The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him in the instant case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent Respondent is now, and has been for the past seven years, a Florida-licensed bail bond agent (license number A134458). He is the owner of Big Larry's Bail Bonds (Agency), a bail bond agency located in Broward County, Florida, with which two other Florida-licensed bail bond agents, James Jones (who is Respondent's brother) and Ron Striggles, are affiliated. Count I On April 23, 2002, Hugh Clarke went to the Agency, where he obtained from Respondent a $4,500.00 bail bond for a friend, Richard Dyke, who had been arrested in Palm Beach County, Florida, on a theft charge. To obtain the bail bond, Mr. Clarke had to pay a bail bond premium fee of $450.00 and provide collateral in the amount of $1,050.00. Payment was made by a single check (check number 611) for $1,500.00 made out to the Agency. Mr. Clarke also signed a promissory note, which read as follows: On Demand Hugh McGrath Clarke after date, for value received, I Promise to pay to the order of CONTINENTAL HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY Four Thousand Five Hundred DOLLARS, at Big Larry's Bail Bonds, 1310 Sistrunk Blvd., Ft. Laud., Florida[,] [w]ith interest thereon at the rate of 20 percent, per annum[,] from Call Date until fully paid. Interest payable semi-annually. The maker and endorser of this note agrees to waive demand, notice of non payment and protest; and in case suit shall be brought for the collection hereof, or the same has to be collected upon demand of an attorney, to pay reasonable attorney's fees and assessable cost, for making such collection. Deferred interest payment to bear interest from maturity at 20 percent, per annum, payable semi-annually. It is further agreed and specifically understood that this note shall become null and void in the event the said defendant Richard Dyke shall appear in the proper court at the time or times so directed by the Judge or Judges of competent jurisdiction until the obligations under the appearance bond or bonds posted on behalf of the defendant have been fulfilled and the surety discharged of all liability thereunder, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. Respondent provided Mr. Clarke a signed Receipt and Statement of Charges, acknowledging that he had received from Mr. Clarke payment in full for the $450.00 bail bond premium fee. Respondent also presented Mr. Clarke with a pre-printed form entitled "Collateral Receipt and Informational Notice" (Collateral Receipt) that Respondent had filled out and signed (on the appropriate signature line), acknowledging that, on behalf of the surety, Continental Heritage Insurance Company, he had received from Mr. Clarke $1,050.00 as collateral to secure the bail bond that Mr. Clarke had obtained for Mr. Dyke. The Collateral Receipt contained the following "note," "informational notice," and "indemnitor information": NOTE: Unless a properly drawn, executed, and notarized legal assignment is accepted and acknowledged by the surety agent and the surety company named above, the collateral listed above will be returned only to the person(s) named on line (1) above [Mr. Clarke]. Collateral, except for those documents the surety must retain as directed by the law, will be returned within 21 days after the bail bond(s) has been discharged in writing by the court. The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of all collateral documents indicated above, and the Informational Notice printed below. * * * INFORMATIONAL NOTICE CONDITIONS OF BOND: The SURETY, as bail, shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest, and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearance, and for reason other than as enumerated below in paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the SURETY hereunder, and the SURETY shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal and principal shall have no right of any refund whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the SURETY or its Agent. If principal shall move from one address to another without notifying SURETY or his agent in writing prior to said move. If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. If principal is arrested and incarcerated for any other offense other than a minor traffic violation. If principal shall make any material false statement in the application. * * * INDEMNITOR INFORMATION In addition to the terms and conditions of any Indemnity Agreement or other collateral documents which you have executed, this is to notify you that: The Indemnitor(s) will have the defendant(s) forthcoming before the court named in the bond, at the time therein fixed, and as may be further ordered by the court. The Indemnitor(s) is responsible [for] any and all losses or costs of any kind whatsoever which the surety may incur as a result of this undertaking. There should not be any costs or losses provided the defendant(s) does not violate the conditions of the bond and appears at all required court hearings. Collateral will be returned to the person(s) named in the collateral receipt, or their legal assigns, within 21 days after the surety has received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court. It may take several weeks after the case(s) is disposed of before the court discharges the surety bonds. Respondent read to Mr. Clarke that portion of the Collateral Receipt that explained that the collateral would be returned "within 21 days after the surety ha[d] received written notice of discharge of the bond(s) from the court." Nonetheless, for some reason, Mr. Clarke was under the impression that he would be receiving his collateral back within 30 days of April 23, 2002, the date of the transaction, even in the absence of a discharge. In late May 2002, sometime after the 23rd of the month, Mr. Clarke began telephoning the Agency to inquire about the return of his collateral. On each occasion he called, he asked to speak with Respondent, but was told by the person who answered the phone that Respondent was not available. He left messages, but Respondent never returned his calls.2 Mr. Clarke telephoned the Agency approximately twice a month until November 2002, when, frustrated by his inability to reach Respondent by telephone,3 he sent, by facsimile transmission, a letter to the Department of Insurance requesting that it help him in his efforts to gain the return of his collateral. Although Mr. Clarke had been advised in September 2002 by Mr. Dyke that Mr. Dyke's criminal case "was over," Mr. Clarke never got to directly communicate this information to Respondent and to personally ask Respondent to give him back his collateral. Any information Mr. Clarke may have provided about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case and any demands Mr. Clarke may have made for the return of his collateral were provided and made to a person or persons at the Agency other than Respondent, who did not communicate them to Respondent. Pat Anthony, a Special Investigator with the Department of Insurance,4 was assigned the task of looking into the allegations Mr. Clarke had made in his letter. Ms. Anthony met with Mr. Clarke on December 6, 2002, and took his statement. The statement was reduced to writing (by Ms. Anthony, who wrote down what she understood Mr. Clarke to have said), and it then was "subscribed and sworn to" by Mr. Clarke. Mr. Clarke's statement read as follows: On 4/23/02, I went to Larry Jones' office to put up bail for Richard Dyke. I gave him a $450 check and a $1,050 check.[5] Richard told me the case was over with in 9/02.[6] I started calling Larry about a week later.[7] He had told me the $450 was his premium and I would get the $1,050 when the case was completed.[8] I have called several times. The man who answered the phone tells me Larry is not there. In January 2003, Ms. Anthony telephoned the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County (Clerk's Office) to inquire about the status of Mr. Dyke's criminal case. She was told by the person who answered the telephone that the case had concluded and that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged, but that there was "no way to know" whether Respondent had been notified of this information inasmuch as the Clerk's Office did not "always notify the out of town bondsman." Ms. Anthony subsequently advised Respondent as to what she had been told and suggested that he go to the Palm Beach County Courthouse to confirm the information she had been provided. Respondent followed Ms. Anthony's suggestion and went to the Palm Beach County Courthouse on January 21, 2003 (which was "within a week" of his conversation with Ms. Anthony). There, he obtained a certified copy (under seal of the Clerk's Office) of a summary or disposition sheet reflecting that Mr. Dyke's bond had been discharged. That same day, when Respondent returned to the Agency, he telephoned Mr. Clarke and made arrangements to have Mr. Clarke come by the Agency on January 27, 2003, to sign paperwork and pick up a check from Respondent for $1,050.00 (the amount of the collateral Mr. Clarke had given Respondent). Mr. Clarke picked up the check on January 27, 2003, as scheduled. It was not until March 2004 that Respondent received from the Clerk's Office a copy of the actual court order discharging Mr. Dyke's bond. Count II On or about September 1, 2002, the Department of Insurance filed a one-count Administrative Complaint (in Department of Insurance Case No. 43742-02-AG) against Respondent, alleging that "he [had] failed to return collateral and charged an amount in excess of the bond premium." On November 13, 2002, the Department of Insurance issued a Consent Order in Case No. 43742-02-AG, which provided as follows: THIS CAUSE came on for consideration and final agency action. Upon consideration of the record including the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the Insurance Commissioner hereby finds: The Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, as head of the Department of Insurance, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and parties hereto. The entry of this Consent Order and compliance herewith by the Licensee, LARRY LORENZO JONES, shall conclude the administrative proceeding of Case No. 43742- 02-AG before the Department of Insurance of the State of Florida. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: The Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 25, 2002, is hereby approved and fully incorporated herein by reference; Within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.387, Florida Statutes, Licensee shall file[9] notice with the Department of the designated primary agent for each location of all bail bond agencies owned by the Licensee. Failure to file said notice will result in immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure. Licensee shall be placed on probation for a period of twelve (12) months. As a condition of probation, Licensee shall strictly adhere to the Florida Insurance Code, Rules of the Department and the terms of this agreement. If during the period of probation period [sic] the Department has good cause to believe that Licensee has violated a term or condition of probation, it shall suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue, renew or continue the license of appointment of Licensee. Licensee shall pay a fine of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500.00) within thirty (30) days of the date of issue of the Consent Order, pursuant to Section 648.52, Florida Statutes. Failure of Licensee to pay the fine within the specified time limit shall result in the immediate suspension of Licensee's license and eligibility for licensure in this state without further proceeding for a period of sixty (60) days. Reinstatement shall be conditioned upon Licensee's compliance with all terms of the Consent Order, including payment of the administrative fine.[10] Sometime in December 2002, Sally Burke, who was then a Bail Bond Coordinator with the Department of Insurance, visited the Agency for purposes of conducting an audit of the Agency's records. Ms. Anthony accompanied her on the visit. During the audit, Ms. Burke asked Respondent if he had completed and "turned in [the] designation form" required by Section 648.387, Florida Statutes. Respondent replied that he had "never received" a blank form to fill out. At Ms. Burke's request, Ms. Anthony handed Respondent a blank designation form. Respondent proceeded to complete it in Ms. Burke's and Ms. Anthony's presence. When he was finished, he attempted to give the completed form to Ms. Burke, but she told him, "Larry, you have to mail it in yourself, but make me a copy for my file." As requested, Respondent made a copy and gave it to Ms. Burke, who, in turn, handed it to Ms. Anthony. He then left the Agency and mailed the original to the Department of Insurance. When he returned to the Agency, Ms. Burke and Ms. Anthony were still there. Months later, in September 2003 at around the time of the issuance of the instant Administrative Complaint, Respondent received a telephone call from Greg Marr, an attorney with Petitioner, who told Respondent that Petitioner had never received his completed designation form.11 Respondent informed Mr. Marr that the completed form had been mailed in December 2002. Mr. Marr responded, "[O]ur records show that it's not in,"12 and asked Respondent to "send in another one," which Respondent did (on or around September 19, 2003). Petitioner received this completed designation form on September 26, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order dismissing, in its entirety, the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2004.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Adriana Winkelmann, d/b/a Adriana's Bail Bonds, Tampa, currently is licensed and eligible for licensure in this State as a Limited Surety Agent. On or about October 31, 1986, William L. Counts and his wife, Madie Counts, a/k/a Madie G. Clark, went to see the Respondent about getting Mr. Counts' first cousin, Clayton D. Counts, bailed out of jail. Cousin Clayton was charged with second degree murder, and bail was set on the second degree murder charge at $5000. Clayton Counts also had been charged with eight other counts involving sexual battery on a child and sexual activity with a child under his custodial authority. On October 2, 1986, Clayton Counts had posted $14,000 of bonds that had been set on the eight charges and had been released from jail. Adriana's Bail Bonds, acting as bail bondsman and as attorney-in-fact for the surety company, Accredited Surety And Casualty Company, Inc. (Accredited or the surety), was the surety on the $14,000 of bonds, and Scott Erickson, a friend of Clayton Counts, indemnified Accredited and put up collateral to secure the indemnification agreement. All but $150 of the premium on the $14,000 of bonds had been paid to Adriana's Bail Bonds; Clayton Counts' wife promised to pay the additional $150 at a later date. When Clayton Counts was re-arrested and charged with second degree murder and just an additional $5000 bond was set on the new charge, Erickson became fearful that Clayton Counts might skip the bonds, jeopardizing Erickson's collateral. He told the Respondent that he wanted to be taken off the bonds. At about this same time, on or about October 31, 1986, Mr. and Mrs. William L. Counts came in to Adriana's Bail Bonds, at Clayton Counts' request, to see about bailing out Clayton for the second time. Mr. and Mrs. Counts agreed with the Respondent to indemnify the surety on the total amount of all of the bonds, $19,000. They agreed to pay the $150 balance of the premium on the bonds put up on or about October 2, 1986, on the first set of charges, plus a $500 premium on the bond put up on or about October 31, 1986, on the second degree murder charge. The indemnity agreement was to indemnify the surety company for the entire $19,000 amount of the bonds in the event of a forfeiture, plus "all claim, demand, liability, cost, charge, counsel fee, expense, suit order, judgment, or adjudication" sustained or incurred by the surety company. As collateral to secure their indemnity agreement, Mr. and Mrs. Counts put up their mobile home, to which they gave the Respondent a power of attorney dated October 31, 1986, and an $8,000 mortgage on a lot worth approximately $8000. They also gave Adriana's Bail Bonds a $19,000 promissory note as collateral. On October 31, 1986, an employee of Adriana's Bail Bonds gave Mr. Counts a collateral receipt, signed by Mr. Counts and the employee, for the $19,000 promissory note, the indemnity agreement, the mortgage on the lot and the mobile home. The original was given to Mr. Counts and Adriana's Bail Bonds kept a copy. There was no evidence that the collateral receipt, or any other statement or affidavit, for this or any other collateral (other than Erickson's original collateral on the $14,000 of bonds on the first set of charges) ever was filed anywhere. Mr. Counts paid $500 by check dated November 14, 1986, for the premium on the $5000 second degree murder bond. In December 1986, Clayton Counts left the state and missed a court appearance on December 19, 1986. The $19,000 of bonds was estreated. In about January 1987, Mrs. Counts went to see the Respondent about substituting some other collateral for the mobile home. She was concerned about where she and her husband would live if the bonds were estreated and forfeited and the mobile home had to be sold to perform the indemnity agreement. She wanted to be able to move the mobile home somewhere else even in that event. After some discussion, it was agreed that the Respondent would accept $6000 cash as substitute collateral in place of the mobile home. Mrs. Counts promised to pay the $6000 in installments of approximately $500 a month. The Respondent repeatedly was able to have the court delay forfeiture of the bonds because she was able to demonstrate that she was trying to locate and return the defendant to the court. In her efforts, the Respondent incurred expenses for hiring private investigators, for a six- day trip to Missouri, for long distance telephone charges, for attorneys' fees for getting postponements of the forfeiture of the bonds and for other miscellaneous expenses. The Respondent collected portions of the promised cash collateral substitution in the following installments, some of which were picked up at the Counts' home by the Respondent: April 21, 1987 $2,000 July 17, 1987 $ 300 August 10, 1987 $ 500 August 20, 1987 $ 800 January 6, 1988 $ 500 On each occasion, the Respondent gave Mrs. Counts a collateral receipt signed by the Respondent and by Mrs. Counts. Each receipt noted the amount received, the balance due on the cash collateral substitution promise, and the $150 balance on the premium on the October 2, 1986 bonds on the first set of charges. Again, there was no evidence that any of these collateral receipts were "filed" anywhere. On January 6, 1988, Mrs. Counts asked the Respondent for a summary of the amounts of collateral paid to that date. The Respondent wrote on a piece of paper, incorrectly dated January 6, 1987, that $4100 had been received to date. Mrs. Counts also was confused what the money would be used for. The Respondent answered her question, saying that the money, together with the lot, would go towards indemnifying the surety for the $19,000 amount of the bonds if they were forfeited and, under the indemnity agreement, could be used to indemnity Adriana's Bail Bonds for expenses caused by the estreature. The Respondent listed these items on a piece of paper, too: Attorney fees to continue case 4 times over one year. Long distance calls for one year. Gas, stamps, & miscellaneous. One trip to Missouri, gas, motel, meals. Investigators services in Missouri and Florida. Later in January 1988, Clayton Counts was arrested and returned to Florida. The bonds, however, were not discharged at that time. Later in 1988, the Respondent made demand on Mrs. and Mrs. Counts for payment of an additional $2,150. This was supposed to represent $2000 due on the cash collateral substitution promise, plus the $150 balance on the premium on the October 2, 1986 bonds on the first set of charges. In fact, only $1900 was due and owning on the cash collateral substitution agreement. In March and April 1988, the Respondent collected from Mrs. Counts two additional $350 installments of the cash collateral substitution promise. Only one receipt was given for both installments, once again signed by both the Respondent and Mrs. Counts, reducing the balance to $1200, plus the $150 premium owing. In June and July 1988, Mrs. Counts was hospitalized. On June 13, 1988, the Respondent went to the hospital to have Mrs. Counts sign a receipt for the return of the original collateral for the $19,000 of bonds--i.e., the $19,000 promissory note and indemnity agreement, the mortgage on the lot and the mobile home. The Respondent did not return the cash collateral. On July 14, 1988, the court entered an order releasing the surety and Adriana's Bail Bonds from the bonds. The Respondent did not return the cash collateral because Mrs. Counts died in July 1988, and the Respondent was unsure to whom the money should be paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of the violations set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order and that her license and eligibility for licensure be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days, that she be required to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $250, and that she be placed on probation for nine months after expiration of the suspension period, conditioned on : (1) successful completion of either a basic certification course or a correspondence course approved by the Bail Bond Regulatory Board; and (2) payment of the cash collateral to the rightful owner, or in the alternative, if the Respondent is in doubt as to the rightful owner, into a court registry in conjunction with an interpleader action, within 30 days of entry of final order. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 88-2588 To comply with Section 120.59(2), Florida statutes (1987), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner'S proposed findings of fact: 1-9. Accepted and, along with other facts, incorporated. 10. Rejected in part and accepted in part. The note was a receipt of sorts, but it was not the only receipt. The incorrect date on the "receipt" was January 6, 1987; the actual date the "receipt" was given was January 6, 1988. 11.-16. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James N. Casesa, Esquire 3845 Fifth Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32999-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, applied for a Bail Bond Runner's License, which application was sworn to and subscribed on the 11th day of June, 1978. Petitioner had previously, on July 9, 1976, submitted an application for professional Bail Bondsman. The Respondent, by letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Licensing, Mrs. Onez O'Neal, dated August 31, 1978, informed Mr. LaFratta that his application for Bail Bond Runner's License was denied and stated that "the investigation conducted by this Department reflects that you do not meet the qualifications as set forth in Sections 648.27(2)(4), and 648.34(2)(f), Florida Statutes." The Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. A deposition of Howard Paul Sabin, who was at the time imprisoned for bribery, was entered into the evidence without objection. The deposition was taken at the Hendry Correctional Institute in Immokalee, Florida, on December 20, 1978, by counsel for the Respondent after Respondent had denied Petitioner's application for licensure. Counsel for the Petitioner, Herb Fried, Esquire, 1461 NW 17th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125, and the Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, were present. Sabin's testimony was that the Petitioner, whom he identified at the taking of the deposition, shared commissions in performing bail bond activities and that Petitioner acquiesced and participated in bribing a police officer. Mr. Sabin testified that Mr. LaFratta used LaFratta's apartment as an office. Telephone calls were made from the apartment to call the jail and speak to people to see if Sabin could help them make bond while only Sabin, not Mr. LaFratta, was licensed. Sabin testified that the name of the agency was AABBEE Bail Bonds and that LaFratta paid Sabin a percentage of bonds solicited by Mr. Sabin and referred to Mr. LaFratta. The time frame Sabin testified about was approximately from September of 1975, to December of 1975. The Petitioner's attorney questioned Sabin about any promises made to him for his testimony and about other bondsmen, but there were no questions or contradictions by Petitioner or his attorney as to testimony concerning the subject of this hearing. A yellow page from a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company Directory, dated 1976, was submitted into evidence in which there was an advertisement "Bail Bonds, 24-Hour Service Any Court - State, Federal, Criminal, Narcotic - Pat LaFratta, Manager - AABBEE Bail Bonds" and a telephone number. Also submitted into evidence was a copy of a business card "AABBEE Bail Bonds - Pat LaFratta - 24-Hour Service" with the same telephone number as advertised in the yellow pages of the 1976 telephone directory. It is obvious upon examination that the telephone advertisement and card were advising the public using the directory that Petitioner LaFratta was in the bail bond business. Petitioner was not then licensed. On the application for Bail Bond Runner's License of June 11, 1978, Question 14: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" was answered "Yes." The remainder of the question stated: "If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet." This was answered: "1970 - Broward Cty. Ct. - Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. - Poss. Stolen Prop. - 23 counts, 1 yr. cty. jail 2-5 yrs. probation conc." Petitioner listed no other charges or convictions on the application or on a separate sheet. Respondent submitted in defense of its denial a number of exhibits which were entered into evidence as follows: Exhibit 3(a) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 20, 1969. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(b) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 23, 1967. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. Petitioner was released from custody. Exhibit 3(c) concerns the offense of auto theft and is dated April 4, 1969. The solicitor announced "No Information," and the Respondent was released from custody. Exhibit 3(d) concerns the offense of uttering a forged instrument and is dated June 30, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(e) concerns the offense of two counts of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. The Judge released the Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(f) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated January 22, 1969. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(g) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(h) concerns the offense of receiving or aiding in the concealment of parts of a 1968 Chevrolet Impala and is dated October 31, 1969. The State was allowed 30 days to amend because of the vagueness of the charge. Exhibit 3(i) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(j) concerns the offense of aggravated assault and is dated October 27, 1967. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner was not the defendant in said case. Exhibit 3(k) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated December 13, 1968. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(l) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property arid is dated October 1, 1969. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court and released from custody. Exhibit 3(m) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated June 25, 1968. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court arid released from custody. Exhibit 3(n) concerns the offense of assault and battery, a misdemeanor, and is dated October 30, 1967. Exhibit 3(o) is a judgment and sentence for the crime of receiving stolen property and is dated October 5, 1971. Petitioner was placed on probation for five years. Exhibit (p) is a judgment and sentence dated April 5, 1971. Petitioner was sentenced to one year in prison and an assessment. Exhibit 3(q) concerns the violation of parole. Respondent's Exhibit 3(e), (g), (i), (o), and (p), supra, are part of a 23-count information which was submitted as Petitioner's Exhibit #6 in Case No. 70-25492, an information for Receiving Stolen property. Respondent's Exhibit 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h), (k), (l), and (m), supra, refer to felony charges of receiving stolen property, uttering a forged instrument and auto theft, which were not listed on the Petitioner's application and were not part of the 23-count information, which information concerned receiving stolen property. Exhibit 3(a), (b), (f), (k), (l), and (m), supra, concern stolen property preceding the dates of the offenses mentioned in the 23-count information. The failure to list the foregoing felony charges shows the Petitioner made material misstatements on his application. Petitioner LaFratta testified that he sent a package regarding the 23 counts mentioned in Findings of Fact No. 3, supra, with both application for Professional Bail Bondsman and for subject license to the Respondent. His testimony was not backed by evidence that he in fact sent the materials to the Respondent, which were required to have been sent at the time the application was made and listed on his application. His testimony that he had requested the clerk to "make out a whole booklet on everything that pertains to me," if true, was not adequate to truthfully answer Question 14, Findings of Fact No. 3, supra. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner did not furnished a full and detailed report and information as required by Question 14. It is the finding of the Hearing Officer that Petitioner did not intend to furnish the required information. Petitioner testified that he did not think that he had ever been arrested for assault, but the Respondent presented evidence showing that Petitioner had in fact been arrested for assault and battery. On subject application the Petitioner also failed to fully answer the question as to his employment history for the past five years. He failed to disclose that he had worked for Abel Bail Bonds. On the question as to his residence for the past five years, Mr. LaFratta failed to show that he had been incarcerated at Florida State Prison during that period of time. The herein mentioned 23-count information and the Restoration of Civil Rights were certified in June of 1976, and application for Professional Bail Bondsman was submitted in July of 1976. It is the finding of this Hearing Officer that these instruments were the only information submitted by the Petitioner to the Respondent as to his charges and convictions, despite his testimony. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights to Pat LaFratta, dated June 8, 1976, was previous to the application for Bail Bond Runner's License sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on June 11, 1978, and to the application for Bail Bondsman sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on July 9, 1976. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights is dated June 8, 1976, and within a few weeks thereafter Petitioner failed to truthfully answer questions under oath on his application on July 9, 1976, and failed to fully and truthfully answer the question on his application for Bail Bond Runner's License of July 11, 1978.
Recommendation Reject the application of Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, for a license as a Ball Bond Runner. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick F. Maroney, Esquire Florida Department of Insurance Legal Division 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Max P. Engel, Esquire 1461 North West 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Respondent has been charged by Administrative Complaint with violations of several provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. All of the violations charged relate to allegations that the Respondent failed to return certain personal property received by the Respondent as collateral security on a surety bond.
Findings Of Fact Facts admitted by all parties The Respondent, Sergio Roque, Jr., is currently licensed in this state as a limited surety agent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Administrative Complaint in this matter, the Respondent was licensed in this state as a limited surety agency. On or about July 19, 1990, Respondent, while acting in his capacity as a limited surety agent, did, as agent for Amwest Surety Insurance Company, post a $100,000 general surety appearance bond, power number X00-0-00000331, to obtain the release of defendant Domingo Arrechea from the Dade County Jail. In conjunction with the posting of the aforementioned surety bond, Respondent did on or about July 19, 1990, receive $10,000, which represented the premium payment for said surety bond. Respondent did in conjunction with the posting of said bond receive from indemnitor Lorraine DeVico a diamond engagement ring, a Rolex watch, and the title to a 1979 Mercedes automobile (ID#11602412149348) as partial collateral security for the aforementioned surety bond. On or about April 3, 1991, Respondent did cause to be surrendered back into custody the defendant Domingo Arrechea, thus terminating all liability for said surety bond. Respondent has failed to return to indemnitor Lorraine DeVico the collateral security described above; namely, the diamond engagement ring, the Rolex watch, and the title to the 1979 Mercedes automobile. Additional facts proved at hearing In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from the defendant Arrechea, and from the defendant's wife, a conditional mortgage on a condominium. In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from "Mike Farina" a conditional mortgage on real estate owned by Mike Farina. Mike Farina was a friend of the defendant Arrechea. "Mike Farina" later turned out to be a fictitious name. Lorraine DeVico was a very close friend of the defendant Arrechea. The Rolex watch Ms. DeVico put up as part of the collateral for Arrechea's bond was a watch that had been given to her by her father. Shortly after Ms. DeVico put the watch up for collateral, her father began to inquire as to the whereabouts of the watch. Because she felt that her father would disapprove of what she had done, and because her father was the source of most of her wealth, Ms. DeVico told several lies to her father about the whereabouts of the watch. As a result of continuing inquiries by her father, Ms. DeVico wanted her watch back and no longer wanted to be responsible under the indemnity agreement she had signed. Towards the beginning of February 1991, Ms. DeVico began to call the Respondent to advise that she was frightened that the defendant Arrechea was considering jumping bond. The Respondent received numerous calls from Ms. DeVico requesting return of her collateral and requesting to be off the indemnity agreement. Consequently, the Respondent hired MV Investigations on February 16, 1991, to locate the defendant Arrechea. On March 27, 1991, Ms. DeVico advised the Respondent that the defendant Arrechea was not answering his digital pager and that his telephone had been disconnected. She advised the Respondent that she sent her employee to look for Arrechea but could not find him. She asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and get her off the bond, agreeing to pay all the expenses. On April 1, 1991, Ms. DeVico again asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and again agreed that she would pay the costs associated with the pick-up. On April 3, 1991, the investigators hired by the Respondent located and picked up defendant Arrechea and surrendered him back to the Dade County Jail. The Respondent returned the collateral deposited by Mr. Farina and by the defendant Arrechea and his wife. After having the defendant Arrechea picked up and surrendered, the Respondent called Ms. DeVico to give her the information and advise her of the pick-up costs. Ms. DeVico verbally refused to pay any pick-up costs. On April 14, 1991, the Respondent sent by certified mail to Ms. DeVico a notice under Section 648.442, Florida Statutes, notifying her that he would be selling her collateral in ten days against his pick-up expenses. The Respondent sold the Rolex watch and diamond ring pledged as collateral by Ms. DeVico after expiration of the ten days. The indemnity agreement signed by Ms. DeVico in conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea included the following language: 2. The indemnitor(s) will at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the Company and save harmless the Company from and against any and all claims, demands, liabilities, costs, charges, legal fees, disbursements and expenses of every kind and nature, which the Company shall at any time sustain or incur, and as well from all orders, decrees, judgments and adjudications against the Company by reason or in consequence of having executed such bond or undertaking in behalf of and/or at the instance of the indemnitor(s) (or any of them) and will pay over, reimburse and make good to the Company, its successors and assigns, all sums and amounts of money required to meet every claim, demand, liability, costs, expense, suit, order, decree, payment and/or adjudication against the Company by reason of the execution of such bond or undertaking and any other bonds or undertakings executed in behalf of and/or at the instance of the Indemnitor(s) and before the Company shall be required to pay thereunder. The liability for legal fees and disbursements includes all legal fees and disbursements that the Company may pay or incur in any legal proceedings, including proceedings in which the Company may assert or defend its right to collect or to charge for any legal fees and/or disbursements incurred in earlier proceedings. * * * 7. The Indemnitor(s) agree(s) that the Company may at any time take such steps as it may deem necessary to obtain its release from any and all liability under any of said bonds or undertakings, and it shall not be necessary for the Company to give the Indemnitor(s) notice of any fact or information coming to the Company's notice or knowledge concerning or affecting its rights or liability under any such bond or undertaking, notice of all such being hereby expressly waived; and that the Company may secure and further indemnify itself against loss, damages and/or expenses in connection with any such bond or undertaking in any manner it may think proper including surrender of the defendant (either before or after forfeiture and/or payment) if the Company shall deem the same advisable; and all expenses which the Company may sustain or incur or be put to in obtaining such release or in further securing itself against loss, shall be borne and paid by the Indemnitor(s). In conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea, Ms. DeVico also signed a Bail Bond Information Sheet which advised her in bold print that: When all agreements have been fulfilled and bond is discharged, in writing or by the court, and without loss expense on the bond, your full collateral will be returned to you.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing an administrative penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and a suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4378 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected for two reasons; first, the proposed finding is irrelevant because it is not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, second, the proposed finding was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: First sentence accepted. Remainder of this paragraph rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 6 through 13: Accepted in substance with some details clarified. Paragraph 14: First sentence accepted. Remainder rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting procedural details or conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: Rejected as constituting statement of position or legal argument, rather than proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 17: First sentence accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting conclusions of law or legal argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20: Accepted COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Martin L. Roth, Esquire Haber & Roth 1370 Northwest 16th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Russell Bruce Moncrief is licensed with Respondent as a general lines agent (2-20) and at all times here relevant was so licensed. Shortly after Respondent opened his bail bond office, he was approached by Sams who represented himself as a bounty hunter who could pick up "skips" and others the bail bondsman wanted for surrender under their bonds. Sams represented that he was a member of the Florida Assurity Association, that he so worked for several bail bondsmen and was qualified to pick up skips for bail bondsmen. Sams produced an impressive badge, business cards and arrest forms for the bondsman to sign which would authorize Sams to pick up the individuals who had skipped out on their bonds. At this time Respondent had no skips to pick up and suggested Sams contact him later; and, during the period between June and September, 1978, Sams picked up some five (5) to eight (8) individuals on whom Respondent had written a bond and returned these people to Respondent. For these services, Respondent paid Sams a percentage of the bond. This relationship with Sams terminated when the latter gave Respondent a worthless check. Subsequently, Sams learned that his "bounty hunting" was unauthorized and applied for licensure as a bail bond runner. During Petitioner's investigation of Sams' application, his association with Respondent became known and Respondent told Petitioner's agents of his relationship with Sams. This led to an investigation of Respondent and to the charges here preferred. On March 9, 14, 15 and 20, 1979, agents of Petitioner visited the office of Respondent during the morning hours and found the office closed. These times the office was visited were generally between 9:00 A.M. and 12:00 Noon. On March 9, 1979, Nelson Messimore waited at Respondent's office from 6:00 A.M. until 2:00 P.M. before the office was opened. This individual tried numerous times to call the phone number shown on a sign inside Respondent's office but received no answer. He obtained the bond desired when the office was opened. From the time he opened his bail bond office in early 1978, until he learned of the charges being investigated, Respondent had his office opened around noon by his secretary who stayed at the office until 6:00 P.M. Respondent usually arrived between 2:00 and 4:00 P.M. and kept the office open until nearly midnight. During this period he had an answering service to answer his calls 24 hours per day when the office was not open and a paging service to "beep" him when someone was trying to contact him. After learning that Petitioner's agents deemed his office hours to be in violation of Petitioner's regulations, Respondent engaged the services of another bail bondsman and had the office opened at 8:00 A.M. and it remained open during the normal working day. Respondent continued to keep the evening hours he previously used. On or about February 28, 1978, Respondent was given the jail card of Willie Frank Boone by the booking officer to use in preparing a bailbond. Boone had previously been bonded by Respondent and he was somewhat familiar with Boone's record. While the card was in his custody, Respondent thought one entry on the card was an error and interlined that item. Further perusal of the card led Respondent to realize the card had not been in error. When he returned the card to the booking officer, he told the booking officer of the changes he had made to the card. This caused considerable consternation in the booking officer and led to procedural changes to not allow custody of the jail cards to be given to bail bondsmen. The change to the jail card made by Respondent could not benefit Respondent financially or otherwise. However, the change could have affected the sentencing of the accused.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of a violation of bail bondsmen disciplinary statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bondsman. He operates Freedom Bail Bonds in Orlando, Florida. On May 28, 1988, law enforcement officers of the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrested John P. Moody and placed him in the Orange County jail. Mr. Moody had never previously been arrested. After he was arrested, Mr. Moody contactedRespondent about obtaining a bail bond in order to get out of jail. Respondent agreed to come to the jail and interview Mr. Moody to determine if Freedom Bail Bonds could provide him a bond. When Respondent arrived at the jail on the evening of May 28, he was informed by an officer of the three charges that were pending against Mr. Moody. The bond was $1000 per charge, and the premium was 10% of the bond. Respondent met with Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had any assets to secure the bond. Mr. Moody explained that he had no assets such as a car, cash, or cash equivalent. However, he said that he owned jointly with his mother some land in Orange County. At the conclusion of the interview, Respondent had decided to write the bond. Respondent then learned from the booking officer that another charge had been added. Following a brief conversation between Respondent and Mr. Moody concerning the new charge, Respondent learned from the booking officer that a fifth charge had been added. After another conversation with Mr. Moody, Respondent learned in this manner that a sixth, and final, charge had been added. In all, Mr. Moody was charged with one count of failing to return a hired automobile and five counts of fraudulent bank deposits. Each charge carried a $1000 bond, so Mr. Moody now required a total bond of $6000, which in turn required a total premium of $600. Due to the increased amount of the bond, Respondent informed Mr. Moody that he would have to secure the bond with a mortgage on the property jointly held with his mother. Mr. Moody agreed, but asked Respondent not to contact Mr. Moody's mother immediately. It was the middle of the night, and Mr. Moody's mother is an invalid. Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Moody to contact his mother later and obtain her signature on a mortgage. Because Mr. Moody lacked the funds, a friend, Marion Reed Johnson, agreed to pay the premium. Knowing that Mr. Moody would not be able to obtain that evening his mother's signature to a mortgage, Respondent insisted on some interim security and agreed to accept six $1000 promissory notes from Mr. Johnson. These notes were payable on demand, but, according to their terms, became void if Mr. Moody appeared in court when ordered to do so and discharged all of the obligations of the bail bond. Respondent gave Mr. Johnson receipts for the $600 premium and six $1000 notes as soon as Respondent received these items. At the same time, also on the evening of May 28, Respondent completed a bail bond application and indemnity form, on which Mr. Moody provided certain background information. Mr. Moody and Mr. Johnson also signed indemnifications in favor of the surety. The application form states that the surety: shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. The application form also provides: In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearances, and for reason other than as enumerated below is paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the Surety hereunder, and the Surety shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal, and principal shall have no right to any refund of premium whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the Surety or its Agent. * * * If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. * * * The application and indemnities were signed. Mr. Johnson paid the $600 premium and executed and delivered the six $1000 demand notes. Respondent then caused Freedom Bail Bond to issue the bond. Mr. Moody was released from the jail during the evening of his arrest (actually during the predawn hours of May 29). May 28 was a Saturday. The following Monday, Respondent gave one of his employees a copy of the warranty deed from Mr. Moody's mother to herself and Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody hadgiven a copy of the deed to Respondent during their initial interview in order to allow Respondent to prepare the mortgage that Mr. Moody had agreed to provide. Respondent instructed the employee to use the legal description from the warranty deed to prepare a mortgage and send it to Mr. Moody for execution by his mother and him. The employee did as instructed and promptly mailed the mortgage to Mr. Moody with instructions for execution, witnessing, and notarization. After about a week, Respondent asked the employee if she had received the executed mortgage. She replied that she had not and proceeded to telephone Mr. Moody. When she asked him about the mortgage, Mr. Moody did not express any unwillingness to sign it, but said that he had not received it. Confirming the mailing address, the employee agreed to send him another mortgage and did so on June 6, 1988. Several times after mailing the second mortgage, the employee contacted Mr. Moody and discussed the need to get the document fully executed and delivered to Freedom Bail Bonds. On one occasion, Mr. Moody agreed to return the executed mortgage on June 22. But on the last of these conversations, Mr. Moody informed the employee, for the first time, that he had no intention of providing the mortgage. The employee told Respondent what Mr. Moody had said and returned the file to Respondent for further action. At about the same time that Respondent's officehad sent the mortgage to Mr. Moody the second time, Mr. Moody's sister telephoned Respondent. Estranged from her brother, she was concerned that Mr. Moody, whom she believed had misused funds of their invalid mother in the past, might try to obtain their mother's signature on a mortgage to secure a bond in order to get out of jail. Mr. Moody's sister informed Respondent that her brother was not authorized to obtain their mother's signature on the mortgage. She said that her brother was not to be trusted, had improperly removed money from their mother's trust in the past, and had defaulted on at least one debt so as to require the creditor to lien the jointly held property in order to be repaid. At about the same time, a different employee of Respondent received an anonymous telephone tip that Mr. Moody was about to depart, or had already departed, on a trip to Alabama with another man. The informant described what turned out to be a vehicle owned by Mr. Johnson, with whom Mr. Moody had been living since his release from jail on May 29. Several attempts by Respondent's employees to reach Mr. Moody over the next two to four days were unsuccessful. In fact, Mr. Moody had gone to Alabama, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Orange County Circuit Court. On July 18, 1988, one of Respondent's employees contacted the Clerk of Court's office and learned that Mr. Moody had not qualified for the services of a Public Defender. In addition, the employee had been notified on or about July 6, byreceipt of a notice of hearing on a Determination of Counsel, that Mr. Moody had not been diligent in obtaining counsel. After determining that other Determination of Counsel hearings had been and were being set by the Court, the employee reasonably concluded that Mr. Moody was not diligently trying to obtain counsel or independently resolve the pending criminal matters. The employee communicated this information to Respondent on July 18. Respondent contacted Mr. Moody by telephone on July 18 and asked when he was going to supply the executed mortgage. Mr. Moody responded that he had determined that Respondent did not need the additional security and was not going to provide it. At this point, Respondent concluded that it was likely that Mr. Moody had in fact left the state without permission. Respondent also concluded that Mr. Moody no longer represented an acceptable risk. Respondent thus directed another employee to join him to arrest Mr. Moody and surrender him to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Respondent and his employee immediately visited Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had left the state. Mr. Moody admitted doing so. Respondent and the employee then arrested Mr. Moody and returned him to jail. Mr. Moody remained in jail for 63 days until he pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to the time served, placed on probation for four years, and required to makerestitution, which he has done so far in accordance with the schedule. Following his release from jail, Mr. Moody returned to live with Mr. Johnson and gradually repaid him the $600 that he owed him. Although Mr. Moody demanded return of the $600, he never offered any proof of payment to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson never demanded the return of the money. Respondent has retained the $600 premium. The six $1000 notes were automatically voided when Mr. Moody was arrested on July 18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney David D. Hershel Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney Alan B. Robinson 56 East Pine Street Orlando, FL 32801
