Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (the "Agency") concerning the Administrative Complaints for LIFE CARE CENTER OF SARASOTA, CON 7904, LIFE CARE CENTER OF ORANGE PARK, CON 7737, LIFE CARE CENTER OF NEW PORT RICHEY, CON 8813, LIFE CARE CENTER OF PORT ST. LUCIE, CON 8975, LIFE CARE CENTER OF OCALA, CON 7923 AND LIFE CARE CENTER OF MELBOURNE, CON 3828 collectively known as Life Care Centers of America (hereinafter "Life Care") which the Agency filed the Administrative Complaints for Life Care's failure to comply with Medicaid conditions placed on the CONs. Composite Exhibit 1. The parties have since entered into a Settlement Agreement. Exhibit 2. It is ORDERED that: The findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the Administrative Complaint are adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The Settlement Agreement is attached hereto and made a part hereof. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement upon payment of any fines. The Respondent shall pay the Agency a total of $5,780.00 within 30 days of the date of this Final Order. The total amount is divided among the cases as such: Case Number 2008013528 - $323.00 Case Number 2008013522 - $663.00 Case Number 2009000372 - $1,663.00 Case Number 2009000369 - $1,530.00 Case Number 2009000371 - $1,365.00 Case Number 2008013532 - $236.00 A check made payable to the "Agency for Health Care Administration" and containing the AHCA ten-digit case numbers should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 The above-styled cases are hereby closed. DONE AND ORDERED this Z--1 day of 011, in Tallahassee, Florida. Elizab Agen tion
Other Judicial Opinions A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW, WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING THE ORIGINAL NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A COPY ALONG WITH THE FILING FEE PRESCRIBED BY LAW WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been furnished by U.S. or interoffice mail to the persons named below on this '/,:r: day of RICHARD J. SHOOP, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 412-3630 COPIES FURNISHED TO: Charles A. Stampelos Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) Jay Adams, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Attorney for Life Care Centers of America (U. S. Mail) James H. Harris, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Richard Joseph Saliba, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Interoffice Mail) MAR-17-2009 10:39 AGENCY HEALTH CARE ADMIN Mar 17 2009 10=25 850 921 0158 P.08 STATE OF PLORXDA
Conclusions Having reviewed the four Notices of Intent to Deny Application issued May 13-18, 2010, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1, 2, 3, and 4), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 5) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Petitioner shall remit to the Agency, within thirty (30) days of the entry of a Final Order adopting this agreement, an administrative fee in the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. 3. Checks should be made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration.” The check, along with a reference to this case number, should be sent directly to: Filed January 10, 2012 1:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 4. Unpaid amounts pursuant to this Order will be subject to statutory interest and may be collected by all methods legally available. 5. Any requests for an administrative hearing are withdrawn. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees. This matter is closed. DONE and ORDERED this [0 day of ~ Bettie: ; 20/2, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. — Ds we { izabeth Dudek, retary fey ir wacked 0. th€are Administration A PARTY WHO JS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Lance P. Cohen, Esquire Warren J. Bird, Asst. General Counsel Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Office of the General Counsel 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite # 102 Agency for Health Care Administration Jacksonville, Florida 32310 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 (U. S. Mail) Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Roger Bell Health Care Clinic Unit Manager Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Suzanne F. Hood Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (U.S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the oa above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the 10 day of aaa » 2012" Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 Certified Article Number , ?bbO 390) Y5778 8971 SEMDERS RECORD i", Certified Article Number (?160 3901 9846 7935 1337 SENDERS RECORD One Nofice $1149/1° CHARLIE CRIST FIORDAAGENCY FOR HEATH CARE ADMINS TRATION Better Health Care for ail Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8428 1680 Dunn Ave Case #: 2010004935 Ste 39 Jacksonville, FL 32218 F INTENT TO DENY APP TION It Is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 1680 DUNN AVE, STE 39, JACKSONVILLE, FL, 32218, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further Information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 15, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: A copy of the closing documents, stock or similar certificates signed and dated by both the buyer and seller is required, In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGH Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 ; Legal Intake Unit, Mall Stop 3. EXHIBIT 14 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 " Certified Article Number , 7260 3901 9648 57748 8995 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8430 9826 San Jose Blvd Case #: 2010004881 Jacksonville, FL 32257 .. : NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 9826 San Jose Bivd, Jacksonville, FL, 32257, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated March 27, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 8, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Subpart 1.B, Name-of.Applicant: The name of the applicant must be the corporation or legal entity as it is registered with. the Division of Corporations, it must also match-the FEIN indicated in section 1.C. This subpart was submitted as a response to the omissions, but the. applicant's name indicated does not match the FEIN# listed in section 1.C. of the application. : As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhead, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. : In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). TION OF HT! Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing, In order to obtain a formal proceeding before -the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120,57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing-must conform to the - requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ; : : Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida,com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 EXHIBIT 2 Physicians Medical Centers -. . Inc Page 2 : May 12, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 Te thictee-Va thet [9 Number fd60 3901 9848 7495 a2, SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 13, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File #8427 5960 Beach Blvd : Case #2010004956 Ste3 ; Jacksonville, FL 32207 NOTICE OF INTENT TQ DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 5960 Beach Bivd., Ste 3, Jacksonville, FL, 32207, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 7, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on Apri! 9, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhéad, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. ; In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. EXHIBIT 3 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Page 2 May 13, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. Health Cae Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 RTE ecm 3901 94a 7935 yy74 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY TOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION oe ERNGS Better Health Care for all Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD May 18, 2010 CERTIFIED MAIL / RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED File Number: 8429 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax, Inc 2020 Kingsley Ave Case #: 2010005135 Suite A Orange Park, FL 32073 NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 2020 Kingsley Avenue, Suite A, Orange Park, Florida, 32073 be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes, You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency’s correspondence, Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 12, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Evidence of Ownership — Information received by the Agency states that Victoria Critzer is the owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax Inc. Provide the following documentation as evidence of ownership: * A copy of the final closing documents such as a bill of sale or stock purchase agreement. signed and dated by both the buyer and seller including the effective date sale or transfer. The closing documents should contain the signature of Gordon Garver DC, previous owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc and Joseph Thomas MD, new owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc. ¢ A copy of the cancelled and reissued stock certificates transferring shared to Joseph Thomas MD. ¢ Acopy of the lease agreement that includes the name(s) of the owner(s). e Acopy of the business tax receipt that includes the name of the corporation and owner. In addition, the Agency received information indicating that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXHIBIT 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com . Physicians Medical Centers - Ja... .nc Page 2 May 18, 2010 EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120,569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S. your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ey SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS, For questions regarding this notice, please contact Ruby Schmigel, Health Services & Facilities Consultant with the Health Care Clinic Unit at (850) 412-4413. oger Bgl, Mandger Health Care Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS PHYSICIANS MEDICAL CENTERS-JAX, INC., Petitioner, DOAH Case Nos. 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 vs. AHCA CASE Nos.: 2010004881, 2010004956 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 2010004935 and 2010005135, ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Respondent, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter the “Agency”), through its undersigned representatives, and Petitioner, Physicians Medical Centers- Jax, Inc. (hereinafter “Petitioner”), pursuant to Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, each individually, a “party,” collectively as “parties,” hereby enter into this Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) and agree as follows: WHEREAS, the Petitioner applied for four certificates of exemption from licensure pursuant to Section 400.9935(6), Florida Statutes and Chapter 59A-33, Florida Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, Victoria Critzer has applied for four initial health care clinic licenses, expressly intending to purchase the interest of Dr. Joseph Thomas in Petitioner upon issuance by the Agency of those licenses; and WHEREAS, the Agency has jurisdiction of the license and exemption applications described in the foregoing paragraphs, by virtue of being the regulatory and licensing authority over the said licenses and exemptions; and EXHIBIT 5 WHEREAS, the Agency served the Petitioner with four Notices of Intent to Deny Application on or about May 13, 2010, notifying the Petitioner of the Agency’s intent to deny the certificates of exemption for the reasons stated thereon, in Agency cases numbered 2010004881, 2010004956, 2010004935 and 2010005135; and WHEREAS, Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, and in response to said request the matters were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), and were designated as cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 in that tribunal; and subsequently the parties agreed to, and did abate those cases in DOAH, for the purpose of discussing settlement; and WHEREAS, the Agency alleges, and Petitioner denies, that during the period of processing of the aforementioned applications, Petitioner operated one or more unlicensed health care clinics in violation of Florida law as to which no formal administrative, civil or criminal action has thus far been brought; and WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that a fair, efficient, and cost effective resolution of this dispute would avoid the expenditure of substantial sums to litigate the dispute; and WHEREAS, the parties stipulate to the adequacy of consideration exchanged; and WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated in good faith and agreed that the best interest of all the parties will be served by a settlement of these proceedings; and NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and recitals herein, the parties intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 1. All recitals are true and correct and are expressly incorporated herein. 2. Both parties agree that the “whereas” clauses incorporated herein are binding findings of the parties. 3. Joseph Thomas, M.D. hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by him, he is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center-Jax, Inc. 4, Victoria Critzer hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by her, she is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 5. Upon full execution of this Agreement, Petitioner agrees to waive any and all proceedings and appeals to which it may be entitled including, but not limited to, an informal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(2), a formal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(1), appeals under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes; and declaratory and all writs of relief in any court or quasi-court (DOAH) of competent jurisdiction; and further agrees to waive compliance with the form of the Final Order (findings of fact and conclusions of law) to which it may be entitled. Provided, however, that no Agreement herein, shall be deemed a waiver by either party of its right to judicial enforcement of this Agreement. 6. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the parties agree to the following: a. Petitioner's four (4) applications for exemption from licensure are hereby withdrawn, and Petitioner expressly waives its right to challenge or appeal, or both, in DOAH or elsewhere, the denial by the Agency of the exemptions. b. The Agency will resume processing the four initial licensure applications submitted by Victoria Critzer as intended future 100% owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc., now pending, and if the applications are complete and the applicant qualified under applicable law, the Agency will issue the licenses upon full payment by Petitioner of an agreed upon sum, as set forth below, to resolve the Agency's claim of unlicensed activity against Physicians Medical Center, Inc. Ms. Critzer agrees to use reasonable diligence to timely remedy any omissions from the applications cited by the Agency, to make the facilities available as required by law for all inspections required in connection with the licensure of the facilities, and to otherwise comply with all requirements of the application process, and all statutes and administrative rules thereunto appertaining, including background screening as may be applicable. c. The Agency agrees to use all reasonable diligence to process the initial license applications, and to issue the initial licenses as expeditiously as reasonably possible, provided that Ms. Critzer timely complies with all reasonable requests for additional information to which the Agency is entitled as a component of the application and licensure process, and provided that Victoria Critzer, and the applications she presented, are qualified for the licenses under all applicable statutes and administrative rules. d. Victoria Critzer will maintain the health care clinic license #HCC6732 currently held by Physicians Medical Center Inc. (PMC), for purposes of billing health care services provided solely at the licensed location, 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, Jacksonville, Florida. Whereas, Ms. Critzer, through counsel, has advised the Agency of a change of address for the license from 9826 San Jose Boulevard, to 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, PMC will submit a change of address application to the Agency together with the appropriate fee, within 10 days of execution of this agreement, and prior to resumption by the Agency of processing of the subject licensure applications. The license will be maintained 7. under a different federal employer identification number from any other licenses issued to Victoria Critzer or any entity in which she has a controlling interest. A separate health care clinic license must be obtained for any other location at which any health care services will be provided and third-party reimbursement sought for on behalf of Physicians Medical Centers Inc. e. Physicians Medical Centers, Inc. agrees to pay the sum of thirty thousand and no/100s dollars ($30,000.00) to the Agency, to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. The sum will be paid in lump sum at the time that the initial licenses referenced in paragraph b., above, are issued, or within 30 days following rendition of a Final Order by the Agency that incorporates this Agreement, whichever occurs first. f. Nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the Agency from denying Petitioner’s application for licensure based upon any statutory and/or regulatory provision, including, but not limited to, the failure of Petitioner to satisfactorily complete a survey reflecting compliance with all statutory and rule provisions as required by law. By executing this Agreement, the Petitioner neither admits nor denies the allegations raised in the Notices of Intent to Deny referenced herein. 8. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency shall enter a Final Order adopting and incorporating this Agreement in its entirety, and closing the above-styled case(s). The cases resident in DOAH, referenced above as DOAH cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10- 3204 and 10-3205, are currently closed by Order entered in that tribunal on October 7, 2010. The parties hereby further agree that those cases shall remain closed permanently, and each party hereby waives its right to seek to have any of those cases re-opened. 9. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 10. This Agreement shall become effective on the date upon which it is fully executed by all the parties. 11. The Petitioner for itself and for its related or resulting organizations, its successors or transferees, attorneys, heirs, and executors or administrators, does hereby discharge the Agency and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to this matter and the Agency’s actions, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal or state court or administrative forum, including any claims arising out of this Agreement, by or on behalf of the Petitioner or related or resulting organizations. 12. This Agreement is binding upon all parties herein and those identified as a party, or a beneficiary, of the provisions of this Agreement, and each signatory acknowledges same and the adequacy of consideration therefor. 13. In the event that Petitioner is or was a Medicaid provider, this settlement does not prevent the Agency from seeking Medicaid overpayments or from imposing any sanctions pursuant to Rule 59G-9.070, Florida Administrative Code. This Agreement does not prohibit the Agency from taking action regarding Petitioner’s Medicaid provider status, conditions, requirements or contract. 14. The undersigned have read and understand this Agreement and have authority to bind their respective principals to it. Both parties have been represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of this Agreement. The Petitioner fully understands that counsel for the Agency represents solely the Agency and Agency counsel has not provided legal advice to or influenced the Petitioner in its decision to enter into this Agreement. 15. This Agreement contains the entire understandings and Agreements of the parties. 16. | This Agreement supersedes any prior oral or written Agreements between the parties. This Agreement may not be amended except in writing. Any attempted assignment of this Agreement shall be void. 17. Venue for any action brought to interpret, challenge or enforce the terms of this Agreement or the Final Order entered pursuant hereto shall lie solely in the Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. 18. ‘Ifa court of competent jurisdiction finds any part of this Agreement to be void, voidable, or unenforceable, then the remainder of the contract shall remain in full force and effect. 19. All parties agree that a facsimile signature suffices fe 20. The following representatives and beneficiaries hereby ae duly S. to enter into this Agreement. Molly McKéns eputy Secretary {_ panes P. Céhen, Esquire Health Quality ance Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Agency for Health Care Administration 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite 102 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3 Jacksonville, Florida 32310 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Counsel to Petitioner DATED: (frolir DATED: 1-1 U~ aye William R. Roberts Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: /7 [(3l 4 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: Uf (5) WH Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc. 9826 San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 patep: _})-14~!/ ~~ x. 1 _f- Victoria Critzer as president, sole director and 100% Owner Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 9826-B San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 DATED: _|1- (4-//
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that respondent's decision to deny petitioner's capital expenditure proposal to lease the Cambridge Nursing Home in New Port Richey be AFFIRMED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Art Forehand, Administrator Office of Community Medical Facilities Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frank M. Gafford, Esquire Post Office Box 1789 Lake City, Florida 32055 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Florida Hospital Medical Center is entitled to reimbursement in the amount preliminarily determined by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, in a reimbursement dispute regarding bills submitted by Florida Hospital Medical Center to Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company for medical services provided to two individuals involved in work-related accidents; and Whether Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company properly adjusted those bills of Florida Hospital Medical Center in accordance with the requirements of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Florida Hospital is a full-service, not-for-profit hospital system located in Orlando, Florida, that operates a smaller satellite hospital in Winter Park, Florida. Florida Hospital is a “health care provider” within the meaning of Section 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Macy’s and Amerisure are “carriers” within the meaning of Sections 440.02(4) and 440.02(38), Florida Statutes. The Department has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between carriers and health care providers regarding payments for services rendered to injured workers, pursuant to Sections 440.13(7) and 440.13(11)(c), Florida Statutes. Qmedtrix is a medical bill review company.3/ Case No. 09-6871 R. P., an employee of Macy’s, slipped and fell at work on May 20, 2009, and presented to Florida Hospital Winter Park for evaluation and treatment where medical personnel documented vomiting, brain attack, and brain trauma. After evaluation and treatment, patient R. P. was diagnosed with a bruise to the head and released the same day. On September 16, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to R. P. totaling $5,547.20 to Macy’s for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Macy’s forwarded the bill to its workers’ compensation medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix reviewed the bill by comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by Florida Hospital with examples in the CPT book for billing of emergency department services. Florida Hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 920, which reads “contusion of face, scalp, or neck.” Use of this code means R. P. presented with a bruise or hematoma, but not a concussion. Florida Hospital also reported ICD diagnosis code 959.01 (“head injury, unspecified”) which also means that R. P. did not present with a concussion, loss of consciousness, or intracranial injuries. Florida Hospital’s bill included a charge of $2,417 with CPT code 99285 for emergency department services. The bill also included separate charges for a head CT, and various lab tests, drugs, and IV solutions. According to Mr. von Sydow, the bill was sent through Qmedtrix’s computer program for review, and was flagged for review by a physician. Mr. von Sydow further testified that one of Qmedtrix’s medical director’s suggested that the CPT code of 99285 be reduced. The medical director, who Mr. von Sydow said reviewed the bill, however, did not testify and no documentation of his recommendation was submitted at the final hearing. Qmedtrix determined that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285. Qmedtrix found that, while the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285, its usual charge for an emergency department visit billed with CPT code 99284 is $1,354. Macy’s paid Florida Hospital a total of $2,683.55, which amount included $1,010.24 for the emergency department visit based on [approximately] 75 percent of Florida Hospital’s usual charge for CPT code 99284. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Macy’s (or its designated entity)4/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed,” and has columns designated as “BR Red,” “PPO Red,” “Other Red,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed” column. There is also a column entitled “Reason Code” which sets forth codes, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(o)3., that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.5/ The “reason code” set forth adjacent to the $2,417.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” There is also another code, “P506” listed in the “Reason Code” column adjacent to the same line item, which, according to the key provided on the EOBR, means “[a]ny questions regarding this Qmedtrix review, please call (800)-833-1993.” “P506,” however, is not a “reason code” listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 68L- 7.602(5)(o)3. The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Macy’s pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital in fact billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 958 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) for the proposition that “SB-50 amended section 440.13 . . . [revealing] legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographic area.” Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Macy’s also contended that “upcoding” and “unbundling” were additional grounds for adjustment or disallowance that were not identified on the EOBR. The response explained that “upcoding” refers to billing with a procedure code that exaggerates the complexity of the service actually provided; that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services; that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes; that the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285; and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a healthy, young adult patient who sustained a blunt head injury with local swelling and bruising without subsequent confusion, loss of consciousness or memory deficit” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99283. The response requested a determination by the Department that Macy’s payment equaled or exceeded the amount usual and customary for CPT code 99283. On November 13, 2009, the Department, through its Office of Medical Services (OMS) issued a determination (Determination in 09-6871) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $5,547.20 and the carrier reimbursed $2,683.55. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, references a manual not incorporated by rule, and provides CPT codes that the respondent alleges are correct. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $4,160.40 ($5,547.20 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$4,160.40). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Macy’s paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P., and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Macy’s is required to pay for such services, equals $1,476.85. The Determination in 09-6871 did not directly address Macy’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6871 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Macy’s timely requested a hearing. Case No. 09-6872 J. L., an employee of Major League Aluminum, was injured in a work-related accident on the evening of May 3, 2009, and visited the emergency department of Florida Hospital Orlando. After evaluation and treatment, J. L. was diagnosed with a bruise to the knee and released the next morning. On September 23, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to J. L. totaling $2,851 to Amerisure, Major League Aluminum’s workers’ compensation insurer, for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Amerisure forwarded the hospital bill to its medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix for review. Qmedtrix’s medical bill review in this case, as in the companion case, entailed comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book. The hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 924.11, which reads “contusion of . . . knee.” The hospital also reported ICD diagnosis codes 724.2 (“lumbago”), E888.1 (“fall on or from ladders or scaffolding”) and 959.7 (“injury, other and unspecified . . . knee, leg, ankle, and foot.”). Florida Hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 9924 for emergency department services and also billed for X-rays and various drugs and IV solutions. Comparing procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book, Qmedtrix concluded that billing with CPT code 99284 was not appropriate, but that billing with CPT code 99282 was. Qmedtrix also found that, while the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, the average charge in the community for a visit to the emergency department billed with CPT code 99282 is $721. Qmedtrix determined the “usual and customary charge” in the community from its own database compiled by entering all of particular hospital bills into Qmedtrix’s database, along with data from the American Hospital Directory. Qmedtrix derives the average charge in the community based upon zip codes of the hospitals. Amerisure paid Florida Hospital a total of $1,257.15, which amount included $524.70 for the emergency department visit codes based on 75 percent of what Qmedtrix determined to be the average charge in the community for CPT code 99282. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Petitioner Amerisure (or its designated entity)6/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed Charges,” and has columns designated as “FS/UCR Reductions,” “Audit Reductions,” “Network Reductions,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed Charges” column. There is also a column entitled “Qualify Code” which sets forth reason codes that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.7/ The code set forth adjacent to the $1,354.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99282 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99284 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Hospital Manual. Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Amerisure pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital, in fact, billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon, supra. Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Amerisure contended “upcoding” as an additional ground for adjustment or disallowance that was not identified on the EOBR. As in the companion case, the response explained “upcoding,” that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services, and that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes. The response further stated that the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a patient with a minor traumatic injury of an extremity with localized pain, swelling, and bruising” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99282. The response requested a determination by the Department that Amerisure’s payment equaled or exceeded the usual and customary charge for CPT code 99282. On October 20, 2009, the Department’s OMS issued a determination (Determination in 09-6872) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $2,851.00 and the carrier reimbursed $1,257.15. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, and references a manual not incorporated by rule. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. Therefore, the charges, as billed by the hospital, did not constitute billing errors. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $2,138.25 ($2,851.00 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$2,138.25). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Amerisure paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Amerisure is required to pay for such services equals $881.10. The Determination in 09-6872 did not directly address Amerisure’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6872 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Amerisure timely requested a hearing. Alleged “Upcoding” for Emergency Department Services The Petitioners’ responses in both cases allege that Florida Hospital “upcoded” its bill for emergency department evaluation and management services. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital, however, reported alleged “upcoding” as an explanation for the Petitioners’ adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. While the Dispute Determinations by the Department do not directly address the carrier’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding” raised in the Petitioners’ responses, they found that “Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment[, and that] [o]nly through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill.” According to Mr. von Sydow, who was offered by Petitioners as an expert in billing, coding, reimbursement, and payment issues,8/ the “reason codes” that workers’ compensation carriers are to use pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602, do not mention “upcoding,” and therefore an EOBR could not be generated with a reason code explaining reduction or disallowance based on “upcoding.” The following reason codes, however, are included in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602: 23 – Payment disallowed: medical necessity: diagnosis does not support the services rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: documentation does not substantiate the service billed was rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: level of evaluation and management service not supported by documentation. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital includes reason code 23, 40, or 41. And neither EOBR explains or otherwise suggests that that Florida Hospital’s level of billing was not supported by medical necessity, services rendered, or sufficient documentation. In fact, Petitioners did not disallow reimbursement and do not contend that reimbursement should be denied for any services rendered by Florida Hospital to R. P. and J. L. on the grounds that the billed services were not medically necessary for the injured employees’ compensable injuries. In addition, Petitioners did not adjust or disallow payment for any of the billed procedures on the grounds that the procedures were not provided. In sum, the EOBR’s did not give Florida Hospital notice that alleged “upcoding” was an issue. Even if Petitioner’s EOBR’s gave Florida Hospital notice that it was asserting “upcoding” as a reason to reduce or adjust the hospital’s bill, the evidence does not support a finding that Florida Hospital utilized the wrong code in its billing for emergency department evaluation and management services. The CPT® 2009 Current Procedural Terminology Professional Edition, (Copyright 2008), (CPT book), is adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(3)(d) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-7.020(2). The CPT book sets forth the procedure codes for billing and reporting by hospitals and physicians. The CPT book sets forth CPT codes ranging from 99281 through 99285 used to report evaluation and management services provided in a hospital’s emergency department, described as follows: 99281: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A problem focused history; A problem focused examination; and Straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self limited or minor. 99282: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. 99283: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate severity. 99284: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A detailed history; A detailed examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity, and require urgent evaluation by the physician but do not pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. 99285: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; and Medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity and pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. Mr. von Sydow testified that a Qmedtrix “medical director,” reviewed Florida Hospital’s bill for services rendered to R. P., but not the medical records, and recommended that the hospital’s charge for emergency department services under CPT 99285 be “re-priced” to Qmedtrix’s determination of the “usual and customary charge” for CPT 99284. Mr. von Sydow acknowledged the need for physician review for some cases (as opposed to review by non-physician coders) by testifying, “The more complicated the medicine, the more likely it is that he [a medical director at Qmedtrix] wants to see it.” Despite Qmedtrix’s original determination to “reprice” the bill from CPT code 99285 to CPT code 99284 (reflected in the reduced payment but not explained in the EOBR), Mr. von Sydow opined that the correct CPT code for emergency department services provided to patient R. P. was 99283, as opposed to 99285 billed by the hospital. Mr. von Sydow testified that his opinion was based upon his own review of the medical records, without the assistance of a medical director or medical expert, and review of examples for the CPT codes for emergency department services from the CPT book, and various provisions of ICD-9 and CPT book coding resources. Aside from the fact that Mr. von Sydow’s opinion differed from the purported recommendation of a Qmedtrix “medical director,” Mr. von Sydow is not a physician. Moreover, Qmedtrix failed to provide the testimony of the medical director, or anyone else with medical expertise to evaluate the medical records and services provided or to validate either the opinion of Mr. von Sydow or the original recommendation to “re- price” Florida Hospital’s use of CPT Code 99285 in its bill for emergency department services rendered to patient R. P. Mr. von Sydow offered similar testimony and examples to explain Qmedtrix’s “re-pricing” of Florida Hospital’s bill from CPT code 99284 to CPT code 99282 for emergency services rendered to patient J. L. on behalf of Amerisure. According to Mr. von Sydow, an internal Qmedtrix coder (not a medical director) reviewed the bill for emergency services rendered to J. L. and determined it should be re-priced to the usual and customary charge, as determined by Qmedtrix, using that CPT code 99282. While knowledgeable of the various codes and their uses, given the manner in which preliminary diagnostics under emergency circumstances drives Florida Hospital’s determination of the appropriate CPT code for billing emergency department services, without the testimony of a medical expert familiar with the medical records generated in these cases in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the emergency care rendered to patients R. P. and J. L., Mr. von Sydow’s testimony was unpersuasive. Ross Edmundson, M.D., an employee, vice-president, and medical manager for Florida Hospital, explained that, unlike other settings, hospitals generally do not have the medical histories of patients presenting for emergency hospital services. When a patient comes to Florida Hospital for emergency services, they are triaged by a nurse to determine the level of urgency, then a doctor sees the patient, conducts a differential diagnosis to rule out possible causes, obtains the patient’s history, and then performs a physical examination. While emergency room physicians at Florida Hospital do not decide which CPT code is utilized for the evaluation and management services provided by its emergency department, the various tests and procedures they undertake to evaluate and treat emergency department patients do. James English, the director of revenue management for Florida Hospital explained the process through his deposition testimony. Florida Hospital, like over 400 other hospitals, uses the “Lynx System” – a proprietary system for creating and maintaining medical records electronically. The program captures each medical service, supply, and physician order that is inputted into the electronic medical record. The hospital’s emergency evaluation and management CPT code is generated from the electronic record. A “point collection system” in the Lynx System translates physician-ordered services, supplies it to a point system, and then assigns the CPT code that is billed based upon the total number of “points” that are in the system at the time the patient is discharged from the emergency department. The level of the evaluation and management CPT code (99281 to 99285) that is reported on Florida Hospital’s bill is a direct reflection of the number and types of medical services that a patient receives from his or her arrival through discharge. In light of evidence showing the manner in which emergency services are provided and the importance of medical records in generating the appropriate billing code for emergency evaluation and management services, it is found that Petitioners failed to provide an adequate analysis of the medical records of either R. P. or J. L. to show that the appropriate CPT codes were not utilized by Florida Hospital in billing for those services. On the other hand, both Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute filed by Florida Hospital with the Department attached appropriately itemized bills utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. In addition, medical records for the evaluation and treatment provided by Florida Hospital for both patients R. B. and J. L. supporting the itemized bills were submitted to the Department. These documents were also received into evidence at the final hearing. Florida Hospital’s bills at issue correctly identified the hospital’s usual charges for each individual and separately chargeable item, service or supply, with the corresponding code assigned to such billable items as maintained in Florida Hospital’s “charge master.” In addition, Petitioners concede the compensability of both patients’ work-related injuries and do not dispute whether any service or supply rendered and billed by Florida Hospital for these two cases were “medically necessary.”9/ Unbundling As noted above, in Case No. 09-6871, Qmedtrix’s response to Florida Hospital’s petition for resolution of reimbursement dispute contended “unbundling” as a ground for adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. At the final hearing, Arlene Cotton, the nurse who issued the Dispute Determinations, explained that reason code 63 regarding “unbundling” is inapplicable to hospital billing, as there is no rule that requires hospitals to bundle bill for its services. Mr. von Sydow agreed that reason code 63 was inapplicable. In addition, footnote 2 of Petitioners’ Proposed Recommended Order states, “they did not pursue the allegations of unbundling.” Therefore, it is found that Petitioners did not prove and otherwise abandoned their claim of “unbundling” as a ground to adjust or disallow reimbursement to Florida Hospital. Usual and Customary Charges The Dispute Determinations issued by the Department found that correct payment in both cases equaled 75% of billed charges, citing “Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., [which] incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Both Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and the Hospital Manual provide that hospital services provided to patients under the workers’ compensation law “shall be reimbursed at 75 percent of usual and customary charges.” The Department interprets the term “usual and customary charges” as set forth in the Hospital Manual and Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, quoted above, to mean a hospital’s usual charges of the hospital, whereas Petitioners contend that “usual and customary charges” means the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area. While apparently not contending that Petitioners failed to raise the issue of “usual and customary” charges in their EOBR’s,10/ at the final hearing, the Department argued that “nowhere in [either Macy’s or Amerisure’s] response is the issue of customary charges raised.” A review of the responses filed by Qmedtrix to Florida Hospital’s reimbursement dispute petitions filed with the Department reveal that both raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Mr. von Sydow’s letter attached to both responses state: As you may know, the proposed adoption of Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System as a methodology for reimbursing hospitals 60% and 75% of “usual and customary charges” follows from the decision of the First District Court of Appeals in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, No. 1D05-5459 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (SB-50 amended section 440.13 to remove all reference to the charges of any individual service provider; this amendment reveals the legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographical area). This court decision requires DFS to define payment rates for out patient service that are uniformly applicable to all hospitals in a given geographic area. In addition, at the final hearing, the Department argued that the petitions for administrative hearing did “not raise as a disputed issue of fact or law whether or not usual and customary charges should apply in this case.” Indeed, a review of the request for relief set forth in the petitions for administrative hearings filed by Petitioners do not mention the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Rather, the relief requested by both petitions for administrative review of the Dispute Determinations, as summarized in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, is: Petitioner[s] seeks reversal of OMS’ Determination(s) and the matters remanded for the Department to: direct payment based upon the actual treatment required/provided and pursuant to the correct CPT code; find that the hospital upcoded and that Petitioner properly reimbursed (or exceeded amount due); and determine that the hospital has the burden of proof to substantiate its billing and the use of the chosen CPT code. Contrary to the Department’s argument, however, both petitions for administrative hearing raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Page 9 of Macy’s petition, in pertinent part states: Petitioner submits that in issuing the above findings OMS failed to consider the holding in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration (wherein the Court determined that reimbursement should not be based solely upon a mathematical equation [as found within the Reimbursement Manual] and applying it to the fee charged by a particular provider; and that by eliminating the reference to any one facility’s charges, the legislature intended that the charges be based on average fees of all providers in a geographical area as opposed to the fees of the particular provider in question). Likewise, review of Amerisure’s petition for administrative hearing reveals that the issue of “usual and customary charges” was raised. Pages 7 and 8 of Amerisure’s petition state, in pertinent part: Further, if the Hospital is permitted to utilize incorrect revenue codes it would be impossible to determine whether the charges are consistent with the Hospital’s own [usual and customary] charges for the service, procedure or supplies in question and, further, whether such charges are consistent with charges by other like facilities (in the same geographical area) for the same services, procedures, or supplies. See One Beacon Insurance, supra. In addition, Amerisure’s petition on page 12 states with regard to the Department’s determination: Such finding was issued without consideration of . . . the amounts charged for the same services in the Orlando area where this hospital is located. Petitioners further preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” in the first paragraph of their statement of position on page 3 of the Joint Prehearing Statement, as follows: Petitioners, Macy’s and Amerisure, take the position that the Determinations must be reversed as the Department has the duty to scrutinize the bills in question in order to determine, first, whether the hospital, in fact, charged its usual charge for the services provided, and second, whether the billed charges are in line with the customary charges of other facilities in the same community (for the same or similar services) and that the Department failed to do so. As such, Petitioners contend that payment for services provided by Florida Hospital should have been based upon 75% of usual and customary charges, not 75% of billed charges. Therefore, it is found that Petitioners have preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” for consideration in this administrative proceeding. Although preserved, Petitioners failed to demonstrate that their interpretation of “usual and customary charges” should prevail. The Department has consistently interpreted the term “usual and customary charges” as used in the Hospital Manual, Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and rules related to hospital reimbursement under the workers’ compensation law as the “usual and customary charges” of the hospital reflected on the hospital’s “charge master.” The Hospital Manual requires each hospital to maintain a charge master and to produce it “when requested for the purpose of verifying its usual charges. . . .” (Emphasis added). Petitioners did not conduct or request to conduct an audit to verify whether the charges billed by Florida Hospital corresponded with the Florida Hospital’s charge master. In fact, Mr. von Sydow conceded at the final hearing that Florida Hospital’s bills at issue were charged in accordance with Florida Hospital’s charge master. Nor did Petitioners institute rule challenge proceedings against the Department regarding the Hospital Manual, incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-7.501. Instead, Petitioners assert that they should be able to reduce Florida Hospital bills based upon a different interpretation of the phrase “usual and customary charges” to mean the average charge in the community as determined by Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix is not registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and does not employ any Florida-licensed insurance adjuster, physician, or registered nurse. Qmedtrix earns 12 to 15 percent of “savings” realized by carriers utilizing their bill review services. For example, if a bill is reduced by $100, Qmedtrix is paid $12.11/ Qmedtrix uses a proprietary bill review system called “BillChek.” According to Qmedtrix’s website: BillChek reviews out-of-network medical charges for all bill types in all lines of coverage, including group health, auto, medical, and workers’ compensation. BillChek is a unique specialty cost- containment service that determines an accurate and reasonable reimbursement amount for non-network facility and ancillary medical charges. BillChek incorporates historical data to help determine reasonable payment recommendations across all sectors of the health care industry. All BillCheck recommendations are backed by extensive medical and legal expertise, and supported by Qmedtrix’s experienced Provider Relations and Dispute Resolution teams. According to the testimony of Mr. von Sydow, Qmedtrix collects and maintains data from various sources, including Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the American Hospital Directory (AHD.com), and HCFA 2552’s (data reported to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services on HCFA 2522) in order to construct a database of health care providers’ usual charges. Mr. von Sydow advised that AHD.com data was a principle source for constructing the database. He also advised that AHCA data was included in the database even though Qmedtrix found the AHCA data defective. Examples of data downloaded from AHD.com for Florida Hospital showing a profile of the facility was received into evidence as P-5. The data did not, however, show usual charges for the CPT codes for emergency department services at issue in this case. Petitioners also introduced into evidence Exhibits P-6 and P-7, which contained AHD.com data showing average charges for Florida Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, respectively, for Level 1 through Level 5 emergency room visits (corresponding to CPT codes 99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained that the data was part of the information Qmedtrix used to construct the average charge in the community. Petitioners failed to provide similar AHD.com data for other hospitals in the area Qmedtrix determined to be the “community.” In addition, Petitioners introduced AHCA’s Florida Health Finder Web-site, as Exhibit P-8, which ostensibly included average charges for all hospitals in Florida for the subject emergency department CPT codes (99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained, however, “[w]e find that [the AHCA data] is not refreshed very often, unfortunately, and some other defects in the scrubbing of the data by the agency, which they know, I will say. But this is incorporated in our database to a large extent.” The exhibit was received into evidence for the purpose of helping to explain how Qmedtrix constructed its database, with the recognition that it was largely composed of hearsay. In sum, while Petitioners showed their methodology of constructing the database, other than the AHD.com data for Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, Petitioners failed to introduce reliable evidence sufficient to show the “usual and customary charge” of all providers in a given geographical area as determined by Qmedtrix. In addition, the AHCA data, though characterized by Mr. von Sydow as unreliable, indicates that there is a wide range of differences in emergency room charges between hospitals in Florida. Petitioners’ interpretation of “usual and customary charge” to mean the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area does not take into account an individual hospital’s indigent care, cost of labor, overhead, number of beds, size, age, or various other differences between facilities that could affect amounts each hospital charges for emergency department and other services; the Department’s interpretation does.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a Final Order consistent with this Recommended Order that: Directs Macy’s Claims Services to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to patient R. P., and to submit proof of reimbursement of that amount within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received; Directs Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to patient J. L., and submit proof of reimbursement of that amount to the Department within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2010.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Dentistry, filed an Administrative Complaint in DPR Case Number 00-52375 against the Petitioner's license to practice dentistry on May 13, 1986. The Petitioner did not dispute the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the Board of Dentistry held an informal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on September 13, 1986. On October 2, 1986, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order suspending the Petitioner from the remunerative practice of dentistry for a period of ten (10) years and advised the Petitioner of his right to appeal the Board's Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the October 2, 1986 Final Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about May 1, 1987, and/or May 2, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider correspondence from the Petitioner seeking a determination of compliance with the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order for his proposal to do volunteer community service dental work at "St. Catherine Laboure Manor" in Jacksonville, Florida. The Board of Dentistry requested further clarification from the Petitioner and took no further action with respect to the Petitioner's request. On June 10, 1987, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's request to allow him to provide volunteer community service dental work under indirect supervision, and on June 26, 1987, the Board of Dentistry issued an Order Denying the Modification. The Petitioner did not appeal the June 26, 1987, Order of the Board of Dentistry. On or about March 9, 1988, the Petitioner submitted his second request to the Board of Dentistry for modification of its October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner identified the following reasons as why the Board of Dentistry should grant his request: My obligation to the people of the State of Florida was fully satisfied on September 28, 1987 (enc.). My civil rights were restored on February 25, 1988 (enc.). The fine imposed by the Board of Professional Regulation ($2000.00) has been paid in full. Since July 1987 I have been treating patients in St. Catherine Laboure' Manor under the direct supervision of Owen Boales D.D.S., as required by order of the Board (enc.). I am currently 64 years of age and need gainful employment. My wife and I are currently surviving primary on her earnings as an employee of the Florida Community College at Jacksonville. My mentally disabled son was admitted to The Northeast Florida State Hospital approximately one month after my arrest. His condition would be benefited by whatever personal attention and care my wife and I may be able to provide. The ten year suspension order now in effect is tantamount to lifetime punishment. This long suspension does not benefit the public but severely obstructs rehabilitative effort. It minimizes the opportunities for professional public service and prevents professional employment. It reduces the available options to demonstrate reliability and observable conformity to the profession's ethical standards. It will continue to impede all my effort to becoming a self sustaining productive and worthy member of society. On April 23, 1988, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's second request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion and consideration of the evidence and arguments of the Petitioner, the Board of Dentistry on July 13, 1988, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner did not appeal the Board's July 13, 1988 Order denying his second request. On or about June 5, 1990, the Petitioner through his attorney submitted his third request to the Board of Dentistry for a modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner's third Motion for Modification of Final Order submitted to the Board on or about June 5, 1990, did not contain information or circumstances that were substantially different from those known to the Board at the time the Final Order of October 2, 1986, was entered, at the time the first order was entered denying the modification request, or that were known to the Board when it had previously heard and denied Petitioner's second request in 1988. On July 28, 1990, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the October 2, 1986 Final Order. After discussion of the parties and upon the advice of legal counsel, the Board of Dentistry on August 13, 1990, issued an Order Denying Modification of Final Order. The Petitioner timely sought an appeal of the Board's August 13, 1990 Order in the First District Court of Appeal, Case Number 90-2369. On September 4, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its opinion where they found the August 13, 1990 Final Order to be ambiguous, vacated the August 13th Final Order, and remanded the case back to the Board of Dentistry for further proceedings. On October 8, 1991, the First District Court of Appeal issued its Mandate to the Board of Dentistry to hold further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On or about October 15, 1991, the Petitioner submitted an Amended Motion for Modification alleging for the first time that "there had been material changes in circumstances since his suspension was entered and/or since the previous rulings as to his suspension." On November 8, 1991, the Board of Dentistry met to consider the Petitioner's third request for modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order, the Amended Motion for Modification of Final Order, and the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal. After discussion and consideration of the Petitioner's requests for modification, the Opinion and Mandate of the First District Court of Appeal, and the evidence presented, on December 12, 1991, the Board of Dentistry issued a Final Order on Remand granting the Petitioner's Amended Motion for Modification of the Board's October 2, 1986 Final Order. The Petitioner is a sole proprietor of a professional practice of dentistry. His principal office and domicile are located in Jacksonville, Florida. He has fewer than twenty-five (25) full-time employees, and his net worth, at the time of filing, was less than two million ($2,000,000) dollars. The Petitioner incurred appellate attorney's fees in the amount of $8,990.00 and costs in the amount of $323.92. The Respondent did not dispute the reasonableness of the fees and costs in this case.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent, Florida State Hospital, is an "employer" as statutorily defined at Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact Behavioral Health Solutions LLC is a private business entity (BHS). The Petitioner was employed by BHS as a clerk- typist beginning on October 6, 2006, and until February 6, 2007, when she was terminated. BHS and the Department of Children and Family Services/Florida State Hospital entered into a contract on September 16, 2006, whereby BHS was to be responsible for providing staff for various positions for the provision of services to residents of Florida State Hospital. One of those positions was that occupied by the Petitioner, at times pertinent to this proceeding. The contract provided that BHS would be responsible for hiring, transferring, promoting, discipline, and discharge/termination of BHS staff. BHS was also responsible for providing its staff with salaries, benefits, compensation packages and training. BHS has its own organizational structure which was not integrated into that of the Respondent Florida State Hospital's organizational structure. The Respondent Florida State Hospital was charged with supervising BHS's staff and with recommendations where required, for disciplinary action or removal from the work site. BHS had the final authority to reassign, discipline or terminate BHS staff, however, by the terms of the contract. The Petitioner was hired by BHS as of October 6, 2006. The offer of employment which she accepted came from BHS. The Petitioner was told later that she was terminated in February 2007 by Angie Burge, the BHS Human Resources Manager. The Petitioner's date of employment were October 6, 2006, through February 6, 2007. The testimony of Angie Burge and Amy Bryant establishes that BHS employees such as the Petitioner, were trained by BHS. Ms. Bryant established through her testimony, as the Operations and Management Consultant for the Department of Children and Families (Department) that neither the Department nor Florida State Hospital had controlling responsibility over employee relations matters regarding BHS's staff/employees, such as the Petitioner. Although she and Florida State Hospital worked in conjunction with Ms. Burge and BHS on employee training requirements, BHS employees, including the Petitioner, were trained by BHS and its staff. BHS and the Respondent Florida State Hospital had a contract for BHS to provide staff for the forensic unit at Florida State Hospital, where the Petitioner was employed by BHS and the contract included the requirement that BHS operate that unit. At orientation, BHS provided its employees or new hires, including the Petitioner, all polices and procedures of BHS and trained them as to such policies and procedures. Ms. Burge, a BHS staff member, provided that training. BHS had authority to hire employees or to terminate them or discipline them and to make final decisions on the performance of the duties of the staff it hired, including the Petitioner. Florida State Hospital and the Department did not have final authority on such matters but could only recommend to BHS. The salary and benefits plan of BHS was very different from that of Florida State Hospital. It was based upon the parent company's pay and benefits scheme, the parent company being Lakeview Center, Inc. The administrators of Florida State Hospital did not have any decision-making authority in employee regulation, discipline, hiring, and termination decisions. Ms. Burge, the BHS Human Resources Manager, made the decision and informed the Petitioner of her termination. The Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence that Florida State Hospital had sufficient control over the terms and conditions of the Petitioner's employment, or the employment of other BHS staff members, so that such staff members, including the Petitioner, could be deemed employees of the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety due to lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Corrine Hamilton 440 South Cone Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000
