Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
SELCUK YETIMOGLU vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 90-003669 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 13, 1990 Number: 90-003669 Latest Update: Mar. 11, 1991

Findings Of Fact On January 22, 1986, American Aviation Resources, Inc., sold an airplane to Munur Yurtsever, a resident of Brazil. This aircraft was a Hansa jet model HFB-320 with U.S. registration number N71DL (the subject aircraft). On January 28, 1986, Mr. Yurtsever transferred title of the subject aircraft to Petitioner, Selcuk Yetimoglu. At the time of the transfer, the subject aircraft was in the State of Florida undergoing repairs. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Yetimoglu resided at 20530 Jacaranda Road, Cutler Ridge, Miami, Florida, in a residence owned by Mr. Yurtsever. The aircraft bill of sale dated January 28, 1986, reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu was the purchaser of the subject aircraft and that Mr. Yurtsever was the seller. The bill of sale recited that the consideration paid was $20.00 and other good and valuable consideration. While the bill of sale reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu resided in Miami, Florida, the bill of sale does not state that the sale occurred in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu applied to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the registration of the subject aircraft in his name. On March 13, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote to the FAA regarding the registration and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Mr. Munur Yurtsever sold the aircraft to me on January 28, 1986, five days after he bought the aircraft from American Aviation Resources, Inc. when he found out that the government of Brazil did not give him a (sic) permission to import the aircraft and that he could not register the aircraft in the United States because he was not a citizen of the United States. By letter dated May 15, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu provided the FAA proof that the subject aircraft had not been registered in Brazil. Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner of the subject aircraft between January 28, 1986, and March 13, 1987. On March 13, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu sold the subject aircraft back to Mr. Yurtsever. The bill of sale identifies the purchaser as being: Munur Yurtsever Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. Av. Mal. Camara 160-GR. Rio de Janeiro - RJ Brazil On April 8, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote the FAA and stated, in pertinent part: ... I request cancelation of U.S. registra- tion for the aircraft ... because I sold the aircraft back to Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. ... On January 11, 1988, Respondent issued to Petitioner a "Notice of Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Due and Assessed" (Notice of Assessment) based on the transaction involving Mr. Yetimoglu, Mr. Yurtsever, and the subject aircraft. The Notice of Assessment contained the following statement: "This Department has information that you purchased the following aircraft. However, there is no evidence of payment of Florida Sales and/or Use Tax". The Notice of Assessment reflected that Respondent had, pursuant to Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, estimated the value of the aircraft as being $320,000 and assessed the following taxes, interest, and penalties: Florida State Sales/Use Tax 5% $16,000.00 (Estimated) Per 212.06(8), F.S. Penalty 5% per month; Maximum 25% of 4,000.00 (25%) Tax Due Per Section 212.12(2), F.S. Additional Penalty 11,840.00 (50%) Per 212.12(2)(a), F.S. Interest = 1% per month from date of 3,680.00 (23%) Purchase To Date of Payment Per Section 212.12(3), F.S. Less Tax Paid ----------------- TOTAL DUE WITH THIS NOTICE $35,520.00 Respondent requested that Mr. Yetimoglu provide it information and documentation as to the value of the aircraft. Mr. Yetimoglu contends that he paid Mr. Yurtsever nothing for the aircraft, that the title was transferred to him and registered in the FAA in his name so that the aircraft could be test flown after it was repaired, and that Mr. Yurtsever had paid $100,000 for the aircraft. There was no evidence as to the sales price that Mr. Yetimoglu paid for the aircraft other than Mr. Yetimoglu's testimony. Respondent estimated that the reasonable value of the subject aircraft on January 28, 1986, was $320,000. This estimate was based on an appraisal prepared for Respondent and assumed that the aircraft was in a scrapped or junked condition. Respondent generally uses a standard reference work on the value of aircraft to assist it in estimating the value of the subject aircraft. Because of its age and model, the subject aircraft is no longer listed in this standard reference. In support of his contention that Mr. Yurtsever paid $100,000 for the aircraft, Mr. Yetimoglu provided Respondent with a copy of a wire transfer of funds from Mr. Yurtsever to American Aviation Resources, Inc. in the amount of $100,000. However, there was no documentation provided that established that the $100,000 constituted the entire purchase price paid by Mr. Yurtsever. The dispute between the parties as to the value of the aircraft is resolved by finding, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that the reasonable value of the aircraft at the times pertinent to this proceeding was $320,000.00. In December 1986, while Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner, the subject aircraft engaged in international flight between the Turks and Caicos Islands and the State of Florida. Respondent's Notice of Redetermination, dated February 26, 1990, upheld the Notice of Assessment on the basis that the underlying transaction was subject to use tax pursuant to Section 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The issue to be resolved was framed by the Notice of Redetermination as being: "The only issue involved pertains to a use tax assessment upon an aircraft brought into this country". This determination was based, in part, upon a letter to Respondent from an attorney who was representing Mr. Yetimoglu at the time the letter was written. 1/ The letter implied that the aircraft was brought into Florida after the title was transferred to Mr. Yetimoglu, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The transferor of the aircraft, Munur Yurtsever, is a nonresident alien. His inten- tion is to deliver the plane to a purchaser outside the country. Mr. Yurtsever advises that the F.A.A. will not allow the plane to be flown in this country unless it is owned by a U.S. resident. As it was imperative to fly the plane here in order to prepare it for its flight outside the country, Mr. Yurtsever transferred the plane to his partner, Selcuk Yetimoglu, who is a resident of the United States. ... At the formal hearing, Mr. Yetimoglu established that the aircraft was in Florida undergoing repairs at the time the title was transferred to him. Prior to and at the formal hearing, Respondent asserted the position that use taxes, interest, and penalties were due for this transaction. In its post- hearing submittal, Respondent, for the first time in this proceeding, contends that sales taxes, interest and penalties are due for this transaction.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which withdraws the subject assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57212.02212.05212.06212.12
# 1
TOMBSTONE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 98-001519 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 27, 1998 Number: 98-001519 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is liable for sales and use taxes, penalties, and interest and, if so, how much.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner operated a bar and grill in Punta Gorda that served beer, wine, liquor, and food at retail. In the course of business, Petitioner collected tax from the customers. Petitioner reported to Respondent sales tax collections for May 1996, November 1996, March 1997, November 1997, and December 1997. In connection with these collections, Petitioner remitted to Respondent seven checks representing the net tax due Respondent. These checks totaled $6700.64. The bank on which the checks were drawn dishonored them. The remittance of net sales tax proceeds by payment through checks that are later dishonored implies a fraudulent, willful intent to evade the payment of these sums. Respondent has issued five warrants concerning the unremitted taxes, penalties, and interest. Warrant 953620064 shows that Petitioner owes $1171 in sales tax remittances for the five months from July through November 1995. With penalties and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $1832.37. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.35. Warrant 467049 shows that Petitioner owes $2940.25 in sales tax remittances for the following months: April 1996, October 1996, December 1996, and January 1997. Petitioner purportedly paid each of these remittances with five (two in January) checks that were later dishonored. With penalties, including the 100 percent penalty for fraud, and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $7480.12. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.95. Warrant 971680037 shows that Petitioner owes $1301.85 in sales tax remittances for the following months: December 1995, June 1996, July 1996, September 1996, November 1996, and February 1997. With penalties and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $2669.69. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.43. Warrant 471481 shows that Petitioner owes $2912.48 in sales tax remittances for October and November 1997, for which Petitioner made remittances with two dishonored checks. With penalties, including the 100 percent penalty, and interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $6751.49. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $0.95. Warrant 989840034 shows that Petitioner owes $8077.76 in sales tax remittances for the following months: August 1997, September 1997, December 1997, January 1998, and February 1998. With interest, the total due on this warrant, through June 5, 1998, is $8285.21. Interest accrues after June 5 at the daily rate of $2.65. Totaling the five warrants, Petitioner owes a total of $27,018.88 in taxes, penalties, and interest through June 5, 1998, and $5.33 per day for each ensuing day until the amount is paid.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $27,018.88 in taxes, penalties, and interest through June 5, 1998, and $5.33 per day for each ensuing day until the amount is paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John N. Upchurch Nicholas Bykowsky Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Judith Crown, President Tombstone, Inc. Suite P-50 1200 West Retta Esplanade Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668

Florida Laws (3) 120.57212.11212.12
# 2
OMNI INTERNATIONAL OF MIAMI, LTD. vs. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 83-000065 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000065 Latest Update: Jan. 09, 1991

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Omni International of Miami, Limited (Omni), is the owner of a large complex located at 1601 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. The complex is commonly known as the Omni complex, and contains a shopping mall, hotel and parking garage. On July 30, 1981, Petitioner filed two applications for refund with Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, seeking a refund of $57,866.20 and $4,466.48 for sales tax previously paid to the Department of Revenue on sales of electricity and gas consumed by its commercial tenants from April, 1978 through March, 1981. On November 22, 1982, Respondent denied the applications. The denial prompted the instant proceeding. The shopping mall portion of the Omni complex houses more than one hundred fifty commercial tenants, each of whom has entered into a lease arrangement with Omni. The utility companies do not provide individual electric and gas meters to each commercial tenant but instead furnish the utilities through a single master meter. Because of this, it is necessary that electricity and gas charges be reallocated to each tenant on a monthly basis. Therefore, Omni receives a single monthly electric and gas bill reflecting total consumption for the entire complex, and charges each tenant its estimated monthly consumption plus a sales tax on that amount. The utility charge is separately itemized on the tenant's bill and includes a provision for sales tax. Petitioner has paid all required sales taxes on such consumption. The estimated consumption is derived after reviewing the number of electric outlets, hours of operations, square footage, and number and type of appliances and lights that are used within the rented space. This consumption is then applied to billing schedules prepared by the utility companies which give the monthly charge. The estimates are revised every six months based upon further inspections of the tenant's premises, and any changes such as the adding or decreasing of appliances and lights, or different hours of operations. The lease agreement executed by Omni and its tenants provides that if Omni opts to furnish utilities through a master meter arrangement, as it has done in the past, the tenant agrees to "pay additional rent therefor when bills are rendered." This term was included in the lease to give Omni the right to invoke the rent default provision of the lease in the event a tenant failed to make payment. It is not construed as additional rent or consideration for the privilege of occupying the premises. Omni makes no profit on the sale of electricity and gas. Rather, it is simply being reimbursed by the tenants for their actual utility consumption. If the applications are denied, Petitioner will have paid a sales tax on the utility consumption twice -- once when the monthly utility bills were paid, and a second time for "additional rent" for occupancy of the premises.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's applications for refund, with interest, be approved. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1983.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57212.031212.081
# 4
WALKER OIL COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 77-000807 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000807 Latest Update: Sep. 25, 1979

The Issue Petitioner's alleged liability for motor fuel and special fuel tax, interest, and penalties, pursuant to Chapter 206, F.S., as set forth in Notice of Proposed Assessments, dated April 1, 1977.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Walker Oil Company is located in Pensacola, Florida and is licensed by the State of Florida under Chapter 206, Florida Statutes, as a dealer in special fuels. The firm is also licensed in the State of Alabama with respect to the sale of both special fuels and motor fuel. The company was formed in 1955 and during ensuing years operated service stations and sold motor fuel and special fuels in the Pensacola and south Alabama area. Its operations were audited yearly during the period 1955 to 1961 by Respondent. In 1972 an audit for the period October 1970 to March 1972 revealed underpayments of special fuel tax in the approximate amount of $600 during the audit period. (Testimony of Walker, Exhibit 5) In July 1975, Respondent's auditor, Clyde Whitehead, commenced an audit of Petitioner's records to determine whether any motor fuel or special fuel taxes were delinquent for the period July 1, 1972 through June 30, 1975. Although Petitioner's records were available to the auditor for the period January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, no records were available for the initial 18 month period of the audit from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1973. Petitioner had filed monthly tax reports with Respondent as to special fuels, but had not submitted any such reports during the audit period for motor fuel. (Testimony of Whitehead, Walker) As a result of the audit, an assessment of $43,356.11, including interest and penalty, for motor fuel taxes incurred during the period January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, was asserted against Petitioner. The assessment was based on audit findings that Petitioner had sold 430,866 taxable gallons, but had not remitted the tax to Respondent. Petitioner paid the assessment. C. C. Walker, Petitioner's former president, testified at the hearing that such payment was made in order to secure the dismissal of then pending state criminal charges alleging that Petitioner had "bootlegged" gasoline during the period in question. (Testimony of Walker, Exhibit 2) Pursuant to the audit findings, a Notice of Proposed Assessment for delinquent motor fuel taxes during the period July 1, 1972 through December 1, 1973, in the amount of $20,076.43, including penalty and interest through March 31, 1977, was issued by Respondent on April 6, 1977. On the same date, a Notice of Proposed Assessment for special fuel tax in the amount of $51,022.96, including penalty and interest through March 31, 1977, was also issued to Petitioner. A revised assessment, dated September 19, 1978, deleted certain portions of interest charged on the original proposed assessments. These deletions resulted in the reduction of motor fuel assessment to $12,396.52, and the special fuel assessment to $38,052.90. After the hearing, under date of February 27, 1979, Respondent further reduced the motor fuel assessment to $6,732.22. (Exhibit 1, Hearing Officer Exhibit 1) Due to the absence of Petitioner's records for the first 18 month period of the audit, Respondent based liability for motor fuel and special fuel taxes for that period on an estimate, using audit findings of the second 18 month period of the audit for which Petitioner's records were available. This was the first instance in at least 13 years in which an estimated assessment of fuel tax had been made by Respondent. Respondent had no regulations or established policy for arriving at such an estimate, but its officials testified that they simply tried to be "fair and equitable" in making the determination. (Testimony of Williamson, Thomas, Deposition of Whitehead, Exhibit 3) Respondent's method of estimating Petitioner's motor fuel tax liability was predicated upon relating the known 1974-75 figures on purchases and sales of gasoline and the amount of tax found delinquent during that period, to known purchases of gasoline by Petitioner during the period of the estimated assessment. The audit for the period 1974-75 showed that 60 1/2 percent of Petitioner's gasoline purchases from known suppliers in Florida and Alabama had been sold in Florida. Respondent therefore determined from the sales records of Petitioner's known gasoline suppliers and from tax reports it had submitted to Alabama, that the firm had purchased 4,221,454 gallons of motor fuel during the 1972-73 period. Applying the 60 1/2 percent factor, Respondent's auditor determined that 2,554,259 gallons had been sold in Florida during that period. Since it had been found that Petitioner had sold 430,866 taxable gallons during the 1974-75 period for which tax had not been remitted to the state, which was 7 1/2 percent of its total Florida sales for that period, Respondent applied the same factor to the estimated amount of Florida sales during the 1972-73 period. This resulted in an estimated 191,569 gallons on which Respondent assumed Petitioner had collected but not remitted the motor fuel tax. By multiplying this figure by the 8 cents tax per gallon, it was estimated that Petitioner owed $15,325.52 to the state. This figure was later revised by the February 27th Notice of Adjusted Final Assessment to $10,176.15 plus a 10 percent penalty of $1,017.62. This reduction was based on the fact that approximately 1/3 of Petitioner's total sales of motor fuel during the 1974-75 period was made to one company named Pac-a-Sak, which did not do business with the firm during the first 18 month period of the audit. After deducting the sum of $4,461.55 representing overpayment of interest in the 1974-75 assessment payment, Respondent determined that $6,732.22 was due for motor fuel tax during the 1972- 73 audit period. The original estimated assessment reflects Respondent's acknowledgment that only the lesser amount reflected therein is due. (Testimony of Whitehead, Thomas, Deposition of Whitehead, (Exhibit 3), Exhibits 2, 4B, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1) Respondent's proposed assessment against Petitioner for special fuel tax and penalty in the total amount of $38,052.90 is derived from audit findings based on availability of Petitioner's records for the 1974-75 portion of the audit period, and on an estimated assessment for the 1972-73 period. Additionally, Petitioner's Florida tax reports for the entire period were used in making the audit. It was determined that Petitioner had purchased 1,510,073 gallons of special fuel in Florida during the 1974-75 period and had sold 1,590,587 gallons in Florida during the same period. The auditor found that Petitioner had sold 156,150 gallons of special fuel for which Petitioner should have collected tax, but did not. The bulk of the untaxed gallonage was sold to Hinesway Trucking Company and Polar Ice Cream Company, neither of which were licensed as special fuel dealers in Florida. Therefore, all of the sales to these two companies were treated as taxable sales, because no resale certificates were obtained by Petitioner when it sold special fuel tax free to those companies. The principal of Hinesway Trucking Company had mistakenly informed Petitioner's office employee that it was licensed as a special fuel dealer when in fact it was not. The audit findings showed that Petitioner had sold a total of 841,855 taxable gallons during the 1974-75 period, for which tax was due in the amount of $67,348.40, but that tax had only been remitted by Petitioner in the amount of $46,809.60, leaving a total tax due of $20,538.80. The total due and payable by Petitioner to Respondent for this period was therefore computed to be $24,443.05, including penalty and interest through June 30, 1975. It is found that the audit correctly reflects Petitioner's special fuel tax liability for the 1974-75 period. (Deposition of Whitehead (Exhibit 3), Exhibit 2, 4A) The estimated special fuel tax for the 1972-73 period was calculated in a manner similar to that of the estimated motor fuel tax assessment. Respondent's auditor determined that Petitioner's taxable sales during the 1974- 75 period were approximately 53 percent of its total sales. He also determined that Petitioner had experienced a 15 percent increase in business in the latter period. It was therefore determined to estimate the sales for the 1972-73 period as being 85 percent of the total sales of 1,590,587 gallons during the later period which resulted in an estimated 1,351,999 gallons sold in Florida during 1972-73. Applying the taxable percentage of approximately 53 percent to this figure led to a finding that 715,577 taxable gallons had been sold by Petitioner. Petitioner had reported the sale of 539,893 taxable gallons; and accordingly, the audit found that additional tax was due on the difference of 175,684 gallons at 8 cents per gallon, resulting in estimated tax due of $14,054.72. Thus, this figure added to the 1974-75 deficiency of $20,538.80 resulted in an alleged special fuel tax deficiency for the audit period in the amount of $34,593.52, plus a 10 percent penalty in the amount of $3,459.38 for a total amount due of $38,052.90. Respondent, in formulating the above estimated assessment for the 1972-73 period, assumed that Petitioner had the same percentage of taxable sales as that for the 1974-75 period. However, approximately 150,000 taxable gallons on which tax had not been collected during the 1974-75 period were sold by Petitioner to Hinesway Trucking Company from about June 1974 through June 1975, under a misapprehension as to its nonlicensed status. Hinesway had not been a customer of Petitioner prior to 1974. Respondent's auditors made no allowances for this unusual situation, nor did it consider the low deficiencies accrued by Petitioner as a result of its 1970-72 audit. (Testimony of Walker, Deposition of Whitehead (Exhibit 3) Exhibit 1-2, 4A) Petitioner's president, C. C. Walker, testified at the hearing that as a result of the "personal vendetta" of an employee of Respondent in harassing Petitioner's customers and releasing unfounded information to the press, plus the instigation of criminal charges against the firm, a great loss of business was caused and severe damage to its reputation in the community. He denied any intentional wrongful acts on the part of the company or any of its personnel and claimed that any Florida sales of fuel for which tax was not paid was due to "human error." (Testimony of Walker)

Recommendation That the proposed assessment of motor fuel tax and penalty, as set forth in Respondent's Notice of Adjusted Final Assessment, dated February 27, 1979, be withdrawn. That Respondent's Notice of Proposed Assessment (adjusted) for special fuel tax and penalty, dated September 19, 1978, be revised to delete inclusion of Petitioner's sales to Hinesway Company as a factor in determining an estimated assessment, and that such revised assessment be asserted against Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 16 day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Davis, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol LL05 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James R. Green, Esquire Seville Tower 226 South Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ACTION NOTICE =================================================================

Florida Laws (9) 206.01206.06206.12206.14206.41206.43206.59206.94206.97
# 5
LAWRENCE NALI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 76-001823 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001823 Latest Update: Nov. 29, 1977

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to certain facts, legal issues, and their respective contentions, as follow: "1. At all times pertinent to this action, Petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc., was a Florida Corporation licensed and doing business in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this action, Respondent Department of Revenue, State of Florida, was an agency of the State of Florida exercising duties relating to the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent conducted an audit of tran- sactions involving Petitioner for the period November 1, 1972, through October 31, 1975. As a result of that audit, Respondent claims that as of September 17, 1976, the Petitioner had a balance due to the Depart- ment of Revenue of $17,383.58 in taxes, interest and penalties. The assessment indicating the above amount is attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner is in agreement that if the assessment is upheld, Petitioner owes to the Respondent the amount of $17,383.58 plus interest calculated to date of payment to Respondent. The tax assessment in this case is based upon two factual situations: Petitioner, manufactured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities consisting of cities, towns, municipalities, counties, school boards, junior colleges and others. Petitioner also hauled the asphalt to the job cite (sic) at a fixed ton/mile rate determined by bid. Petitioner, as a subcontractor, manu- factured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities above described. The general contractor contracted with the political entities in various fashions but the Petitioner's duties were always the same and included manufacture, installation and hauling of asphaltic concrete based on a rate certain per ton and per ton mile. The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is correct in contending that the Petitioner must pay a sales and use tax on the produced asphalt which it uses in the performance of the construction contract jobs described in paragraph 6. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was remitted, by the Petitioner on the produced asphalt. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was paid by the instant customers to the Petitioner. It is Respondent's contention that, pursuant to the above-cited rules, the Peti- tioner is required to pay sales or use tax on the produced asphalt which is used to construct real property pursuant to a con- tract described in Rule 12A-1.51(2)(a), F.A.C. It is Petitioner's contention that the above-cited rules do not apply in the instant case since the customers involved in the instant fact situations are political subdivision or because the transaction was of the type described by Rule 12A-1.51(2)(d), F.A.C. Petitioner is entitled to rely on the earlier 1967 audit by Respondent because neither Petitioner's method of doing business, nor the law, has changed materially since 1967. Respondent agrees that this is an issue but fails to agree that Petitioner is so entitled to rely." All purchase orders or invitations for bid received by petitioner from political subdivisions stated that the entity was exempt from federal and state sales taxes and that such taxes should not be included in the bid. Typical bid forms entitled "Specifications for Asphaltic Concrete" called for a lump-sum price per ton for delivery and placement of the material by the vendor plus a sum per ton per mile for transportation costs. No breakdown of amounts for the cost of materials and cost of installation is reflected in the bid documents. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook, Exhibits 3, 7 (late filed)) Respondent audited petitioner's operations in 1967 and, although it had had previous transactions with governmental entities prior to that date, no assessment for back taxes was issued for failure to pay sales tax on such transactions nor was petitioner advised to do so in the future by state officials. After 1967, petitioner did not seek information from respondent concerning the subject of sales tax. As a consequence of the 1967 audit, petitioner believed that it was unnecessary to charge or pay sales tax on such transactions with political subdivisions. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook) As of April 1, 1977, Brevard County had a population of over 250,000. Although it is a large county in terms of size, respondent has only two auditors in the sales tax division to cover the entire county. (Testimony of Alberto, Cowan, Exhibit 4)

Recommendation That the petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc. be held liable for sales tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set forth in respondent's proposed assessment. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Brown, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Andrew A. Graham, Esquire Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922

Florida Laws (6) 120.56212.02212.05212.07212.08212.12
# 6
CHEROKEE RENTAL AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 90-003246 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 24, 1990 Number: 90-003246 Latest Update: Oct. 18, 1990

Findings Of Fact In a letter dated April 13, 1990, the Department informed the Petitioner, Cherokee Rental And Construction Co., Inc., that it was denying the Petitioner's request for refund of the $95.00 fuel tax and civil penalty assessment it had previously paid to the Department. In a letter received by the Department on February 13, 1990, the Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the Department's decision. The address included on the Petitioner's letter was the address used by the Department to notify the Petitioner of its decision to deny its request for a refund. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on June 1, 1990, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address listed in its letter requesting a formal hearing. Neither party responded to the Notice. On July 12, 1990, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner at the address listed in his letter requesting a formal hearing. The Petitioner did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Department was present at the hearing. The Petitioner did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that he would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Petitioner to appear, the hearing was commenced. At the commencement of the formal hearing the Department was informed that it could proceed with the formal hearing or, since Petitioner had the burden of proof in this case, move for dismissal of the case. The Department elected to make an ore tenus motion for dismissal. The Department was informed that a Recommended Order would be issued recommending dismissal of this case.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's request for hearing in this case for failure to appear at the final hearing. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Read Cherokee Rental & Construction Co., Inc. Post Office Box 850606 Mobile, Alabama 36685 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
# 7
SUNSHINE TOWING AT BROWARD, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 10-000134BID (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 12, 2010 Number: 10-000134BID Latest Update: May 07, 2010

The Issue The issues in this bid protest are, first, whether, as Petitioner alleges, Intervenor's failure to attach copies of "occupational licenses" to its proposal was a deviation from the requirements of the Request for Proposal; second, whether any such deviation was material; and third, whether Respondent's preliminary decision to award Intervenor the contract at issue was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.

Findings Of Fact On September 18, 2009, Respondent Department of Transportation ("Department") issued Request for Proposal No. RFP-DOT-09/10-4007FS (the "RFP"). Through the RFP, which is entitled, "Treasure Coast Road Ranger Service Patrol," the Department solicited written proposals from qualified providers who would be willing and able to perform towing and emergency roadside services on Interstate 95 in Martin County, St. Lucie County, and Indian River County. The Department intended to award a three-year contract to the "responsive and responsible Proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department." The Department anticipated that the contract would have a term beginning on December 1, 2009, and ending on November 31, 2012. The annual contract price was not to exceed $1.59 million. Proposals were due on October 13, 2009. Four firms timely submitted proposals in response to the RFP, including Petitioner Sunshine Towing @ Broward, Inc. ("Sunshine") and Intervenor Anchor Towing and Marine of Broward, Inc. ("Anchor"). An evaluation ensued, pursuant to a process described in the RFP, during which the Department rejected two of the four proposals for failing to meet minimum requirements relating to technical aspects of the project. As a result, Sunshine and Anchor emerged as the only competitors eligible for the award. Sunshine offered to perform the contractual services for an annual price of $1,531,548. This sum was less than the price that Anchor proposed by $46,980 per year. Despite Sunshine's lower cost, Anchor nevertheless edged Sunshine in the final score, receiving 92.86 points (out of 100) from the Department's evaluators, to Sunshine's 87.75. On November 30, 2009, the Department duly notified the public of its intent to award the contract to Anchor. Sunshine promptly initiated the instant protest, whereby Sunshine seeks to have Anchor's proposal disqualified as nonresponsive, in hopes that the Department will then award the contract to Sunshine as the highest-ranked (indeed the sole) responsive proposer. Sunshine alleges that Anchor's proposal failed to conform strictly to the specifications of the RFP, principally because Anchor did not attach copies of its "occupational licenses" to the proposal. Anchor insists that its proposal was responsive but argues, alternatively, that if its proposal deviated from the specifications, the deviation was merely a minor irregularity which the Department could waive. Anchor further contends that Sunshine's proposal contains material deviations for which it should be deemed nonresponsive. The Department takes the position that Anchor's failure to attach "occupational licenses" was a minor irregularity that could be (and was) waived.1 The RFP includes a "Special Conditions" section wherein the specifications at the heart of this dispute are located. Of particular interest is Special Condition No. 8, which specifies the qualifications a provider must have to be considered qualified to perform the services called for under the contract to be awarded. Special Condition No. 8 provides as follows: QUALIFICATIONS General The Department will determine whether the Proposer is qualified to perform the services being contracted based upon their proposal demonstrating satisfactory experience and capability in the work area. The Proposer shall identify necessary experienced personnel and facilities to support the activities associated with this proposal. Qualifications of Key Personnel Those individuals who will be directly involved in the project should have demonstrated experience in the areas delineated in the scope of work. Individuals whose qualifications are presented will be committed to the project for its duration unless otherwise excepted by the Department's Project Manager. Where State of Florida registration or certification is deemed appropriate, a copy of the registration or certificate should be included in the proposal package. Authorized To Do Business in the State of Florida In accordance with sections 607.1501, 608.501, and 620.169, Florida Statutes, foreign corporations, foreign limited liability companies, and foreign limited partnerships must be authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Such authorization should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contact. For authorization, [contact the Florida Department of State].[2] Licensed to Conduct Business in the State of Florida If the business being provided requires that individuals be licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, such licenses should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contract. For licensing, [contact the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation]. References and experience must entail a minimum of three (3) years of experience in the towing industry in Florida. NOTE: Copies of occupational licenses must also be attached to the back of Form 'F'. (Boldface in original.) Special Condition No. 19, which defines the term "responsive proposal," provides as follows: RESPONSIVENESS OF PROPOSALS Responsiveness of Proposals Proposals will not be considered if not received by the Department on or before the date and time specified as the due date for submission. All proposals must be typed or printed in ink. A responsive proposal is an offer to perform the scope of services called for in this Request for Proposal in accordance with all the requirements of this Request for Proposal and receiving fifty (50) points or more on the Technical Proposal.[3] Proposals found to be non-responsive shall not be considered. Proposals may be rejected if found to be irregular or not in conformance with the requirements and instructions herein contained. A proposal may be found to be irregular or non-responsive by reasons that include, but are not limited to, failure to utilize or complete prescribed forms, conditional proposals, incomplete proposals, indefinite or ambiguous proposals, and improper and/or undated signatures. (Emphasis and boldface in original.) In the "General Instructions to Respondents" section of the RFP there appears the following reservation of rights: 16. Minor Irregularities/Right to Reject. The Buyer reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, and to waive any minor irregularity, technicality, or omission if the Buyer determines that doing so will serve the State's best interests. The Buyer may reject any response not submitted in the manner specified by the solicitation documents. Anchor did not attach copies of any "occupational licenses" to the back of Form 'F' in its proposal. Anchor contends that it did not need to attach such licenses because none exists. This position is based on two undisputed facts: (1) The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("DBPR") does not regulate the business of providing towing and emergency roadside assistance; therefore, neither Anchor nor Sunshine held (or could hold) a state-issued license to operate, and neither company fell under DBPR's regulatory jurisdiction. (2) The instrument formerly known as an "occupational license," which local governments had issued for decades, not for regulatory purposes but as a means of raising revenue, is presently called (at least formally) a "business tax receipt," after the Florida Legislature, in 2006, amended Chapter 205 of the Florida Statutes, changing the name of that law from the "Local Occupational License Tax Act" to the "Local Business Tax Act." See 2006 Fla. Laws ch. 152. Sunshine asserts that the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are synonymous and interchangeable, and that the RFP required each offeror to attach copies of its occupational licenses/business tax receipts to the proposal. Sunshine insists that Anchor's failure to do so constituted a material deviation from the specifications because, without such documentation, the Department could not be sure whether an offeror was authorized to do business in any given locality. Sunshine presses this argument a step further based on some additional undisputed facts. As it happened, at the time the proposals were opened, Anchor held a local business tax receipt from the City of Pembroke Pines, which is the municipality in which Anchor maintains its principal place of business. Anchor had not, however, paid local business taxes to Broward County when they became due, respectively, on July 1, 2008, and July 1, 2009. Anchor corrected this problem on December 14, 2009, which was about two weeks after the Department had posted notice of its intent to award Anchor the contract, paying Broward County a grand total of $248.45 in back taxes, collection costs, and late penalties. As of this writing, all of Anchor's local business tax obligations are paid in full. Sunshine contends, however, that during the period of time that Anchor's Broward County business taxes were delinquent, Anchor was not authorized to do business in Broward County and hence was not a "responsible" proposer eligible for award of the contract. In support of this proposition, Sunshine relies upon Section 20-15 of the Broward County, Florida, Code of Ordinances ("Broward Code"), which states: Pursuant to the authority granted by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, no person shall engage in or manage any business, profession or occupation, as the same are contemplated by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, unless such person first obtains a business tax receipt as required by this article, unless other exempt from this requirement . . . . On this latter point regarding Anchor's authority to operate in Broward County, Sunshine appears to be correct, at least in a narrow legal sense. It is abundantly clear, however, and the undersigned finds, that, as a matter of fact, Anchor was never in any danger of being shut down by the county. Indeed, even under the strict letter of the local law, Anchor was entitled to continue operating in Broward County unless and until the county took steps to compel the payment of the delinquent taxes. Broward Code Section 20-22, which deals with the enforcement of the business tax provisions, provides: Whenever any person who is subject to the payment of a business tax or privilege tax provided by this article shall fail to pay the same when due, the tax collector, within three (3) years from the due date of the tax, may issue a warrant directed to the Broward County Sheriff, commanding him/her to levy upon and sell any real or personal property of such person liable for said tax for the amount thereof and the cost of executing the warrant and to return such warrant to the tax collector and to pay him/her the money collected by virtue thereof within sixty (60) days from the date of the warrant. . . . The tax collector may file a copy of the warrant with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Broward County[, which shall be recorded in the public records and thereby] become a lien for seven (7) years from the due date of the tax. . . . Any person subject to, and who fails to pay, a business tax or privilege tax required by this article, shall, on petition of the tax collector, be enjoined by the Circuit Court from engaging in the business for which he/she has failed to pay said business tax, until such time as he/she shall pay the same with costs of such action. There is no evidence suggesting that the county ever sought to enjoin, or that a court ever issued an injunction prohibiting, Anchor from engaging in business, nor does it appear, based on the evidence, that a tax warrant ever was issued, filed, or executed to force Anchor to pay its back taxes. Given the relatively small amount of tax due, the likelihood of such enforcement actions being taken must reasonably be reckoned as slim to none. While paying taxes when due is certainly the obligation of a good corporate citizen, it would not be reasonable, based on the facts established in this case, to infer that Anchor is a scofflaw for failing to timely pay a local tax amounting to about $80 per year. Anchor, in short, was a responsible proposer. Sunshine's other argument has more going for it. The RFP clearly and unambiguously mandated that "occupational licenses" be attached to a proposal. If, as Sunshine maintains, the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are clearly synonymous, then Anchor's proposal was noncompliant. For reasons that will be explained below, however, the undersigned has concluded, as a matter of law, that the term "occupational license" does not unambiguously denote a "business tax receipt"——at least not in the context of Special Condition No. 8. The specification, in other words, is ambiguous. No one protested the specification or otherwise sought clarification of the Department's intent. The evidence shows, and the undersigned finds, that the Department understood and intended the term "occupational license" to mean the instrument now known as a "business tax receipt." The Department simply used the outdated name, as many others probably still do, owing to that facet of human nature captured by the expression, "old habits die hard." The Department's interpretation of the ambiguous specification is not clearly erroneous and therefore should not be disturbed in this proceeding. Based on the Department's interpretation of Special Condition No. 8, the undersigned finds that Anchor's failure to attach copies of its occupational licenses was a deviation from the requirements of the RFP. That is not the end of the matter, however, for a deviation is not necessarily disqualifying unless it is found to be material. The letting authority may, in the exercise of discretion, choose to waive a minor irregularity if doing so will not compromise the integrity and fairness of the competition. There is no persuasive direct evidence in the record that the Department made a conscious decision to waive the irregularity in Anchor's proposal. Documents in the Department's procurement file show, however, that the Department knew that Anchor's proposal lacked copies of occupational licenses, and in any event this was a patent defect, inasmuch as nothing was attached to the back of Anchor's Form 'F'. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the Department elected to waive the irregularity, and the undersigned so finds. Necessarily implicit in the Department's action (waiving the deficiency) is an agency determination that that the irregularity was a minor one. The question of whether or not Anchor's noncompliance with Special Condition No. 8 was material is fairly debatable. Ultimately, however, the undersigned is unable to find, for reasons more fully developed below, that the Department's determination in this regard was clearly erroneous. Because the Department's determination was not clearly erroneous, the undersigned accepts that Anchor's failure to submit occupational licenses was a minor irregularity, which the Department could waive. The Department's decision to waive the minor irregularity is entitled to great deference and should be upheld unless it was arbitrary or capricious. The undersigned cannot say that waiving the deficiency in question was illogical, despotic, thoughtless, or otherwise an abuse of discretion; to the contrary, once it has been concluded that the irregularity is minor and immaterial, as the Department not incorrectly did here, waiver seems the reasonable and logical course of action. The upshot is that the proposed award to Anchor should be allowed to stand. The foregoing determination renders moot the disputed issues of fact arising from Anchor's allegation that Sunshine's proposal was nonresponsive. It is unnecessary, therefore, for the undersigned to make additional findings on that subject.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order consistent with its preliminary decision to award Anchor the contract at issue. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2010.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57205.194205.196607.1501
# 8
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs STELLMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A CITGO FOOD MART, 95-002803 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Naples, Florida Jun. 01, 1995 Number: 95-002803 Latest Update: Sep. 03, 1996

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a Citgo Food Mart in Naples at which it sells gasoline and diesel fuel at retail, provides limited motor vehicle service, and sells food and beverage items. Petitioner issued Respondent retail dealer's fuel license #21- 000828, which authorizes Respondent to sell motor fuel at retail and requires Respondent to collect and remit to Petitioner motor fuel taxes. The principal of Respondent is Jack Stellman. He caused Respondent to purchase the business in April 1993 from the fuel wholesaler, which had purchased it from the previous retailer. The previous retailer had suffered business and personal setbacks that necessitated the sale. Mr. Stellman and his wife, Phyllis, who claims not to be an officer or employee of Respondent despite her considerable involvement, have contributed much personal capital and labor to the new business. Immediately after taking over the business, Mr. and Mrs. Stellman discarded outdated inventory, fired a number of dishonest employees, eliminated prostitution that had been taking place on the premises, added new equipment such as a pressure fryer and hood system, and started advertising. Cash flow was a problem for Respondent from the start. The major improvements were completed by the fall of 1994. By early 1994, however, Mr. Stellman had quit taking a salary from Respondent. Over the 19-month period from August 1993 through March 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Stellman borrowed $140,000 from a variety of sources, including from their retirement plan, from relatives, and on property that they own individually. Despite these infusions of cash, Respondent was unable to stay current with certain important creditors, such as their fuel supplier, the Internal Revenue Service, and Petitioner. In August 1993, the fuel wholesaler began to demand payment on delivery, instead of in 30 days, as it had done previously. The wholesaler shortened the credit terms on fuel after Respondent fell behind in payments shortly after beginning operations. In any event, the change in credit terms involved monthly volumes of typically 40,000-50,000 gallons. The loss of use of money corresponding to the wholesale purchase of this amount of fuel does not begin to explain the tax deficiencies that Respondent ran up. Respondent's deficiencies on its motor fuel tax also began in August 1993. Returns are filed the month following the month for which the motor fuel tax is due. For August 1993, Respondent filed a return in which it underremitted the motor fuel tax by $62.15. The next month, Respondent filed a return in which it remitted $2000 and left an unremitted balance of $2867.49. The next month, Respondent filed a return, but remitted none of the $6077.28 of motor fuel tax due. For November 1993, the next month, Respondent filed a return and remitted $2000, leaving an unremitted balance of $3278.78. For December 1993 through July 1994, Respondent filed returns but remitted no tax. The total tax deficiency for this eight-month period was $58,300.87, or an average of $7287.61. In the 12-month period ending with the July 1994 return, Respondent had failed to remit a total of $70,586.57. For the August, September, and October 1994 returns, Respondent made partial remittances. For August and September, Respondent left unremitted balances of only $15.34 and $84.30, respectively, remitting a total of $11,315.49. For October, Respondent remitted $4827.90, leaving an unremitted balance of $2623.98. For November 1994, Respondent filed a return, but failed to remit any of the $5983.74 due. In the summer of 1994, the Stellmans finally sold their house in New York, but realized less cash than they had expected. In October 1994, the Stellmans applied for a loan on their Florida residence. During the same month, they began negotiations with Texaco to convert their Citgo convenience store into a Texaco outlet. The Stellmans believed that they would receive $225,000 from Texaco, which would be sufficient to pay their fuel wholesaler and Petitioner, convert their service operation into more store space, and acquire additional inventory and working capital. The record does not permit a finding whether $225,000 would cover all of these items. In any event, the Texaco negotiations did not proceed quickly. The fuel wholesaler threatened litigation over the prospective cancellation of its contract to supply Respondent with fuel and oil. And Petitioner's representatives were increasingly unsatisfied with Respondent's lack of progress in paying back taxes. Repeatedly, the Stellmans promised payments that did not materialize. At the same time, Respondent was not remitting motor fuel taxes currently. For December 1994 through March 1995, Respondent did not even file returns. During this four-month period, motor fuel taxes due and unremitted totalled $32,106.59. The total of unremitted motor fuel taxes for August 1993 through March 1995 was now $111,400.52, exclusive of penalties and interest. Penalties for the underremittances for the period August 1993 through March 1995 totalled $60,284.67. Interest for the same period totalled $14,042.88. The total of tax, penalties, and interest was thus $185,728.07. Respondent later reduced this deficiency by paying a total of $323.48 of penalties and $4154.52 of interest, so the current totals are tax of $111,400.52, penalties of $59,961.19, and interest of $9888.36, for a total of $181,250.07. The interest is current through August 1, 1995, and the daily interest thereafter is calculated by multiplying the tax deficiency by 0.000328767. Mr. and Mrs. Stellman claim that the $185,728.07 deficiency arose due to business setbacks, but the business setbacks that they have shown do not account adequately for the deficiency. The Stellmans clearly began the business badly undercapitalized. Mr. and Mrs. Stellman attribute part of the financial problems to bad debts suffered by Respondent. From August 1993 through the end of 1993, the Stellmans pursued seasonal business by offering liberal credit terms, which eventually resulted in worthless accounts receivable. However, the total bad debt was only $15,000. Although hardly meriting mention, except perhaps to reveal their lack of insight, the Stellmans also complain that they lost cash flow due to ill- advised advertising deals into which they entered where they traded fuel for advertising. Even ignoring the benefits derived from such agreements, Respondent traded only about $4000 worth of fuel under these arrangements. Together, these claimed business setbacks of no more than $20,000 constitute less than 18 percent of the taxes, penalties, and interest owed Petitioner. The amount of motor fuel tax that Respondent would have collected on $20,000 worth of fuel would be around $1500. With more zeal than business acumen, the Stellmans attacked the challenge of a new business. Their lack of business sophistication, not fraud, led the Stellmans to convert the motor fuel taxes from current payables to long- term debt, to underreport the amount of fuel pumped on 12 of 19 returns filed with Petitioner during the period in question, and repeatedly to file returns late, so as to lose the collection allowance normally given retail dealers. The unwillingness of Petitioner to become a long term creditor was manifested dramatically when, on May 4, 1995, Petitioner issued an emergency order suspending Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license. The emergency suspension took place after a meeting of Petitioner's Emergency Response Group, which, after reviewing the facts, determined that this was the best course of action to prevent the loss of motor fuel tax. The Stellmans complain that Petitioner did not give them enough time to try to pay the tax deficiencies. However, the record does not justify the Stellmans' demand that Petitioner share their confidence in their ability to take care of this substantial debt. As late as mid-February 1995, the Stellmans were still making unfulfilled promises to pay, as when they assured a Naples employee of Petitioner that Respondent would pay $10,000 by mid-April. This sum was not paid, nor were the motor fuel taxes that Respondent collected at the time even paid currently. In other words, Respondent was still taking the motor fuel tax that it was collecting from customers and applying it to other debts. The Stellmans never told Petitioner what they expected to net from the Texaco agreement. They never explained why the negotiations took so long to conclude. In early 1995, Petitioner's representatives justifiably saw: 1) new financing never resulted in any reduction of the outstanding deficiencies and 2) the outstanding deficiencies continued to grow as Respondent continued to collect motor fuel tax and apply it to other purposes. The record is not entirely clear as to the status of Respondent with respect to unremitted or unpaid taxes in April 1995 and following. Respondent owed $34,861.20 in unremitted sales tax, as of May 1, 1995. However, it appears more likely than not that, during at least part of the period subsequent to May 1, 1995, Respondent remitted and paid to Petitioner its currently accruing tax obligations. With the cessation of fueling operations, these obligations arose from sales of convenience store items, as these sales were unaffected by Petitioner's action against Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license. Since the suspension of the license, the Stellmans have supplied Petitioner with accurate, current information concerning Respondent's tax liabilities, at least to the extent that they possess such information. Respondent's financial condition is precarious, at best. Even assuming that the Stellmans were willing to continue to contribute more money to Respondent, there is nothing in the record to suggest that they have the financial resources to contribute substantial sums beyond a large fraction of the total currently due Petitioner in this case. Such a payment would probably come from a combination of the Stellmans' assets and the assets of friends and family. Their obvious failure to prepare and follow a feasible business plan does not bode well for Respondent's future ability to operate and, at the same time, retire what has become a substantial financial liability owed to Petitioner.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order: 1) suspending Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license for the lesser of six months from the date of the final order or until Respondent pays the sums described in paragraphs 38 and 39 and executes a promissory note with the conditions set forth in paragraphs 38 and 39 and 2) revoking Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license at the expiration of six months from the date of the final order unless Respondent has paid the above-described sums and entered into the above-described promissory note. ENTERED on October 27, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 27, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5-7: rejected as recitation of evidence and subordinate. 8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10: rejected as subordinate. 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12-18: rejected as subordinate. 19-21: adopted or adopted in substance. 22-23: rejected as subordinate. 24-26: adopted or adopted in substance except the taxpayer is Respondent, not Mr. Stellman individually. 27: rejected as subordinate. 28: adopted or adopted in substance. 29-35: rejected as subordinate. 36-37: adopted or adopted in substance. 38: rejected as subordinate. 39: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 40-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44: rejected as recitation of evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-7: adopted or adopted in substance, although the "great expense" in paragraph 7 is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 8-10: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. The financial problems were minor. 11: adopted or adopted in substance to the extent relevant. 12-13: rejected as subordinate. 14: rejected as speculative. 15: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 16: rejected as irrelevant. 17: adopted or adopted in substance. 18-19: rejected as subordinate. 20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence except that the filings is rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Francisco Negron, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Christian B. Felden Felden and Felden 2590 Golden Gate Parkway Suite 101 Naples, FL 33942

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68206.055213.015213.21250.0772.011 Florida Administrative Code (4) 12-17.00112-17.00312-17.00512-17.006
# 9
VANGUARD INVESTMENT COMPANY vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 82-003464 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003464 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1983

The Issue There is little controversy as to the facts in this cause. The issue is essentially a legal issue and is stated as follows: When parties act in reliance and in conformity to a prior construction by an agency of a statute or rule, should the rights gained and positions taken by said parties be impaired by a different construction of said statute by the agency? Both parties submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders filed March 17 and 18, 1983. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based on the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Vanguard Investment Company, is a Florida corporation with its principal offices at 440 Northeast 92nd Street, Miami Shores, Florida 33138. On or about March 3, 1981, Vanguard purchased an aircraft described as a Turbo Commander, serial number N9RN, from Thunderbird Aviation, Inc., for a purchase price of $120,000 plus $4,800 in sales tax. The sale price plus the sales tax was paid by Vanguard to Thunderbird, which remitted the $4,800 in sales tax to the Department of Revenue (DOR) less a three percent discount as authorized by law. On February 27, 1981, Vanguard had executed a lease of said aircraft to General Development Corporation for a term of two years commencing on March 1, 1981, contingent upon Vanguard's purchase of said aircraft from Thunderbird. Prior to March 1, 1981, General Development had leased said aircraft from Thunderbird, and the least terminated on February 28, 1981. Vanguard purchased said aircraft for the sole purpose and in anticipation of continuing its lease to General Development. Vanguard never took possession or control of said aircraft, which remained in General Development's possession at Opa-locka Airport in Dade County, Florida. No controversy exists that all sales tax payable under General Development's lease of the aircraft, both with Thunderbird and subsequently with Vanguard, had been remitted to DOR with no break in continuity of the lease as a result of the change in ownership of the aircraft on or about March 1, 1981. At the time Vanguard purchased the aircraft from Thunderbird, Vanguard had not applied for or received a sales and use tax registration number pursuant to Rule 12A-1.38, Florida Administrative Code. Vanguard applied for said sales and use tax registration number on or about April 2, 1981, approximately 30 days after the purchase of said aircraft. The sales and use tax registration number was granted by DOR on or about April 23, 1981. Shortly thereafter, Vanguard inquired of DOR concerning a refund of the $4,800 in sales tax paid on the aircraft plus the three percent discount taken by Thunderbird. In lieu of Vanguard's providing Thunderbird a resale certificate and having Thunderbird apply for the sales tax refund, it was suggested that Vanguard obtain an assignment of rights from Thunderbird and apply directly for the refund because Thunderbird had been dissolved immediately after the sale of the aircraft to Vanguard. Acquisition of the assignment of rights from Thunderbird by Vanguard was delayed by the dissolution of Thunderbird and the death of Thunderbird's principal officer. Vanguard received the assignment of rights from Thunderbird on or about July 1, 1982, and immediately applied for a refund of the sales tax. Said application for refund was well within the three years permitted by Florida law to apply for a sales tax refund. On November 22, 1982, the Office of Comptroller (OOC) notified Vanguard of its intent to deny Vanguard's application for the sales tax refund because Vanguard had failed to obtain a sales and use tax registration number prior to purchasing the aircraft from Thunderbird. At the time of the purchase, it was the policy of DOR to permit individuals to apply late for a sales and use tax registration number and not to deny refunds on the basis that the applicant did not have the sales and use tax registration number at the time of the taxable purchase. On or about July 1, 1982, this policy of DOR was altered to conform with the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State Department of Revenue v. Robert N. Anderson, 403 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1981). Vanguard was aware of the DOR policy at the time of the sale, relied on that policy, and conformed to that policy. It was clearly stated that had Vanguard applied for its refund even a month earlier, in June of 1982, the refund would have been approved under the then-existing policy.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the application of Vanguard Investment Company for refund of sales tax be approved, and that said refund be paid by the Office of Comptroller. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Kaplan, Esquire 907 DuPont Plaza Center Miami, Florida 33131 William G. Capko, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 203 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas L. Barnhart, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Office of Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer