The Issue The issue presented is whether Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO or Petitioner) properly terminated Christopher Hamilton (Respondent) from his employment as a deputy sheriff for engaging in conduct prohibited in Chapter 89-404, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act), and Petitioner's General Order Section 3-1.3, Rule and Regulations 3.4(d) and 5.21, and General Order Section 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for providing law enforcement and corrections in Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to these cases, Petitioner employed Respondent as a deputy sheriff. Respondent does not dispute that his conduct violated Petitioner’s rules and regulations. Respondent alleges that the penalty of termination is excessive, inconsistent with the progressive discipline policy, and, therefore, disparate. General Order 3-1.3, Rule and Regulation 3.4(d), relates to “Performance of Duty.” The cited provisions require that “All members will be efficient and effective in their assigned duties, performing them in a competent, proficient and capable manner.” For convenience, the cited provisions are referred to as Rule 3.4(d). The evidence shows that from March 2004 through August 8, 2008, Respondent demonstrated a pattern and practice of violating Rule 3.4(d). The individual violations are undisputed, and it is undisputed that the violations arose from Respondent’s inability to complete required reports, to do so in a timely manner, and to be punctual in attendance. It is also undisputed that the violations arose from events in Respondent’s personal life, which included a divorce and custody battle that precipitated a financial crisis for Respondent and the death of Respondent’s father. Finally, Respondent acknowledged during cross-examination that Petitioner attempted to “work with” Respondent during his personal crises. Petitioner first disciplined Respondent for violating Rule 3.4(d) in March 2004. In January 2005, Petitioner issued a formal reprimand for a second violation. Petitioner issued a second formal reprimand for the third violation in February 2005. In May 2007, Petitioner issued a third formal reprimand for a fourth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On December 6, 2007, Petitioner issued a written reprimand to Respondent for a fifth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On April 10, 2008, Petitioner found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender, as defined hereinafter, and suspended Respondent for seven days for violation of Rule 3.4(d). In June of 2008, Respondent again violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to complete and submit reports within the required timeframe. Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d) on May 27, 2008, and again on June 24, 2008. Petitioner notified Respondent that he was required to attend a Vehicle Crash Review Board (VCRB) on May 27, 2008. However, Respondent failed to attend the VCRB. Petitioner re-scheduled the VCRB for June 24, 2008, and notified Respondent that he was required to attend that VCRB. Respondent failed to attend the VCRB on June 24, 2008. General Order 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17, relates to “Timeliness.” The cited provisions state that “Members shall not be late to work without valid reason or authorization,” The cited provisions are referred to for convenience as Rule 2.17. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work on February 28 and March 8, 2008. Petitioner disciplined Respondent for both offenses in a single written reprimand. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work again sometime between June 18 and July 2, 2008. On or about August 8, 2008, Respondent reported to work approximately 30 minutes late in violation of Rule 2.17, and this proceeding began. On September 11, 2008, Petitioner conducted an Administrative Review Board (ARB) meeting at which Respondent testified. The ARB concluded that Respondent had violated Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17 and found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender of both rules. General Order 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.21 (Rule 5.21), defines “Chronic Offender” as a member of the PCSO who violates the same rule or regulation three or more times within an 18-month period. Respondent is a Chronic Offender of Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17. Respondent violated each rule three or more times within an 18-month period. The progressive discipline policy treats Chronic Offender violations as a more severe “Level Five” violation. Petitioner has issued written guidelines that are followed during the disciplinary process and are contained within General Order 10-2. The goal of General Order 10-2 is to standardize the disciplinary process and make the process fair and consistent in application. Consistency is important to ensure fairness for the member being disciplined and for maintaining accountability throughout the agency. General Order 10-2 sets forth a procedure for assigning points for sustained violations based on their severity level. The points range from Level Five to Level One. Level Five violations result in the most serious discipline. The total of points to be assigned in these cases is determined by considering Respondent’s prior disciplinary record. Additional points are assigned for disciplinary violations within the recent past. Total disciplinary points are comprised of points for the current offense, plus carryover points for recent discipline against Respondent. The range of discipline that is appropriate in these cases is based upon the total number of disciplinary points accumulated. The highest or most severe discipline applies because Respondent accumulated more than 100 discipline points. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4823 is 108.3 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4824 is 116 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Termination of employment is reasonable in this proceeding. Termination of employment does not impose disparate discipline on Respondent. From 2005 through the date of the final hearing, nine members of the PCSO have been disciplined within the same discipline range as Respondent. Petitioner terminated the employment of seven of those nine members of the PCSO. Four of Respondent’s exhibits are excerpts of the case files of other PCSO members charged with violating Rule 5.21 as was Respondent. In each case, the alleged violation of the Level Five Chronic Offender rule was based upon repeated violations of Level Three rules. Respondent’s Exhibits 2 and 3 each show a member who violated the Level 3 rule, pertaining to abuse of sick leave a sufficient number of times to be considered a Chronic Offender in violation of Rule 5.21. In both cases, it was the member’s first Chronic Offender violation. Authorized discipline ranged from a suspension to termination of employment. In each case, the member received the minimum length of suspension, which is the minimum discipline in General Order 10-2. This is comparable to and consistent with the seven-day suspension Petitioner imposed against Respondent for his first violation of the Chronic Offender rule. The remaining proposed comparator introduced as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 relates to an agency member disciplined for being a Chronic Offender based on repeated violations of Rule 3.4(d). This was the member’s first violation as a Chronic Offender in Rule 5.21. Like Respondent’s seven-day suspension for his first offense as a Chronic Offender, the member in Respondent’s Exhibit 1 received a suspension corresponding to the bottom of the disciplinary range under the disciplinary policy. Prior to Respondent, no other agency member had been found to have violated the Chronic Offender rule a second time. However, Petitioner’s Exhibit 5 shows that subsequent to Respondent’s discipline, the member referenced by Respondent’s Exhibit 2 was disciplined for violating Rule 5.21 a second time. In similar fashion to Respondent, this member was disciplined as a Chronic Offender for the second time with respect to accumulated violations of the same Level Three rule as the first time he was found to be a Chronic Offender. Like Respondent, this member received the minimum suspension for the first violation of Rule 5.21 and was terminated for the second.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Afienko, Esquire Kenneth J. Afienko, P.A. 560 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Sherwood S. Coleman, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500 James L. Bennett, County Attorney Office of County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed May 28, 1986, Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) charged that Respondent, Theodore Riley (Riley), while employed as an adjuster by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Group, (USF&G), did wrongfully obtain the sum of $400 from a workmens compensation claimant to assure that USF&G would not contest the claim (Count I). The complaint further alleged that on September 16, 1985, Riley entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging a violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes, a felony of the second degree and a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the court withheld adjudication and placed Riley on 18 months probation (Count II). The Department concluded that such conduct demonstrated, inter alia, a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance; fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit; and, a plea of nolo contendere to a felony involving moral turpitude. Section 626.611(7),(9) and (14), Florida Statutes. At hearing, Riley entered a plea of no contest to Count II of the Administrative Complaint in exchange for the Department's dismissal of Count I of the Administrative Complaint and the Department's agreement that the penalty imposed would be limited to a suspension of his eligibility for licensure for a period of two (2) years. While not conditioning his agreement to a two year suspension, Riley did request that the Department consider crediting the time he has been on probation against the two year suspension. The evidence shows that Riley was arrested and charged with the subject offense in March 1985, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere, that adjudication of guilt was withheld, and that he was placed on probation for 18 months commencing September 16, 1985. As a special condition of probation, Riley was ordered not to apply for an adjuster's license during the term of his probationary period. Consistent with the terms of his probation, Riley has not renewed his adjusters' license. The Department's records reflect that Riley's license was last due for renewal, but not renewed, on April 1, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The following facts are stipulated by the parties and are incorporated herein: The Respondent has been the clerk of court for Collier County since June of 1986. The Respondent was the clerk of court at all times material to this complaint. In July of 1990, the Respondent's wife was issued a citation for having glass bottles on the beach, a violation of municipal ordinance No. 16.30, City of Naples. On August 21, 1990, upon failure to timely pay the fine for the violation of the above-described ordinance or to appear in court on this date, an arrest warrant for Theresa Giles was issued. On August 30, 1990, on or about 4:30 p.m., police officers arrived at the Respondent's residence to arrest Ms. Giles for her failure to appear or to pay fine. The officers allowed Ms. Giles to make a telephone call to her husband at the clerk's office. The Respondent went to one of his deputy clerks, Lorraine Stoll and discussed the situation with her. As a result, Ms. Stoll called the officers at the Respondent's home and informed them that the bench warrant for Ms. Giles was recalled. Ms. Giles was not taken into custody as a result of Ms. Stoll's action. These facts are derived from the evidence presented, weighed and credited: Respondent, James Giles was the Collier County finance director, performing the pre-audit function for the county, when he was appointed county clerk to finish a two year term in 1986. He was then elected to a four year term ending in January 1993, and was not reelected. His prior employment experience was as a private certified public accountant, an employee of St. Johns County, and an auditor for the State of Florida. On August 30, 1990, when Theresa Giles called her husband, she was very upset. He had promised to pay the fine, but had forgotten. She was home alone with her young child and her elderly mother when the deputies came to serve the warrant and arrest her. The ticket, or "Notice to Appear" issued to Ms. Giles for her infraction plainly provides notice that if the fine is not paid or the person fails to appear in court at the appointed time, an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Advocate Exhibit No. 2) James Giles immediately called his misdemeanor division and Kathleen Heck answered the phone. After he briefly explained the situation, she went to find the supervisor, Lorraine Stoll. As the two women were at Ms. Stoll's desk, bringing Ms. Giles' case up on the computer, Mr. Giles appeared in person. This was a very unusual situation because the clerk rarely came back to the misdemeanor office. He was Lorraine Stoll's immediate supervisor. He asked if there was anything that could be done and Ms. Stoll responded that the warrant could be recalled. Before she could explain any further, he handed her a paper with his home phone and asked her to make the call. Ms. Giles answered the phone and put the deputy on; Ms. Stoll told him the warrant was recalled, and Ms. Giles was not arrested. Ms. Stoll then told Mr. Giles that the fine and court costs had to be paid. He said the whole thing was ridiculous, that he could not believe a warrant could be issued for such a minor offense. By this time it was after 5:00 p.m. and the cashier's office was closed. Giles paid the $36.50 fine the next day and paid the $100.00 court costs on September 13, some two weeks later. (Respondent's exhibits nos. 1 and 2). James Giles admits being upset at the time that the phone call was made, but was trying to calm down because he knew Lorraine Stoll to be excitable. He was flabbergasted that someone could be arrested for having bottles on the beach. He denies that he pressured Ms. Stoll, but claims he was trying to be rational and get sound advice. He wanted her to make the call because he felt it would "look bad" if he did. James Giles did not raise his voice but both Ms. Stoll and Ms. Heck perceived he was upset and in a pressure situation. Ms. Stoll had never been involved in a circumstance where the warrant was recalled while the deputies were getting ready to make an arrest. She has worked in the misdemeanor section of the clerk's office for eleven and a half years, as deputy clerk. No ordinary citizen could have received the advantage that the clerk and his wife received. Judge Ellis, a Collier County judge, has a written policy providing that a bench warrant may be set aside after payment of costs and fine. Another county judge, Judge Trettis, requires that his office or the State's Attorney be called, and does not have a written policy. Ms. Stoll does not have the authority to recall a warrant without following the proper procedure. This situation was out of the ordinary. She made the telephone call because her boss told her to, and their main concern was that the warrant needed to be recalled so Ms. Giles would not go to jail. On the other hand, Ms. Stoll did not tell Mr. Giles that he was pressuring her, nor did she have the opportunity to tell him the proper procedure before making the telephone call. James Giles' explanation that he was simply seeking advice of his staff and then acting on it without wrongful intent is disingenuous. Whatever his actual knowledge of proper procedures for recalling a warrant, he knew or should have known that what he was doing was not an opportunity available to other citizens. His experience in the clerk's office and in prior public service should have clued him that no one else could simply get a deputy clerk to intercept an arrest with a telephone call.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that James Giles violated Section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending a civil penalty of $250.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4942EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Advocate's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. 8.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. A.-E. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 8 and 12. Rejected as the sequence suggested is contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as misleading. The evidence shows the process was incorrect and both staff knew it was incorrect. The clerk was informed about the correct procedure after the phone call. The procedure is set out in paragraph 13. The evidence is not clear that the fine and costs could not have been paid the same day. By the time Mr. Giles finished complaining, it was after 5:00. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the totality of Ms. Stoll's testimony as well as Ms. Heck's. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. 3. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. More specifically, this proposed finding suggests that the culpability was Ms. Stoll's rather than Respondent's. That suggestion is supported only by Ms. Stoll's timid admissions that she should not have made the phone call without having received the payment from her boss. Ms. Stoll's acceptance of blame does not relieve the Respondent of his responsibility. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig B. Willis Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Raymond Bass, Jr., Esquire Bass & Chernoff 849 7th Avenue, South - Suite 200 Naples, Florida 33940-6715 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based on retaliation for participation in a protected activity in violation of Chapter 760.10(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner (Holden) is an African-American female. At all times relevant to this petition, Holden was employed in a probationary status by the Florida Department of Corrections at Apalachee Correctional Institution (ACI) as a Correctional Officer. Probationary officers are not entitled to progressive discipline, but can be terminated for any reason. At the hearing, Holden withdrew her claims that the Department had discriminated against her based on her race and sex. On or about July 22, 2001, Captain Tullis Scipper responded to a call from the Medical Unit at ACI. Upon his arrival, he observed Officer Holden in front of the Suicide Watch Isolation Cell. She was cussing at the inmate with whom she had a previous confrontation. Scipper explained to her that she was not to argue or verbally abuse the inmate and that she should stay away from the cell. On at least one other occasion that night, Captain Scipper responded to the Medical Unit and observed similar actions by Holden. The next day, Captain Scipper received a call from Warden Adro Johnson, who inquired as to what had happened in the Medical Unit the night before. Warden Johnson had received a complaint from Nurse Carla Weeks that Officer Holden had been cussing the inmates and he was checking into the complaint. Warden Johnson asked Captain Scipper to bring Officer Holden to his office. The purpose of the meeting was not to ascertain whether Officer Holden had been cussing at inmates. The Warden had two eye-witness, staff accounts of her behavior. When confronted, she advised Warden Johnson that she had become angry and had cussed the inmate. Warden Johnson counseled Holden about her behavior. Warden Johnson testified that he felt that Holden was unreceptive to his counseling and that she was argumentative. He believed that she was not displaying the attitude that a good officer displays when he/she is being counseled by a warden. Holden also was upset and crying, and, as a result, Warden Johnson informed her that she needed to adjust her attitude and come back to see him the next day. Warden Johnson testified that he had not made up his mind as to what action he would take against Holden for her actions with the inmate. After the meeting with Warden Johnson, Captain Scipper observed Officers Holden and Shiver arguing with each other. Holden testified that she had asked Shiver about why her tour was changed, and this led to the incident observed by Scipper. In Scipper’s opinion, Holden was the “aggressor” because she continued to advance on Shiver, even though Shiver had his hands in the air and was stating words to the effect that he did not have anything to do with whatever they were arguing about. Knowing that Holden had just had a counseling session with the Warden, Scipper was surprised that Holden would almost immediately be involved in an altercation with a staff member. He relieved Holden of her duties for the rest of her scheduled shift. The next day Holden met as scheduled with Warden Johnson. Captain Scipper did not attend this meeting. Johnson had been informed of the previous day’s incident between Officers Holden and Shiver. He asked Holden if she was willing to change her attitude. He had not determined prior to the meeting if he would take any action at all against Holden. Johnson felt that Holden's response to him was disrespectful, and that she did not have the right attitude. Johnson terminated Holden based on what he perceived to be her poor attitude. He knew that Holden was approaching the end of her probationary status and that if he wanted to terminate her before she attained career service status with its attendant protections, he needed to do so at that time. Petitioner complained in an incident report filed before the Warden the first time that Captain Scipper refused to listen to her when he counseled her about a prior staff altercation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Holden 2103 Vista Road Marianna, Florida 32448 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses; and, if so, whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from employment disqualification would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact APD serves clients with disabilities such as autism, intellectual disabilities, Downs Syndrome, and Prader-Willi Syndrome. APD's clients range from those needing total care to those who can live on their own with minimal assistance. The services APD provides to its clients include personal care, respite care, adult day training, supported living, and a wide variety of other services. The aforementioned services are provided by APD's vendors in individual homes, group homes, and supported living arrangements. Petitioner is seeking to work as a direct service provider in a group home for persons with developmental disabilities. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, mandates that an employer may not hire someone for a position requiring contact with any "vulnerable person" until a completed background screening "demonstrates the absence of any grounds for the denial or termination of employment." The Department of Children and Families ("DCF") administers the background screening process for APD. APD's Action Petitioner's background screening identified three felony counts that are disqualifying criminal offenses, and all for resisting an officer with violence to his person. On November 14, 2016, DCF notified Petitioner that she was disqualified from employment due to her criminal history and specifically because of the three counts of resisting an officer with violence to his person from a November 26, 1975, Miami Dade incident. On or around December 1, 2016, Petitioner submitted a request for exemption, which included the exemption application and questionnaire to DCF. The instructions provided: "[f]or EACH criminal offense appearing on your record, please write your DETAILED version of the events and be specific. Attach extra pages as needed and please type or write legibly. When Petitioner filled out the questionnaire, she provided the following answers to each question on the exemption questionnaire: Question #1 asked for "disqualifying incident(s)." Petitioner responded "3 Counts of Resisting Arrest with Violence." In response to Question #2 "Non-disqualifying Offenses(s)," Petitioner again provided none of the details surrounding these offenses. She listed two non-disqualifying offenses, "Battery" and "Petit Theft" to which she had criminal dispositions. Question #3 asks, "What is the current status in the court system?" Petitioner responded, "N/A." In Response to Question #4 on her Exemption Questionnaire, regarding "the degree of harm to any victim or property (permanent or temporary), damages or injuries," Petitioner indicated "N/A." In answering Question #5, about whether there were "any stressors in [her] life at the time of the disqualifying incident," Petitioner again indicated "N/A." Question #6 asked whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner responded: "[D]ivorced living at home with my 3 minor children. I am a spokes-person for the SEIU union. Fight for Fifteen. I feed the homeless in my community." As confirmed at hearing, Petitioner listed educational achievements and training as the following: Fla College of Business – Certified Nursing Assistant (1985) National School of Technology – Surgical Tech (1998) Food Service – Brevard C.C. Under Question #8 of the Exemption Questionnaire, in response to the question whether she had ever received any counseling, Petitioner indicated "N/A." Question #9 of the Exemption Questionnaire asks, "Have you ever used/misused drugs and alcohol? Please be specific and list the age at which you started and how you started." Petitioner again responded "N/A." Question #10 of the Exemption Questionnaire asks whether Petitioner was involved in any community activities. Petitioner responded, "I have volunteered with Senator Dwight Bullard, Fla. State Rep. McGhee, Mayor Woodard, Joe Garcia, etc." Question #11 asks the applicant to "Document any relevant information related to the acceptance of responsibility for disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses." Petitioner responded as follows: "Yes. I accept responsibility at the time of this offense I was 17 years of age and trying to fit in with my friends. I have learned when you know better you do better." The Exemption Questionnaire also requested Petitioner to provide her three prior years' work history. Petitioner provided detailed information about her 18-year work history in the health care field, which included care of the vulnerable community. Petitioner has worked in a hospital, nursing home, private home, and with both mental health and hospice patients. Petitioner's answer also outlines how she had performed some of the same job responsibilities as a direct service provider for the following employers: JR Ranch Group Home LLC: C.N.A 10/3/16 to present-Companion to individual bathing, feeding, dressing, grooming, etc. Nurse Plus Agency: C.N.A. 3/12/08 to 9/7/15- Working in private homes with hospice patients bathing, feeding grooming, shaving, R.O.M. T.C.C. vital signs, doctor's appointments, etc. Gramercy Park Nursing Home: C.N.A. 2/15/05 to 3/12/08-Working in skilled nursing facility doing patient care, vitals, charting, lifting, bathing, feeding, dressing, physical therapy, etc. Jackson M. Hospital: C.N.A. 1/7/98 to 5/8/2001-Working on HIV unit, patient care, R.O.M., bed making, bathing, feeding, dressing, shaving, oral care, transferring, lifting, etc. On December 15, 2016, DCF sent a letter to Petitioner requesting additional documentation to complete the exemption application. Petitioner was asked to "provide the arrest report (from arresting agency) and CERTIFIED court disposition JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE" for the following offenses appearing on [her] criminal history screening report: 05/20/2013 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BW DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED 5/11/2002 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 5/11/2002 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 12/22/2001 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, COUNTY ORD VIOL 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATT-POL OFF 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, RESISTING OFFICER 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, RESISTING OFFICER 4/11/1994 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGG ASSLT - WEAPON 4/11/1994 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGG ASSAULT –WEAPON 01/14/1991 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, SHOPLIFTING 11/07/1981 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, ASSAULT 11/07/1981 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, RESISTING OFFICER 11/07/1981 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISORDERLY CONDUCT The DCF letter also instructed Petitioner that if she could not obtain the arrest report and/or court disposition, she might submit a notarized written "detailed statement on each arrest explaining why you were arrested. You must include the victim's age and relationship to you and the sentence you received (probation, jail, prison, etc)." Additionally, the letter requested proof of income, an affidavit of good moral character, two to five letters of recommendation, and a personal history explaining what happened with each arrest, current home life, education, training, family members, goals, and community involvement. The letter provided Petitioner a 30-day deadline and notified Petitioner "[n]o further action [would] be taken on [her] application for exemption until we receive the requested information." (emphasis added). On or about December 21, 2016, Petitioner complied with the DCF letter and provided 99 pages of documents including Florida Criminal History Record requested, certified police arrest reports, notarized printed dockets of her criminal offenses with court dispositions, notarized document from the Clerk of Circuit and County Court Harvey Ruvin listing all Petitioner's criminal charges and court dispositions available in Miami-Dade, certificate of parole, 2009 certificate of restoration of civil rights, taxes, nursing assistant certification, certificate of liability insurance, continuing education certificates, program certificates, June 13, 2015, White House Conference on Aging program listing Petitioner as a speaker at the White House, 2015 newspaper articles detailing Petitioner's substantive work in minimum pay raise advocacy nationwide for the Fight for Fifteen campaign, letters of recommendation, driving history records, ACHA exemption to work in the healthcare field as a Certified Nursing Assistant ("CNA"), and a personal statement. Petitioner's personal statement and testimony at hearing provided a comprehensive history of how she has been a caregiver since 1982 "working [i]n hospitals, nursing homes, mental health, hospice, private homes, SLF, etc." Petitioner's statement further detailed that she became a Certified Nursing Assistant in 1985 after the disqualifying offense incident and became a surgical technician in 1997. Petitioner also provided the requested following explanations for each of her arrests: 1.) 11/26/1975: I was arrested for (3) counts of resisting arrest with violence. At the time I was 17 years of age hanging with the wrong crowd. 2.) 11/07/1981: Was at a party drinking got in fight with boyfriend. No case action. 3.) 01/14/1991: In store buying groceries didn't realize there were a pair of socks in my buggy charged with petty theft no way I would have stolen a pair of one dollar socks. Judge was dumbfounded. 4.) 04/11/1994: Got into argument with my mother in which she was drinking she called police to say I had a gun. In which was not true. Office[r] ask me had I ever been to jail I stated yes he then said put your hands behind your back then placed me under arrest. My Mom was there next morning to bond me out. Case No Action. 5.) 09/28/1996: I was witness to a murder I told officer what I seen but didn't want to speak in front of people, also did not want to be labeled as a snitcher. I told the officer I would come to talk but I would not walk with him. I proceeded to walk away the officer grabbed me by the back of my hair, the officer and I proceeded to fight at that time other people got involved. The lead detective asked the officer why he did that. The lead detective promise me he would come to court with me in which he did case was dismissed. Case No Action. 6.) Boyfriend and I got into argument he was drinking and he wanted to drive I told him no he wouldn't give me my keys, so I proceeded to knock head lights out. Case No Action. 7.) 01/13/1998: Got in fight with boyfriend. Case No Action. Petitioner responded to the best of her ability to each of DCF's requests for information. DCF summarized Petitioner's 99 document submission in an Exemption Review Summary ("summary") and forwarded the application, questionnaire, and supporting documents to APD for review. The summary correctly identified Petitioner's 1975 acts of resisting an officer as the disqualifying offenses. The summary outlined twelve non-disqualifying offenses with which Petitioner was charged. However, the summary categorized one non-disqualifying offense as a driving charge and outlined an additional nine non-disqualifying offenses as dismissed or dropped, as Petitioner had reported in her personal statement when she said "no action" was taken. The summary only listed a 1991 shoplifting charge and a 2001 county ordinance violation for which Petitioner was prosecuted. On March 17, 2017, Agency Director Barbara Palmer advised Petitioner by letter that her request for an exemption from the disqualification has been denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. On May 1, 2017, Petitioner requested to appeal APD's denial. Hearing At hearing, as well as in the exemption package, Petitioner took full responsibility for her disqualifying offenses. At hearing, Cunningham also showed remorse. In her personal statement she stated she "paid her debt to society . . . learned from [her] mistakes." Petitioner also credibly explained the circumstances at hearing for her 1975 disqualifying convictions and testified that she was 17 years old when she broke into the neighbor's empty house across the street and was hanging out there. When she was arrested they were handling her roughly. She was originally charged with burglary, larceny and resisting arrest. The burglary and larceny charges were dropped and she pled to three counts of resisting an officer with violence to his person. Petitioner was sentenced to a youth program but left it, was bound over as an adult, and was sentenced to prison where she served three and a half years. Petitioner successfully completed her parole on August 23, 1981, and her civil rights were restored on May 8, 2008. Petitioner testified to her other non-disqualifying offenses as she had detailed in her personal statement. She explained that the 1981 criminal charge was dropped and stemmed from a fight with her boyfriend while at a party where she had been drinking. In 1994, her mom, who was a drinker, was acting out and called the police on Petitioner. Her mother lied and told the police Petitioner had a gun, which she did not. The police asked Petitioner if she had been to jail previously and she answered yes and was arrested. Her mother came and got her out of jail the next morning and the case was dismissed. Petitioner verified that in 1996, she would not tell the police officer what she saw regarding a murder because she was going to the police station to report it privately. The officer grabbed her from behind, they fell to the ground, and she was arrested for Battery on an Officer. The next day the lead detective came to court and testified on Petitioner's behalf that the officer's behavior was inappropriate and Petitioner was released and the charges were dropped. Petitioner also explained that she received another arrest because her boyfriend was drunk and took her car keys and was going to drive. Petitioner testified she could not stop him so she knocked the headlights and windows out of her car to prevent him from driving and ultimately the charges were dropped. Petitioner confirmed at hearing that at least nine of the criminal charges she obtained were either dismissed or dropped and she had not been arrested in over 10 years. Petitioner's credible detailed testimony during the hearing was information that APD did not have the benefit of having while reviewing her application. Petitioner affirmed that she had a July 1999 public assistance fraud case on which adjudication was withheld for her trading food stamps to pay her light bill. DCF failed to ask Petitioner about the case in the request letter with the list of other charges. Petitioner admitted that the public assistance fraud case was the only case in which Petitioner had to make restitution. She paid back the total amount of food stamps she sold and then her food stamps were reinstated. Evelyn Alvarez ("Alvarez"), APD Regional Operations Manager for the Southern Region, made an independent review of Petitioner's Request for Exemption, Petitioner's Exemption Questionnaire, and documentation submitted on December 21, 2016. Among the factors identified by Alvarez as a basis for the recommendation of denial of the exemption was the perception that Petitioner's application was incomplete. Alvarez determined Petitioner did not take responsibility for her arrests or show any remorse. Alvarez testified that APD needs to be able to rely on the answers provided by the applicant in the Exemption Questionnaire to get the information needed to decide whether to grant an exemption. Although she relied on other information gathered as well, what the applicant stated in the Exemption Questionnaire is very important. Alvarez explained that she considered both Petitioner's disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses, the circumstances surrounding those offenses, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the disqualifying incident, and finally, any other evidence indicating whether the applicant will present a danger to vulnerable APD clients if employment is allowed. Alvarez also testified that she looked for consistency in the applicant's account of events in her Exemption Questionnaire, whether or not the applicant accepted responsibility for her actions and whether the applicant expressed remorse for her prior criminal acts. Alvarez concluded that there were inconsistencies between Petitioner's account of her disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses compared with those found in the police reports. Alvarez further testified she was concerned that Petitioner had numerous traffic citations. Alvarez explained the citations concerned her because individuals who are granted exemptions would potentially be in positions to transport clients and an applicant that maintains a good driving record demonstrates an ability to ensure the health and safety of clients being served. At hearing, Petitioner testified that her driving record "was not the best." The summary detailed that the 2008 infractions included failure to pay required tolls, improper left, and lack of proof of insurance. Petitioner also had other driving offenses, such as a DWLS and Driver License in 2007 and a safety belt violation in 2006. After her review, Alvarez decided that Petitioner had exhibited a continuing pattern of criminal offenses over an extended period of time, many of which were violent and involved fights, and she concluded Petitioner had not demonstrated rehabilitation. At hearing, Tom Rice ("Rice"), APD Program Administrator for Regional Supports/Licensing, testified that an individual's good character and trustworthiness is important for individuals who provide direct care for APD because service providers are frequently responsible for assisting individuals in making decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. APD must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Rice explained that APD's clients are susceptible to abuse because they are reliant on others to assist with intimate tasks, such as getting dressed, going to the bathroom, feeding, medicine, and funds. Direct service providers need to care and keep clients safe. Rice verified that Petitioner was eligible to work in an APD group home as a CNA. Rice also testified that APD was concerned with Petitioner's failure to disclose details in her accounts regarding her criminal offenses because it calls into question her trustworthiness. He further testified such factors demonstrate a pattern of poor judgment and decision-making and provide cause for APD to question Petitioner's fitness for providing services to the vulnerable individuals for which it is responsible and that is why Petitioner was denied. Findings of Ultimate Fact Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses of resisting an officer with violence to his person and that she will not present a danger to disabled or otherwise vulnerable persons with whom she would have contact if employment in a group home were allowed. Petitioner has shown she is a responsible individual by successfully holding jobs in the health field for approximately 18 years. Her employment has been in positions where she cared for vulnerable persons and no evidence was presented that Petitioner was a danger while doing so. Instead, Petitioner's exemption package mirrors her credible testimony of her previous employment serving as a companion, bathing, feeding, dressing, grooming, taking vital signs, transporting patients to doctor's appointments, and working in a private home, which are personal care services that some direct service providers also supply. Petitioner was honest and forthright about her past and supplied 99 pages detailing her past to comply with DCF's request to complete her application. Petitioner testified convincingly that she has turned her life around. Petitioner's only disqualifying offenses occurred over 40 years ago. Even though she was arrested at least twelve times since then, nine of the charges were dismissed and Petitioner's last criminal arrest was 2002. Petitioner also obtained three certificates after her disqualifying offenses. Petitioner received licensure as a CNA and she has been successfully practicing under her license with an ACHA exemption in the health care field. Some of Petitioner's work has even been with vulnerable adults in both a hospital and nursing home. The undersigned further finds that denial of Petitioner's exemption request would constitute an abuse of discretion. As discussed above, it appears Respondent relied heavily on the initial application submitted, hearsay in the police reports, and traffic infractions, and failed to adequately consider the 99 pages and nine dismissed charges Petitioner provided regarding her rehabilitation. In doing so, Respondent failed to properly evaluate Petitioner's disqualifying offenses having occurred over 40 years ago and the last non-disqualifying criminal arrest being at least 15 years ago and the majority of the charges being dismissed. The evidence also indicates that Petitioner has performed successfully in a healthcare work setting, including some care of vulnerable individuals. Additionally, Petitioner has gone above and beyond to contribute in the community. She volunteers with the homeless and also volunteers with legislators and a mayor, and advocated nationally for a minimum wage increase in the Fight for Fifteen campaign, serving as the spokes-person. In 2015, the White House also extended an invitation to Petitioner to speak because of her advocacy, and Petitioner passed the background check and screening that the secret service conducted. As Petitioner testified at hearing, had she been any type of threat or been dangerous or violent based on her previous arrests, she would not have passed the high security screening and been allowed in the White House to speak. Petitioner also testified she does not have anything to hide. She demonstrated, by credible and very compelling evidence, that she made wrong decisions and took the initiative to turn her life around. For these reasons, it is determined that no reasonable individual, upon fully considering the record in this proceeding could find that Petitioner is not rehabilitated. The concerns expressed by Respondent in formulating its intended action, without the benefit of hearing testimony, particularly with those regarding her untruthfulness and lack of remorse for her actions, were effectively refuted by the credible testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order granting Petitioner, Molita Cunningham's, request for an exemption from disqualification from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Kurt Eric Ahrendt, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Molita Cunningham 12437 Southwest 220th Street Miami, Florida 33170 (eServed) Jada Williams, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 335E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Michael D. Ely, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and licensing law enforcement officers pursuant to Florida law. As such, the Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary actions against law enforcement officers. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer holding certificate number 1119822. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was employed by the Escambia County Sheriff's Office and worked as a deputy sheriff assigned to road patrol for a designated geographic area within the county. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was romantically involved with or was residing with an individual identified in this record as Greta Fernandez or Greta Brown. By his admission, the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown began around the first of August 2002. The Respondent met Ms. Brown while he was working an off duty job at Pensacola Beach. His romantic interest in her began in earnest a short while later after he bumped into her at a club known as "Coconuts." Shortly after beginning his association with Ms. Brown, the Respondent was verbally counseled by his superior officer regarding his choice of friends. Officers are warned not to socialize with and associate themselves with undesirable persons. Concerns over the Respondent's association with Ms. Brown continued and eventually led to a written report (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) issued on September 21, 2002. According to the Respondent, an individual named Patty Clark verbally teased and tormented Ms. Brown's minor child as the student left the school bus en route home. While the child did not testify in this cause it is presumed for purposes of this record that the extent of the "teasing" included verbal comments and a hand gesture commonly referred to as "the finger." It was alleged that the child was very upset by the incident. At Ms. Brown's urging, on or about September 21, 2002, the Respondent contacted Ms. Clark by telephone and identified himself as a deputy sheriff. He further admonished Ms. Clark to cease her behavior regarding the minor child and issued a veiled comment regarding the status of Ms. Clark's driving privileges (suspended). The Respondent did not write up the incident, did not refer the matter to other law enforcement who might have jurisdiction over the matter (e.g. the Pensacola police department), or take any official action against Ms. Clark. Other than the telephone call that was intended to curb Ms. Clark's actions toward the child, the Respondent took no other official action against the alleged perpetrator. Because she did not appreciate the manner in which she had been contacted, Ms. Clark filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Sheriff's Office. That complaint led to the written counseling report noted in paragraph 6. It is not alleged that Ms. Clark's actions or comments to the minor child constituted any criminal behavior. Moreover, other than to pacify Ms. Brown and presumably her child, it is unknown why the Respondent would have used his official position as a deputy sheriff to pursue the matter. If Ms. Clark committed a crime or an actionable infraction, the Respondent's wiser course would have been to refer the matter/incident to an appropriate law enforcement authority. As it happened, the Respondent attempted to use his official position of authority to secure a benefit for himself, his girlfriend and/or her child, that is, to coerce the alleged perpetrator (Ms. Clark) and to thereby keep her from interacting with the minor again. Despite the counseling on September 21, 2002, and in contrast to his testimony in this cause on October 15, 2003 (that his relationship with Ms. Brown ended "like the second week of September of 2002"), the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown did not end in September 2002. The weight of the credible evidence supports the finding that the Respondent continued seeing Ms. Brown after the second week of September 2002 and knew or should have known that she associated with persons whose reputations were less than stellar. In fact, the Respondent admitted that he utilized resources available to him through the Sheriff's Office to run background checks on at least two of Ms. Brown's friends because he thought they were "no good." More telling, however, is the fact that the Respondent admitted receiving and delivering to Ms. Brown what he believed were narcotic pills (from Dan Faircloth). The Respondent admitted that Ms. Brown did not go to physicians or doctors on a regular basis for treatment. He also knew that Mr. Faircloth was neither a doctor nor a pharmacist. Finally, the Respondent knew that Ms. Brown continued to receive and take pills for her alleged pain. How the Respondent could have imagined it appropriate for Mr. Faircloth to supply drugs to Ms. Brown is not explained in this record. Whether or not the pills actually were a controlled substance is unknown. It is certain the Respondent believed them to be. Eventually, the Respondent admitted to his superior that he found a crack pipe in his apartment (presumably owned by Ms. Brown). When the incident of the pipe came out, the Respondent was again instructed to break off his relationship with Ms. Brown. As late as November 2002 the Respondent continued to be in contact with Ms. Brown. The Sheriff's Office was by that time so concerned regarding the Respondent's poor judgment in his selection of associates that Lt. Spears felt compelled to write a memorandum to her superior regarding various allegations. One of the incidents that triggered an internal affairs investigation was the Respondent's disclosure to Ms. Brown that the Sheriff's Office was looking for one of her former friends. Ms. Brown tipped the person (for whom an arrest warrant had been issued) off that deputies were looking for her. Based upon the warning of her impending arrest, the suspect fled the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the suspect's arrest was delayed due to the Respondent's disclosure of the warrant information to Ms. Brown. At some point a reasonable person, and certainly a trained law enforcement officer, should have known that Ms. Brown and her associates were not appropriate persons with whom to socialize. In fact, when the Respondent elected to run a background check on Ms. Brown (presumably to check the status of her driving privileges) because he did not want her to drive his vehicle without a valid license, he should have questioned whether or not he should associate with someone he might not be able to trust. When two of her friends were arrested as a result of his checks on them, he should have clearly known to disassociate from Ms. Brown. That he remained in the relationship for as long as he did is incomprehensible. The Respondent offered no rational explanation for his behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding the Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by law and that the Respondent's certification be revoked based upon the severity of the conduct, the number of violations established by this record, and the lack of mitigating circumstances to support a lesser penalty. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9675 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Roy M. Kinsey, Jr., Esquire Kinsey, Troxel, Johnson & Walborsky, P.A. 438 East Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32502
The Issue Whether Petitioner violated Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.1(002), 3-1.3(066), and 3-1.3(067), and, if so, whether Petitioner should be terminated from his position with the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office.
Findings Of Fact Based on a review of the case file, the Transcript of the final hearing, and the exhibits entered into evidence, the following Findings of Fact are found. On July 13, 2001, Dominguez was assigned to foot patrol at the K-Mart store in South Pasadena, Florida, as a community police officer. At that time he had been employed by the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office for approximately sixteen and one-half years. On the evening of July 13, 2001, Dominguez was standing outside K-Mart talking to an employee of K-Mart, Renee Herrington (Herrington). While talking to Herrington, Dominguez observed a white van and a black sport utility vehicle (SUV) parked in front of K-Mart next to a yellow curb. The area in which the vehicles were parked was marked by a faded “no Dominguez observed the vehicles for a time and when no one moved the vehicles, he decided to cite both vehicles for parking violations. He issued a citation to the white van and then proceeded to the black SUV. The SUV had been parked in front of K-Mart by Maryellen Ruvolo (Ruvolo) while she and her niece went into K-Mart to make a purchase. Ruvolo left the vehicle running, and her sister and two nephews remained in the vehicle. Dominguez went to the rear of the SUV and began writing the ticket. Ruvolo’s sister, Eugenia Quinn (Quinn), got out of the SUV and asked Dominguez to not issue the ticket and allow her to move the vehicle. Dominguez refused her requests and gave the ticket to Quinn. Dominguez started walking in the direction of Herrington, who was sitting on a bench approximately 30 yards away from the vehicles. When Ruvolo returned to the vehicle, Quinn gave her the ticket and told her that Dominguez would not let her move the SUV. Ruvolo turned in the direction of Dominguez and shouted, “Have a nice day, you fucking fat bastard.” Dominguez turned around and went back to where Ruvolo was standing. He wanted to confront her about her comment. Ruvulo started to yell after Dominguez went up to her. He arrested her, handcuffed her, and put her in his patrol car. The charge was disorderly conduct. During the confrontation between Dominguez and Ruvolo, none of the members of the public became involved in the dispute and Ruvolo did not incite any members of the public to participate in the dispute. She never physically or verbally threatened Dominguez. Ruvolo’s actions did not invade the right of others to pursue their lawful activities. Herrington went back inside K-Mart and other members of the public were not disrupted in their entering and leaving K-Mart. Quinn asked Dominquez why he was arresting her sister and he told her that he did not get paid enough to put up with what Ruvolo had said. While he was arresting Ruvolo, Dominguez had requested assistance from another deputy sheriff, Kelvin Franklin. When Deputy Franklin arrived on the scene the confrontation was over. Dominguez asked Franklin to go inside K-Mart and get the address of Herrington, who had witnessed the incident. Dominguez did not request Franklin to take a statement from Herrington. On the way to the jail, Ruvolo apologized to Dominguez, and he told her to shut up. Prior to reaching the jail, Ruvolo stopped for a few minutes in a parking lot and met with his supervisor to get some in-service papers. When they reached the jail, Dominguez was advised that there were six persons to be processed ahead of Ruvolo. Dominguez got out of the patrol car and turned off the ignition. He did some paperwork on the trunk of his patrol car while waiting. He left Ruvolo in the patrol car without air conditioning and the windows rolled up for approximately six or seven minutes. He returned to the vehicle and turned on the ignition and waited to be called to take Ruvolo inside the jailhouse. They waited approximately 20 minutes from the time they got to the jail until they entered it. Ruvolo spent approximately five hours in jail and was required to post bail before she could be released. After arresting Ruvolo, Dominguez prepared his incident/offense report and complaint/arrest affidavit. Dominguez admitted during his testimony that neither the arrest report nor the arrest affidavit set forth facts to establish the elements for the offense of disorderly conduct, the crime for which he arrested Ruvolo. Dominguez told the Administrative Review Board (ARB) that he felt that Herrington’s peace had been disturbed. Dominguez did not talk with Herrington between the time he heard Ruvolo make her remarks to him and the time he arrested Ruvolo. When asked why he had not included any statements from Herrington in his report, he replied, “Laziness.” During the ARB hearing, Dominguez stated that he had no excuse for not completing a thorough report and detailing the elements of the crime. He acknowledged the position that he placed the Sheriff's Office in when he did not do a complete and thorough report. Ruvolo and Quinn made complaints to the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office about Dominguez’s actions. The complaints alleged that Dominguez was rude, intimidating, and unprofessional in his behavior during the July 13, 2001, incident. Ruvolo also alleged her arrest to be false. As a result of the complaints, Sergeant Tim Pelella (Pelella) of the Administrative Investigations Division of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office conducted preliminary interviews of Ruvolo and Quinn. During the course of the interview, Ruvolo recognized that she would have to pursue her false arrest claim through the courts. Pellella referred the matter to the commander of the road patrol division for investigation of the non-arrest components of the complaints. The complaints were referred to Sergeant Jay Morey (Morey), Dominguez’s immediate supervisor. Sergeant Morey talked to Dominguez and Herrington, but did not talk to either Ruvolo or Quinn. Morey concluded that he would not sustain the complaint, but his conclusion was never finalized or reduced to writing. The arrest for disorderly conduct was referred to the State Attorney’s Office for prosecution. The arrest report and arrest affidavit were reviewed by Assistant State Attorney Lydia Wardell, who concluded that neither the report nor the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to prosecute the case. As a result, a No Information was filed by the State Attorney’s Office disposing of the charges against Ruvolo, stating: “The facts and circumstances revealed do not warrant prosecution at this time.” As a result of the decision not to prosecute, the Administrative Investigation Division of the Sheriff’s Office retrieved the complaints from Morey and began its investigation of the false arrest complaint. It is the policy of the Sheriff’s Office not to investigate allegations of false arrest until such time as the State Attorney’s Office makes a decision on whether to prosecute. Dominguez was notified that an investigation was being initiated. Dominguez gave a sworn statement to the investigators assigned to the case. Ruvolo and other witnesses also gave sworn statements. After the investigation was completed, Dominguez was given an ARB hearing. In accord with General Order 10-2 of the Sheriff’s Office, at least one member of Dominguez’s chain of command sat on his ARB hearing. Prior to the hearing, the ARB members are given a copy of the investigation conducted by the Administrative Investigation Division. At the hearing Dominguez was permitted to offer a statement, to respond to questions, and to present additional evidence. The ARB made the following determination: On July 13, 2001, Manuel Dominguez, #52303, while on duty in Pinellas County, Florida; did violate the Pinellas County Sheriff's Civil Service Act Laws of Florida, 89-404 as amended by Laws of Florida 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4, by violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations and operating procedures of the Office of the Sheriff. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.1 (Level Five Violation), 002, relating to Loyalty, to wit: Members shall maintain their loyalty to the Sheriff's Office and it's [sic] members as is consistent with law and professional ethics as established in General Order 3-2. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you failed to abide by the PCSO Code of Ethics, to wit: You acted officiously or permitted personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or friendships to influence your decisions while in the performance of duty as a deputy sheriff. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three Violation), 066, relating to Performance of Duty, to wit: All members will be efficient in their assigned duties. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you failed to accurately document an incident that resulted in the arrest of a citizen of this county. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three Violation), 067, relating to Performance of Duty, to wit: All members will be effective in their assigned duties. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you effected an arrest which the State Attorney's Office could not prosecute because you were ineffective in your assigned duties. The violations resulted in a cumulative point total of 75 points. A Level Five violation is given a point value of 50 points. A Level Three violation is given a point value of 15 points. The ARB assigned a total of 25 points for the two Level Three violations and 50 points for the Level 5 violation. There were no previous discipline points added. The discipline range for 75 points is from a ten-day suspension to termination. The ARB recommended the maximum penalty of termination. General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office deals with disciplinary procedures. It provides that the termination procedure to be followed is the same as that of a member who is suspended without pay with certain additional procedures. Only the sheriff has the authority to terminate a member of the Sheriff’s Office. A member can only be terminated “subsequent to an Administrative Investigation Division investigation supported by findings and disciplinary action recommended by a Administrative Review Board, and at the instruction of the Sheriff” that the member be terminated. At the time that the ARB made its recommendation that Dominguez be terminated, Rice, the Pinellas County Sheriff, was out of the state. He had discussed Dominguez’s disciplinary case with Chief Deputy Coats (Coats) prior to leaving the state. Rice had specifically authorized Coats to impose discipline, including termination, upon Dominguez that was consistent with the ARB’s recommendations. Coats advised Rice of the findings and recommendations of the ARB. Rice told Coats that he had no problem with terminating Dominguez. Coats signed the inter- office memoranda for Rice, advising Dominquez of the findings and recommendations of the ARB and advising of the decision to terminate Dominguez from employment with the Sheriff's Office. Coats was instructed by Rice to terminate Dominguez. In his deposition, Rice stated that Dominguez should have been terminated and that it was his decision to approve Dominguez's termination. Dominguez did not know the elements of the offense of disorderly conduct when he arrested Ruvolo. He felt that he could arrest her for her inappropriate comments to him. At the final hearing, Dominguez admitted that based on his long career in law enforcement that he should have known what constituted disorderly conduct. Dominguez was insulted by Ruvolo's name-calling and felt that her words were a challenge to the uniform of a deputy sheriff. Dominguez allowed his personal feelings to influence his decision to arrest Ruvolo.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a Final Order finding Manuel R. Dominguez guilty of violating the Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as set forth in September 27, 2001, inter-office memorandum and upholding the termination of Manuel R. Dominguez from his employment as a deputy sheriff with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Laubach, Esquire Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association 14450 46th Street, North Suite 115 Clearwater, Florida 33762 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34756 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186
