The Issue The issues in this case are (a) whether Respondent committed fraud in seeking to obtain funds from the McKay Scholarship Program, thereby warranting Petitioner's summary suspension of payments to Respondent; and (b) whether Petitioner should revoke Respondent's participation in the McKay Scholarship program for failing to comply with applicable laws.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Muskateer's Academy, Inc. ("MAI") is a Florida corporation that, at all times relevant to this case, operated a private school known as Muskateer's Academy ("Muskateer's"). MAI was closely held by Erick and Jacqueline Cermeno, a married couple. Together, they ran the school, holding (and sometimes swapping) various titles of importance, such as "principal" and "superintendent," which signified their supervisory roles. Located in Hialeah, Florida, Muskateer's served mainly at-risk students who, for one reason or another, were unable or unlikely to succeed in the public school system. On paper, the school's tuition was quite steep. The undersigned infers, however, that few parents, if any, actually paid the "sticker price" for tuition and other expenses that Respondent reported to the Florida Department of Education ("Department") in its student fee schedules, which charges totaled $24,000 per year, per child. Rather, the undersigned infers that, for most students at least, Respondent agreed to accept as payment in full whatever amount was available annually for a particular student under the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students With Disabilities Program ("McKay Scholarship Program"). Respondent operated two separate high schools at Muskateer's. One was a "regular," four-year high school that followed the traditional model, where instructors taught various academic subjects to classes of students, who attended classes for the purpose of learning academic subjects from their teachers. In this high school, tests were given periodically, as a means of measuring the students' mastery of the material. The other program was an "accelerated" high school where each student worked individually, at his own pace. Teachers played a relatively small part in this program, doing little but overseeing the "testing room" in which the students took tests——their primary scholastic activity. Students received course credit for passing tests.1 At the relevant times, there were three or four teachers at Muskateer's. To be a teacher there, a person did not need a bachelor's degree. Instead, MAI was willing to hire individuals having some type of educational background, preferably including at least 40 college credits, more or less. One of the teachers at Muskateer's was Amneris Mesa, whose brother, O. F., attended the school for some period of time. As will be seen, O. F. is one of the key figures in the instant dispute. In August 2006, the Department's Office of Independent Education and Parental Choice ("Choice Office") received a complaint about Muskateer's, the gravamen of which was that MAI was continuing to receive funds under the McKay Scholarship Program for former students who had stopped attending the school. The Choice Office, which administers the McKay Scholarship Program, referred the complaint to the Department's Office of Inspector General ("OIG") for investigation. The OIG's investigation led to the discovery of evidence sufficient to persuade the Commissioner of Education ("Commissioner") that MAI had engaged in fraudulent activity with regard to the McKay Scholarship Program. Consequently, on November 1, 2006, the Commissioner issued an Administrative Complaint against MAI, which charged MAI with fraud and other violations of the laws governing the McKay Scholarship Program. At the same time, the Commissioner immediately suspended all payments to MAI under the McKay Scholarship Program. Being thus cut off from its primary source of revenue, MAI closed Muskateer's on November 18, 2006. As of the final hearing, the school had not reopened. The Commissioner's present case against MAI hinges on allegations that, to induce the payment of funds under the McKay Scholarship Program, the company falsely represented to the Department that three students——O. F., N. P., and C. M.——had "reenrolled" at Muskateer's for the 2006-07 school year, when in fact two of them (O. F. and N. P.) previously had graduated, and the third (C. M.) had dropped out midway through the preceding school year. MAI disputes these allegations, and hence the focus of the hearing largely was on whether the three individuals in question had attended Muskateer's during the 2006-07 school year. Before addressing the contested factual issues, however, a brief examination of the McKay Scholarship Program is in order, to provide context for the findings of fact that will follow. The McKay Scholarship Program affords a disabled student the option of attending a different public school from the one to which he is assigned, or, if he is eligible, the opportunity to receive a scholarship to defray the cost of attending a private school of choice. Once awarded, a McKay scholarship remains in force until the student returns to a public school, graduates, or turns 22, whichever first occurs; provided, however, that he does not drop out, which would render the student ineligible for the scholarship, at least during the period of non-enrollment. To participate in the McKay Scholarship Program, a private school must meet certain conditions as well. Inasmuch as the Commissioner has alleged that MAI failed to comply with some conditions of continued eligibility, the relevant ones will be discussed in greater detail below. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that McKay scholarship funding is potentially available to most private schools operating lawfully in the state, for the program is designed to be inclusive in this regard. A private school that wants to participate in the McKay Scholarship Program must notify the Department of its interest and submit information demonstrating compliance with the eligibility requirements. This information——and other data necessary to secure the disbursement of scholarship funds——must be transmitted to the Department electronically, through forms available online to registered users, at a secure website maintained by the Department. To access this site, a private school must first obtain a unique code and establish a confidential password, both of which must be entered correctly in order to logon to the Department's secure web page. If the parent of an eligible student chooses the private school option and secures a place for his child at the private school of choice, then the parent must notify the Department of his decision before the child begins attending the private school. After receiving such notice, the Department verifies the student's enrollment in the private school, obtains from the private school a schedule of the tuition and fees, and receives from the student's school district a "matrix of services" reflecting the student's special educational needs. The maximum amount of the McKay scholarship for a particular student is the lesser of (a) the "calculated amount" (which is roughly equal to the estimated cost of educating the student in the public school to which he is assigned) or (b) the actual amount of the private school's tuition and fees.2 The amount of the student's scholarship is deducted from his public school district's total funding entitlement.3 McKay scholarship payments are made in four equal amounts during the school year to which the scholarship applies. The payment dates are September 1, November 1, February 1, and April 1. Payments are made by warrant payable to the student's parent. The Department mails each warrant to the private school of the parent's choice. The parent is required restrictively to endorse the warrant, authorizing the funds to be deposited only in the private school's account.4 To remain eligible for the McKay scholarship, the student must have regular and direct contact with his teacher(s) at the private school's physical location. Thus, ahead of each payment (after the initial payment), the private school must verify, through the Department's secure, password-protected website, that the student continues to be enrolled in, and to attend, the private school. It is in connection with this ongoing duty to verify continued enrollment and attendance at the private school that MAI is alleged to have engaged in fraudulent activity, namely, reporting to the Department that O. F., N. P., and C. M. were still enrolled in, and attending, Muskateer's when, in fact, they were not. The undersigned will now turn to these allegations, which lie at the heart of this matter. But first: It must be acknowledged that the evidence is in conflict concerning the historical facts relevant to the allegations of fraudulent activity. Given the evidential conflicts, the undersigned supposes that reasonable people might disagree about what happened here. Ultimately, however, it falls to the undersigned, rather than a group of hypothetical "reasonable people," to resolve the evidential conflicts and settle the disputed issues of material fact. Thus, to the extent that any finding below (or herein) is inconsistent with the testimony of one witness or another, or with some documentary evidence, the finding reflects a rejection of all such inconsistent testimony and evidence (none of which was overlooked, disregarded, or ignored) in favor of proof that the undersigned deemed, in the exercise of his prerogatives as the fact-finder, to be more believable and hence entitled to greater weight. O. F. In January 2006, halfway through the 2005-06 school year, O. F. was enrolled as a student of Muskateer's. He began attending the accelerated high school on January 26, 2006. At the same time, his sister, Ms. Mesa, started working for MAI as a teacher in the regular high school. About five months later, O. F. graduated from Muskateer's. O. F. participated in a graduation ceremony on June 3, 2006, and, according to the transcript maintained in his student file, O. F. was awarded a diploma or certificate on that date. The transcript notwithstanding, it is undisputed that O. F. did not actually receive his diploma until several months after his graduation date. MAI contends that it withheld O. F.'s diploma because he had not finished all the tests necessary for graduation. The undersigned finds, however, that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that O. F. had not finished his degree requirements as of June 3, 2006; indeed, the greater weight of the persuasive evidence is to the contrary. Accordingly, MAI's assertion that O. F. did not graduate from high school at the end of the 2005-06 school year is rejected. On May 26, 2006, MAI reported to the Department, through the Department's secure, password-protected website, that O. F. had reenrolled in Muskateer's for the 2006-07 school year, and that he would resume attending the school on July 1, 2006. On the same date and in the same manner, MAI reported that O. F.'s tuition and fees for the upcoming school year would total $24,000. These representations were made for the purpose of obtaining funds from the McKay Scholarship Program. The foregoing representations regarding O. F.'s reenrollment in Muskateer's for the 2006-07 school year were false. Moreover, the greater weight of the evidence persuades the undersigned that, more likely than not, the individuals responsible for making these representations——namely Mr. And Mrs. Cermeno——actually knew that the representations were false, or they recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of the matters asserted.5 Despite having graduated, O. F. returned to Muskateer's on three or four occasions in September and October 2006, at which times he took a few tests that he had previously taken and passed. This happened because the Cermenos refused to give O. F. his diploma unless he retook these tests——a condition that was repeated both to O. F.'s mother and his sister (the teacher).6 The undersigned infers that, more likely than not, the Cermenos used the threat of withholding O. F.'s diploma as a means of coercing his "attendance" at Muskateer's during the 2006-07 school year, to create plausible deniability in the event the charge were brought (as it was) that MAI had fraudulently sought to obtain McKay scholarship funds for O. F. At any rate, post-graduation "attendance" such as O. F.'s——to retake exams for no apparent legitimate reason——is not the kind of regular attendance that would support the reasonable inference that the student had enrolled for the 2006-07 school year.7 N. P. N. P. enrolled in Muskateer's on May 3, 2004, and began attending classes in the accelerated high school on August 16, 2004. He graduated (at least in the ceremonial sense) at the end of the 2004-05 school year but never received a diploma. N. P. testified that he never returned to Muskateer's as a student after he (ceremonially) graduated. In other words, N. P. claims that he was not a student of Muskateer's during either the 2005-06 school year or the 2006-07 school year. N. P.'s testimony in this regard is corroborated by the testimony of his aunt (and legal guardian), Altagracia Moreta. Additionally, N. P.'s testimony is corroborated by the absence of well-kept, reliable documentation——such as enrollment registers and attendance records——attesting to his ongoing attendance at Muskateer's after the 2004-05 school year. The undersigned considers the lack of such documentation to be a telling fact. Consequently, although there is conflicting evidence, the undersigned finds that, more likely than not, N. P. did not attend Muskateer's during the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, as he testified. On May 4, 2005, MAI reported to the Department, through the Department's secure, password-protected website, that N. P. had reenrolled in Muskateer's for the 2005-06 school year, and that he would resume attending the school on August 8, 2005. On the same date and in the same manner, MAI reported that N. P.'s tuition and fees for the 2005-06 school year would total $24,000. These representations were made for the purpose of obtaining funds from the McKay Scholarship Program. On May 26, 2006, MAI reported to the Department, through the Department's secure, password-protected website, that N. P. had reenrolled in Muskateer's for the 2006-07 school year, and that he would resume attending the school on July 1, 2006. On the same date and in the same manner, MAI reported that N. P.'s tuition and fees for the 2006-07 school year would total $24,000. These representations were made for the purpose of obtaining funds from the McKay Scholarship Program. The foregoing representations regarding N. P.'s reenrollment in Muskateer's for the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school year were false. Moreover, the greater weight of the evidence persuades the undersigned that, more likely than not, the individuals responsible for making these representations——namely Mr. And Mrs. Cermeno——actually knew that these representations were false, or they recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of the matters asserted. C. M. In July 2004, C. M. registered to attend Muskateer's. He began attending the accelerated high school on August 16, 2004. C. M. testified at hearing (via deposition) that he continued to attend Muskateer's while this proceeding was pending, having been in class there as recently as "yesterday" (January 17, 2007). C. M. did not know what courses he was currently taking or how many other students currently were attending Muskateer's. (Recall that Muskateer's closed its doors on November 18, 2006, and, as of the final hearing, had not reopened).8 Whatever credibility C. M. still possessed after giving testimony such as that just described was shredded when Petitioner impeached him with a prior inconsistent (actually, contradictory) statement. On August 22, 2006, C. M. told the OIG's investigator that he had stopped attending Muskateer's in December 2005 and never returned. The investigator made an audio recording of C. M.'s statement, which was received in evidence, but C. M. was not under oath at the time he gave the statement. The undersigned finds that C. M. is not a believable witness, and his testimony, being unreliable and unpersuasive, is given no weight.9 The documents in C. M.'s disorderly (and seemingly incomplete) student file are likewise insufficient to establish, to the required degree of persuasiveness (namely, that the fact is more likely true than not), the dates on which C. M. attended Muskateer's as an enrolled student. The bottom line is that the evidence is insufficient to permit the undersigned to make a finding as to when (or whether) C. M. stopped attending Muskateer's (prior to its closure on November 18, 2006).10 Lacking sufficient proof regarding the dates during which C. M. attended Muskateer's as a duly enrolled student, it is impossible to determine whether MAI engaged in any fraudulent activity with regard to C. M. Determinations of Ultimate Fact The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, to induce the state to disburse McKay scholarship funds for the benefit of O. F., MAI engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: MAI intentionally reported to the Department that O. F. had reenrolled in Muskateer's for the 2006-07 school year, while either (a) knowing that this representation of material fact was false or (b) recklessly disregarding the truth or falsity of this material representation, which was, in fact, false. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, to induce the state to disburse McKay scholarship funds for the benefit of N. P., MAI engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: MAI intentionally reported to the Department, on separate occasions, that N. P. had reenrolled in Muskateer's for the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, while either (a) knowing that these representations of material fact were false or (b) recklessly disregarding the truth or falsity of these material representations, which were, in fact, false. The greater weight of the evidence is insufficient to establish that MAI engaged in fraudulent activity in connection with its efforts to obtain McKay scholarship funds for the benefit of C. M. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, by failing to keep and maintain complete and orderly records of enrollment and attendance, MAI failed to meet its obligation under Section 1002.39(8)(a), Florida Statutes, to comply with all of the requirements set forth in Section 1002.421, which mandates that private schools participating in the McKay Scholarship Program must, among other things, conform to all the requirements outlined in Section 1002.42, Florida Statutes, including Section 1002.42(4), which directs that private schools must prepare and keep attendance records in accordance with the provisions of Section 1003.23(2), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner enter a final order (a) suspending payment of McKay Scholarship funds to MAI in connection with the 2006-07 school year (b) revoking MAI's participation in the McKay Scholarship Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue may retain Petitioner's after-tax lottery prize of $4,074.50 and apply it to reduce the outstanding arrearage for child support in the amount of $11,050.00 as of October 23, 2002.
Findings Of Fact DOR and DOL are the agencies of the State of Florida charged with the duty for the administrative enforcement of the intercept of lottery prize winnings to satisfy past due child support debt. Petitioner made a claim to a lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50 after-tax on or about May 28, 2002. DOR notified DOL that Petitioner was indebted to the state for court-ordered child support through the court depository and administrative cost in the amount of $13,049.25. Pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner's entire lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50 after-tax was transferred to DOR by DOL. Petitioner was given written notice on May 30, 2002, of the DOR's intent to intercept his lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50, it had received from DOL, and apply it to partially satisfy his unpaid child support debt. Petitioner requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, regarding the final decision by DOR to retain the $4,074.50 and apply it to the certified child support debt. Petitioner disputes the claim by DOR that he owes child support that is being collected through a court. On October 19, 1984, Catherine Siler, the custodial parent of the children, signed a non-AFDC application for child support enforcement with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the predecessor to DOR. On October 19, 1984, DOR filed a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) petition with the Clerk of Court in Escambia County, Florida, to be forwarded to Indiana. On October 26, 1984, the Escambia County Clerk of Court requested that the Indiana court issue an order to require child support payments to be paid through the Escambia County, Florida Clerk of Court Depository. On May 24, 1985, the Indiana court entered an order requiring the child support payments in the case of Catherine Silver v. Gregory Aull be paid through the Escambia County, Florida Clerk of Court Depository. Florida has received and continues to receive child support payments from Petitioner on behalf of Catherine Siler. At a May 8, 1998, hearing, the Indiana court determined that Petitioner had a support arrearage of $23,009.00. The Indiana court ordered Petitioner to pay the arrearage at the rate of $50.00 per week beginning May 15, 1998. The order required Petitioner to execute a voluntary Wage Withholding Order. Petitioner consistently made payments toward the arrearage and on May 28, 2002, Petitioner had a child support arrearage in the amount of $13,049.25. On October 23, 2002, Petitioner had an arrearage of $11,050.00. DOR intends to apply Petitioner's lottery prize in the amount of $4,074.50 to partially satisfy his past due child support debt.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order wherein it retains the $4,074.50 lottery prize of Petitioner and apply it to reduce the accrued arrearage of $11,050.00 as of October 23, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory J. Aull 107 Georgia Avenue St. Cloud, Florida 34769 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louise Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Petitioner has defaulted on student loans and, if so, the principal amounts due on the loans, as well as accrued interest, and collection costs. Whether Petitioner's employer should be required to withhold payments from Petitioner's pay pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Johnny Martin. Petitioner's mailing address is 11431 Quailhollow Drive, Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent is the Florida Department of Education. The Department's business address is 325 West Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The Department is a guarantee agency which holds the loan account in question after paying the claim of the lender on July 28, 1994. All loans in this proceeding are Supplemental Loan(s) for Students (SLS), also known as Florida Auxiliary Loans. SLS loans are not subsidized by the federal government. Therefore, the federal government has no responsibility for payment of interest during periods of deferment or forbearance and there is no grace period for SLS loans. During any period of deferment or forbearance, such as when a borrower is unemployed, the borrower's repayment obligation may be suspended; however, interest accrues to the account for which the borrower is responsible. When the deferment or forbearance ends, the outstanding interest is capitalized on the loan. SLS loans accrue interest at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date of disbursement. Persons eligible to receive SLS loans include parents of dependent undergraduate students. As set forth below, Petitioner, as parent of an eligible dependent undergraduate student, received four SLS loans. Loan 1: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000000442 in 1983. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 1. Although the Department is the guarantor of Loan 1, the lender never declared the loan in default or sold it to the Department. Therefore, Loan 1 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 2: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000001064 in 1984. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 2. The lender declared Petitioner in default and sold Loan 2 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 2 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 2 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 2 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 3: Petitioner applied for and received Loan A000003767 in 1985. This loan, in the amount of $3,000.00, will be referred to as Loan 3. The lender declared Petitioner in default and transferred Loan 3 to the Department as guarantor. Because Loan 3 was in repayment status for more than seven years, exclusive of suspensions of the repayment period, Loan 3 was discharged in bankruptcy. Therefore, Loan 3 is not at issue in this proceeding. Loan 4: On or about August 5, 1986, Petitioner executed an Auxiliary (SLS) Loan application on behalf of his daughter, Kelly Aleta Martin, an eligible dependent undergraduate student. On or about September 8, 1986, Petitioner executed the promissory note for this loan. This SLS Loan was in the amount of $3,000.00. This loan was disbursed on or about October 9, 1986. The Department guaranteed this loan. Throughout exhibits presented by the Department, the loan number for this SLS Loan is A000007005; however, for convenience, herein this loan will be referred to as Loan 4. Loan 4 is the only loan at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner's first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. The payment due date later changed to the 20th of each month. Petitioner's last payment to the lender was made on July 17, 1990. However, as Petitioner was behind in his payments, this payment was applied to the payment due May 20, 1990. The Petitioner is considered in repayment status for 44 months, from October 1986 through May 1990. A borrower is not considered in repayment status during any suspension of the repayment period, including any period of forbearance or deferment. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on September 18, 1990. This deferment was for the period from July 21, 1990 through December 28, 1990. Because Petitioner was not current in his payments, he requested and received a forbearance from the lender for the payments due on June 20 and July 20, 1990, in order to qualify for the unemployment deferment. The forbearance together with the unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 for seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment period ending December 28, 1990. Petitioner applied for and received an unemployment deferment on April 23, 1991. This deferment was for the period from February 24 through July 23, 1991. Because Petitioner failed to make any payments following the deferment ending December 28, 1990, he again requested and received a forbearance for the payments due January 20 and February 20, 1991. The forbearance and unemployment deferment brought Petitioner current in his payments; however, they again suspended the repayment period for Loan 4 by another seven months (two months for the forbearance and five months for the deferment). Following Petitioner's unemployment deferment ending July 1991, he failed to resume payment to the lender beginning August 20, 1990. Thereafter, the lender declared Petitioner in default and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. However, the Department refused to pay the lender's claim citing due diligence violations, and as a result, Petitioner is considered in repayment status from August 20, 1991 through April 20, 1992, or nine months, even though no payments were actually received by virtue of his Fresh Start Application. Petitioner submitted a Fresh Start Application to the lender dated May 13, 1992. This document reaffirmed the student loan obligation and, when received by the lender on May 19, 1992, reinstated the Department's guarantee of Loan 4. In an application dated May 24, 1992, Petitioner requested another unemployment deferment. The lender refused Petitioner's request for an unemployment deferment due to the fact that Petitioner was working at the time. However, the lender granted Petitioner a forbearance. This forbearance covered payments due from May 20 through December 20, 1992. Thereafter, Petitioner again requested and was granted forbearance of payments due through June 20, 1993. These forbearances, from May 20, 1992 through June 20, 1993, suspended the period Loan 4 is in repayment status by 14 months. Petitioner failed to resume payments beginning July 20, 1993, the final due date at default. In 1994, the lender declared Petitioner in default on Loan 4 and made application to the Department for claim payment based on the guarantee. The Department paid the default claim on Loan 4 on July 28, 1994. Although no payments were received from July 20, 1993 through July 20, 1994, or 13 months, Petitioner is considered in repayment status for that time because there was no forbearance or deferment in place. When the Department acquired Loan 4, Petitioner owed $2,195.68 in principal and $290.19 in accrued (claim) interest. These figures were capitalized by the Department and yield the figure of $2,484.18 in capitalized principal which is subject to interest at the rate of 12 percent per year. Beginning in 1995, Petitioner entered into a voluntary wage garnishment agreement with the Department. Under this agreement and through the period Petitioner was under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, a total of $383.95 was received by the Department and applied to Petitioner's account in accordance with Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.404(f), relating to how borrower payments will be applied. The entire amount received was applied to outstanding interest. Prior to filing bankruptcy, Petitioner's Loan 4 was considered in repayment status from July 29, 1994 through January 5, 1995, during the time it was held by the Department. The Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for five months, even though he made no payments. Additionally, Petitioner was credited for being in repayment status for 12 months in 1995, whether or not regular payments were received under Petitioner's voluntary wage garnishment agreement. Because Petitioner filed for bankruptcy prior to the January 20, 1996, the payment due date, the month of January 1996 cannot be counted as being in repayment status. Petitioner filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on January 11, 1996. The Department filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court for Loans 2, 3, and 4 in the principal amount of $5,571.91, the amount of capitalized principal due on the accounts. The Department filed with the court the claim of $5,647.02 due on the accounts through date of filing the case. See item 5 on page 2 of Department's Exhibit 5. This amount was the capitalized principal and interest due. On February 4, 1999, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, issued an "Order Discharging Debtor After Completion of Chapter 13 Plan" in Petitioner's case, number 96-00175-3F3. That order provides in pertinent part, "The debtor is discharged for all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under 11 U.S.C. [Section] 502, except any debt . . . for a student loan or educational benefit overpayment as specified in 11 U.S.C.[Section]523(a)(8)." In 1996, Title 11 United States Code Section 523(a) provided in pertinent part: A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an education benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless-- such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of an applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing of the petition . . . Pursuant to this order, Petitioner's debt to the Department for Loans 2 and 3 was discharged. The first payment for Loan 4 was due October 25, 1986. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy on January 11, 1996, nine days prior to the payment due date of January 20, 1996. There were 111 months from the month the first payment of Loan 4 was due through the month prior to the filing of bankruptcy (the month that bankruptcy was filed cannot be counted if the payment due date was after the date Petitioner filed for bankruptcy). Petitioner was in forbearance or deferment status for 28 months which suspends the period Loan 4 is considered in repayment status. Petitioner was in repayment status on Loan 4 for 83 months regardless of whether he actually made payments on the account. Therefore, Loan 4 was not discharged. Section 682.410(b)(2) of Title 34, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that the Department shall impose collection costs as follows: Collection charges. Whether or not provided for in the borrower's promissory note and subject to any limitation on the amount of those costs in that note, the guarantee agency shall charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim. These cost may include, but are not limited to, all attorneys fees, collection agency charges, and court costs. Except as provided in [Sections] 682.401(b)(27) and 682.405(b)(1)(iv), the amount charged borrower must equal the lesser of -- The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection under the formula in 34 CRF 30.60; or The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection in the loan was held by the U.S. Department of Education. The Department established that the amount of the annual collection cost mandated by Title 34 Code of Federal Regulations Section 682.410(b)(2) for the loan at issue in this proceeding should be calculated at least annually at the rate of 25 percent of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. Petitioner agreed to pay these costs in the application and promissory note he executed. Petitioner is employed by the Duval County School Board, a political subdivision of the State of Florida. As an employee of a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner is subject to the provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions pertain to employees of the State of Florida or its political subdivisions who have defaulted on an education loan made or guaranteed by the State of Florida. The Department notified Petitioner by letter dated August 13, 1999, that he had one or more student loans in default and offered him the opportunity to make voluntary payments on the loans. The letter also advised Petitioner that the Department would seek to make involuntary withholdings if he did not make voluntary payments. Petitioner elected to request the formal hearing which triggered this proceeding. As stated above, the capitalized principal due the Department for Loan 4 is $2,485.87. This amount reflects the principal due and the outstanding interest accrued on the account at the time the Department acquired the loan from the lender. All payments received by the Department were applied to outstanding interest which accrued on the account after the loan was bought by the Department, and no payment was applied to the capitalized principal. The capitalized principal accrues interest at the rate of 12 percent per year of $.82 per day. As of February 4, 1999, after taking into consideration the $383.95 received by the Department, the unpaid accrued interest for Loan 4 was $881.74. Pursuant to federal regulations collection costs assessed at the rate of 25 percent of principal and interest due as of February 4, 1999, were $867.08. Therefore, as of February 4, 1999, the total principal, interest, and collection costs due for Loan 4 totaled $4,234.69. Interest continues to accrue to the account as provided by law and collection costs may be reassessed as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, finds that Petitioner, as of February 4, 1999, owes the sum of $4,234.69, and orders the involuntary wage withholding of Petitioner's pay through his employer, Duval County School Board, pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny Martin 11431 Quailhollow Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32218-3621 Ronald G. Stowers Assistant General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the sum of $1,318.00 should be permanently withheld from Petitioner's lottery winning.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Virginia Ann Dassaw, was formerly known as Virginia Ann Davis. In 1979, Petitioner was charged with a criminal violation of Section 409.325, Florida Statutes, welfare fraud. The information alleged Petitioner had received food stamps which she was not entitled to because financial assistance was not available to her. On May 29, 1979, Petitioner appeared before the court and entered a guilty plea to the charge. As a result of the negotiated plea, Petitioner received two years of unsupervised probation and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner received $1,318.00 in overpayments from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for the period March, 1977 through June, 1978. Such overpayments, monthly assistance payments, were from aid to families with dependent children; benefits Petitioner was not entitled to receive. Petitioner did not believe she was required to repay the overpayment amount since the criminal court did not require restitution as part of the conditions of her probation in connection with the food stamp welfare fraud. Petitioner did not, however, aver that she had repaid the obligation at issue nor did she dispute that she had received an overpayment. She felt that the criminal proceeding had been sufficient to satisfy the question. The order granting probation and fixing terms thereof did not, however, excuse Petitioner from the amount claimed in the instant case. On or about February 26, 1996, Petitioner became a lottery prize winner in the amount of $2,500.00. In conjunction with its claim for the overpayment described above, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services notified the Department of the Lottery of its claim for reimbursement from Petitioner's winnings in the amount of $1,318.00. The Department of the Lottery transmitted the winning amount to the Office of the Comptroller. The winning amount, less the claim filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, was issued to Petitioner by expense warrant number 4-17 700 616 on March 12, 1996, in the amount of $1,182.00. Petitioner timely contested the amount claimed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller, issue a final order finding the Department correctly reduced Petitioner's lottery prize winning by $1,318.00 and dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the amount disbursed. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1996. APPENDIX Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 6 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia Ann Dassaw 10075 Southwest 170th Terrace Perrine, Florida 33157 Andre L. Williams Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue, N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Josephine A. Schultz Chief Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Robert F. Milligan Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Cooper General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-00350
The Issue Whether Leroy Smith and/or Alice Longwood are entitled to the $5,000.00 prize for a winning lottery ticket presented by Leroy Smith to the Lottery for collection?
Findings Of Fact On March 7, 1988, Mr. Smith completed a Lottery Winner Claim Form (hereinafter referred to as the "Form") and submitted the Form and a Cool Million instant-winning lottery ticket (hereinafter referred to as the "Ticket"), number 02-114569-303, good for a prize of $5,000.00 for collection. On the back of the Ticket Mr. Smith listed his name and address on the spaces provided for the person claiming the prize and signed the Ticket. The space on the back of the Ticket where the first name of the person claiming the prize was to be listed had been covered with a "white-out" material and "Leroy" written in. At the bottom of the Form Mr. Smith indicates that this was done to replace his first name for a nickname that had previously been entered on the ticket. Mr. Smith also listed his name, Social Security Number, address and phone number on the Form. Mr. Smith signed the Form as the "Claimant." In a letter dated March 8, 1988, DHRS notified the Lottery that Mr. Smith owed $7,478.20 in Title IV-D child support arrearages and $150.00 in court-ordered costs, a total of $7,628.20, as of March 8, 1988. By letter dated March 18, 1988, Mr. Smith was notified that the $5,000.00 prize for the Ticket he submitted was being transferred to the Comptroller for possible payment of his Title IV-D child support arrearages and court costs. The $5,000.00 prize was forwarded from the Lottery to the Comptroller on March 22, 1988. Mr. Smith was notified by the Comptroller by letter dated March 23, 1988, that the Comptroller intended to apply the $5,000.00 prize toward his unpaid obligation. Mr. Smith requested a hearing to contest the proposed action of the Comptroller. The Title IV-D child support arrearages and court costs owed by Mr. Smith are related to two child support cases involving Mr. Smith. First, on December 1, 1981, Mr. Smith was ordered to pay child support to Deidah Brown in an Order of Dependency and Support issued by the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Flagler County, Florida. On November 6, 1984, Mr. Smith was ordered to pay child support to Patti Victoria Smith by the same court. Mr. Smith's total obligation as of the date of the formal hearing was $7,348.20: $3,578.20 in public assistance arrearage, $3,620.00 in non-public assistance arrearage and $150.00 in court-ordered costs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be Issued providing for payment of the $5,000.00 prize attributable to the Ticket to DHRS. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1743 The Petitioners have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1-2 1. 3 1-4. 4 5. 5 6. 6 7-8. 7 10. 8 Statement of law COPIES FURNISHED: Jo Ann Levin Senior Attorney Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Leroy Smith Post Office Box 1465 Bunnell, Florida 32010 Patrick Loebig, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa Hargrett, Esquire Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alice Longwood Post Office Box 1753 Bunnell, Florida 32010 Rebecca Paul, Secretary Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tom Bell, General Counsel Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On January 7, 1994, the Petitioner, Idarue Pearl Jackson, executed and submitted a Winner Claim Form to the Respondent, the Department of the Lottery (hereinafter referred to as the "Lottery"). Ms. Jackson filed a lottery ticket with the Winner Claim Form worth a cash prize of $2,500.00. On January 7, 1994, the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as "DHRS"), informed the Lottery that Ms. Jackson owed the State of Florida $3,237.00 for excessive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter referred to as "AFDC"), payments she had previously received. On or about January 26, 1994, Ms. Jackson was informed that the $2,500.00 prize would be applied in payment of her outstanding AFDC debt. On or about January 31, 1994, Ms. Jackson requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the decision of the Respondents. Prior to August of 1987 Ms. Jackson, then known as Idarue Shepard, began receiving AFDC payments from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Ms. Jackson signed an information and consent form provided by DHRS prior to receiving AFDC payments. In executing the form, Ms. Jackson agreed, among other things, to the following: C. I KNOW PUBLIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS (APPLICANTS) HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO: . . . . Repay the Department for any assistance received for which they are ineligible. The assistance owed will be deducted for each monthly grant amount until the entire amount is paid back. Ms. Jackson also agreed by executing the DHRS exhibit 3, to inform DHRS of any changes in her employment status which would impact her entitlement to AFDC payments. Beginning in August of 1987 Ms. Jackson began employment for which she earned a sufficient amount that she was no longer eligible for AFDC payments. Whether Ms. Jackson informed DHRS of this change is not clear. From August of 1987 through December of 1988 (excluding June of 1987), Ms. Jackson, continued to receive AFDC payments. Because of her employment, she was not entitled to the payments she received from August of 1987 to December of 1988. Ms. Jackson received a total of $3,336.00 in AFDC payments for which she was not eligible. Whether she received these payments because she failed to inform DHRS of her employment or because DHRS made an error in continuing to send her the payments is not relevant. What is relevant is that Ms. Jackson received the payments by check and that she cashed the checks. DHRS investigated the payments made to Ms. Jackson between August of 1987 and December of 1988 and determined that Ms. Jackson was not eligible for the amounts she received during that period of time. By letter dated November 4, 1989, DHRS informed Ms. Jackson that she owed DHRS for the payments she improperly received. In May of 1993, DHRS began withholding a part of other benefits Ms. Jackson was receiving in payment of the excessive AFDC payments she had received. As of the date of the final hearing of this case, Ms. Jackson still owed $3,192.00 to DHRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Ms. Jackson's petition and transferring Ms. Jackson's $2,500.00 lottery prize to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in partial satisfaction of Ms. Jackson's debt to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX Case Number 94-0772 Ms. Jackson and DHRS have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Ms. Jackson's Proposed Findings of Fact The first paragraph (other than the first sentence) is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is a statement of the position of the Respondents. The first three sentences of the second paragraph are statements of law. The fourth sentence of the second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. See finding of fact 13. The fifth sentence of the second paragraph is a statement of law. The sixth sentence of the second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The third paragraph is argument. DHRS' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1 and 2. Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 6. Accepted in 13 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 7 and 8. See 9 and 11. Accepted in 14 and 15. Accepted in 11. 10-11 Hereby accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Idarue Pearl Jackson 17011 NW 37th Avenue Miami, Florida 33054 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, Esquire General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Kim Tucker, Esquire General Counse Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Scott C. Wright Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa Warren Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery Capitol Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4011 Katrina Saggio, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
