The Issue Whether the Hernando County Housing Authority (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in a discriminatory housing practice against Peggy Troiano (Petitioner) on the basis of her disability by refusing to provide Section 8 funding for a housing unit being occupied by Petitioner and the housing unit's owner, Petitioner’s daughter, Julia Williams.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by HUD and administered by Respondent. Petitioner is an individual claiming that she is disabled because of a toxic injury that requires her to live isolated in a non-toxic environment. Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s claim of disability and it is, therefore, found that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of applicable law. Julia Williams is Petitioner’s daughter who, at all relevant times, owned the house located at 15141 Pomp Parkway, Weeki Wachee, Hernando County, Florida (“15141 Pomp Parkway unit”). Ms. Williams is specially trained to deal with toxic injury and is paid through a federally-funded, consumer-directed program to provide assistance to Petitioner. Respondent is a public housing agency that administers the Section 8 Housing Program as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which recodified the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. As a recipient of funding from HUD for its Section 8 Program, Respondent is required to comply with HUD Section 8 regulations, as well as all Federal, State, and local fair housing laws and regulations. In order to receive funding from HUD, Respondent is required to sign an annual contributions contract (ACC) wherein it agrees to follow the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). If Respondent does not follow the C.F.R. or HUD’s guidelines, HUD has the right to terminate Respondent’s Section 8 program funding. In addition, HUD could make Respondent repay any funding used for ineligible housing. On March 17, 2014, during the annual reexamination for her Section 8 voucher, Petitioner signed, under the penalty of perjury, a summary report which identified her as the only household member permitted to live in any unit under her Section 8 voucher. Around the time of the annual reexamination, Petitioner was living at a unit on Philatelic Drive with plans to move into and rent a unit at 15141 Pomp Parkway. The Pomp Parkway unit was owned, but not being occupied, by Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams. In April of 2014, Petitioner asked Respondent for permission to rent the unit from her daughter. Petitioner and her daughter spoke with Respondent’s officials about her request. Generally, a public housing agency, such as Respondent, cannot approve a unit for participation in the Section 8 program if it is owned by a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, sister, or brother of any member of the participant’s family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.306. Respondent, however, ultimately approved Petitioner’s rental of the Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 program, even though it was owned by Petitioner’s daughter, pursuant to a limited exception under 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d), which provides an express exception to the rule if “the [public housing agency] determines that approving the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d). Also, during April of 2014, Petitioner and Ms. Williams were working on constructing a caregiver suite for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit and had discussions with Respondent’s staff about it. There are documents purportedly created during this time frame summarizing several conversations between Respondent, Petitioner, and Ms. Williams. The documents state that Respondent’s officials had a conversation with Petitioner and her daughter wherein they discussed the requirements for a live- in aide and that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that Ms. Williams could never live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Respondent also contends that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that, even if Ms. Williams was approved as a live-in aide, Ms. Williams could not live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On the other hand, Petitioner contends that the alleged conversations warning her that her daughter could not reside in the home did not occur during this time frame, and that she and her daughter continued to renovate the house to specifications suitable to accommodate Petitioner's disability with the expectation that her daughter would ultimately be able to reside in the home after renovations were complete. Upon consideration of the credibility of the witnesses and timing of the purported documents, the undersigned finds that the testimony and documents regarding these alleged April conversations are unreliable and do not support a finding that the conversations and warnings actually occurred during the April time frame. The evidence is also insufficient to support Petitioner's contention that Respondent was somehow responsible for Petitioner's expectation that her daughter would be able to both act as Petitioner's caregiver and live in the home while Petitioner was receiving rent vouchers under the Section 8 program. Petitioner was the only person that Respondent approved to live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under her Section 8 voucher. In May of 2014, Petitioner’s daughter entered into a one-year residential lease with Petitioner and a Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP Contract) with Respondent. According to the HAP Contract, Petitioner was the only person able to reside in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without the express, written consent of Respondent. At the time the HAP Contract was signed, Petitioner advised Respondent that she would be the only person living in the unit. Ms. Williams, as the landlord, signed a check cashing agreement with Respondent wherein she agreed Petitioner would be the only person occupying the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Also, Petitioner’s income verification summary report provides that Petitioner is the only person allowed to live in a unit covered by her Section 8 voucher. In early May of 2014, Ms. Williams moved into the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without notice to Respondent. Petitioner has never received written approval from Respondent to have Ms. Williams live and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 voucher program. By letter dated June 17, 2014, Petitioner submitted an HCHA Live-in Aide Request Verification Form, along with letters from her doctor. Petitioner also requested that her daughter Julia Williams serve as her live-in aide. Approval for a live-in aide is a different process than the approval process to have someone added to the household. While Petitioner's request for a live-in aide stated that Petitioner was living at 15141 Pomp Parkway, it did not mention that Petitioner's daughter was the owner of the dwelling, nor did it include a specific request that Ms. Williams be allowed to move into and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that she owned. Upon receipt of the written request for a live-in aide by Petitioner, Respondent began its investigation to determine whether Petitioner met the qualifications for a live-in aide and whether Ms. Williams met the qualifications to serve as a live- in aide. Respondent has implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 into its written policy regarding live-in aides, which provides: LIVE-IN ATTENDANTS A family may include a live-in aide provided that such live-in aide: Is determined by the [public housing agency] to be essential to the care and well-being of an elderly person, a nearly-elderly person, or a person with disabilities, Is not obligated for the support of the person(s), and Would not be living in the unit except to provide care for the person(s). Under the C.F.R., a public housing agency is required to approve a live-in aide, if needed, as a reasonable accommodation for an elderly or disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 982.316 (“The PHA must approve a live-in-aide if needed as a reasonable accommodation” to a family with an elderly or disabled person.). By letter dated June 27, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner of the approval of her request for her daughter to serve as her live-in aide. Although Respondent was aware that a home occupied by an owner was not eligible for a Section 8 voucher at the time it gave its permission for Petitioner's daughter to serve as Petitioner's live-in aide, the letter did not speak to that issue. Rather, the June 27, 2014, letter, signed by Donald Singer, stated: Pursuant to your letter dated June 17, 2014 requesting a reasonable accommodation for a live in aide. Your letter also ask [sic] that the live in aide be your daughter, Julia Williams based upon her qualifications as presented. After reviewing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) regulations for Live-in Aides and the Housing Authority's Section 8 Program Administrative Plan for Live in Aides our office has determined that your daughter, Julia Williams meets the program qualification(s) to act as your Live in Aide. Therefore our office is approving Julia E. Williams as your Live in Aide effective immediately. Should you have any questions regarding this action/letter please contact our office at 352-754-4160. By email on August 11, 2014, Petitioner notified Mr. Singer that she and her live-in aide, Julia Williams, intended to live at the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On August 11, 2014, Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams was still the owner of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Under 24 C.F.R. § 892.352, a unit being occupied by its owner is deemed “ineligible” and a public housing agency is prohibited from providing funding for such unit. The C.F.R. provides a limited exception for shared housing that allows an owner to occupy a unit funded by Section 8. Under that limited exception, however, the Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.615(b)(3). Based upon the prohibition under the C.F.R. which forbids a public housing agency from funding a unit occupied by an owner who is a blood relative of the Section 8 participant, by letters dated August 22, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner and Ms. Williams that the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was “ineligible housing” that could not be funded. The letters also informed Petitioner that Julia Williams' approval as a live-in aide did not supersede HUD regulations and that, because Julia Williams was occupying the unit, Respondent was terminating the HAP contract effective September 30, 2014. The only reason Respondent terminated the funding for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was because the C.F.R. does not allow Respondent to continue funding a unit occupied by its owner. Prior to the August 22nd letters, Respondent was advised by HUD that Respondent did not have any discretion in funding “ineligible housing.” HUD approved the draft of the August 22nd letters. The evidence does not support a finding that either Respondent or HUD waived or should otherwise be prevented from applying the limitations and requirements of the law that a Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. Respondent would have been willing to continue Petitioner’s housing assistance as long as Petitioner met program requirements and the housing was deemed eligible housing under the C.F.R. through the issuance of a new three-bedroom voucher for a different unit, or by having Petitioner live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without Ms. Williams both owning and occupying the unit. By letter dated August 27, 2014, Respondent provided Petitioner with a new Section 8 voucher and voucher packet information so that Petitioner could start searching for a new rental unit where Ms. Williams could continue to serve as Petitioner’s live-in aide under Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher. The new voucher was required to be returned to Respondent by September 30, 2014. There was no testimony that Petitioner returned the new Section 8 voucher to Respondent by September 30, 2014, or that Ms. Williams moved out of 15141 Pomp Parkway by that date. On September 4, 2014, before the funding was terminated for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit, Petitioner filed a complaint for discrimination. Petitioner emailed a signed three-bedroom voucher on October 30, 2014, a month after funding under the new voucher expired, for the rental of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that had already been deemed ineligible housing as defined by 24 C.F.R. § 982.316. That voucher is not valid and the facts fail to support a finding that Respondent’s refusal to allow Petitioner to participate in the Section 8 voucher program while occupying a unit owned and occupied by her daughter was because of Petitioner’s disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 22nd day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, within the meaning of and in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2005), by requiring Petitioners to submit a second application for the approval of a condominium purchase.
Findings Of Fact It is undisputed that Petitioner, Allan Kangas, has no handicap and is not a disabled person. At the conclusion of Petitioners' case-in-chief, Mr. Kangas testified that he has no handicap. The undersigned, sua sponte, entered an ore tenus order on the record dismissing the case brought by Mr. Kangas. Petitioner, Anna Kangas, is an elderly female and the mother of Mr. Allan Kangas and Mr. Sheldon Kangas, the latter being the representative in this proceeding for the named Petitioners. It is undisputed that Mr. Sheldon Kangas is not handicapped, but that Mrs. Kangas is handicapped, within the meaning of Section 760.22(7), Florida Statutes (2005), because of Alzheimer's disease. Respondent is a condominium association lawfully incorporated as a Florida corporation (Association). Respondent must operate in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, and Declaration of Condominium (condominium documents). The condominium documents require the Association to approve each purchase of a condominium. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Sheldon Kangas and Mrs. Anna Kangas contracted with Ms. Mary Cox to purchase condominium unit 15, located at 23 Hatchett Creek Road. Ms. Cox is a real estate agent and a co-owner of unit 15. Ms. Cox notified Ms. Pat Williamson, Association Secretary, of the prospective purchase. For the reasons stated herein, Respondent did not discriminate against the prospective purchasers, but approved the purchase of condominium unit 18 in a timely manner after the purchasers changed their purchase contract from unit 15 to unit 18. The prospective purchasers completed an application for approval of the purchase of unit 15 sometime between December 8 and 10, 2005. The Association conducted a meeting to approve the proposed purchase on December 10, 2005. During the meeting on December 10, 2005, the purchasers informed the Association that they wished to purchase unit 18, located at 29 Hatchett Creek Road, rather than unit 15. Unit 18 was owned by Mr. Brian Isaac. Ms. Cox did not object to releasing the purchasers from the contract for the purchase of unit 15. The Association informed the purchasers that a new application for unit 18 would be required. The purchasers completed a new application under protest. At a meeting conducted on January 3, 2006, the Association approved the application for the purchase of unit 18. The purchase of unit 18 closed on January 25, 2006. The purchasers seek reimbursement of living expenses incurred for hotel rooms and meals during the delay caused by the requirement for a second application. The purchasers are not entitled to reimbursement. The purchase of unit 18 was the first time the Association had required a second application. However, it was also the first time a purchaser had changed his or her choice of units after submitting an application. The Association did not discriminate against Mrs. Kangas because of her handicap. The record evidence contains no justifiable issue of law or fact to support the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David G. Muller, Esquire Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. 630 South Orange Avenue, Third Floor Sarasota, Florida 34236 Shelden Kangas Allan Kangas 4578 Manor Drive Sarasota, Florida 34233
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discriminatory housing practices based on his race or his handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this cause, Petitioner was a tenant of a rental apartment located at 284 South First Street, Apartment 6, Macclenny, Florida (the Apartment). Petitioner?s tenancy was established by a lease agreement with a final effective date of November 24, 2009. Petitioner moved out of the apartment on May 3, 2012. Respondent is a Florida Limited Liability Company. Among its other holdings, Respondent owns four 4-plex units located on First Street, Second Street, and Third Street in Macclenny, one of which includes the Apartment. The racial make-up of the tenants occupying Respondent?s apartments in the vicinity is roughly 50 percent African-American and 50 percent Caucasian. Petitioner is African-American. Petitioner has an unspecified mental condition. He takes medications for management of his symptoms, and receives periodic visits from Ms. Gadsby to ensure that he is complying with his medication regimen. Petitioner does not receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. Petitioner holds a bachelor?s degree in criminal justice from Benedict College in South Carolina. As part of the application for rental of the Apartment, Petitioner was asked “[h]ave you been arrested or had criminal charges filed against you? (If yes, please list them).” In response to the application question, Petitioner answered “yes Trepass [sic.].” The trespass charge was related to a misdemeanor incident that occurred at an unspecified time in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner failed to disclose a felony conviction for an incident that had occurred in South Carolina. Petitioner stated that he thought the requirement to disclose criminal charges applied only to charges arising from incidents having occurred in Florida. However, nothing in the application can be read to support that limitation. As such, Petitioner materially falsified his lease application. Petitioner cut hair for members of his church, neighbors, family, and friends at the Apartment, and had done so for the two-and-one-half years of his tenancy. He equipped the Apartment with a barber chair and a small waiting area. He accepted “donations” of food, clothes, and cash for his services. The cash receipts were used to pay his electric and water bills, among other things. Thus, despite its small scale and limited clientele, Petitioner operated what can only be described as a barbershop from the Apartment. The Lease Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent provides that the Apartment was not to be used “for any other purpose than as a private dwelling unit.” The Lease Agreement also provides that Petitioner was to comply with all applicable building and housing codes. The Macclenny Code of Ordinances, Part III, Section 4-105, provides that home occupations are subordinate and incidental to a residential neighborhood, but that certain occupations, including barbershops, “shall not be considered as home occupations under any circumstance.” Thus, Petitioner?s operation of a barbershop from the Apartment was a violation of the Lease Agreement. There were no apparent landlord/tenant disputes involving Petitioner?s tenancy until late 2011. Mr. Stivender testified that he began to receive periodic complaints from tenants in the area regarding the Apartment, including cars being parked on the grass and in the road, loud music, and people milling about the premises. He testified that at least one tenant advised Respondent that she was afraid to venture out of her apartment due to the number of people in the area. The testimony of Mr. Stivender regarding complaints of other tenants would be hearsay if taken for the truth of the matters asserted. However, the undersigned accepts his testimony as evidence, not of the facts surrounding the alleged complaints, but of a non-discriminatory reason for actions to be described herein, most notably the events of March 6, 2012. At the end of October 2011, Petitioner was cited by Respondent for having more than one car regularly parked at the Apartment. Petitioner?s car was not in running condition. The other cars parked at the Apartment belonged to friends or relatives. Petitioner subsequently sold his vehicle, and would borrow his father?s or his cousin?s car when needed. The incident caused bad feelings between the parties. On November 1, 2011, Respondent sent a notice to each of its tenants in Macclenny. Although the notice was precipitated by the complaints against Petitioner and Respondent?s observations of activities in and around the Apartment, the notice was not limited to Petitioner. The notice cited provisions of the common lease agreement regarding the use of the premises and tenant conduct, and advised that excessive noise, driving on the grass, and “loitering” would be cause for eviction. The notice further advised that the landlord would “be patrolling the area on a regular basis at night to check for violations.” On March 6, 2012, Mr. Ferreria was driving by the Apartment at approximately 10:30 p.m. There were, along with Petitioner and his daughter, three guests at the Apartment, Bianca Gaines-Givens, Jacoby Givens, and Misty Lee. They were playing music on an electronic keyboard. Mr. Ferreria stopped his car on the side of the road. He called his property manager, Mr. Stivender, and advised him that he was going to go speak with Petitioner about the noise coming from the Apartment. Mr. Stivender works for a gas company, and was at work routing gas trucks. Mr. Stivender advised that he was going to come to the Apartment, and asked Mr. Ferreria to wait for him before speaking with Petitioner. Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens left the Apartment after Mr. Ferreria?s arrival in the neighborhood, and noticed Mr. Ferreria sitting in his vehicle. They drove away from the Apartment, but decided to return shortly thereafter. By the time they returned, Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender were leaving. Thus, they did not witness the confrontation described herein. After Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens drove off, Mr. Ferreria, disregarding Mr. Stivender?s request, went to the Apartment and knocked on the door. It was, by then, approximately 10:45 p.m. When Petitioner answered the door, the two immediately began a heated discussion over the music and the cars. Ms. Lee went to the back of the Apartment when Mr. Ferreria arrived. She heard yelling, but heard nothing of a racial nature. Shortly after Mr. Ferreria arrived at the Apartment, Mr. Stivender arrived on the scene. Mr. Stivender is a solidly built man, and could be an intimidating presence under the right circumstances. These were the right circumstances. Mr. Stivender physically moved Mr. Ferreria out of the way, and came between Mr. Ferreria and Petitioner. He was primed for a confrontation. He had his hand in his pocket, but testified convincingly that he was not armed.1/ He and Petitioner had a loud and angry exchange of words, and Mr. Stivender forcefully suggested to Petitioner that it would probably be best if he moved out of the Apartment. After Mr. Stivender appeared on the scene, Ms. Lee came out from the back of the Apartment. She recognized Mr. Stivender as Respondent?s “office manager.” She noted that Mr. Stivender had his hand in his pocket, and was talking loudly and pointing his finger in Petitioner?s face. Ms. Lee went outside and spoke with Mr. Ferreria. She testified that Mr. Ferreria indicated that some of the neighbors were afraid of Petitioner because of the noise and the number of people who hung around the Apartment. The confrontation ended with Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender leaving the premises. The police were not called. The next morning, Petitioner called Ms. Gadsby. Petitioner frequently called Ms. Gadsby when he was feeling “stressed.” She went to see him that morning, and testified that he was very upset over the events of the previous evening. She returned that afternoon for a “well-check,” and he was doing better. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner called the Baker County Sheriff?s Office to report the March 6, 2012, incident. A deputy went to the Apartment, spoke with Petitioner and Ms. Lee, took their sworn statements, and prepared an offense report. The description of the incident as reflected in the report, including statements made by Petitioner and Ms. Lee, did not contain any account of racial threats or epithets, or any allegation of discriminatory intent based on race or handicap.2/ Other than Mr. Stivender?s statement made in the heat of the March 6 argument, Respondent made no effort to evict or otherwise remove Petitioner from the Apartment. On March 31, 2012, Petitioner noticed water coming from behind a wall of the Apartment. He called Respondent, and Mr. Stivender came to the Apartment to inspect. Mr. Stivender first suspected that the air-conditioning unit was leaking. The air conditioner was turned off and Mr. Stivender left, intending to contact an air-conditioning repair service. By 6:00 p.m. on March 31, 2012, the rate of the leak was such that it was determined that a water pipe had burst under the foundation of the Apartment. Petitioner did not know where the shut-off valve was located, and was unable to stop the flow, which began to cover the floor in several rooms of the Apartment. Mr. Stivender returned to the Apartment, and determined that a car owned by one of Petitioner?s guests was parked on the grass, and was over the meter box with the shut- off valve. The car was moved, and the water turned off. Respondent called a plumber to fix the pipe. Since the pipe was under the foundation, and in order to avoid breaking up the slab, the repair was accomplished by re-routing the pipe in the wall of the Apartment. The repair entailed cutting an access hole in the drywall. That hole was not immediately repaired. Respondent also called Servpro to perform water cleanup services. The standing water was vacuumed up, and large fans and dehumidifiers were placed in the Apartment to dry it out. While the repairs and drying activities were ongoing, Respondent paid for Petitioner and his daughter to stay in a motel in Macclenny. They were there for three to four days. Respondent paid Petitioner?s power bill for the days that Petitioner was unable to use the Apartment. Petitioner returned to the Apartment, and stayed there for some time. He was upset that the access hole for the pipe repair had not been closed up, and that the baseboards had not been replaced in some areas. On April 9, 2012, Petitioner wrote to Respondent about the effects of the water leak. After thanking Respondent for the “compassion” shown to Petitioner and his family during the event, he complained about the damage to his personal property resulting from the water leak, and an odor “suggesting the presence of mold.” He stated his belief that his daughter?s preexisting asthma was aggravated by the smell in the Apartment. In his April 9, 2012, letter, Petitioner also stated that “due to my mental health condition, I am on prescribed medicine that has now been adjusted to assist me through this stressful situation.” Petitioner?s statement, which was not accompanied by any form of medical evidence, was not sufficient to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner had a record of having, or was regarded as having, any form of mental disability. Mr. Stivender testified that no one ever advised Respondent that Petitioner had a mental disability, and that Respondent had no such knowledge. The April 9, 2012, letter being insufficient on its own to convey such information, Mr. Stivender?s testimony is credited. On May 3, 2012, Petitioner moved out of the Apartment. He had been served with no eviction notice or other written request to vacate. Petitioner gave no notice to Respondent, but dropped off his key at Mr. Ferreria?s business on the day he moved out. Mr. Stivender testified that Petitioner left the Apartment in a filthy, deplorable condition. As a result, Respondent withheld Petitioner?s $400.00 security deposit to offset the costs of returning the Apartment to rentable condition. Petitioner testified that the Apartment was not in poor condition when he moved out, and that some of the damage was the result of the pipe leak. However, Petitioner did not testify, or even suggest, that the decision to withhold the deposit was the result of any racial hostility or animus, or of any reaction to his handicap. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence that he was treated differently under similar circumstances than were tenants of Respondent who were not African-American, or who did not have comparable mental disabilities. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent undertook any act pertaining to Petitioner?s occupancy of the Apartment based on Petitioner?s race. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent knew of Petitioner?s mental disability or handicap, or that Respondent regarded Petitioner as having any such mental disability or handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Petitioner?s race or handicap caused or contributed to the March 6, 2012, confrontation. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the confrontation resulted from noise, issues with cars and parking, and complaints directed to Petitioner by other tenants. Petitioner failed to prove that he was ready, willing, and able to continue to rent the Apartment, but that Respondent refused to allow him to do so. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took any action to evict him from the Apartment, or to otherwise intentionally interfere with Petitioner?s occupancy of the premises. To the contrary, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent took reasonable and appropriate steps to repair and remediate the Apartment after the water line break, and provided no-cost accommodations to Petitioner while the Apartment was not habitable. The repairs may not have been completed to Petitioner?s satisfaction, but any such deficiency was not the result of discrimination against Petitioner based on his race or his handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent?s decision to withhold his security deposit was based on Petitioner?s race or handicap. In sum, the evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his race or his handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2013H0034. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020) (FFHA), was timely filed.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2020 versions.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above. The Lease Petitioner, Ross Couples, leased a house located at 11635 Meadowrun Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property), from Respondent Xuan Ren. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed the Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA) and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease arrangements. On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner executed a year lease for the Property from January 15, 2018, to January 15, 2019. The lease included the following provision for its renewal: 18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. … A new lease is required for each period of lease. At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner another lease agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another 12-month lease, nor did Petitioner move out. As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month-to- month arrangement.4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the HOA. On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager and Respondent Cloud. In that email, Petitioner made numerous complaints and mentioned the need for a larger hot water heater for his hydrotherapy tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a new lease. On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the current leasing arrangement had 4 No written lease agreement for the month-to-month arrangement was offered into evidence. been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before May 15, 2019. Petitioner did not move out of the Property on or before May 15, 2019. On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action against Petitioner in the appropriate court. A final judgment in the eviction action was rendered on June 6, 2019, and a writ of possession was issued for the Property on June 7, 2019. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019. Housing Complaints Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents. On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner, and specifically finding "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. … No evidence was found to support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict him." The HUD Letter does not indicate Petitioner could re-open the HUD case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. It does not mention the FFHA or FCHR, and it does not provide any instruction or information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing discrimination laws.5 Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jordan, told him he had a year from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork." 5 The HUD Letter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint. This proceeding does not involve either of those situations. Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission.6 It is unclear when this conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan's role was at HUD, and whether the discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is hearsay and not corroborated by any non-hearsay evidence or documentation. There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of possession of the Property to file an FFHA discrimination complaint with FCHR. The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing Commission" on June 10, 2020, regarding his FFHA claim. He admits he did not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rather, at that time, he spoke with an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out and returned. There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in his Response that he filed the Complaint with FCHR on June 10, 2021. Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint is dated July 22, 2020, and indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the Complaint on July 21, 2020. Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020. Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified the Complaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020. 6 The undersigned is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See § 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “Commission” to mean the Florida Commission on Human Relations).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2021. Ross Joseph Couples Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Teuber Law, PLLC Post Office Box 49885 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Timothy Cloud D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Mahshie & DeCosta 1560 Matthew Drive, Suite E Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Suite 202-200 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Xuan Ren D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Paul Edward Olah, Esquire Law Offices of Wells Olah, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 808 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice.
Findings Of Fact Several years prior to 2007, Petitioner, Wanda Hutcheson, leased one side of a duplex apartment from LGMS. The apartment was located on 3359 Greenbrier Circle, in Gulf Breeze, Florida. During the time that LGMS owned the property, the property manager found her to be a responsible tenant who paid her rent on time. Indeed, the manager felt that she had improved the look and value of the property because she had done extensive landscaping in her front yard. The increase in value was not shown by the evidence. At the time, Petitioner’s landlord knew that she had a mental disorder known as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). In part, the extensive yard work done by Petitioner was due to her OCD. She regularly watered her yard with the shared sprinkler system that served both apartments in the duplex. However, the electricity for the water pump that operated the sprinkler system was hooked into the electrical system for the apartment adjoining Petitioner’s apartment. The sprinkler system was operated by a switch located either by or in the electrical box for the adjoining apartment and the electrical box for her apartment. Petitioner was frequently in the area of those boxes. Respondent, Sand Dunes Property, LLC (Sand Dunes), is a limited liability company owned and operated by Respondents, Robert and Justin MacFarland. In 2006, Sand Dunes purchased several parcels of rental property from LGMS, including the apartment leased by Petitioner. In February 2006, prior to Sand Dunes’ purchase of the property, the MacFarlands visited the premises they were about to purchase and met Petitioner. At that time, Petitioner told the Respondents that she had OCD. She neither requested nor indicated the need for any special accommodations from the Respondents regarding her lease. The evidence did not show that the Respondents knew or were aware that OCD could be a disability that might significantly interfere with a person’s life activities. To them, Petitioner did not seem mentally disabled and appeared able to carry out her daily activities. She appeared to live her life as any other person might. In fact, among other things, Petitioner drove a car, occasionally worked cleaning houses, performed yard work, had the electrical part of her apartment’s sprinkler system transferred to her electrical system, paid her lease and cared for other people’s children. Around March 2006, subsequent to the purchase of the property by the Respondents, Peter Bouchard moved into the apartment next to Petitioner’s apartment. Shortly after he moved in, Petitioner was watering her yard with the sprinkler system. Mr. Bouchard saw her and turned off the sprinkler system. He told her he did not believe in watering the grass and that he did not want his yard watered. He told her that as long as the pump was hooked to his electrical box that she could not use the sprinkler system since he was paying for the electricity used in its operation. He suggested that she could have the pump transferred to her electrical box if she wanted to continue to use the system. Petitioner called Respondents and left a message about the need to transfer the electrical connection for the sprinkler system to her electrical box and to make sure it was alright for her to pay to have the system transferred. The evidence did not show that she related the details of Mr. Bouchard’s actions to Respondent’s. She did not receive a response to her message and eventually paid for the system to be transferred to her electrical box. At some point, even though she did not own the sprinkler systems components, she removed the sprinkler heads from Mr. Bouchard’s side of the yard. She capped the pipe where the heads had been and filled the hole. She did not tell anyone that she had removed the sprinkler heads, but kept the sprinkler heads in her apartment. Additionally, during March 2006, Petitioner complained to Santa Rosa Animal Control about Mr. Bouchard’s two dogs being abused by him and barking. She also complained about the two dogs of the neighbor who lived behind her, Jodi Henning. Both of these incidents were investigated by Animal Control and no abuse was discovered. In fact, the dogs never barked or only barked for a short time when the investigator visited the duplex on two occasions. Petitioner’s actions appeared to be in retaliation for Mr. Bouchard’s refusal to permit her to use the sprinkler system. Finally, at some point, Petitioner while on her front porch saw Mr. Bouchard’s son walking to his apartment. She told the boy that she would cause Mr. Bouchard’s dogs to be removed for abuse and then would have him removed for the same reason. The comment upset both the boy and Mr. Bouchard. On April 3, 2006, Sand Dunes mailed a written offer to enter into a new lease with Petitioner. The offer was made to Petitioner because her lease would terminate on May 30, 2006. The offer was conditioned upon an increase in the monthly rent on Petitioner’s apartment. The offer stated, “Please let us know by May 1st of your decision so that we may set up an appointment to review and sign your new lease agreement.” The intent of the letter’s language was to not be contractually bound until a new lease was signed by the parties. There was no evidence that Respondents treated any other potentially continuing tenant differently. Around April 4, 2006, Mr. MacFarland left a message for Petitioner regarding a maintenance check on her apartment’s air conditioner. Petitioner returned the call and left a message that she could not be present at the time suggested and asked that the work be performed at another time. Petitioner received the written offer of renewal on April 5, 2006, and attempted to accept the offer by leaving a message on Respondent’s telephone. After the first message, Petitioner left town to attend a family function out of state. Around April 6, 2006, air-conditioning maintenance checks were performed on nine of ten units owned by the Respondents in the Greenbrier area. Around April 6 or 7, 2006, Respondents were contacted by Mr. Bouchard. Mr. Bouchard complained about Petitioner to the MacFarlands. He told them that Petitioner had stolen the sprinkler heads out of his side of the yard and that she turned off the electricity to his apartment. He showed them a photograph of the unlocked electrical box to his unit. He also relayed to Respondents that Petitioner had repeatedly accused him of abusing his dogs, not properly vaccinating his dogs and had repeatedly reported him to Animal Control for animal abuse and barking dogs. Apparently, Mr. Bouchard complained enough about Petitioner to Respondents to make them believe that Respondent was a particularly disruptive and vengeful tenant. At some point, Respondents became aware of Jodi Henning’s problems with Petitioner. Ms. Henning lived in a different complex from Petitioner. However, her backyard adjoined Petitioner’s backyard. She called the Sheriff's Department on Ms. Hutcheson on a few occasions for problems she had with Petitioner. None of the incidents amounted to an arrest. During an evening in March 2005, Ms. Henning’s dogs were inside with her. They had not been outside. Ms. Henning answered the door. Petitioner, who was quite angry, complained about Ms. Henning’s dogs and told her that she had made an enemy of Petitioner and that she would make Ms. Henning’s life miserable. Ms. Henning called the Sheriff’s Department. The 911 operator asked if Petitioner was drunk. Ms. Henning said that Petitioner was not drunk, but just crazy and mean. Petitioner was told by law enforcement personnel that Santa Rosa County Animal Control should be contacted if she had an issue with a neighbor's dog. She then filed a complaint with Santa Rosa County Animal Control about Ms. Henning’s dogs. Petitioner made a similar complaint in April 2006. Neither complaint was found to have merit by the investigator for Animal Control. Additionally, Ms. Henning felt that she could not go out in her yard without Petitioner coming out to watch her. Petitioner never engaged in any physically, aggressive behavior. However, Ms. Henning felt she became threatening to the point she was afraid. Petitioner had told both Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard that she had OCD. However, based on their observation of her, neither thought that Petitioner was disabled by her condition. They both thought that she was simply nosy and mean. On the other hand, there were former neighbors who thought Petitioner was a nice person and a good neighbor. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that these neighbors’ opinions were known to the Respondents during the time the offer to lease was outstanding. Mr. MacFarland obtained copies of "call reports" received by Animal Control regarding Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard's dogs. Those reports consisted of complaints in March 2005 about Ms. Henning's two dogs, and in March 2006 concerning Ms. Henning's two dogs and Mr. Bouchard's two dogs. On April 10, 2006, Respondents sent a letter on Sand Dunes' stationary revoking the earlier offer to lease her apartment after expiration of her lease. Based on the Respondents limited knowledge about Petitioner during the time the offer to lease was outstanding, their conclusion was neither unreasonable nor discriminatory. Thereafter, the Respondents were entitled to rely on the expiration of the lease by its terms and the peaceful return of the premises. Petitioner received the revocation letter around April 12, 2007, when she returned home from out of state. No explanation was given in the letter for the withdrawal of the offer to lease. Petitioner called Mr. MacFarland on the date she received the revocation letter. She was very distraught and tearful. During the long conversation, the only explanation Respondent recalled from Mr. MacFarland as to why Respondents withdrew their offer was that he did not like her. Petitioner also was told to communicate with their lawyer, Keri Anne Schultz, Esquire. Petitioner went to Ms. Schultz's law office to discuss the situation with her. Ms. Shultz was not in the office. Petitioner was told by the receptionist that she could not wait in the office for Ms. Schultz to return. Ms. Hutcheson wanted to write Ms. Schultz a note regarding renting the duplex. Mr. Bordelon, Ms. Schultz's partner, threatened to call the police if Petitioner remained at the office. Petitioner left the office. Thereafter, the only communication from the MacFarlands or their attorney was legal notices to vacate the premises. Petitioner did attempt to send them information on OCD. The evidence was not clear whether the Respondents received the information or reviewed it. Petitioner refused to vacate the premises and an eviction action was filed in June 2006. A hearing was held in the Circuit Court in June and July of 2006. By court order dated August 17, 2006, Respondents were awarded possession of the property on August 31, 2006, at 11:59 p.m. Unfortunately, Petitioner, due to ill health, did not begin to vacate the premises until a few days prior to forcible removal. She was not finished moving on September 5, 2006, five days after the Respondents were to be put in possession of the property. The Respondents had the Sheriff’s Deputy remove Petitioner from the premises, telling her that she should have been out a long time ago. The MacFarlands, with a little help from Mr. Bouchard, removed the rest of Petitioner’s possessions to the curb. During the removal, the bottom of a box Mr. Bouchard was carrying came undone and some of the contents fell onto the pavement. One jar of food was broken. All of these events were very distressful to Petitioner. Upon learning that she would be evicted, Petitioner began seeing Dr. Bingham in May 2006. Eventually, she was involuntarily committed for a short time and has been seeing Dr. Bingham every two or three weeks for the last year. The apartment remained vacant for several months after the eviction. Eventually, Mr. Bouchard moved into the unit at a lower rate of rent than he paid for his old apartment but higher than the amount Petitioner would have paid if the new lease had taken effect. As indicated, between February 2006 and April 2006, Mr. and Mrs. MacFarland's only contact with Petitioner was a visit to her duplex apartment with the realtor selling the property and some voice mails exchanged between them concerning the sprinkler and air conditioning systems. Respondents had little knowledge regarding Petitioner. Even though the evidence demonstrates that Respondents could have acted more kindly and could have better informed themselves about the circumstances of Petitioner, there was no evidence that the withdrawal of the offer to renew was made based on an intent to discriminate against Petitioner because of her mental disability. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Melissa A. Posey, Esquire Melissa A. Posey, P.A. 201 East Government Street, Suite 36 Pensacola, Florida 32502 Robert and Justyn MacFarland Sand Dune Properties 7173 Blue Jack Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioners have been subjected to an unlawful housing practice by Respondents, as alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed by Petitioners on March 13, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Ingrid Gomez and Luis Moran, are married. They and their son moved into Coral Gardens Apartments in early 2000. Petitioners entered into a one-year lease on January 13, 2000. The lease was not renewed at the end of one year, and Petitioners, thereafter, lived in their apartment as month-to- month tenants. Coral Gardens Apartments is a 36-unit apartment complex located in Naples, Florida. Many of the residents are minorities. Respondent DeMarco Investments is the absentee owner of the complex, which is managed through a Fort Myers company called Services-Taylor Made, Inc. Respondents Jim and Judy Hill were hired to manage the complex in March 2003. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill sent a notice to all tenants that stated as follows, set forth verbatim:1/ Now we have [sic] ask you to please make sure that when you give your children snacks, drinks, or what ever [sic] to eat that you the parent would make sure your children discard the trash inside the unit or in the dumpster. Apparently this went in one ear and out the other. Now all unit [sic] has to suffer this price because no one wants to help keep the trash up by disposing of it yourself [sic]. The adults are getting just as bad. So every unit is going to pay an additional $35.00 a month trash clean up fee. You want to live trashy MOVE across the street. So when you pay your July Rent pay an extra $35.00 to pay for the person that has to clean up YOUR trash. I sent out letters to everyone that it was $25.00 and if it didn't improve I would raise it. Well I didn't inforced [sic] the $25.00 and it hasn't changed at all. So it [sic] in effect for sure now [sic]. YOU WILL PAY $35.00 WITH JULY'S RENT. Now you don't want to pay it next month then start picking up the TRASH! Also from now on you put furniture out at the dumpster it will cost you $50.00 first piece and $15.00 per piece after that. They charge me to come and get the stuff then I charge you. The camera's [sic] will be watching and don't get caught. I hate to inform all of you we are not the old managers, the old owners, the old maintenance personal [sic]. We are new and we are the LAW here. We are working to improve this place and if you can't help with keeping this place clean then I DON"T [sic] want to here [sic]. I AM NOT GOING TO LIVE IN A TRASHY PLACE! After receiving this notice, Mr. Moran and Mr. Novarro went to the manager's office to discuss the propriety of the proposed $35.00 trash pick-up fee. Mr. Moran stated to Ms. Hill that he believed an imposition of such a fee on tenants was against the law. Mr. Moran testified that Ms. Hill stated, "I am the law." Mr. Moran demanded that Ms. Hill give him the phone number of Mr. DeMarco. He told her, "I want to talk to the owner of the circus, not the clowns." Mr. Moran testified that at this point, Ms. Hill became apoplectic. She called Mr. Moran "a fucking nigger Latino." Mr. Novarro, whose English was very sketchy, confirmed that Ms. Hill used those words. Ms. Gomez, who speaks relatively fluent English, testified that on another occasion Ms. Hill stated that she was "tired of the fucking negros Latinos." This raised a question whether Ms. Hill also used the term "negros" in her confrontation with Mr. Moran and whether it became "nigger" only in the imperfect translation. In any event, Ms. Hill's use of the word "fucking" was unambiguous and certainly indicated a racial animus against Mr. Moran, who is indeed a black Latino. In a second notice to all tenants dated June 22, 2003, Ms. Hill acknowledged tenant complaints about the $35.00 fee. She had "consulted the Florida Landlord/Tenant Act and state officials in Tallahassee," and concluded that she was required to rescind the $35.00 trash fee. Thus, the controversial fee was never collected. Dennis Gomez, Petitioners' middle-school-aged son, testified that Ms. Hill told him she would pay him $5.00 per week to pick up trash on the property. Mr. Moran told Dennis not to accept, because tenants paid Ms. Hill $10.00 per month to clean up the property. Dennis testified that after he refused the offer, Ms. Hill told him that he had to pick up the trash anyway because he "was a slave." When Dennis asked why he was a slave, Ms. Hill stated that Dennis' father was a "nigger and a slave," and that made Dennis a "slave, too." Dennis Gomez' testimony is not credible. There is undoubtedly a kernel of truth in his story, but Dennis' obvious embellishments of his conversations with Ms. Hill render his testimony of doubtful probative value. At some point in June 2003, Ms. Hill served Petitioners with a seven-day notice to vacate the premises, because of her confrontation with Mr. Moran. However, the notice was never enforced and the Petitioners stayed on until August 1, 2003, when they voluntarily terminated their tenancy. There was a problem with the return of Petitioners' deposit. Ms. Gomez contacted Mr. DeMarco, who returned the deposit to Petitioners after a two-month delay caused by cash flow problems with his businesses. Mr. DeMarco credibly testified that he knew nothing of the controversy between Petitioners and Ms. Hill until he received the Housing Discrimination Complaint. His only contact with Petitioners was the telephone conversation with Ms. Gomez in August 2003 concerning the Petitioners' deposit. From the weight of the testimony, it is apparent that there was a great deal of animosity between Petitioners and the Hills. The notices authored by Ms. Hill were crude and insulting, but were not directed toward Petitioners in particular. There is credible evidence that on at least one occasion Ms. Hill uttered a derogatory and insulting racial comment to Mr. Moran. However, the record evidence does not demonstrate that Ms. Hill took any action against Petitioners on the basis of their race or familial status. The $35.00 trash fee notice was provided to all tenants. The fee itself was never collected. Petitioners were given a seven-day notice, but it was never enforced. Petitioners chose to vacate their tenancy. No adverse action whatever was taken against Petitioners. DeMarco Investments was unaware of the hostile situation between Petitioners and the Hills. Mr. DeMarco's delay in returning Petitioners' deposit was due to legitimate business reasons.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed discriminatory housing practices against Petitioners based on their familial status.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners appeared but presented no evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with her dwelling based on her race or handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 51-year-old black female who relocated to Leesburg, Florida, from Port Chester, New York, in February 2012. Respondent, Richman Property Services, Inc., is the corporate owner/manager of Laurel Oaks Apartments (Laurel Oaks) located at 131 Bayou Circle in Leesburg, Florida. Amy Lewis is the Community Manager of Laurel Oaks. Petitioner rented a two-bedroom apartment unit from Respondent from February 24, 2012, until she moved to Orlando, Florida, on December 3, 2012. Petitioner?s daughter, Sushon Dillard, occupied the apartment with Petitioner during her tenancy at Laurel Oaks. Petitioner spoke with Ms. Lewis via telephone to inquire regarding the availability of a unit at Laurel Oaks while Petitioner was still residing out of state. Petitioner applied for tenancy at Laurel Oaks by faxing her application to Ms. Lewis. Petitioner?s application was accompanied by a copy of her award letter documenting Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments as proof of income. On February 24, 2012, Petitioner signed a lease for Laurel Oaks unit #103, paid a security deposit, and moved into the unit. Petitioner has a current clinical diagnosis of “schizophrenia, paranoid.” She also claims to be diagnosed bi- polar with Tourrete?s Syndrome. While Petitioner presented no documentation of the additional diagnosis, her testimony on this issue is credible and is accepted by the undersigned. Petitioner was first hospitalized for treatment of an unspecified mental illness at Bellevue Hospital in New York in 1982. She apparently lived without significant incident for the next 26 years. Petitioner had a “breakdown” in 2008, while living in Arizona, and another “breakdown” that same year in New York, for which she was hospitalized at Greenwich Hospital in Connecticut, and later transferred to Stamford Hospital in Connecticut. Petitioner reports that since April 2008, she has “spent time in numerous mental institutions in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Maryland and New York.” Petitioner?s most recent incident occurred in August 2012, while she was living at Laurel Oaks. She was taken by police to a local facility named “Life Stream” where she was treated for a number of days, then returned home to her apartment at Laurel Oaks with her daughter. Petitioner appeared calm and controlled at the final hearing. She testified that she is taking her medications and doing very well. Petitioner claims that when she moved into the unit at Laurel Oaks, it was not cleaned, was “infested with dead roaches,” and the washing machine was filthy. Petitioner?s daughter testified there were dead roaches even in the dishwasher. Petitioner also bases her allegation of discrimination on Respondent?s accusation in April 2012, that Petitioner had not paid a $300 security deposit prior to occupying her apartment. When Petitioner paid her April rent, Trifonia Bradley, an employee in the office at Laurel Oaks, informed Petitioner she still owed a $300 security deposit. Petitioner responded that she had paid the deposit on February 24, 2012. Although the evidence was not clear as to the specific date, Petitioner later met with Ms. Bradley and brought in her receipt showing the $300 had been paid in February. After that meeting, Petitioner received a phone call from Ms. Lewis apologizing for the error and stating something to the effect of “we are all good.” Petitioner believes Respondent was attempting to take advantage of her disability and trick her into paying the deposit again. At final hearing, Petitioner and her daughter presented evidence and testimony regarding additional alleged discriminatory acts by Respondent. Petitioner alleged that someone employed by, or otherwise acting on behalf of Respondent, sabotaged her automobile; harassed her by requesting her daughter fill out a separate rental application in order to live with her; harassed Petitioner about her request for accommodation based on her disability and claimed she had not demonstrated that she was disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act; threatened to tow away her car because it was inoperable; and stole money from her apartment. Each of these additional alleged acts occurred after September 21, 2012, the date on which FCHR issued its determination of no cause, and was not investigated by FCHR. Petitioner is intelligent and articulate. Her exhibits were well-organized and contained copious documentation of the alleged discriminatory acts occurring after September 21, 2012. Her documentation included correspondence with Laurel Oaks? management, notices which were posted on the apartment door, copies of numerous forms and applications, and a police report. In contrast, Petitioner offered no tangible evidence regarding the condition of the property upon occupancy other than her testimony, which was not persuasive. She introduced no photographs, no written complaint, and no correspondence with the manager or other employees of Laurel Oaks regarding the condition of the apartment. In fact, she offered no evidence that she brought the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks? management. Given the totality of the evidence, including the demeanor of the Petitioner and Ms. Dillard, the undersigned finds that either the unit was not unclean or Petitioner did not bring the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks upon occupying the unit. Further, the undersigned finds that Laurel Oaks erroneously requested the security deposit in April 2012, and corrected the error after reviewing Petitioner?s documentation. The mistake was not an act of discrimination based either on race or disability.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0289. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2012.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners on the basis of race, or retaliated against them for exercising a protected right, or both, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was admitted into the record at the final hearing, the undersigned cannot make any findings of fact. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (“Findings of fact shall be based … exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.”).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Petitioners no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Antonio Carraway Whang Carraway 1406 Southwest Osprey Cove Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 (eServed) Jillian Sidisky, Esquire Stefanie S. Copelow, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
