The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(e) and (1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed real estate sales associate. She was licensed in 2003. Her license number is 3061179. Respondent was working for Weichert Realty in the Orlando area at the time of the final hearing. She started working for that firm in October 2006, and prior to that, she “did not do a whole lot with [her] license as far as practicing real estate.” Respondent filled out and submitted her license application over the Internet. She submitted a signed notarized statement dated January 15, 2003, attesting that she answered the questions in the application “completely and truthfully to the best of [her] knowledge.” She also submitted a fingerprint card. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that there were at least three material misstatements and omissions in Respondent’s license application. First, Respondent did not provide a Social Security number (SSN) in her license application. The SSN that she subsequently provided to the Division, 378-72-0704, was incorrect. Respondent testified that her SSN is 378-62-0704. That is the SSN listed for Respondent in the driver’s license records maintained by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). There is evidence suggesting that Respondent’s SSN may actually be 380-80-3178, but the evidence is not clear and convincing on that point.3 The document on which Respondent provided the incorrect SSN was not offered into evidence by the Division. Respondent denied providing an incorrect SSN, and she testified that if she did provide an incorrect SSN, it must have been typographical error. Second, the only name listed for Respondent in her license application was Yolanda Orr, which was Respondent’s married name and her legal name at the time she submitted her application. Respondent answered “no” to the question that asked whether she has ever “used, been known as or called by another name (example - maiden name . . .) or alias other than the name singed to the application.” (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent’s maiden name is Yolanda Small. She used that name until July 1998, when she was married. She was divorced in February 2006, and she is again using her maiden name. Respondent currently has two valid forms of identification issued by DHSMV: a Florida driver’s license in the name of Yolanda D. Small (No. S540-964-67-7491) and a Florida identification card in the name of Yolanda D. Orr (No. O600-964-57-7490). The driver’s license was issued in March 2006,4 and expires in July 2010; the identification card was issued in August 2002, and expires in July 2007. The birth date listed on the driver’s license is July 9, 1967, whereas the birth date listed on the identification card is July 9, 1957. Respondent testified that her middle name is Daniella, not Denise. She further testified that she has never used the name Yolanda Denise Orr. In response to a request to the state court in Michigan for records relating to Respondent, the Division was provided documentation of multiple traffic offenses committed in Flint, Michigan in 1999 and 2001 by Yolanda Denise Orr, as well as documentation of criminal offenses committed in Michigan by Yolanda Daniella Orr and Yolanda Danielle Orr. The traffic records do not list the defendant’s Social Security number, but the birth date listed in the records matches Respondent’s birth date. Respondent’s testimony that the traffic offenses did not involve her was not persuasive, nor was her claim there must be multiple Yolanda Orr’s in Flint, Michigan, with the same birth date as hers. Respondent admitted to being in Flint, Michigan at the time of the traffic offenses, and she admitted that she drove a Ford vehicle at the time of the ticket that was issued to Yolanda Denise Orr in October 2001 while driving a Ford. Moreover, the Michigan driver’s license number of Yolanda Denise Orr contained in the traffic records -- O600961139544 -- is identical (except for one number) to the Michigan driver’s license number -- O600961135544 -- that Respondent surrendered to DHSMV when she first applied for a Florida driver’s license. The evidence is clear and convincing that the Yolanda Denise Orr referred to in the traffic records is Respondent, and that Respondent failed to disclose that name (and her maiden name, Yolanda Small) in her license application. Third, Respondent only disclosed one criminal offense in response to the question in the application that asked whether she had “ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) . . . .” The criminal offense that Respondent disclosed was, according to the application, a 1987 offense in Louisiana which Respondent “used the wrong social security number” when “filling out [her] financial aid papers for the first time.” There is no evidence that Respondent was prosecuted for such an offense in Louisiana. Respondent was, however, prosecuted in federal court in Michigan in 1993 for using a false SSN on two separate student loan applications. Those offenses were prosecuted as part of an indictment that also included four counts of filing fraudulent tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service and two counts of using a false SSN on tax returns. In February 1995, Respondent pled guilty to one count of filing a fraudulent tax return, one count of using a false SSN on a tax return, and one count of using a false SSN on student loan applications. The other counts of the indictment were dismissed as part of her plea agreement. In September 1995, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of the offenses to which she pled guilty and was sentenced to six months in federal prison, followed by three years of probation. She was also required to pay restitution in the amount of $8,177 to the Internal Revenue Service and restitution in the amount of $2,761 to the U.S. Department of Education. Respondent testified that “the whole reason the [federal] case came about” was that she filed a tax return not knowing that one had already been filed on her behalf by H&R Block; that the investigation into the “double” filing of the tax return led to the charge involving the “student loan application that had the wrong social security number on it”; and that it was her understanding that the offenses related to the student loan application submitted to Grambling State University, not any colleges in Michigan. Respondent’s testimony regarding the circumstances giving rise to the federal offenses was not credible because, among other things, she was charged with filing false tax returns on three separate occasions -- in 1990, 1991, and 1992 - - not just one time. The background check conducted on Respondent based upon the fingerprint card that she submitted as part of her license application identified two additional criminal offenses that Respondent did not disclose in her application. The first undisclosed offense was a 1990 felony retail fraud offense prosecuted in state court in Michigan. Respondent pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to one year of probation. The record does not reflect the circumstances surrounding the retail fraud offense, but Respondent described it as “basically a petty theft.” The second undisclosed offense was a 1991 bad check charge, which was also prosecuted in state court in Michigan. The case was not resolved until February 2001 because, according to Respondent, it involved a check she wrote prior to leaving for college and she was unaware that that a case was pending against her until she returned to Michigan after college. Respondent was required to disclose criminal traffic offenses in her license applications; she was not required to disclose traffic offenses such as “parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations.” The traffic records suggest that several of the offenses may have been criminal in nature (e.g., driving with a suspended license), but the evidence was not clear and convincing on that issue.5 Respondent testified that she did not disclose the state court offenses because she did not remember them at the time she submitted her license application. She testified that she considered the federal offenses to be related and that she thought that disclosing one of the offenses was adequate since the other offenses were related and prosecuted together. Respondent’s explanation as to why she did not disclose all of her federal offenses is not entirely unreasonable under the circumstances. The offenses were all prosecuted in a single criminal proceeding and, even though they involved offenses committed in Michigan between 1990 and 1992 (rather than in Louisiana in 1987), they did involve use of an incorrect SSN on a student loan application. Respondent’s explanation as to why she did not disclose the offenses prosecuted in state court was not plausible. It is understandable that Respondent might not recall all of the details of the retail fraud offense since it occurred more than 10 years before the date of her application, but her testimony that she did not even remember the existence of the offense at the time she filled out her application was not credible or reasonable. Respondent’s testimony that she did not remember the bad check offense at the time she filled out her license application was even less credible because the court records related to that offense reflect that the case was not finally resolved until February 2001, which only two years prior to the date of Respondent’s license application. Respondent testified that she was told by a Division employee that she did not need to disclose all of the counts of the federal case because the related offenses would be discovered as part of the background screening based upon the fingerprint card submitted by Respondent. Respondent offered no evidence to corroborate her unpersuasive, self-serving testimony on this point. Respondent testified that she was directed by the same Division employee to provide a supplemental letter to the Division explaining the federal offenses, and that she did so. However, there is no record of what, if anything, Respondent submitted to the Division. Respondent’s application did not go to the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) for approval even though a criminal history was disclosed in the application. The Commission policy in effect at the time authorized the Division to approve such applications on a case-by-case basis. The policy did not require an applicant such as Respondent to appear before the Commission, as is the case under current Commission policy. Respondent did not present any evidence of mitigation at the final hearing. However, in her post-hearing filing, she stated, “I am a single mother, and as such, I rely on my real estate business as my only source of income.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order that: finds Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Count I of the Administrative Complaint); finds Respondent guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2) and, hence, Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Count II of the Administrative Complaint); revokes Respondent’s license; and imposes an administrative fine of $1,000 or the Division’s investigative costs, whichever is less. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2007.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent violated sections 475.25(1)(e), 475.42(1)(b), and 475.42(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2011), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2- 14.009, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the real estate industry in the state of Florida, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed real estate sales associate having been issued license number 3101946. During the time relevant to this case, Respondent was a sales associate affiliated with Bahia Real Estate ("Bahia"), a brokerage company owned by Raul and Ricardo Aleman, with offices located in Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, Florida. Respondent was employed in Bahia's Miami location. In 2010, Respondent acted as a sales associate on behalf of Michael Perricone for a real estate transaction involving the purchase of a condominium in the Blue Lagoon Towers ("Blue Lagoon") in Miami which was purchased as an investment. Mr. Perricone's sister, Francesca Palmeri, and her husband, Santo Palmeri, were present at the closing where they met Respondent for the first and only time. During the closing, which lasted approximately one hour, the Palmeris indicated to Respondent that they would be interested in making a similar purchase of investment property if another comparable condominium unit became available at Blue Lagoon. The Palmeris had no further interaction with Respondent until he contacted them at their home in Pueblo, Colorado, in 2011 to advise them of the availability of a condominium for sale at Blue Lagoon. On or about October 6, 2011, Respondent faxed a partially completed Bahia form "'AS IS' Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase" to Mrs. Palmeri for the Palmeris to use in making an offer on a condominium unit located at 5077 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida. Prior to forwarding the document to Mrs. Palmeri, Respondent wrote on the form the property description, the escrow agent name and address, the initial escrow deposit amount and additional deposit, the time for acceptance, the closing date, and listed himself as the "Cooperating Sales Associate" with "Bahia Realty Group, LLC." The Palmeris decided to offer a $125,000.00 purchase price. Respondent directed Mrs. Palmeri to complete the contract and provide a ten percent escrow deposit. Mrs. Palmeri entered a purchase price of $125,000.00, initialed each page, and signed the form as "Buyer." Respondent provided Mrs. Palmeri with instructions on how to wire the funds for the escrow deposit. On October 7, 2011, Mr. Palmeri wired $12,000.00 to J.P. Morgan Chase, which was then deposited in an account for Bonaventure Enterprises, LLC ("Bonaventure").1/ The Palmeris had no knowledge of Bonaventure, but, based upon the representations of Respondent, they understood the money they were asked to wire to the J.P. Morgan Chase account of Bonaventure was an escrow deposit for the property they intended to purchase at Blue Lagoon. The Palmeris had no discussion with Respondent regarding the reason for sending the escrow deposit to Bonaventure. They assumed that Bonaventure was somehow related to the seller or its title company. The condominium unit in question was bank owned; however, the Palmeris were not informed of this. No evidence was presented that Respondent had an ownership interest in Bonaventure. However, Bonaventure is owned by Respondent's brother and sister-in-law. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the managing member of Bonaventure. Bonaventure is not a licensed real estate broker. Bahia does not maintain an escrow account, and its sales associates are authorized to use title companies of their choice for receipt of escrow deposits. Respondent was aware that he was unable to accept the escrow deposit of the Palmeris in his own name, because, as a licensed real estate sales associate, he is prohibited from receiving the money associated with a real estate transaction in the name of anyone other than his broker or employer. In fact, Respondent was disciplined in 2010 for a similar violation.2/ Respondent claims that the Palmeris entrusted him with their $12,000.00 to hold for possible investments, not necessarily related to real estate transaction, and he was doing it as a favor for them as "friends." Respondent contradicted himself by stating his intention in directing the Palmeris to deposit their money into the Bonaventure account was to help them have cash on hand in Florida in order to meet the Blue Lagoon condominium seller's requirements to make the escrow deposit with the seller's title company within 24 hours after an offer was accepted. The Palmeris had no knowledge of the seller's unique restrictions on the escrow money. Further, Respondent's asserted motive in requesting the $12,000.00 to have cash on hand in Florida is undermined by the fact that, if the Palmeris could wire $12,000.00 to Bonaventure's bank account, they could also wire the funds directly to a title company chosen by the selling bank after acceptance of their offer. Shortly after returning the contract to Respondent and sending the escrow deposit, Mrs. Palmeri discussed increasing the purchase price by $1,000.00 for a total of $126,000.00. Based upon the language of the proposed contract, the Palmeris expected a response to their offer within 24 hours. Immediately thereafter, Respondent told the Palmeris that they were "in negotiations." However, almost a month passed before they heard from Respondent regarding the status of the purchase of the condominium. On or about November 4, 2011, Respondent contacted Mrs. Palmeri and stated that he had "good news." He indicated that the seller would be willing to sell the property for a price of $129,500.00. According to Respondent, the seller requested documentation from the Palmeris' bank indicating their ability to pay. Mrs. Palmeri indicated that this was not an acceptable counter-offer. Respondent suggested that he could negotiate a sales price of $129,000.00, but he needed the Palmeris to send an additional $9,000.00 to put into escrow. Mrs. Palmeri told Respondent that she was no longer interested in the property because their maximum offer was $126,000.00. During the same conversation, Mrs. Palmeri asked for the return of her deposit. Respondent expressed agitation that she was retreating from the possible purchase because he had done "so much work." Respondent clearly anticipated he would receive a commission if the deal was consummated. The Palmeris did not get an immediate return of their escrow deposit. Mrs. Palmeri called Respondent repeatedly and received no answer. She also sent an e-mail to J.P. Morgan Chase trying to find out the status of the deposit and received no reply. Mrs. Palmeri again attempted to contact Respondent on November 18, 2011, and left him a message that he needed to call her regarding the deposit. After receiving no response, she contacted Bahia and spoke with Ricardo Aleman. Mrs. Palmeri explained to Aleman that she had signed a real estate contract with Respondent on October 6, 2011. She no longer wanted to pursue this real estate transaction and wanted the escrow deposit returned. Aleman was unaware that Respondent was negotiating a real estate transaction for the Palmeris or had accepted their deposit money. Aleman contacted Respondent who confirmed by email that the Palmeris were no longer interested in purchasing the condominium at Blue Lagoon. Respondent wrote, "After a month of hard work . . . the client decided to drop. It was a little bit problematic. I lost time and money because the offer was already accepted and she had no reason to negotiate." Respondent assured Aleman he would return the deposit to the Palmeris. In accordance with Bahia's policies and procedures, its sales associates are required to complete a deposit form at the time of receipt of funds for escrow. No such receipt was received by Bahia from Respondent with regard to the transaction involving the Palmeris. However, it was not unusual for Bahia not to receive information regarding real estate transactions conducted by their sales associates until the time of closing. After discussing the matter with Aleman, Respondent advised the Palmeris that he could return their money within ten days. Respondent advised Mrs. Palmeri that he would send her two checks for the total amount--one check which she could cash immediately and a second check which would be postdated. In order to get a return of their deposit, Mrs. Palmeri agreed. On or about November 28, 2011, the Palmeris received two checks, each in the amount of $6,000.00, including one postdated for December 16, 2011. These checks were written on the account of Bonaventure and signed by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a final order imposing on Alfonso Miranda an administrative fine in the amount of $6,000.00 and suspending the real estate sales associate license of Alfonso Miranda for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Andrey Barhatkov, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Facts are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed Florida real estate sales associate issued License No. 660647 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a sales associate with All American Realty, Inc., 227 North John Young Parkway, Kissimmee, Florida 34741. On or about July 5, 2005, Respondent prepared a residential sale and purchase contract on behalf of a buyer and faxed the contract to Jerome Fortson, who is not a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, broker associate, or broker, for Mr. Fortson to present to the buyer and obtain the buyer's signature. Having obtained the buyer's signature, Mr. Fortson later appeared on behalf of the buyer at the closing. Respondent was not present at the closing. Respondent admitted that he had Mr. Fortson show the real estate property to the buyer, that he had an arrangement with Mr. Fortson to show properties for him, and that Mr. Fortson was to report back to him for follow-up. Respondent acknowledged that Mr. Fortson was a mortgage broker and that they had an informal business referral agreement wherein Mr. Fortson would arrange financing for buyers that he had shown properties. In the course of this activity, Mr. Fortson, who represented himself as a sales representative for the buyer, contacted the listing agent for information regarding the property and showed the property. Respondent never met the buyer. The real estate agent representing the seller was not aware of Respondent's involvement in the transaction until he requested his share of the commission.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a final order finding that: (1) Respondent, Andrey Barhatkov, violated Subsections 455.227(1)(j) and 475.42(1)(e), Florida Statutes; Respondent's license as a real estate salesperson be suspended for one year, followed by one year of probation; Respondent be fined $2,000; (4) Respondent be required to attend such remedial ethics and educational courses as are determined appropriate by Petitioner; and (5) Respondent be required to pay the costs of the investigation and prosecution of this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division on Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building, Suite N802 Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Andrey Barhatkov 408 Pinewood Drive Davenport, Florida 33896 Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the Division of Real Estate of the Department of Professional Regulation. As such, Petitioner acts as the licensing and regulatory agency for real estate salesperson licensees. The Respondent is Jack Wilson Johnson, holder, at all times pertinent to these proceedings, of license number 0636049 issued by Petitioner. His license is currently inactive. His address is c/o Jack Lu, Inc., 8445 Pensacola Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32534. On or about February 26, 1996, Respondent submitted an application to Petitioner for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Question number 9 on the application read as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer “NO” because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of any other state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering “NO.” If you answered “Yes,” attach details including dates and outcome, including sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not understand the question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent marked the “NO” box beside this question. Respondent then signed the “Affidavit of Applicant.” Above his signature was printed the following language. The above named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate sales person under the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as amended, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that (s)(he) has carefully read the application, answers, and attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and recollection permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatever; that (s)(he) knows of no reason why this application should be denied; and (s)(he) further extends this affidavit to cover all amendments to this application or further statements to the Division or its representatives, by him/her in response to inquiries concerning his/her qualifications. On or about July 6, 1989, Respondent pled nolo contendere to reckless driving in Santa Rosa County, Florida, and was adjudicated guilty with a sentence of 6 months probation. Later, Respondent pled nolo contendere to a second charge of reckless driving on or about February 21, 1991. On or about January 19, 1994, Respondent pled guilty to violation of his probation on this charge. On or about March 8, 1993, Respondent pled nolo contendere to Battery in Escambia County, Florida. Adjudication was withheld. On or about May 1, 1974, Respondent pled nolo contendere to three counts of failure to register as a dealer or salesman, a felony, in Escambia County, Florida. Respondent admitted at the final hearing that he was guilty of answering “NO” to question number 9 on the application that he made to Petitioner in this case, but that this action was merely a result of “poor judgment.” Respondent offered mitigating testimony by two witnesses, establishing that he had handled real estate transactions for them to their satisfaction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the offenses charged in the administrative complaint and revoking his license. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack Wilson Johnson c/o Jack Lu, Inc. 8445 Pensacola Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32534 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by inducing a seller to enter in a contract for sale of real estate, based on a $50,000.00 earnest money deposit that was never made.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Fred Marberry, Jr. is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker-salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0369879 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Bernon Earl Thomas is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433736 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Fred Marberry was President of Marberry and Mack Development, Inc., and maintained an office in Altamonte Springs, Florida. James Mack was the Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer of the company. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Bernon Thomas was a real estate salesman with General Realty Management Corporation. His office was in Kissimmee, Florida. In 1985, the two Respondents had worked together on the potential sale and development of a multi-family project in Kissimmee. Thomas was aware of the availability of some commercial property in Kissimmee known as Cross Creek that he felt would be a good deal and shared that information with Marberry. Thomas got his information on Cross Creek from Larry Heninger, who was working with the owner, R. S. Futch, in putting together a development package to present to potential buyers and developers. Heninger had expended considerable effort in working with an engineer and permit agencies and had made contacts with a number of businesses interested in locating on the property. The engineering reports, correspondence and figures supplied to Marberry by Thomas indicated that the parcel comprised 14.75 usable acres. There were letters from the City saying that sewage capacity, utilities and similar public services would be based on this amount. Marberry told Thomas that the development package looked good and to continue working on it. Some time in mid-July 1985, Larry Heninger informed Thomas that some third parties were also interested in the Cross Creek property and that if Marberry and Mack, Inc., wanted to present an offer, they would need to do so immediately as Mr. Futch was leaving on a vacation for several weeks. Thomas called Marberry to relay this information. The details of the conversation are in dispute, but it is uncontroverted that Thomas was made a Vice-president of Marberry and Mack, Inc., for the sole purpose of executing a sales contract immediately. Arrangements were made for Thomas to draw up the contract/offer and have it taken to the Orlando airport where R. S. Futch was either leaving or was en route on his vacation. Marberry and Thomas disagree on what was discussed with regard to an escrow deposit. Thomas contends that Marberry authorized him to provide for a $50,000.00 escrow deposit to be held by Fred Marberry, licensed real estate broker upon acceptance of contract. Marberry denies this and claims that he never maintained an escrow account, that escrow funds were always handled by his (Marberry's) attorney. Marberry claims that the day after signing, when he actually saw the contract, he said something to Thomas about his failure to delete the escrow language on the contract form. Thomas denies this. Both Marberry and Thomas agree that all parties should have known that the deposit could not be escrowed upon acceptance, since Marberry was not there for the signing. The contract was prepared and signed by Thomas in Thomas' Kissimmee office and was taken to the Orlando airport. The contract, prepared on the standard Florida Bar and Association of Realtors approved form, provided a purchase price of $1,600,000.00, the $50,000.00 escrow deposit, and closing on August 25, 1985. The contract provided that closing could be extended by the buyer for 30 days with an additional $50,000.00 deposit. The contract contained the following special clauses: Contingent upon financing. Above described property of [sic] being viable to building Comm. Prop. with all necessary zoning and available utilities. [Pet. Ex. #5] At the airport, R. S. Futch accepted the offer by Marberry and Mack, made a few changes on the contract, initialled them and signed the contract; the changes were also initialled by Bernon Thomas. Later Thomas called Marberry and told him about the changes. The morning after the contract was signed, Marberry and Thomas visited Heninger's engineer to review the project. They reviewed the engineering plans and learned that the property was in a floodplain. Drainage was a problem and parking was a problem and it appeared that only 4.3 acres was actually buildable. On leaving the engineer's office Marberry told Thomas that there was no way the project could work; they could never get financing for a $1.6 million parcel of 14.75 acres, with only 4.3 buildable acres. Marberry felt the contingencies in the contract could not be met and the contract was off. Thomas still believed in the project, and since he had already put so much time and effort in it, he wanted to keep working on pulling it together. Marberry did not dissuade him, but said only to keep him informed on what was going on. Thomas told Heninger that Marberry didn't want the contract. Heninger said he wanted the contract to stay intact and encouraged Thomas to keep working on it. He also tried to get Thomas to do the deal himself, but Thomas told him he did not have the funds. Thomas claims that Heninger told him not to worry about the $50,000.00; Heninger denies this. Nothing was communicated in writing regarding the contract being terminated. The $50,000.00 deposit was never made. The deadline for closing passed, and sometime in September 1985, Larry Heninger arranged a meeting between R. S. Futch and Fred Marberry in a motel in Orlando. The purpose of the meeting was to either extend the contract entered in July (according to R. S. Futch), or to negotiate a new contract for the property (according to Fred Marberry). During the meeting Futch was told that no $50,000.00 deposit had been made on the original contract. The meeting apparently terminated and shortly later Futch filed suit for the $50,000.00. The testimony of the principal witnesses in this case: Marberry, Thomas, Futch and Heninger, establish a picture of lack of communication, misunderstanding, bungling, and unprofessionalism. It is impossible to determine from the rambling and disjointed stories of these witnesses, that either Fred Marberry or Bernon Thomas, individually or together, engaged in "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and breach of trust..."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against both Fred Marberry and Bernon Thomas, be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert D. Gatton, Esquire Maitland Center 1051 Winderley Place Maitland, Florida 32751 Bernon Earl Thomas 4226 Match Point Drive Augusta, Georgia 30909 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Richard B. Watson holds a license issued by petitioner and has since 1976. He holds license No. 0163723, and has, at all pertinent times, worked as a broker-salesman for Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., 126- 128 Eglin Parkway Southeast in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On June 13, 1983, Lloyd H. Waldorff executed an employment contract under which Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. was to have the exclusive right to sell the 25 units Waldorff Properties of Ft. Walton proposed to build as "phase two" of its La Mar West Townhouse Project in Mary Ester, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Nobody signed the written agreement on behalf of the broker, but Mr. Waldorff's testimony that Ms. Caldwell or somebody in the agency "accepted" it was uncontradicted, and fully consonant with the other evidence adduced. Mr. Waldorff or his organization needed agreements from prospective buyers to purchase units when built, in order to induce a lender to lend money for construction of phase two. One Saturday, probably in mid-July of 1983, Ms. Caldwell presented him with 18 such agreements. It seemed peculiar to Mr. Waldorff, getting 18 purchase agreements at once; and he was also struck by the number of Californians and other non- Floridians among the putative purchasers. But he had nevertheless signed the agreements himself before Ms. Caldwell gave them to Mr. Watson for attestation; and he later furnished all of the purchase agreements to Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Panama City in support of an eventually successful application for a $1,100,000.00 construction loan. (T.90) Mr. Waldorff signed the purchase agreements in a back room within the Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. offices. At hearing he remembered that a woman was present. He did not recall respondent's being there. Seventeen of the 18 agreements furnished the lender were purportedly signed by persons to whose signatures, except in one instance, respondent Watson attested. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On 16 of the 17 purchase agreements on which he signed as a witness to putative purchasers' signatures, respondent also signed as a witness to Mr. Waldorff's signature in a blank provided under the heading "signed in the presence of:". Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Respondent was aware at the time that Mr. Waldorff, whom he considers a friend, needed such agreements in order to obtain financing. As time for closing on the purchase agreements approached, Mr. Waldorff testified, he became suspicious, and asked Ms. Caldwell to see her escrow account statements, but she put him off. Eventually he asked her if the purchase agreements were "bogus," and she answered by nodding affirmatively. It was at this point, Mr. Waldorff said, that he notified the lending institution of their falsity, and asked for an extension of time in which to repay the construction loan. But the weight of the evidence established that the purchase agreements were shams from their inception and that Mr. Waldorff knew it before he obtained the loans. On September 9, 1985, Paul R. Bratton, III, an investigator for DPR, asked Mr. Watson about the purchase, agreements on which he had witnessed purported parties' signatures. In this interview, Mr. Watson said, with respect to some of the contracts which he had signed as a witness, "that he did not see the buyers or the sellers sign the contract." (T.63) In a deposition he gave in the course of related civil litigation, respondent Watson testified that it was "(p)retty much," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, p.10, "standard procedure" for him to witness signatures which he had not seen being affixed. In response to the question, "Does that mean also you wouldn't know whether these people exist in real life or not?", Mr. Watson answered, "It could be. ..." Id. as 15. Mr. Waldorff told Mr. Watson he was going to use the 18 purchase agreements, all but one of which respondent had signed as a witness, to secure a construction loan even though they were "bogus." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This conversation antedated the loan closing. Id.
The Issue Whether the registration of the Respondent, Betty Lou Haber, license #0034988 should be revoked or suspended, or whether Respondent should be otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact An administrative complaint was filed by the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, on September 29, 1978, seeking to revoke or suspend or otherwise discipline Respondent Haber. The administrative complaint charged that the licensee was presently confined in a state prison. Respondent requested an administrative hearing. A stipulation was entered by Barry A. Cohen, Esquire, the attorney for Respondent, confirming that Respondent Haber was and had been continuously confined in the Broward Correctional Institution since August 16, 1977. Said stipulation is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Prior to the hearing a letter was received by the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, advising the Petitioner that Respondent did not intend to proceed to hearing and requesting Petitioner to close the matter. The Division of Administrative Hearings was not so notified. A copy of said letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Petitioner presented the aforesaid stipulation and aforesaid letter and a witness at the hearing. The witness, Martha Iglesias, Inmate Records Supervisor for the Broward Correctional Institution, testified that Respondent Haber was an inmate of said institution, having been found guilty by a jury of First Degree Murder in Case #75-518 in the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, and sentenced to be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary for a period of her natural life.
Recommendation Revoke the non-active salesman license held by the Respondent, Betty Lou Haber. DONE and ORDERED this 18TH day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Barry A. Cohen, Esquire 100 Twiggs Street, Suite 4000 Tampa, Florida 33602 DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of obtaining his real estate salesperson's license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Seeking to become a licensed real estate salesperson, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application on December 16, 1996. One of the questions on the application form asks: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? . . . [Bold] If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. [End Bold] Respondent checked "yes," but failed to attach the details or otherwise describe them on the form. As alleged, Respondent pleaded no contest to driving under the influence in July 1991, and he was adjudicated guilty. He was placed on supervised probation for one year and lost his driving privileges for six months. As alleged, Respondent pleaded no contest to the traffic misdemeanor of reckless driving and misdemeanor possession of under 20 grams of marijuana in June 1995. He was adjudicated guilty of reckless driving, and adjudication was withheld as to possession of marijuana. He was fined $630 and court costs for reckless driving. In completing the application, Respondent realized that he would have to supply the details of the criminal offenses, of which he admitted when he checked the "yes" box. However, he set aside the application for a week or two, and, when he picked it up again to finish, he forgot about the need to attach a supplement. He thus sent it in incomplete and with a personal attestation that it was complete. Despite the obvious omission from the application, Petitioner issued Respondent a real estate salesperson's license without requesting further information concerning the criminal offenses. Respondent took the licensing examination on February 17, 1997. Passing the examination, he received his license shortly after it was issued on March 24, 1997. The next contact between the parties was when Respondent received a letter, dated February 25, 1998, from Petitioner noting that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement had informed Petitioner of an arrest for the latter criminal offenses. The letter states: "To clear any ambiguity regarding your 'YES' response to the relevant application question, we request additional information." The letter also requests an explanation regarding Respondent's failure to disclose this information on his application form. The letter concludes that Respondent's application would be held in abeyance until receipt of the requested information. By letter dated March 9, 1998, Respondent explained the circumstances surrounding the latter offenses, saying that he had not disclosed the information on the original application due to embarrassment. The letter does not mention the earlier criminal offense of driving under the influence. Respondent testified at the hearing that he claimed embarrassment because he did not think that it would sound as good to say that he had forgotten about the need to add the supplement to his application. This testimony is credited. It is impossible to infer an affirmative misrepresentation or attempt to conceal in the initial application. Respondent disclosed a criminal offense, and it was abundantly clear on the face of the short application form that he had failed to describe the disclosure, as requested to do so. Perhaps Petitioner's employees missed the box checked "yes" or, finding it, forgot to follow up on the matter. Clearly, though, Respondent sufficiently disclosed the matter to preclude a finding, on these facts, of any misrepresentation or intent to conceal. Respondent's March 9 response to the February 25 letter is a different matter. Although the February 25 letter focuses its inquiry upon the latter criminal offenses and does not request a comprehensive response to the question of criminal offenses, Respondent could have also mentioned the earlier offense. This would have negated any inference whatsoever of an affirmative misrepresentation or intent to conceal in the application or at this later stage. However, even considering the shortcoming of the February 25 response, the facts still do not support the finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent intentionally concealed the criminal offenses in his application. As to the omission from the February 25 letter as a basis for discipline in itself, the Administrative Complaint does not charge Respondent with anything arising directly out of the contents of his February 25 letter. Likewise, Petitioner's proposed recommended order does not even mention Respondent's February 25 response.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Ghunise Coaxum, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Warren Keith Babb, pro se 2310 Southwest 53rd Street Cape Coral, Florida 33914 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of Respondent, and his testimony during the proceeding herein, the documentary evidence received, including a prehearing stipulation executed by counsel for the parties and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts 1/ are found. Respondent, Stewart Sax, is a real estate salesman who holds License No. 0347241. Respondent is presently employed by Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation, 3365 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The prosecution of this matter was initiated by Petitioner against Respondent based on an Administrative Complaint filed herein, signed August 3, 1981. On July 24, 1980, Respondent submitted an application for licensure with the Petitioner. In connection therewith, Respondent answered question No. 6 in the negative by asserting "No." That question reads in total: Have you ever been arrested for, or charged with commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violation), without regard to whether convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled? Respondent was first arrested on April 21, 1972, when he was charged with credit card theft in Atlanta, Georgia. At this time, he was approximately 22 years old and was a student at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. Respondent pled nolo contendere to the charges and received three years probation and a $500.00 fine based upon this plea. Respondent contends that the credit card belonged to a girl friend's mother and he initially had the right to use that credit card. Respondent was next arrested on January 25, 1974, when he was arrested for credit card theft, public indecency and public drunkenness in Atlanta. The charges on the first two counts were dismissed and Respondent received a 30-day suspended sentence on the public drunkenness charge. Respondent was next arrested on July 24, 1980, in Fort Lauderdale, and was charged with grand larceny and issuing a worthless check. The worthless check charge was nolle prosequi and the grand larceny charge was reduced to petty theft, to which Respondent pled no contest. Respondent was placed on probation for six (6) months; he paid $50.00 court costs and adjudication of guilt was withheld. On July 24, 1980, Respondent was again arrested for driving while intoxicated and with an expired driver's license. No information was issued on the driving while intoxicated charge and Respondent pled no contest to the expired driver's license charge. He paid $25.00 for court costs and adjudication was withheld. Finally, Respondent was arrested on July 30, 1980, and charged with prowling in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. These charges were dismissed. Respondent contends that he was under a great deal of pressure when he submitted his application for licensure and was of the opinion, based on representations of his former counsel, that he did not have to reveal these matters on applications, etc.; that these matters were dropped, and would not follow him in the future. (Prehearing Stipulation) As noted above, the matter was presented based upon a prehearing stipulation, prepared by counsel for the parties whereby Respondent admitted each of the allegations as contained in the Administrative Complaint with explanations for each allegation. Evidence presented at the hearing indicated that, except for the Public drunkenness charge, all remaining charges were either nolle prosequi, dismissed without any information being filed or adjudication was withheld and sentences were probated. Respondent has enjoyed success in his field as a real estate salesman since he has been licensed. Respondent as far as the record reveals, has not had any disciplinary charges brought against him since he has been licensed as a real estate salesman. Other professionals in the area have a high regard for Petitioner, both personally and professionally as a real estate salesman. Respondent is a highly intelligent real estate salesman who, it can be assumed, understood the application for licensure which he executed to become a real estate salesman. Based on the admissions contained in the prehearing stipulation and Respondent's testimony, his failure to truthfully answer all questions on his application, he (Respondent) violated the provisions of Chapter 475.17(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's real estate License No. 0347241 be REVOKED. That Respondent be afforded an opportunity to reapply for a license as a real estate salesman and that pending a decision by the Board on Respondent's reapplication for licensure, the Board spend the revocation referred to in the Recommendation above. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1982.
