The Issue This issue is whether proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, constitute a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Florida Home Builders Association, Inc. (FHBA), and Florida A.G.C. Council (FAGC) are trade associations. A substantial number of their members contract with governmental entities for construction services and related sales of tangible personal property. FHBA and FAGC were organized, in part, to represent their members on matters relating to the construction industry, including proceedings involving agency rules. Petitioner Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (Wackenhut) frequently contracts with governmental entities. The proposed rule amendments will result in greater tax liability for Wackenhut in its performance of governmental contracts. Intervenor Florida School Board Association, Inc. (FSBA) represents all 67 local school boards in the State of Florida. FSBA's purpose is to represent its members before governmental agencies, in part to ensure cost containment in the construction, maintenance, and improvement of school facilities. Petitioners and Intervenor will be substantially affected if Respondent adopts the proposed rule amendments. They all have standing in this case. Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, imposes a tax on "retail sales" or "sales at retail." The statute also imposes a companion "use tax" when a retail sale does not occur in this state but the items sold are used here. Section 212.02(14), Florida Statutes, defines "retail sale" or "sale at retail" as a "sale to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than resale in the form of tangible personal property." Section 212.02(20), Florida Statutes, defines "use" as the "exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership thereof, or interest therein, except it does not include the sale at retail of that property in the regular course of business." Therefore, when tangible personal property is purchased and resold while still tangible personal property, the individual or company that resells the property is a dealer and has an obligation to collect, but not to pay, sales tax. See Sections 212.06(2) and 212.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The obligation to pay the tax rests on the final purchaser of the items while they are still tangible personal property. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, creates a sales tax exemption for direct sales to governmental entities. The statute also creates an exception to that exemption for sales to contractors who purchase or manufacture items for the purpose of installing them in a governmental project. At one time, governmental contractors benefited from the same sales tax exemption that governmental entities enjoyed, even when the contractor was the ultimate consumer. Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes (1957), stated as follows in relevant part: (7) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.--There shall also be exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States government, the state or any county, municipality or political subdivision of this state, including sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed by any such government or political subdivision thereof where such tangible personal property goes into and becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof. (Emphasis added) Chapter 59-402, Section 2, Laws of Florida, amended this provision by deleting the word "including" and substituting "provided, this exemption shall not include." Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided as follows in relevant part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof, except public works in progress or for which bonds or revenue certificates have been validated on or before August 1, 1959. Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, which implements Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended on August 10, 1992. The existing rule currently provides, as follows, in relevant part: 12A-1.094 Public Works Contracts. This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and materials for use in public works, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), This rule shall not apply to non- public works contracts as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1.051, F.A.C. . . . In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. "Contractor" is one who is engaged in the repair, alteration, improvement or construction of real property. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works where the sale of tangible personal property is made to or by contractors involved in public works contracts. Such contracts shall include, but not be limited to, building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard contracts. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or affixture to real property is determined by the objective and presumed intent of the parties, based on the nature and use of the project and the degree of affixation to realty. Mobile homes and other mobile buildings are deemed fixtures if they (1) bear RP license tags, or (2) have the mobile features (such as wheels and/or axles) removed, and are placed on blocks or footings and permanently secured with anchors, tie-down straps or similar devices. * * * (4) The exemption in subsection (3)(a) is a general exemption for sales made to the government. The exception in subsection (2)(a) is a specific exception for sales to contractors. A determination of whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is governed by subsection (2)(a) or is a sale to a governmental body as provided by subsection (3) of this rule based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will give special consideration to factors which govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Such factors include provisions which govern bidding, indemnification, inspection, acceptance, delivery, payment, storage, and assumption of the risk of damage or loss for the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss is a paramount consideration. A party may be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the party either: bears the economic burden of posting a bond or obtaining insurance covering damage or loss; or enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such bond or insurance. Other factors that may be considered by the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program include whether: the contractor is authorized to make purchases in its own name; the contractor is jointly or severally liable to the vendor for payment: purchases are not subject to prior approval by the government; vendors are not informed that the government is the only party with an independent interest in the purchase; and whether the contractors are formally denominated as purchasing agents for the government. Sales made pursuant to so called "cost-plus", "fixed-fee", "lump sum", and "guaranteed price" contracts are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program that such sales are, in substance, tax exempt sales to the government. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended by Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida. The statute currently states, as follows, in pertinent part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The department shall adopt rules that give special consideration to factors that govern the status of the tangible personal property before its affixation to real property. In developing these rules, assumption of the risk of damage or loss is of paramount consideration in the determination. Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida, was the result of Respondent's "map-tracking" exercise to ensure that its rules were supported by appropriate legislation. Proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, are at issue here. Those rules, as revised by the proposed amendments, read as follows: This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and material for use in public works contracts, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), F.S. This rule shall not apply to non-public works contracts for the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property, as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1,051, F.A.C. In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. 1. "Contractor" is one that supplies and installs tangible personal property that is incorporated into or becomes a part of a public facility pursuant to a public works contract with a governmental entity exercising its authority in regard to the public property or facility. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier, or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Contractor" does not include a person that furnishes tangible personal property that is not affixed or appended in such a manner that it is incorporated into or becomes a part of the public property or public facility to which a public works contract relates. A person that provides and installs tangible personal property that is freestanding and can be relocated with no tools, equipment, or need for adaptation for use elsewhere is not a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Contractor" does not include a person that provides tangible personal property that will be incorporated into or becomes part of a public facility if such property will be installed by another party. Examples. A vendor sells a desk, sofas, chairs, tables, lamps, and art prints for the reception area in a new public building. The sales agreement requires the vendor to place the furniture according to a floor plan, set up the lamps, and hang the art prints. The vendor is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the vendor is not installing the property being sold in such a way that it is attached or affixed to the facility. A security system vendor furnishes and install low voltage wiring behind walls, motion detectors, smoke alarms, other sensors, control pads, alarm sirens, and other components of a security system for a new county courthouse. The components are direct wired, fit into recesses cut into the walls or other structural elements of the building, and are held in place by screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The security system is installed and affixed in such a manner that it ha been incorporated into the courthouse. A vendor enters an agreement to provide and install the shelving system for a new public library. The shelves are built to bear the weight of books. The shelf configuration in each unit maximizes the number of books the shelves can hold. The number and size of the units ordered is based on the design for the library space. The units will run floor to ceiling and will be anchored in place by bolts or screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The shelving system will be affixed in such a manner that it becomes a part of the public library. e. A manufacturer agrees to provide the prestressed concrete forms for a public parking garage. A construction company is awarded the bid to install those forms and build the garage. The manufacturer is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the manufacturer will not install any tangible personal property that becomes part of the garage. The construction company is a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Governmental entity" includes any agency or branch of the United States government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state. The term includes authorities created by statute to operate public facilities using public funds, such as public port authorities or public-use airport authorities. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work that involves installing tangible personal property in such a manner that it becomes a part of a public facility. For purposes of this rule, a public facility includes any land, improvement to land, building, structure, or other fixed site and related infrastructure thereon owned or operated by a governmental entity where governmental or public activities are conducted. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works, although such projects are included within the term. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or fixture to real property will be determined by reference to the definitions contained in Rule 12A-1.051(2), F.A.C. * * * (4)(a) The exemption in s. 212.08(6), F.S., is a general exemption for sales made directly to the government. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a governmental entity or a taxable sale to or use by a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is a taxable sale to or use by a contractor or an exempt direct sale to a governmental entity based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The following criteria that govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property will be considered in determining whether a governmental entity rather than a contractor is the purchaser of materials: Direct Purchase Order. The governmental entity must issue its purchase order directly to the vendor supplying the materials the contractor will use and provide the vendor with a copy of the governmental entity's Florida Consumer's Certification of Exemption. Direct Invoice. The vendor's invoice must be issued to the governmental entity, rather than to the contractor. Passage of Title. The governmental entity must take title to the tangible personal property from the vendor at the time of purchase or delivery by the vendor. 5. Assumption of the Risk of Loss. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss by the governmental entity at the time of purchase is a paramount consideration. A governmental entity will be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the governmental entity bears the economic burden of obtaining insurance covering damage or loss or directly enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such insurance. Sales are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible division that such sales are, in substance, tax-exempt direct sales to the government. Respondent's staff assisted various industry groups in drafting proposed legislation for the 2001 and 2002 legislative sessions that would expand the sales tax exemption for public works contracts. The Legislature did not enact any of these proposals. The proposed rule amendments reflect Respondent's current practice regarding tax exemptions for public works contracts. The proposed amendments detail all factors, criteria, and standards that Respondent considers in determining whether transactions qualify for the exemption set forth in Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes. The existing version of Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, as revised in 1992, does not reflect these factors. In drafting the proposed revisions to Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent's staff considered statutory language, questions asked by taxpayers, and cases involving protests of audit assessments. Respondent's staff also considered areas that it believed failed to provide clear guidance as to how taxpayers could structure transactions to avoid the tax. Finally, Respondent's staff considered the decisions in Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 403 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 422 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1982). As a general rule, a for-profit corporation instead of the contractor is liable to pay sales tax when the contractor agrees to purchase items and to resell the items to the corporation such that the corporation takes possession and ownership thereof. This would be true regardless of whether the contractor or some other individual eventually installs the items on the for-profit corporation's property or in its facility. In either instance, the contractor, as a reseller of tangible personal property, is a dealer who has the obligation to collect the sales tax from the for-profit corporation. The for-profit corporation would be the ultimate consumer of the items. If a contractor resells items to a non-governmental customer, who enjoys tax-exempt status, while the items are still tangible personal property, no sales tax is due. In such a case, it makes no difference whether the contractor or some other individual later installs the items. The taxability of sales to or by contractors who repair, alter, improve and construct real property pursuant to non-public works contracts is governed by Rule 12A-1.051, Florida Administrative Code, which states as follows in relevant part: Scope of the rule. This rule governs the taxability of the purchase, sale, or use of tangible personal property by contractors and subcontractors who purchase, acquire, or manufacture materials and supplies for use in the performance of real property contracts other than public works contracts performed for governmental entities, which are governed by the provisions of Rule 12A-1.094, F.A.C. . . . Definitions. For purposes of this rule, the following terms have the following meanings: * * * (c)1. "Fixture" means an item that is an accessory to a building, other structure, or to land, that retains its separate identity upon installation, but that is permanently attached to the realty. Fixtures include such items as wired lighting, kitchen or bathroom sinks, furnaces, central air conditioning units, elevators or escalators, or built-in cabinets, counters, or lockers. 2. In order for an item to be considered a fixture, it is not necessary that the owner of the item also own the real property to which the item is attached. . . . * * * (g) "Real property" means land, improvements to land, and fixtures. It is synonymous with the terms "realty" and "real estate." Pursuant to the statute and the proposed rule amendments, contractors who purchase tangible personal property that goes into or becomes a part of a public works are not entitled to an exemption from paying sales tax. Such a contractor would be the ultimate consumer of the tangible personal property and not a dealer. The statute and the rule at issue here require Respondent to look at the substance instead of the form of each transaction to determine when sales tax is due. To say that no tax is due anytime a contractor agrees to purchase and resell items to a governmental customer, such that the governmental customer takes possession and ownership thereof before the same contractor installs the items, would be contrary to the statute. To find otherwise would place form over substance, allowing the contractor and the governmental entity to avoid the statutorily imposed tax by casting the transaction as a resale. The proposed rule amendments do not expand the sales and/or use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Instead, they implement the statutory provision requiring governmental contractors to pay sales tax when they supply and install items in a governmental project pursuant to a public works contract. Depending on the circumstances, "public works" include a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns the real property. It also includes a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns a public facility located on real property owned by a private individual. The term "public works" includes a public facility which is owned and operated by a governmental entity for the purpose of conducting governmental activities regardless of who owns the real property on which it is located. According to the statute, Respondent's rules must give special consideration to the status of tangible personal property "before its affixation to real property." This provision does not mean that a transaction is not taxable unless the tangible personal property becomes a "fixture" or "appurtenance" to real property. Instead, Respondent's proposed rule amendments properly implement the broader legislative intent to tax any sale to a contractor who supplies and installs tangible personal property in public works. Respondent looks first to see whether the tangible personal property will be a fixture or improvement to real property. Next, Respondent must determine whether the tangible personal property will be permanently attached and function as a part of a public works project that does not fit the definition of real property. For example, a port authority may operate an office out of a permanently docked ship. The statute directs Respondent to consider the assumption of risk of damage or loss to be most important but not the only factor in determining whether the sale of tangible personal property is taxable. In addition to the assumption of risk of loss, the proposed rule amendments require a nontaxable sale to show the following: (a) a direct purchase order to the vendor who will supply materials to the contractor; (b) a direct invoice from the vendor rather than the contractor; (c) direct payment to the vendor; and (d) passage of title at time of purchase or delivery. The five factors are inclusive of the elements that Respondent will consider when determining whether of a sale is, in substance, a direct nontaxable sale to a governmental entity.
The Issue The petition that initiated this proceeding challenged the taxes, interest, and penalties assessed against Petitioner by Respondent following an audit and identified the following four issues: Issue One. Does the sale of obsolete games at the "annual game sale" qualify for exemption from sales tax as an occasional or isolated sale? Issue Two. Are the purchases of video games exempt from Florida sales and use tax as sales for resales? Issue Three. Are the purchases of plush exempt from Florida sales and use tax as sales for resale or, alternatively, does taxation of the vending revenues and taxation of purchases of plush represent an inequitable double taxation? Issue Four. Should penalties be assessed based upon the facts and circumstances [of this proceeding].
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Illinois Corporation headquartered in Texas and licensed to do business in Florida. Petitioner owns and operates video and arcade game amusement centers, hereafter referred to as centers. Petitioner sells to center customers the opportunity to play the games in the centers. Petitioner purchases the games from sources outside itself; it does not manufacture the games it makes available in its centers. Petitioner paid sales tax upon the purchase of machines purchased in Florida and use tax upon the purchase of machines outside Florida and imported for use inside Florida. The Florida Department of Revenue (DOR) is the State of Florida agency charged with the enforcement of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, Tax on Sales, Use and Other Transactions, the Transit Surtax, and the Infrastructure Surtax -- the state and local taxes at issue in this case. The DOR audited Petitioner for the period December 1, 1986 through November 30, 1991, hereafter referred to as the audit period. During the audit period, Petitioner operated 12 centers in the State of Florida. For purposes of the instant litigation, references to the centers will mean only the centers located in Florida. The audit determined that Petitioner owed $51,593.37 in sales and use tax, $440.81 in transit surtax, and $1,459.80 in infrastructure surtax. Each of the sums assessed included penalty and interest accrued as of September 13, 1994. In accordance with section 120.575(3), Florida Statutes, Petitioner paid $32,280 as follows: a. sales and use tax $22,411 b. interest 8,575 c. charter transit surtax 234 d. interest 64 e. infrastructure surtax 750 f. interest 246 The centers make available three types of games. The games are activated either by a coin or a token that is purchased at the center. Video games include pinball machines and electronic games which do not dispense coupons, tickets or prizes. Redemption games include skeeball, hoop shot and water race which dispense coupons or tickets which the player earns according to his or her skill. Merchandise games include electronic cranes which the operator or player maneuvers to retrieve a prize directly from the machine. Merchandise games do not dispense coupons or tickets. The tickets earned in the course of playing redemption games can be exchanged for prizes displayed at the centers. The prizes obtained directly from the merchandise games and exchanged following receipt from redemption games are termed "plush." Plush may be obtained only by seizing it in a redemption game or by redeeming coupons earned during the play of redemption games; it may not be purchased directly for cash. A merchandise game does not dispense an item of plush upon the insertion of a coin or token and activation of the crane's arm -- acquisition of plush requires a certain level of skill on the player's part. A redemption game does not dispense an item of plush upon the insertion of a coin or token and the push of a button -- acquisition of tickets requires a certain level of sill on the player's part. Petitioner purchases plush in bulk and distributes it to the various centers. Each of the centers sells some of its games to individual buyers. Petitioner's headquarters coordinates the sale. For each of the years in the audit period, the centers sold games at various dates. Petitioner characterizes as its "annual sale" the period November 1 through January 10 when most of the sales took place. The specific dates for the sales that took place during the audit period follow; numbers in square brackets indicate the number of sales on a particular date if there is more than one. a. December 1986 through July 1987 -- no information available -- but more than one sale was made during this time. b. November 1987: 2, 5, 7, 10, 17, 18[2], 20, 22, 25, 28[3] c. December 1987: 2, 4, 7, 15, 18, 23 d. November 1988: 4, 5, 7[2], 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 20[2], 21[2], 25, 26, 28, 29 e. December 1988: 6, 7, 8, 10[2], 12[2], 16, 21, 22, 23[2], 24 f. January 1989: 3, 6, 7[4], 9, 12 g. November 1989: 6, 15, 16[2], 20 h. December 1989: 1, 6, 10, 22, 29[3], 31 January 1990: 26 March 1990: 26 April 1990: 26 l. June 1990: 12 m. November 1990: 3, 9, 13[2], 14, 16, 19, 24, 26 n. December 1990: 1, 2, 7, 20 January 1991: 8 May 1991: at least 1 q. November 1991: 4, 9, 10, 14, 15, 21 Petitioner did not provide its machine vendors resale certificates upon Petitioner's purchase of the games. Petitioner did not provide its plush vendors resale certificates upon Petitioner's purchase of plush. Petitioner did not apply for a refund of sales tax paid upon its purchase of games in Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein. The assessments against Petitioner should be sustained to the extent the assessments are consistent with the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1996.
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Petitioner is a joint venturer with two foreign corporations who subcontracted to perform the dredging portion of the contract to develop the port of Dammam in Saudi Arabia. The joint venture is called GLABVO and the joint venture agreement was admitted as Exhibit 1. The parties contributed capital and leased equipment to the joint venture while the latter paid for all supplies used by the parties in carrying out the subcontract. All of the equipment and materials purchased and which is the subject of the tax assessment here involved is personal property of a nature subject to sales and use tax, was ordered by Petitioner for GLABVO and shipped to Miami where it was loaded for shipment to Saudi Arabia. The property was purchased from both within and without the state. The nature of the operation, the urgency of the contract with respect to time of completion, and the lack of existing port facilities necessitated special shipping arrangements which involved a contract carrier in lieu of a common carrier. Accordingly the various dredges, workboats, barges and related equipment here loaded on a large barge which was towed from Ft. Lauderdale to Saudi Arabia. Lack of port facilities at Dammam necessitated the capability to unload being carried with the equipment so the larger elements transported wore floated onto the barge, and off the barge upon arrival, by sinking the barge. Most of the supplies were packaged for overseas shipment before being shipped to Miami where this material and equipment was marshalled at Petitioner's facility on Dodge Island at Miami, Florida. At this marshalling yard, which was the Florida shipping destination for materials purchased, the supplies were inventoried, repackaged, if necessary, for the barge shipment by placing in containers that could be floated off the barge and segregated into the three shipments that would be needed to move the equipment and supplies to Dammam. Petitioner used its tax registration number in purchasing the supplies on behalf of GLABVO and the vendors were relieved from collecting the sales tax. At the time the supplies were shipped to Petitioner there were no export declarations in connection with these items but much of the equipment was packaged for export and the shipping documents represented the material was shipped "for export". The contract carrier that had been engaged to provide the transportation had no facility that could be used as a marshalling yard and Petitioner did have such a facility. Due to the nature of the operation it was essential to assemble the supplies and equipment at a marshalling point for inventory and checking against the list of needed supplies before continuing the transportation to Saudi Arabia. Bills of lading and export declarations were made up where the material was placed on board the contract carrier's barge. On those items shipped from outside Florida Respondent assessed a use tax and on those items purchased in Florida Respondent assessed a sales tax. It is undisputed that all property on which the tax was assessed was purchased for use in Saudi Arabia and was shipped to Saudi Arabia; that the property had an initial Florida destination at Dodge Island, Florida; that the property was shipped from Florida to Saudi Arabia on bills of lading; and that export declarations were executed. For the purpose of this case no distinction exists with respect to the export nature of those shipments purchased from a supplier in Florida and those purchased from a source outside of Florida.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent properly conducted a sales and use tax audit of Petitioner's books and records; and, if so, whether Petitioner is liable for tax and interest on its purchases of materials used for improvements to real property.
Findings Of Fact During the audit period, Petitioner was a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 7820 Professional Place, Suite 2, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner's Florida sales tax number was 39-00-154675-58, and Petitioner's federal employer identification number was 59-3089046. After the audit period, the Florida Department of State administratively dissolved Petitioner for failure to file statutorily required annual reports and filing fees. Petitioner engaged in the business of providing engineering services and fabricating control panels. Petitioner fabricated control panels in a shop Petitioner maintained on its business premises. Petitioner sold some of the control panels in over-the- counter sales. Petitioner properly collected and remitted sales tax on the control panels that Petitioner sold over-the-counter. Petitioner used other control panels in the performance of real property contracts by installing the panels as improvements to real property (contested panels). Petitioner was the ultimate consumer of the materials that Petitioner purchased and used to fabricate the contested panels. At the time that Petitioner installed the contested panels into real property, the contested panels became improvements to the real property. Petitioner failed to pay sales tax at the time Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate the contested panels. Petitioner provided vendors with Petitioner's resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax, when Petitioner purchased the materials used to fabricate the contested panels. None of the purchase transactions for materials used to fabricate the contested panels were tax exempt. The audit is procedurally correct. The amount of the assessment is accurate. On October 23, 2000, Respondent issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records (form DR-840), for audit number A0027213470, for the period of October 1, 1995, through September 30, 2000. During an opening interview, the parties discussed the audit procedures and sampling method to be employed and the records to be examined. Based upon the opening interview, Respondent prepared an Audit Agreement and presented it to an officer and owner of the taxpayer. Respondent began the audit of Petitioner's books and records on January 22, 2001. On March 9, 2001, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (original Notice of Intent). At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted an audit conference with Petitioner. At the audit conference, Petitioner provided documentation that the assessed transactions involved improvements to real property. At Petitioner's request, Respondent conducted a second audit conference with Petitioner's former legal counsel. Petitioner authorized its former legal counsel to act on its behalf during the audit. At the second audit conference, the parties discussed audit procedures and sampling methods, Florida use tax, fabricated items, and fabrication costs. Respondent revised the audit findings based upon additional information from Petitioner that the assessed transactions involved fabricated items of tangible personal property that became improvements to real property. Respondent assessed use tax on the materials used to fabricate control panels in those instances where Petitioner failed to document that Petitioner paid sales tax at the time of the purchase. Respondent also assessed use tax on fabrication costs including the direct labor and the overhead costs associated with the fabrication process, for the period of October 1, 1995, through June 30, 1999. Respondent eliminated use tax assessed on cleaning services in the original Notice of Intent because the amount of tax was de minimis. On August 29, 2001, Respondent issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Revised Notice of Intent). On September 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until January 25, 2002. On October 18, 2001, Petitioner executed a second Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment to File a Claim for Refund until April 25, 2002. On February 6, 2002, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment for additional sales and use tax, in the amount of $21,822.27; interest through February 6, 2002, in the amount of $10,774.64; penalty in the amount of $10,831.12; and additional interest that accrues at $6.97 per diem. Petitioner exhausted the informal remedies available from Respondent. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed a formal written protest that, in substantial part, objected to the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit. Respondent issued a Notice of Decision sustaining the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest. Respondent correctly determined that the audit procedures and sampling method employed in the audit were appropriate and consistent with Respondent's statutes and regulations. Respondent concluded that the assessment was correct based upon the best available information and that Petitioner failed to provide any documentation to refute the audit findings. Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration that did not provide any additional facts, arguments, or records to support its position. On May 16, 2003, Respondent issued a Notice of Reconsideration sustaining the assessment of tax and interest in full, but compromising all penalties based upon reasonable cause.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for relief and sustaining Respondent's assessment of taxes and interest in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Michael E. Ferguson Control Design Engineering, Inc. 809 East Bloomingdale Avenue, PMB 433 Brandon, Florida 33511 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Does the taxpayer owe sales tax, penalty, and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Revenue, is an agency of the State of Florida, lawfully created and organized pursuant to Section 20.21, Florida Statutes. By law, the Department is vested with the responsibility of regulating, controlling and administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including, specifically, the laws relating to the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use tax, pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Worldwide Equipment Group, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company, whose principal address is Post Office Box 1050, Freeport, Florida 32439. Respondent sells and leases heavy equipment. In early 2006, Petitioner, Department of Revenue, conducted an audit of the books and records of Petitioner, pursuant to statutory notice. The period covered by the audit was March 1, 2002, through February 28, 2005. The audit was conducted by Department of Revenue auditor David Collins and addressed three issues. Issue A-01 addressed misclassified exempt sales, i.e. failure to collect appropriate sales and use tax or lack of documentation to prove tax exempt status of certain sales. Issue A-03 addressed discrepancies in sales for 2003 as reported for federal income tax returns and for state sales and use tax returns. Issue A-03 addressed interest owed due to a timing difference between actual transactions and the filing of state returns: basically a manipulation of the grace period for payment of sales and use taxes. Respondent was notified of the apparent discrepancies observed by the auditor. The original Notice of Intent To Make Audit Changes was issued February 17, 2006, and started at more than $75,000.00 in taxes, penalty, and interest due. Respondent then filed amended federal income tax returns, reflecting larger sales figures covering a portion of the audit period which reduced the discrepancy. The dispute was originally referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on or about August 30, 2006. The original facts in dispute surrounded an addendum to the Notice of Proposed Assessment showing a balance due of $31,434.82. This was DOAH Case No. 06-3287. The request for a disputed-fact hearing was made by David R. Johnson CPA, who has a power of attorney on file with Petitioner Agency permitting him to represent Respondent. Throughout these proceedings, Worldwide has been served through Mr. Johnson by Petitioner and by DOAH. The parties filed a Joint Motion for Provisional Closing Order in DOAH Case No. 06-3287 on November 1, 2006. On November 2, 2006, DOAH Case No. 06-3287 was closed with leave to return if the parties' proposed settlement was not finalized. Mr. Johnson met once with counsel for Petitioner during the time the case was returned to the Agency. At some point, Respondent had produced certain accounting entries and supporting documents to the auditor. These were used to adjust the assessment levied by the Department. A Revised Notice Of Intent To Make Audit Changes dated March 13, 2007, was issued with a letter of the same date. The revised, and final Notice included an assessment of tax, penalty and interest totaling $15,065.24, as of the date of issue and information that the tax accrues interest at the rate of $3.10 per diem. On April 4, 2007, Petitioner filed before DOAH its Motion to Re-open Case and Notice for Trial. No timely response in opposition was filed by Respondent. By an Order to Re-open Case File, entered April 19, 2007, the case was re-opened as the instant DOAH Case No. 07-1710. Petitioner has established that the amount of $15,065.24 as tax, penalty, and interest was due as of March 13, 2007.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue sustain the March 13, 2007, assessment of the subject sales tax, penalties and interest to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Bird, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 David R. Johnson, CPA 1265 Highway 331 South Defuniak Springs, Florida 32435 Worldwide Equipment Group LLC Post Office Box 1050 Freeport, Florida 32439
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's final assessment of sales and use tax plus interest against Petitioner Karsten Enterprises FL, Inc., is correct.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation headquartered in Dothan, Alabama, doing business in Florida. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. During the audit period in controversy, from October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2007, Petitioner was a dealer in manufactured or modular homes and did business at one or more Florida locations. During the pertinent period, Petitioner entered into various contracts to provide manufactured or modular homes to its customers for delivery at locations in Florida. At a Karsten Sales Center, models of residential factory-built buildings are displayed. These residential factory-built buildings are produced by manufacturers that Karsten uses for that purpose. In most of the transactions during the audit period, Petitioner's customers would contract with Petitioner for the sale and installation of a factory built building on property owned by the customer. In the remainder of the contracts during the audit period, Petitioner would either purchase the property or enter into a contract for the sale of the property to the customer, and Petitioner would install a home that Petitioner had purchased from a manufacturer and then sell the home and land package to the customer. The contract prices were a lump sum, which included not only the manufactured or modular home, but also installation of the home at a Florida location. Petitioner’s contracts with its customers did not itemize individual components of the modular or manufactured homes, such as individual nuts, bolts, and shingles, but instead agreed to deliver the entire modular or manufactured home on an installed basis. The contracts between Petitioner and its customers specify the type of home that the customer wanted to have erected or installed on the property. Upon selection of a floor plan, options, and other customization, the customer would agree to order a specific home from a manufacturer. Petitioner purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. The manufacturer would produce the home upon receiving an order from Petitioner. The manufacturer shipped the completed home to Petitioner, delivering the home to the property where the home would ultimately be erected and installed. Once shipped to the site, the factory-built buildings were placed on a foundation constructed for that purpose. Petitioner would either directly, through the manufacturer, or through subcontractors, construct the foundations, place the homes on the foundations, and connect the homes to required utilities. All of these activities were done as part of Petitioner's contracts with its customers for real property improvement. In many instances, the manufacturer both delivered the homes to the sites and provided post-delivery services to the homes. Additional services provided by the manufacturer after it installed the homes on the foundations included trim work, repair work, and fit and finish work. Petitioner paid the manufactures directly for these post-delivery services. During the audit period at issue, Petitioner sold, erected and installed approximately 30 residential modular or factory-built buildings in the state of Florida. If the home was built by a Florida factory, the factory would include sales tax in its invoice to Petitioner, based upon the cost of materials, but not including labor, that the manufacturer used in the construction of the home prior to its delivery to the site. If an out-of-state manufacturer built the home, the manufacturer would not include a sales tax amount in its invoices to Petitioner. Rather, the out-of-state manufacturers indicated that the cost of materials for construction of the homes at the factory was approximately 60% of the purchase price Petitioner paid for the homes. When Petitioner closed its contracts with its customers, if the manufacturer was an out-of-state manufacturer that had not previously included a sales or use tax in its invoice to Petitioner, Petitioner would remit a use tax directly to the Department, based upon 60% of Petitioner’s purchase price of the manufactured or modular homes. In either case, whether paying sales tax directly to a Florida manufacturer based only on the Florida manufacturer's cost of materials, or remitting use tax on 60% of its purchase price of manufactured or modular homes from out-of-state manufacturers, rather than paying tax on 100% of the price it paid for the homes, Petitioner did not pay sales or use tax on the manufacturer’s labor or fabrication costs. In remitting use tax, or paying sales tax to the Florida manufacturers, Petitioner was seeking to pay tax only on the manufacturer’s cost of materials used in the manufacturing process. There is no dispute concerning the Department’s math calculations. Rather, Petitioner disputes that the labor costs were taxable. Petitioner has no proof that the Department has ever received payment of tax from any person on the manufacturer’s labor costs at issue in this proceeding. Drenea York, who testified for the Department, is an accountant and auditor with twenty years of experience, all in sales and use taxation. Tammy Miller, who testified for the Department, is an attorney who has worked with the Department for eight years within the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution section (Department's Dispute Resolution Section). The Department's Dispute Resolution Section employs “Tax Conferees,” such as Ms. Miller, who hear informal taxpayer protests, issue the Department's notices of decisions regarding final assessments, and provide guidance to the public upon request. Her practice has focused principally upon sales and use taxation, and she has handled several cases involving taxation of modular home contractors. Tammy Miller signed the notice of decision regarding the Final Assessment at issue. She also wrote the article for the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which Petitioner introduced into evidence as P1. She testified as the Department’s corporate representative. Douglas Uhler testified as a former employee of Petitioner and also as an expert witness for the Petitioner. He is a CPA with some tax experience, who was not shown to be a specialist in taxation or in Florida sales and use taxation. He practices in Birmingham, Alabama, where he is licensed. He has knowledge and expertise in valuation and other areas, but was not qualified as an expert to testify as to the tax determinations at issue in this controversy. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Uhler applied for a TAA. Mr. Uhler was permitted to testify, over the Department’s hearsay and relevancy objections, that he relied on an oral statement from an alleged Department employee, concerning how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During his testimony, however, Mr. Uhler did not know the name of the person to whom he allegedly spoke and he was not sure that the person he spoke to was an employee of the Department of Revenue. Therefore, no weight was given to his testimony regarding his recollection of a conversation with an alleged Department employee on the issue of how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During the audit period at issue, the Department made four revisions to its original audit report in response to additional information provided by the Petitioner. During this period, the Petitioner paid the uncontested portion of the Department's assessment, leaving only one issue in dispute: whether additional tax and interest is due on Petitioner’s purchase of the modular homes. The Department’s audit and resulting tax assessment considered Petitioner, and not the manufacturer, to be the “real property contractor” responsible for the payment of the tax, within the meaning of the aforementioned rule provisions. The Department’s determination that Petitioner was the responsible “real property contractor” is consistent with the fact that the real property improvement contracts at issue were entered directly between Petitioner and its customers, and not between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. In its contracts with its customers, Petitioner directly arranged installation work, either providing the installation itself or through the manufacturer or a subcontractor on behalf of Petitioner's customers. The issue of whether Petitioner or the manufacturer performed the installation work, however, was not considered by the Department to be a determinative factor, in and of itself, in making the Final Assessment. According to the Department, it would not consider a manufacturer to be the responsible “real property contractor” unless the contracts for real property improvement were directly between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. The evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's customers had direct contracts for real property improvements with the manufacturers of the homes. The Department also considered Petitioner to be the “end user” under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3) and (4), which, according to the Department, imposes tax on the “end user.” The Department considered Petitioner, as opposed to Petitioner's customers, to be the end user based upon the reasoning that Petitioner was the last party to purchase the modular units as “tangible personal property,” before the modular homes became affixed to real property. Ms. York and Ms. Miller explained that the Department did not consider Petitioner’s customers to be the “end users” because Petitioner's customers did not purchase resold items of “tangible personal property,” itemized in detail under Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3)(d). Rather, they explained that Petitioner’s customers, who purchased under lump- sum contracts, were considered to have purchased an improvement to real property, and improvements to real property fall outside the scope of the Florida sales and use tax chapter. In its audit, the Department examined Petitioner’s contracts with its customers solely to determine that the Petitioner was the end user or the “real property contractor.” The Department’s assessment did not seek to impose tax or interest liability on Petitioner’s transactions with its customers. Instead, the Department taxed Petitioner on Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing modular homes, giving Petitioner full credit for any partial tax that Petitioner had paid. As noted above, during the audit period, when it was dealing with a Florida manufacturer, Petitioner generally remitted sales or use tax directly to the manufacturer, at the time of purchase. More often, however, Petitioner paid sales or use tax on a monthly basis, by direct accrual or remittance to the Department on approximately 60% of the amount Petitioner paid for homes manufactured by out-of-state manufacturers. The invoices to Petitioner frequently included other itemized charges, which the Department did not consider part of Petitioner’s “cost price” of the purchased modular units. For example, if an invoice included sales or use tax, the Department excluded charges for tax when calculating Petitioner’s “cost price,” so as to avoid imposing tax on the itemized tax. Likewise, no charges for installation of the modular units onto real property were included in the Department’s calculation of “cost price.” The Department instead determined “cost price” by adding up the “Base Price” for purchasing the modular homes, together with itemized home “Options,” as they appeared on the manufacturer's invoices to Petitioner for the modular homes. Examples of several “Options” would be such things as better carpeting, a sliding glass door, or a plywood floor. The combined total of “Base Price” and “Options” were used by the Department in determining Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing the units as items of tangible personal property from the manufacturer’s factory. Petitioner's "cost price" as determined by the Department reflected the seller’s (in this case the manufacturer’s) material and labor costs. The Department's Final Assessment, however, did not include costs related to the installation of the modular homes onto real property, as those were considered by the Department as costs arising subsequent to the sale of the product as tangible personal property. The Final Assessment only sought tax on Petitioner’s purchase cost of the modular homes as tangible personal property leaving the factory. Because Petitioner had already paid tax on approximately 60% of its cost price, the Department’s assessment sought to capture the 40% of sales and use tax that Petitioner never paid. The Department's assessment determined that Petitioner owed tax on its own “cost price” as invoiced by the manufacturer. The Department determined that the Petitioner’s “cost price” was a different “cost price” than the manufacturer’s “cost price.” According to the Department, the manufacturer’s cost price excluded labor on its factory floor but Petitioner’s “cost price” included all materials and labor costs that were necessarily a component of Petitioner's actual purchase price. The Department’s auditor gave Petitioner full credit for all taxes paid, whether Petitioner had paid the tax by direct remittance or at the time that it paid an invoice, with one exception: credit was generally not given for payments made by Petitioner to a company named Cavalier because during the audit period at issue, Petitioner remitted certain amounts of sales tax to a manufacturer named Cavalier, but Cavalier refunded these amounts to Petitioner.3/ The Department’s audit and assessment did not treat Petitioner as a “manufacturer” nor give Petitioner the benefit of the special exemption, under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which is available to manufacturers of a “factory- built building.” This is because the Department did not consider Petitioner to be a manufacturer. Although Petitioner argued that it qualified for the special exemption under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, under the theory that it was a "manufacturer," Petitioner failed to show that it is a “manufacturer” entitled to such exemption. In accordance with Petitioner's Application for Registration with the Department, Petitioner was registered as a “Manufactured (Mobile) Home Dealer” rather than as a manufacturer. In response to audit interview questions, Petitioner advised the auditor that it was in the business of “Retail Sale” of “Mobile and Modular Homes.” Petitioner made this same representation again in its response to a Pre-Audit Questionnaire and Request for Information. The first time that Petitioner ever asserted that it was a "manufacturer" was after Petitioner received the Department’s Notice of Intent to make Audit Changes, and became aware that, as a “real property contractor,” it would be assessed tax on 100% of its “cost price.” Petitioner then changed its self-description of its business model, asserting that it was a “manufacturer.” When Petitioner protested the Department’s assessment, however, it abandoned, at least at the informal protest stage, the argument that it was a manufacturer. Petitioner instead argued that it should be treated like a real property contractor engaged in the business of stick built homes. According to Tammy Miller, Petitioner's president, Mr. Copeland, told Ms. Miller during the informal protest process, that Petitioner was not a manufacturer. The Final Assessment corroborates Tammy Miller’s recollection because it addressed Petitioner’s various legal arguments but did not address Petitioner’s argument that it is a manufacturer, because that argument apparently was not made during the informal protest. The Amended Petition does not allege that Petitioner was a manufacturer or that it should be treated like one. Petitioner instead asserts that it is a modular home dealer who purchases from “the factory” and that it should be treated like a stick-built contractor. Petitioner stipulated that it is a modular home “dealer” and that it purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. No evidence was introduced that Petitioner owns or operates factories or an assembly line. Rather, the evidence showed that Petitioner operated out of an office building in Alabama. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has been licensed or certified as a “manufacturer” by the Department of Community Affairs, which is the agency that regulates manufacturers of factory-built buildings. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-1.002(15) and 1.007(1). Petitioner’s representative repeatedly referred to Petitioner, throughout opening statement, argument and testimony, as a dealer purchasing from the factory. The Department’s witnesses testified that the sales and use tax applies to “real property contractors” in a way that taxes all real property contractors (stick-built or modular) on their full “cost price” of purchased materials, regardless of whether the purchased materials are lumber, shingles, nails, finished kitchen cabinetry, or assembled modular home modules. The Department's witnesses explained that the cost price of each item purchased will vary because the item purchased in each instance is different and some items will include greater material and labor costs than others. The Final Assessment reflects the unpaid balance assessed, after all revisions and payments made, and provides a per diem amount so that accrued interest may be readily calculated. The Final Assessment determined that the unpaid balance of tax and interest for the audit period (after crediting Petitioner with all payments made) was as follows: $41,446.31 combined tax and interest through 1/26/09, with $7.57 per day for each day thereafter until the postmark date of payment. The Final Assessment waived all penalties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Final Assessment and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due as of January 26, 2009, in the amount of $41,446.39, with interest thereafter accruing at $7.57 per day, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined. Background Petitioner, Gator Coin Machine Company, Inc. (petitioner or Gator), is a Florida corporation engaged in the vending machine business throughout the northern part of the State extending from Leon County eastward to Duval County. Gator places coin-operated cigarette vending machines in various business locations, such as lounges, package stores, motels and restaurants. In return for allowing the machines to be placed on the premises, the location owner receives a fee for each pack of cigarettes sold from the machine. This fee is paid to the location owner and is considered a commission or rent for allowing Gator to "lease" the real property on which the machines are placed. All such commissions are subject to the sales tax, which rate may vary depending on the sales tax rate in a particular county. The sales tax is included with the commission (rent) paid to the location owner, and the location owner then has the obligation of remitting the tax to the state. However, the burden of showing that the tax has been paid to the location owner rests upon the vending machine owner. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. Among other things, DOR performs audits on taxpayers to insure that all taxes due have been correctly paid. To this end, in 1990 a routine audit was performed on Gator covering the audit period from June 1, 1985, through April 30, 1989. After the results of the audit were obtained and an initial assessment made, on January 22, 1991, DOR issued a revised notice of intent to make sales and use tax audit changes wherein it proposed to assess Gator $35,561.67 in unpaid sales taxes, $8,887.82 in delinquent penalties, and $12,934.34 in accrued interest on the unpaid taxes through the date of the revised notice, or a total of $57,383.83. The unpaid taxes related to taxes allegedly due on commissions paid to location owners during the audit period and were assessed against Gator on the grounds the taxpayer had not separately stated the tax on its evidence of sale and failed to provide internal documentation to verify that the taxes had actually been paid. On April 19, 1991, a third revision of the proposed assessment was issued which decreased slightly the unpaid taxes and corresponding penalties but increased the size of the assessment to $57,945.10 due to the continuing accrual of interest. On July 1, 1991, Gator was offered the opportunity to informally contest the assessment. A letter of protest was filed on July 29, 1991, wherein Gator generally contended that (a) its records conformed with the industry practice and that an adequate audit trail existed to substantiate the payment of taxes, and (b) the responsibility for payment of the taxes ultimately rested with the location owner rather than Gator. On February 10, 1992, DOR issued its notice of decision rejecting Gator's position but offering to reduce the penalty on the unpaid sales taxes to 5%. At the same time, and although Gator had not challenged the auditor's method of computing the amount of sales tax, DOR upheld the auditor's determination on that point. After a petition for reconsideration was filed by Gator on March 10, 1992, in which Gator raised for the first time a claim that it was due a refund of $11,015 for overpayment of taxes on cigarette sales during the audit period, DOR issued its notice of reconsideration on June 12, 1992, denying the petition and offering Gator a point of entry on these issues. Such a request was timely filed and this proceeding ensued. The Tax The tax for which petitioner has been assessed became effective on July 1, 1986, and is found in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. On an undisclosed date, DOR mailed each vending machine company in the state a flier which summarized the new changes in the tax law. The flier noted that the sales tax would be levied on each "license to use or occupy property" and specifically included "an agreement by the owner of real property granting one permission to install and maintain full-service coin-operated vending machines on the premises." Because the vending machine owner is considered to have been granted a license to use the real property of the location owner, the fee (rent) paid by the vending machine owner to the location owner was thus subject to the new sales tax. The notice further provided that the tax "must be collected by the person granting the privilege to use or occupy any real property from the person paying the license fee and is due and payable at the time of receipt." This flier constituted the only notice by DOR concerning the imposition of the new tax. There was no notice to the vending machine owners that they must separately state the sales tax from the commission when paying the commission to the location owner. This was because the flier's main purpose was to put the taxpayers on notice that they were subject to the new tax. Sometime after the tax became effective, DOR developed a rule to implement the new law. Specifically, it amended Rule 12A-1.044, Florida Adminstrative Code, to provide guidance to taxpayers in the coin-operated industry as to who had the taxpaying and collecting responsibility. However, the rule simply stated that the owner of the vending machine was responsible for paying the tax on the rental fee paid to the location owner and did not state how this payment was to be documented or recorded by the lessee. In the absence of any guidance from DOR, the Florida Amusement Association, of which Gator is a member, held meetings around the state to inform the members of their responsibilities under the new law. One method thought to be acceptable to establish payment of the sales tax was to keep internal documentation as to commission rate and tax paid to the various locations. As will be discussed hereinafter, Gator and other vending machine owners began following this practice. On May 11, 1992, or three years after the audit period had ended, and almost six years after the imposition of the tax, DOR adopted an amendment to rule 12A-1.044(10) to provide that "the tax must be separately stated from the amount of the lease or license payment." This constituted the first notice to vending machine owners that they were required to state separately on the check remitted to their locations each month the commission plus tax. It should also be noted that DOR has never specified the exact type of documentation required by this rule or the format in which the information should be submitted. The Industry Practice Petitioner is one of many coin-operated vending machine companies doing business in the state of Florida. The evidence shows that of some twenty representative companies doing business in the state, including Gator, all operate in the same manner. Generally, the vending machine owner has a low investment in equipment which is easily relocated from one place of business to another. Because it is not unusual for the businesses in which equipment is placed to frequently change ownership, and often times the location owner can shop around and obtain a better commission from another vending machine company, it is fairly common to have machines placed in a location for as few as six or seven months. Therefore, it is a common practice in the industry to do business on a handshake and without a formal written agreement. In other words, the agreement to allow the machines to be placed on the premises and the amount of commission (rent) to be paid for leasing that space is based largely on a handshake between the two owners. This accounts in part for the lack of documentation such as a charge ticket, sales slip or invoice between the two owners concerning the amount of sales tax associated with the rent since such documents or evidence of sale are not practicable. The lack of documentation is also attributable to the fact that until May 1992 DOR never advised the vending machine companies that some type of "evidence of sale" was needed. In determining the commission rate to be paid to the various locations, the vending machine owner must first ascertain what the market will bear in terms of selling a pack of cigarettes in the machine. After calculating his overhead, the vending machine owner then bargains with the location owner as to how much of the remaining difference between the cost of cigarettes and overhead and the selling price should be paid to the location owner. This amount of money agreed upon by the vending machine and location owners, and expressed in a per pack rate, is commonly known as the commission expense and includes the total sum of rent plus sales tax. For example, if the total commission is twenty cents per pack of cigarettes sold from each machine, the rent would be approximately 18.2 cents while the sales tax would make up the remainder of that amount. All vending machine owners, including Gator, made it explicitly clear to the location owner that the commission check was tax inclusive. During the audit period, it was standard industry practice for the vending machine owner to write a tax inclusive check to the location owner each month. In other words, a check for the amount due the location owner, including rent and tax, is paid to the location owner each month without any notation on the check as to what portion represents the rent and what portion represents the tax. In the case of Gator, its checks carried only the stamped notation "CIG- COM", which represented the words "cigarette commissions." The record shows that except for one small company with relatively few clients, all representative vending machine companies operated in this manner. Gator's Recordkeeping Like other vending machine companies, Gator's records consisted only of hand-written records on index cards. Indeed, Gator kept no computerized records at the time of the audit. More specifically, all calcuations as to taxes owed, the price of cigarettes, tax calculated on cigarettes vended through any given machine, and any additional information pertaining to the individual machines were kept on 8 x 10 white and pink index cards. These cards were commonly referred to as location cards and were updated each time the machine was moved from one location to another and when the price of cigarettes was changed. At the time of the audit, more than 99% of the original white and pink cards from the sample time period requested by the auditor were available for her inspection. The only documentation existing between the location and vending machine owners was the machine or route ticket, which is no different than merchandising tickets showing the number of units sold. This document reflected the amount of packs sold and the amount of money received from each machine but did not contain a separation of commission plus tax. This information was used by Gator to determine the number of packs sold from each machine during the month. The number of packs was then multiplied by the "rate" for that machine to ascertain the commission due the location owner. Although route tickets were contemporaneously prepared by a route (service) man, they were discarded before the audit began. This is probably because in a prior audit conducted in 1983 or 1984 DOR auditors expressed no interest in reviewing the route tickets. In any event, the route tickets are not essential to a resolution of the issues. A pink card was generated by Gator for each machine placed in a lessor's place of business. The card contained information, all written in pencil and amended as necessary, regarding inventory, location of machine, selling price of cigarettes, the negotiated commission rate to be paid to the location owner, and the tax computed on the license fee. The latter item was recorded in the top right hand side of the index card and, when coupled with the independent accounting firm's representation as to the integrity of the accounting system, provides reliable evidence that the commission paid to the location owner was tax inclusive. For example, petitioner's exhibit 2 received in evidence, which contains representative pink cards, reveals that on November 7, 1986, machine number 175 was installed at "River Walk Cruises #1" in Jacksonville and the location owner was thereafter paid a per pack commission of fourteen cents, of which 13.15 cents represented the rent while the remainder represented the sales tax. It is noted again that more than 99% of these cards from the sample period audited were available for inspection. A white card was also prepared for each machine and listed the number of packs sold, the per pack rate, and the amount paid to the location owner. However, it did not contain a breakdown between commission expense and the related tax. In addition, Gator maintained what was known as a monthly report, which was a summation and accumulation of sales information derived from the white cards. The report listed the rate and number of packs sold for each machine. Like the white card, the monthly report did not contain a breakdown between the rent and sales tax. Finally, journals and ledgers were prepared containing summaries of information taken from the machine cards. Expert testimony by two certified public accountants (CPAs) and a longtime industry representative established that petitioner's records (general accounting records, route tickets, location cards and ledgers) were in conformity with good accounting practice and the industry norm. If anything, Gator's records were more comprehensive than most other vending machine companies and satisfied the requirements of applicable rules and statutes. More specifically, by maintaining location cards which show the sales price per pack of cigarettes with a breakdown between the tax and rent, Gator's records were consistent with good accounting practices and the type of recordkeeping maintained by the industry. It was further established that the industry practice is to conduct business on a "tax inclusive" basis, that is, to issue checks without separately stating what portion of the amount is taxes. In addition, cancelled checks, bank statements, journals and ledgers were available to verify commissions paid to various locations. DOR did not challenge the accuracy of this supporting documentation and agreed, for example, that the month-end commission summaries tied into petitioner's journals and checks. Both financial experts concluded, and the undersigned so finds, that the records establish that the taxes were paid. During final hearing, and for the first time during the administrative hearing process, DOR challenged both the testimony of the experts and the reliability of petitioner's records on the ground the CPAs who testified were not present when the checks were written and thus had no personal knowledge that the checks were tax inclusive. However, the CPAs established the integrity of petitioner's recordkeeping and accounting system and the fact that the system used by Gator produces accurate information that can be relied upon by third party users. This was not credibly contradicted. It can be reasonably inferred from these facts that the hand-written notations on the pink cards concerning the sales tax computed on the license fee were accurate and that the corresponding checks paid to the location owners were tax inclusive. DOR also suggested that the penciled entries on the pink cards pertaining to the tax may have been prepared solely for purposes of this litigation and were not contemporaneous. For the reason stated above, this assertion is also rejected. It should be noted further that except for the allegations themselves, DOR did not challenge the authenticity of the records nor produce any evidence of circumstances that would show the records lacked trustworthiness. DOR further contended that because there was no written contract or other tangible evidence of sale between the two owners where the tax was separately stated, there was insufficient evidence to support petitioner's claim that the taxes were paid. Put another way, DOR contended that Gator needed not only internal documents (such as location cards) to verify the payment of taxes, it also needed documents submitted to the location owner reflecting the separation of tax and commission. However, prior to the 1992 amendment to rule 12A-1.044(10), there was no formal or informal requirement to do so nor had DOR given notice of such a need, and since the internal documentation confirms the payment of the taxes, no other evidence is required. Finally, the evidence shows that a vending machine company has never been considered a "dealer" within the meaning of Subsection 212.07(2), Florida Statutes, as asserted by DOR, and thus the requirement in that subsection that a dealer separately state the amount of tax on the evidence of sale is not applicable. Indeed, this interpretation of the statute is consistent with the language in Rule 12A-1.086, Florida Administrative Code, which characterizes the lessor (location owner) rather than the lessee as the dealer. Refund Issue Gator contends that using an error rate of two or three percent, a recomputation of its taxes paid during the audit period reveals that it is owed a refund of $11,015 occasioned by its bookkeeper incorrectly computing the tax due on the gross sales price of cigarettes rather than on the net price. Since the alleged overpayment of taxes occurred during the period from June 1, 1985, through April 30, 1989, the last alleged overpayment of taxes would have occurred shortly after April 30, 1989. Prior to March 10, 1992, when Gator filed its petition for reconsideration with DOR, Gator had not filed a request for a refund on DOR Form 26 (DR-26), which is the form on which refunds must be requested. In its petition for reconsideration, Gator noted that "a Petition for Refund will be filed in the immediate future if this has not previously been accomplished." As of the date of hearing, which was more than three years after the last alleged overpayment of taxes was made, no DR-26 had been filed. Therefore, the request for refund is deemed to be untimely.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order granting the petition of Gator Coin Machine Company, Inc. and rescinding (withdrawing) the assessment set forth in the notice of reconsideration dated June 12, 1992, but denying petitioner's request for a refund of $11,015 for sales taxes allegedly overpaid during the audit period. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4806 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 8-9. Rejected as being unnecessary. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 12-14. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. 15-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 18-20. Rejected as being irrelevant. 21-22. Rejected as being unnecessary. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 25. Rejected as being unnecessary. 26. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 14. 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 28-29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 30-33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 36. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 37. Rejected as being unnecessary. 38-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 40-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 42. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 15. 43-45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 46-49. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 50-51. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 52. Rejected as being unnecessary. 53-54. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 55-56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 61-63. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. 64-65. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 66-68. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 69. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 70-75. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected to the extent it is inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 79-81. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 82. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 14. 83-84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected to the extent it is inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 87-88. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Rejected as being irrelevant since the collection of taxes from Jax Liquors occurred after the audit period. 93-95. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 10. Rejected as being unnecessary. 11a. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 11b. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10, 13 and 15. 11c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 11d. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 12-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, subordinate, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 William A. Friedlander, Esquire Marie A. Mattox, Esquire 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, FL 32303 Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue Is Department of Revenue Rule 12A-1.096(1)(b),(1)(d), (4), and (5)(e)1, Florida Administrative Code, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority? See Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner opened a new commercial laundry facility in Pompano Beach, Florida, in 1993. Petitioner installed in the new facility machinery and equipment costing approximately $1,400,000.00 for the purposes of cleaning and processing linens used by hospitals in the south Florida area (the "Laundry Equipment"). Petitioner charges a fee to hospitals in the south Florida area for cleaning and processing the hospitals' linens with the Laundry Equipment. The new facilities are additional, not replacement, facilities. The Laundry Equipment: Qualifies as "industrial machinery and equipment", as defined by Section 212.08(5)(b) and (6)(c), Florida Statutes; Was purchased by Petitioner for use in a new business; Processes items of tangible personal property, the hospital's linens, at a fixed location; Was purchased before Petitioner first began its productive operations and delivery was made within 12 months of that date; and Has increased productive output at Petitioner's commercial laundry facility. The equipment included a tunnel washer system, conveyers, feeders/folders, ironers, a boiler, and air compressors. By application dated September 3, 1993, Petitioner applied for a temporary tax exemption permit with respect to the Laundry Equipment which it planned to purchase for use in its new business. Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer obtain that permit to receive the exemption. The Department denied Petitioner's application. On August 22, 1994, Petitioner paid to the Department, under protest, the sum of $18,095.36, which represented the tax of $16,773.98, plus interest of $1,321.38, on Petitioner's purchase of the Laundry Equipment. Petitioner timely filed its claim for refund, which the Department denied. Respondent denied Petitioner's request for a temporary tax exemption permit, and Respondent denied Petitioner's refund claim based upon Rule 12A- 1.096, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's request for a tax exemption permit and Petitioner's refund claim are based upon the exemption provided in Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, which applies to a new (as opposed to an expanding) business.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner owes sales tax of $15,230.15 plus interest from October 15, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a sole proprietorship organized in this state and doing business at 851 Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for administering the state sales tax in accordance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.1 In 1992, other businesses located at Petitioner's address reported to Respondent that they paid rent to Petitioner. However, Petitioner did not collect and remit sales tax on the rental income and was not registered as a dealer. On February 3, 1992, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Audit Petitioner's books and records ("Notice of Intent to Audit") for the tax period February 1, 1987, through January 31, 1992. The Notice of Intent to Audit included a detailed list of the books and records needed for Respondent to conduct a detailed audit. The Notice also requested that Petitioner provide Respondent with a date on which it would be convenient to begin the audit. On February 11, 1992, Respondent had not heard from Petitioner. The auditor contacted Petitioner to schedule a date on which the audit could begin. At that time, Petitioner stated that he would not provide the auditor with any books and records. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1990 through 1992 because Petitioner incorrectly suspected that Respondent maintained a secret "blacklist." Petitioner based his suspicion, in part, on the fact that he had refused to respond to a questionnaire Respondent had mailed to taxpayers throughout the state prior to the Notice of Intent to Audit. Petitioner also based his suspicion on the erroneous assumption that Respondent's audit was part of a criminal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") into Petitioner's federal taxes for 1987 and 1988. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1987 through 1989 because those records were in the possession of the IRS. Petitioner maintained that the proposed audit was illegal. Respondent sent Petitioner copies of its statutory authority to audit Petitioner and made numerous attempts to arrange a mutually convenient time to begin the audit. Respondent did not commence the audit until March 10, 1993. On March 10, 1993, the auditor and audit group supervisor met with Petitioner and Mr. Eugene Nail, Petitioner's paralegal. Petitioner stated that he did not have the books and records Respondent needed to conduct a detailed audit because the IRS had confiscated them in connection with the pending criminal case. Respondent conducted the audit using the information Petitioner made available to the auditor. Petitioner made available: sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992 grouped together by calendar month; sales and use tax return booklets; resale and exemption certificates; and commercial lease agreements. No journals and ledgers were available. Respondent determined Petitioner's tax deficiency by sampling the available information. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the auditor used a six month sample period. The auditor explained to Petitioner that she would use Petitioner's invoices during the sample period to determine tax- exempt sales. She compared the invoices to resale certificates and calculated an error ratio based on discrepancies between the sales invoices and the resale certificates. Respondent determined the actual deficiency in sales tax during the six month sample period based on actual invoices that did not have a resale certificate and for which no sales tax was remitted. Respondent estimated the additional deficiency in sales tax by applying the error ratio to the balance of the audit period. Respondent examined only those invoices provided by Petitioner and previous sales tax returns filed by Petitioner. On April 9, 1993, the auditor conducted a meeting with Petitioner and discussed the audit procedures, results, applicable law, and abatement rules. On June 15, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $45,469.05 ("Notice of Intent"). The Notice of Intent included a copy of all audit exhibits and workpapers. On August 30, 1993, Petitioner provided additional invoices to Respondent in a meeting with the auditor and audit group supervisor. On October 15, 1993, the auditor adjusted certain items in the audit file, reduced the proposed assessment, and issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $37,417.45 ("Revised Notice of Intent"). Petitioner requested additional time to provide more information, including additional resale certificates. However, Petitioner failed to provide the additional information. By letter dated December 9, 1993, the audit group supervisor notified Petitioner that she was closing the case and sending it to the Tallahassee office as a contested case. On December 23, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner assessing Petitioner for $37,417.45 in tax, penalty, and interest through October 15, 1993. On February 21, 1994, Respondent received Petitioner's written protest dated February 10, 1994. Respondent revised the audit figures again. On January 20, 1995, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision reducing the assessment against Petitioner to $15,230.15. The Notice of Decision assessed Petitioner for taxes of $8,900.55, penalties of $2,225.14, and interest of $4,104.46 through October 15, 1993. Interest accrues at the per diem rate of $2.93 until paid. On March 16, 1995, Petitioner timely appealed the Notice of Decision by filing a Petition for Formal Hearing with Respondent. Inadequate Records Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records within the meaning of Sections 212.12(6), 212.13(2), 212.35, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.093(2) and (5).2 Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records for the five year audit period prescribed in Section 213.34(2). Petitioner failed to maintain general ledgers and journals for the five year audit period. The only records Petitioner maintained were sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Petitioner was unable to produce adequate records for 1987 through 1989. Petitioner asserted that the IRS had those records and that Petitioner could not obtain the records required by Florida law. The federal tax case has been pending against Petitioner since 1990.3 During those seven years, Petitioner was unable to obtain copies of any records in the possession of the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1987 and 1988 were maintained on computer floppy disks. Petitioner asserts that the floppy disks were lost. Petitioner asserts that his attorney kept the books and records for 1989 in an out-of-state location to avoid producing those records for the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1990 though 1992 are in the possession of Petitioner's accountants. Petitioner did not produce those records during the audit or at the administrative hearing. Petitioner could have requested the journals and ledgers for 1989 through 1991 from his attorney and accountants, respectively, but chose not to do so. Petitioner made available to Respondent only sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Without the general ledgers and cash journals to cross- reference the sales invoices, Respondent could not corroborate the financial records available for audit. Respondent was required by applicable law to conduct the audit by sampling Petitioner's available records. Exempt Sales: Resale Certificates Certain exempt sales claimed by Petitioner during the six month sample period were not supported by resale certificates. Respondent disallowed the exempt sales that were not supported by resale certificates and allowed the invoices that were supported by resale certificates. For the six month sample period, Respondent assessed an actual sales tax deficiency for those sales that did not have a corresponding resale certificate.4 Respondent prepared audit schedules for the six month sample period that listed the invoices with a sales tax deficiency due to the lack of a resale certificate. Based on the audit schedules, Respondent determined an error ratio and applied the error ratio over the five year audit period to determine the estimated tax deficiency.5 Respondent conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted audit procedures and with applicable state law. Disallowed exempt sales were listed individually by invoice, name of vendor, and the date and amount of the sale. Disallowed exempt sales were listed for each of the six months in the sample period. Additional Taxable Sales Sales invoices for the six month sample period showed that Petitioner collected more sales tax than he reported to Respondent on his monthly sales tax returns. Respondent treated the collected, but unremitted, sales tax as "additional taxable sales" rather than as an unremitted sales tax. Respondent assessed Petitioner for the sales tax paid on Petitioner's invoices but not remitted to Respondent by Petitioner. The deficiency existed for May and June, 1990, and for January and February, 1991. Taxable Rent Respondent reviewed lease agreements relating to property rented by Petitioner at his business address. Respondent determined that Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the rental of his property. Respondent assessed Petitioner for sales tax Petitioner failed to collect and remit on taxable rent. Petitioner does not contest that portion of the assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein UPHOLD Respondent's assessment of $15,230.15 plus interest statutorily due from October 15, 1993, until paid.RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1997.
