The Issue Whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against the Petitioner on the basis of national origin,1 in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes (2005).2
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., owns and operates specialty retail stores. Its headquarters are located in Dallas, Texas. In the summer of 2005, Neiman Marcus began hiring personnel to work in a new store that would open in the fall of 2005 in the Town Centre mall in Boca Raton, Florida. Ms. Jean-Pierre is a permanent resident alien in the United States. She was born in Haiti in 1970 and entered the United States in 1983. In September 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre was employed as a sales associate in the accessories section of the Nordstrom department store in the Town Centre mall when she was approached by two women who inquired about Chanel sunglasses. They requested her business card and later called to tell her that they were very impressed with her sales skills. They asked if she was interested in working as a sales associate at the new Neiman Marcus store. Ms. Jean-Pierre applied for a position with Neiman Marcus, went through an interview and a drug test, and was hired to begin work on October 24, 2004. Hurricane Wilma hit South Florida on October 24, 2005, and the Neiman Marcus employees were not able to go to the hiring site during the week following the hurricane. As a result, the newly-hired employees who were to begin work on October 24, 2005, including Ms. Jean-Pierre, were told to report to work on November 1, 2005. Ms. Jean-Pierre's group of newly-hired employees joined the group of newly-hired employees that were to report to work on October 31, 2005. Because there were a large number of people, they were split in two groups. Ms. Jean-Pierre's group went to the store site to begin training on the first day they reported for work, while the other group reported to the hiring center to receive training and to complete the paperwork required of newly-hired employees. Ms. Jean-Pierre's group went to the hiring center on November 3, 2005, for training and to complete their paperwork. All newly-hired employees of Neiman Marcus are required to complete an Immigration and Naturalization Service Employment Eligibility Verification form, known as the "I-9 Form." The I-9 Form consists of three pages. The first page is divided into three sections, two of which must be completed for newly- hired employees. The second page consists of the instructions for completing the I-9 Form, and these instructions "must be available during completion of this form." The third page is headed "Lists of Acceptable Documents" and consists of List A, List B, and List C. Section 1 on the front of the I-9 Form, Employee Information and Verification, must be completed and signed by the employee. The employee must include his or her name, address, maiden name (if applicable), date of birth, social security number, and an attestation, given "under penalty of perjury," that the employee is either a "citizen or national" of the United States, a "Lawful Permanent Resident," or an "Alien authorized to work" in the United States. Section 2 of the I-9 Form, Employer Review and Verification, must be completed and signed by the employer. The employer is required to examine one document from List A ("Documents that Establish Both Identity and Employment Eligibility"), or one document from List B ("Documents that Establish Identity") and one document from List C ("Documents that Establish Employment Eligibility"). The document or documents provided by the employee must be listed in Section 2, and the employer or a representative of the employer must sign the form, attesting, "under penalty of perjury," that he or she has "examined the document(s) presented by the above-named employee, that the above listed document(s) appear to be genuine and to relate to the employee named, that the employee began employment of (month/day/year) and that to the best of my knowledge the employee is eligible to work in the United States." The "Instructions" sheet that must be available during completion of the I-9 Form directs the employee to complete Section 1 of the form "at the time of hire, which is the actual beginning of employment." The instructions direct the employer, in pertinent part, to complete Section 2 by examining evidence of identity and employment eligibility within three (3) business days of the date employment begins. If employees are authorized to work, but are unable to present the required document(s) within three business days, they must present a receipt for the application of the document(s) within three business days and the actual document(s) within ninety (90) days. . . . Employers must record document title; 2) issuing authority; 3) document number; 4) expiration date, if any; and 5) the date employment begins. Employers must sign and date the certification. Employees must present original documents. Employers may, but are not required to, photocopy the document(s) presented. These photocopies may only be used for the verification process and must be retained with the I-9. (Emphasis in original.) When newly-hired employees report to the hiring site for training, they are placed at a computer to type in the information required in Section 1 of the I-9 Form. It is Neiman Marcus's policy to provide all newly-hired employees, at the time they are completing Section 1 at the computer, a copy of the page setting forth the "Lists of Acceptable Documents," with a copy of the "Instructions" page stapled to that document. When the information required in Section 1 is complete, the I- 9 Form prints out of the computer with the employee's information included. The employee signs the form, and the Neiman Marcus representative examines the documents presented by the employee and completes and signs Section 2 of the I-9 Form. Neiman Marcus requires all newly-hired employees to present original documents from List A or List B and List C for verification within 72 hours of the beginning of employment. If an employee fails to provide the necessary original documents or a receipt for the application of the documents within the 72- hour timeframe, it is Neiman Marcus's policy to suspend the employee's employment with Neiman Marcus and to allow them a week to provide documents required for identification and employment verification. If the newly-hired employee is unable to produce the necessary documents, the employee is terminated, but the employee is advised that they are welcome to re-apply for a job when they are able to produce the original documents that satisfy the requirements on the I-9 Form. It is not Neiman Marcus's policy to specify the documents a newly-hired employee must present to verify his or her identity and employment eligibility. Rather, Human Resource Managers at the various Neiman Marcus stores have been told not to specify any document that must be produced to satisfy the identification and employment verification requirements on the I-9 Form. Donna Bennett is, and was at the times pertinent to this proceeding, the Human Resource Manager for the Neiman Marcus store in Boca Raton. Amy Wertz was the Human Resources Coordinator and worked for Ms. Bennett at the times pertinent to this proceeding. When Ms. Jean-Pierre reported to the hiring center on November 3, 2005, she completed Section 1 of the I-9 Form on the computer provided by Neiman Marcus and, to verify her identity, presented her Florida driver's license to Ms. Wertz, who was the Neiman Marcus representative verifying employment eligibility for the newly-hired Neiman Marcus employees in Ms. Jean-Pierre's group. Ms. Jean-Pierre advised Ms. Wertz that her "Green Card"3 and her Social Security card had been in her car, which was stolen from the parking lot of her condominium building after the Hurricane Wilma. Ms. Jean-Pierre did not provide Ms. Wertz an original document from either List A or List C to verify her employment eligibility on November 3, 2005. She did give Ms. Wertz her Social Security number and a copy of her Permanent Resident Card, income tax return, and pay stub from her previous employment. Ms. Wertz would not accept these documents for purposes of satisfying the I-9 Form requirement of verification of employment eligibility. On November 3, 2005, Ms. Wertz advised Ms. Bennett that Ms. Jean-Pierre had failed to produce the original document from List A or List C required to verify her employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett directed Ms. Wertz to send Ms. Jean- Pierre home to look for an original document that would satisfy the requirements for establishing her employment eligibility. Ms. Jean-Pierre reported for work on November 4, 2005, without an original document from List A or List C. Ms. Bennett went to the official website of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to verify the government policy on the production of documentation to establish employment eligibility. After reviewing the information on the website, Ms. Bennett advised Ms. Jean-Pierre that, if she produced a receipt showing she had applied for a replacement document among those on List A or List C, she could have an additional 90 days in which to produce the original document. Ms. Bennett did not contact Neiman Marcus's corporate legal department with regard to this information before she passed it on to Ms. Jean-Pierre. On November 5, 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre provided either Ms. Wertz or Ms. Bennett a document printed from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services website entitled "I-90 Form: Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card" and told them that she had an appointment with the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the end of November 2005.4 Ms. Bennett believed that this document was an acceptable receipt for an application for a replacement document, and she advised Ms. Jean-Pierre that she had 90 days from November 5, 2005, in which to produce the original document. A notation was made on the I-90 Form that "[y]ou have 90 days from today." Ms. Bennett did not consult with anyone at Neiman Marcus corporate headquarters regarding the sufficiency of the document provided by Ms. Jean-Pierre or receive authorization to allow Ms. Jean-Pierre an additional 90 days in which to produce the original document. In late November 2005, Ms. Wertz told Ms. Bennett that Ms. Jean-Pierre had missed her appointment with the Immigration and Naturalization Service because of a death in her family. Ms. Bennett became concerned that Ms. Jean-Pierre did not take seriously the requirement that she provide original documents to establish her employment eligibility within the 90-day grace period, which, according to Ms. Bennett's understanding, began to run on November 5, 2005. Ms. Bennett called Ms. Jean-Pierre into her office and spoke with her about the importance of providing the necessary original documentation. Ms. Jean-Pierre told her that she would take care of the matter. On or about December 15, 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre produced to Ms. Bennett a document identified as a Citizens and Immigration Services form I-797C, Notice of Action. The "Case Type" specified on the document was "I-90 Application to Replace Alien Registration Card"; the "Receipt Number" noted on the document was "MSC-06-800-46861" the date on which the application was received was noted as December 14, 2005; the applicant was identified as "A37 888 854 Jean-Pierre, Nita"; and the "Notice Type" specified on the document was "Receipt Notice." When she gave Ms. Bennett this document, Ms. Jean- Pierre told Ms. Bennett that it would take between six months and one year to receive the replacement card because of September 11, 2001. Ms. Bennett became concerned that Ms. Jean- Pierre would not be able to provide the required original document within the 90-day grace period. At this time, she contacted Susan Moye, a manager in Associate Relations at Neiman Marcus's corporate headquarters in Dallas, Texas, and arranged to have the I-797C form faxed to Ms. Moye. Ms. Moye consulted with Neiman Marcus's legal department about the sufficiency of the I-797C Form Ms. Jean- Pierre had provided on December 15, 2005. Ms. Moye was advised that this document was not sufficient to meet the I-9 Form requirement that the employer examine the original of one of the documents included on List A or List C to verify employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett was absent from work for a period of time due to the illness and death of her father. During her absence, Ms. Wertz was in communication with Ms. Moye regarding Ms. Jean- Pierre's employment status. Ms. Moye directed Ms. Wertz to notify Ms. Jean-Pierre that the I-797C form she had provided was not sufficient to verify her employment eligibility and that she was suspended from employment for one week to give her the opportunity to obtain an acceptable original document. Ms. Jean-Pierre did not provide the required documentation by the end of the one-week period of her suspension. Ms. Bennett returned to work on December 27, 2005. Ms. Bennett spoke with Ms. Moye about the matter on December 27, 2005, and Ms. Moye told her that Ms. Jean-Pierre needed to provide an original document in order to establish her eligibility for employment and that the document Ms. Jean-Pierre had provided on December 15, 2005, was not an acceptable original document. Ms. Moye advised Ms. Bennett that she would need to terminate Ms. Jean-Pierre. At the time she directed Ms. Bennett to terminate Ms. Jean-Pierre, Ms. Moye was not aware of Ms. Jean-Pierre's race or national origin.5 Ms. Bennett called Ms. Jean-Pierre into her office and explained to her that it was Neiman Marcus's policy to require original documentation of identification and employment eligibility within three days of beginning employment; that the document she provided on December 15, 2005, was unacceptable; and that she was terminated. During this meeting, Ms. Jean-Pierre argued that the document she had provided on December 15, 2005, was acceptable. Ms. Bennett explained to Ms. Jean-Pierre that, in accordance with Neiman Marcus's policy, she needed to produce the original document, not the receipt for an application for a replacement document. When she terminated Ms. Jean-Pierre, Ms. Bennett told her that she was welcome to re-apply for a job when she was able to produce the appropriate documents to establish her employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett did not tell Ms. Jean-Pierre that a "Green Card" was the only acceptable document to establish her employment eligibility. Nor did she tell Ms. Jean-Pierre that she needed to provide more documentation than others because she was Haitian. In January 2006, Ms. Jean-Pierre returned to the Neiman Marcus Boca Raton store and provided Ms. Bennett with a receipt showing that she had applied for a Social Security card on January 10, 2006. Ms. Bennett faxed this document to Ms. Moye, who responded that the receipt was insufficient and that Ms. Jean-Pierre needed to produce an original document. On January 5, 2006, Ms. Jean-Pierre obtained a stamp on her passport indicating that employment was authorized for her, which authorization would expire on January 4, 2007. Ms. Jean-Pierre received her replacement Social Security card on January 16, 2006. Ms. Jean-Pierre did not present an original Social Security card to Neiman Marcus or her stamped passport to Neiman Marcus as verification of her employment eligibility. Ms. Bennett has previously terminated newly-hired employees who failed to timely provide the documents required to establish employment eligibility. Those employees were invited to re-apply when they received their original documents. Several re-applied, provided their original documents, and were re-hired. Of the more than 59 newly-hired employees reporting to work on or about November 1, 2005, Ms. Jean-Pierre was the only employee who failed to produce to Neiman Marcus the required original documentation verifying her employment eligibility. Summary The direct evidence presented by Ms. Jean-Pierre is not sufficient to establish that Neiman Marcus discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin. Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett were aware that Ms. Jean-Pierre was from Haiti residing in the United States, but the evidence establishes that both Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett were concerned about her failure to produce any original documents as required for verification of employment eligibility and that Ms. Bennett talked to her about the seriousness of the issue and urged her to get the necessary document. Ms. Jean-Pierre's testimony that Ms. Bennett told her she needed more documentation because she was a Haitian is unsupported by any other testimony or documentary evidence. Finally, Ms. Moye, the person who directed Ms. Bennett to terminate Ms. Jean-Pierre, was not aware that she was born in Haiti. Ms. Jean-Pierre's testimony that both Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett insisted she must provide a "Green Card" to verify her permanent residence is, likewise, unsupported by any other testimony or documentary evidence. In any event, this evidence would not, of itself, establish that either Ms. Wertz or Ms. Bennett was motivated by the intent to discriminate against Ms. Jean-Pierre because she is Haitian. The evidence presented is sufficient, however, to support an inference that Ms. Jean- Pierre misunderstood the information she received from Ms. Wertz and Ms. Bennett and assumed that they were referring to an original Permanent Resident Card rather than an original document included on the "Lists of Acceptable Documents."6 Ms. Jean-Pierre acknowledged in her testimony that, when Ms. Wertz told her she needed to verify her permanent residence, she interpreted this to mean that she needed to get a replacement copy of her Permanent Resident Card. Similarly, Ms. Jean-Pierre may have interpreted Ms. Bennett's statements that she needed to produce an original document as requiring that she produce a Permanent Resident Card. The evidence presented by Ms. Jean-Pierre is sufficient to establish that Ms. Jean-Pierre is entitled to protection from employment discrimination on the basis of her national origin; that she was qualified for the position of sales associate with Neiman Marcus; and that she was subjected to an adverse employment action because she was terminated from her employment. Ms. Jean-Pierre stated unequivocally in her testimony, however, that she did not know of any other person who failed to verify their employment eligibility that was allowed to work at Neiman Marcus. She has, therefore, failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed by Nita Jean-Pierre on September 20, 2007. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2008.
The Issue The issue presented for determination in these causes, pursuant to F.S. Section 120.56(1), is whether or not the "12 hour F rule," F.A.C. Rule 6J- 5.56(11)(b), and/or the "mandatory grade curve rule," F.A.C. Rule 6J-5.56(5)(c), constitute either an invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative authority, or an exercise of invalidly delegated legislative authority. The major contention of petitioner is that the respondent failed to comply with the notice requirements of F.S. Section 120.54(1)(a) when it adopted the rules in question. No other issues, including the wisdom or the applicability of such rules, are appropriate in a Section 120.56 proceeding for an administrative determination of a rule.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitions filed herein allege that petitioner was academically dismissed from the law school because of the "12 hour F rule" and that he received a failing grade in Tax 601-602 because of the "mandatory grade curve rule." After some student input, the faculty of the FSU law school adopted the "12 hour F rule" and the "mandatory grade curve rule" in 1973 and 1975 respectively, prior to the effective date of Chapter 75-191, Laws of Florida. Effective June 26, 1975, Chapter 75-191, Laws of Florida, included units of the state university system within the confines of the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes. Pursuant thereto, the respondent, Florida State University, began the process of adopting new and repromulgating its existing rules. The Dean of the FSU Law School was instructed by respondent to submit all of the law school rules to the respondent so that they could be properly promulgated along with other FSU rules. The Dean complied with this request. On August 20, 1975, and again on August 22, 1975, legal ads were placed in the Tallahassee Democrat concerning respondent's intent to adopt proposed rules. Notices were also published, making reference to the aforesaid more complete notice, in the Miami Herald, the St. Petersburg Times and the Jacksonville Times-Union. The August 20th notice in the Tallahassee Democrat announced that a hearing would be held on September 3, 1975, and set forth for each rule the purpose and effect of the rule, a summary of the rule, general authority for the rule and the law implemented. The challenged College of Law Rules numbered, as 6J-5.56, were included in this legal ad and were in substantially the same form as that previously adopted by the law school faculty. By letter dated August 13, 1975, Mr. Mike Beaudoin, respondent's Director of Informational Services, notified respondent's three foreign branches in Florence, Italy, London, England and the Canal Zone of the proposed rules. Gail Shumann, a staff assistant to respondent's Vice President for Academic Relations, assisted in the rule promulgation process. Utilizing a list furnished her by the Coordinator of Student Organizations, Shumann sent by campus mail a "notice of intent to file rules" to all listed registered student organizations existing on January 17, 1975. Such notice was also posted in the personnel office. This notice announced that the rules would be adopted on September 10, 1975, that a copy of the notice of the proposed rules was available in the Office of Student Government, that a copy of the rules was available at the information desk in the Strozier Library and could be obtained at cost from the Division of University Relations and that a hearing on the proposed rules would be held on September 3-5, 1975. The notice was dated August 18, 1975. The list of registered student organizations furnished Ms. Shumann by the Coordinator of Student Organizations did not contain the name of the student body president and listed the former president of the student bar association. A secretary for the student body president was unable at the time of the hearing to find or to recall whether she had received copies of the notice of intent to adopt rules. She testified that she did not have the opportunity to go through all of her files and that it was possible she received such notice. The president of the student bar association, who was not on campus during the summer quarter, could not recall having seen the notice of intent, but testified that it was possible that it came through his office while he was off campus. At least fourteen days prior to the scheduled hearing, Informational Services Director Beaudoin directed a reliable employee to post the notice of intent upon respondent's fifteen official bulletin boards. On August 20, 1975, respondent's rules were filed with the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. Public hearings were held on September 3, 4, and 5, 1975, on the FSU campus for the purpose of hearing comments concerning the proposed rules. Few persons attended these hearings. The rules were filed with the Secretary of State on September 10, 1975, and became effective on September 30, 1975.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner John T. Barnes is currently employed by Santa Rosa County in the capacity of Veterans Service Officer. At some undisclosed date, apparently in 1985, Petitioner submitted a request to Respondent that he be permitted to "purchase" a period of employment with the Santa Rosa County School Board from 1939-1941 as creditable service under the Florida Retirement System (testimony of Petitioner, Hearing Officer Exhibit 2). In his petition, Petitioner claims that he worked as a full time employee as a janitor at the Chumuckla High School from July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941. He was a student at the school during this period, but would have been unable to return in the fall of 1939 since his father died and it was necessary for him to work to support the family. With the janitorial job, Petitioner was able to attend school while performing his janitorial duties before and after regular school hours, plus weekends. He testified that his salary was $30 per month, which was paid by check that he received from the Superintendent each month. Petitioner performed his duties under the supervision of the school principal. Petitioner is unsure as to whether or not he had a written agreement with the Superintendent. Both the Superintendent and Principal at that time are now deceased. Petitioner was the first janitor to be employed at the Chumuckla High School (testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1). In order to establish his claim of prior service, Petitioner requested that the School Board of Santa Rosa County search the School Board's records concerning his employment from 1939-1941. Pursuant to this request, the School Board Personnel Officer, Gertrude E. Wolfe, searched the School Board records for the period in question, but was unable to find any mention of Petitioner. However, subsequent to that search, a copy of the minutes of a regular meeting of the Board of Public Instruction of Santa Rosa County on June 3, 1941 was discovered. It stated that the sum of $7.50 was paid to Petitioner for an unstated purpose and was simply characterized as a "bill." Petitioner submitted the affidavits of his sister, Clara B. Lloyd, who had been a teacher at the Chumuckla School during the period of June 1, 1939 to May 31, 1941 and therein certified that Petitioner had served as a janitor at the school during that period and had received a salary of $30 per month from the Santa Rosa County, Florida school system. Another affidavit to like effect was submitted by a "student and co-worker," Jack D. Jernigan, to the same effect, except that it showed the period as July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941. Another affidavit from Mrs. A. L. Gillman, who was a teacher and assistant principal at the school during the time in question, certified also that Petitioner had been employed by the School Board during that period at a salary of $30 a month (testimony of Barnes, Wolfe, Petitioner's Exhibits 1- 2). By letter, dated February 27, 1987, the Respondent's State Retirement Director denied Petitioner's request for retirement service credit on the basis that he had been a temporary student employee during 1939-41 and did not therefore meet the definition of a regularly established position, and thus the service was not creditable and could not be purchased under the Florida Retirement System. The letter noted, however, that Respondent had received a letter from the Superintendent of Schools, presumably of Santa Rosa County, which stated "We have researched our records for the employment of John T. Barnes for the school terms of 1939-40 and 1940-41 as janitor for the Chumuckla High School and failed again to find such employment for him. We feel that it is possible that Mr. Barnes was paid by the Principal with School Funds or General Funds which each school had funds of this type. If he were paid in this manner, the County office would have no record to substantiate his salary or employment." (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2) Based on the foregoing uncontroverted evidence, it is found that the Petitioner did in fact perform janitorial duties for the Santa Rosa School Board during the period July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941, at a salary of $30 a month.
The Issue Whether or not on or about August 16, 1975, Castlewood International Corporation, a licensed vendor and/or its agent, servant or employee, to wit: Brent Hanry Hansell, did permit and/or allow a person, Johnny Pannell, under the age of 18, to consume alcoholic beverages on its licensed premises, contrary to Florida Statute 562.11(1).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner presented its case based upon certain oral testimony offered in the course of the hearing and certain tangible items of evidence offered at the hearing. Before placing any witnesses on the stand, certain stipulation were entered into the record between the parties. The first such stipulation was to the effect that no violations of the sort alleged in the administrative complaint had been committed by the Respondent in any of the six facilities which it had in the Division of Beverage District Five area, in the two years proceeding the date of the hearing. It was also stipulated that Petitioner's Exhibit 4, which was a drinking glass, allegedly taken from Johnny Pannell on or about August 16, 1975, while Johnny Pannell was in Big Daddy's number 53, which contained a chemical substance which had as a part alcohol, and that the chain of custody of the glass and contents while in the care of the Division of Beverage Authority and their affiliates remained inviolate, up to and including the date of the hearing. It was further stipulated that Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which is a copy of a license issued for 1975-76 could be admitted into evidence without objection. Further stipulations included an agreement that the Respondent had been duly served with a notice to show cause and attendant administrative complaint, and that the Respondent was duly noticed of the hearing date for January 22, 1976. The Petitioner called as its first witness, James Lee Yeager, Jr., an agent for the Division of Beverage. On August 15, 1975, the officer met with a group of other officers for purposes of going to check bars in the Kissimmee area for possible violation of the beverage laws, specifically the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. At around 12:30 A.M. August 16, 1975, the witness entered the premises of the Respondent and momentarily observed the patrons. He indicated that there were 75 to 100 customers in the bar. He then returned outside and met with the other officers, and together they reentered the bar for purposes of checking identifications of select patrons. On both occasions when the witness entered the bar, he indicated that there was a white female taking cover charge money but that she never asked for any identification. While in the bar, the witness approached one white male, later identified as Johnny Pannell. When requested to produce some identification, Pannell produced an identification card which has been admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. This identification card is a photo I.D. with the word Identification affixed and the back of the card has finger prints together with a notary seal. It is noted that the notary has certified the signature, photo and thumb prints; however, the date of birth is not notarized. It was later established through the witness, Johnny Pannell, that the matters set forth on the card, with the exception of the age were correct. Officer Yeager indicated that when Johnny Pannell was approached that Pannell had in his hand the glass, which has been stipulated to at the commencement of this hearing as to the chain of custody and as to the contents. When the officer asked for further identification, Pannell produced a drivers license which showed that Pannell was 17 years of age on August 16, 1975. Pannell was therefore placed under arrest for an offense of drinking under age. Officer Cruz, Division of Beverage, took the stand and indicated that he assisted Officer Yeager in the interrogation of Johnny Pannell, while in the Respondent's premises. The witness recalls that Pannell admitted being 17. Officer Cruz also agreed with officer Yeager, in that he did not see the lady at the door check any identification when the officers entered. One additional observation solicited in the course of Officer Cruz's testimony, was to the effect that the premises were dark in the main part of the bar. Agent Perry Lee Lyle of the Division of Beverage, took the stand and testified that he was involved in the identification check in the bar. He further testified that he arrested Brent Hanry Hansell for permitting the sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor. Johnny Pannell took the stand for the Petitioner and testified that he was 17 years old, born September 13, 1958. When he entered the bar, according to the witness, the lady asked him for identification and he showed her Petitioner's Exhibit 2. He had purchased this bogus identification card in Orlando, for a price of $5.00, and had used it 5 or 6 times before the night of August 16, 1975. When the officers entered the bar and approached him, he had a drink in his hand and that drink has been identified as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. When Officer Yeager asked him for further identification the witness said that he did not volunteer that identification but that Officer Yeager found a drivers license which showed the witness to be 17 years of age. One final observation by the witness, was to the effect that he never told the officers that he was under 18 years of age. At the close of the Petitioner's case the Respondent's attorney moved to dismiss the case because the Petitioner had failed to prove that the premises as existing on August 16, 1975, was a premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, by the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. Therefore, according to the Respondent, there could be no proof of the consumption of alcoholic beverages on a licensed premises. This motion will be subsequently considered in the findings of fact in the section of this recommended order entitled CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. The Respondent presented a case in chief, notwithstanding its motion to dismiss, because the possibility existed that the motion would not be accepted by the undersigned and/or the Director. The first witness was Enid Marie Hunt. Miss Hunt was working on the door on August 16, 1975, and was the lady that the officers observed in making their entry. Additionally, she was the door checker when Johnny Pannell entered the bar that evening. She recalls checking the identification of Johnny Pannell, specifically the Petitioner's Exhibit 2. She did not ask for further identification although a sign in the foyer indicated that this was a policy of the Respondent to check two identifications. Some of the comments by the witness about policy matters relating to identifications, were to the effect that they look for identification cards with pictures; however, it was not their policy to accept cards with the initials I.D. or the words Identification Card. The witness further stated that she remembers the picture in the particular instance and the fingerprints and notary stamp and other matters reflected on the front side of the card, and found this to be satisfactory. She didn't have any explanation for accepting a card with the word Identification, nor did she think that the photo on the identification card made Johnny Pannell appear to be 18 years of age at the time the card was issued. Nevertheless, she said that she felt that he looked 18 years of age at the time he entered the bar on August 16, 1975. The witness had been working there only two nights, and apparently had not had an opportunity to familiarize herself with the written policy by the Respondent on the subject of identification checks. She did indicate, that Mr. Hansell had instructed her six times on how to check identification cards. Considerations suggested by Mr. Hansell, other than those mentioned before, were that you check identification on persons who appear to be 18 through 22 years old. You do not, as a practice, check those persons who appear to be older. The witness also seemed to suggest that the policy of checking two identifications could be disregarded if the first identification card appeared obviously legitimate. Brent Hanry Hansell who was the manager of Big Daddy's number 53, on the night in question and who is still acting in that capacity, took the stand. He testified that he instructed Miss Hunt that she could accept picture drivers license, a draft card, a voter registration card, and a military identification. He indicated that cards with the word Identification or the initials I.D., birth registration cards were types of identification that were not sufficient. He did seem to believe that the notary stamp attached a certain air of legality to an identification document. He stated that the manual issued by the Respondent to the employees of the Respondent sets out the identification procedures to be utilized. He did not testify that Miss Hunt had had an opportunity to read and familiarize herself with that manual. His comment about Miss Hunts training was to the effect that she was working there on the second night, though usually there is a week training period. In the defense of his position of allowing Miss Hunt to work on the second night, he stated that he had briefed her several times on the duties of an identification card checker. Robert E. Betz took the stand. Mr. Betz is the area supervisor for the Respondent and one of his functions is to assist in the hiring of identification checkers. He stated that the manual discusses those documents which would constitute a sufficient identification. In alluding to the sign found in the foyer of the subject premises, he said that the sign was primarily one designed to discourage under age persons from attempting to purchase or consume alcoholic beverages on the premises. As commented before, the motion to dismiss was made at the close of the Petitioner's presentation. An examination of the testimony offered by the Petitioner's witnesses, together with the tangible items of evidence would seem to support a finding of a violation on the part of the Respondent, were it not for the failure of one necessary element of proof. The element of proof not shown, is the affirmative proof that the premises in question was a premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, under the laws of the State of Florida. The Petitioner's Exhibit 1 does not show that a license was in existance on August 16, 1975, and the record is devoid of any other proof of that fact. Consequently, though the facts, as produced by the Petitioner, show that a sale of alcoholic beverages was made to Johnny Pannell, a minor, and that the identification card would not have been accepted by a proprietor using due diligence and that the acceptance has not been effectively defended against in the Respondent's case in chief, the Petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case or to establish a violation by the standard of proof necessary in this cause.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Castlewood International Corporation, t/a Big Daddy's number 53, be released from further prosecution for the matters set forth in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stewart McHenry, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William A. Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Sy Chadroff, Esquire 120 North Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33132
The Issue Whether Petitioner has defaulted on student loans and, if so, the principal amounts of the loans, any accrued interest, and any collection costs. Whether Petitioner's employer should be required to withhold payments from Petitioner's pay pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact As will be set forth in more detail, there are three loans at issue in this proceeding. For ease of reference, these loans will be referred to as Loans One, Two, and Three.2 Loans One and Three were issued as Florida Guarantee Student Loans, which are popularly known as Stafford Loans. Loans Two and Four were supplemental loans issued by the Student Loan Services program, which are referred to SLS loans. Loans One, Two, and Three were funded and are at issue in this proceeding. THE STAFFORD LOANS, LOANS ONE AND THREE On September 22, 1986, Petitioner executed an Application and Promissory Note for a Guaranteed Student Loan, number 545967. This Stafford Loan, referred to as Loan One, was in the amount of $5,000. Loan One was disbursed in two equal installments of $2,500 (less appropriate fees). The first installment was disbursed on or about December 4, 1986, and the second installment was disbursed on or about December 11, 1986. On June 1, 1987, Petitioner executed an Application and Promissory Note for a Guaranteed Student Loan, number 586917. This Stafford Loan, referred to as Loan Three, was in the amount of $2,261.00. Loan Three was disbursed in one installment of $2,261.00 (less appropriate fees) on June 25, 1987. The promissory notes and other paper work documenting Loan One and Loan Three provided that interest at the rate of 8% per annum would begin to accrue on these loans six months after Petitioner ceased to attend school on at least a half-time basis. Because a Stafford Loan is guaranteed by the federal government, the obligor may be eligible to receive periods of deferment and periods of forbearance during which the federal government may or may not make interest payments. If the federal government made interest payments during a particular period, Petitioner is not obligated for interest during that period. If the federal government did not pay interest during a particular period, Petitioner is obligated to pay interest for that period. Respondent is not claiming any interest on Loans One and Three for any period while interest was paid by the federal government. While Petitioner was attending school on at least a half-time basis and for six months thereafter (the grace period), Loans One and Three were in periods of forbearance, and the federal government paid the interest for both loans. Petitioner ceased attending school on at least a half-time basis on March 18, 1988. The six month grace period on Loans One and Three ended on September 18, 1988, which is the date interest began to accrue on Loans One and Three. As of that date, the principal balance due on Loan One ($5,000.00) and on Loan Three ($2,261.00) totaled $7,261.00. Between September 18, 1988, and January 23, 1997, interest accrued on Loans One and Three in the total amount of $4,744.75, as follows: Between September 18, 1988, and June 15, 1993, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $2,754.80. Between June 16, 1993, and October 6, 1993, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $245.87. Both loans were in a period of administrative forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between October 7, 1993, and January 7, 1994, both loans were in a period of deferment due to Petitioner's unemployment, and the interest was paid by the federal government. Between January 8, 1994 and January 31, 1994, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $51.73. Both loans were in a period of administrative forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between February 1, 1994, and April 30, 1994, both loans were in a period of deferment due to Petitioner's unemployment, and the interest was paid by the federal government. Between May 1, 1994, and July 24, 1994, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $189.88. Both loans were in a period of administrative forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between July 25, 1994, and April 30, 1995, both loans were in a period of deferment due to Petitioner's unemployment, and the interest was paid by the federal government. Between May 1, 1995, and December 1, 1995, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $492.65. Both loans were in a period of forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between December 2, 1995, and January 23, 1997, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $1,009.82. Petitioner defaulted on the repayment of Loan One. Petitioner has not made any principal or interest payment since the loan was disbursed. Petitioner defaulted on the repayment of Loan Three. Petitioner has not made any principal or interest payment since the loan was disbursed. On January 23, 1997, Respondent purchased Loan One and Loan Three.3 As January 23, 1997, the principal and the accrued interest for Loan One, plus the principal and the accrued interest for Loan Three, totaled $12,005.75. THE SLS LOAN: LOAN TWO On January 31, 1987, Petitioner executed Auxiliary Loan Application and Promissory Note number 8914 for a supplemental student loan through the Student Loan Services program (Loan Two). This type loan, generally referred to as an SLS loan, was in the principal amount of $4,000.00. Loan Two was disbursed in one installment of $4,000.00 (less appropriate fees) on or about April 9, 1987. The promissory notes and other paper work documenting Loan Two provided that interest at the rate of 12% per annum would begin to accrue upon disbursement. SLS loans also provide for periods of deferment and forbearance during which no payment is due. The federal government does not make interest payments during a period of deferment or forbearance. The borrower is obligated to pay all of the interest from date of disbursement.4 Petitioner defaulted on the repayment of Loan Two. Petitioner has not made any principal or interest payment since the loan was disbursed. Respondent purchased Loan Two from the holder on September 11, 1997.5 Interest in the amount of $7,348.91 accrued on Loan Two between April 9, 1987, the date the loan was disbursed, and September 11, 1997. The total principal balance and accrued interest for Loan Two as of September 11, 1997, was $11,348.91. COLLECTION COSTS Section 682.410(b)(2) of Title 34, C.F.R., provides that Respondent shall impose collection costs, as follows: (2) Collection charges. Whether or not provided for in the borrower's promissory note and subject to any limitation on the amount of those costs in that note, the guaranty agency shall charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim. These costs may include, but are not limited to, all attorney's fees, collection agency charges, and court costs. Except as provided in §§ 682.401(b)(27) and 682.405(b)(1)(iv), the amount charged a borrower must equal the lesser of-- The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection under the formula in 34 CFR 30.60; or The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection if the loan was held by the U.S. Department of Education. Respondent established that the amount of the annual collection cost mandated by 34 C.F.R. 682.410(b)(2) for each defaulted loan at issue in this proceeding should be calculated at the rate of 25% of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. PRINCIPAL, INTEREST, AND COLLECTION COSTS AS OF JUNE 1, 1998 Respondent calculated the principal, interest, and collection costs for each loan as of June 1, 1998. For Loan One the amount of the collection costs assessed by the Respondent was $2,231.60. Interest that accrued between January 23, 1997, and June 1, 1998, totaled $895.13. As of June 1, 1998, the total principal, interest, and collection costs for Loan One totaled $11,394.01. For Loan Two the amount of the collection costs assessed by the Respondent was $2,961.20. Interest that accrued between September 11, 1997, and June 1, 1998, totaled $981.29. As of June 1, 1998, the total principal, interest, and collection costs for Loan One totaled $15,291.39. For Loan Three the amount of the collection costs assessed by the Respondent was $1,009.13. Interest that accrued between January 23, 1997, and June 1, 1998, totaled $404.78. As of June 1, 1998, the total principal, interest, and collection costs for Loan One totaled $5,152.39. The total amount due from Petitioner as of June 1, 1998, for Loans One, Two, and Three for principal, interest, and collection costs is $31,837.79. WAGE WITHHOLDING Petitioner is a social worker employed by Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida. As an employee of a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner is subject to the provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions pertain to employees of the State of Florida or its subdivisions who have defaulted on an education loan made or guaranteed by the State of Florida. Respondent notified Petitioner in writing by letter dated October 1, 1997, that Loans One, Two, and Three were in default and offered him the opportunity to make voluntary payments on these loans. The letter also advised Petitioner that the Respondent would seek to make involuntary withholdings if he did not make voluntary payments. Petitioner thereafter elected to request the formal hearing that triggered this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, finds that Petitioner, as of June 1, 1998, owes the sum of $31,837.79, and orders the involuntary wage withholding of Petitioner's pay through his employer, Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1998
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues involved in this case, Respondent, Bruce M. Williams, held Florida teacher certificate number 414669 authorizing him to serve as a substitute teacher. On March 21, 1984, after a trial by bury in the County Court of Alachua County, Florida, on Case No. 83-4274-MM-A , Respondent was found guilty of the offense of trespass after warning. On April 30, 1984, the Judge of the County Court entered a Judgement of Guilt and placed the Respondent on one year's probation with the stipulation that, among other things, he not go onto the University of Florida campus unless his probation officer gave him prior permission. This judicial determination of guilt. It was the culmination of a series of events involving the Respondent and his repeated entrances onto property owned by the University for which he was repeatedly warned and directed not to return. Respondent contends that he had legitimate reasons to be on the University property each of the times in question and contests the use of these reports branding them a violation of his rights. He overlooks the fact that the conviction came after several instances of unauthorized entrance and that the conviction was based on proven violations. Nonetheless, it appears that on December 30, 1982, Respondent was observed by Kenneth E. Solomon, an investigator with the University police department, in the parking lot of Diamond Village, a University married students' housing area not open to the public. Mr. Solomon attempted to identify the Respondent who was at first reluctant to identify himself but who finally agreed and indicated that his wife was inside doing their laundry. Since this is an area reserved for university students and their families, Mr. Solomon issued a warning to Respondent not to trespass on University property and thereafter filled out and filed a report of the incident. Thereafter, on March 15, 1983, Keith B. Reddick, who was at that time an officer with the University police was called to University Hospital (Shands), where he was met by a Mrs. Fugate and a guard who had Respondent in custody. Mrs. Fugate advised at that time that Respondent had previously been at the hospital on March 7 with no legitimate reason for being in the area. On that occasion, when asked why he was there, Respondent indicated he had been given permission to be there by a member of the medical school faculty, Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz categorically denies ever having given Respondent permission to be where he was. In fact, she met him only once when he stopped her and asked her about the possibility of a job with the hospital. At that time she told him there were none available except for fellowships for which an applicant had to be a physician already. Nonetheless, he gave her a resume and she believes he indicated he was involved in research. With this one exception, she has had no contact with him and never gave him authority to work with patients in her department or be there for any reason. On this latter occasion, when asked what he was doing there, Respondent replied that he had become lost while looking for a laboratory. He also said he was looking for a doctor friend whose name he could not remember and as a chemistry major, was working on his thesis. On this occasion, Officer Reddick took Respondent to the police station, showed him a map of the campus, told him where he could and could not go on the campus by pointing to the map areas, and told him not to return again to the university unless on official business or for public functions. The following day, on March 16, 1983, Respondent was observed in the Shands Hospital cafeteria by Officer Rogers of the University police. When asked for his identification and reason for being there, Respondent indicated he had paid a bill in the laboratory, so Rogers let him go. When Rogers checked the story out, however, he found that the bill which was alleged to have been for unauthorized use of the hospital copying machine, had in reality been paid three hours before the Respondent was contacted. Rogers again saw Respondent on March 29, 1983 in the hub area of the University book store on campus. Rogers had been notified by Reddick that Respondent was on campus and when he had approached the Respondent, Respondent walked off and into the book store. Rogers and three other officers contacted Respondent in the book store where Respondent indicated he had met with a Mrs. Greene, a University affirmative actions officer and upon receiving that explanation, the officers let him go. Respondent was again identified on July 6, 1983, by officer Edward Miles who observed him in an off-limits gynecological area on the 4th floor of the University hospital. When Miles arrived at the scene, a contract security officer was talking with Respondent. This officer had seen Respondent in the area and had asked for identification in response to which request, Respondent showed a student identification card which was no longer valid since Respondent was no longer a student. Asked what business he had in this particular area, Respondent indicated he was looking for work but when, after 30 minutes, he could not verify this story, Officer Miles placed Respondent under arrest and took him to campus police headquarters. From all of the above, it is clear that though Respondent may have felt he had a legitimate basis for being on the campus and, in fact, may have had when he went to speak with Mrs. Green and went to pay the bill at the hospital, he stretched these occasions into several unauthorized occasions even after he had been warned with full knowledge that his presence on the campus was not authorized. The conviction in County Court was not contested at the time and on the basis of the above evidence, appears to have been warranted. On July 8, 1983, an arrest warrant was issued out of the Circuit Court for the 8th Judicial Circuit in Alachua County alleging sexual battery in violation of Section 794.011, Florida Statutes. This warrant contained allegations that Respondent had committed a sexual battery against his 9-year- old stepdaughter. However, Respondent was tried on a reduced charge of lewd and lascivious assault upon a child and at his trial he entered a plea of no contest. Respondent was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years probation the terms of which required him to undergo mental health counseling among other requirements. Respondent continues to deny his commission of the offenses to which he pleaded no contest at the trial. However, in a statement he made at the time of his arrest, he admitted several factors which contradict that. He admitted that he had a very physical relationship with his stepdaughter; that he appeared nude in front of her many times; and that he would be in bed with her laying on top of him while both were nude with the child's mother there as well. He also admitted having French kissed his stepdaughter (she indicates he taught her how to do this) but denies having any sexual intercourse with her. Respondent contends that these charges are all a plot to deprive him of the close relationship with his family, instituted by someone unnamed and unidentified. The fact remains that Respondent is delinquent in his probation and has made little progress in the required mental health counseling because of his continued belief that he has done nothing wrong but is the victim of this conspiratorial plot. Sometime in or around February 1984, Respondent entered the restaurant owned and operated by Mrs. Vlahopous, in Gainesville, and asked to speak with her daughter, Alex, who apparently had come to the blood center at which he worked. At this point Respondent identified himself as "Dr. Bruce. When she asked him for his office address and phone number since Alex was not there, he said he didn't have an office, but he wrote his name and phone number on one of her cards for her. After Mrs. Vlahopous thought about this over night, she went to the blood bank where Respondent had said he worked and asked for Dr. Williams. At this point she was told by blood bank personnel that Williams was not a doctor, had been fired, and would be rejected if he came there again. Be that as it may, Sharron A. Sturdevant, an official of the blood bank where Respondent had been working, does recall that at times Respondent was referred to as Dr. Bruce at the center. This was, however, only a term of affection or friendliness and was not in any way intended to authorize him to hold himself out to the public as a doctor. Respondent did work for the City of Gainesville in a conservation project in May and June of 1984 but he was terminated because he had not listed his full police record on the application form. This termination was a matter of necessity under city personnel policies which required termination of anyone who intentionally falsified an application form. It had nothing to do with Respondent's performance or anything that took place while he was employed by the city. Mr. John Middleton, Principal of Ft. Clarke Middle School, knew Respondent as a paraprofessional at the alternative school when Mr. Middleton was principal there and Respondent was employed for approximately a month and a half. While Respondent was working at the alternative school he was working as aide to another teacher. He was apparently unable to accept the fact, however, that when a teacher and a paraprofessional (aide) are in the same classroom, it is the teacher who always is in charge. Respondent was discharged from his employment at the alternative school because of an incident where it was alleged he had usurped the authority of and changed the orders of the teacher for whom he was working, in front of the class. The investigation report, which Mr. Middleton received from the teacher and students who observed the incident indicated that the Respondent was loud and boisterous at the time of the incident. Since these students at the alternative school were emotionally handicapped to start with, a fact which Respondent knew, his misconduct was even more serious than it would have been in a normal situation. These students need calm more than noise. In the situation here, Respondent's actions served only to upset them. Mr. Middleton had observed that prior to this incident, Respondent's dealings with the students aggravated rather than helped them. As a result, this incident was only one factor in the decision to terminate Respondent from employment and after the incident took place, Mr. Middleton wrote an unsatisfactory performance report on the Respondent. Based on his personal observation of the Respondent, and what he now knows of Respondent's criminal record, Mr. Middleton is convinced that a teacher with this record could not be effective in the classroom. His effectiveness would be definitely reduced by his misconduct and his conduct would not set a positive example for students. In his opinion, students should not be exposed to anyone with criminal convictions. These sentiments are reinforced by Mr. Wilford A. Griffin, a career service specialist with the Alachua County School Board, who first met Respondent when Respondent left Newberry High School seeking a place in the Alachua County system. Respondent had been terminated at Newberry High School because of some problem with his certification which had nothing to do with performance or misconduct. After the alternative school termination referenced above, Respondent was placed at Eastside High School but was terminated there because of his difficulties with teachers similar to those he had at the alternative school. As an aide, he disagreed openly with teachers in the classroom and in this case, the teacher complained that he would not follow directions and would not do what the teacher wanted done. In all cases, Mr. Griffin counseled with the Respondent about the problem. Respondent obviously felt that the complaining teacher was demeaning him. He felt that he was being helpful and had been rebuffed. Based on his experience with this Respondent, Mr. Griffin would never again try to place him within the school system. Considering Respondent's record in and out of the classroom, Mr. Griffin could not recommend Respondent for employment in the school system. He believes Respondent could not be an effective teacher because of his inability to understand the ramifications of his actions. This does not even consider the convictions which merely aggravate the situation even more. There is no evidence to counter these professional opinions of Respondent's fitness to teach and they are accepted and adopted as fact.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent: (1) made deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in or related to the practice of medicine; (2) failed to keep appropriate medical records with respect to Patient T.G.; (3) fell below the minimum acceptable standard of care in his treatment of T.G.; misrepresented or concealed a material fact during the course of the disciplinary process; and/or (5) improperly interfered with Petitioner's investigation. If so, it will be necessary to determine whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's medical license within the applicable penalty guidelines, or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Dr. Choy was licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida, having been issued license number ME 74815. The Department has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed physicians such as Dr. Choy. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. Here, the Department has charged Dr. Choy with medical malpractice, which is a disciplinable offense pursuant to section 458.331(1)(t)1, Florida Statutes, both for allegedly failing to inform his patient, T.G., that a CT scan performed in June 2008 revealed the presence of a potentially malignant tumor in her pancreas, and for failing to refer T.G. to a specialist for further investigation of this finding. The Department alleges, as well, that, after an attorney representing T.G.'s family contacted Dr. Choy following T.G.'s death in 2010, Dr. Choy altered his medical records to make it appear as though he not only had informed T.G., in and after June 2008, that she might have pancreatic cancer, but also had urged her repeatedly to see a specialist. Based on these allegations,1/ the Department has charged Dr. Choy with: one, making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine, an offense under section 458.331(1)(k); two, failing to keep legally sufficient medical records in compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.003, an offense under section 458.331(1)(m); and, three, misrepresenting or concealing material facts during, and improperly interfering with, a disciplinary proceeding, which are separate offenses under sections 458.331(1)(gg) and 458.331(1)(hh), respectively. The events giving rise to this dispute began on May 13, 2008, when Dr. Choy's longtime patient, T.G., presented with complaints of left lower quadrant pain and a change in bowel habits. T.G., who was then 77, had a number of medical conditions for which she had been seeing Dr. Choy, including diabetes, hypertension, depression, heart disease, and arthritis. Reviewing the results of blood work ordered the previous month, Dr. Choy diagnosed T.G. with anemia and ordered another blood test to determine if the condition persisted. In addition, Dr. Choy ordered a CT scan of T.G.'s abdomen and pelvis. T.G. went to the lab to have blood drawn on May 13. The next day, Dr. Choy received the test results, which showed that T.G. remained anemic. Dr. Choy suspected that T.G. might have colon cancer. He made a note on the lab report that T.G. should be prescribed a medication for her anemia and that she needed to "be referred to a GI specialist for eval[uation]." Following the customary procedure in Dr. Choy's office, an employee called T.G. on May 19 to inform her of these instructions and wrote "5/19 done" at the top of the lab report. T.G. underwent the CT scan of her abdomen and pelvis on June 17, 2008. The radiologist's three-page report was faxed to Dr. Choy on June 19. On the first page of the report, which discusses the abdominal scan, it is stated that "[t]here is a large lobulated malignant tumor mass in the tail of the pancreas . . . ." On the next page, the third of four enumerated impressions based on the abdominal CT scan reads: "Large malignant tumor mass tail of the pancreas as described." Also on page 2, following the report of the abdominal procedure, is the interpretation of the pelvic CT scan, which resulted in a finding of diverticulosis but was otherwise negative. Dr. Choy reviewed the report and wrote "ok" on page 1, next to the first impression from the abdominal scan, which was: "Old healed calcified granulomatous disease right lower lobe." On page 2, adjacent to the impressions from the pelvic scan, Dr. Choy wrote the following note:2/ At some point after Dr. Choy wrote the foregoing note, the report was scanned into his office's electronic medical records system. Also, a hard copy of the report of T.G.'s CT scan was placed in a traditional patient chart, as was done with all lab reports that Dr. Choy's office received. On June 19, 2008, someone from Dr. Choy's office called T.G. at 3:34 p.m. and spoke with her (or someone in her home) for nearly five minutes. Dr. Choy testified that he personally placed this call, a claim the Department disputes. The identity of the caller is immaterial, however, because the main purpose of the call was, most likely, to schedule an appointment for T.G., so that Dr. Choy could go over the recent blood work and CT scan with T.G. in person. T.G. was not told during this phone call about the tumor that had been observed in her pancreas, but she was probably given Dr. Choy's recommendations for managing diverticulosis, as indicated by a handwritten note at the top of page 2 of the CT scan report, which says, "6/19/08 Done." T.G. returned to Dr. Choy's office on June 30, 2008. Unfortunately, there is no reliable contemporaneous record of what Dr. Choy communicated to T.G., if anything, about the finding of a tumor in her pancreas. Dr. Choy testified that he did not use words such as "cancer" or "mass" in front of T.G., both to avoid upsetting her and because he is a "soft person" who "hate[s] to give people bad news." Dr. Choy thinks that he might have told T.G. there was a "spot" on her pancreas (although he is not sure he used that term), and he clearly recalls having advised T.G. to "see a specialist" because——he recalls telling her——although he "didn't know what it was," it "could be bad." The Department disputes that Dr. Choy said even that much. In support of its position that Dr. Choy failed to disclose to T.G. the radiologist's finding of a pancreatic tumor, the Department focuses on Dr. Choy's electronic medical records, in which——as originally prepared——he made no mention of a pancreatic mass. For example, at the time of T.G.'s June 30, 2008, visit, Dr. Choy wrote that the patient did not have "[a]bdomenal [sic] pain," and he typed the following notes regarding his impressions and diagnoses: ZZ-Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG; Anemia Iron Deficiency – 2809 repeat Test if no Improvement we will refer pt to GI evaluation;Diabetes w/ unspecified complication-250.90; Hyperlipidemia-2724; Hypertension-4019; Hypertensive Heart Disease without HF 402.90; Hypothryoidism- 2449; Declining Function-7993; Depression- 311; Vertigo-7804 This record, made at or around the time of the June 30, 2008, visit, is silent about the potentially malignant tumor that had recently been seen in T.G.'s pancreas. Dr. Choy testified that his contemporaneous records are not silent as to the pancreatic mass because when he saw T.G. on June 30, 2008, he wrote an additional note on the hard copy of the CT scan report, creating the following:3/ That Dr. Choy inserted the reference to a pancreatic tumor after June 19, 2008, is proved by the existence of the digital copy of the CT scan report——converted via scanner from paper to electronic file that day——which does not contain the reference. Because Dr. Choy did not put a date on the subsequent note, however, his testimony is the only evidence that it was made on June 30, 2008. The Department contends that Dr. Choy's testimony in this regard is not credible. The undersigned agrees with the Department. There are a number of reasons for rejecting Dr. Choy's testimony. To begin, Dr. Choy's account requires one to imagine that, when making his original notes, Dr. Choy jotted down a treatment plan for diverticulosis while simultaneously failing to acknowledge the ominous finding of a pancreatic tumor, despite being aware of the potentially terminal condition. Further, Dr. Choy would have the undersigned believe that, just as he was soft-pedaling the CT scan results in conversation with T.G., he was writing "malignant tumor" on the report——using the type of words he (credibly) denies uttering in T.G.'s presence. The reference to the pancreatic tumor looks out of place, moreover, in the section of the report discussing the pelvic scan, which did not find the mass, atop the previous notes relating to diverticulosis, which the pelvic scan did reveal. Finally, there is the undisputed fact, which will be discussed in depth below, that Dr. Choy altered many other medical records after questions were raised concerning his treatment of T.G.—— and particularly about whether he had told her she might have pancreatic cancer. In sum, the undersigned does not credit the annotated CT scan report as evidence tending to establish that Dr. Choy notified T.G. in June 2008 that there was a suspicious mass in her pancreas. The next time T.G. saw Dr. Choy was September 3, 2008. The entries that he made in the patient's electronic medical record for this visit were, originally, silent about the possibility that T.G. might have cancer of the pancreas. He noted that T.G. was "[d]oing well with no change in clinical status" although she reported "[a]domenal [sic] [p]ain," which she had not complained about on June 30, 2008. Dr. Choy recorded T.G.'s various diagnoses in the electronic patient chart, making no mention of the pancreatic mass. This pattern was repeated during the several visits which followed, on January 19, 2009; February 11, 2010; and March 31, 2010. Dr. Choy's contemporaneous records of these visits say nothing about T.G.'s pancreatic tumor or his efforts, if any, to follow the condition. When T.G. returned to Dr. Choy's office on June 24, 2010, she complained of abdominal pain and abnormal weight loss. Dr. Choy reviewed T.G.'s blood tests, which indicated that she was again anemic and might have liver disease. Concerned, and having forgotten the 2008 scan, Dr. Choy ordered additional blood tests and a CT scan of T.G.'s abdomen and pelvis. After leaving Dr. Choy's office, T.G. went to the lab, where her blood was collected on June 24. The test results, which were reported on June 28, 2010, showed that her platelets were low, suggesting a blood disorder. For that reason, Dr. Choy referred T.G. to Dr. Luis Villa, a hematologist and oncologist whom T.G. had wanted to see. Dr. Villa saw T.G. on July 1, 2010. In a letter to Dr. Choy that he prepared on the same day, Dr. Villa advised that T.G. "look[ed] great; certainly, younger than her stated age." Dr. Villa believed that laboratory data for T.G. were suggestive of chronic liver disease, and he recommended that Dr. Choy order additional tests. Dr. Villa informed Dr. Choy that he had "reassured [T.G.] that there is nothing acute here that necessitate[s] immediate attention." On July 7, 2010, T.G. returned to Dr. Choy's office for a follow-up visit. During this visit, Dr. Choy noted Dr. Villa's recommendation and recorded (for the first time) a differential diagnosis of "potential malignancy," to be ruled out. Dr. Choy ordered more tests, including an abdominal CT scan. T.G. underwent a CT scan on July 15, 2010, her second, two years after the previous scan had first detected a pancreatic mass. A report of the results of this CT scan was delivered to Dr. Choy's office on July 16, 2010. The report indicated that T.G. had "a large mass at the level of the pancreatic tail." T.G. had an appointment to see Dr. Choy for a follow- up examination on July 19, 2010. That morning, however, T.G.'s son, being worried about how weak T.G. suddenly had become, took her directly to the hospital, without stopping at Dr. Choy's office. Dr. Choy signed the order to admit T.G. to Mercy Hospital, where she was received on July 19 at 1:11 p.m. carrying a diagnosis of pancreatic cancer with possible metastasis to the liver. Although Dr. Choy did not see T.G. in his office that day, as expected, a record of the upcoming visit was created in Dr. Choy's electronic medical records system. Somehow, a record of the canceled visit was thereafter transmitted to T.G.'s HMO as if Dr. Choy had seen T.G. in his office as scheduled, making it appear that he had performed an examination which in fact had not occurred. The Department alleges that Dr. Choy submitted a false insurance claim in connection with the canceled appointment. This contention is rejected as unproved. There is no persuasive evidence that Dr. Choy received any payment for the July 19th appointment which, as it happened, T.G. could not keep, and more important, the evidence is insufficient to establish, clearly and convincingly, that Dr. Choy intended to deceive the HMO. The simplest and likeliest explanation for the July 19th office- visit note is that, owing to the unexpected change of plans, someone got the paperwork confused and made a mistake. The day after she was admitted to Mercy Hospital, T.G. underwent a liver biopsy, which revealed a "metastatic tumor of pancreatic origin." Sometime in July 2010, after the pathology report confirmed T.G.'s diagnosis, T.G.'s family requested that Dr. Choy's office provide them with copies of T.G.'s medical records. Dr. Choy's staff complied with this request, printing the electronic medical records on July 27, 2010, and delivering them to a family member. The set of records provided at this time went back only as far as January 19, 2009, and thus omitted the notes for T.G.'s appointments with Dr. Choy in 2008. On August 8, 2010, T.G. passed away due to liver disease and acute renal failure. On August 19, 2010, Dr. Choy received a letter from an attorney representing T.G.'s family, which requested copies of T.G.'s records. At this point, Dr. Choy feared that T.G.'s family would bring a medical malpractice lawsuit against him, and he "panicked" because he had never been sued before and did not have liability insurance. On reviewing the records, Dr. Choy concluded that some of the language was "ugly" and "didn't look right" as written. Wanting to make the records "as presentable as possible" for the lawyer, Dr. Choy decided to edit the electronic text. He then proceeded to delete some entries and add others without identifying any of the alterations. As a comparison of the original text to the revised text clearly reveals, Dr. Choy's self-confessed concern was obviously owing to the remarkable absence of any notes in the medical records pertaining to the possibility that T.G. might have pancreatic cancer as stated in the radiologist's report interpreting the June 2008 CT scan. This is apparent from the fact that, without significant exception, the sole purpose of the alterations is plainly to correct that particular, glaring deficiency. The covertly amended records convey the impression that Dr. Choy timely informed T.G. of the CT scan results and repeatedly urged her to see a specialist to investigate the findings further. Indeed, if one were unaware of the original, unaltered records, his review of the revised records would provide little or no cause to criticize Dr. Choy's handling of T.G.'s case. The inevitable inference is that Dr. Choy knew the original records would be persuasive, if not conclusive, evidence of his failure to inform T.G. of her potentially fatal condition, in violation of the standard of care, so he secretly (or so he thought) doctored the records to turn them into evidence that he had satisfied the standard of care. To see just how incriminating the alterations are, it is helpful to place the original and revised texts, respectively, side-by-side, as below. In the following table, the language printed in boldface identifies deletions from the original, contemporaneous record and additions to the much-later revised record (misspellings in original): Visit Date Contemporaneous Record Revised Record 6/30/08 ZZ-Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP ZZ-Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG; Anemia Iron EKG; Anemia Iron Deficiency Deficiency – 2809 repeat – 2809 And abdominal pain Test if no Improvement we with and abnormal CT scan. will refer pt to GI We will refer pt to GI evaluation;Diabetes w/ evaluation for possible GI unspecified complication- malignancy of the 250.90; Hyperlipidemia- Pancreas;Diabetes w/ 2724; Hypertension-4019; unspecified complication- Hypertensive Heart Disease without HF 402.90; Hypothryoidism- 2449; Declining Function- 7993; Depression-311; Vertigo-7804 250.90; Hyperlipidemia- 2724; Hypertension-4019; Hypertensive Heart Disease without HF 402.90; Hypothryoidism-2449; Declining Function-7993; Depression-311; Vertigo- 7804 9/03/08 A- Medically Stable; ZZ- Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG; Diabetes w/ unspecified complication- 250.90; Hyperlipidemia- 2724; Hypertension-4019; Hypertensive Heart Disease without HF 402.90; Hypothryoidism- 2449; Declining Function- 7993; Depression-311; Vertigo-7804 -; Abdominal Pain Unknown ET – 78900; Anemia – 2859 Pt was advice again to see a GI Dr. The possibility of a Ca of the pancreas was discuss with the pt; ZZ-Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG; Diabetes w/ unspecified complication-250.90; Hyperlipidemia-2724; Hypertension-4019; Hypertensive Heart Disease without HF 402.90; Hypothryoidism-2449; Declining Function-7993; Depression-311; Vertigo- 7804 1/19/2009 Malaise and Fatigue and Malaise and Fatigue and Other -780.79; Declining Other -780.79; Declining Function-7993; Dizziness Function-7993; Dizziness and Giddiness - and Giddiness - 780.4;Diabetes mellitus 780.4;Diabetes mellitus Uncontrolled-25002; ZZ- m Uncontrolled-25002; ZZ- m Resently admitted to BH Resently admitted to BH with CHF Possible angina with CHF Possible angina Pectoris before Pectoris before admittion admittion Dr. Peter V Weight Loss Abnormal- Choy; Z-VP EKG; Diabetes 783.21; Abdominal Pain w/ unspecified Unknown ET – 78900 Possible complication-250.90; ca of the Pancreas; ZZ-Dr. Hyperlipidemia-2724; Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG; Hypertension-4019; Diabetes w/ unspecified Hypertensive Heart complication-250.90; Disease without HF Hyperlipidemia-2724; 402.90; Hypothryoidism- Hypertension-4019; 2449; Declining Function- Hypertensive Heart Disease 7993; Depression-311; without HF 402.90; Vertigo-7804; Congestive Hypothryoidism-2449; Heart Failure-428.0 Declining Function-7993; associatted with Actos Depression-311; Vertigo- 7804; Congestive Heart Failure-428.0 2/11/10 A- Medically Stable; ZZ- Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG; Trigger finger on the right great finger.; Contusion Foot-924.20; Back Pain Lower-7242 and in the thoracic area;Diabetes w/ unspecified complication- 250.90; Hyperlipidemia- 2724; Hypertension-4019;; Congestive Heart Failure- 428.0; Hypothryoidism- 2449; Back Pain Lower- 7242; Neuropathy Peripheral-3569 Trigger finger on the right great finger.; Contusion Foot-924.20; Back Pain Lower-7242 and in the thoracic area;Diabetes w/ unspecified complication- 250.90; Hyperlipidemia- 2724; Hypertension-4019;; Congestive Heart Failure- 428.0; Hypothryoidism-2449; Back Pain Lower-7242; Neuropathy Peripheral-3569 3/31/10 A- Medically Stable; ZZ- Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG;Diabetes w/ unspecified complication- 250.90; Hyperlipidemia- 2724; Hypertension-4019;; Hypothryoidism-2449; Back Pain Lower-7242; Neuropathy Peripheral- 3569; Hypertensive Heart Disease with HF 402.91 Dr Peter V Choy; Z-VP EKG; Weight Loss Abnormal-783.21 Again case was discuss with the Pt and she was advice of the abnormal finding;Diabetes w/ unspecified complication- 250.90; Hyperlipidemia- 2724; Hypertension-4019;; Hypothryoidism-2449; Back Pain Lower-7242; Neuropathy Peripheral-3569; Hypertensive Heart Disease with HF 402.91 The alterations are clear and convincing proof of the material fact that Dr. Choy did not tell T.G. that the June 19, 2008, CT scan report stated she had a "[l]arge malignant tumor mass" in her pancreas, for a simple reason: he was unaware that a tumor mass was described in the report. This latter fact is evident from Dr. Choy's alarm, in August 2010, about the deficiencies in the records. Why, only then, did Dr. Choy realize that the records "didn't look right?" What did Dr. Choy know, without question, in August 2010, that he might not have known earlier? The answer, of course, is that in August 2010 Dr. Choy knew that the 2008 CT scan report disclosed the existence of a large mass in T.G.'s pancreas, a grave finding that should have been conspicuously noted in T.G.'s medical records. Dr. Choy's admission that the records looked "ugly" to him in August 2010 is revealing because, in fact, the records look bad only in the light of the 2008 CT scan results; but for that report, they would appear to be at least adequate, notwithstanding a few typographical errors. The bottom line is that if the CT scan report had contained no references to a pancreatic mass, then T.G.'s original medical records would have looked alright. The undersigned readily infers, therefore, without hesitation, that T.G.'s medical records looked fine to Dr. Choy when he originally wrote them because, when he originally wrote them, he was unaware that the 2008 CT scan report described a tumor mass in T.G.'s pancreas. Only later, after learning the full contents of the 2008 CT scan report, did the incriminating nature of the contemporaneous medical records become clear to Dr. Choy, who then, in his panic, made the costly mistake of tampering with the evidence. Dr. Choy's failure to read the 2008 CT scan report closely enough to take notice of its critical finding regarding T.G.'s pancreas, whatever the cause of that failure was, is sufficient to explain his failure to tell T.G. that she might have pancreatic cancer. Simply put, Dr. Choy did not tell T.G. about the pancreatic mass because he did not know of its existence. The parties stipulated that the minimum standard of care required that, within a reasonable time after June 19, 2008, Dr. Choy both: (1) notify T.G. that the results of the June 2008 CT scan suggested she had a mass in her pancreas; and (2) refer T.G. to an appropriate specialist for further evaluation and treatment of the pancreatic mass. Being unaware of the finding regarding a pancreatic mass, Dr. Choy did neither. Thus, his treatment of T.G. fell below the standard of care. T.G.'s family ultimately elected not to sue Dr. Choy, but in July 2011, T.G.'s son filed a complaint with the Department alleging that Dr. Choy had provided T.G. with substandard care. This consumer complaint set in motion the investigation which led to the instant proceeding. In connection with its investigation, the Department requested a copy of all T.G.'s electronic medical records from Dr. Choy going back to T.G.'s first visit in 1999. These medical records were printed from Dr. Choy's office computer system on July 27, 2011, and delivered to the Department in August 2011. On August 23, 2011, a Department investigator interviewed Dr. Choy regarding his care of T.G. The investigator——who was in possession not only of the recently produced records, but also copies of the records Dr. Choy's office had provided to T.G.'s family back in July 2010, before Dr. Choy had tampered with the electronic documents——asked Dr. Choy to explain why there were two different versions of the office notes for T.G.'s January 19, 2009, visit. After some initial hesitation, Dr. Choy admitted that he had altered the records to reinforce his case after learning he might be sued for malpractice. During the course of discovery in this proceeding, the Department asked Dr. Choy whether he had made any other changes to T.G.'s records besides the ones previously identified. Dr. Choy compared the printouts of T.G.'s untampered-with records given to the family in July 2010, which covered office visits from January 19, 2009, forward, to the fabricated versions provided to the Department in August 2011, and was unable to identify any additional changes. Neither the Department nor Dr. Choy was able to retrieve copies of T.G.'s original electronic records for the office visits prior to January 19, 2009, because Dr. Choy had overwritten the computer files when he altered the documents in August 2010. Consequently, the Department retained a forensic computer expert, who managed to recover the authentic records from a backup. Armed at last with a full set of T.G.'s medical records as they had looked on the dates Dr. Choy saw T.G., the parties were finally able to identify the changes Dr. Choy subsequently made to the office notes for the visits of June 30 and September 3, 2008. Ultimate Factual Determinations The Department has established by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Choy made deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine. He did so by deliberately altering T.G.'s medical records with the intention of fabricating evidence to support his claim that he had timely informed T.G. about the mass in her pancreas, when in fact the authentic, contemporaneous records make no mention of the pancreatic mass. Dr. Choy is therefore guilty of the offense defined in section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes. The Department has established by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Choy failed to identify, as such, any of the material, after-the-fact revisions he made to T.G.'s medical records, so that the office notes appeared to be contemporaneous accounts of the patient's course of treatment, when in fact they were not, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8- 9.003(4). Dr. Choy is therefore guilty of the offense defined in section 458.331(1)(m). The Department has established by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Choy committed medical malpractice in his treatment of T.G., by failing to timely inform her of the pancreatic mass seen in the CT scan in June 2008, and by failing to timely refer T.G. to a specialist for further investigation of the mass. Dr. Choy is guilty of the offense defined in section 458.331(1)(t)1. The Department has established by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Choy concealed the material fact that he had altered the original, contemporaneous records of T.G.'s care and treatment when he knowingly produced T.G.'s revised medical records to the Department in August 2011 without disclosing that the records were not what they purported to be. Dr. Choy is guilty of the offense defined in section 458.331(1)(gg). The Department failed to prove that Dr. Choy interfered with its investigation. Dr. Choy was reasonably cooperative throughout the investigation, during the course of which, however, he committed the additional offense of concealing a material fact from the Department, for which he will be disciplined. Dr. Choy is therefore not guilty of the offense defined in section 458.331(1)(hh).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Dr. Choy guilty of the offenses described in sections 458.331(1)(k), 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(t)1, and 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine revoke Dr. Choy's medical license and impose an administrative fine of $4,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2014.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner failed to follow testing procedures on the Essay subtest of the General Knowledge Test administered July 26, 2003, as alleged by the Respondent in correspondence dated September 3, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On June 18, 2003, Ms. Guerrero completed the Registration Application to take the Certification Examination for Florida Educators that was administered on July 26, 2003. A Registration Bulletin accompanied the Registration Application and contained directions for completing the application. On page 24 of the Registration Bulletin, applicants were advised that, in signing Block 19 of the Registration Application, they were agreeing to the conditions set forth in the Registration Bulletin, including the following: I understand that all of the examination booklets, answer sheets, and other examination materials are the sole property of the Florida Department of Education and that I am not permitted to take any of the examination materials from the examination center or to reproduce the materials in whole or part by any method. If I do anything prohibited by this paragraph, my examination performance will be voided. I understand that during the examination I will not be permitted to use written notes, make written notes of the content of the examination booklets, use scratch paper, or communicate with other examinees in any way. I also understand that the only materials that may be on my desk during the examination are the test booklets, answer sheets, pencils and eraser, and examination aids that are specified on my admission ticket, and that I will be permitted to use the margin of my test booklet for any preliminary work preparatory to answering specific questions. I understand that I am not permitted to give assistance to or receive assistance from other examinees, I must follow the instructions of the test administration personnel, and I must be the person whose name appears on the test receipt card for this test. If I do anything prohibited by this paragraph, my examination will be voided. Approximately two weeks before an examination is administered, it is the Department's practice to send the candidates for the examination their admission tickets and a copy of Certification Examinations for Florida Educators, which includes the following: Cheating is any unauthorized activity that impairs or alters the circumstances of the examination as a measure of the knowledge or skills it was designed to assess, including but not limited to the following: * * * g. During or after the examination administration, taking, or attempting to take, from the examination room, copies of, or notes regarding, examination questions, prompts, answers, responses, or examination question stimulus materials. Ms. Guerrero received a copy of Certification Examinations for Florida Educators, along with her examination admissions ticket. Ms. Guerrero was admitted to the examination center on July 26, 2003. Two essay topics were included in the essay booklet for the examination, and the candidates were to choose one topic on which to write. Ms. Guerrero does not understand English very well, and, shortly after the examination began, she wrote the two essay topics on the back of the admission ticket so she would better understand them before she chose the topic on which to write her essay. Ms. Guerrero also wrote her "logic rules" on the front of the admission ticket to make sure that she remembered them. Ms. Guerrero used the admission ticket as though it were a piece of scratch paper. At 8:35 a.m., the examination proctor observed Ms. Guerrero writing on her examination admission ticket and immediately began walking to Ms. Guerrero's seat to confront her. As soon as she saw the proctor approaching, Ms. Guerrero realized that she should not have written on any of the examination materials because they belong to the Department. Ms. Guerrero moved to put the admission ticket into her purse, but the proctor arrived at her seat before she could complete the action. Ms. Guerrero gave the admission ticket to the proctor, who prepared an irregularity report on the incident. The proctor allowed Ms. Guerrero to continue taking the examination. The Department decided to invalidate the Essay subtest of Ms. Guerrero's examination as a result of the proctor's report of the irregularity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a final order invalidating the Essay subtest of the General Knowledge Test administered to Maria Guerrero on July 26, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Maria Guerrero 80 East 18th Street Hialeah, Florida 33010 Scott Odenbach, Esquire Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jim Horne, Commissioner Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the application of Anne L. Kruppa (Petitioner) for a Florida Educator's Certificate should be denied for the reasons set forth in the Notice of Reasons issued on July 13, 2004, by Jim Horne, Commissioner of Education (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact By an application dated July 7, 2000, Petitioner applied for a teaching position with the Hillsborough County School District. In the application, the Petitioner identified her college degree as "B.S. Zoology" from the University of South Florida (USF). Above Petitioner's signature, the application states that Petitioner certified that the information provided on the application was "true and correct without any falsifications, omissions, or misleading statements of any kind whatsoever." The application contained a space where the date of Petitioner's college graduation was to be provided. Petitioner's application did not include a graduation date. A handwritten question mark appears in the space where the date was to be set forth. Petitioner was employed as a teacher by the Hillsborough County School District for the 2000-2001 school year. At the time of her employment, Petitioner was instructed to obtain her college transcript from USF and provide it to the Hillsborough County School District. The evidence establishes that Petitioner did not have a bachelor's degree in zoology from USF when she completed the employment application. By an application dated July 31, 2000, Petitioner applied for a Florida Educator's Certificate. In the application, Petitioner stated that she had received a bachelor's degree in zoology from USF in 1998. According to the application, by her signature, Petitioner certified that "all information pertaining to this application is true, correct, and complete." At the time of the certification application, Petitioner was directed to obtain her college transcript and provide it to the Florida Department of Education. The evidence establishes that Petitioner did not have a bachelor's degree in zoology from USF when she completed the certification application. By spring of 2001, Petitioner had not provided a transcript to either the Hillsborough County School District or to the Florida Department of Education. At that point, the Hillsborough County School District contacted USF to assist in obtaining Petitioner's transcript, at which time the district learned that Petitioner did not have a bachelor's degree. In April 2001, the Hillsborough County School District terminated Petitioner's employment because she could not obtain a Florida Educator's Certificate without a college degree, and the employment required such certification. After the termination of employment by the Hillsborough County School District, Petitioner worked with the Hillsborough County School District as a substitute teacher and attended Hillsborough Community College in the fall semester 2001. After completing a course at the community college, Petitioner received a bachelor's degree in zoology from USF on December 14, 2001, and returned to teaching full-time for the school district. The evidence establishes that prior to December 14, 2001, Petitioner did not have a bachelor's degree, contrary to the information set forth on her application for employment with the Hillsborough County School District or the application to obtain a Florida Educator's Certificate from the Florida Department of Education. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that at the time she filed the applications she believed that she had received her bachelor's degree from USF in the summer of 1997 after taking a course called Elementary Calculus II during the summer term. The USF summer term included three separate sessions. Session A and Session B were six-week terms. Session C, a ten- week term, is not at issue in this case. The records of the 1997 USF summer term indicate that the Petitioner was enrolled in "MAC 3234 Elem Clclus II" (Elementary Calculus II) during the Summer Session A. According to the transcript, she received an "F" in the course. Petitioner testified that she thought she had enrolled in the course for Summer Session B. Petitioner testified that she paid another person to attend the classes and take notes for Petitioner. Petitioner testified that Petitioner took "a bunch of the tests" and "was figuring I had roughly a B something in the course." The note-taker testified by deposition and recalled taking notes for Petitioner during July and August of 1997 for a fee of ten dollars per hour. There is no evidence that the note-taker took any tests. Classes for the 1997 USF Summer Session B commenced on June 30 and ended on August 8. Classes for the 1997 USF Summer Session A commenced on May 12 and ended on June 20. Petitioner testified that at some point after the summer session was completed, she saw the course instructor and spoke to him about her performance in the class. The instructor did not testify at the hearing. Petitioner testified that she did not receive her grade for Elementary Calculus II, but presumed that she had passed the course and received her degree. Review of Petitioner's USF transcript establishes that at various times Petitioner took courses identified as "MAC 3233 Elem Clclus I" (Elementary Calculus I) and "MAC 3234 Elem Clclus II" (Elementary Calculus II). Petitioner enrolled in Elementary Calculus I in the fall term of 1994, but withdrew. In the fall term of 1995, Petitioner re-enrolled in Elementary Calculus I and received a grade of "A." Petitioner first enrolled in Elementary Calculus II in the spring term of 1996 and received a grade of "F." Petitioner again enrolled in the course in the summer term of 1996 and received a grade of "D." In the fall term of 1996, Petitioner re-took the Elementary Calculus I course and received a grade of "F." Petitioner's testimony regarding her presumed performance in the summer 1997 course lacks credibility based on review of the transcript. Based on the performance in the referenced calculus courses, it is unlikely that Petitioner reasonably presumed without further inquiry that she passed the Elementary Calculus II course and received her degree after the summer term of 1997. Petitioner also testified that she believed her admission to the USF graduate school indicated that she had completed her undergraduate requirements, and that further inquiry was apparently not required. The Official Acceptance that was mailed to Petitioner and was required to be presented to USF officials in order to register for courses clearly states that the admission was "provisional." The Official Acceptance required that Petitioner submit to the graduate school her undergraduate transcript indicating that the degree had been conferred. Nothing provided to Petitioner by the USF graduate school indicated that the undergraduate degree had been awarded. Petitioner was in the USF graduate program for one semester and was enrolled for five classes, four of which were undergraduate-level classes. In the fifth class (identified as "EDF 6432 Fndtns Measrmnt") she received a grade of "F."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Jim Horne, as Commissioner of Education, enter a final order denying Petitioner's pending application for a Florida Educator's Certificate and providing that Petitioner may not reapply for such certification for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2004.
