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DEBRA J. IHASZ vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 93-004039 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 26, 1993 Number: 93-004039 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1993

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt to any state agency or owing child support collected through a court.

Findings Of Fact On June 16, 1993, petitioner submitted a claim to the Department of Lottery (Lottery) on a Black Jack Instant Ticket she held. Such ticket reflected that petitioner was eligible for a prize of $1,000.00. On June 17, 1993, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) certified to the Lottery that petitioner owed $1,224.00 in Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefit overpayments and $675.00 in Food Stamp benefit overpayments, for a total of $1,899.00. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted the prize amount to the Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). By letter of June 28, 1993, DBF notified petitioner that it was in receipt of her prize from the Lottery and that it intended to apply the entire $1,000.00 toward the unpaid claim owing DHRS. Such letter, likewise, advised petitioner of her right to request a hearing to contest such action. By letter of July 13, 1993, petitioner requested a formal hearing to contest DBF's action, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that the only state warrants actually negotiated by petitioner, which represented an overpayment of benefits for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, totalled $612.00. All other state warrants which had been issued to petitioner, and upon which DHRS had initially calculated the debt owing to it from petitioner for overpayments of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamp benefits, had been returned, unnegotiated, to the state. Accordingly, the total debt shown to be owing DHRS by petitioner was $612.00.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order applying $612.00 of petitioner's lottery prize of $1,000.00 to satisfy the debt owing DHRS, and remit the balance of $388.00 to petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of October 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra J. Ihasz 1529 61st Trail South West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October 1993. Scott C. Wright Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Katrina M. Saggio Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1335 23 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa Warren Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (2) 120.5724.115
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LEONARD K. WILLIAMS vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 92-000692 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 03, 1992 Number: 92-000692 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1992

The Issue Whether or not the Department of Banking and Finance is required by law to transmit $2,159.41 to the State of Florida Department of Education or $2500.00 to the Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact DOE, through its Office of Student Financial Assistance, functions as a guarantee agency for purposes of the guaranteed student loan programs. In this capacity, DOE issues a loan guarantee to a participating lender, such as a bank, when the lender has applied for the guarantee in connection with making a student loan to a student borrower. If the student borrower defaults on repaying the loan to the lender, the lender submits to DOE a claim for DOE to repay the loan to the lender. When DOE repays the loan to the lender, the promissory note evidencing the debt is assigned to DOE which then pursues collection of the loan against the defaulting student borrower. On or about November 18, 1988, Petitioner Leonard K. Williams applied for a guaranteed student loan to be made by the Florida National Bank. On or about December 11, 1988, DOE issued its guarantee and the loan was made by the bank to Petitioner. Petitioner's first payment to repay the loan was due on February 1, 1990. He made no payments then or thereafter. On July 1, 1990 he was in default. DOE, as the guarantee agency, paid the bank's claim on December 27, 1990 and the bank assigned the promissory note evidencing Petitioner's indebtedness to DOE. Petitioner purchased a winning Florida Lottery ticket for the Play 4 drawing of November 19, 1991. On November 26, 1991, Petitioner submitted his claim to DOL to claim the prize of $2,500.00. On November 26, 1991, DOE certified to DOL that Petitioner had an outstanding defaulted student loan and requested that the lottery prize money won by Petitioner be transmitted to the Comptroller to be credited toward the Petitioner's student loan debt. The total principal and interest accrued on that debt as of December 11, 1991 was $2,159.41. On December 4, 1991, Petitioner requested from DOE a form captioned, "Physician's Certification of Borrower's Total and Permanent Disability." On January 3, 1992, DOE received the completed form signed by Petitioner's physician, Anne L. Rottman, M.D. Dr. Rottman treated Petitioner from August 18, 1986 through July 19, 1990, treating him for chronic cervical and lumbar spinal pain. She was unable to state when Petitioner's condition began or when he became unable to work, as the condition and disability commenced prior to the date she first saw him on August 18, 1986. Petitioner's condition was static during the time she treated him. Petitioner was unable to work during the time she treated him.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order which withholds $2,159.41 from Petitioner's lottery winnings and transmits that sum to the Department of Education and which also transmits the balance of $340.59 to Petitioner. Since the money has already been effectively transmitted as recommended, the Final Order could simply ratify those prior transmittals. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott C. Wright ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17 day of September, 1992. Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Leonard K. Williams 1425 NE 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Leonard K. Williams Post Office Box 490955 College Park, Georgia 30349 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles S. Ruberg Assistant General Counsel State Board of Education The Capitol, Suite PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

USC (1) 34 CFR 682.402(c)(1) Florida Laws (3) 120.57159.4124.115
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WILLIE J. THOMPSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 89-001102 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001102 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 1989

The Issue Whether Willie J. Thompson is entitled to the $5,000.00 prize for a winning lottery ticket presented by Mr. Thompson to the Department of the Lottery for collection?

Findings Of Fact Horace Bell purchased lottery ticket number 04-202290-059 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ticket") on approximately December 11, 1988. The Ticket was an instant winning ticket in the amount of $5,000.00, in the Florida Lottery's Money Tree Instant game. Willie J. Thompson drove Mr. Bell, his wife and other family members to Tallahassee on December 12, 1988, to file a claim for the prize. Upon arriving at the Lottery's offices Mr. Bell found that he did not have proper identification. Therefore, he allowed Mr. Thompson to present the ticket for collection because Mr. Thompson had proper identification. On December 12, 1988, Mr. Thompson completed a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form (hereinafter referred to as the "Form") and submitted the Form and the Ticket to the Lottery. On the back of the Ticket Mr. Thompson listed his name and address on the spaces provided for the person claiming the prize and signed the Ticket. Mr. Thompson listed his name, Social Security Number, address and phone number on the Form. Mr. Thompson signed the Form as the "Claimant." In a letter dated December 12, 1988, DHRS notified the Lottery that Mr. Thompson owed $4,026.40 in Title IV-D child support arrearages as of December 12, 1988. Mr. Thompson has been paying his child support arrearages by having $30.00 taken out of each of his pay checks. The $5,000.00 prize was forwarded from the Lottery to the Comptroller on December 12, 1988. By letter dated December 20, 1988, Mr. Thompson was notified that the $5,000.00 prize for the Ticket he submitted was being transmitted to the Comptroller for possible payment of his Title IV-D child support arrearages. Mr. Thompson was notified by the Comptroller by letter dated December 28, 1988, that the Comptroller intended to apply $4,026.40 of the $5,000.00 prize toward his unpaid obligation. Mr. Thompson was provided a state warrant for the $973.60 balance of the $5,000.00 prize. Mr. Thompson requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the proposed action of the Comptroller. Mr. Thompson's total obligation as of the date of the formal hearing had been reduced by the court-ordered $30.00 payments he has made since December, 1988. As of the date of the formal hearing, Mr. Thompson's total obligation was $3,335.60. His obligation will reduce further by payments made up until the date of the issuance of a Final Order in this matter. Mr. Thompson should be given credit for these additional payments.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it Is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued providing for payment of the portion of the $5,000.00 prize attributable to the Ticket owed by Mr. Thompson as child support arrearages as of the date of the Final Order to DHRS. The balance of the $5,000.00 prize should be paid to Mr. Thompson. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 89-1102 The Petitioners have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1. 1. 2. 2-3. 3. 4 and 6. 4 7. 5 9. 6 11. 7 13. 8-9 Conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Jo Ann Levin Senior Attorney Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa E. Hargrett Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chriss Walker Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Willie J. Thompson Post Office Box 3655 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (3) 120.5724.10524.115
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JOHN I. CHANDLER vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 96-000999 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 28, 1996 Number: 96-000999 Latest Update: Jan. 07, 1997

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner won $2,500 in Florida Lottery prize. By Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County Family Law Division, Case Number 86-3999, dated June 20, 1986, the Petitioner was ordered to pay $100 weekly for the support of three minor children. By Order on Arrears in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Putnam County, Case Number 91-6412-FD-57, dated November 7, 1996, the court found the following facts: Respondent was ordered to pay $100.00 per week for the support of his 3 children by the Circuit Court in Hillsborough County. Respondent never made a payment on this obligation. Arrears totaling $33,200.00 accrued until this Court's order in November 1992. This Court reduced the support obligation to $35.00 per week effective November 9, 1992, in view of two of the three children reaching the age of majority. Support was suspended effective July 1, 1996 Based on the calculation of unpaid support which was somewhat offset by Social Security benefits paid to the mother of the children, the court calculated the total arrears as $22,509. The Order on Arrears concludes that the "Department of Revenue may apply funds withheld from the [Petitioner's] lottery winnings in satisfaction" of the unpaid child support.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Office of Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance, enter a Final Order transferring the Petitioner's lottery prize winnings to the Department of Revenue as partial satisfaction of the Petitioner's unpaid child support obligation. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Ken Hart General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dr. Marcia Mann, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 John I. Chandler, Pro Se 6216 50th Street Tampa, Florida 33610 Josephine A. Schultz, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance The Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chris Walker, Esquire Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.5724.116
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs SILVA OF SOUTH FLORIDA, INC., D/B/A NEW HORIZONS (7502), AND YUDIT SILVA, 17-003898SP (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jul. 12, 2017 Number: 17-003898SP Latest Update: Mar. 14, 2018

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents, as the owner and operator of a charter school or a private school, or both, engaged in fraudulent activity or otherwise ran the school(s) in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of students or the public; and, if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' participation in several scholarship programs that provide financial assistance to eligible students who choose to attend private schools.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Silva of South Florida, Inc. ("SSF"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation that, at all times relevant to this case, operated a private school known as New Horizons (the "School"). An employee of SSF, Yudit Silva ("Silva"), served as the School's principal or administrator at all times relevant. The Department of Education ("Department") administers the Gardiner Scholarship Program and the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program. See §§ 1002.385 & 1002.39, Fla. Stat. The Department has some administrative responsibilities in connection with the operation of the Florida Tax Credit ("FTC") Scholarship Program as well. See § 1002.395, Fla. Stat. Gardiner, McKay, and FTC scholarships defray tuition and other qualified educational expenses for eligible students who attend private schools in the state of Florida. It is not necessary to make detailed findings about these scholarship programs. There is no dispute that, during the relevant time, the School participated in the three programs mentioned, and was therefore eligible to accept, and did receive, scholarship funds paid on behalf of its students on scholarships. As will be discussed more thoroughly below, the Commissioner of Education possesses the authority to immediately suspend payment of McKay and FTC scholarship funds to a private school if he or she finds probable cause for believing that, inter alia, the school has engaged in "fraudulent activity." In addition, or alternatively, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's continued participation in the McKay and FTC programs for wrongful conduct, including the operation of an "educational institution" by the private school's owner or operator "in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of the public." Finally, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's participation in the Gardiner Scholarship Program "for a violation of . . . section" 1002.385, Florida Statutes. On March 30, 2017, Petitioner Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education (the "Commissioner"), issued an Administrative Complaint against Silva and SSF stating that she had determined there was probable cause for believing that Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity during the years 2013 through 2016 while operating a charter school known as Pathways Academy K-8 Center ("Pathways"). On May 2, 2017, the Commissioner issued an Amended Administrative Complaint wherein she expanded the original charges with new allegations that, in 2017, Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity while operating the School. Based on the alleged wrongdoing of Silva and SSF, the Commissioner immediately suspended payment of all scholarship funds to the School and gave notice of her intent to revoke the School's participation in the Gardiner, McKay, and FTC programs. The Commissioner's immediate and intended actions rested substantially on allegations of misconduct that the Broward County School Board ("BCSB") had asserted previously as grounds for terminating the charter school agreement between BCSB and SSF under which SSF operated Pathways. BCSB had given notice to SSF of its intent to terminate this agreement in April 2016, prompting SSF to request a formal administrative hearing. SSF's request had led, in turn, to the initiation of Broward County School Board v. Silva of South Florida, Inc., DOAH Case No. 16-2576 ("Pathways"). Over the course of several days in July and August 2016, Judge Robert E. Meale had conducted the Pathways hearing. In his Recommended Order dated January 9, 2017, Judge Meale had recommended that BCSB terminate SSF's charter. SSF had submitted exceptions to the Recommended Order, but on February 27, 2017, before BCSB had taken final agency action, SSF filed a Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal of Petition for Hearing, stating that SSF planned not to renew its charter and would, instead, close Pathways. BCSB evidently accepted this notice as sufficient to conclude the Pathways litigation, for it failed to issue a final order. The upshot is that Judge Meale's findings of fact never achieved administrative finality.1/ The relevant BCSB allegations, as the Commissioner summarized them in the administrative complaints, were quoted above in the Preliminary Statement. To prove them, the Commissioner relied primarily on two witnesses: Andrew Ramjit and Patrick Reilly. Neither provided evidence persuasive enough to support findings confirming the BCSB allegations. Mr. Ramjit is a former employee of SSF. He worked at Pathways as an assistant principal for a few months in the summer of 2015, between school years. His brief tenure at the charter school was apparently an unhappy one for all concerned, and when Mr. Ramjit left this job, he took with him (i.e., stole) original files belonging to SSF, to use as evidence of the wrongdoing he would accuse SSF of committing. He later filed several complaints against SSF with the Department, which in August 2015 referred the matter to BCSB to investigate, since BCSB was Pathways' sponsor. BCSB assigned the task of conducting the investigation to Mr. Reilly, a CPA who conducts audits for the school district. Mr. Reilly's months-long investigation resulted in findings that were detailed in an Internal Audit Report presented to the school board in March 2016. Mr. Reilly concluded that Mr. Ramjit's allegations were "substantiated" and that BCSB had good cause to terminate Pathways' charter school agreement. BCSB agreed and, as already noted, took steps to do just that. As a witness at hearing, Mr. Ramjit at times came across as a disgruntled ex-employee anxious to settle some scores. Despite the evident bias, however, the undersigned finds Mr. Ramjit's testimony to be more or less believable, as far as it goes. The problem is, Mr. Ramjit's testimony is superficial or conclusory, or both. For example, he asserts that he observed SSF employees "forging" teacher and parent signatures on various documents, but none of these supposedly falsified documents was produced, no forgery "victim" testified, and no expert testimony about disputed signatures was adduced. Mr. Ramjit claims that Silva and another administrator directed him to "artificially lower" teacher evaluation scores——but, really, what does this mean? Mr. Ramjit, who worked at Pathways during the summer months only, could not himself have evaluated any teacher (for he had not been there to observe anyone teach at the charter school), and therefore, he cannot truly have known whether a particular score was "artificial" or not. Mr. Ramjit accuses SSF personnel of spending public funds on goods purchased for private use, but the items in question, insect repellant and plants, are not inherently personal in nature and could reasonably have been purchased for the school, as Silva testified.2/ This testimony, at bottom, does not amount to much. Mr. Reilly's testimony (which was presented in the form of a transcript from the Pathways hearing) has more substance but is deficient in a different way. Mr. Reilly related the granular findings of his investigation, but he, himself, possesses no personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts he had found. In other words, what he knows, he did not witness or experience; rather, he searched for proof, as an investigator does, and reached conclusions based on the evidence obtained. To be sure, if Mr. Reilly's testimony had consisted in relevant part of expert opinions based on hearsay, such opinions might have been competent substantial evidence. His testimony, however, concerned matters of historical fact that did not require expertise to understand (or, at least, not expertise in accounting). Mr. Reilly's testimony, in short, establishes persuasively that he believes the BCSB allegations to be true, but, consisting largely of hearsay, is insufficient to prove to the undersigned the truth of the allegations. The Commissioner alleged that, while working at the School in March 2017, Silva sent a handful of suspicious faxes to the Broward County School District's Office of Exceptional Student Education. These faxes transmitted eight letters, each of which purported to be from the parent of a student receiving a McKay scholarship. The letters were identical (a form, obviously) and unsigned. In them, the parent (or "parent") complained that the district had "illegal[ly]" changed his or her child's "IEP Matrix Level" from "level 4" to "level 1" "without notifying [the parent] and without an IEP meeting." The letter urged the district to "[p]lease change the IEP Matrix Level back to its correct level within 5 business days" and requested that all future communications be in writing "only through email." Without getting into unnecessary detail, the "IEP Matrix Level" reflects the intensity of services provided to a student with disabilities. The higher the level, the greater the number of services required. There is a correlation between the matrix level and the level of funding available under the McKay scholarship program, so that a reduction in the matrix level might affect a student's McKay scholarship. The requests to increase the matrix level from 1 to 4, therefore, might have been prompted by a concern that, without such action, the students in question would see their scholarships diminished. There was nothing wrongful per se about the form letters at issue; sure, the contentions therein that the district had acted illegally and was preventing students from receiving necessary services might have been overblown or mistaken, but ultimately the decision whether to change the matrix level back to 4, as rather politely, if firmly, requested, was the district's alone to make. If there were a wrongful act, it would have been that Silva sent the letters on the parents' behalf without their approval. On this charge, the only nonhearsay evidence of record is the deposition of E.M., a parent who supposedly sent one of the form letters. E.M. disclaimed knowledge of the letter and denied having authorized the School to write and send it for him. At the same time, though, he professed to know nothing about the scholarship programs and freely acknowledged that he relied entirely upon the School to take care of all the paperwork required "to get that money." E.M.'s testimony persuades the undersigned that regardless of whether E.M. had any involvement in the form letter, he certainly would have expected the School to prepare and submit such "paperwork" if the School believed it necessary to "get that money." Based on this evidence, the undersigned cannot find that the School committed fraud. The remaining allegations against SSF and Silva concern several dozen FTC scholarship applications submitted to Step Up for Students ("SUFS"), a nonprofit scholarship funding organization that helps administer the FTC and Gardiner Scholarship Programs. FTC scholarships are intended to benefit students who, without financial assistance, would be unable to attend private school due to low household income. Because household income is an important factor in determining an FTC scholarship award, any knowingly false, misleading, or incomplete representations made in an application that bear on this material fact would constitute an act of fraud——a point that is stressed in the application forms. The Commissioner argues that, in at least 39 applications, Silva falsely represented facts regarding the household income of students of the School. The disputed applications were submitted, online, in several tranches. Six were submitted between 8:28 p.m. and 9:55 p.m. on February 22, 2017. Five were sent on February 24, 2017, between 11:15 a.m. and 3:48 p.m. On the night of March 12, 2017, from 7:20 p.m. through 11:59 p.m., 12 of these applications were submitted, followed by 13 more on March 13, 2017, sent between 9:22 a.m. and 2:53 p.m. A final group of three was submitted on the morning of March 14, 2017, between 11:29 a.m. and 11:52 a.m. Because it is unlikely that 39 parents acting independently would happen to file their applications in bunches like this, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that the School's staff coordinated these submissions. SSF and Silva admit, at any rate, that the School's staff assisted the parents with these scholarship applications, providing them with email addresses and computer access. Other details about these applications, however, suggest that the assistance provided by the School's staff was more hands-on than SSF and Silva have admitted. The application asks the parent completing the online form to identify his or her "birth city" as the answer to a security question. Every parent gave the same answer, "miami." While it is doubtful that every parent was, in fact, born in Miami, the truth of this assertion is immaterial. Still, that every applicant typed in "miami" raises an eyebrow; that all of them failed, idiosyncratically, to capitalize the proper name strongly implies a common agency, the most likely being the School——an inference further reinforced by the probability that the School's staff did not know the actual birthplace of every parent, and thus would have found it convenient simply to make Miami the ubiquitous choice by default. Another common denominator of the applications is that every parent reported his or her marital status as, "Single. I have never been married." This emphatic statement of lifelong singlehood seems peculiar, suggesting a common hand, but the response might have been a selection from a dropdown menu, a possibility which undermines the inference. Nevertheless, it would be unusual if, in this group of 39 single parents of young children, not one had ever been married——so unusual, in fact, that the undersigned deems that situation highly unlikely; some of these responses, it is inferred, were untrue. That being said, the materiality of the representation that the parent had never been married is unknown, for the record is silent on this point. Like the ubiquitous answer to the "birthplace" security question, however, the shared response to the martial status inquiry implies a common agency——the most obvious candidate being, again, the School. The evidence reviewed so far supports the inference, which the undersigned has drawn, that School personnel provided assistance to the parents in completing applications for FTC scholarships, including supplying requested information. In so doing, the School made each parent say he or she had never been married, making a representation of fact that was probably false in at least some instances. Because that fact was not shown to be material, however, it cannot be concluded, without more, that the School committed fraud. Unfortunately, there is more. Each parent claimed in the application to have "zero" household income. This was a material representation. Obviously, to be a single parent without any income is to experience extreme poverty. While it is theoretically possible that all 39 of the subject parents were destitute, this is highly improbable,3/ and, not surprisingly, the number of zero- income applications coming from the same private school caught the attention of SUFS, which in due course launched an investigation.4/ Meantime, however, SUFS sent the parents two forms, on paper, to be competed and returned. One was called Verification of Household Composition ("Verification Form"), and the other was titled Statement of No Household Income ("Explanation Form"). The Verification Form needed to be filled out by someone neither related to nor living with the applicant, e.g., a friend or neighbor, who was capable of listing, as requested, the names of all adults and children residing in the applicant's household, together with their respective ages and relationships to one another. On the Explanation Form, the parent (applicant) was required to "explain in the space provided how you are able to pay for rent, food, and clothing, etc." with "a household income of zero ($0.00)." Alternatively, if "the entry of a household income of zero ($0.00) was a mistake," the applicant was to "provide proof of the most recent 30 days of income for each person receiving income in your household." Silva completed, signed, and submitted to SUFS a Verification Form for each of the 39 parents. Every form she signed was dated March 15 or March 17, 2017, except for one dated March 21, 2017. The only adult listed on any of these completed forms is the parent or guardian (applicant). The only other members of the households at issue whom Silva listed are minor children. In other words, to be clear, every household Silva described in these 39 Verification Forms consisted of one parent or guardian plus that adult's minor child or children—— and no one else. Above Silva's signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate, the persons listed above are personally known to me and the household as shown above is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that providing false representations constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. Each completed Explanation Form that SUSF received bears a signature purporting to be that of the parent or guardian and has the same date as the corresponding Verification Form. On every form, except one, the parent states that he or she is able to survive on zero income because "I live with family members" or similar words to the same effect.5/ Above each signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. The undersigned further understands that providing false representations herein constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. As an explanation for how one is able to get by with zero household income, the statement that "I live with family members" can only be read to mean that the income-less person and his or her dependents are residing in (and thus belong to) the household of generous relatives who have the wherewithal to provide financial support for their impecunious kin; otherwise, it would be nonresponsive to the question posed by the Explanation Form. So understood, however, the statement——if true——logically refutes the applicant's assertion that his or her "household income" is zero because the family members supporting him or her must have had an income, which should have been reported and substantiated per the instructions on the Explanation Form. It seems impossible that not one of the 39 applicants noticed that SUFS was interested in household income as opposed to parental income, and thus likely that some of them (assuming any personally completed these forms) would have been aware that their responses (if true) were contradictory and incomplete to the point of being, arguably, fraudulent. But this inconsistency is of passing interest, as it does not necessarily inculpate the SSF, Silva, or the School. A different discrepancy implicates the School in wrongdoing. The statements of household composition in the Verification Forms that Silva signed, all of which describe a household consisting of one adult (the applicant) and his or her minor dependent(s), belie the statements in the Explanation Forms claiming that the applicant lives with, and relies financially upon, his or her relatives——relatives who, in this context, cannot plausibly be understood as being the applicant's minor children. These statements, clearly, are mutually exclusive and, therefore, cannot both be true. If an applicant lived with family members who supported the applicant's family, as represented in every Explanation Form at issue, then Silva provided false information to SUFS in every Verification Form she executed. While a few instances of inaccurate reporting on Silva's part might be written off as honest mistakes, an error rate of 100 percent would suggest that something else was going on. The other possibility that must be considered, however, is that Silva was truthful, and the applicants (unknown to her) were not. In this scenario, the applicants——operating individually or in concert——falsely claimed to be living with family members (presumably to maintain the "zero income" fiction) without informing Silva of this deception. The undersigned regards this latter possibility as incredible. There is no reasonable likelihood that 39 applicants separately decided to commit the exact same fraud using essentially the very same language; such a coincidence is simply inconceivable. As a practical matter, the applicants would have needed to conspire with one another. But to infer such a conspiracy, one must assume that all 39 applicants (not only the one(s) who came up with the scheme) were sufficiently dishonest to participate and disciplined enough to keep their mouths shut about it. These assumptions defy credulity. This is not to say that the statements in the Explanation Forms were likely truthful. To the contrary, the undersigned infers that they were false or intended to mislead. That is, in all likelihood, the applicants' households were, in fact, composed (for the most part) of the persons listed in the Verification Forms, and the false statements of material fact were that the applicants had no household income and were financially dependent upon family members with whom they lived. It is found, further, that Silva, not any applicant(s), was the driving force behind this deception, because, in view of all the circumstances, no other reasonable inference can account for the fact that 39 applicants happened to make the very same false statements in their applications. Whether the parents, or any of them, knowingly participated in Silva's fraudulent scheme is unclear——but is ultimately immaterial for purposes of this case.6/ Ultimate Factual Determinations The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, to increase the chances that the School's students would receive the maximum amount of FTC scholarship funding, Silva engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: Silva falsely represented to SUFS that 39 FTC scholarship applicants had "zero household income" and were forced, as a result, to live with family members. Silva made these statements of material fact knowing they were false or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the representations, which were in fact false.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner enter a final order revoking Respondents' participation in the McKay, FTC, and Gardiner scholarship programs. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2017.

CFR (1) 7 CFR 210 Florida Laws (6) 1002.331002.3851002.391002.395120.569120.57
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ENRIQUE BENITEZ vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 97-004432 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 22, 1997 Number: 97-004432 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 1998

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt to a state agency.

Findings Of Fact By letter of June 9, 1997, the Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Assistance (Department), notified the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) that Petitioner owed the Department $26,356.28, as of June 9, 1997, as a consequence of outstanding defaulted student loans. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted the prize amount ($24,781.66), less Federal income tax withheld ($6,938.86), to the Department. By letter of June 10, 1997, the Department notified Petitioner that it was in receipt of his prize money, less Federal income tax withheld, and that, since the amount owed the Department exceeded the amount of the prize, it planned to apply the entire sum it had received ($17,842.80) to the outstanding indebtedness. The Department's letter also advised Petitioner of his right to request a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, to contest the Department's decision. Petitioner filed a timely request for a formal hearing to contest the Department's decision, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an administrative law judge to conduct the formal hearing Petitioner had requested. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that Petitioner was the recipient of three student loans, each of which was funded by Centrust Savings Bank (Centrust) and guaranteed by the Department. The first loan (No. 7701) was in the amount of $3,000, which was disbursed on December 19, 1986. The second loan (No. 557720) was in the sum of $5,000, which was disbursed on January 29, 1987. The third loan (No. 631534) was for $5,000; however, only $2,500 was disbursed. That disbursement occurred on November 26, 1987. Petitioner defaulted on the student loans, and Centrust filed a claim with the Department. The Department, as guarantor, paid the lender the amounts due on the loans as follows: A.) On August 12, 1993, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 557720. At the time, the principal due was $5,021.562 and interest due was $1,942.59, for a total of $6,964.15. B.) Also on August 12, 1993, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 631534. At the time, the principal due was $2,510.78, and interest due was $971.29, for a total of $3,482.07. C.) Finally, on January 20, 1994, the Department paid the claim on Loan No. 7701. At the time, the principal due was $3,118.28, and interest due was $2,458.40, for a total of $5,576.68. As of June 9, 1997, the date the Department received the proceeds of Petitioner's lottery prize, the balance due on the defaulted loans, with accrued interest, was as follows: Loan No. 7701, $7,842.80; Loan No. 557720, $9,096.52; and Loan No. 631534, $4,548.25. In total, as of June 9, 1997, Petitioner owed the Department $21,487.57, as principal and accrued interest owing on the defaulted loans.3

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which approves the application of the $17,842.80 of Petitioner's lottery prize the Department received toward the partial satisfaction of the debt owing the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1998.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.5724.115
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs LATMA CHRISTIAN ACADEMY (4204)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Madison, Florida Nov. 07, 2017 Number: 17-006102SP Latest Update: Oct. 05, 2024
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J. G. MCKAY, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 77-001982 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001982 Latest Update: Feb. 01, 1978

Findings Of Fact J. G. McKay, Jr. maintained a savings account in the Chase First Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida during the period between 1945 and 1955 while he resided at 5984 SW 42nd Terrace, Miami, Florida. For the purpose of resolving the claim submitted by Martin-Young Mortgage Co., Inc., the agreement between them and McKay will be considered. This agreement recites that McKay may be duly entitled to certain assets and that he will assign 50 percent of these assets to Martin-Young for services rendered and to be rendered up to the time McKay receives all assets due, and Martin-Young is to be paid immediately upon disbursement of funds. The agreement further recites "No fee is due the Martin-Young Mortgage Co. Inc. unless assets are received by the above named person(s) and no additional fees will be charged except the customary 50 percent of total assets received." This agreement is a contract for services between McKay and Martin- Young. The agreement specifically contemplates payment to Martin-Young from assets received by McKay. If McKay receives no assets he owes nothing to Martin- Young. Accordingly, even though the agreement provides for McKay to assign 50 percent of the assets to Martin-Young, this does not give the latter a claim to the assets until after they are received by McKay. Martin-Young has no claim to this property under the terms of the statute. Stated another way, the statute contemplates the return of the property to the rightful owner upon proof that the claimant is the owner. It does not purport to require the Comptroller to adjudicate contractual disputes as in this situation. Martin-Young's "claim" does not conflict with the claim of McKay, i.e. their claim is not in derogation of McKay's claim but is derived solely from McKay's claim. It is only after McKay has been determined to be the rightful owner that Martin-Young, pursuant to contract, can claim a portion of the property. The sole function of the Comptroller and hence the hearing officer in this case is to ascertain the rightful owner. Here that has been determined to be J.G. McKay, Jr. McKay moved to his present residence on Key Biscayne and lost or misplaced his passbook for this account. He is the rightful owner of the account deposited in the name of J.G. McKay, Jr.

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THOMAS BOGANSKI vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, AND DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, 95-003587 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 12, 1995 Number: 95-003587 Latest Update: Dec. 21, 1995

Findings Of Fact On November 28, 1994, a hearing officer of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Circuit Court for Broward County, Florida (Seventeenth Judicial Circuit) conducted an evidentiary hearing on a petition to determine child support filed against Thomas Boganski (Petitioner). By Report dated November 28, 1994, the hearing officer determined, among other things, that Petitioner was liable for a past public assistance obligation in the amount of $8,871, representing monies received by his children from October 1991 through November 1994 and that payments on the child support obligation would be payable through the court. By Order dated December 12, 1994, a circuit judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit ratified and approved the hearing officer's Report; thereby, establishing a child support debt, payable through the court. On June 26, 1995, a hearing officer of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit conducted an evidentiary hearing on a motion for contempt filed against Petitioner for nonpayment of the child support obligation. By Report dated June 26, 1995, the hearing officer determined, among other things, that Petitioner had a past public assistance obligation and arrears totaling $10,551 as of June 14, 1995. By Order dated July 14, 1995, a circuit judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit ratified and approved the hearing officer's Report. On January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented to the Department of the Lottery (Respondent Lottery) a claim for payment of a lottery ticket which he had purchased. The lottery ticket had a prize value of $2,500. On June 9, 1995, the Department of Revenue (Respondent Revenue) certified to Respondent Lottery that, as of that date, Petitioner had a court- ordered past public assistance debt of $9,500. The $2,500 prize winnings was transmitted to the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller (Respondent Banking and Finance) by Respondent Lottery. Respondent Banking and Finance did not disburse the $2,500 to Petitioner but retained the entire amount. By letter dated May 9, 1995, Respondent Banking and Finance notified Petitioner that the $2,500 prize winnings had been transmitted to it by Respondent Lottery. Furthermore, Respondent Banking and Finance notified Petitioner that the entire $2,500 was going to be applied to his unpaid past public assistance obligation of $9,500.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller enter a final order providing for payment to the Department of Revenue the lottery prize winnings of $2,500 claimed by Thomas Boganski. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX Respondents' joint proposed findings of fact 1 - 6 have been adopted in substance in this recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Boganski 1519 North 57th Terrace Hollywood, Florida 33021 Stephen S. Godwin Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue P.O. Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (2) 120.5724.115
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