The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency as provided under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Whether the amount claimed by Petitioner for attorney's fees and costs is reasonable.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent agency is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.30, Florida Statutes (1995). If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with Sections 760.20 - 760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, the Respondent agency may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statues, on behalf of the aggrieved party. On February 3, 1993, Polly Leggitt filed a complaint with the Respondent agency and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Complaint named Carole Naylor, Property Administrator, as the person who discriminated against her. On March 24, 1993, the Respondent agency notified Regency Place Apartments and Carole Naylor that the Complaint had been filed, and stated that within 100 days, the Respondent agency would investigate the Complaint and give notice whether there was or was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The notice further provided that final administrative disposition of the Complaint would be completed within one year from the filing of the Complaint, which would be on or about February 3, 1994. A Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge was made and issued and served on August 28, 1996. It named Regency Place Apartments; Carole Naylor, Frank Cutrona, Property Manager; and Robert Stitzel, owner. The notice was issued more than one year after the filing of the Complaint. Following the formal hearing, this Administrative Law Judge made certain findings of fact which were incorporated in the Recommended Order. Those findings held, inter alia: Robert Stitzel was the developer and owner of Regency Place Apartments. Carole Naylor, at the direction of the manager Frank Cutrona, sent Ms. Leggitt letters rejecting her application for an apartment unit at Regency Place Apartments because there was no apartment of the kind she wanted that was available and further that her income was insufficient to qualify her for housing at that place. Cutrona died on December 26, 1996. Carole Naylor did not work in the rental office. She made no judgments regarding the rental of the apartment, nor the creditworthiness of the prospective tenants. Robert Stitzel made no judgments regarding the tenants. Regency Place Apartments had a policy which requires income equaling three times the gross rental. The creditworthiness and the determination of who would rent apartments was left solely with the resident manager. Stitzel demonstrated that many disabled people had lived in the apartment complex. Accommodations were made for people with disabilities by the manager and such costs for these accommodations were paid by Regency Place Apartments. The agency made a prima facie case of discrimination in that Leggitt is a handicapped person, who is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment, and suffered a loss of a housing opportunity, under circumstances which lead to an inference that Stitzel based its action solely upon her handicap. Evidence was presented that Regency Place Apartment's requirement of gross income equaling three times the monthly rent had not been satisfied by Leggitt's mother's agreement to contribute $550 per month. Leggitt's income was $281.34 per month. Three times the monthly rent was $1,140.00, thus rendering her income short by $308.66 per month. The motivation for rejecting the application was that the apartment which Leggitt wanted was not available and Leggitt did not have sufficient income to qualify. There was no evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of Cutrona, Naylor, Stitzel, or Regency Place Apartments, other than conjecture. There was no evidence that suggests the reasons given were not true at the time the letters were written or that they were merely pretextual. Further, it did not appear from the evidence that any discriminatory motive was proven. There was nothing in the evidence that proves that Leggitt's legal blindness was a cause of the rejection of her application. There was no evidence of any act or conduct which would suggest discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory animus by any of the persons named as Respondents in the Administrative Charge. Taken as a whole, the credible evidence indicated that the sole basis for rejecting Leggitt's application was the unavailability of the unit that she requested, and her failure to satisfy management of her financial ability to meet the financial requirements of Regency Place Apartments. Although Leggitt testified as to her inconvenience caused by the denial of her application, there was no evidence of any quantifiable damages presented at the hearing. In the Conclusions of Law, it was determined that the Motion to Dismiss should have and was granted on the grounds that the Respondent agency failed to comply with the statutory time requirements: Under the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, "the Secretary shall make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and complete such investigation within 100 days after filing of the Complaint . . . unless it is impracticable to do so." 42 U.S.C. s 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). The statute also provides that if "the Secretary is unable to complete the investigation within 100 days" after complainant files the complaint, the Secretary "shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." 42 U.S.C. s. 3610(a)(1)(c). This same provision is found in the Florida Fair Housing Act. See Section 760.34, Florida Statutes (1995), and Chapter 60Y-7, Florida Administrative Code. The Florida Administrative Code provides as follows: "Section 60Y-7004(8)(b) If the Commission is unable to complete its investigation within 100 days, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." Section 60Y-7.004(10) The Commission will make final administrative deposition of a complaint within one year of the date of receipt of the complaint, unless it is impracticable to do so. If the Commission is unable to do so, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so." It is undisputed in this case that the Respondent agency did not file its determination until August 28, 1996, over three and one-half years from the time Leggitt filed her complaint. It is also undisputed that the Respondent agency never notified Petitioner, or the other parties, that it would be unable to complete the investigation within 100 days as required by statute. Nor did it notify Stitzel in writing why an administrative disposition of a Complaint had not been made within one year of receipt of the Complaint. Petitioner established that the Respondent agency violated the statutory time limits and that the three and one- half year delay in filing the Respondent agency's Notice of Probable Cause caused the proceedings to be impaired and was to Petitioner's extreme prejudice. At the attorney's fee hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to the cause for the extreme delay in the filing of the Administrative Charge, or the rationale for filing the Charge two and one-half years after the expiration of the statutory deadline for filing said charges. At the attorney's fees hearing, Respondent agency offered no testimony or other evidence as to why it claimed to be substantially justified in finding probable cause and filing the Administrative Charge. The Petitioner, demonstrated that, at the time the matter was initiated, Regency Place Apartments was a business operating as a limited partnership and that Robert Stitzel was the general partner; that the principal place of business was in Florida; and that it did not have more than 25 full-time employees. Petitioner retained counsel to defend it on the charges contained in the Notice of Determination, Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge, and Petitioner was the prevailing small business party. Counsel for Petitioner expended 76 hours on this matter, not including time expended on the Petition for Attorney's Fees or time expended following his appearance before the Commission prior to the issuance of the final order. Counsel's billing for Petitioner's time at an hourly rate of $200 is reasonable in this case. The Petitioner's billable costs of $609.75 are reasonable.
The Issue Whether Respondents, Charleston Cay, Ltd., et al. (Charleston Cay), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact Ms. Cardwell is an African-American woman who rented an apartment from Charleston Cay. Ms. Cardwell and Charleston Cay entered into a written lease beginning on December 23, 2009, and ending on November 30, 2010. The lease required Ms. Cardwell to pay her rent on the first of each month and that the rent would be delinquent by the third of each month. Furthermore, the lease provided that non-payment of rent shall result in a breach of the lease and eviction. The initial monthly rent for Ms. Cardwell's apartment was $663.00, a month and was subsequently increased to $669.00, a month. Ms. Cardwell credibly testified that she had not read the lease or the Housing Addendum which she signed when entering into the lease and that she had not subsequently read either document. On November 1, 2010, Ms. Cardwell failed to pay her rent. On November 4, 2010, Ms. Jaster, manager of Charleston Cay apartments, posted a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises. On November 9, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another notice for Ms. Cardwell about non-payment and requesting that Ms. Cardwell call or come to the office. Ms. Cardwell paid $100.00, of the rent on November 17, 2010. Again, Ms. Jaster posted a three-day notice seeking payment of the remaining November 2010, rent in the amount of $569.00. On November 24, 2010, Ms. Cardwell paid an additional $200.00, of the $569.00, owed, leaving a balance of $369.00 for November 2010. Because Ms. Cardwell's written lease was to expire at the end of November, she requested that Charleston Cay enter into a month- to-month lease, but Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Cardwell that Charleston Cay was not interested in entering into a month-to- month tenancy. On December 1, 2010, Ms. Jaster posted another three- day notice requiring Ms. Cardwell to pay the $369.00, owed in November, or to vacate the premises. The facts also showed that Ms. Cardwell did not pay the $669.00, owed by December 1, 2010, or anytime thereafter. On December 8, 2010, Charleston Cay filed an eviction and damages complaint against Ms. Cardwell based on non-payment of the rent. Some time in December 2010, Ms. Cardwell contacted Ms. Tina Figliulo of the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition, seeking financial assistance to avoid being evicted. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition administers grant money to help prevent a person from being evicted and helps individuals find affordable housing. A provision of the grant, however, prevents the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition from paying money into a court registry if an eviction process has begun. Ms. Figliulo credibly testified that she contacted Ms. Jaster about making a payment on Ms. Cardwell's behalf. Ms. Jaster informed Ms. Figliulo that Charleston Cay had already begun eviction proceedings. Consequently, Ms. Figliulo was unable to use grant money to pay for Ms. Cardwell's back rent. Based on the eviction proceedings, Ms. Cardwell vacated the premises sometime in December 2010, and turned in her key for the apartment. The initial hearing on the eviction was set for January 5, 2011. On December 28, 2010, the hearing was cancelled based on Ms. Cardwell's vacating the premises. On January 13, 2011, Ms. Cardwell filed a Motion to Dismiss the case in county court indicating that she had given up possession of the premises. On January 31, 2011, the Charlotte County Court issued an Order dismissing the case effective March 1, 2011, unless Charleston Cay set a hearing on damages. The record credibly showed through the exhibits and Ms. Jaster's testimony that Ms. Cardwell was evicted from her apartment based on her non-payment of rent. There was no evidence that other individuals, who were not in Ms. Cardwell's protected class, were treated more favorably or differently, than she was in the proceedings. There was no evidence, either direct or indirect, supporting Ms. Cardwell's claim of racial discrimination. Ms. Cardwell testified that she felt that Ms. Jaster had acted based on race, because of Ms. Jaster's perceived attitude. Ms. Cardwell did not bring forward any evidence showing a specific example of any comment or action that was discriminatory. Ms. Jaster credibly testified that she did not base the eviction process on race, but only on non-payment. Ms. Cardwell specifically stated during the hearing that she was not addressing the retaliation claim or seeking to present evidence in support of the FCHR determination concerning the retaliation claim. Consequently, the undersigned does not make any finding concerning that issue. There was testimony concerning whether or not Ms. Cardwell had properly provided employment information required by the written lease in relation to a tax credit. The facts showed that Charleston Cay apartments participated in a Low Income Tax Credit Housing Program under section 42, of the Internal Revenue Code. On entering the lease, Ms. Cardwell had signed a Housing Credit Lease Addendum which acknowledged her participation in the tax credit, and agreement to furnish information concerning her income and eligibility for compliance with the tax credit. Failure to provide information for the tax credit would result in a breach of the rental agreement. As early of August 2011, Ms. Jaster, manager for Charleston Cay Apartments, contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information concerning her income and continued eligibility for the program. Ms. Cardwell provided information that was incomplete as to her income, because it failed to demonstrate commissions that she earned. Again, in November 2010, Ms. Jaster contacted Ms. Cardwell about providing information to recertification for the tax credit. Finally, on November 11, 2010, Ms. Jaster left a seven-day notice of non-compliance, with an opportunity to cure, seeking Ms. Cardwell to provide information concerning her income. Ms. Cardwell provided information concerning her salary, but did not have information concerning commissions that she earned from sales. This information was deemed by Ms. Jaster to be incomplete and not in compliance for the low income housing tax credit. The record shows, however, that Ms. Cardwell's failure to provide the required income information was not a basis for her eviction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order of dismissal of the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (FFHA).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Her Housing Discrimination Complaint alleges that Respondent “charged her $300 more than her White neighbor who has the same disability and the same income”; “she did not have a washer/dryer upon moving into the unit, but her white neighbor had a washer/dryer when she moved in[to] her unit”; “she was required to pay her utilities herself while her white neighbor was given a grant to cover her utilities”; and “she was given a fifteen day notice to vacate on March 9, 2017 that required her to vacate the property by March 31, 2017.” To resolve these allegations, the undersigned has relied on a record that consists only of brief testimony by Petitioner, limited cross-examination by counsel, and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. From November 2014 until she was evicted in March 2017 for non-payment of rent, Petitioner rented a two-bedroom unit owned and managed by Respondent. The property is located at 2418 Santa Barbara Boulevard, Naples, Florida. Petitioner’s final lease agreement was executed on March 1, 2016, on a month-to-month basis, and provided that Respondent could terminate the lease with a 15-day written notice prior to the end of the monthly period. It also provided that the agreement could be terminated for a failure to timely pay the rent. Two-bedroom units are normally shared by two residents, who split the monthly rent. Petitioner has two service animals who reside with her, and she testified that a housemate might not wish to share a unit with two service animals. Accordingly, she agreed to pay $800.00 per month for single occupancy of the unit. The lease agreement required Petitioner to pay her rent the first day of each month. Petitioner testified that she had an oral agreement with management to pay the rent on the third Wednesday of each month, when she received her Social Security disability check. There is no written agreement to confirm this arrangement, and even if an oral modification was agreed to by the parties, Respondent’s accounts receivable ledger reflects that Petitioner frequently did not pay her rent until the end of the month. According to the lease, the monthly rent includes a $75.00 allowance for utilities. Presumably, any charges in excess of that amount are the responsibility of the tenant. Petitioner testified that her next door neighbor is not a member of a protected class and was given more preferential treatment than she was. As an example, Petitioner points out that she paid her own electric bills from November 2014 until February 2016, while her neighbor received a utility subsidy. However, there is no competent evidence in the record to establish what type of arrangement the neighbor had for paying electric bills or whether the neighbor received some type of assistance for this expense. In any event, this allegation is based on events that occurred more than a year before the Complaint was filed and is time-barred. § 760.34(2), Fla. Stat. Petitioner also contends she was charged $300 more per month than her neighbor. Records submitted by Respondent show that the next door neighbor was also in a two-bedroom unit, but was assigned a housemate and paid $495.00 per month during the 12 months preceding the filing of the Complaint. Therefore, both the neighbor and Petitioner were charged the correct amount for their units.2/ Petitioner alleges her next door neighbor’s unit had a washer/dryer when the neighbor moved in, but Petitioner’s unit did not receive these appliances until February 2016. No evidence regarding this issue was presented, and a claim based on acts that occurred more than a year before the Complaint was filed is time-barred. Id. Throughout her tenancy, Petitioner consistently paid her rent late and failed to pay any rent during certain months. As of January 17, 2017, Petitioner was $1,521.00 in arrears on rent. Accordingly, that day, a three-day notice for nonpayment of rent and demand for rent or possession within three days was posted on the premises. On February 22, 2017, a second three-day notice for nonpayment of rent in the amount of $800.00 (presumably based on non-payment of the February rent) and demand for rent or possession within three days was hand-delivered to Petitioner. On March 8, 2017, a 15-day notice of termination of tenancy pursuant to section 83.58, Florida Statutes, was posted at the unit. The notice informed Petitioner that she must vacate the premises by the end of the month. On March 31, 2017, Petitioner vacated the premises, without paying the March rent. Petitioner’s Complaint was filed with FCHR on May 22, 2017. The eviction action was taken only because Petitioner failed to pay the rent, and not because of her race. In her Petition for Relief, Petitioner added an allegation that “FCHR’s Determination: No Cause” was based in part on the erroneous assumption that Respondent does not receive federal housing assistance. Petitioner testified that Respondent receives federal funds and is subject to eviction regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She points out that a 30-day eviction notice is required under HUD regulations, but she was only given 15 days’ notice pursuant to state law. Even if this is true, it does not support a charge of discrimination, as the eviction here was based on a non-discriminatory reason, a failure to pay rent, and not because of her race. Finally, Petitioner alleges that Respondent “made housing unavailable to her based on her race,” and that other persons similarly situated to her, but outside her protected class, were treated more favorably. The evidence shows that at least ten other tenants, including white tenants, were evicted for non-payment of rent during the same time period. See Resp. Ex. 14. There is no evidence, direct or indirect, to support a claim of housing discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2018.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by allegedly excluding Petitioner from participating in a homeowner’s meeting on January 14, 2009, or ejecting Petitioner from the meeting, based on Petitioner’s religion and alleged handicap, in violation of Section 760.37 and Subsections 760.23(2), 760.23(8), 760.23(8)(2)(b), and 784.03(1)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and, if not, whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a condominium association defined in Section 718.103, Florida Statutes. Respondent manages a condominium development, identified in the record as Tregate East Condominiums (Tregate). Tregate is a covered multifamily dwelling within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a Jewish male whose age is not evidenced in the record. A preponderance of the evidence presented at the final hearing does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, medical, or mental disability, or perceived disability. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner in the association meeting on January 14, 2009. In particular, the fact-finder reviewed the videotape of the entire meeting that took place on January 14, 2009. The meeting evidenced controversy, acrimony, and differences of opinion over issues confronting the homeowners present. However, the video tape did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on Petitioner’s religion, ethnicity, or alleged handicap. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees in this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes (2009). Pursuant to Subsection 120.595(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2009), this Recommended Order finds that Petitioner has participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.595(1)(e)1., Florida Statutes (2009). The evidence submitted by Petitioner presented no justiciable issue of fact or law. Petitioner provided no evidence to support a finding that he suffers from a handicap defined in Subsection 760.22(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claims to have a disability based on migraine headaches but offered no medical evidence to support a finding that Petitioner suffers from migraine headaches or any medical or mental disability. Petitioner’s testimony was vague and ambiguous, lacked precision, and was not specific as to material facts. Petitioner called four other witnesses and cross-examined Respondent’s witnesses. Petitioner’s examination of his witnesses and cross-examination of Respondent’s witnesses may be fairly summarized as consisting of comments on the answers to questions and argument with the witnesses. Petitioner repeatedly disregarded instructions from the ALJ not to argue with witnesses and not to comment on the testimony of a witness. Petitioner offered no evidence or legal authority that the alleged exclusion from the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, was prohibited under Florida’s Fair Housing Act.3 Petitioner offered no evidence that he is a “buyer” or “renter” of a Tregate condominium within the meaning of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Petitioner is not a buyer or renter of a Tregate condominium. Petitioner attended the homeowners meeting on January 14, 2009, pursuant to a power of attorney executed by the owner of the condominium. If a preponderance of the evidence were to have shown that the owner’s representative had been excluded from the meeting, the harm allegedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would have been suffered vicariously by the condominium owner, not the non-owner and non-renter who was attending the meeting in a representative capacity for the owner. The condominium owner is not a party to this proceeding. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has standing to bring this action. Petitioner was neither an owner nor a renter on January 14, 2009. Petitioner’s only legal right to be present at the meeting was in a representative capacity for the owner. The alleged exclusion of Petitioner was an alleged harm to the principal under the Fair Housing Act. Respondent is the prevailing party in this proceeding, and Petitioner is the non-prevailing party. Petitioner has participated in two or more similar proceedings involving Respondent. The parties resolved those proceedings through settlement. The resolution is detailed in the Determination of No Cause by the Commission and incorporated herein by this reference. Respondent seeks attorney’s fees totaling $3,412.00 and costs totaling $1,001.50. No finding is made as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees costs because Respondent did not include an hourly rate and did not submit an affidavit of fees and costs. However, the referring agency has statutory authority to award fees costs in the final order pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and requiring Petitioner to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amounts to be determined by the Commission after hearing further evidence on fees and costs in accordance with Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2011)1/.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents Hoyt and Nancy Davis (the Davises) own a residential property located at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, Florida (the Property). The Property is utilized exclusively as a rental. Respondent Florida Coastal Jacksonville Realty, Inc. ("Florida Coastal") and its principal John McMenamy ("McMenamy") acted as listing agents for the Property (collectively, the "Broker Respondents"). Mr. McMenamy and his company have managed the rental of the Property for approximately six years. In association with their listing of the Property, the Broker Respondents were responsible for advertising, showing, accepting applications for and assisting in the selection of tenants for the Property. At the time of the events in question, the Property was being offered for lease at a rate of $1,450 per month. Generally, due to its location within a St. Johns County golf community and proximity to good schools, the Property rents easily and quickly. The Rental Applications On May 14, 2010, Petitioner Jaime Terry (Mrs. Terry) contacted McMenamy regarding the Property. McMenamy instructed Mrs. Terry on the rental application process. On the afternoon of Sunday, May 16, 2010, Petitioners submitted via e-mail their rental application, dated May 15, 2010. On their application, the Petitioners disclosed that they had previously declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy was entered in December 2007 and discharged in January 2009. Petitioners also disclosed that they were currently living with Mrs. Terry's parents. The application included a statement of the Terrys' monthly income, and also disclosed that they had three children residing with them -- aged eleven, five and two at the time. A memo attached to the application elaborated on the bankruptcy and other details of their employment and financial situation. Mrs. Terry testified that during the application process the Respondents did not solicit additional information concerning her employment history. On May 18, 2010, McMenamy ran a credit check on the Terrys using the "Online Rental Exchange." The credit report for Jaime Terry reflected a credit score of 664, while Steven Terry's assigned score was 649. However, both reports noted "conditional" approval because of the bankruptcy filing. Although the exact date is unknown, at approximately the same time that the Terrys submitted their application, another couple, Rick and Jessica Egger (the Eggers) contacted McMenamy regarding their interest in possibly renting the Property. On the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Eggers formally submitted an application to rent the Property. The Eggers' application disclosed that, unlike the Terrys', they did not have a bankruptcy in their history. In addition, the Eggers' combined monthly income was higher than the Terrys'2/ and the younger of their two children was nine years old. The credit report obtained for the Eggers reflected a credit score of 672 for Jessica Egger and 696 for Rick Egger, with an unconditional approval rating. Respondents' Tenant Selection Process McMenamy testified that in evaluating applications, potential tenants must meet certain minimum criteria. Factors he considers in assessing applicants include credit checks, criminal background checks, employment status, and rental history. However, he agreed that the evaluation process he uses is subjective. McMenamy acknowledged that bankruptcy would not automatically disqualify a potential tenant, and in fact, confirmed that he has rented to tenants who have a bankruptcy in their history. With regard to credit scores, McMenamy testified that he considered a score below 500 to be unacceptable. Mrs. Davis testified that McMenamy manages the entire process of renting the Property on behalf of herself and her husband. Once McMenamy determines the suitability of a prospective tenant, he discusses that tenant with the Davises. McMenamy does not discuss applicants with the Davises that he does not consider eligible. The Davises do not participate in the background screening process and they do not review applicants' credit ratings. However, Mrs. Davis was aware of McMenamy's process for selecting tenants, and she confirmed her understanding that applicants must meet certain minimum requirements. In selecting a tenant, McMenamy looks not only for a candidate that is financially qualified, but also one who will rent the property for a significant period of time, will take good care of the property, and will make monthly rent payments in a timely manner, according to Mrs. Davis. Denial of Petitioners' Lease Application Mr. Davis testified that he and Mrs. Davis discussed the Petitioners' application with McMenamy. At hearing, Mr. Davis recounted that conversation as follows: Cross-examination by Mr. Organes: Q. Mr. Davis, you stated that you had discussed with Mr. McMenamy the application of Steven and Jaime Terry? A. Yes. Q. And that’s a common practice with Mr. McMenamy as when he receives reasonably qualified applicants, he discusses them with you? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what he did with the Terrys? A. Yes. Q. And you said you did not tell him not to rent to them because of their children? A. That is true, we did not tell him. Q. The issue of children wasn’t discussed at all? A. No. Q. What reason did you give him to tell them why their application was being denied? A. Because of their past rental history and their bankruptcy foreclosure. Q. In general if you don’t approve of an applicant, what reason would you give for denying that applicant? A. I would give that reason, that we didn’t feel that, you know, we probably would get a better applicant and the reason we turned them down is because we didn’t feel that they were suitable for our rental. There is no evidence in this record as to precisely when the above conversation between the Respondents took place, although based upon Mr. Davis's statement that "we probably would get a better applicant" it is reasonable to infer that it was prior to the Eggers submitting their application on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010.3/ Early on the morning of Friday, May 21, 2010, McMenamy sent an e-mail to Ms. Terry, which read: Jaime I left a message yesterday but did not hear from you. I spoke to the owner about the application and she was concerned about not really having any rental history and the number of small children. She is a perfectionist and just had the home professionally painted. The one family who lived there had small children and there were handprints all over the walls so that it needed to be repainted. So this was her main concern and therefore does not want to rent to you and the family. If you have any questions please call. Sincerely, John At hearing, Mrs. Davis maintained that the Petitioners' children were not the determining factor in the decision to deny their application. Rather, it was based on their finances and lack of rental history. Consistent with Mr. Davis's testimony, Mrs. Davis also testified that she and her husband did not instruct McMenamy to reject the Petitioners' application because of their children. After being informed that their application was denied, Petitioners immediately began searching for alternate housing. Mrs. Terry testified that their primary concern was to locate a rental in a high quality school district. Within a couple of weeks of receiving the denial e-mail from McMenamy, the Terrys located a home at 983 Lilac Loop, St. Johns, Florida. Petitioners entered into a lease for this property on June 6, 2010; the rent was $ 1,200 per month. Although the Lilac Loop home was acceptable, the Terrys considered it to be inferior to the Property, and Petitioners paid to have the home repainted and wired for cable access. The cable installation fee was $150.00. On September 22, 2010, Petitioners were notified that the Lilac Loop house was in foreclosure. Petitioners appealed to a default-law organization in an attempt to enforce their one-year lease, but were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result of the foreclosure, Petitioners were forced to seek alternative housing within the same school district, and in November 2010, leased a property at 1528 Summerdown Way, Fruit Cove, Florida, 32259. The monthly rent at 1528 Summerdown Way was $1,600 monthly. Petitioners also incurred additional expenses necessitated by hiring a moving service, in the amount of $773.50. At of the hearing, Petitioners continued to reside in the Summerdown Way rental. The Commission Investigation On August 16, 2010, the Terrys filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with HUD alleging they had been unlawfully discriminated against by Respondents based upon their familial status. Thereafter, the Commission opened an investigation of the allegation. As part of that investigation, Respondents were invited to submit written statements setting forth their version of the events at issue, and any defenses to the allegation they wished to raise. On August 19, 2010, the Davises submitted a written statement to the FCHR. In the first paragraph of that submittal the Davises stated: To Whom it May Concern: We enlisted realtor John MaMenamy to find a new tenant for our rental house at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, FL 32092. Mr. McMenamy was told that we preferred not to rent to someone with more than one, if any, very small children at this particular time. The reason being we just had to have the interior of the house professionally repainted and repairs made to several areas, the walls in particular. Additionally, in light of the fact there were several highly qualified persons interested in and looking at the house concurrently. The submittal continued by identifying four former tenants of the Property, as well as the current tenants (the Eggers), all of whom had children living with them. It is found that McMenamy's e-mail of May 21, 2010, and the Davises' letter of August 19, 2010, constitute direct evidence that Respondents' decision not to rent to Petitioners was based upon their familial status. The testimony of McMenamy and the Davises that familial status was not the reason for refusing to rent to Petitioners is rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Terrys in violation of section 760.23(1) and (2), and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's national origin, Puerto Rican, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rosa M. Cabrera is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination based on national origin under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2009). On September 17, 2009, she filed a complaint for housing discrimination against the management of Costa del Sol, LLC. Respondent, Monica Londono, is employed by Morgan Whitney, Inc., the company that manages Costa del Sol, a sixteen-unit apartment complex at 7425 Byron Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Ms. Cabrera lived at Costa del Sol for 4 years. In her complaint, she alleged discrimination in the conditions and services provided to her as a tenant based on her national origin. The Housing Authority of Miami Beach inspected Ms. Cabrera's unit annually as required for units subsidized under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 8. On March 23, 2009, a notice was mailed to Ms. Cabrera to inform her that her annual inspection was scheduled for April 10, 2009, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Mr. Cabrera was not there, on April 10, 2009, when the inspector arrived, so a door handle notice and a letter mailed the same day notified her that the inspection was rescheduled for April 13, 2009. About the same time, Ms. Cabrera said she had trouble with her hot water heater. On April 13, 2009, the unit failed inspection. The inspector found that a bedroom air conditioner was not cooling properly, that a sink stopper was missing, and that a closet door mirror was cracked. A re-inspection was scheduled for May 11, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Cabrera was offended and apparently turned away, what she said was, a group of six people who came to make repairs without giving her prior notice. On May 11, 2009, the same defects were noted and, on May 29, 2009, the Housing Authority abated the rent and terminated its contract for the unit with Costa Del Sol effective June 30, 2009. Ms. Cabrera was scheduled to meet her Section 8 case worker, Housing Authority Specialist Felipe Roloff, to "start the moving process" at 4:00 p.m., on June 5, 2009. Ms. Cabrera did not keep the appointment and it was rescheduled for June 16, 2009. On June 9, 2009, however, an "abate-cure" inspection was conducted and the unit passed. On July 21 and 23, 2009, Ms. Cabrera contacted Mr. Roloff to tell him that her refrigerator was not working and the landlord was given 24 hours to repair or replace it. When a handyman came alone to make repairs, Ms. Cabrera was afraid to let him in her apartment fearing sexual battery. So Ms. Londono accompanied the handyman when they attempted to deliver a refrigerator. They were unable to exchange the refrigerators because Ms. Cabrera had changed the locks without giving the manager a new key a violation of the terms of her lease, and she would not unlock the door. Ms. Cabrera's son arrived home at the same time and he also did not have a new key. At his suggestion, the refrigerator was left in the hallway for him to exchange it with the one in Ms. Cabrera's apartment later. Ms. Cabrera claimed, without any supporting evidence, that Ms. Londono publicly embarrassed her by calling her a "fucking Puerto Rican bitch" and a "ridiculous old lady." Ms. Londono, who is also of Puerto Rican descent, denied the allegation. Someone, Ms. Londono believes it was Ms. Cabrera, called the Miami Beach Code Compliance Division, to report that the refrigerator was left in the hallway and it was hauled away as household waste. Ms. Cabrera said the refrigerator left in the hallway was in poor condition. Ms. Londono, according to Ms. Cabrera, called the police and accused her of stealing the refrigerator. There is no supporting evidence of their accusations and suspicions about each other. When she finally got a replacement refrigerator, Ms. Cabrera said it was missing one of the crisper drawers. Ms. Cabrera believed she was being discriminated against in receiving poor services and also when Ms. Londono required her to move a plant from the hallway, but did not make another tenant move his motorcycle from the area where it was parked. Ms. Londono notified Mr. Roloff of Ms. Cabrera's lack of cooperation, and that she intended to collect August rent and to withhold a portion of the security deposit to cover the cost of the missing refrigerator. On August 5, 2009, the Housing Authority issued to Ms. Cabrera a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance effective September 30, 2009. The Notice cited her failure to allow the landlord to enter to make necessary repairs and her failure to report the income of her son who was living with her. When the rent was not paid on August 5, 2009, Ms. Londono delivered a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate to Ms. Cabrera's unit. Ms. Cabrera did not vacate. Eviction proceedings were begun in September. Ms. Cabrera was evicted on November 22, 2009. After Ms. Cabrera moved the report of the inspection of the unit indicated that, among other damage, it was infested with fleas, supporting Ms. Londono's previous claim that Ms. Cabrera was leaving her window open to allow cats to come and feed in her unit, in violation of Section 8 rules. Ms. Cabrera's claim of discrimination based on national origin is not supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Face and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rosa M. Cabrera 7851 Northeast 10th Avenue, Apt. 26 Miami, Florida 33138 Monica Londono Morgan Whitney, Inc. Costa del Sol, LLC 1385 Coral Way, Penthouse 403 Miami, Florida 33145
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, Hugh and Betty Dalton (the "Daltons"), discriminated against Petitioner, Verita Holder ("Holder"), on the basis of her race (African- American) or familial status (single mother) in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Holder is an African-American woman who is raising her children as a single mother. At all times relevant hereto, Holder resided at 1219 Japonica Lane, Cocoa, Florida, in a house owned by the Daltons. Holder was renting the house from the Daltons with the assistance of a Section 8 federal housing grant. Holder entered into a Residential Lease with the Daltons on July 22, 2009. The lease period was to begin on August 1, 2009, and run through July 31, 2010. Holder's share of the lease payment started at $3.00 in the first month, which increased to $15.00, then $27.00, and, on the first anniversary date of the lease, $287.00 per month. In April 2010, there was a leak in the plumbing at the house. The Daltons were contacted and had the leak repaired by E.K. Coggin Plumbing. Beginning in June 2010, i.e., 11 months into the lease, Holder discovered the existence of some mold under the carpet in a portion of the house. The Daltons resolved the problem by having the carpet removed and cleaned, then replacing the matting under the carpeted area. When Holder was not satisfied, the Daltons eventually replaced the portion of the carpet that had been wet. Holder and her family began having health issues at about the same time, but there was no credible evidence that those health problems were directly connected to the mold issue. Holder became a hold-over tenant at the house when her lease expired on July 31, 2010. In September 2010, Holder stopped making required payments under the lease. In November 2010, the City of Cocoa performed an inspection of the property and found some Class B violations. Those violations were deemed not to pose an immediate threat or danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of the tenants. The Daltons made repairs necessary to bring the house into conformance with required regulations. When the inspector went to the house with the Daltons, he heard Mrs. Dalton say that the tenants were dirty people. That comment was overheard by Holder's daughter. The Daltons filed an eviction action against Holder, but that action was ultimately dismissed as a result of a settlement between the parties dated March 24, 2011. Pursuant to the settlement, the Daltons waived all back rent from Holder. However, Holder was to commence paying rent again as soon as the Daltons replaced the carpet over the area where mold had been found. The carpet was replaced on March 27, 2011. On or about April 11, 2011, Holder moved out of the house.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Verita Holder in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th of January, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hugh Dalton Betty Dalton Post Office Box 541564 Merritt Island, Florida 32954 Verita Holder Post Office Box 3032 Winter Haven, Florida 33885
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether any of the respondents is guilty of unlawful discrimination against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling, in violation of section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been an individual with a disability because he is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He is required regularly to take medication to control the disease. At all material times, Respondent Scandinavian Properties, LLC (Respondent Scandinavian) has owned a small complex of rental units in Miami Beach consisting of one or more Airbnb units at the back of the property and two duplex units at the front of property in a two-story building. This case involves one of the two-bedroom, one-bath duplexes with the address of 7910 Byron Avenue, Unit 1 (Unit 1), which was the ground-floor duplex. At all material times, Respondent Renes has been a managing principal of Respondent Scandinavian, and Respondent Bourguigne has been an employee of a property management company retained by Respondent Scandinavian to manage the complex. In an effort to find a suitable rental unit, Petitioner employed the services of a real estate broker or associate, who contacted Respondent Renes to discuss the rental of Unit 1, which had just undergone extensive renovations of two years' duration. Petitioner was recovering from recent surgery, so, as a favor to the real estate agent, Respondent Renes agreed to rent Unit 1 to Petitioner with a background check, but not the customary face-to-face meeting that Respondent Renes required with prospective tenants. Thus, Respondent Renes had limited, if any, contact with Petitioner during the lease negotiations. Petitioner and Respondent Scandinavian entered into a 12-month lease commencing November 1, 2018 (Lease). The Lease prohibited keeping any pets, smoking "in the Premises," creating any "environmental hazards on or about the Premises," keeping any flammable items "that might increase the danger of fire or damage" on the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, destroying, defacing, damaging, impairing or removing any part of the premises belonging to Respondent Scandinavian, and making any alterations or improvements to the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, although Petitioner was allowed to hang pictures and install window treatments. The Lease required Petitioner to ensure that all persons on the premises acted in a manner that did not "unreasonably disturb any neighbors or constitute a breach of the peace" and permitted Respondent Scandinavian to adopt or modify rules for the use of the common areas and conduct on the premises. The Lease assigned to Petitioner the responsibility for maintaining smoke detectors, locks, keys, and any furniture in the unit. The Lease permitted "[o]ccasional overnight guests," who could occupy the premises for no more than seven nights per month, and required written approval for anyone else to occupy the premises. Among the rules of the complex was a prohibition against disabling smoke detectors. However, without reference to the Lease provision applicable to pets, one rule allowed one dog or one cat. Another rule assured that management would help tenants gain access to their units when locked out. Within a few weeks of the commencement of the Lease, Petitioner's visitors violated two provisions of the Lease by smoking outside and allowing a dog to run loose in the common area. Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner of the violations, which do not appear to have resulted in any penalties. Admitting to the presence of the dog, Petitioner testified only that the video of the dog violation, if not also the smoking violation, led him to believe that he was being watched. Petitioner's complaint of individual surveillance became an ongoing issue--in his mind. The minimal staffing and small area occupied by the small complex, as a practical matter, both precluded individual operation of cameras to trace the movements of Petitioner and his visitors in the common area and facilitated the surveillance of all, or nearly all, of the common area with relatively few cameras. The evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the respondents at any time conducted video surveillance particularly of Petitioner or his visitors. Subsequently, Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner that someone had been shouting his name outside the gate of the complex during the evening hours. This incident is not prohibited by the Lease because the person, while perhaps acquainted with Petitioner, was not his invitee onto or about the premises. Nonetheless, Petitioner's sole reported reaction to this disturbance was to demand a copy of any video--and complain when the respondents failed to comply with his demand. Another of Petitioner's visitors parked a car outside the gate in a space reserved for occupants of the Airbnbs. When, evidently in the presence of Petitioner, Respondent Bourguigne confronted the visitor, the visitor replied that he had only been parked there for 20 minutes. Respondent Bourguigne stated that she had seen the car parked in the spot for 43 minutes. Again, Petitioner's sole response was not to deal with the violation, but to complain about surveillance, evidently of the parking area. The most serious violations of the Lease were discovered on January 28, 2019, when Respondent Renes conducted an inspection of Unit 1. Respondent Renes inspected all rental units of the complex every two or three months to check for safety issues that could imperil tenants or the complex itself. In her inspection, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had disconnected the smoke alarms and encased them in plastic tape to render them inoperative. She also found that Petitioner had crowded the unit with furniture to the point of impeding egress and constituting a fire hazard. Although not involving safety issues, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had attached screws to metal doors and kitchen cabinets, damaging these new fixtures. Additionally, Respondent Renes noted the presence of a cat. As noted above, the rules conflicted with the Lease as to the presence of a single dog or cat. In any event, by this time, the respondents were aware that the cat, as well as a human, routinely shared Unit 1 with Petitioner, and the respondents had impliedly consented to these cohabitations. Again, Petitioner's reaction to the Lease violations found by Respondent Renes on January 28 was not to address the problems. Instead, he objected to the inspection as singling him out. By letter delivered to Petitioner on February 14, 2019, Respondent Scandinavian advised that he was in violation of the Lease for allowing an unauthorized person and a cat to occupy the unit, for wrapping the smoke detectors in plastic, for damaging the unit's fixtures by attaching screws into the metal doors and kitchen cabinets, and by cluttering the interior of the unit so as to impede internal movement. The letter demands that Petitioner correct the violations within seven days, or else Respondent Scandinavian would terminate the lease. Respondent Bourguigne's main involvement with this case involves an incident that occurred on the evening of February 15, 2019, when Petitioner locked his keys in his unit and was unable to unlock the door or otherwise enter the unit. Petitioner called the office, but Respondent Bourguigne, who responds to such requests during her normal working hours of Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., did not receive the call until the following morning when she listened to messages. Respondent Bourguigne promptly called Respondent Renes for guidance, and Respondent Renes directed her to summon the complex's handyman, who, as soon as he could, which was 1:00 p.m. on February 16, drove to the complex and opened Unit 1 for Petitioner. Rather than call a locksmith when the respondents failed to respond immediately to his call to the office, Petitioner and a companion attempted to break into Unit 1 with a screwdriver at about 1:30 a.m. Although unaware of the lockout, Respondent Renes learned of the attempted break-in through an automated security system, so she called the police, who reported to the scene and, after briefly interrogating Petitioner, determined that no crime had taken place. Petitioner wrongly concluded that Respondent Renes had been watching him in real time and called the police, knowing that the apparent perpetrator was really Petitioner and no crime was taking place. While locked out of his unit, Petitioner had also sent emails to Respondent Renes. In one of them sent on February 16, Petitioner advised for the first time that he was diagnosed with HIV and dependent on medication that was locked in his unit. Respondent Renes testified that she did not see these emails until days later. At minimum, it is clear that, prior to February 16, no respondent was on notice of Petitioner's disability, so the seven-day notice letter delivered two days earlier could not have been motivated by a discriminatory intent. Despite the seven-day deadline contained in the letter of February 14, by email or text dated February 21, Petitioner advised Respondent Renes that, by 2:00 p.m. on February 22, he "will have remedied each of the … listed [violations]." This was one day past the deadline. Because Petitioner failed timely to meet the conditions of the February 14 seven-day notice letter, Respondent Scandinavian commenced an eviction proceeding on February 22 and, after a hearing, obtained a judgment ordering the eviction of Petitioner. Petitioner failed to prove any discriminatory intent on the part of any of the respondents in their dealings with him, any incidental discriminatory effect in their acts and omissions, or any failure or refusal to accommodate Petitioner's disability. To the contrary, as to discrimination, Respondent Renes chose to forego eviction and instead give Petitioner a chance timely to remedy the Lease violations; when Petitioner failed to do so, Respondent Scandinavian proceeded to evict Petitioner. Nor has any act or omission of any respondent had a discriminatory incidental effect on Petitioner. Lastly, the availability of Respondents Renes and Bourguigne or other employees of Respondent Scandinavian to open units to locked-out tenants and occupants was reasonable and in no way constituted a failure to accommodate Petitioner's disability, for which Petitioner never requested or, on these facts, needed an accommodation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the respondents not guilty of the charges set forth in the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Philip Kim, Esquire Pensky & Kim, P.A. 12550 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 401 North Miami, Florida 33181 (eServed) Jack Wilson 17560 Atlantic Boulevard, Apartment 515 Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160 (eServed) Cheyenne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioners were the victims of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to renew the lease of an apartment from Respondents, based upon their race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Vernon and Glenda Shaw are husband and wife. They and their children are African-Americans. Respondent EPI Townsend, LLC owns an apartment community located in Gainesville, Florida, known as Uptown Village. Respondent Epoch Management, Inc. (Epoch) manages Uptown Village on behalf of EPI Townsend, LLC. On June 25, 2010, Ms. Shaw submitted an application to lease an apartment at Uptown Village. She listed herself, her husband, and her two children as the proposed occupants. Ms. Shaw noted the family had a dog. She provided her email address on the application, as requested. At the time of application, prospective tenants of Uptown Village are given a document entitled ?Epoch Management, Inc. Rental Application Approval Criteria.? It contains an ?Equal Housing Opportunity? statement and displays the ?Equal Housing? logo approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (?HUD?). When she submitted her application, Ms. Shaw acknowledged receipt of the Rental Application Approval Criteria form. The Shaws’ application was approved, and Ms. Shaw subsequently signed a one-year lease (?the Lease?) agreement on June 26, 2010. Soon thereafter Ms. Shaw moved into Apartment 2- 201 of Uptown Village with her children and their dog. Mr. Shaw was living in Alabama at the time and planned on moving to Gainesville at a later date to join his family.1/ At the time the Shaws began their tenancy at Uptown Village, Rhonda Hayden served as the property manager and Stacy Brown as the assistant property manager for Epoch. Both were experienced property managers and both had received Fair Housing training. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown testified that Epoch tries to create a sense of community among its tenants. Its efforts include hosting monthly breakfasts and other events for tenants. Information about upcoming community events is sent to all tenants with email addresses on file via Constant Contact, an on-line social and business networking platform. The email address provided on Ms. Shaw's rental application was entered into Epoch’s Constant Contact list. The Uptown Village Lease The Lease contained several provisions intended to ensure a safe and peaceful living environment for tenants. For example, paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that a resident shall ?. . . not permit any disturbance, noises or annoyance whatsoever detrimental to the comfort and peace of any of the inhabitants of the community or its Landlord.? Similarly, paragraph 30(G) provided that the ?Resident shall ensure that the pet(s) does not, at any time, disturb any other Resident of the apartment community.? The Lease reserved to Epoch the right to determine, in its sole discretion, whether a pet was disturbing residents. The Lease also incorporated a code of community rules (?the Rules?) for Uptown Village, which provided in pertinent part, ?all garbage, refuse and other types of waste shall be placed in garbage receptacles? and that ?loud and boisterous noise or any other objectionable behavior by any Resident or guests is not permitted.? The Rules also noted that the "quiet time" hours of the complex were from 10:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. Paragraph 12 of the Lease provided that a tenant must give 60 days’ advance notice of his or her intent not to renew the Lease. If notice was not given, then the Lease would renew on a month-to-month basis at the then current market rate, plus $50.00. The Shaws' Neighbors The Alcubilla family, who are Hispanic, lived across from Petitioners’ apartment, in Apartment 2-202. The Alcubilla family included a husband and wife, as well as the wife’s mother (Mrs. Alcubilla), who spoke little English. A Caucasian graduate student, Amanda Watson, lived on the third floor of the building directly above the Shaws in Apartment 3-201. A Hispanic tenant, Angelo Caruso, lived with his girlfriend on the same floor as Ms. Watson. In October 2010, four months after the Shaws became residents, the Kohl family moved into Apartment 2-101, the first floor apartment directly beneath the Shaws’ apartment. Trouble in Paradise The Shaws' first rent check, dated July 9, 2010, was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. On July 14, 2010, Epoch issued a reminder to Ms. Shaw advising her that a neighbor had complained about her dog barking all hours of the day. This was a violation of the Lease and the Community Rules. Mr. Shaw joined his family at Uptown Village on or about August 8, 2010. On the day he moved in, Epoch leasing agent Breanne Parks was conducting a survey of the community grounds and noticed empty boxes outside the Shaws’ apartment on the walkway, as well as trash outside another tenant’s apartment. She issued a warning notice to the Shaws and the other tenant in the building. Leaving trash outside of an apartment is a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On August 20, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease Violation. On October 8, 2010, the Shaws were notified by Epoch that they were being assessed a late fee for failure to pay their rent on time. One week later, on October 15, 2010, Epoch sent the Shaws notification about an outstanding balance on their account. The notices concerned Lease violations. On October 21, 2010, Ms. Watson complained to the office about loud arguments and sounds emanating from the Shaws’ apartment the night before. One of the noises sounded like someone or something had been thrown against a wall. Though she feared that someone was being physically abused due to the intensity of the impact, she decided not call the police. In response to Ms. Watson's complaint, Epoch posted a notice on the Shaws’ door for a second time warning them about noise and asking them to be considerate of their neighbors. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. The same day Epoch posted the noise violation notice on the Shaws' door, Ms. Shaw called the management office and lodged a retaliatory noise complaint against Ms. Watson. As a consequence of this complaint, a warning notice was sent by Epoch to Ms. Watson. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On November 4, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. Epoch allows sworn officers from the Gainesville Police Department to reside on the premises in exchange for services to the community as a Courtesy Officer. At some point during the Shaws' tenancy, Courtesy Officer Farah Lormil, an African-American female police detective, noticed a car belonging to the Shaws parked in an area that was not a designated parking space. This was a violation of Community Rules. Detective Lormil testified that she left a note on the car asking the owner to move the vehicle because "your car doesn't belong here." Detective Lormil also included her name and badge number on the note. At hearing, Ms. Shaw testified that the note read "you don't belong here." Inasmuch as Petitioners did not offer the note in evidence, and given the context in which the note was written (a parking violation), the testimony of Detective Lormil as to the actual wording of the note is the more credible. On December 27, 2010, leasing agent Erin Napolitano wrote a memo to Ms. Parks reporting that Mrs. Alcubilla’s daughter, Mater Alcubilla, had come to the management office the prior weekend to complain about an incident involving Ms. Shaw. Consistent with her memo, Ms. Napolitano testified that Mater Alcubilla had told her that Ms. Shaw had screamed at her family, followed them up and down the stairs to their apartment, and loudly knocked on their door. Mater Alcubilla also accused Ms. Shaw of stating that she knew what type of vehicles the Alcubillas drove and dared them to call the police. The memo recorded Ms. Alcubilla’s daughter as stating the police were called but when they arrived at Building 2, Ms. Shaw already was gone and therefore, no enforcement action was taken. Ms. Napolitano ended her memo to Ms. Parks with a personal observation: ?I just don’t know what to do about all of this but it certainly seems to be escalating.? Whatever the source of the friction between the two families, Ms. Napolitano testified that she had no reason to believe there was any racial animus on the part of the Alcubillas. On December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden invited Mater Alcubilla to the office to discuss the incident with Ms. Shaw. Following their meeting, Ms. Hayden notated the date of the meeting and substance of their discussion in the Alcubilla’s resident conversation log. Ms. Hayden recorded in her own handwriting: ?Resident very frightened, Resident plans on moving at the end of her lease-Resident claimed Ms. Shaw yelled at her and threatened her and told her she needed to return to her country.? Ms. Hayden considered this to be an interpersonal dispute between the Alcubillas and Ms. Shaw. Also on December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks invited Ms. Shaw to the management office to discuss the Alcubillas’ complaints. Ms. Hayden recorded in the Alcubilla’s resident log that Ms. Shaw denied the Alcubillas’ accusations, became upset and told Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks that her neighbors needed to mind their own business. Ms. Hayden also noted that the meeting ended when Ms. Shaw got up, stated, ?you wait? and left the office. Based on what she perceived as a threat by Ms. Shaw of continuing trouble with the Alcubillas, Ms. Hayden recorded her intent to notify a Courtesy Officer of the situation. On February 15, 2011, the Shaws received a three-day notice from Epoch for failure to pay rent, and a notice of an outstanding balance due. This was a Lease violation. Three weeks later, on March 4, 2011, the Shaws were issued another three-day notice for failure to pay rent. This concerned a Lease violation. Ms. Watson continued to hear the Shaws' dog barking and loud voices and other noises, included stomping and footsteps, emanating from the Shaws' apartment. On one occasion, the Shaws left Gainesville for the weekend and placed their dog out on the balcony because it barked continuously. The noise and barking interfered with Ms. Watson’s ability to study and to enjoy her residence. On March 5, 2011, Epoch posted a letter on the Shaws' door regarding complaints received from the Shaws' neighbors about the dog barking for hours at a time, often late at night and in particular on March 3, 2011. This concerned a Lease violation. The loud barking, stomping, and talking within the Shaws' apartment did not abate, and on March 9, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws a "Seven Day Notice to Cure Lease Violation" which cited their violation of Lease Provision 30 and Community Rule Y. On March 17, 2011, Epoch send the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due? notice regarding their outstanding unpaid utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Also on March 17, 2011, an email was generated by Epoch’s answering service which reported that Tara Kohl of Apt. 2-101 had called. The generated message stated Ms. Kohl’s complaint as, ?Apt. Above Very Noisy/Heavy Walking Again.? On March 19, 2011, Ms. Napolitano printed off the email note and called Ms. Kohl to get more information about the complaint. Ms. Napolitano recorded hand-written notes about the conversation on a printed copy of the email which read: ?Last couple nights—beating down on floor–jumping/walking. 3-4 am can hear them all the time.? The email with Ms. Napitano’s hand- written notes was placed in the Kohl’s tenant file. Immediately following Ms. Kohl’s complaint, Ms. Shaw wrote the following note and faxed it to the management office: To Uptown Village On Saturday night, March 19, 2011, I noted a very loud bumping noise coming from my floor. I was home alone and very afraid. I even feared calling the office or security in fear of retaliation. From past experiences when I have voiced a complaint, I receive notes on my door alleging that my dog was barking, that I had trash beside my door, we were stomping, we were too loud and have even found handwritten notes on my car. My family and I can no longer live in such turmoil. Please accept this letter as a formal complaint regarding harassment. If these occurrences continue, I will have no other choice than to contact HUD. Thank you in advance for your help. Glenda Shaw Prior to the date of the faxed letter neither Petitioner had ever complained about discrimination of any kind to anyone at Epoch. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown discussed the content of Ms. Shaw's fax and how to handle its allegations. They viewed Ms. Shaw’s complaint against the Kohls as retaliation against the Kohls for making a complaint about noise from the Shaws’ apartment the day before, and therefore a personal dispute. They also considered whether to respond to Ms. Shaw’s allegation of harassment by Epoch, and decided that any response would just be viewed by Ms. Shaw as evidence of further harassment. They decided to place the faxed letter in the Shaw’s tenant file and take no other action. It was a normal business practice of Epoch to generate a list of tenants whose leases were due to expire within the following 90 days. The list was used to create flyers reminding those tenants to contact the management office regarding renewal. Flyers were sent to each tenant on the list regardless of whether the tenant was in default of the lease or potentially a candidate for non-renewal. A renewal flyer was placed on the Shaws’ door in late March and a second renewal flyer was posted on the Shaws' door the following month. Neither renewal notice elicited a response from the Shaws. On March 25, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due Notice? regarding their overdue utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Just prior to Easter, 2011, an Uptown Village tenant asked the management office for permission to hold a private Easter egg hunt for their friends on the community’s volleyball court. Epoch approved the request. Uptown Village residents were not notified of the event through Constant Contact because the Easter egg hunt was not an Epoch-sponsored event. The individual who organized the event made the decision whom to invite. On May 10, 2011, Ms. Shaw came to the management office and was assisted by Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw accused Brian Kohl of confronting her daughter and calling her ?two-faced.? Ms. Shaw demanded that Epoch take action against Mr. Kohl and stated that if Epoch would not do anything about the situation, she was going to call the police or the Florida Department of Children and Families. Before Ms. Shaw left, Ms. Brown asked about the Shaws' intentions to remain residents upon the expiration of their Lease. Ms. Shaw did not give a definitive answer. Ms. Brown then told Ms. Shaw that if the Shaws decided not to renew, Epoch would not hold them to the 60-day advance notice required by the Lease. Three days after this meeting, Ms. Brown notified Ms. Shaw that Epoch could not send a notice of violation to Mr. Kohl because the accusations against him were not Lease violations. However, Ms. Brown offered to discuss the allegations with Mr. Kohl, a truck-driver who was often on the road. On May 18, 2011, Ms. Brown met with Brian Kohl to discuss Ms. Shaw’s complaint. Mr. Kohl gave his side of the story. After he left, Ms. Brown entered the following note in the Kohl’s resident conversation log: Brian came in wanting to break lease b/c [because] daughter is being harassed by girls in 2-111 and 2-1012/ so badly that she won’t go outside. Told him that one 2-111 should be finish soon (they are on NTV [Notice to Vacate] and the other may too, (2-101) lease expires 6/25. Otherwise would do what I can and to give us the opportunity to help before he moves. Ms. Brown also made an entry in the Shaws' resident conversation log regarding Mr. Kohl’s allegation that the Shaws' daughter was bullying the Kohl’s daughter. The following day, May 19, 2011, Ms. Watson came to the management office and gave notice that she was moving out of Uptown Village when her lease expired in August 2011. She was asked to complete a form entitled ?Notice to Vacate from Resident.? In her own handwriting, she wrote the reason for vacating as ?loud tenants.? The Notice to Vacate from Resident was placed in Ms. Watson’s tenant file as part of Epoch’s regular business practices. At hearing, Ms. Watson testified that she and her fiancé had considered living in her apartment after they married and decided they could not live there due to the continued noise and disturbances emanating from the apartment below. With Ms. Watson’s notice to vacate, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown came to the realization that three tenants in Building 2 had levied complaints against the Shaws and two had made decisions to move out in whole or in part due to the Shaws’ conduct. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown then conducted a more thorough review of the Shaws’ tenant history, and discussed whether the Shaws should continue to reside at Uptown Village. They called Epoch’s attorneys to get legal advice and left a message. On May 29, 2011, Epoch received a handwritten letter from Tara Kohl making numerous complaints against the Shaws, including loud noises late at night, and the Shaws parking one of their cars in a handicapped parking space. On June 8, 2011, the management office received a hand-written letter from Brian Kohl giving notice of his family’s intent to break their lease and move out. The reasons given all centered on the noise being generated in the Shaws' apartment, and alleged threats that had been made by Ms. Shaw against Ms. Kohl. On June 17, 2011, Ms. Shaw called the management office and spoke with Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw asked for a copy of her lease, inquired about the shortest lease term possible, and the amount of any rent increase. Ms. Brown did not commit that the Shaws' lease would be renewed nor did she quote a renewal rate. Ms. Shaw continued to press the issue and Ms. Brown finally stated that a normal rent increase on renewal was $100 a month. On June 20, 2011, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown spoke to Epoch’s attorneys regarding options for ending the Shaws' tenancy. A decision was made to non-renew their lease as that would cause the least disruption to the Shaws. Ms. Hayden prepared a non-renewal letter, and it was posted on the Shaws' door the same day. Later that afternoon, Mr. and Ms. Shaw came to the management office, met with Ms. Brown, and demanded to know the reason why their Lease would not be renewed. Ms. Shaw insisted that Ms. Brown had told her their Lease would be renewed at a rate of $937.00. Ms. Brown denied she made this statement. Ms. Brown asked Ms. Hayden to intervene in the dispute. Ms. Hayden explained that Epoch had a right to issue a non-renewal notice and that the decision was based on the numerous complaints received about the Shaws. Ms. Shaw insisted that if there were grounds to terminate the Lease for cause, Epoch should issue them a seven-day notice to vacate. Ms. Hayden explained that they had decided to issue a non- renewal notice rather than a notice to vacate to allow the Shaws more time to make arrangements and to foster an amicable parting. Epoch has sent non-African-American, White and Hispanic tenants notices of violation regarding excessive noise and non-payment of rent and fees, and also has terminated leases (through eviction) on these bases. There is no competent substantial evidence in this record to even suggest that the decision to non-renew the Shaws' lease was in any way related to their status as African-Americans. On June 23, 2011, Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend was walking their dog outside Building 2 off leash (in violation of the Rules) when it began to chase the Shaws' son. The dog nipped at their son’s leg but did not draw blood or break his skin. When Mr. Caruso learned of the incident, he came to the Shaws' apartment to apologize. He later returned and asked to take a photo of their son’s leg because he feared Ms. Shaw might bring legal action against him, given her hostility after he had offered her a bag to clean up her dog’s waste on a previous occasion. Ms. Shaw refused to allow Mr. Caruso to photograph her son’s leg. Instead, she told him if he did not leave she would call the police, and if his dog ever attacked again she would report him and have the dog put to sleep. On June 27, 2011, a second non-renewal letter was posted on the Shaws' door to ensure that Petitioner’s understood their lease would not be renewed. The following day the Shaws returned to the management office and insisted that at the end of the June 20th meeting, they had been told their lease would be renewed. Ms. Hayden denied this and reiterated that their lease was being non-renewed based on complaints from neighbors. As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw became increasingly agitated; she turned to Ms. Brown and asked if Ms. Brown found her to be confrontational. Ms. Brown responded that she thought Ms. Shaw had a ?strong personality.? To that, Ms. Shaw replied, ?It’s my culture.? As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw began to inject the issue of race into the conversation. For example, in response to Ms. Hayden’s remark that the decision to non-renew was not personal, since she would not even recognize Ms. Shaw if she saw her at a mall, Ms. Shaw stated that ?white people think we all look alike.? As the conversation was taking an uncomfortable turn, Ms. Hayden ended the meeting and referred the Shaws to Epoch’s attorneys if they had any further questions or concerns. In early July 2011, Mr. Caruso was returning to Building 2 after walking his dog on leash and encountered Mr. Shaw. Mr. Shaw told Mr. Caruso to keep his dog away or he would kick it. On July 11, 2011, Ms. Shaw complained to the management office about Mr. Caruso’s dog charging at her while it was on a leash. She noted this was the second incident involving the dog. Ms. Brown told Ms. Shaw she would look into the matter, since this would be considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On July 12, 2011, Ms. Brown spoke with Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend and cautioned her to keep the dog under control. Ms. Brown noted their conversation in both the Shaws’ and Mr. Caruso's resident conversation log. On August 4, 2011, Ms. Watson completed a "Move Out Survey" and in response to a question about what could have been done by management to encourage her to stay, wrote in her own hand-writing: ?Dealt with loud neighbors more consistently and effectively . . .? She added that her reason for leaving was ?loud, inconsiderate tenants.? The Shaws refused to move out by the date given in their non-renewal notice and stopped paying rent. On August 3, 2011, the Shaws dual-filed a charge of housing discrimination (race and color) with the Commission and the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. The charge alleged that Epoch had refused to rent to them, made discriminatory statements, and had offered them less favorable terms, conditions, privileges, services or facilities than other non-African-American tenants. The facts supporting their charge were that they were not invited to the Easter egg hunt; that they had been told their lease would be renewed yet it was not; and that Ms. Hayden had made racist statements. The Shaws did not pay rent for July 2011,3/ and on August 4, 2011, were sent a "Notice to Pay Rent" by Epoch. The Commission investigated the Shaws' charge of housing discrimination and issued a determination on August 31, 2011, finding there was no probable cause to support the claims. On September 29, 2011, the Shaws filed a Petition for Relief from an alleged discriminatory housing practice, giving rise to the instant proceeding. During the pendency of this matter, the Shaws were evicted from Uptown Village for non- payment of rent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon Petitioners’ race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2012.
