Findings Of Fact Respondent, Margaret Speer (Speer), received her initial foster care license from Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), on March 18, 1991. Speer resided at 1501 Windorah Way, West Palm Beach, Florida 33411, on that date. On March 18, 1992, HRS renewed Speer's foster care license. At that time Speer was living at 992 Whipporwill Way, West Palm Beach, Florida. On April 14, 1992, after moving to 12212-3 Sagharbor Court, Wellington, Florida, Speer received a foster home license for the new address. In October 1992, Speer received a foster home license for her residence at 129 Gregory Road, West Palm Beach, Florida. In June or July of 1992, Speer moved to 5380 Gene Circle, West Palm Beach, Florida. HRS never issued a foster home license to Speer at this address and the residence was not inspected by the local health department. In September 1993, Speer moved to 738 Carissa Drive, Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411. On October 18, 1993, the Health Department inspected Speer's home at 783 Carissa Drive, Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411, and found it to be unsatisfactory for use as a foster home for children. Speer moved to 4852-C Orleans Circle, West Palm Beach, Florida. She received a foster home license for that residence on October 31, 1993. At the date of the final hearing, Speer was living at 515 North 10th Street, Lake Worth, Florida. It is important that foster children have stability in their lives, including the location of their residence. Speer's frequent changes of residence could have a detrimental effect on the foster children in her care as noted by an HRS children and families counselor who visited Speer's homes over 17 times from June 1992 to October 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Margaret Speer's application for renewal of her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1769 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Rejected as not necessary. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's letter did not delineate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Paragraphs 1-2: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 3: Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Catherine M. Linton Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 South Sapodilla West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Margaret Speer 515 North 10th Street Lake Worth, Florida 33460 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The primary issue in this case is whether Respondent, a licensed group home operator, violated several statutes and rules governing such homes and their staffs, with most of the alleged offenses occurring, Petitioner charges, in connection with the accidental death of a resident. If Respondent is found guilty of any disciplinable offenses, then it will be necessary to determine the appropriate penalties for such violation(s).
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this action, Respondent Daniel Madistin LLC #1 ("DM1") held a Certificate of License, numbered 091867, which authorized DM1 to operate a group home for the developmentally disabled in West Palm Beach, Florida, for the one-year period from April 1, 2014, through March 31, 2015. DM1 had been licensed as a group home since 2009. DM1's facility (the "Home") could house up to six residents at a time. As a group home licensee, DM1 falls under the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD"), which issued DM1's initial and annual renewal licenses and periodically inspected the Home. One of the Home's longtime residents was a young man named V.H.-D. This wheelchair-bound, nonverbal resident suffered from a number of medical conditions, including severe cerebral palsy, as a result of which he was unable to care for himself. The Home's staff, therefore, were required, among other things, to feed V.H.-D., whose difficulty swallowing solid foods had caused him to be placed, on doctor's orders, on a diet of puree as a precaution against choking. (V.H.-D.'s family had refused to consent to the placement of a feeding tube.) On the morning of Sunday, October 19, 2014, an employee of DM1, Pharah Murat, fed V.H.-D. his breakfast, as she had done many times since starting to work in the Home in June of 2014. Because V.H.-D. could not talk, he generally manifested satiety by regurgitating food and expelling it from his mouth, at which point the caregiver would clean him up. So, this day, when V.H.-D. began expelling food, Ms. Murat stopped feeding him and wiped his mouth, per the routine. The situation was not routine, however, as Ms. Murat soon realized. V.H.-D. became pale and nonresponsive and looked unwell. Concerned, Ms. Murat immediately called her supervisor, Daniel Madistin, the eponymous principal of DM1. Upon hearing Ms. Murat's description of V.H.-D.'s condition, Mr. Madistin, who was at church with his wife, ended the call and promptly dialed 911. Having thus summoned emergency medical services and law enforcement, Mr. Madistin rushed to the Home. Meantime, Ms. Murat and a fellow employee, Marie Cadet, attended to V.H.-D. as they awaited the arrival of the paramedics. The evidence, which is in conflict, persuades the undersigned to find that, more likely than not, Ms. Murat placed V.H.-D. on the floor and performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation, or tried to, although to what avail cannot be determined. Afterwards, she and Ms. Cadet returned V.H.-D. to his wheelchair and moved him from the dining room to the front door, so that the paramedics would be able to work on him without delay once they appeared, which they did within a matter of minutes. V.H.-D. was removed from the Home and taken by ambulance to the hospital, where he died from asphyxiation due to pulmonary aspiration of food secondary to cerebral palsy. APD contends that V.H.-D. was the victim of "neglect" because (a) Ms. Murat called Mr. Madistin, instead of 911, and (b) the staff failed to (i) recognize that V.H.-D was choking and (ii) handle an emergency situation promptly and intelligently. While there is no dispute that Ms. Murat called Mr. Madistin, there is no debate that she did so immediately upon realizing that V.H.-D. might be in distress, which she observed very quickly. The evidence does not establish whether or not Ms. Murat realized that V.H.-D. was choking, but it does clearly prove that she not only realized something was wrong, but also acted upon that recognition without delay. APD insinuates that by not calling 911 first, Ms. Murat increased the response time of the EMTs, to the detriment of V.H.-D. There is, however, no persuasive evidence that Ms. Murat's actions decreased the likelihood of V.H.-D.'s survival, nor is that a reasonable inference. To the contrary, it is more reasonable to infer, although not necessary to find, that Ms. Murat expedited the delivery of emergency medical services because she could converse in her primary language with Mr. Madistin, whose first language, too, is Creole, enabling the latter, who is fluent in English, to relay the relevant information efficiently to the 911 dispatcher. In addition, it should be mentioned that DM1's policy directed employees to call 911 in an emergency. So, even if Ms. Murat's failure to call 911 first amounted to neglect in this instance, which it did not, there is no basis in the evidence for holding the licensee responsible, for there is no evidence suggesting that DM1 knew or should have known that Ms. Murat would act as she did in a crisis. In any event, the evidence shows, and the undersigned finds, that Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet acted with reasonable skill and efficiency in this emergency. In making this finding, the undersigned is mindful that direct care staff are not medical providers. Indeed, at the time DM1 hired Ms. Murat, a caregiver needed only an eighth-grade education to meet the minimum academic requirements,1/ and even under the current rule a high school diploma or its equivalent suffices.2/ The point is that it is unreasonable to expect a direct service provider in a group home, when responding to a medical emergency, to meet the standard of care applicable to a doctor, nurse, or EMT. No persuasive evidence in the instant record establishes the appropriate standard of care for direct service providers, but the undersigned is nevertheless able to determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the performance of DM1's staff, while probably falling short of heroic, was at least reasonable, and certainly not neglectful. After the EMTs had left for the hospital, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office ("PBSO") deputies stayed behind at the Home to investigate. One of the officers tried to interview Ms. Murat, but she was reluctant to speak. Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet are Haitian immigrants whose native tongue is Creole, and once the officers realized this, they called for the assistance of Deputy Vessage, a bilingual PBSO deputy who often serves as a translator in such instances. Deputy Vassage responded to this request and questioned the women in Creole, without incident. APD has alleged that Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet were not fluent speakers of English and thus were incapable of communicating effectively in the official language of the state of Florida.3/ This allegation was not proved. That Ms. Murat insisted upon using her primary language when speaking with law enforcement officers, who were investigating a fatal event that had just recently occurred in her presence, shows good judgment, not a lack of communication skills. At any rate, the evidence persuades the undersigned to find that both women likely were able to speak English with sufficient proficiency to make themselves understood in ordinary circumstances. More important, however, as will be discussed below, the law does not require that direct service providers such as Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet be capable of communicating effectively in English, but rather that they be capable of communicating effectively. Needless to say, speaking in English is not the only way to communicate effectively; nor, for that matter, is talking necessary for effective communication. APD investigated the circumstances surrounding the death of V.H.-D., and in so doing reviewed DM1's business records, including the personnel file for Ms. Murat. APD claims that DM1 failed to maintain written evidence of Ms. Murat's qualifications as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-2.012(5)(b)(1978). This rule was substantially amended in 2014, however, and the recordkeeping requirement was repealed, effective July 1, 2014. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65G- 2.012 (2014). There is no persuasive evidence in this record to support a finding that DM1 failed to comply with the former version of rule 65G-2.012 while it was in effect.4/ It is undisputed that DM1 did not terminate Ms. Murat's employment, or otherwise discipline her, as a result of V.H.-D.'s death. On January 16, 2015, an APD employee named Sabah Bissainthe made an unscheduled visit to the Home to conduct an inspection. Upon her arrival, she encountered Sinclair Concin, who worked for DM1. Mr. Concin, who was not expecting visitors, called Mrs. Naomi Madistin for guidance when he realized that Ms. Bissainthe was a state employee performing official business. Mr. Concin put Ms. Bissainthe on the phone with Mrs. Madistin, and the two made arrangements for Mrs. Madistin to meet Ms. Bissainthe at the Home as soon as Mrs. Madistin could get there, which she did within an hour. Mrs. Madistin cooperated fully with Ms. Bissainthe. Ms. Bissainthe was not refused entry to the Home or forbidden from inspecting any part of the facility, contrary to APD's allegations. Mr. Concin's primary language is Creole, which Ms. Bissainthe does not speak. APD alleged that Mr. Concin does not speak English, but the evidence fails to prove that charge, which would not, at any rate, be a disciplinable offense, without more. APD further asserted that Mr. Concin is unable to communicate effectively because he did not converse in English with Ms. Bissainthe. The evidence shows, however, that Mr. Concin and Ms. Bissainthe did communicate effectively, notwithstanding that each spoke a different primary language, because Mr. Concin proved capable, in fact, of accomplishing the task when the circumstances required that he accommodate an APD investigator who had appeared unannounced at the doorstep of the Home. On February 18, 2015, an investigator from the Attorney General's office, Paul Valerio, paid an unannounced visit to the Home in connection with a matter unrelated to V.H.-D.'s death. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Madistin was on-site at the time, so Mr. Valerio called Mr. Madistin to let him know that an official investigation was under way. The two men agreed that Mr. Valerio would meet with Mrs. Madistin at the Home the next day, and that meeting took place as planned. Mrs. Madistin fully cooperated with Mr. Valerio, who completed his investigation without difficulty. The evidence does not establish that Mr. or Mrs. Madistin was unavailable or uncooperative, as APD charged. Ultimate Factual Determinations Neither Ms. Murat nor Ms. Cadet abused, neglected, exploited, or harmed V.H.-D., who received prompt and appropriate medical treatment on the day he died. Moreover, Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet were mentally competent to perform their duties as direct service providers. The evidence, therefore, does not establish the violations of sections 393.13(3)(a), 393.13(3)(g), and 393.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes; and Florida Administrative Code Rules 65G-2.008(1)(h) and 65G-2.009(1)(d) set forth in Count I of the Administrative Complaint. The evidence failed to establish that Ms. Murat and Ms. Cadet, or either of them, were (i) incapable of demonstrating effective communication or (ii) not mentally competent to perform their jobs as direct service providers. Thus, the violations of rules 65G-2.008(1)(g) and 65G- 2.008(1)(h) alleged in Count II were not proved. The charges brought in Count III of the Administrative Complaint are duplicative of the charges set forth in Count I and fail for the same reasons of fact. The charges in Count IV are based on allegations that DM1 failed to maintain adequate personnel records for Ms. Murat, in violation of outdated provisions Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-2.012(5)(1978), which expired on July 1, 2014, when a new version of the rule took effect. The evidence failed to show that DM1 violated the former rule at any time during its existence. The charges brought in Count V of the Administrative Complaint are duplicative of the charges set forth in Count II and fail for the same reasons of fact. The allegations of Count VI largely overlap those of Counts I and III, with the additional allegation that DM1 failed to fire Ms. Murat or suspend her employment. While it is true that Ms. Murat was not punished as a result of V.H.-D.'s death, DM1's decision not to take such action does not constitute a disciplinable offense, and the remaining allegations of Count VI fail for the same reasons of fact that doom the charges set forth in Count I. The charges in Count VII are based on allegations that Sinclair Concin (i) was unable to communicate effectively with Sabah Bissainthe and (ii) refused to allow Ms. Bissainthe to enter the Home to conduct an investigation, thereby putting DM1 in violation of rules 65G-2.008(1)(g), 65G-2.008(1)(h), and 65G- 2.0032(3). The evidence showed, however, that Mr. Concin did communicate effectively with Ms. Bissainthe, and that he let her into the Home. Therefore, the charges were not proved. In Count VIII, APD charged DM1 with failure to have a facility operator (manager) on-site or on call at all times, in violation of rule 65G-2.012(1)(a). This charge was based on the allegation that when investigator Paul Valerio arrived at the Home for an unscheduled visit, neither Mr. Madistin nor his wife was in the residence. Mr. Valerio was able immediately to reach Mr. Madistin by phone, however, and make plans to meet with Mrs. Madistin the following day. Thus, the charge set forth in Count VIII was not proved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order finding that Daniel Madistin LLC #1 is not guilty of the offenses charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' foster home license based on violations of section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes (2014), and provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-13 alleged in the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License dated April 16, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175.2/ Respondents are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed as Provider FSFN ID #100032652, the therapeutic foster home at issue in this proceeding.3/ A.A., an eight-year-old child, was placed into Respondent's foster home in April 2014.4/ On the afternoon of September 4, 2014, Respondent Cherie Iturriaga took A.A. and her two grandchildren to a shopping center. When they were ready to leave, A.A. refused to get into the family van. Mrs. Iturriaga testified that she tried, for approximately ten to 15 minutes, to persuade A.A. to get into the vehicle, but he refused. She became very frustrated, yelled at A.A. to get into the van, and began to back the van out of the parking space while A.A. was standing next to the van's open door.5/ A passerby called 911 to report that Mrs. Iturriaga—— who the passerby characterized as A.A.'s "grandmother"——was attempting to make A.A. get into the vehicle against his will. The passerby told A.A. "you don't have to get in the van if you don't want to." Mrs. Iturriaga also called 911 to report that A.A. would not get into her vehicle. She told the 911 dispatcher that she was not staying for him, and that she was "going home." The dispatcher told her that because the child was supposed to be in her care, she had to stay with him, and that officers already were on the way to that location. Nonetheless, Mrs. Iturriaga drove away and left A.A. in the parking lot with the passerby, who Mrs. Iturriaga characterized, in testimony at the hearing, as a "random person." The evidence does not clearly establish whether Mrs. Iturriaga left A.A. in the parking lot for "five to ten minutes," as she claimed, or for as much as 20 to 30 minutes, as indicated by other evidence in the record. Regardless, it is undisputed that she drove away from the parking lot and left A.A. in the company of a stranger. At some point, Mrs. Iturriaga returned to the parking lot to pick up A.A., but he was not there. She called 911, and the dispatcher confirmed that A.A. had been taken to the Pembroke Pines Police Department. Mrs. Iturriaga went to the police department to pick up A.A. There, she was arrested and charged with child neglect without great bodily harm, a third-degree felony; this charge ultimately was dropped. A.A. was not physically harmed as a result of being left in the parking lot. The evidence establishes that approximately 45 days before the September 4, 2014, incident, Mrs. Iturriaga requested that Citrus remove A.A. from Respondents' foster home within 30 days; however, he was not timely removed. When the incident giving rise to this proceeding occurred, A.A. was immediately removed from Respondents' foster home. Another child, J.O., who was approximately 14 years old at the time of the incident, was placed in Respondents' foster home approximately two and one-half years before the incident. Since then, J.O. has formed very close bonds with both Respondents, particularly Mr. Iturriaga. At the time of the hearing, J.O. had not been removed from Respondents' home and continued to reside with them. J.O. does not wish to be removed from Respondents' home. Eric Sami serves as the guardian ad litem for J.O., and has done so for the past three and one-half years. Mr. Sami testified, persuasively, that when he was assigned to J.O.'s case, J.O. was a very withdrawn, depressed, socially unstable child who had been moved through several different foster homes, and who was academically struggling. Since being placed in Respondents' home, J.O. has flourished. He has made friends, his academic performance has dramatically improved, and he is no longer depressed and socially unstable. According to Mr. Sami, Respondents have treated J.O. as if he were their own child, including taking him on family vacations and involving him in all holiday celebrations. Mr. Iturriaga participates in parent- teacher conferences for J.O. and has taken an interest in J.O.'s school work and in helping him improve his academic performance. Sami also testified, credibly, that in the short amount of time in which A.A. lived in Respondents' home, he was an extremely disruptive force, bullying J.O. and Respondents' grandchildren and killing ducks in front of Respondents' granddaughter——an event that was extremely traumatic for her to witness. Sami observed, and the undersigned agrees, that it is fundamentally unfair for J.O. to suffer the consequences of Respondents' license revocation due to an event that was precipitated by A.A.'s extreme, ongoing misbehavior before he was removed from the home. Because Sami and J.O.'s therapist, Fred Leon, believed so strongly that removing J.O. from Respondents' home would have very substantial negative consequences for J.O., they advocated to Petitioner and Citrus to allow Respondents to keep their foster home license and to keep J.O. in their home. However, that did not dissuade Citrus from recommending that Petitioner revoke Respondents' license. In October 2014, J.O.'s placement was changed from foster care in Respondents' home to non-relative placement in Respondents' home. Because revocation of Respondents' license would require J.O. to be removed from Respondents' foster home, this placement change was necessary in order for J.O. to remain in the home. However, this placement change is not without negative consequences. J.O. remains in Respondents' home but they do not receive any monetary allowance for his care,6/ so they are placed in the position of supporting him without receiving any financial assistance through the foster care system. Thus, the consequence of revoking Respondents' license is that if J.O. remained in the foster care system, he would have to be moved to a licensed foster home. If he were to stay in Respondents' home in a non-relative placement, Respondents would not receive any monetary assistance through the foster care system to help with his support. Respondents' fervently wish to keep J.O. in their home, even without financial assistance through the foster care system, due to the strong emotional bond they have with him and because of the remarkable social and academic strides he has made while in their care. However, Mr. Iturriaga testified, persuasively, that this situation imposes a financial hardship on them, which, in turn, penalizes J.O. That Respondents wish to continue to provide a nurturing home for J.O., despite the financial hardship, is strong evidence that they have J.O.'s best interests at heart and that they would continue to provide the same stable, nurturing environment for him that they have provided for more than two and one-half years. As noted above, the criminal charges against Mrs. Iturriaga were dropped. Nonetheless, employees of Citrus testified that because there was an open child abuse investigation with verified findings, they could not recommend that Respondents' foster home continue to be licensed. Petitioner presented the testimony of Sonia De Escobar, licensing manager of Petitioner's Circuit II foster care program. Ms. De Escobar testified that Petitioner is seeking to revoke Respondents' license in part due to concern for the safety of children who may be placed in Respondents' foster home in the future. De Escobar noted that it is not uncommon for children in the dependency system to "misbehave,"7/ and Petitioner is concerned about Respondents' ability to deal with child misbehavior in the future. However, the evidence establishes that Respondents successfully cared for eight foster children over a six-year period and never had any problems dealing with child misbehavior until the incident involving A.A. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that A.A. was extremely aggressive and engaged in behavior that seriously disrupted Respondents' home environment. Because of A.A.'s extreme behavior, Respondents previously had given Citrus the required 30-day notice. However, Citrus did not timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home and the incident giving rise to this proceeding thereafter ensued. As noted above, there is no dispute that Mrs. Iturriaga intentionally left A.A. with a complete stranger for some period of time. In doing so, she endangered his health and safety, in violation of section 409.175(9)(a)1. However, the undersigned finds that mitigating circumstances in this case militate against revoking Respondents' foster home license. Specifically, Respondents enjoyed a spotless record as foster parents before the incident involving A.A. Further——and very importantly——they have fostered a very successful, nurturing, long-term parental relationship with J.O. that will be jeopardized if their foster home license is revoked. Finally, it is undisputed that A.A.'s behavior was extremely aggressive, disrespectful, and disruptive throughout the time he was placed in Respondents' home. On September 4, 2014, his behavior finally caused Mrs. Iturriaga to "snap."8/ Although her actions unquestionably were inappropriate and affected A.A.'s health and safety, the evidence indisputably shows that this was a one-time incident that occurred while Mrs. Iturriaga was under significant duress, and that, under any circumstances, A.A. was not injured. The undersigned further notes Citrus' role in this incident. As the child placing agency, Citrus is charged with placing foster children in foster homes, and with removing them when circumstances warrant. As discussed above, in July 2014, Respondents gave Citrus the required 30-day notice for transitioning A.A. out of their home. However, Citrus failed to timely meet its obligation to remove A.A. from Respondents' home and this incident subsequently occurred. Had Citrus met its obligation to timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home, this incident would not have occurred. Thus, Citrus is not without blame in this matter. The undersigned further notes that if Respondents were allowed to keep their license, Citrus, as the child placing agency, is obligated under the Bilateral Agreement to consult with Respondent before placing children in their home. This consultation process presumably would help ensure that children having extreme behavioral problems are not placed in Respondents' home in the future. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that allowing Respondents to keep their foster home license would enable them to continue their close, nurturing relationship with J.O., and, further, likely would not result in any danger or other adverse effect on the health and safety of foster children who may be placed in their home in the future.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License issued on April 16, 2015, and imposing a corrective action plan on Respondents' foster home license to the extent deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should be subject to administrative penalties, up to and including revocation of its group home license, for non-compliance with the residential facility requirements of Chapter 393, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the licensing and operation of foster care facilities, group home facilities, and residential habilitation centers. Respondent holds a group home facility license. The group home is located in Lake City, Florida. Ms. Amanda Houston is the operator of the group home. Ms. Houston is responsible in that capacity for compliance with statutes and rules relating to residential facilities. At all times material here, A.D. was a vulnerable 17-year-old female who resided at the group home. A.D. is mentally retarded and has significant behavior issues. Ms. Nigeria Taiwan Wills was a trusted employee of the group home for four or five years. On October 8, 2008, Ms. Wills was responsible for the supervision and care of the group home's disabled residents. On October 8, 2008, Ms. Wills began her shift at 2:00 p.m. and worked until 8:00 p.m. During at least part of that time, Ms. Wills was the only staff member present in the home. On October 8, 2007, while under the supervision of Ms. Wills, A.D. suffered significant injury to her buttock area. The next morning, Ms. Houston arrived at the group home around 6:30 a.m. Ms. Houston woke A.D. who dressed herself. Ms. Houston gave A.D. her medications. Ms. Houston did not notice any difference in A.D.'s demeanor. A.D. seemed normal in every way. The group home had four residents. Three of the clients, including A.D., rode a bus to school. On October 9, 2009, the bus arrived to pick up the clients at 8:10 a.m. It left the facility at 8:20 a.m. Ms. Houston was not aware of A.D.'s injury before the bus picked her up. On October 9, 2008, Ms. Wills visited the group home around 11:00 a.m. to pick up a piece of paper that she had left there the night before. While at the group home, Ms. Wills casually mentioned to Ms. Houston that she had an incident with A.D. the night before, that it was no big deal, and that she would tell Ms. Houston about it when she returned to work her shift that evening. Ms. Wills then left the group home. Ms. Wills did not have a home phone. All supervisory employees of the group home are trained to keep notes during every shift to record chronologically all events occurring at the group home. If an injury of any kind occurs, an employee is supposed to immediately fill out an incident report and call Ms. Houston. Ms. Houston knew that Ms. Wills had not filled out an incident report the night before. Ms. Houston read Ms. Wills' notes from the night before and, finding no reference to an incident with A.D., mistakenly assumed that whatever had happened truly was no big deal. This was not an unreasonable conclusion given Ms. Wills' long-term employment with no complaints and A.D.'s history of stealing and other behavior problems. In the mean time, Ms. Lanitra Sapp, a child protective investigator for the Department of Children and Family Services, received a call from A.D.'s school. Ms. Sapp subsequently visited the school, interviewed A.D., and observed bruising to her buttocks and upper thigh. Ms. Sapp concluded that the bruising was consistent with physical abuse. Ms. Sapp then took A.D. to her office. When A.D. did not get off the bus after school, Ms. Houston called the school, A.D.'s mother, and A.D.'s waiver support coordinator. Ms. Houston was unable to locate A.D. until she received a call from Ms. Sapp, asking Ms. Houston to go to Ms. Sapp's office. At Ms. Sapp's office, Ms. Houston and her husband, Adam Houston, first learned about A.D.'s injury. Mr. and Mrs. Houston were shocked at the degree of A.D.'s injury as reflected in photographs. After a short meeting, A.D. voluntarily rode with the Houstons to the group home. Ms. Sapp followed in her car. When the Houstons and Ms. Sapp arrived at the group home, the police were already there. Ms. Wills was also there. Ms. Houston left A.D. in the car with Mr. Houston before going into the group home. Ms. Wills talked to the police and Ms. Sapp in separate interviews. At some point, Ms. Wills told the police that she had spoken to Ms. Houston about the incident that morning. Ms. Houston admitted to the police and Ms. Sapp that Ms. Wills had made a reference to an incident that morning. Ms. Wills never admitted that she spanked A.D. with a belt. Ms. Houston placed Ms. Wills on administrative leave just before the police handcuffed her and took her to jail. Immediately thereafter, Ms. Houston prepared and sent an official incident report to Petitioner and A.D.'s waiver support coordinator. A.D. wanted to remain at the group home. Her mother and waiver support coordinator agreed. A.D. remained in that environment until March 2008, when Respondent lost its status as a Medicaid waiver provider. Ms. Houston never let Ms. Wills return to the group home. Instead, Ms. Houston paid Ms. Wills for one week of earned wages and one week of vacation time. This was the final pay check for Ms. Wills. Within days, Ms. Houston took A.D. to see her pediatrician for a medical evaluation. A week or so later, Ms. Sapp took A.D. for an evaluation by the Department of Children and Family Services child protection team. The Department of Children and Family Services subsequently issued a report containing verified findings of failure to protect against Mr. and Ms. Houston and maltreatment/physical injury against Ms. Wills.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent's license is not subject to discipline for failure to protect. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Waldman, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 1621 Northeast Waldo Road Gainesville, Florida 32609 Lloyd E. Peterson, Jr., Esquire 905 Southwest Baya Drive Lake City, Florida 32025 John Newton, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 James DeBeaugrine, Executive Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s request for a foster home license should be denied due to her alleged failure to comply with foster care licensing requirements.
Findings Of Fact Since 2006, Petitioner has held a foster care license, issued by the Department through Citrus, which is a child placing agency ("CPA"). Since becoming a foster parent, there have never been any concerns raised as to the care Petitioner provided to the foster children. Every year, Petitioner entered into a Bilateral Service Agreement with Citrus. The Agreement identifies the responsibilities of both the foster parents and Citrus on behalf of the children served in the foster care program. Under the heading “Foster Parent Responsibilities to the CPA” the Bilateral Service Agreement provides that the foster parent is required: To notify the CPA immediately of a potential change in address, living arrangements, marital status, family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child’s well-being. To notify the CPA promptly of all contacts the family or any member of the home has with police or any law enforcement agencies. In the summer of 2010, Citrus sent a letter to all foster parents reminding them that all family members or visitors who frequent the home on a daily basis, or sleep overnight, or have constant contact with the foster children, must have background checks completed. In the fall of 2010, for the annual review for the upcoming year of 2011, Citrus conducted a home study, which included an announced visit and inspection of the home. The Citrus consultant who conducted the home study recorded that Warren Clark (Clark), Petitioner’s son, was living in the home. Petitioner’s daughter was listed as a family member that did not live in the home and was not a frequent visitor. She conducted a background screening on Clark, and discovered that Clark had been arrested twice for battery/aggravated assault charges in May, 2010. If Petitioner’s daughter had been listed as a household member or frequent visitor, the consultant would have conducted background screening on the daughter as well. During her announced visit, the consultant saw Clark’s room, and only noticed male belongings. She did not see any kind of female items, such as jewelry, makeup, or female clothing. Petitioner never reported Clark’s arrests to Citrus. At the hearing, she testified that she was unaware of her son’s arrests, and was only made aware of the arrests when the Citrus consultant told her about them. Her son testified that he had never told his mother about the arrests because he was embarrassed. The undersigned does not find this testimony credible, as it is self-serving in nature and is not plausible, given that Petitioner’s son lived with Petitioner and was arrested twice in one month. It was ultimately Petitioner’s duty to be informed of any involvement between a household member and law enforcement, and to promptly notify the Department. On January 27, 2011, a foster care licensing staffing was held. Petitioner agreed to have her son move out of her home, due to the nature of the arrests. To memorialize the agreement reached during the meeting, Petitioner signed a statement indicating that she would have her son move out of the foster home, and that she understood that if her daughter was going to be a frequent visitor, her daughter needed to be fingerprinted. The statement also indicated that any violation of this agreement might result in revocation of her foster home license. This statement was dated February 22, 2011. During the exit interviews of two of Petitioner’s foster care children, the children reported that Petitioner’s daughter lived at the foster home. Citrus and the Department conducted an unannounced home visit on March 10, 2011. Dulce Pupo, a Citrus Foster Care Licensing Supervisor, and Ada Gonzalez, a Department Licensing Specialist, conducted the visit. Present at the home were two foster children, Petitioner, Petitioner’s daughter, and a tutor for one of the foster children. One foster child, who was approximately 12 years old, told Ms. Gonzalez that Petitioner’s daughter lived in the home, and pointed out her bedroom. When Ms. Gonzalez approached the room that had been indicated, Petitioner asked her not to enter that room, because it was messy. Ms. Gonzalez entered the bedroom, and found items that belonged to a woman; she photographed women’s jewelry, skin products, perfumes, women’s clothing, women’s shoes, and a curling iron that she saw in the room. Petitioner told Ms. Gonzalez that the items were her daughter’s items, but that her daughter did not live at the foster home. On March 11, 2011, a staffing was held. Petitioner attended and admitted that her daughter was living at her home. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that during this staffing, she was very upset, and misspoke when she stated that her daughter lived in her foster home. She, did, however, admit that her daughter was a frequent visitor, and that she should have reported that fact to Citrus. On May 9, 2011, the renewal of Petitioner’s foster care license was denied by the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding that Petitioner violated section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes, and deny Petitioner’s request to renew her foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2011.
The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 393.0673(1), Florida Statutes (2018), Respondent, which holds a license to operate a group home facility, was identified in a verified report by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) as the perpetrator of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, failed to disclose on a renewal application a perpetrator of "the . . . abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult" (Maltreatment),1 and allowed a new employee to begin working at the group home before completing all of the background screening requirements; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against Respondent's license.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, as authorized by the License, Respondent, a Florida not-for-profit corporation, has provided services to intellectually disabled persons residing at the Group Home. At all material times, Respondent's directors have been Etha Griffith, her daughter Kim Griffith, and Francis Griffith. The record does not disclose if Respondent has any members. Etha Griffith, who is 79 years old, serves as an officer and the onsite manager of the group home, for which Kim Griffith and Francis Griffith serve as the backup managers or supervisors of the Group Home. Petitioner presented no admissible evidence in support of Count I. Prominent among the excluded evidence is the Verified Report, as to which Petitioner failed to demonstrate its relevance, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, or its authenticity, given that it is unsigned and bears other indicia of an investigation that, although closed, was never completed.5 In support of Count II, Petitioner introduced the Application,6 which was filed on November 12, 2018. Etha Griffith7 completed the Application by providing the information requested on Petitioner's application form, which serves a natural person or legal entity who or that is an applicant or licensee seeking the issuance or renewal of a group home facility license (Application Form). Etha Griffith signed the Application as Respondent's designated representative, and her signature was notarized on November 8, 2018. The Application states the answer, "no," to the question posed in Section V, Item 2: "Have you or ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application ever been identified as responsible for the abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child or the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult?" For several reasons, Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the material facts in support of Count II. First, "no" was correct because the question refers to a determination, not allegation, of Maltreatment. The Application Form does not define "identified," whose common meaning is not "alleged," but "established,"8 such as after a completed investigation. As explained in endnote 5, the evidence fails to establish that DCF determined that Etha Griffith is the perpetrator of Maltreatment. Second, even if there had been a determination of Maltreatment in the Verified Report by November 12, 2018, "no" was not a willful or intentional misstatement or a false statement because neither Etha Griffith nor any other agent of Respondent knew about the Verified Report or DCF's determination of Maltreatment--and not for a lack of inquiry. Aware that an investigation had taken place during the summer of 2018, in October 2018, Kim Griffith contacted the DCF protective investigator who had conducted the investigation and asked for any findings. The investigator returned to her, not the Verified Report, but a Notice of Conclusion, stating only that the investigation was "complete" and "closed," and DCF had recommended no additional services. Etha Griffith has never received a copy of the Verified Report. No agent of Respondent knew anything about the Verified Report until preparing for the hearing in this case. On these facts, Etha Griffith and Respondent's other agents had no reason to think, as of November 12, 2018, that DCF had determined that Etha Griffith had perpetrated Maltreatment. Third, even if, by November 12, 2018, Etha Griffith were aware that DCF had determined that she had perpetrated Maltreatment, the failure to disclose this fact or the Verified Report was not material. An audit of the Group Home by Petitioner led to DCF's protective investigation, and the findings of the protective investigation, such as they were,9 implied that any misappropriation involved substantially smaller sums than those specified in the audit.10 Knowledge of the audit findings would thus include knowledge of the protective investigation findings. Fourth, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, "no" is correct because, in the question posed in Section V, Item 2, "you" refers to the applicant or licensee, and "ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application" does not effectively refer to Etha Griffith. The Application Form does not define these terms. Items 1, 3, and 4 also contain questions posed to "you." The questions in Items 1 and 3 alternatively address a "controlling entity affiliated with this application," so, except for dropping "ownership," the questions in Items 1 and 3 are directed to the same addressee as is the question in Item 2. The question in Item 4 is directed only to "you." All four of these items frame questions seeking potentially important information about past license discipline and adverse action involving the Medicaid and Medicare programs.11 Judging from her testimony at the hearing, Etha Griffith possesses modest language skills. Given the level of analysis required to determine the meaning of "you" and "ownership controlled entity affiliated with this application," Etha Griffith could not possibly have understood that the question in Section V, Item 2 addressed her. The two key issues in Count III are whether Ms. Meliard was an employee or a covered volunteer, as defined in the Conclusions of Law, and, if so, whether she had completed her local screening. Ms. Meliard did not testify, nor did Petitioner direct any questions to Kim Griffith as to Count III. Petitioner's investigator testified that, upon his unannounced arrival at the Group Home at 2:05 p.m. on January 1, 2019, he found Ms. Meliard "seated in a chair by the front window," presumably in a common area of the house, such as a living room. Tr., p. 63. Ms. Meliard was alone in the Group Home, as the residents typically returned from their day programs around 3:00 p.m. Tr., p. 63. On the investigator's arrival, Ms. Meliard called Etha Griffith, who arrived at the Group Home very shortly after the call. Tr., p. 64. On her arrival, Etha Griffith told the investigator that she was "trying to give [Ms. Meliard] a job." Tr., p. 64. The testimony recited in this paragraph is credited. Petitioner's witnesses were in conflict as to the screening that Ms. Meliard had cleared. Petitioner's operations management consultant testified that Ms. Meliard had not cleared level 1 or 2 screening. Tr., p. 44. Petitioner's investigator testified to the same effect, but immediately corrected himself by saying that she had cleared Level 2 screening, but not local screening. Tr., pp. 65-66. Petitioner is unable to produce documentary evidence of screenings because this material is confidential, even in hearings of this type, according to Petitioner's counsel. Tr., p. 46. When asked if Ms. Meliard had cleared her level 2 screening, Etha Griffith testified, "That is the one we got, yeah." Tr., p. 95. No one asked Etha Griffith directly if Ms. Meliard had not yet passed her local screening. In a clear-and-convincing case, no finding is possible based on the negative implication inherent in Etha Griffith's statement. Her modest communication skills and laconic communication style betray a lack of mental acuity, so no inference is possible by Etha Griffin's use of the definite article, "the." A personnel file, which may be opened for a candidate for employment, typically contains evidence of a local screening, which comprises an inquiry to the relevant local law enforcement agency and a response from the agency. Tr., p. 83. Proof of a failure to obtain a local screening thus depends on a negative-- the absence of documentation in the personnel file. Unable to recall clearly whether he had seen evidence of a level 2 screening, Petitioner's investigator testified that he recalled not seeing evidence in Ms. Meliard's personnel file of clearing the local screening. Tr., p. 83. The testimony on the issues of employment and local screening is too vague and uncertain to support findings by clear and convincing evidence that, on January 10, 2019, Ms. Meliard was employed by Respondent and had not passed her local screening. The investigator presented himself as exceptionally capable and articulate, but nothing in the record suggests that he investigated with any diligence the employment or local screening issues involving Ms. Meliard.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of all counts set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2019.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, a foster home operator, committed violations of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, as alleged by Respondent, sufficient to justify Respondent's refusal to renew Petitioner's license.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1999, Petitioner applied for renewal of her license to operate a foster care home. The license was due to expire on February 15, 2000. Respondent's investigation of the application was eventually concluded on June 15, 2000. By letter dated August 10, 2000, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's decision that, as a consequence of the Florida abuse report finding that Petitioner had failed to provide adequate food and medical care to children in her care, her home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. At final hearing, Petitioner's testimony established that she did not intend to again operate a foster home. Her desire in requesting a hearing was simply "to clear her good name" from the allegations contained in Florida abuse report number 1999-124723. She further admitted that her personal physician opposed renewal of her license due to Petitioner's heart condition. Petitioner offered copies of medical reports from a medical practitioner as proof that allegations of the abuse report were incorrect. Specifically, it is found that the medical records proffered at best show only that the children were taken to a doctor on specific occasions and does little to rebut the abuse report’s allegations of inadequate food and medical care. Further, testimony of Respondent’s employees at final hearing established that Petitioner’s son, a convicted felon without exemption status, had been residing in the home. Pursuant to applicable statutes, such a resident in the home also prevents re-licensure.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is recommended that a final order be entered confirming the denial of Petitioner’s license to operate a foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158 Stephanie Reeves 1707 Birchwood Circle Apartment 1 Leesburg, Florida 34748 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not Petitioner is eligible to be assigned foster children.
Findings Of Fact Based on the Hearing Officer's observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record complied herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Johnnie Mae Smith, was licensed as a foster parent on July 1, 1987, for one (1) female foster child (Certificate No. 787-48-1). Thereafter, Petitioner requested that foster children be placed in her home and she was denied. Specifically, by letter dated December 4, 1987, Gloria P. Simmons, District Operations Manager, Children Youth and Family (CYF) Services, advised Petitioner that "we are not placing any foster children in your home for the following reasons: Insufficient income to provide adequate cash flow to support additional expenses incurred. Lack of integrity in reporting income while receiving AFDC 1/ payments. "Your provocative, overbearing, abrasive, and implusive (sic) behavior." Petitioner was advised of her right to appeal Respondent's denial of placement of foster children in her home and she timely appealed that denial. Gene Majure, (Majure hereafter) Senior CYF Counselor, has been employed by Respondent in excess of 16 years. Majure is presently assigned to making license recommendations for foster home applicants in Dade County. Majure was assigned Petitioner's foster home applicants license application for review. During October 1986, Petitioner received pre-service training as a foster parent at which time she made application for licensure as a foster parent. Petitioner's initial foster home study was conducted by Gene Majure, who rejected it primarily on the basis of "insufficient income." Petitioner protested her initial foster home application rejection and instead of being processed through normal appeal channels, she was informed by Leonard Helfand, District Legal Counsel, that she would be reinvited to pre- service training and she could reapply. Petitioner reattended the second part of pre-service training on May 21, 1987, and she officially reapplied. Lois Rossman, (hereafter Rossman) Senior Youth and Family Counselor, and Peggy Ann Siegal, Children Youth and Family Supervisor, visited Petitioner in her home on June 12, 1987. Their interview of Petitioner revealed that Petitioner shared her three-bedroom home in Opa Locka with her two daughters, Chantrell (15) and Latrise (14). Petitioner is separated from her husband for approximately one year and his specific whereabouts is unknown. Majure again visited Petitioner during January 1987. At that time, Majure inquired as to Petitioner's financial income and Petitioner responded verbally, and in writing, on October 9, 1986, and again on June 12, 1987, that she has $400 per month earned income which income is derived from a laundry service which she has operated for the past 5 years. On the other hand, Petitioner signed a monthly income statement with AFDC indicating that she has no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner has earned income, she incorrectly reported her income to AFDC since October 1986, which may result in either an overpayment or fraudulent involvement in her income reporting. (Respondent's exhibit 3). Rossman was also assigned Petitioner's case to determine her eligibility to be assigned foster children. Rossman was present on the June 12, 1987, visit to Petitioner's residence at which time Petitioner again related that she had earned income of approximately $400 per month which income statement was contrasted with the available records that Respondent's employees had obtained from the AFDC office wherein Petitioner indicated that she had no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner does not have earned income, she has indicated a total income of $264 per month and stated expenses of approximately $400-$605 per month which creates cause for concern as to her ability to maintain a stable and secure family environment for foster children. Rossman also became involved in circumstances wherein Petitioner repeatedly called the CYF counselor's office demanding to speak with supervisory employees wherein she demanded that she be assigned foster children since she was licensed. When secretarial employees advised Petitioner that her message would be relayed and that as soon as a supervisor or other placement official became available, they would return her call, Petitioner would again call using an alias to attempt to get through. This problem persisted for several months following the time that Petitioner's foster home application was approved in July 1987. Respondent's secretarial employees who answer the phone and greet clients in person have been trained to deal with irate and abusive clients, however Petitioner's unrelentless calling became so problematic that employees felt harassed and one employee broke down and starting crying based on Petitioner's persistence about seeing or talking to certain supervisory employees at certain times. Prior to the time that Petitioner's foster home license application was approved, she was much more pleasant in her conversations with employees in the CYF office. (Testimony of Peggy Siegal and Ellie Roman). Petitioner also keeps three large dogs in her yard, one of which is a Pit Bull and two are large German Shepherds who made threatening postures at Respondent's employees when they visited Petitioner's home for inspections. Although Petitioner maintains that the two German Shepherds do not belong to her, they were at her home on each occasion when she was visited by licensing staff and Respondent's sanitation inspector. Petitioner keeps the dogs, which roam at will around the fenced area her home, at bay by swinging a rubber hose at them. The fact that Petitioner is receiving welfare benefits is not an automatic disqualification which prevents her from being assigned foster children. Petitioner encountered problems with her spouse which culminated in a separation and she was, therefore, left with insufficient income to maintain herself and she applied for and is receiving welfare benefits. Petitioner plans to begin employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital shortly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not eligible to be assigned foster children. 2/ DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of October, 1988. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1988.
The Issue Whether the application of Hancel and Irma Felton for foster home licensure should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Children and Family Services is the state agency responsible for granting or denying applications for foster home licensure. Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. Hancel and Irma Felton have been married 10 years, and both consider their marriage to be a happy one. Mr. and Mrs. Felton are raising Mrs. Felton's two children from a previous marriage; her daughter is a junior in high school and her son is in middle school. Mr. Felton treats these children as though they were his own; neither of these children has even had behavior problems. Mr. Felton is currently employed by the City of Coral Gables driving a garbage truck. Mrs. Felton works as a bus attendant for Dade County, although she worked in a child care center until 1989. Mr. and Mrs. Felton profess to have a Christian home, and they both testified that they are very active in the church. Although he has no formal theological training, Mr. Felton is an ordained minister of a church called Our Temple of God for All Ages. Mrs. and Mrs. Felton engage in missionary work, which involves working with young people in prison and with people who live on the street, including prostitutes and drug addicts. They often invite these people to stay in their home so they can counsel them and show them a better way to live. In the summer of 1996, Hancel and Irma Felton indicated to a representative of the Department that they were interested in becoming foster parents. According to Mrs. Felton, she and her husband want to become foster parents because she is an only child and wants more children but cannot have more of her own. Mr. and Mrs. Felton passed the initial "screening" and were enrolled in the MAPP/GPS class, which is a 10-week course which must be taken by all prospective foster and adoptive parents as part of the application process. Mr. and Mrs. Felton regularly attended the MAPP/GPS classes from July to September, 1996, and the Department issued certificates dated September 19, 1996, indicating that they had successfully completed the program. During the first meeting of the MAPP class, Personal Profile forms were distributed to the participants. Mr. Felton filled out this form, detailing his family history, and turned it in to the MAPP instructor. Question 14 in the profile requested: "Please list any children you have, from previous marriages or relationships, who do not currently live with you." Mr. Felton wrote "none" in the blank space provided for the response. Question 17 in the profile asked: "If you have remarried, or entered into a new relationship with someone other than your children's mother, how did your children adjust to the new person?" Mr. Felton responded by stating that the question was "not applicable," that there were "no other children." On July 11, 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Felton signed a Release of Information, in which they authorized the Department to obtain information from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to determine if they had any criminal history and to obtain information from the "central abuse registry and tracking system" maintained by the Department to determine if they were named in any confirmed reports of child abuse.1 The Department's check of records kept regarding reports and investigations of child abuse revealed that a report was made to the central abuse registry on February 21, 1989, in which it was alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Felton had abused a child named C. A., who was identified as Mr. Felton's daughter. C. A. is Mr. Felton's daughter by a woman with whom he had a relationship before he met Mrs. Felton. In February, 1989, C. A. was 8 years old. She had been raised by her mother in Detroit, Michigan, but the mother had died approximately a year earlier, and C. A. was placed in foster care in Detroit. In the summer of 1988, Mr. Felton requested that the Detroit authorities place C. A. with him, and she came to live with him and Mrs. Felton in December, 1988. C. A. had behavior problems during the few months she lived with Mr. and Mrs. Felton. Mrs. Felton was apparently unable to cope with her behavior, and Mr. Felton testified that things were getting very difficult with his wife as a result of C. A.'s living in their home.2 As a result of the problems Mrs. Felton had with C. A., Mr. Felton took C. A. out of the home he shared with Mrs. Felton and her children in February, 1989, and moved her into the home of his step-grandmother. In late February, a protective investigator with the Department went to C. A.'s school in response to a report that she had been abused. The investigator talked to C. A. in the presence of the school principal. During the interview, C. A. removed some of her clothing, and the investigator observed raised and discolored welts on the girl's back and legs. C. A. told the investigator that she had been beaten with a folded electrical extension cord. The investigator had observed welts with similar configurations on other children, and she determined, based on her experience, that the welts on C. A. had been inflicted with an extension cord. The protective investigator went to the Felton home and examined Mrs. Felton's two children for signs of abuse; she found no signs of abuse on these children. She interviewed Mr. and Mrs. Felton and noted in her report that they "admitted that they had beat C[]. A[]. with a belt and extension cord." Because they were not related by blood, the Department removed C. A. from the home of Mr. Felton's step-grandmother, even though she was a loving person and provided good care for C. A. C. A. was placed in a shelter and returned to Detroit shortly thereafter. Mr. Felton did not challenge the classification of the abuse report, and it became final as to him. Mrs. Felton hired an attorney, who negotiated a settlement with the Department whereby the abuse report became final as to her, but she was granted an exemption from the disqualification from working with children which resulted from the abuse report. At the hearing, both Mr. and Mrs. Felton denied ever "beating" C. A. They admitted, however, that they "spanked" her. During the time they participated in the MAPP classes and selection process, neither Mr. Felton nor Mrs. Felton disclosed to the Department that they had been named in an abuse report in 1989. Both testified that, since they had signed the Release of Information form, they assumed the Department would find out about it. Mr. and Mrs. Felton both testified that they had benefited greatly from the MAPP program. They have learned that it is inappropriate to spank a child for misbehavior and that it is better to talk with the child and make the child feel loved and wanted. C. A., who is now 16 years old, calls her father occasionally, and Mr. Felton is in contact with his mother, who apparently lives in Detroit and can provide some information about C. A. Mr. Felton testified that his daughter lives mostly on the street and has essentially raised herself since her mother died. Mr. Felton related that C. A. had recently called him and asked if she could come stay with him for the summer. He refused her request because he "needed to get his name straight." He wants C. A. to come live with him eventually. Mr. Felton provides support for C. A. though the $101.50 the City of Coral Gables currently deducts from Mr. Felton's biweekly paycheck. The evidence presented by Mr. and Mrs. Felton is not sufficient to establish their fitness for licensure as foster parents. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that Mr. and Mrs. Felton currently do not possess the good moral character necessary for those entrusted with a foster home license, which is recognized as a public trust and a privilege. Mr. Felton made intentional misstatements on the Personal Profile form which he completed as part of the foster home licensure application process when he twice stated that he had no children from relationships or marriages other than that with Mrs. Felton. In addition, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Felton disclosed to the Department the existence of the 1989 abuse report involving C. A., apparently feeling no obligation to do so and assuming that the Department would find out about it when they did the screening required for foster home license applicants. Finally, Mr. and Mrs. Felton are currently unable or unwilling to provide shelter and care to Mr. Felton's own child, C. A., who, in Mr. Felton's words, has "raised herself" and is currently living "on the street" in Detroit, Michigan. These three factors, taken together with their treatment of C. A in 1989,3 establish that the Feltons do not have the good moral character required of foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the application of Irma and Hancel Felton for foster home licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1997.
