see to it that it was closed out." Walsh continued to work on Bryant's bathroom addition and got paid monies until June 2008. As Walsh completed portions of the job, Bryant paid him the following: $800 on April 18, 2008, for the wall and tile; $3,500 on June 3, 2008, for the construction of the bathroom; and $325 on June 9, 2008, for the stucco for the bathroom. Walsh also was paid for other construction work beside the bathroom addition for Bryant. Bryant never heard from Walsh again after paying him $325.00 with the June 9, 2008, check. He contacted him numerous times to no avail. The job was not completed. On December 30, 2008, Bryant signed a contract with Complete Property Repair to complete the bathroom addition Action had started. The contract amount was for $36,800. The contract included redoing some of the previous work completed by Action and some upgrades including a two-person Jacuzzi and travertine rock instead of tile. The Charges: In Count I, Petitioner charges Respondent with abandoning a construction project in which the contractor is engaged or under contract as a contractor in violation of section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes. In Count II, Petitioner charges Respondent with failing to include a written statement explaining the consumer's right's under the Florida Homeowners' Construction Recovery Fund in the contract with Donnell Bryant in violation of Section 489.1425(1)(d)1.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondent guilty as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, imposing as a fine of $2,500, and placing Burns' license on probation for a period of one year; (b) finds Respondent guilty as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, imposing a fine of $250.00; and (c) not imposing any restitution since it was not proven in this matter at hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2011.
The Issue Should Petitioner fine Respondent for using contaminated spoil from the previous septic system to cover a new drainfield being installed?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner issues permits for the construction, installation, modification, or repair of onsite sewage treatment systems in accordance with Section 381.0065, Florida Statutes. Those repairs are conducted by septic tank contractors as qualified and registered by Petitioner, with the expectation that the registrants shall be subject to ethical standards of practice in their business as established by Petitioner's rules. See Section 489.553(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent, whose address is Post Office Box 390073, Deltona, Florida 32738-0073, is registered by Petitioner as a septic tank contractor. Respondent does business as Alpha Environmental Services. Respondent contracted with a customer at 1019 Pioneer Drive, Deltona, Florida to replace an onsite sewage treatment and disposal system at that address. Petitioner issued a permit for the work related to the septic system. Leila Baruch, then of the Volusia County Florida Environmental Health Agency, certified by Petitioner in inspecting septic systems, inspected the site before the work was performed. On February 18, 1999, Ms. Baruch returned to the site for the purpose of examining the "easy way" drainfield which Respondent had installed over the natural soil at the bottom of the replacement system. The easy way drainfield is a system of pipes surrounded by pieces of styrofoam. At the time of this inspection, the cover that was to be placed over the top of the drainfield had not been arranged. Ms. Baruch observed the old contaminated material that had been excavated from the failed system (the spoil) located to the side of the new drainfield. The new drainfield had been left uncovered to allow the inspector to observe its placement depth. As was the custom, the Volusia County Environmental Health Agency approved the installation of the drainfield concerning its relative depth and a call was made from Ms. Baruch to Respondent's business indicating that it would be acceptable to cover the drainfield following the more recent inspection. By this contact, it was not intended to grant permission to cover the drainfield with the spoil that had been removed from the failed system. This call to Respondent's business was made on February 18, 1999. Later on February 18, 1999, Ms. Baruch spoke with Respondent. This contact was based upon remarks that had been made to Ms. Baruch by the customer homeowner during Ms. Baruch's inspection of the site earlier on that date. The customer's remarks were to the effect that she understood that Respondent intended to use the spoil removed from the original septic system to cover the new system. In her conversation with Respondent, Ms. Baruch reminded Respondent that Respondent could not use the spoil to cover the new drainfield. In addition, Ms. Baruch read from Rule 64E-6.015(6), Florida Administrative Code, concerning the prohibition against the use of spoil material in covering the new drainfield. Ms. Baruch returned to the job site two or three days later and observed that the spoil material from the failed septic system had been used to cover the new drainfield. Respondent was responsible for the placement of the spoil material as a cover for the new drainfield. This condition in which the spoil material had been placed over the new drainfield was also observed by Scott Chambers of the Volusia County Environmental Health Agency, who is registered as a sanitarian with the Florida Environmental Health Association and certified by Petitioner for inspection of onsite sewage and disposal systems. As a consequence of the findings made by the inspectors, Petitioner cited Respondent for violation of Rule 64E-6.015(6), Florida Administrative Code, and seeks to impose a fine in accordance with Rule 64E-6.022(1)(p), Florida Administrative Code. Respondent's contention in his testimony that the spoil material was not placed immediately on the new drainfield is rejected. A substantial portion, if not all, of the new drainfield was covered by the spoil removed from the failed drainfield.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which finds Respondent in violation of Rule 64E-6.015(6), Florida Administrative Code, and imposes a $500.00 fine in accordance with Rule 64E-6.022(1)(p), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Charlene J. Petersen, Esquire Department of Health 420 Fentress Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Michael Jedware Post Office Box 390073 Deltona, Florida 32738-0073 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1999. 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Dr. Robert G. Brooks, Secretary Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Arthur L. Jones, Trustee of the Arthur L. Jones Revocable Trust, also known as Eastlake Woodlands Shopping Center ("Eastlake"). Petitioner is not and never has been responsible for the discharge of pollutants at Eastlake within the meaning of Section 376.302. On November 9, 1993, Petitioner requested a determination of eligibility under the "Good Samaritan" program authorized in Section 376.305(6). Petitioner seeks reimbursement of $644,712 in costs associated with the assessment and remediation of perchloroethylene ("PCE") contamination at Eastlake. From May, 1982, through May, 1986, Eastlake included a dry cleaning establishment among its tenants. The dry cleaning establishment utilized PCE. PCE contamination was discovered in June, 1992, when a Publix Supermarket adjacent to the former dry cleaning business ("Publix") requested an environmental assessment as part of its expansion at Eastlake. The environmental assessment was performed by Chastain-Skillman, Inc. ("Skillman"). Skillman first discovered PCE contamination at the site as a result of tests of groundwater obtained from behind the former dry cleaning establishment. From July, 1992, through August, 1992, Skillman confirmed the PCE contamination through tests of additional groundwater samples from 10 other locations. In October, 1992, Petitioner orally notified Respondent of PCE contamination at the site. The PCE contamination was not reported to Respondent's Emergency Response Coordinator. The PCE contamination was not an emergency. Emergencies typically include incidents such as a petroleum spill related to a vehicular accident, a chemical spill, or a fire related release. The PCE contamination did not constitute an imminent threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. It did not constitute a threat to potable water wells at the site. PCE is a solvent commonly used in the dry cleaning business. Release of PCE is a relatively common occurrence in the dry cleaning business. On September 27, 1993, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a consent order with regard to PCE contamination at the site. In relevant part, the consent order requires Petitioner to submit a Contamination Assessment Report and Remedial Action Plan. Petitioner submitted a Contamination Assessment Report in November, 1992. Petitioner did not submit a Remedial Action Plan because Respondent placed a moratorium on enforcement actions undertaken with regard to PCE contamination at dry cleaning establishments. Respondent is in the process of implementing a program for state funded cleanup of contaminated dry cleaning sites throughout the state. Respondent is developing a priority system for cleanup of contaminated dry cleaning sites based upon relative threat to the public health and environment. There are approximately 2,800 contaminated dry cleaning sites around the state that will be affected by Respondent's dry cleaning program. Petitioner is entitled to apply for reimbursement of future costs once Respondent implements its dry cleaning program. Respondent has issued a policy memorandum concerning the review of Good Samaritan applications. Respondent's policy differentiates between petroleum contamination and non-petroleum contamination, such as PCE contaminated sites. Reimbursement of petroleum contamination is funded through the Inland Protection Trust Fund ("IPTF"). Reimbursement of non-petroleum contamination is funded through the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund ("WQATF"). IPTF funds are statutorily limited to reimbursement of costs associated with petroleum contamination. Respondent's policy is to exhaust the enforcement process before WQATF trust funds are utilized for the assessment and remediation of non- petroleum contamination. Respondent's policy requires a Good Samaritan to obtain prior approval from Respondent's Emergency Response Section or On-Scene Coordinator before initiating cleanup of a non-petroleum site such as the PCE contaminated site at Eastlake. The requirement for prior approval is designed to allow Respondent to preserve the amount of personnel, equipment, and resources available for statutorily prescribed priorities, including emergency responses. 2/ The requirement also allows Respondent to determine the endpoint of the emergency phase of a cleanup and the beginning of the remedial phase of the cleanup. The requirement for prior approval may be waived in the event of an imminent hazard. Respondent adequately explicated its non-rule policy for a moratorium on dry cleaning sites and for prior approval of remediation of non-petroleum sites including dry cleaning sites contaminated with PCE. Respondent's explication was adequate even if its policy constitutes an unwritten rule within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes. Petitioner failed to show good cause for waiver of the requirement for prior approval. The PCE contamination at the site was neither an emergency nor an imminent hazard. The public was restricted from the contaminated area by a fence surrounding the site. The public was not exposed to or threatened with contamination by inhalation. No potable water wells are near the site. Therefore, there was no threat of public access to contaminated drinking water. Petitioner did not obtain prior approval for its remediation of the site. Remediation was undertaken to complete the Publix expansion in a timely manner. Petitioner's efforts in assessing and remediating the site have been exemplary. Petitioner has fully cooperated with Respondent in assessing and remediating the site. In July, 1993, Petitioner retained American Compliance Technologies ("ACT") as a consultant to assist Petitioner in the remediation of the contaminated site. ACT prepared a health and safety plan for workers on the site. The plan addressed the risk to workers of exposure to PCE during construction and demolition activities necessary for the Publix expansion. Construction and demolition activities included removal of the concrete slab at the location of the former dry cleaning business. Disturbance of the soils contaminated with PCE created a potential for exposure of workers to PCE. The health and safety plan developed by ACT required workers to wear standard protective gear utilized by the industry. The plan satisfied the requirements of OSHA. ACT did not prepare a risk assessment addressing the potential for exposure of the general public to PCE. Nor did ACT prepare a risk assessment for the potential impact of PCE on groundwater or potable wells. The PCE contamination did not constitute an imminent threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.
