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IVAN ROSARIO vs ORANGE COUNTY, 95-005380 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 08, 1995 Number: 95-005380 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 1997

Findings Of Fact Ivan Rosario, the Petitioner, was at all relevant times an employee of Orange County, Florida, as an equipment operator (EO III) in the highway maintenance department and assigned to the landscape crew. Mr. Rosario's national origin, Puerto Rican, is uncontroverted. William Baxter is also an employee of Orange County and in 1989 was manager of highway maintenance. On or about October 10, 1989 he received a memo from Ivan Rosario's foreman recommending that Mr. Rosario be terminated for failing to meet the minimum qualifications for equipment operator. Mr. Rosario had been in that position since approximately September 27, 1989. In accordance with established due process requirements and Orange County policy, and after notice to Mr. Rosario and to other relevant parties, William Baxter conducted a pretermination hearing on October 20, 1989. The outcome of the hearing was Mr. Baxter's determination that Mr. Rosario was exonerated of any of the accusations or charges. Mr. Rosario was not terminated. It is Mr. Baxter's usual practice after such proceedings to write a letter stating the outcome and to provide a copy to the employee and to the personnel file. However, several years after the 1989 hearing, Mr. Rosario informed Mr. Baxter that the letter was not in his personnel file. After verifying this fact, Mr. Baxter agreed to write a statement and to put it in his personnel file. Mr. Baxter or someone in the county administrative staff had also inquired of the legal staff whether the original written charges could be removed from Mr. Rosario's personnel file. The response from the county attorney's staff was that the personnel files were public records and could not be destroyed or expunged without violating Chapter 119, Florida Statutes. In a memo dated August 1, 1994, William Baxter directed Mark Massaro, the manager of traffic engineering, to place this statement in Mr. Rosario's file: On October 20, 1989, a hearing was held concerning the allegations that Mr. Rosario was hired by Orange County and on the appli- cation form he had stated he was qualified to operate equipment, however, it has been alleged that he was not capable of operating this equipment nor had he ever operated this equipment. After conducting the hearing, I made a determination and I can find no faults with the qualifications of Mr. Rosario and that the allegations against him were false. This was the result of the hearing. (Respondent's exhibit no. 3, William Baxter deposition) There is no explanation of record for the absence of some written confirmation of Mr. Baxter's decision between 1989, when the hearing was held, and 1994, when the above-described memorandum was prepared. Mr. Baxter usually provides that written decision within approximately ten (10) days and he has no recollection of failing to write the letter earlier. Mr. Rosario contends that the unexplained charges in his file prevented his being promoted and kept him from a union stewardship. He also contends that the charges hurt his reputation. No evidence was presented regarding any specific promotional opportunities or any reasons why such opportunities might have been denied to Mr. Rosario. "Stewardship," a union appointment, is a matter within the jurisdiction of the union and its bargaining unit members. The county has no control over union stewardship appointments. Mr. Rosario presented two witnesses who were also displeased with their employment experiences at Orange County. Miguel Ortiz is a computer program analyst who was with the county for five years and left in October 1994 because he felt that he was denied equal employment opportunities. He filed many grievances during his tenure and was removed from stewardship due, he believes, to his pointing out problems. He concedes that union stewardship is a union matter and not a management prerogative. Jason Stroud is an equipment operator with the Orange County Highway Department. He only contends that he has a case "along the same lines" as Mr. Rosario's case. He claims that the county "makes the rules," and breaks them or makes up new rules. Orange County has an Equal Employment Opportunity program and compliance officer. That officer, Bernard Ouellette, investigates when there are internal charges and compiles responses to send to the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or Florida Commission on Human Relations. Mr. Ouellette has, in the past, found county supervisors who violate equal employment laws and they are dealt with and disciplined appropriately. A recent example is a county employee who made racially derogatory remarks and was terminated.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the complaint and petition for relief by Ivan Rosario be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY W. CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Rosario 16268 East Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32820 Jeffrey J. Newton Assistant County Attorney Orange County Attorney's Office Post Office Box 1393 Orlando, Florida 32802-1393 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

USC (1) 42 USC 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.02760.10760.11
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FERNANDO J. CONDE vs WALT DISNEY WORLD COMPANY, 03-004670 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 11, 2003 Number: 03-004670 Latest Update: Aug. 05, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2002), by forcing the termination of Petitioner's employment with Respondent because of his gender (male), and/or national origin (Venezuela), and/or his age (37); and because Petitioner alleged that younger, female lifeguards were given better work assignments.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from November 26, 2002, until April 17 2003, in the position of deep water lifeguard at Respondent's facility at the Grand Floridian Hotel (Grand Floridian) located in Lake Buena Vista, Florida. He worked in that position until his resignation on April 17, 2003. Petitioner is a Hispanic male, aged 37, and a member of a protected class. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Petitioner was hired for a full-time position to work 40 hours per week. He normally worked a ten-hour shift, four days a week. Petitioner never applied for any other position or promotions during his employment. All full-time lifeguards at the Grand Floridian are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Respondent and the Services Trades Council Union. A lifeguard working at the Grand Floridian does not have to be a member or pay dues to the union in order to be covered by the terms of the CBA. Petitioner is not a member of the union. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was provided with a packet of materials containing Respondent's employment policies. Respondent had a policy regarding harassment that covered all of its employees and prohibited all types of harassment in the workplace, including any such behavior based on age, national origin, and/or gender. Respondent also has an "equal opportunity" policy that applies to all of its employees. This policy provides that all employees should be treated equally in terms of hours, work location, and scheduling based on seniority. Operations at the Grand Floridian Of the class of lifeguards hired at the same time, Petitioner was the only one assigned to the Grand Floridian. At the time of being assigned to the Grand Floridian, there were approximately 25 lifeguards employed there. The lifeguards at the Grand Floridian are full-time, part-time casual, or part- time regular employees. There are also "college program" lifeguards who perform all of the same duties as the full-time and part-time employees. The starting times for employees are staggered, based on the needs of the area and the time of the year. The main duties of a lifeguard at the Grand Floridian are to ensure safety and guard the pools, clean the pool and beach areas, work the cash register, and operate the marina. The head supervisor of the Grand Floridian lifeguards during Petitioner's employment was Jerry Davis. Davis has been employed with Respondent for nine years. He has served in his current position as the recreation operations manager for six years. His duties in this position include supervising the outside recreation areas, including the pools, boats, and lifeguards at the Grand Floridian. Davis plays no role in hiring the employees that report to him, but rather Respondent's Employee Relations Department is responsible for hiring these employees. Davis has the authority to terminate lifeguards that report to him. Prior to terminating an employee, however, Davis seeks the input of the Employee Relations Department. The evidence is credible that Davis is accessible to his direct reports and makes sure that his office is always open to them. If a lifeguard wants to speak with Davis, he will make himself available to him or her. As a manager, Davis has undergone training from Respondent regarding its equal employment policies and anti- harassment policies. He has also been trained that employees may raise complaints about working conditions with either their manager or the Employee Relations Department. All employees are made aware of these policies and complaint procedures as a part of their orientation program. Under Davis, the next supervisor was Darin Bernhard. Bernhard has been employed with Respondent for eight years and is currently employed as a recreation guest service manager. Until October 2003, Bernhard was employed at the Grand Floridian. In that capacity, Bernhard directly supervised lifeguards, marina employees, and activities' employees. Bernhard had continuous interaction with lifeguards throughout the day while at the Grand Floridian. Bernhard had an open-door policy to all employees and made himself accessible to them. Under Davis and Bernhard, there were three coordinators who served as the immediate supervisors of the lifeguards. The weekly work schedule for lifeguards was posted on the wall every week. Bernhard, along with Respondent's Labor Office, was responsible for preparing this weekly schedule. The factors used in preparing this schedule were a scheduling bid submitted by each employee, scheduled vacations, and operational needs. As for operational needs, Bernhard would try to give a combination throughout the week based on full-time, part-time, and college program employees and avoid having all college program employees on duty at one time, thereby providing more experience on each shift. The CBA contains a provision stating as follows: "The principles of seniority shall be observed in establishing days off and work schedules by department, location, or scheduling pool." As a result, the schedule bids of all employees were considered based on the seniority of the employees. At the time of his hire, Petitioner spoke with Bernhard about special scheduling requests. Specifically, Petitioner asked to receive early shifts and weekends off. He wanted the weekends off due to child-care issues with his son. Bernhard informed Petitioner that he would attempt to work with Petitioner on this, but that he was limited in what he could do based on the seniority requirements set forth in the CBA, as well as the fact that most of the lifeguards preferred to have weekends off. At that point in time, Petitioner had the least amount of seniority of all the full-time lifeguards, since he was the most recently hired employee. Despite the CBA restrictions, Bernhard made every effort to provide Petitioner with at least one day each weekend off and tried to provide him with two, whenever possible. On a regular basis, Petitioner was scheduled to have Saturdays off. In addition, on numerous occasions, he was given Friday, Saturday, and Sunday off from work, in accordance with his special request. At no time during his employment did Petitioner ever complain to Bernhard about not getting enough days off on the weekend. Employees would occasionally complain to Bernhard about the weekly schedule. When he received such complaints, Bernhard would listen to their complaints and not take any adverse action against any employee for complaining to him about scheduling issues. On occasion, lifeguards would be sent home early due to slow business or inclement weather. This decision would be made either by the immediate supervisor on duty or one of the coordinators. The lifeguards would be allowed to volunteer to go home on a "first-come, first serve" basis. No lifeguard, however, was forced to go home early. Similarly, Bernhard did not receive complaints from any lifeguard about being forced to go home early. The coordinators at the Grand Floridian were responsible for making the daily rotation schedules. There were five primary positions that the lifeguards could be assigned to on a daily basis, consisting of two lifeguard positions at the pool, the slide, the marina, and cashier. The coordinators made these assignment decisions based on the people they had available that day. The primary focus was to make sure that all of the areas were properly covered. Such daily rotation assignments were also based on certain needs during particular periods of the day. In addition, certain assignments were given to certain employees if they are more capable of performing the task. It is also not uncommon for the daily rotation to be changed during the day based on unexpected factors, such as absent employees. In terms of shift assignments, an effort is made to make sure that regular employees and college program employees are working together so that the regular employees can provide guidance when needed. During a workday, most of the employees rotate positions every 30 minutes to an hour. The rotation of duties for the lifeguards changed on a daily basis. Petitioner enjoyed working as a lifeguard because he considered himself a stronger lifeguard than others in his department. He also described himself as the "leader of the lifeguards." All lifeguards are trained in the cashier duties, but very few individuals are chosen to actually work as a cashier. These cashiers undergo special training prior to performing these duties. The primary attributes for a cashier are good guest interaction and good phone skills because a cashier is required to interact with guests, both on the telephone and in person. This assignment also differs from the other assignments in that the employee assigned to this position normally does not rotate throughout the day to other assignments. It is not uncommon for the same employee to serve as a cashier for an entire day. Petitioner was sometimes assigned to work at the marina, but not as a cashier. Petitioner never spoke with any of his supervisors or coordinators about working more at the marina or as a cashier. Each lifeguard at the Grand Floridian was required to complete four hours of in-service training each month, either at his home resort or at another resort. Attendance at these training sessions were tracked on a daily sign-in sheet. If a lifeguard failed to complete his or her in-service training for the month, he would be reprimanded. Davis prepared a reprimand for Petitioner on April 1, 2003. This reprimand was the result of Petitioner's failing to complete his in-service training hours for the month of March 2003. As a result of failing to complete this training, Petitioner received a two-point reprimand for poor job performance. Petitioner did not know when Davis prepared the Poor Job Performance Memorandum dated April 1, 2003. Davis and Petitioner did not see each other between Petitioner's accident on March 30, 2003, and the date Petitioner signed the Poor Job Performance Memorandum on April 9, 2003. At the time that Davis prepared this memorandum, Petitioner had not made any complaints of discrimination or harassment to Davis. The attendance of the lifeguards on a daily basis was tracked by the use of an electronic swipe card. The daily schedule and attendance of the lifeguards was also tracked on a daily sheet completed by the coordinators. This sheet was kept in the managers' office and was forwarded to the Respondent's Labor Office when it was completed. Bernhard usually reviewed these sheets on a daily basis as well. The lifeguards did not have access to these sheets on a daily basis. Under the attendance policy in the CBA, three absences in a 30-day period warranted a one-point written reprimand. An employee had to receive three written reprimands within a 24- month period before he could be terminated for attendance issues. The reasons for an absence did not make a difference for purposes of accruing points under the policy. On March 24, 2003, Petitioner called in sick and did not appear for work. On his way home from work on March 31, 2003, Petitioner was in a car accident in a parking lot on Respondent's property. As a result of that accident, Petitioner's car had to be towed because it was not drivable. Petitioner did not, however, seek medical treatment as a result of the accident. Shortly after the accident occurred, Petitioner contacted Bernhard. He informed Bernhard of the accident and told him that he would not be available for work the next day because his car had been destroyed. He did not inform Bernhard that he had been injured in any way. Petitioner was absent from work on April 1, 2003, because he had no transportation. Petitioner called in his personal absence on April 1, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2003, and was a "no show" on April 2, 2003. As a result of these numerous absences, Davis made a decision to contact Petitioner by telephone and inquire about the reasons for these multiple absences. Petitioner informed Davis that he still did not have transportation. Petitioner expressed concern to Davis that he was afraid he was going to accrue too many points and get himself terminated. Davis responded to Petitioner that if he did not return to work, he would accrue points under the attendance policy. Petitioner asked Davis if it would be better if he terminated himself or if he was terminated by Respondent. Davis also informed Petitioner that if he terminated himself, at some point he might be able to return to his job at Respondent, though he did not guarantee him that he could simply return. Davis made it very clear to Petitioner that this was a decision he had to make. At the time of Davis' phone call to Petitioner, he had accrued sufficient points under the applicable "attendance policy" set forth under the CBA to warrant giving him a one- point written reprimand. Davis had not been able to give the reprimand to Petitioner, however, because he had not returned to work. At no time had Davis ever informed Petitioner that such a reprimand was waiting for him. In addition, such absences would not have provided a basis for terminating Petitioner at that point in time. Petitioner contacted Davis the following day and informed Davis that he was going to voluntarily resign his employment. Upon learning of this decision, Davis informed Petitioner that he needed to return his uniform and all other of Respondent's property prior to receiving his last paycheck. All employees are required to return their uniform and Respondent's property at the time of resignation. Davis never informed Petitioner that he was being terminated or that he had an intention of terminating him. Similarly, Davis never told Petitioner that he had no option but to resign. Davis had no problem with Petitioner returning to work, provided he could obtain proper transportation. After Petitioner's resignation, Davis completed the required paperwork and indicated that Petitioner should be classified as a "restricted rehire." Davis chose this restriction due to Petitioner's tardiness and attendance issues, as well as his failure to take responsibility to make it to work. This decision to categorize him as a "restricted rehire" was not based on Petitioner's age, national origin or his gender. Petitioner visited Respondent's casting center (human resource department) on June 17, 2003, approximately two months after his resignation, with the intent to reapply for his prior position. Petitioner wanted to return to his same position at the Grand Floridian, working for Davis and Bernhard, as well as working under the same coordinators. On June 17, 2003, Petitioner met with Fernanda Smith, who has served as a recruiter for Respondent for five years. Smith was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is Hispanic. As a recruiter, Smith is responsible for interviewing, selecting, and hiring the strongest candidates for positions at Respondent. She is responsible for hiring employees for all hourly, entry- level positions. The hiring process used by Respondent is the same for both new applicants and former employees of Respondent. That process is set forth in the "Rehire Review" policy given to each recruiter. Once Smith is randomly assigned an applicant, she brings them to her office and reviews their personal data in the computer. She then reviews the application for accuracy and completeness. She also confirms that they are qualified to work in the United States and their criminal background. Smith reviews the conditions of employment with the applicant, including compensation, appearance, ability to attend work and transportation. If the applicant was previously employed by Respondent, Smith also reviews the application for the reasons the employee previously left employment and the applicant's rehire status. The different rehire statuses are "yes rehire," "restricted rehire," and "no rehire." If a former employee has been categorized as a "restricted rehire," Smith then must confirm that the person is currently employed and that he or she has been at that employment for a period of at least six months at the time of re-application. Assuming they can satisfy these requirements, the applicant is required to provide an employment verification letter from their current employer within one week of the interview. At that point, the information is forwarded to a rehire committee for consideration. On June 17, 2003, Smith interviewed Petitioner for potential rehire with Respondent. She recalls that when she met him in the lobby, he was very professionally dressed. Upon entering her office, Smith reviewed the information on Petitioner's application with him. At that point, she noticed that he had a recent date of termination from Respondent and asked him the reasons for his termination. Petitioner responded that he had left his employment because of transportation problems and that he had missed a number of days from work. In reviewing Petitioner's application, she realized that he did not meet the requirements for consideration as a "restricted rehire." First of all, Petitioner did not offer any evidence of current employment at the time of the interview. Secondly, Petitioner had only been gone from Respondent for a period of approximately two months, and thus, did not have the six months of continuous employment to be considered for rehire. Smith shared with Petitioner that he did not meet the minimum requirements for a "restricted rehire." Petitioner had no idea what that designation meant. At that point, Petitioner responded by getting very upset, yelling and screaming at Smith, standing up and pointing his finger at her. He then informed Smith that he was going to sue Respondent for discrimination and left her office. Petitioner did not allow Smith to make any other comments to him. Immediately after Petitioner had left the building, Smith prepared the standard evaluation that she prepares for all applicants she interviews, including the incident that occurred in the interview with Petitioner. If Petitioner had allowed Smith to explain the process and eventually provided the appropriate documentation, he might have been considered for rehire. Based on his behavior in the interview, however, Smith recommended that he not be considered for rehire, particularly for the position of lifeguard where he would be dealing with guests on a regular basis. Allegations of Discrimination Petitioner alleges that one of the coordinators referred to his national origin in a derogatory manner on one occasion. Other than this isolated alleged comment, he stated he never heard anyone else at Respondent make any derogatory comments about his being Hispanic or Venezuelan. Petitioner did not complain about this comment to anyone at Respondent and specifically did not complain to Davis, Bernhard, or employee relations about it. Other than this one comment by an unnamed coordinator, Petitioner offered no evidence that any actions or decisions were taken against him based on his national origin. In support of his age discrimination claim, Petitioner alleges that some of his co-workers referred to him once or twice as "old." Petitioner did not offer any evidence that any of his supervisors or coordinators ever used any of these terms in reference to him. Petitioner does not know whether or not he ever discussed his age with other workers. At the time of Petitioner's resignation, he was not the oldest lifeguard working at the Grand Floridian. Penny Ivey and Sherry Morris were both older than Petitioner, and Davis was born on February 5, 1951. At the time of Petitioner's resignation, Davis was 52 years old. Other than these alleged isolated comments, Petitioner offered no other evidence that any actions or decisions were taken against him based on his age. Petitioner claims that one example of gender discrimination was that the rotation schedule was not equal. In particular, he alleges that the "young and beautiful girls" were preferred in the rotation schedules because they were allowed to work in the marina and at the cash register more than males. Petitioner alleges that Jaimy Tully, a 23-year-old female lifeguard, was always late. For example, Petitioner alleges that Tully was late on March 2, 2003, based on the fact that she was supposed to be there at 10:00 a.m. The daily schedule indicates that she arrived for work at 9:30 a.m. In reviewing the document, however, it indicates "S/C" which means that a schedule change was made, and Tully showed up for work half an hour early, not late, and she still worked her scheduled day of ten hours. A schedule change would occur for several reasons, including the need to have certain employees come in early for an in-service session or the personal request of an employee. It sometimes required employees to come in for work early and other times required them to work later. Petitioner similarly alleges that Tully was late on March 22, 2003, and should have been fired for that. In reviewing the daily schedule for that date, however, it is evident that a schedule change was made, and Tully was scheduled to work from 9:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m., a regular 10-hour day, and that she actually worked those hours. Petitioner admitted at the hearing that she was actually early to work and not late. Petitioner alleges that Tully was late again for work on April 7 and April 16, 2003. A review of those daily schedules, however, reveals that Tully had a schedule change on each of those days and that she worked the hours that she was assigned. Of all these allegations of Tully being late to work, Petitioner never complained to anyone about it. Petitioner then alleges that Tully arrived for work early on February 15, 2003, and that she was allowed to work extra hours and earn overtime. On that particular occasion, however, Tully was called in early because she needed to attend an in-service training session that was occurring that day. Petitioner conceded that Tully was not late on that day. Petitioner admitted that both males and females were called in to work additional hours as lifeguards. For instance, Michael Whitt, a male employee, was allowed to start work earlier based on a schedule change on March 4, 2003. Similarly, a schedule change was made involving Whitt on February 25, 2003, and he was required to report to work at 11:40 a.m., not 10:00 a.m., and as a result, was not given any breaks that day. Petitioner never received any discipline as a result of being late to work or for leaving work early. Petitioner claims that he suffered discrimination on January 12, 2003, because Tully was allowed to start work later than he and then was allowed to work as a cashier for the majority of the day. He claims that she should have been on a rotation like him and that she was given more hours than he was. Tully was trained as both a lifeguard and a cashier, but she had more cashier experience than the majority of the other lifeguards. She also had good guest-interaction and cash- handling skills, and thus, she was placed as a cashier more than most of the other lifeguards. The cashier assignment also differed from the other assignments in that the employee assigned to this position normally did not rotate throughout the day, and it was not uncommon for the same employee to serve as a cahier for an entire day. Petitioner never spoke with any of his supervisors or coordinators about serving as a cashier, nor did he ever complain to Bernhard about any of his daily assignments. He alleges that the woman and the "young girls" were always placed at the marina. When asked to identify "these girls," he stated he was referring to Mindy and Matt, a male employee. In particular, Petitioner testified that on December 25, 2002, Matt served in the marina for three consecutive rotations on that particular day. He also points out that Matt had a longer break than he did on that particular day. There was no pay differential between employees who were assigned to work at the marina and those who worked at the pool. Similarly, there was no pay differential between employees working as a cashier and those at the pool. Petitioner never made any complaints to Davis about his weekly schedule or his daily rotation assignments. Similarly, Petitioner never complained to Davis about any disparate treatment or harassment based on his age, national origin, or gender. Petitioner never raised any complaints about discrimination or any other working conditions with Bernhard. Bernhard never made any derogatory comments to him or about him. Bernhard does not give any preference to any employees based on age, national origin, or gender. Petitioner was aware that there was an Employee Relations Department located at the casting center, but never complained to them about his working conditions or alleged discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismisses his complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Fernando J. Conde 4732 Olive Branch Road Apartment No. 1205 Orlando, Florida 32811-7118 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802-4956 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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RHUEBEN GOLPHIN vs WAL-MART STORES, INC., 03-003146 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 03, 2003 Number: 03-003146 Latest Update: Jun. 03, 2004
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SYLVESTER A. HOLLY, JR. vs SOLUTIA, INC., 01-002078 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 25, 2001 Number: 01-002078 Latest Update: Jul. 29, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his race or age when he was not selected as Lead Mechanic in Area I KA/Nitric.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male who was over 40 at the time he applied for the Area I (One) Lead Mechanic position. At the time Petitioner applied for the Area I Lead Mechanic position, he was a lead mechanic in the Central Maintenance Compressor and Gear Box shop, pay grade level 28 position. Pay grade level 28 is the highest nonexempt pay grade at Solutia, Inc. On January 25, 1999, Solutia posted a job opening for a lead mechanic position in Area I KA/Nitric, a pay grade level 28 position. Petitioner applied for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. Had Petitioner been selected for the Area I Lead Mechanic position, it would have been a lateral transfer and not a promotion because Petitioner was already at a level 28 pay grade. No evidence was received that the incumbent of the Area I Lead Mechanic position would have had more authority or promotion opportunities than the position previously held. Petitioner, along with three other mechanics, interviewed for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. The other three applicants were: William G. Cook (a white male); Joseph S. Mann (a white male); and David Wolfe (a white male). Petitioner admits that all the applicants were qualified for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. Respondent used a ranking procedure to evaluate the applicants for the Area I Lead Mechanic position. The applicants were ranked by subjectively grading their answers to questions in five areas: 1) problem-solving and decision-making ability; 2) teamwork and coaching ability; (3) communication ability; (4) honoring differences; and (5) results orientation and initiative. The applicants were given a score from one to five by each panel member based upon the panel members' subjective assessment of applicants’ answers on each of the five criteria. Five was the highest grade and one being the lowest. The points were totaled and converted into a percentage score. The applicant having the highest overall score was selected to fill the job. The applicants were interviewed by a panel composed of six employees: Nikki Owens; Mike Conley; Darren Dobson; Tony Williams (a black male); Terry Wilcox (who was over 40 at the time of the interview); and Greg Barker. All of these persons were from Area I. The majority of the panel worked regularly with the person ultimately selected. Petitioner admits that there was no overtly discriminatory questions or activity in the interview. There were no questions or discussions amongst the panel members about the applicants' race or age. The panel members scored each applicant separately without knowing how the other panel members scored the applicants. The panel members scored the applicants as follows: W. Cook S. Holly J. Mann D. Wolfe Nikki Owens 45% 77% 90% 67% Michael Conley 53.3% 63.3% 70% 63.6% Darren Dobson 40% 63% 70% 67% Greg Barker 40% 57% 73% 57% Tony Williams 57% 73% 67% 50% Terry Wilcox 33% 66.6% 76.6% 57.7% After the individual panel members totaled their respective scores, the applicants were ranked. Joseph Mann was ranked first by five of the six panel members, and one panel member, the black male, ranked Petitioner first. The panel discussed the results and reached a unanimous consensus to offer the Area I Lead Mechanic position to Joseph Mann. The panel prepared and provided feedback to all the applicants. Petitioner's shortcoming was that he failed to give specific examples to questions posted during his interview. When he was not selected, Petitioner complained about the outcome, believing he was the most qualified applicant and was rejected for racially motivated reasons. Rachel Gold (a black female) and Lerissa Rowe, who both worked in Respondent's Human Resources Department, investigated Petitioner's complaint. During their investigation, it came to their attention that a panel member, Terry Wilcox, stated to a co-employee, "I don't think that there would ever be two black people in charge of a group of white mechanics in a shop." After learning of Terry Wilcox' comment, Respondent took the following action: (a) Respondent recalculated the panel's score leaving out Terry Wilcox' score; and (b) Respondent disciplined Terry Wilcox by suspending him for two days without pay. After recalculating the scores, Joseph Mann still had the highest overall score. Petitioner's overall score remained the same. Petitioner remained with Respondent until he voluntarily retired effective November 1, 1999. No one forced Petitioner to retire. The decision was Petitioner's alone, prompted in part by a change in Respondent's retirement plan. Petitioner admits that none of the panel members had ever discriminated against him because of his race or age prior to the complained of selection. Since retiring, Petitioner has not sought employment elsewhere. He is basically enjoying retirement.

Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the instant petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvester A. Holly, Jr. Post Office Box 301 Cantonment, Florida 32533 Erick M. Drlicka, Esquire Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon 30 South Spring Street Pensacola, Florida 32596 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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LEONA SANDERS vs. G & B PRODUCTS/BATES FILE COMPANY, 79-002265 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002265 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, Leona Sanders, a black female, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by unlawfully failing to consider her for employment based on her race. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record complied herein, I make the following:

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action. Petitioner timely filed her complaint and Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Chapter 9D-9.08, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, Leona Sanders, is a black female who filed an application for employment with the Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, for a factory worker's job on July 13, 1978. 1/ The Respondent, having employed fifteen (15) employees for each working day in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks during times material herein, is an employer within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Petitioner satisfied Respondent's listed requirements for the position of factory worker and sought factory employment based on the advice of her doctor. Petitioner was unable to obtain a personal interview from Respondent when her application was originally filed inasmuch as Respondent's Personnel Director and Executive Secretary, Dorothy Russell (Director), was then on vacation. Petitioner was informed by a Personnel employee that she would be scheduled for an interview when the Director returned from vacation on July 17. Petitioner, after having waited until Wednesday, July 19, without receiving a call from Respondent, called the Director, since in her opinion the Director would not be granting her request for an interview without some prodding on her (Petitioner's) part. Petitioner was unable to schedule an interview with the Director on the following day, Thursday, July 20, at which time she was told by the Director that a full complement of employees had been hired. The Director assured Petitioner that she would be called during the following week should any vacancies occur. Petitioner was assured that in any event she would be notified if she would be hired by July 25. During the interview, Petitioner expressed a desire in being considered for work on the first and second shift inasmuch as she had four children who ranged in ages from ten to sixteen. However, she advised the Director that she would accept a position on any shift. From the date of the interview, July 20, through August 7, Petitioner was not called or otherwise notified of any vacancies for factory workers by Respondent. While reading the employment section of the classified ads in the local newspaper on August 7, Petitioner noted an advertisement by Respondent's Personnel Office for factory workers. Upon reading the ad for the factory workers, Petitioner immediately visited Respondent's factory and reported to the Personnel Office in hopes of being employed. Petitioner was again told by Respondent's Personnel Director that a full complement of workers had been hired but that she would be notified should any vacancies occur. Respondent hired sixteen non-black females as factory workers during the period July 15 through August 23. All of the sixteen newly hired employees made application for employment after Petitioner, i.e., July 15. Respondent, in completing the final phase of its heavy seasonal hirings, hired its first black factory worker on approximately August 28, 1978. Petitioner has suffered from hypertension in the past. As stated, she was encouraged to seek factory work by her physician. Petitioner has an automobile to commute from her home to Respondent's factory if offered a position. Petitioner passed a test designed to measure dexterity and aptitude. Results of the tests were provided to the Personnel Director. Petitioner has sought, and continues to seek, employment from neighboring employers. The list of employers she has applied to for employment includes St. Joseph Medical Center, The News Press, R. L. Polk & Company, and all local nursing homes. Petitioner's interim earnings during times material amount to $968.16. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE Respondent's Personnel Director testified that the number of applicants greatly outnumbered the available factory worker positions. Director Russell considered Petitioner better suited for employment at a hospital, nursing home or for clerical work and suggested that she seek employment in those areas. According to Director Russell, Petitioner displayed a poor attitude during the interview since she attempted to dictate the hours that she was willing to work and she concluded that Petitioner would not work out satisfactorily in the factory based on her expressions as to the hours and positions for which she wanted to be considered for employment.

Conclusions The Florida Commission on Human Relations, a Section 706 deferral agency for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, administers the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended. The intent of the Human Rights Act of 1977 (Act) is to eradicate employment discrimination based on certain protective classifications, including race. Chapter 23.167(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). Respondent is an employer subject to the guides of the Act. Respondent, as an employer, has an established affirmative action policy and employee selection plan which guides it in its search of employees on an equal opportunity basis. Respondent also has a policy of attempting to hire those employees with children to work on the first shift. (Testimony of Director Russell.) During the months of July and August, Respondent repeatedly placed ads for employees in the local newspaper. Petitioner, during this period, repeatedly sought employment at Respondent's factory, as well as with other employers. As reflected by all the available criteria required by Respondent for its selection of employees. Despite Petitioner's continuing efforts to be selected for employment with Respondent, she was repeatedly told that a full complement of employees had been selected. On the other hand, Respondent continued to advertise for factory employees. Given the above factors which reveal that Petitioner satisfied the eligibility criteria for employment selection as required by Respondent; Petitioner's continued efforts to be selected for employment with Respondent; Respondent's continued search for employees by the placing of ads in the local newspaper and the rejection to Petitioner based on the claim that the full employee complement had been selected, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by Respondent in violation of Section 23.167(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1979). I shall so recommend. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in order to effectuate the purposes of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order requiring Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, to: Cease and desist from discriminatorily denying or limiting Petitioner's employment opportunities. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended: Make Petitioner whole by: Reimbursing Petitioner for the difference in wages between what Petitioner would have earned as a factory worker and what she earned in other employment from July 13, 1978, plus interest until Petitioner is offered employment by Respondent as a factory worker. Back pay is to be computed in accordance with Schedule "A" attached here. Offer to Petitioner the next available factory worker position on the first shift. Post, for a period of sixty (60) days, in Respondent's facilities in places where notices to employees are usually posted, copies furnished by the Commission to the effect that Respondent will not discriminate because of race in affording equal employment opportunities and terms and conditions of employment to all its applicants and employees. Report to the Commission, within thirty (30) days of the Commission's order, steps taken by it respecting the fulfillment of the above conditions. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August 1980.

Florida Laws (2) 120.5790.803
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SANDRA F. JACKSON vs HALIFAX MEDICAL CENTER, 00-001781 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Apr. 27, 2000 Number: 00-001781 Latest Update: Mar. 14, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act, as amended, as alleged in Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, Petitioner, Sandra Jackson, who is an African-American, has alleged that on April 8, 1996, she was unlawfully terminated from employment with Respondent, Halifax Medical Center, on account of her race. Although the record does not specifically address the issue of whether Respondent is an "employer," it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current calendar year, and is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Halifax Medical Center, located in Daytona Beach, is a part of the Halifax Community Health Systems network serving East and Central Florida. Petitioner was first hired by Halifax Medical Center on February 13, 1989, as a pharmacy technician. She remained in that position until April 16, 1990, when she transferred to a position of Social Worker I at the Hospice of Volusia/Flagler (Hospice), which performs hospice services for the Halifax network in Volusia and Flagler Counties. In that position, Petitioner's duties included assisting the various supervisors, taking care of patient requests, and filling out financial assistance forms for Medicaid or Medicare patients. She was also required to fill out memorial fund requests. Because of a change in the federal law in 1992, which required that all Hospice social workers have a master's degree, Petitioner was no longer qualified to work as a social worker since she held only a bachelor's degree. In order to allow Petitioner (and several other affected social workers) to remain with the organization, the Hospice created the position of Resource Specialist. Petitioner transferred to that position on November 1, 1992. Petitioner's contention that her transfer was actually a demotion and confirms that she was treated differently from other employees has been rejected. This is because the evidence clearly shows that her transfer, and that of several similarly situated employees, was caused by a change in the federal law, and not by discriminatory animus on the part of her employer. Although the duties of a Resource Specialist were similar to that of a Social Worker I, and included providing assistance to other Social Workers, a Resource Specialist was not allowed to perform patient assessments or give supportive counseling. However, Petitioner's paperwork duties remained the same. From 1992 until 1994, Karen Grimm was Petitioner's supervisor. Grimm served as the Hospice's Psychosocial Bereavement Coordinator. When Grimm's position was split in two on January 17, 1994, Kathleen Moore became Petitioner's new supervisor. Both Grimm and Moore were required to prepare performance evaluations for all employees under their supervision, including Petitioner. Grimm's first evaluation of Petitioner was made on April 16, 1993. On that evaluation, Petitioner scored a 7.2 out of a possible 10 points, or an average evaluation. However, the evaluation noted that Petitioner needed to improve in following through on assignments and having an increased awareness of resources. These criticisms were based on complaints Grimm had received from other employees that Petitioner would not finish jobs she was required to do. Grimm discussed these criticisms with Petitioner after the evaluation was prepared. In August 1993, Pamela Toal, a nurse at Halifax Medical Hospital, met with Petitioner and Grimm regarding Petitioner's care of certain patients. In one case, Petitioner had taken two weeks to get a patient a pill box, which would have assisted the patient in ensuring that he took his prescribed medicine on time. In another case, Petitioner had been asked to assist a patient in signing up for Community Medicaid. However, she signed him up for Hospice Medicaid twice, a program in which he was already enrolled. These events were documented by Grimm. In January 1994, or shortly before her position was split, and she would no longer be Petitioner's supervisor, Grimm met with Petitioner to discuss complaints Grimm had received from a patient care coordinator (Cherrie Chester) regarding how difficult it was to find Petitioner when she was needed. Petitioner was instructed to meet with Chester to resolve the difficulty. On April 7, 1994, Kathleen Moore, Petitioner's new supervisor, met with Petitioner regarding Petitioner's work performance. At that time, Petitioner agreed to a number of performance-related changes in her work habits, which are formalized in Respondent's Exhibit 8. That document notes that "[i]f there is no improvement by the time for review [mid-May 1994], you will then be placed on a probationary period for an additional month." On her next evaluation prepared by Moore on May 22, 1994, Petitioner scored a 7.6 out of 10 points, which is considered an average evaluation. In the job responsibility category, however, she received a score of 5, which is below average. The next evaluation was prepared by Moore on April 22, 1995. Petitioner's average score was only 6.35, and her job responsibility score dropped from a 5 to a 4, indicating that she was performing her job below expectations. During this period, a number of complaints were made about Petitioner's job performance by co-workers, supervisors, families, and patients. Based on this continuing pattern of poor performance, Petitioner was placed on written notice by the Hospice Executive Director that she needed to make "immediate improvement in some areas of her work." Moore and Petitioner discussed a performance improvement plan, and Moore requested another review of Petitioner in three months to see if she had improved. In June 1995, a social worker who worked with Petitioner documented a number of incidents in which Petitioner failed to perform necessary responsibilities for patients. This required the social worker to follow up and perform the tasks that should have been completed by Petitioner. Moore conducted a follow-up evaluation of Petitioner on September 4, 1995. Her score dropped to 5.725, and her job responsibility rating dropped to a 3, which is unsatisfactory. This latter decline in rating was caused primarily because Petitioner had not been meeting in person with other social workers and counselors with whom she worked, as required by her job position. The evaluation noted that Petitioner was not improving in other areas and was still having problems filling out financial forms. In response to Petitioner's poor performance, Moore drafted a "Corrective Action Counseling Memo" on September 5, 1995. The memorandum addressed each of Petitioner's deficiencies and required certain corrective action. In addition, it warned her that any "future complaints or violations will result in termination." On September 12, 1995, Moore and Petitioner met concerning Petitioner's inability to meet the job standards. Petitioner was also put on notice that she must start looking for a different position in the Halifax Community Health Systems network as her employment as a Resource Specialist at the Hospice would end in three months. Two days later, Petitioner told Moore that it was Moore's responsibility to find her a new job. In an effort to assist Petitioner, Moore advised her to contact all of the entities under the Halifax umbrella. On September 1995, Petitioner continued to have performance problems, including a failure to report to work until noon one day, filling out incomplete and incorrect billing status forms, and failing to provide documentation to Moore in a timely manner. She also failed to timely meet with other Hospice social workers, as instructed by Moore on September 12. Although Petitioner was told in September that she had three months to find another position, she was allowed to remain in her Hospice job for several additional months because of her lack of success in finding a new job. Finally, on January 8, 1996, Petitioner was told her last day would be April 8, 1996. A Termination Voucher prepared on April 8 lists unsatisfactory ratings in the areas of job knowledge, quantity of work, and quality of work. It also relies upon "extensive notes in Personnel files" as a basis for discharge. There was no discriminatory animus on the part of Respondent in the termination decision, and it was based wholly on Petitioner's poor job performance. Notwithstanding the above, Petitioner points out that she received overall "satisfactory" job evaluations in the October 1990, April 1991, April 1992, and June 1993. While this may be true, beginning at least in April 1993, Petitioner's evaluations contained deficiencies, which persisted for several years until her termination. Petitioner also contends that beginning in 1994, when Moore became her supervisor, she suffered racial abuse in the workplace through comments made by other workers, and that she was assigned "dirty jobs" that other white employees were not required to do. Aside from the lack of corroborating evidence from any other witness to support these contentions, Petitioner never complained about the comments until the hearing. Moreover, none of the alleged statements were made by supervisors or managers who were decisionmakers at the Hospice. Petitioner also asserted that she was treated differently from other Resource Specialists when she was terminated. Besides Petitioner, Moore supervised only one other Resource Specialist, Carole Pope, a white employee, at the time of termination. During Moore's tenure as supervisor, Pope and Petitioner had the same responsibilities, and their assignments were divided by geographic area, not racial lines. Both Resource Specialist positions were apparently eliminated through a corporate "restructuring" in the spring of 1996, with Pope being transferred to a financial position in the psychosocial department and Petitioner being terminated for cause. However, there was no evidence that Pope suffered from the same job deficiencies as did Petitioner, or that Pope was given preferential treatment over Petitioner. A contention that other unnamed "white employees received favorable evaluations" during this same time period so that they would be placed in "related job openings" lacks credible evidentiary support. Another assertion that Petitioner's poor evaluations were attributable solely to Moore is not accurate. The record shows that even when Grimm was supervisor, Petitioner's performance was criticized by Grimm in several respects. The date on which the original complaint was filed is a source of confusion. In an amended letter of transmittal of the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) dated April 26, 2000, the then Commission Agency Clerk indicated that "[o]n April 14, 1996, Petitioner filed a Charged [sic] of Discrimination with the Commission[,]" and that the complaint had been assigned a 1997 case number (97- 0063). However, the Charge of Discrimination referred to DOAH was executed by Petitioner on February 26, 1998, or almost two years after she was discharged from employment, and Petitioner testified that this was the only paper she filed with the Commission. She also acknowledges this fact in her Proposed Recommended Order. Whether Petitioner filed a similar charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 365 days after the alleged discriminatory act, and if so, intended that filing to be a "dual filing" with the Commission, is not of record. It is also unknown whether the Commission and EEOC had a work- sharing agreement in 1996 and 1997.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sandra F. Jackson 828 White Court Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 John W. Bencivenga, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzales, P.A. Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601-0639

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.11
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KENNETH E. BROWN vs STONE CONTAINER CORPORATION (NO. IO03-214685), 91-002763 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida May 07, 1991 Number: 91-002763 Latest Update: Oct. 18, 1991

The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Kenneth E. Brown (Brown) is a black male and is a person as defined within Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. He had been employed by Respondent Stone Container Corporation for several years. In 1989, Petitioner was employed as an electrician/maintenance repairman at the Corporation's mill plant in Panama City, Florida. Part of his duties was to perform preventive maintenance on the plant's machinery. Petitioner's work time did not include a 30 minute lunch allowed by the Company. Time cards were completed by Petitioner and turned in at the mill office. Stone Container Corporation is an employer as defined within Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Throughout his employment the mill had a strict policy against an employee leaving work without advising his or her supervisor and working on personal property while the employee was on duty at the plant. Such violations of company policy could result in dismissal of the employee and had resulted in dismissal of both non-minority and minority employees in the past. The Corporation also had a policy on an employee keeping accurate records of the time spent on the job. Again failure to comply with this policy could result in dismissal of the employee. On October 8, 1989, Petitioner left work early to go to lunch without advising his supervisor and remained out to lunch for more than his allotted time. The Petitioner was out of the plant for one hour and 50 minutes (1:50). None of the time Petitioner took for lunch was reflected on Petitioner's time card. Petitioner's time card showed that he had worked eight full hours when he had not actually done so. Additionally, Petitioner used work time to work on his personal vehicle in the mill parking lot. Petitioner, was discharged by the Corporation a few weeks later for leaving his job without authorization from his supervisor and failing to reflect his extended absence on his time card. Petitioner made no showing that there was any relationship between his race and his termination. Likewise, Petitioner did not present any evidence that on October 8, 1989, he satisfactorily performed his job. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to prove a prima facie case and Petitioner's charge of discrimination should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioners complaint. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Kenneth E. Brown, pro se 1014 Mercedes Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 G. Thomas Harper, Esquire HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN, JOHNSON AND HARPER Post Office Box 40593 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0593 Dana Baird, General Counsel Margaret A. Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F (Suite 240) Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Ronald M. McElrath Executive Director 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ILA SHARPE vs FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, 07-003763 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 21, 2007 Number: 07-003763 Latest Update: Sep. 09, 2008

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Age Discrimination Petitioner, Ila Sharpe, was employed by FCHR from June 28, 2002, until February 6, 2006. Regina Owens is the housing investigations manager for FCHR. In approximately May 2004, Ms. Owens hired Petitioner into the housing unit upon the suggestion of the deputy director, Nina Singleton. Ms. Owens placed Petitioner in a vacant Senior Clerk position under her supervision in the housing unit. At the time, Ms. Owens became Petitioner’s supervisor, Ms. Owens was 51 years old. Petitioner was approximately 50 years old at that time. After Petitioner was in the Senior Clerk position for six or seven months, Ms. Owens promoted Petitioner to the position of Investigation Specialist I. Ms. Owens waived the requirements of a college degree and investigative writing experience for this new position, because Petitioner already worked for FCHR and had expressed an interest in moving up. The Investigator Specialist I position is a Selected Exempt Service position which included investigating cases, as well as “intake” duties. Ms. Owens explained to Petitioner that she would be doing investigations after about four months on the job. Petitioner was promoted to this position in January 2005. Ms. Owens sent Petitioner to Washington D.C. for training on three occasions in 2005: February, June, and December. Each training session lasted about a week and was conducted by the National Fair Housing Training Academy. After attending the February week-long training session, Petitioner continued to perform solely “intake” duties. Following the February training, Ms. Owens asked Petitioner if she was ready to take on an investigative caseload. Petitioner indicated that she was not ready to do so at that time. After Petitioner attended the June 2005, training session, Ms. Owens again spoke to Petitioner and determined that Petitioner was still not ready to take on investigative duties, although she had been in the position more than four months. In September 2005, Ms. Owens had e-mail communications with Petitioner, which gave her cause for concern that Petitioner might not know the answers to matters on which she had received training. In particular, Ms. Owens was concerned that Petitioner’s e-mail responses to her indicated that Petitioner was confused as to whom an investigator should be dealing with in a particular situation. Petitioner attended the third week-long training session in December 2005. After a discussion with Petitioner, Ms. Owens was still concerned about Petitioner’s reluctance to take on investigative duties despite her training and length of time on the job. Petitioner had been in the investigator specialist position for nearly a year but never investigated a case. In late December 2005, Ms. Owens developed a test for employees of the housing unit. The purpose of the test was to test employees’ working knowledge of the HUD manual and research skills in using the manual, specifically regarding the intake process. The “Housing Unit Intake Test” was based on the HUD manual, which is the book that all investigators have and use. The test was similar to the test the investigators had to take in Washington during training. The test developed by Ms. Owens is now given to all new investigators during their training. On January 5, 2006, Petitioner was first given the test using a “closed book” administration. The test pertained to the HUD manual materials, and Petitioner was given an hour to complete the closed book test. The purpose of the closed book administration was to assess the employee’s working knowledge of the subject matter. Petitioner scored ten correct answers out of 34 test questions. On January 6, 2006, Ms. Owens again gave Petitioner the same test questions. However, this second administration of the test was “open book” with two hours allowed to take the test. The open book administration was designed to assess the employee’s ability to do research, find the answers in the HUD manual, and to answer the questions correctly. Petitioner scored 11 correct answers out of 34 test questions. Also on January 6, 2006, Ms. Owens administered the same test to investigation specialist Julina Dolce. Ms. Dolce’s score on the closed book test is unclear from the record. However, on the open book test, Ms. Dolce received a score of 27 correct answers out of 34 test questions. After taking the test, Petitioner spoke to Ms. Dolce about what was on the test. However, there is no evidence in the record that Ms. Owens was aware that Ms. Dolce had a “heads up” on the test content prior to taking the test. The test was also given to Marshetta Smith on January 6, 2006. At the time she took the test, Ms. Smith was a senior clerk who did not do much intake work, and was approximately 30 years old at the time. While not an investigator, Ms. Smith was given the test to assess her working knowledge and research skills for potential upward mobility. Ms. Smith had 11 correct answers out of 34 test questions. Ms. Smith has since been terminated from employment with Respondent. About two weeks after administering the first test, Ms. Owens administered a different test, the “55+ exam”, which pertained to housing regulations for older persons. Petitioner scored 14 correct answers out of 20 test questions on the closed book administration and 16 correct answers out of 20 test questions on the open book administration of the test. Based upon her reluctance to take on an investigative caseload and upon her poor performance on the intake test, it was determined that Petitioner would be demoted to a senior clerk position. A meeting was held on January 26, 2006, with Ms. Owens, Petitioner, and the human resources manager, informing Petitioner of the intended demotion to be effective February 10, 2006. On January 30, 2006, Petitioner submitted her letter of resignation to Ms. Owens effective February 6, 2006. Her resignation was accepted, effective the close of business February 6, 2006. Consequently, the demotion did not take place as Petitioner resigned from employment with Respondent prior to the effective date of the intended demotion. After Petitioner’s resignation, Respondent moved Ms. Dolce into Petitioner’s position of investigation specialist. At that time, Ms. Dolce was 31 years old. While making a vague assertion that Ms. Owens made innuendos regarding younger people “some time ago”, Petitioner acknowledged that Ms. Owens never said anything derogatory to Petitioner about her age. Sherry Taylor began working at FCHR in 1999 as a senior clerk. She moved into an investigator position in April 2000. When Ms. Owens came into the housing unit in 2004, Ms. Taylor was an investigator II. Ms. Taylor was demoted in the fall of 2006 to an investigator I because the quality of her work “went downhill." At the time of her demotion, Ms. Taylor was 30 years old. There is no competent evidence that FCHR used age as a criterion in its decision to demote Petitioner. Timeliness Petitioner sent a document entitled “Technical Assistance Questionnaire for Employment Complaints” to the EEO Office, which alleged that she had been discriminated against by FCHR on the basis of her age. The fax cover sheet shows a date of January 19, 2007, but no “received” stamp appears on the document. The document included a request from Petitioner that the “complaint” not be forwarded to FCHR for investigation. Despite this request, the EEO office forwarded the completed questionnaire to FCHR on January 31, 2007. This date is confirmed by the date stamp indicating receipt, as well as the fax transmittal notation at the top of each page. However, the investigation was conducted by the EEO Office. The Determination: No Cause dated July 30, 2007, issued by FCHR to Petitioner states in part that “the timeliness and all jurisdictional requirements have been met.”

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2008.

CFR (1) 29 CFR 1601.70 Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.10760.11
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DIANE HAWKINS vs BEST WESTERN, 06-002905 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Aug. 15, 2006 Number: 06-002905 Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2007

The Issue Whether Petitioner's termination from employment by Respondent on June 15, 2005, was discriminatory in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2005), due to Petitioner's race (African American).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Black female, was employed by Respondent from November 23, 1998, until her termination on June 14, 2005. Petitioner had performed her duties as a housekeeper adequately during her employment period and had no major disciplinary reports in her record. Her annual reviews indicate she was a fair employee. She had a history of tardiness, but seemed to be getting better in her last years of employment. Petitioner had received a verbal warning notice on March 8, 2005, relating to an altercation with another employee, Katrina Stevens. It appears Petitioner did not instigate the confrontation nor did she actively participate in the argument between Stevens and another employee. She simply happened to be standing nearby when it occurred. A verbal warning notice is preliminary to a reprimand. The other employee, Martine Lane, received a reprimand for the incident. On June 8, 2005, Petitioner received another verbal warning notice, this time for instigating negative remarks toward her supervisor. The gravamen of her complaint about the supervisor was that a certain co-worker had been named Employee of the Month instead of Petitioner. Petitioner became more defiant towards her supervisors and management toward the end of her employment. She would not help out other employees when asked, preferring to tend to her own work area, even when her work was completed. She also made derogatory comments to the co-worker who had won Employee of the Month. When Petitioner's behavior did not change, a decision was made to terminate her employment. It was a difficult decision because good housekeepers were hard to find and Petitioner's work product had always been acceptable. Petitioner had always been well-liked and respected by fellow employees. Both co-workers and management had encouraged Petitioner to apply for supervisory positions when they opened. Her supervisors indicated that, with some training, she could handle a supervisory position. The decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made by the Executive Housekeeper, Steve Jensen. He relied upon input from other management. On June 18, 2005, Petitioner was stopped from clocking in when she came to work. She was told to report to Jensen's office, which she did. At that time Jensen asked her whether she was still happy with her job, then told her she was being terminated. The reasons given were that she was not supportive, not a team player, and had become more belligerent to management. No mention of race was made as a basis for her termination and none seems to have existed. Petitioner was advised she would be entitled to vacation pay, but it was later discovered she had already used up her available vacation time. Respondent subsequently called Petitioner to offer her a different job, but Petitioner had no interest in returning to work for the company. Respondent has anti-discrimination policies in place, is an equal opportunity employer, and employs minorities in supervisory positions. Interestingly, however, there were no other Black housekeepers employed while Petitioner was working. When a supervisory position opened, Respondent would attempt to fill the position from within its existing employee pool. Two such positions opened when Petitioner was employed. Seven then-current employees applied for those positions, including Petitioner. Of the seven, four had prior supervisory experience; Petitioner did not. Two of the applicants had been with the company longer than Petitioner. Five of the seven applicants had computer knowledge and skills; Petitioner did not. Petitioner is the only candidate who admitted a fear of heights, a minor consideration for the position. Petitioner is the only candidate who stated she could not work on weekends. Petitioner was clearly not the best applicant for the job based on comparison to other candidates. Petitioner did not provide any evidence that her race was a basis for her termination from employment. None of her witnesses provided credible statements concerning discrimination. In fact, her witnesses by and large did not see any discrimination by management.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Hawkins 1556 University Lane, Number 407 Cocoa, Florida 32922 Theodore L. Shinkle, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 1800 West Hibiscus Boulevard, Suite 138 Melbourne, Florida 32901 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.02760.10
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DENNIS M. PRESSON vs CRAFT MAINTENANCE COUNCIL, CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1820, 96-001904 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Apr. 19, 1996 Number: 96-001904 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue Did Respondent discriminate against Petitioner because of his handicap and in retaliation for filing an earlier discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, as alleged in Petitioner's Petition For Relief, in violation of Sections 760.01 - 760.11, Florida Statutes, known as the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: Petitioner checked the boxes for both Handicap and Retaliation in the section titled "Cause of Discrimination Based On" of the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on May 14, 1994. In the section titled "Date Most Recent or Continuing Discrimination Took Place" of the Charge of Discrimination Petitioner indicated December 22, 1992. In the section titled "The Particulars Are" of the Charge of Discrimination Petitioner indicated: PERSONAL HARM: On a continuing basis I have not been referred for work by my union, with the last occurrence on December 22, 1992. RESPONDENT'S REASON FOR ADVERSE ACTION: Mr. Mike Brewer, Union Business Agent, said that I was not wanted in the department in which I had previously worked. DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT: I believe I have been discriminated against because of retaliation for filing (FCHR No. 90-8052) for the following reasons: The last time I contacted Mr. Brewer he hung up on me. continuing Mr. Brewer has referred other union members for work on a basis. A NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE was issued by the Commission on March 11, 1996. In Section 3 of the Petition For Relief filed with the Commission on April 15, 1996, Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1993, as Amended, as follows: Conspiring with company to isolate the HANDICAPPED Petitioner in a classification essentially made obsolete with an ex post facto "Crafts Maintenance Contract" subsequent to the July 26, 1990 signing of the A.D.A. (singling him out for "layoff") F.S. 760.10(4b). Filing a grievance to deter the Petitioner from filing any HANDICAP Discrimination complaints, and refusing to process it. Referring others for employment on a continuing basis, (F.S. 760.104(b). Refusing representation. (Foreman/union steward?) At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner Dennis M. Presson was a member of the bargaining unit of the Craft Maintenance Council, Carpenters Local Union No. 1820. Respondent Craft Maintenance Council, Carpenters Local Union No. 1820 Statutes. Commission and the courts. as a Property Craftworker Assistant, and assigned Petitioner to the Furnishings 10. During August, 1990, the work in Furnishings declined and, in lieu of craftworker assistants, including Petitioner, were temporarily assigned on through the first week of October 1990. October 11, 1990, was laid off due to lack of work in Furnishings. Petitioner 12. On November 2, 1990, the remaining six property craftworker assistants higher in seniority than Petitioner. transferred back to Furnishings so that he could be laid off is without merit. department until their function could no longer be justified in lieu of laying The lay-offs on October 11 and November 2, 1990, were caused by lack get back at Petitioner because of his handicap or in retaliation for filing an On October 11, 1990, when Petitioner was laid off, Disney offered as custodians. Although other property craftworker assistants accepted work as On October 12, 1990, Michael Brewer, Shop Steward filed an Employee of seniority - another worker with lower seniority had been retained. Respondent settled with Disney for $2,500 rather than proceed to final and Petitioner received payment. grievance or delayed or refused to process the grievance so as to deter During the grievance process Disney again offered Petitioner a job as From the time Petitioner was laid off on October 11, 1990, until December, 1992, Respondent referred Petitioner to six or seven jobs. These jobs covered every field where the work required unskilled or slightly skilled employees. Petitioner declined each and every offer, stating that he was an artist and wanted a job as an artist. Prior to Petitioner filing this complaint with the Commission, Respondent's last contact with Petitioner was around December 1992, when Petitioner informed Respondent that he had a job as an artist with Dollywood in Tennessee and was moving. On August 27, 1992, Petitioner filed a charge against Respondent with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that Respondent "has restrained or coerced and is restraining and coercing Dennis M. Presson, a crafts worker assistant, in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by refusing to advise him of the status of his grievance on his layoff, for arbitrary, invidious and discriminatory reasons and therefore has breached its of fair representation". The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charge for lack of merit. Respondent has referred Petitioner to jobs where Petitioner's skill matched the classification (unskilled or slightly skilled) of the job being offered. There was no evidence that Respondent had refused or failed to refer Petitioner to jobs that matched his skill because of Petitioner's handicap or in retaliation for filing an earlier discrimination complaint against Disney with the Commission. Petitioner presented no evidence of any job that matched his skill that was available through Respondent which Respondent failed or refused to refer Petitioner for any reason. Based on Petitioner's allegation, Respondent's last refusal to refer Petitioner to an available job occurred in December 1992. There was no evidence that Respondent: (a) conspired with Disney to isolate Petitioner in a classification made obsolete with an ex post facto "Crafts Maintenance Contract" subsequent to the July 26, 1990, signing of the A.D.A. (Americans with Disabilities Act); (b) conspired with Disney to single Petitioner our for lay off; or (c) refuse to represent Petitioner while a member of the union. Petitioner has neither been employed nor has he attempted to obtain any gainful employment since he was laid off by Disney on October 11, 1990. During this period Petitioner has worked on this case and looked after his mother. Petitioner survives on food stamps and other governmental subsidies.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, accordingly, Recommended that the Petition for Relief filed by Dennis M. Presson against Craft Maintenance Council, Carpenters Local Union No. 1820 be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of November, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 2816 4th Street Orlando, Florida 32820 Thomas Egan, P.A. 56 East Pine Street

USC (1) 421 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.01760.10760.11
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