The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Petitioner should issue a cease and desist order and/or impose sanctions against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent, by failing to have its books, accounts, and documents available for examination and by refusing to permit an inspection of its books and records in an investigation and examination, has violated Sections 520.995(1)(a), (f), and (g), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Sometime during the month of February of 1991, Ms. Jennifer Chirolis, a Financial Investigator from the Department of Banking and Finance, visited the offices of the Barat Company. She spoke with Mr. Roque Barat and determined that the Barat Company was conducting retail installment sales without being licensed to do so under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. Mr. Chirolis advised Mr. Roque Barat that he needed a license and asked him to cease operations until he obtained the necessary license. The Barat Company thereafter obtained the necessary license and was still licensed as of the time of the formal hearing. Thereafter, the Department received a complaint about the Barat Company from a customer. The customer's complaint was to the effect that the Barat Company had made misrepresentations concerning the fee paid by the customer. The Department initiated an "investigation" of the customer's complaint and also decided to conduct an "examination" of the Barat Company. On April 22, 1992, a Department Examiner, Mr. Lee Winters, went to the office of the Barat Company to conduct the "examination" and "investigation". The Barat Company is operated out of a small office with two employees and a few filing cabinets. When Mr. Winters arrived, employees of the Barat Company were conducting business with two customers. Mr. Winters identified himself to the employees and informed them that he had been assigned to conduct an "examination" and "investigation" of the Barat Company. A Barat Company employee, Mr. Fred Vivar, said that he could not produce the company's records without express authorization from Mr. Roque Barat, that Mr. Roque Barat was out of the country, that he could not get in touch with Mr. Roque Barat at that moment, but that when he did get in touch with him, he would advise Mr. Roque Barat of Mr. Winter's desire to examine the company's books and records. Following a number of telephone calls over a period of several days, on May 1, 1992, Mr. Vivar advised Mr. Winters that he had received authorization from Mr. Roque Barat for the Department to inspect the books and records of the Barat Company. An appointment was made for the Department to inspect the books and records on May 6, 1992, beginning at 10:00 a.m. On May 5, 1992, a letter from an attorney representing the Barat Company was hand delivered to Mr. Winters. The letter included the following paragraph: It is my understanding that you have requested the opportunity to view the records of the above-referenced company, said inspection to take place on May 6, 1992. Please be advised that if this "inspection" is purportedly being done by your agency's authority, pursuant to F.S. 520.996, that no records will be produced absent compliance by your department with F.S. 520.994 including, but not limited to, the Barat Company exercising its right to challenge said subpoena. The Department concluded from the letter of May 5, 1992, that the Barat Company not only refused to produce records without a subpoena, but that, even if served with a subpoena, the Barat Company would resist compliance with the subpoena unless and until ordered to comply by a court. For that reason the Department did not pursue the issuance of a subpoena. Mr. Winters has been involved in over one hundred "examinations" under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. In the course of those "examinations" there have been only two licensees that did not produce their records. Those two licensees were the Barat Company and another company known as Phase One Credit. Mr. Roque Barat is an officer and director of both Phase One Credit and the Barat Company. The license of Phase One Credit was revoked for its failure to produce its books and records. The refusal to produce the books and records of the Barat Company was occasioned by an effort on the part of Mr. Roque Barat to avoid payment of "examination" fees authorized by Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. In the summer of 1992, the Barat Company filed for bankruptcy, closed down its business operations, and is currently winding up the business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge that the Barat Company has violated Section 520.995(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Concluding that the Barat Company has violated Sections 520.995(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; Imposing a penalty consisting of: (a) an administra-tive fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, and (b) revocation of the Barat Company's license; and Ordering the Barat Company to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5620 The following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance, with the exception of the last five words. The last five words are rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case and as, in any event, not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 8: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inaccurate description of letter. (The relevant text of the letter is included in the findings of fact.) Last sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary evidentiary details. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 10: First two sentences rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Last two sentences accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 13: Accepted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: As noted in the Preliminary Statement portion of this Recommended Order, the Respondent's proposed recommended order was filed late. The Respondent's proposed recommended order also fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fails to contain citations to the portions of the record that support its proposed findings of fact. A party's statutory right to a specific ruling on each proposed finding submitted by the party is limited to those circumstances when the proposed findings are submitted within the established deadlines and in conformity with applicable rules. See Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, and Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), in which the court held, inter alia, that a party is not entitled to more than a reasonable period of time within which to submit its proposals. Because the Respondent submitted its proposals late and because those proposals fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is not statutorily entitled to a specific ruling on each of its proposed findings and no such specific findings have been made. (As noted in the Preliminary Statement, the Respondent's proposed recommended order has been read and considered.) COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Brenner, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite 708-N Miami, Florida 33128 Louis J. Terminello, Esquire 950 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Michael H. Tarkoff, Esquire 2601 South Bayshore Drive Suite 1400 Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Copies furnished continued: William G. Reeves, General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue Whether the Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(a) and (i), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The admissions by the Respondent, together with the records introduced at the hearing by the Florida Real Estate Commission show that Respondent was a licensed real estate broker holding license no. 0122293. The Respondent admitted his participation in all the transactions referenced in the administrative complaint. The bank records and other evidence introduced at the hearing show that the Respondent's escrow account maintained at Liberty Bank of Cantonment lacked sufficient funds to pay the bills which Respondent admitted were owed Lawyers Title Insurance Co. in the amount of $44.00. The Respondent testified that he had paid these bills only two days before the instant hearing with a check on his personal bank account. From the Respondent's testimony, it is clear that he failed to maintain sufficiently detailed records to permit him to account for monies in his escrow account in the Liberty Bank of Cantonment and in the bank account which he maintained with the First State Bank in Pensacola, Florida. The closing statements relating to the Netzer/Hayes transaction showed that the Respondent received $1,225.00. His records for this transaction showed checks on his escrow account relating to this transaction in the amount of $1,481.60. Respondent testified that the error in this transaction occurred when he erroneously stubbed one check as relating to the Netzer/Hayes transaction, when in actuality it related to a separate transaction. However, under cross examination the Respondent could not identify the transaction to which this check related. The Respondent admitted depositing the money involved in the Netzer/Hayes transaction to his Cantonment Liberty Bank escrow account. He also admitted that he had made no transfer of funds from the Cantonment bank account to his First State Bank account. The Respondent admitted and the evidence indicates that payments were made at closing from the First State Bank account. The Liberty Bank account records show a balance of less thank $731.00 at all times after 9-30-76. Therefore, insufficient funds were maintained by the Respondent in the Liberty Bank escrow account to satisfy the obligations on the account arising from the Nitzer/Hayes transaction. Furthermore, the Respondent's handling of escrow account at the Liberty Bank in Cantonment was as it related to this transaction was improper The admissions of Respondent and the evidence introduced showed that he was the broker involved in the Suttles/ Kamplain transaction. No evidence was introduced that the Respondent failed to advise Suttles that he initially had accepted a $250.00 note in lieu of cash as an earnest money deposit. The evidence is clear that upon receipt of the money, the Respondent deposited this money to his account in the First State Bank of Pensacola. Although this account was not designated an escrow account, it did bear the designation of a management account. It was not established by substantial and competent evidence that a management account was not an escrow account. The Suttles/Kamplain transaction closed without problem; however, there is no explanation of the disbursement of the $250.00 received as an earnest money deposit in the records of this transaction. Regarding the Suttles/Gordon transaction, it was established that the Respondent was the broker who handled this transaction. No substantial and competent evidence was produced that the Respondent failed to disclose to the Gordons that he did not obtain an initial $100.00 deposit on the transaction. The record is clear that the Respondent did receive a check in the amount of $1,500.00 from Mr. Suttles which the Respondent deposited to his account in the First State Bank. The Gordons did testify that the Respondent was authorized to allow the Suttles to occupy the premises prior to closing. After occupying the property, the Suttles were to make rental payments to be credited to the payment of the mortgage. After moving into the house, Mr. Suttles and his wife began to have domestic problems, and he immediately ceased to make all rental payments upon the property. Mr. Suttles did not advise the Respondent that he was not making payments and did not intend to make further payments on the house. Mr. Suttles did avoid all of Respondents efforts to contact him. The Suttles and the Gordons did execute the closing papers but by the time the papers were executed, Mr. Suttles failure to make the rental payments had caused a deficiency in payment of the mortgage. Because the mortgage was in arrears, the transaction could not close. When the Respondent became aware of the Suttles' separation, he began to make arrangements to have them vacate the Gordon house. However, Respondent failed to keep the Gordons fully advised as to the statuts of this transaction. Further, the check given to the Gordons by Respondent was not honored by the First State Bank of Pensacola because of insufficient funds in the Respondent's account to meet this obligation. The Respondent retained and disbursed portions of the $1,500.00 deposited to the account, although the transaction did not close. Money was disbursed to the Gordons and Respondent took out his commission. Whether Respondent was not entitled to disburse the monies under the contract between Respondent and the Gordons cannot be determined upon the evidence presented. However, it is clear that Suttles was a bona fide purchaser, who after he entered into occupancy, determined that he would not complete the transaction; and under the terms of the contract between the Respondent and the Gordons, the Respondent earned his commission when a purchaser was obtained. It is clear that the Respondent did not keep the Gordons properly advised of the situation regarding the sale of their house to the Suttles; and that the Respondent's check to the Gordons on the First State Bank was not honored because the account was impaired. The evidence and testimony taken as a whole at the hearing shows that Respondent did not keep a running balance of the accounts which he maintained at the Liberty Bank of Cantonment or the First State Bank of Pensacola. The evidence further shows that the Respondent failed to withdraw commissions earned in their total amount subsequent to closings on property, did not pay bills which closing statements indicate he was obligated to pay, permitted inter-bank transfers of funds owed him by banking institutions to his escrow or management account, did not take steps to ensure that the First State account was properly and clearly titled as an escrow account, did not properly annotate withdrawals from his escrow accounts, and failed to maintain money in his escrow account until it was disbursed.
Recommendation The record taken as a whole indicates that the violations for which the Respondent is responsible are the result of his culpable negligence as opposed to any dishonest or fraudulent act. However, the Respondent is so devoid of any knowledge of his responsibilities with regard to monies entrusted to him that he may not safely be permitted to function as a real estate broker. Based upon the foregoing-findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission revoke the license of Respondent as a registered real estate broker. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Pierce, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 O. E. Adams, Esquire Post Office Box 12217 Pensacola, Florida 32002 ================================================================= AGENCY MEMORANDUM ================================================================= Orlando, Florida November 27, 1978 MEMORANDUM TO: Renata Hendrick, Registration Supervisor FROM: Manuel E. Oliver, Staff Attorney RE: PD 3267 (PD 15776) FREC vs. Ralph D. Villeneuve t/a Don's Realty 122293-1 DOAH Case No. 78-091 Please find enclosed copies of the Final Order filed on April 13, 1978, in the reference case together with the opinion filed on November 2, 1978 by the District Court of Appeal, First District of Florida, affirming the Commission's Order, as well as a copy of the mandate issued by said Court on November 20, 1978. By virtue of the foregoing, the order of the Commission revoking defendant's registration has become firm and effective in all respects. Please make the necessary annotations in the records for all effects. Manuel E. Oliver Staff Attorney MEO/km Enclosures:* * NOTE: Enclosures noted in this memorandum are not available at the division and therefore not a part of this ACCESS document.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Kalunian was registered as a real estate broker with FREC holding Certificate Number 0045958. Kalunian's registration with FREC was suspended by FREC in an emergency suspension order dated September 21, 1978. On or about July 18, 1978, Harry and Joan Soden, as buyers, entered into a contract with Warren and Barbara Grund, as sellers, for the sale and purchase of real property. In connection with that sale, the buyers entrusted the sum of $2,000.00 with Kalunian as an escrow money deposit. The closing for this transaction was scheduled for October 1, 1978, and at no time prior to the scheduled closing did the parties to the transaction authorize the disbursement of the escrow money deposit. On or about June 23, 1978, John and Wanda Carlantonio, as buyers, entered into a contract with Ralph and Margarie Steigerwald, as sellers, for the sale and purchase of real property. In connection with that contract, the buyers entrusted the sum of $7,000.00 with Kalunian as an escrow money deposit. The closing for this transaction took place on September 15, 1978. However, at the time of the closing, the $7,000.00 escrow money deposit was not accounted for. At no time prior to the closing did the parties to the transaction authorize a disbursement of the escrow money deposit. On or about July 8, 1978, Diane Maholland, as buyer, entered into a contract with Rita Auletta, as seller, for the sale and purchase of real property. In connection with that contract the buyer entrusted the sum of $9,500.00 with Kalunian as an escrow money deposit. The closing of the transaction took place on September 6, 1978. However, at the time of the closing, the $9,500.00 escrow money deposit was not accounted for. At no time prior to the closing did the oarties to the transaction authorize a disbursement of the escrow money deposit. On July 31, 1978, the balance in Kalunian's escrow account was $501.13. On August 6, 1978, a letter from Kalunian was discovered in Kalunian's office. In that letter, Kalunian admitted that he had converted funds from his trust account for his own use.
The Issue An Administrative complaint dated April 13, 1999, alleges that Respondent Mr. Stevens violated several provisions of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, when he failed to return an earnest money deposit to a buyer after being directed to do so by the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The issues in this proceeding are whether Mr. Stevens committed the violation and if so what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Collie E. Stevens, has been licensed in the State of Florida as a real estate broker since 1986. Prior to that year he was licensed as a real estate salesperson in Florida. In 1996 Mr. Stevens represented the seller, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in the sale of a home in Orange County, Florida. On October 1, 1996, Doris Wright executed an Offer to Purchase and Contract of Sale for the home. When she signed the contract Ms. Wright gave the broker, Mr. Stevens, a check for $675.00 as an earnest money deposit. Mr. Stevens deposited the check into his escrow account. Later, in October or November 1996, Ms. Wright withdrew her offer to purchase the property. The VA regional office provided a notice to Mr. Stevens dated November 20, 1996, directing him to return the earnest money deposit to Ms. Wright. Mr. Stevens never returned the money to Ms. Wright although she made several requests through his secretary and made several attempts to contact him directly. Mr. Stevens alleges that he is entitled to retain at least $250.00 of the $675.00 deposit because that was the mortgage company's fee for processing Ms. Wright's mortgage application. Mr. Stevens claims that Ms. Wright authorized him to pay that fee on her behalf when she was not in town; Ms. Wright does not dispute that claim. Mr. Stevens also argues that he should be entitled to the remainder of the deposit money because Ms. Wright cancelled a listing agreement for him to sell her house. Ms. Wright disputes this claim and Mr. Stevens did not produce any contract or document evidencing such an agreement. During the pendancy of his dispute with Ms. Wright over entitlement to the deposit Mr. Stevens never notified the Florida Real Estate Commission of the dispute nor did he submit the matter to arbitration, mediation, or any court. Mr. Stevens insists that he could have worked out his differences with Ms. Wright and that he was always willing to give her $425.00, left after deducting $250.00 for the processing fee from the $675.00 deposit. In 1996, in another case, Mr. Stevens was disciplined by the Florida Real Estate Commission for culpable negligence or breach of trust, failure to give notice of his representation of a party, failure to maintain trust funds in an escrow account, and failure to preserve and make available brokerage records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order finding that Collie E. Stevens is guilty of a violation of Sections 475.25(1)(d)1. and 475.25(1)(0), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that the Florida Real Estate Commission suspend his license for two years and require him to complete a 7-hour escrow management course and a 60-hour post-licensure course, and that he pay the costs associated with this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea D. Perkins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 308N Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Collie E. Stevens Son Set Free Realty, Inc. 2294 North U.S. One Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Conclusions This cause has come on for final agency action after the filing of a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice (Notice) by Suntree Pharmacy, inc. (Suntree) at the Division Of Administrative Hearings in Case No. 13-4637 on December 27, 2013 and that Division's entry of an Order Closing File And Relinquishing Jurisdiction (Order) on January 9, 2014. Having considered the Notice and the Order and the Order of Conditional Release From Stop Work Order (Release) and the Payment Agreement Schedule For Periodic Payment of Penalty (Payment Agreement) and associated documents (Attachment A hereto), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Notice Of Assignment And Order issued herein on January 30, 2014 is hereby withdrawn as improvidently issued. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Order of Conditional Release From Stop Work Order and the Payment Agreement Schedule For Periodic Payment of Penalty are affirmed and remain in full force and effect until all terms and conditions thereof are satisfied. Should any term or condition therein be defaulted on by Suntree, the Release shall be immediately lifted and a bar against further work immediately re- ss igsyerneeminyeevnerttaneimm mee imposed and the Payment Agreement shall be accelerated and the full amount due thereunder shall become immediately due and payable. March THE DONE AND ORDERED this _@rel_day of February, 2014. Robert C. Kneip, Chief of Sta
The Issue Respondents' alleged violation of subsection 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(c), and 475.25(3), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. Inasmuch as Respondents were not represented by legal counsel at the hearing, the Hearing Officer explained their rights in administrative proceedings to James F. Catron who elected to represent himself and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a corporation registered as a real estate broker doing business at 5805 Margate Boulevard, Margate, Florida. Respondent James F. Catron is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a registered real estate broker and the active broker and officer of Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. (Stipulation) In January, 1976, Richard H. Goodwin, Jr. and Christine S. Goodwin, his wife, owned a four-unit apartment building at 7650 Southwest 10th Court, North Lauderdale, Florida, described as Lot 7, Block 13, Lauderdale North Park, Section 3. The Goodwins were having marital difficulties and decided to separate at this time and divest themselves of mutually-owned property. In a conversation with a salesman for respondents, Mr. Goodwin learned that James F. Catron was in the business of purchasing investment properties and reselling the same whereupon he would divide any profit with the former owner. Goodwin thereafter entered into negotiations with Catron for the sale of the apartment building. It was orally agreed that Catron would pay $62,700.00 for the property with a $1,000.00 down payment, and assume a first mortgage with Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County in the amount of approximately $57,400.00 and a second mortgage with Seacrest Homes, Inc., John E. Abdo, Trustee, in the approximate amount of $5,300.00. It was further agreed that Catron would pay the Goodwins 30 percent of 80 percent of any net profit realized when he resold the property. As a consequence of this agreement, the Goodwins, on January 19, 1976, executed a deposit receipt contract embodying the above terms except that it recited the receipt of $10.00 as a deposit rather than $1,000.00, and made no mention of assumption of the mortgages. However, the sum of $1,000.00 was paid to the Goodwins by Catron. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that Catron signed this contract, Catron denied it and no such contract signed by Catron was placed in evidence at the hearing. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Catron, Petitioner's exhibit 1) Mr. Goodwin, on January 19, 1976, executed a document authorizing Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. to collect rents from the tenants of the apartment building. Catron, anticipating consummation of the purchase, proceeded to collect rentals in the amount of approximately $800.00 per month for the next four and one-half months, for total collections of approximately $3,600.00. He also made some repairs to the property and paid utilities bills. The Goodwins believed that he would take steps to assume the two mortgages on the property and take over the payments thereon. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that he and his wife had executed a warranty deed and delivered it to Catron, Catron denied receipt of such a deed and it was not produced at the hearing. Accordingly, it cannot be found that such a deed was in fact executed and delivered. The rents were collected by a limited partnership called Forest Run, Limited, of which Catron was a partner. Although the February payments were made on the mortgages, they were discontinued when Catron discovered that he could not assume the second mortgage from Seacrest Homes, Inc. without payment of $1,000.00 to the trustee, Abdo. As a consequence, the Goodwins filed suit against the respondents in the Broward County Circuit Court on June 23, 1976, requesting that any agreements concerning the property be rescinded, and that an accounting be ordered and a receiver appointed to administer and manage the property in question. A receiver was appointed by the court. Thereafter, in August 1976, Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association filed suit to foreclose its mortgage on the property and obtained summary judgment in the Broward County Circuit Court on January 25, 1977. The property was thereafter sold at public sale and bought in by Southern Federal. On January 25, 1977, the suit of the Goodwins against respondents was dismissed by stipulation after the parties had reached an amicable settlement in the matter. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-4)
Recommendation That the charges against the respondents, James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. 5805 Margate Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Michael Crudele, should be disciplined for alleged violations of the statutes and rules governing the conduct of insurance agents.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Michael Crudele, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent. The Respondent was the agent-of-record on two American Life and Casualty Insurance Company (American Life) annuities purchased by Mary Clem, one in the face amount of $30,000 dated October 28, 1992, and the other in the face amount of $20,000 dated December 28, 1992. Clem was 84 years old at the time and a widow. The annuities represented more than 80 percent of her life savings. The Respondent became agent-of-record on these annuities at the request of Charles Perks, a good friend and former fellow Metropolitan Life agent. Clem had been an insurance customer of Perks since approximately 1985. When Clem complained to Perks that "the bottom fell out of interest" on her certificates of deposit, he suggested the American Life annuities as a safe alternative that paid higher interest. But Perks was not an authorized agent for American Life, so he asked the Respondent to participate in the sales and split the commissions. In 1992, the Respondent became involved in the Zuma Engineering Co., Inc., a startup tire recycling venture. After being introduced to Zuma, the Respondent became very enthusiastic about its prospects. He invested $30,000 in Zuma, received stock in return for his investment, and became a thirty percent owner. He also became involved in all aspects of the startup business, from promoting the business to the public, to raising capital from and working with private investors, to cleaning up Zuma's recycling facility. He understood that he was a corporate director, but corporate filings with the Secretary of State indicate that he was a vice-president from October 27, 1993, until March 20, 1994. The Respondent not only solicited investors himself, he participated in recruiting a sales force. As part of this effort, he recruited his friend Charles Perks. In late 1993 and early 1994, Perks and the Respondent approached Mary Clem to solicit her investment in Zuma. It is not clear from the evidence how the solicitation of Mary Clem proceeded. It is believed that Clem may have initially contacted Perks around the time of the anniversary date of the $30,000 annuity to complain that she had been notified of a drop in the interest rate paid by the annuity. Mary Clem received a guaranteed 5.75 percent interest, plus a one percent interest "bonus" for a total of 6.75 percent interest during the first year of her two American Life annuities. The "bonus" interest automatically terminated at the end of the first year. In addition, the evidence was that the standard interest guarantee decreased to five percent starting with the second year. It is not clear when Clem received notice of the decrease in the interest guarantee or whether she received notice from American Life as to the elimination of the interest "bonus," but it is found that by December 2, 1993, Clem knew the interest rate on her $30,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent for the second year of the annuity. It is possible that she also knew by then that the interest on her $20,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent as well. Perks saw Mary Clem's dissatisfaction with the American Life annuities as an opportunity to sell Zuma promissory notes to her. On or about December 2, 1993, Charles Perks approached Mary Clem and sold her a $10,000 promissory note issued by Zuma. On its face, the promissory note was dated December 3, 1993, and paid twelve percent interest, with a single balloon payment of principal and interest due on June 3, 1995. The evidence was that the Respondent did not participate in this transaction on December 2, 1993. Mary Clem does not recall, and both Perks and the Respondent testified that the Respondent was not present. The Respondent testified that he was not even aware of this $10,000 Zuma note until the Department's Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on or about July, 1996, but this testimony is rejected as not being credible. It is found that the Respondent knew about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 promissory note either on December 2, 1993, or soon thereafter. It is found that by December 2, 1993, or shortly thereafter, Clem complained to both Perks and the Respondent about the interest on her annuities. It is found that all three of them discussed Zuma promissory notes as an alternative investment. Contrary to the Respondent's testimony, it is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note by then, the Respondent would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note during these discussions. It also is found that, based on those discussions, Clem decided to surrender her $20,000 annuity and use the money to buy Zuma promissory notes. It is found that Perks and the Respondent helped Clem with the surrender of her $20,000 annuity. It also is found, contrary to the Respondent's testimony, that Perks and the Respondent assisted in arranging for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $20,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $20,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. When American Life was notified of Clem's desire to surrender the $20,000 annuity, the company contacted the Respondent and asked him to "conserve" the annuity, i.e., dissuade Clem from surrendering it. It is found that, if he did not already know about it by then, the Respondent would have learned of Clem's intentions to buy Zuma promissory notes when he contacted her on behalf of American Life to comply with American Life's request that he attempt to conserve the annuity. It also is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note, he would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note at this time. By letter dated January 24, 1994, American Life responded to Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $69.67 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $213.69 and surrender charges in the amount of $1,625.65, for a net of $18,230.33. A check for the net amount was enclosed. A copy of American Life's January 24, 1994, letter was sent to the Respondent as the agent-of-record. On or about February 1, 1994, Perks and the Respondent went to Clem's home to complete the purchase of a $20,000 Zuma promissory note. The Respondent testified that, since all of the arrangements had been made in advance, the Respondent's role in the transaction was solely as "corporate director and verifier" on behalf of Zuma; however, the Respondent also would receive $900 of the $2,000 commission paid by Zuma on the transaction. Meanwhile, his additional role as American Life's agent required him to attempt to "conserve" the annuity policy. At one point, the Respondent testified that, as "corporate director and verifier," he inquired into Clem's assets (presumably to ascertain if the investment was appropriate for her). But he also testified that he assumed her assets were unchanged from 1992, raising a question as to whether the Respondent undertook any inquiry into Clem's assets on February 1, 1994, at all. At another point, the Respondent testified that he understood Mary Clem to have $200,000 in assets. See Department Exhibit 6. But, if so, those assets consisted of her home, the annuities and the $10,000 Zuma promissory note. It is found that the Respondent had no reason to believe she had any other assets. The Respondent also testified that he did not determine from his alleged inquiry into Clem's assets, and did not know, that Clem already had purchased a $10,000 Zuma promissory note. As previously found, it is considered incredible that the Respondent did not already know by February 1, 1994, that Clem had purchased the $10,000 Zuma promissory note; it is all the more incredible that he would not have learned of it from a diligent inquiry into Clem's assets for purposes of determining the appropriateness of the $20,000 Zuma investment. Mary Clem testified that the Respondent and Perks touted the safety of the Zuma investment as well as the higher interest it paid. The Respondent testified that, although acting in the conflicting roles described in the preceding finding, he discussed the differences between the two investments, including the risk of the Zuma investment. The Respondent testified that he read to Mary Clem from a written disclosure statement that defined Zuma's promissory notes as being a "risk investment," but no written disclosure statement was introduced in evidence. In any event, the "verification" was a mere formality; as the Respondent knew full well, Clem already had decided to buy the promissory note. Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $18,230, and Perks and the Respondent gave her Zuma's $20,000 promissory note bearing twelve percent interest. The note was erroneously dated February 1, 1993, and erroneously stated on its face that the single balloon payment of principal and interest was due on February 1, 1995. The note was supposed to have a 24- month term from February 1, 1994, to February 1, 1996. (This discrepancy would lead to problems later. See Findings 32-33, infra.) In view of the conflict of interest inherent in the Respondent's multiple roles in the transaction, it is found that the Respondent did not make a good faith inquiry into appropriateness of the Zuma investment for Mary Clem and did not fully disclose the risk associated with it, as compared to the American Life annuity. If the Respondent disclosed the risk, it is found that he did not do so fully and clearly, again probably due to the conflict of interest inherent in his multiple roles. Neither Mary Clem nor her late husband had ever invested in any stocks, mutual funds or even bonds. Before Mary Clem invested in the American Life annuities, she and her late husband always invested in certificates of deposit. While it is true that Clem wanted higher interest than she was getting on her annuities, she also wanted safety and security. It is found that, if the Respondent had fully and completely disclosed the risk of investing in Zuma promissory notes, Mary Clem would not have invested in them. Mary Clem also surrendered her $30,000 American Life annuity and used the money she received to buy another Zuma promissory note. The Respondent claimed not to have known anything about the third Zuma note, and the Department was not able to prove that he did. It is not clear exactly when Clem decided to surrender her $30,000 annuity and buy a third Zuma note. It was before March 3, 1994, the date of the American Life letter responding to Clem's request to surrender her $30,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $16.04 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $324.71 and surrender charges in the amount of $2,474.92, for a net of $27,216.41. A check for the net amount was enclosed. As with Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity, American Life contacted the Respondent and asked him to try to "conserve" the annuity. The Respondent also received a copy of American Life's March 3, 1994, letter as the agent-of- record. The Respondent admitted that he telephoned Clem on or about February 28, 1994, to try to conserve the annuity but that Clem was adamant. He claimed that Clem did not tell him what she intended to do with the money and that he did not ask. The meeting at which Clem bought the third Zuma promissory note took place on March 10, 1994. Mary Clem thought the Respondent was there but could not swear to it. Perks also testified that he thought the Respondent was there. The Respondent testified that he definitely was not there and did not know the transaction took place. By that time of the meeting on March 10, 1994, the Respondent had become suspicious and distrustful of Zuma's principals. They had diluted his thirty percent share of the company to a mere 0.3 percent. In addition, the Respondent did not think that the principals were following the business plan they had "sold" the Respondent, and which the Respondent in turn had "sold" to private investors, including Mary Clem. By early March 1994, the Respondent began to take steps to attempt to protect the investors in Zuma, including himself, and force Zuma to follow its business plan. Eventually, he emptied Zuma's accounts and placed the funds in the trust account of the lawyers he hired to sue Zuma and its principals to enjoin them to follow the business plan. The court ruled against the Respondent and required him to return the money to Zuma. The Respondent paid his lawyers' fees out of his own pocket. Based on the timing of events, it seems probable that the Respondent did not meet with Perks and Clem on March 10, 1994. By that time, he was becoming deeply involved in his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It is less clear that the Respondent was completely ignorant of Clem's intention to use the money from the surrender of the $30,000 American Life annuity to buy a third Zuma note, but he may well have lost track of Mary Clem and her intentions in the midst of his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It had been arranged before the March 10, 1994, meeting for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $30,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $30,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. The Respondent denied participating in making these arrangements or having any knowledge of them. A similar arrangement already had been made for the $20,000 annuity and Zuma note, and it is conceivable that Perks did not require the Respondent's participation to arrange it for the $30,000 annuity and Zuma note. It is found that the evidence did not prove the Respondent's participation. On March 10, 1994, Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $27,2126.41, and received Zuma's $30,000 promissory note dated March 10, 1994. On its face, the note paid twelve percent interest, with quarterly payments of $900 interest and the principal payable on March 10, 1996. The Respondent contacted Mary Clem in June or July, 1994, to inquire about her Zuma investment. Clem told him everything was fine. In December 1994, the notes were revised to show Mary Clem's daughter as a beneficiary on the notes in the event of Clem's death. The revised $20,000 note preserved the erroneous issuance and due dates. See Finding 21, supra. The $900 interest payment due on the $30,000 Zuma note on March 1995, was seriously past due. In addition, no payments were made on the $20,000 note. On April 1, 1995, the $20,000 note was renewed upon payment of $6,200 interest and penalties. Under the renewal note, monthly interest payments of $200 were due, and a balloon payment of principal and remaining interest was due on September 1, 1995. By mid-1995, Zuma was in default again, and Clem received no payments after August 8, 1995. Zuma paid Clem a total of just $23,400 on the three promissory notes. The Respondent conceded that there was a high risk of losing one's entire investment in Zuma and that someone investing in Zuma had to be prepared to lose the entire investment. He also conceded that Mary Clem should not have invested the bulk of her life savings in Zuma. He also conceded that it would have been significant to know, and he should have wanted to know, the extent of Clem's investment in Zuma before increasing her investment in Zuma.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Michael Crudele, guilty of violating Sections 626.611(7), 626.621(3), and 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1993); and (2) suspending his license and eligibility for licensure as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent for six months. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the charges brought against the Respondent, Jimmy D. Hill, he was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0144888. On June 20, 1983, a contract for the purchase of Unit 219 in Polynesian Village in Bay County, Florida, was signed by Margaret Gorshi and Glenn Coker. The buyers paid a total of $3,000 as an earnest money deposit which the Respondent deposited into his escrow account at Bay Bank and Trust Company in Panama City. This real estate transaction was subject to the buyers obtaining 90 percent financing, and it was scheduled to close on or before September 15, 1983. The transaction did not close because the buyers were not able to obtain the necessary financing, and in September of 1984 the buyers requested that their earnest money deposit be returned. On September 27, 1984, the Respondent's office manager forwarded a check for $3,000 dated September 24, 1984, to the buyers. This check was drawn on the Respondent's escrow account at Bay Bank and Trust Company in Panama City. This check was presented for payment in November of 1984, but it was not paid by the bank, and was returned because of insufficient funds in the Respondent's escrow account. The Respondent's escrow account was closed in July of 1985 without this check having been honored. Sometime prior to the issuance of the check to refund the buyer's deposit, another check in the amount of $5,400 was cashed at Bay Bank and Trust Company, drawn on the Respondent's business checking account at First National Bank. When this check was not honored by First National Bank due to insufficient funds, it was returned to Bay Bank and Trust Company. Upon receipt of this dishonored check, Bay Bank and Trust Company departed from its standard banking policy by charging the full amount thereof against the Respondent's trust or escrow account. As a result, the Respondent's escrow account became out of balance by $5,400. The Respondent's escrow account balance was at least $3,000 from June, 1983, through July, 1984. This balance was $1,600 on August 31, 1984; $1,600 on September 30, 1984; $600 on October 31, 1984; and from November 1984, through July, 1985, when the account was closed, the escrow account balance was $585. Without the unauthorized debit of $5,400, the balance was sufficient to enable the refund check to the buyers in the amount of $3,000 to clear. Although the Bay Bank and Trust Company issued a debit memo reflecting the charge of $5,400 to the Respondent's escrow account, the Respondent did not receive it. He testified that it must have been intercepted or diverted from him, by office personnel. The Respondent learned that his $3,000 check to the buyers had bounced in November or December, 1984. On February 25, 1985, the Respondent issued a replacement check for $3,000 to purchase a cashier's check which he intended to forward to the buyers. This check was given to an office employee to purchase the cashier's check, but the employee did not do so. Approximately three months later, in May of 1985, the Respondent was notified by an attorney for the buyers that they had not received the refund. The buyers had retained this attorney to obtain their refund from the Respondent, and after two or three discussions with the attorney, the Respondent finally forwarded his check for $3,400 plus, to counsel for the buyers in August of 1985. Although the Respondent's first refund check was caused to bounce by the bank's unauthorized charge of another check to his escrow account, the Respondent was negligent in not reviewing his escrow account statements so as to be informed of the bank's charge to his escrow account. The Respondent also failed to follow-up to assure that the buyers received the first replacement check when it was written in February, 1985. He did not regularly review the balances in his escrow account monthly after July of 1984, and only when he was contacted by the Real Estate Commission's investigator did he perform a thorough reconciliation of his escrow account in July, 1985. The Respondent also failed to supervise his employees and establish policies pertaining to review and verification of the balances in his escrow account.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Jimmy D. Hill, trading as Jim Hill Associates, be assessed an administrative fine of $1,000. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 25th day of September, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-1067 Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate vs. Jimmy D. Hill, t/a Jim Hill Associates Case No. 86-1067 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-10. Accepted. 11. Rejected because not a factual finding. 12-17. Accepted. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: (Paragraphs not numbered, but referred to in order.) Accepted. First sentence accepted. Second, third and fourth sentences rejected as not supported by corroborating evidence and thus are self-serving. Fifth, sixth and seventh sentences accepted. First sentence accepted. Second and third sentences rejected as not supported by corroborative evidence and thus are self-serving. Accepted. Accepted. First sentence accepted. Second and third sentences rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Michael C. Overstreet, Esquire 225 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings S. Benton, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
