The Issue Whether the Respondent, John Obrzut, should be terminated from his employment for reasons of incompetence and his alleged failure to advise the Superintendent of the Franklin County School District time and filing requirements under the above-cited Statute, because of failure to submit required monthly reports to the School Board as well as for unauthorized absences.
Findings Of Fact On May 6, 1985, the Respondent entered into an employment contract with the Franklin County School Board for employment in the position of Finance Officer and Business Manager. The contract's term continued through June 30, 1986, with a commencing date of July 1, 1985. The contract provided for a probationary status for Respondent. The Respondent was provided with a copy of the job description for the Finance Officer/Business Manager position he accepted and contracted for at the time of his employment. That job description established that the individual directly responsible to the Superintendent and the School Board for all activities concerned with the financial operations of the school system was the Finance Officer/Business Manager, Dr. Obrzut. Superintendent Gloria Tucker interviewed Dr. Obrzut for this position and was especially concerned that he understand the duties he would have in that office because the School Board was experiencing financial difficulties at that time, primarily related to the disheveled condition of its records for the past several fiscal years due at least in part to previous mismanagement by those with Dr. Obrzut's responsibilities. The Respondent was informed that it would be necessary for him, as Finance Officer, to reconstruct portions of those records. Dr. Obrzut did not inquire regarding the specific status of the records during the time of his employment interview and once he became employed he found the problem to be considerably worse than he had expected. Ms. Tucker informed the Respondent that his duties would include keeping her advised of the "TRIM Bill" time requirements in order to meet the budget publication date of July 25, 1985, as required by that law. His job description also required him to prepare a monthly financial statement showing receipts, disbursements and the balance of funds available in the district budget. Additionally, on June 24, 1985, after he was hired, the Respondent was given the various task assignments, in writing, from the Superintendent. These involved: (1) gathering necessary data and preparing the budget amendment for the June 27, 1985 School Board meeting; (2) develop with Mr. Johnson's help the baseline data that would establish the "time-line" for reconciliation of the 1982-1983 and 1983-1984 budgets, which was one of the Respondent's two major priorities for June and July of 1985 because, given the disarray of its financial records, the Board had an immediate necessity to know what cash reserves it truly had on hand; (3) set up a time schedule concerning when final reports were due on each federal and State project and when that information would be available to the Superintendent, as well as to give the Superintendent a written report as to how the "time-line" would operate during July and August of 1985. (4) The Respondent was required to set up a written time schedule as when Department of Education reports were due so that no reports would be filed late. Assignment number 5 involved reviewing the requirements for budget preparation as stated in the law regarding time requirements (i.e. the "TRIM Bill"). The Respondent was to directly contact the County property appraiser concerning when tax millage information from his office would be ready for the budgeting process. The Respondent's past employment history involved various clerical, accounting and financial analyst positions for most of the last two decades, as well as substantial periods of time spent obtaining graduate degrees. His longest period of employment was four years with the Department of Transportation, where he supervised a clerical unit with a number of employees reporting to him. Prior to his employment with the Franklin County School Board, he had no experience as the overall supervisor of financial operations of any agency of government or a private enterprise. He had no experience with school finance procedures established under Chapter 237, Florida Statutes. On June 24, 1985, the Respondent was given the assignment involving task number 5 mentioned above, whereby he was to review the requirements for budget preparation as stated in the above- cited Statute regarding time requirements. He contacted the property appraiser concerning when the Superintendent and the Board might expect tax millage information from his office required for the budget process. The Respondent was also verbally instructed by the Superintendent at this same time to keep her informed of all specific dates required by the law concerning budget events. In the course of these verbal instructions, the Superintendent advised Dr. Obrzut that she was especially concerned about this because this was her first time to be involved in the budgeting process as a Superintendent of Schools. On June 25, 1985, Dr. Obrzut advised the Superintendent that he had called the Franklin County property appraiser's office and it provided him no information on the requirements for the budget process at that time, in the form of the tax millage information, but he expected advice from them on this subject on June 27, 1985. He also advised the Superintendent at this time that he expected to receive a planning document, with the time requirements for the budgeting process, in the mail from the Department of Education and also expected to receive a copy of it personally at a school financial officer's meeting in Tampa. Dr. Obrzut reviewed Section 200.065, Florida Statutes (the "TRIM Bill"), as requested by the Superintendent, but his testimony establishes that he has no recollection of making any notes or recollection concerning the sequence of events required by the Statute as deadlines in the budget preparation process. In any event, the Respondent had no further communication with the Superintendent concerning the budget time requirements. He subsequently learned that a copy of the planning document would also be mailed to the Superintendent and therefore simply assumed she would monitor the State's various budget planning event time requirements herself. He took no further steps to advise her of the various critical time deadlines. In fact, no one in the Franklin County School District administration was monitoring the budget time schedule of events because the Superintendent, whom the financial officer, Dr. Obrzut, directly reported to, was relying on Obrzut to do this. This fact, however, was discovered accidentally by Mr. David Johnson, a contract certified public accountant, who was performing an audit of the internal accounts of the various district schools. Mr. Johnson was meeting with the Superintendent concerning matters about the internal audit on a Wednesday in July 1985, when he inquired of her as to the status of the district's advertising of its forthcoming budget, as required by law. The Superintendent advised him that Dr. Obrzut was monitoring the schedule of events and deadlines concerning the budget preparation and advertising process. Mr. Johnson thereupon visited Dr. Obrzut at his office and retrieved from him the planning document that Obrzut had received from the Department of Education. Mr. Johnson informed the Superintendent that the budget must be completed and ready for advertising prior to the following Tuesday. This was the first time the Superintendent had learned of the immediately impending deadline for budget advertising as required by the above Statute. The Franklin County School District employees responsible for preparation of the budget then had to work through the entire weekend that ensued in order to timely complete the budget in time for the advertising deadline on Tuesday. The testimony of the Superintendent as well as Mr. Johnson, who has extensive experience in the field of educational finance and was accepted as an expert in that field, established that had that deadline been missed the Franklin County School District would have lost approximately $500,000 in tax revenues needed to fund its $3,000,000 operating budget. Dr. Obrzut acknowledged that he was responsible for ensuring that the federal cash advance reports were sent to the Department of Education in a timely fashion in order to ensure the continuous flow of funds to the district for the district's federally funded projects. He established that he prepared one of these reports himself and delegated the task of preparing the September 1985 report to one of his subordinate employees, Donna Ward. He admitted he did not monitor her work and ensure that the report was timely filed and did not learn of the fact that it had not been filed until the Superintendent informed him of that fact at the time she informed him she would recommend his dismissal. The report was delinquent at that time and the district had already ceased to receive federal funds because of that delinquency. David Johnson was accepted as an expert witness in the areas of accounting and Florida school finance. He worked for the Office of the Auditor General for three years and then spent several years in the capacity of a school Finance Officer. He is a certified public accountant and currently operates an accounting firm that renders accounting assistance to four school districts in Florida. Additionally, he serves as chairman of the Walton County School Board. Mr. Johnson was retained to assist Dr. Obrzut in reconstructing the ledgers and records for the fiscal years 1982- 83 and 1983-84. He was also asked to school Dr. Obrzut in the legal and regulatory requirements and accounting procedures attendant to the peculiarities of Florida school finance. Mr. Johnson established that he had great difficulty explaining to Dr. Obrzut the nuances and peculiarities of the Florida school finance law, reporting requirements and accounting procedures. He spent more than one full day in attempting to explain these duties of Dr. Obrzut's position to him. Dr. Obrzut would indicate that he understood, but later conversation revealed that he did not in fact understand what had been explained to him. Further, Dr. Obrzut showed a penchant for discussing tangential or even unrelated matters with great Verbosity during Mr. Johnson's attempts to explain his financial duties to him. This may have frustrated Dr. Obrzut's opportunity to understand the explanation of his financial duties and the requirements of his position and doubtless frustrated Mr. Johnson's efforts to explain them. In any event, Mr. Johnson established that, based upon his association with Dr. Obrzut over a period of several months, that Dr. Obrzut did not possess the knowledge and skills necessary to enable him to serve as a School District Finance Officer, even in view of his educational degrees in the areas of finance. This opinion was unrebutted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Respondent John Obrzut be terminated from his position of employment with the School Board of Franklin County. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1775 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but not for the material import sought to be conveyed. Rejected as to its overall import as not in accordance with the greater weight of the testimony and evidence presented. Accepted to the extent that the Petitioner failed to present evidence of any unauthorized absences, but the remainder of this proposed finding is rejected as not comporting with the greater weight of the material evidence presented. Rejected as not in accordance with the greater weight of the evidence and testimony presented, except that the record does not reflect that he ever received any written reprimand or warning. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Van P. Russell, Esquire WATKINS & RUSSELL 41 Commerce Street Apalachicola, Florida 32320 Edward S. Stafman, Esquire 317 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Judith Brechner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gloria H. Tucker, Superintendent Franklin County School District 155 Avenue E Apalachicola, Florida 32320
The Issue Whether petitioner abandoned her position and is deemed to have resigned from the Career Service under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact The petitioner was first employed by the State of Florida with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on May 2, 1980. At the time, the petitioner owned her own accounting firm. However because she intended to remain in State employment for a minimum of ten years and did not want to jeopardize her position with HRS, she closed out her accounting firm transferring her clients to another member of Florida State Accounting Association. On October 28, 1985, petitioner became ill with acute bronchitis. She did not return to work until November 8, 1985. During that period of time, she was on authorized leave. On Saturday, November 23, the petitioner had a relapse. After calling her doctor, petitioner resumed taking the medication that had previously been prescribed and stayed in bed. On November 25, 1985, Angela Gary, a co-worker, went by Petitioner's home to give her a ride to work. Petitioner informed Ms. Gary that she would not be going to work that day. Petitioner did not explain to Ms. Gary that she was ill and did not ask Ms. Gary to take any message to the petitioner's supervisor, Ms. Matson, or to the District Fiscal Officer, Mr. Fisher, who was in charge of the entire accounting section. 1/ Mr. Fisher was aware that Ms. Gary was to provide a ride for petitioner on November 25, 1985. Therefore when petitioner did not report to work, Mr. Fisher asked Ms. Gary if she had remembered to go by petitioner's house. Ms. Gary told Mr. Fisher that she had remembered to go by the house but that petitioner said that she wasn't going to work. On Tuesday, November 26, Ms. Gary again went by petitioner's home to drive her to work. At that time, petitioner told Ms. Gary that she wouldn't be going to work and that Ms. Gary did not have to come by her house on Wednesday unless the petitioner called her. Because petitioner did not feel capable of returning to work on Wednesday, she did not call Ms. Gary. Therefore, Ms. Gary did not go by petitioner's house on Wednesday November 27, 1985. At no time during the three day period that she was absent from work did the petitioner telephone her supervisor to inform her of the situation. Prior to this three-day period, petitioner had been absent on several occasions and had always called her supervisor to inform the supervisor that she would be unable to report to work. She was quite familiar with the procedure that she needed to follow. Petitioner had received a copy of the HRS Employee Handbook, HRSP 60-1, which includes procedures to be followed to obtain authorized leave. The procedure for sick leave includes the following: As soon as possible on the first day of absence, it is your responsibility to notify your supervisor that the absence is due to illness....Your supervisor should also be given an estimate of the length of the absence. Medical certification may be required. Further, within the accounting section, the employees had been specifically advised that they had to speak directly to their immediate supervisor when calling in sick. Although petitioner was aware of the sick leave procedure, she did not attempt to call her supervisor at any time during the three-day period she was absent. Her only reason for not calling was that the medication she was taking made her "woozy" and that she slept most of the time. There was no evidence to suggest that petitioner was incapacitated to the degree that she was unable to call her supervisor. 1O. November 27-28 were holidays. On December 2; 1985, the following Monday, petitioner called her supervisor in the morning to inform the supervisor that she would be late to work. At that time, petitioner was informed that she was no longer employed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered sustaining the action of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in deeming Virginia I. Lee to have abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1986.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Kay McGinn, willfully violated Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2001), when she certified the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete because it failed to disclose an in-kind contribution by Frank Furman for the use of telephones used by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers in offices that Mr. Furman owned.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the Mayor of Pompano Beach, Florida. She ran unsuccessfully for Pompano Beach City Commission in 1996. Her campaigns for the same office in 1998, 2000, and 2002 were successful. The alleged offense took place during the 2002 election campaign. Petitioner is an intelligent, conscientious public servant. She is familiar with the Florida election law and is sensitive to her obligation to follow the law and diligent in her attempt to do so. During the 2002 campaign, Frank Furman, a long-time Pompano Beach business man who enjoys an excellent reputation, offered the use of his business offices to Petitioner for campaign activities. Petitioner chose to use Furman's office on six to eight occasions to make campaign-related local telephone calls. Typically, Petitioner and five or six volunteers would spend about one hour in the early evening calling Pompano Beach voters encouraging them to vote for Petitioner. Mindful of the election law requiring the reporting of "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner asked Mr. Furman the value of the use of his telephones for reporting purposes. Furman advised Petitioner that the use of his telephones had "no value." In reporting "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner's practice was to ask the contributor to provide an invoice reflecting the "fair market value" of the "in-kind" contribution. Armed with the invoice, she would then report the "in-kind" contribution. "Fair market value" is an economic concept used most frequently in reported Florida cases when referring to the value of real property taken in condemnation actions or in determining restitution in criminal cases. Numerous definitions are found. Typically, the definitions involve "a willing buyer and a willing seller, fully informed as to the value of the object of the transaction, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell." Respondent's Statement of Findings, which was analyzed by Petitioner's expert witness, offers an amortized cost to Mr. Furman for use by Petitioner and her volunteers of the telephones. This amortized cost is apparently advanced as evidence of "fair market value" or "attributable monetary value." Mr. Furman pays a fixed-rate of slightly less than $1,500.00 per month for the use of 32 to 33 telephone lines. This means that each line costs approximately $46.87 per month. Assuming 30 days per month, the daily cost per line is $1.56. Assuming 24-hour days, the hourly cost per line is $0.065. Further assuming that six volunteers used one telephone for one hour on eight different days, the result is 48 hours of line use. The resulting amortized use cost, given the known use by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers, is $3.12. Amortized use cost is not fair market value. Neither an "attributable monetary value" nor a "fair market value" of Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones was established. To the contrary, it was established that there was no "market" for access to six to eight telephones for one hour, one night per week. While it is assumed that Petitioner would benefit from telephone calls made by her supporters, whether made from their individual homes or from some group setting, the evidence failed to established that Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones had any "attributable monetary value" or "fair market value." Given that the use of the telephones by Petitioner was during non-working hours when the telephones would normally be idle, it is not surprising that Mr. Furman advised Petitioner that there was no cost associated with the use of his telephones. His monthly telephone bill would be the same whether Petitioner used his telephones or not. Nor is Petitioner to be faulted for relying on the contributor's assessment of the value of the "in-kind" contribution of the use of the telephones. The real value to Petitioner's campaign was the use of Mr. Furman's office as a meeting place. As a practical matter, each volunteer could have taken a list of the telephone numbers of Pompano Beach voters to their respective homes and made the telephone calls from their homes. This was not a professional "phone bank," sometimes used in political campaigns where trained callers use scripted messages designed to elicit voter preferences and where the candidates receives "feed-back" on salient issues. A "fair market value" can be easily established for such services as they are common in the market place. The evidence suggests that campaign volunteers making telephone calls to registered voters from their homes or from someone's office is a common practice in political campaigns in Florida. It is also suggested that this common practice is not reported as a campaign contribution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Kay McGinn, did not violate Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, as alleged, and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stuart R. Michelson, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Recommendation In light of the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended petition on the grounds that Petitioner lacks standing to administratively challenge the Department’s decision not to disapprove McLaughlin’s proposed appointment to Sunniland’s board of directors and that the Department, having failed to act within the time frame prescribed by Rule 3C-100.0385, Florida Administrative Code, does not have the authority to reconsider its decision and issue a letter of disapproval, as requested by Petitioner.16 DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 1997.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner effectively elected to move her retirement account from the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Pension Plan to the FRS Investment Plan prior to her retirement from state employment or, if not, whether Respondent, State Board of Administration (“SBA”) is estopped from claiming that Petitioner did not successfully elect to move her retirement account into the FRS Investment Plan.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Adrian Wagner began her state employment on April 22, 1994, with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which was renamed the Department of Children and Family Services after a 1996 reorganization. Since 2012, the agency has been named the Department of Children and Families. Upon her hiring, Ms. Wagner was enrolled in the Pension Plan, which was the only retirement program available for eligible employees in 1994. In 2002, the Investment Plan was made available for employees participating in the FRS. Ms. Wagner was provided a three month window, from December 1, 2002, through February 28, 2003, to switch to the Investment Plan. The Plan Choice Administrator did not receive an election from Ms. Wagner during the three month period. Therefore, Ms. Wagner remained in the Pension Plan by statutory default. See § 121.4501(4)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Wagner changed employers but remained in the FRS system until her last day of employment on April 3, 2019. At the time of her retirement from FRS-eligible employment, Ms. Wagner was working for the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office. On March 4, 2019, Ms. Wagner logged onto the FRS website, MyFRS.com, from her home computer. Her intention was to use the second election opportunity afforded by section 121.4501(4)(f), Florida Statutes, to move from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner recalled clicking a green button to change her plan, which took her to a page that read, “ready to make a decision” to change from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. It set out the steps needed to make the change. Ms. Wagner testified that she clicked on a green arrow that said, “change your plan,” which took her to a page that set forth the amount of money she would have in the Investment Plan. She continued to a page showing the different plans available to participants in the Investment Plan. The website advised her to contact an Ernst and Young (“EY”) financial planner to discuss her plan options. Ms. Wagner testified that a few minutes later she used the phone number provided by the MyFRS.com website to contact the EY financial planners. She testified that the EY planner with whom she spoke was named “Josh.” The EY call summary log for Ms. Wagner was entered into evidence. The log is a record of every phone call between EY and Ms. Wagner. It includes the date and time of the call, the name of the EY employee who spoke to Ms. Wagner, and a brief summary of their discussion. The EY call summary log identified the EY planner who spoke with Ms. Wagner at 12:10 p.m., on March 4, 2019, as Joshua Kantrowitz. Ms. Wagner testified that Mr. Kantrowitz told her that he could not see in his computer that she had made the switch to the Investment Plan. While Mr. Kantrowitz waited, Ms. Wagner clicked several “back” buttons on the MyFRS.com website. She then went through the same page progression she had done previously to make her plan selection. Ms. Wagner recalled finalizing her decision by clicking a button that read “send,” or “submit,” or “continue.” Ms. Wagner testified that Mr. Kantrowitz told her that he could now see that she had elected to change her retirement from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. They discussed fund options, tax questions, and penalties for taking funds out of the Investment Plan. Mr. Kantrowitz verified Ms. Wagner’s email address so that he could send her an FRS Investment Beneficiary Form. Ms. Wagner understood Mr. Kantrowitz to say that she would not be able to see that she had changed to the Investment Plan on the website for about a month. The conversation was interrupted when the phone connection was lost. Ms. Wagner testified that it was her understanding that she had successfully changed her retirement from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan, and that this change had been confirmed by Mr. Kantrowitz. A transcript of the conversation between Ms. Wagner and Mr. Kantrowitz was entered into evidence. The transcript does not confirm every aspect of Ms. Wagner’s recollection. The transcript records that Ms. Wagner told Mr. Kantrowitz that she “just switched over from the FRS Pension Plan to the Investment Plan.” Mr. Kantrowitz asked when she made the switch. Ms. Wagner responded, “I just hit it today. Did it today.” She added that she made the election “about ten minutes ago.” The transcript clarifies that Mr. Kantrowitz accepted, but did not confirm, Ms. Wagner’s statement that she made the switch to the Investment Plan. After Ms. Wagner told him that she made the switch only 10 minutes ago, Mr. Kantrowitz stated: Okay. And you did it by--basically, you know, if you do--you know, it’s still being processed at the moment. Basically, you know, in the next month, it’s going to make that conversion. In order to, you know, switch and make that choice, you know, the types of investments you’re putting into. Okay. So I do want to keep you aware of that if you did fill it out today, okay. Mr. Kantrowitz never confirmed that the second election had been completed nor did he state whether he could or could not see the change on his computer. Mr. Kantrowitz simply accepted Ms. Wagner’s word and went on to tell her what would happen next if she indeed made the change. Mr. Kantrowitz did state that the conversion would be made in the next month, confirming in part Ms. Wagner’s recollection that she was told that it would be a month before she could see the switch to the Investment Plan on the website. Again, however, this statement was contingent: if Ms. Wagner made the change, the conversion would take about a month. The EY call summary log entry for the March 4, 2019, conversation, presumably completed by Mr. Kantrowitz, records Ms. Wagner’s “Question or Problem” as “made a switch to the FRS IP. [D]oesn’t plan to work in the FRS anymore.” The log records the “Resolution” with a series of four bullet points: talked about IP. taxation, timelines, HIS. says she spoke with admin and they said she would hit NRA at April 1 for 25 YOS SR. she did the 2nd election online and was defaulted into the FRS RDF. needs to set up beneficiaries sending out beneficiary form It could be argued that the second bullet point confirms that Ms. Wagner successfully completed the second election into the Investment Plan. However, when read in tandem with the transcript, Mr. Kantrowitz’s notes clearly set forth his summary of the conversation as it occurred, not his independent conclusion that Ms. Wagner had completed the second election. After the call with Mr. Kantrowitz was dropped, Ms. Wagner called back to inquire as to her exact retirement date. She spoke briefly with another EY planner, Zach Brown, who told her that the Division of Retirement keeps the record of official years of service for employees. Mr. Brown transferred the call to the Division of Retirement. The transcript indicates that Ms. Wagner remained on hold for some time, then hung up before speaking with a Division of Retirement representative. Ms. Wagner testified that on March 18, 2019, she again contacted the EY financial planners. She spoke for roughly a half-hour with a woman whose name she did not recall. The woman verified Ms. Wagner’s personal account information. After being verified, Ms. Wagner asked tax and health care subsidy questions and stated that she planned eventually to move her Investment Plan account from EY to an outside investment firm. Ms. Wagner testified that the EY planner never stated that she was not enrolled in the Investment Plan. The EY call summary log does not show a phone call from Ms. Wagner on March 18, 2019. Ms. Wagner testified that on March 19, 2019, she met with Shawn Powers, the human resources manager for the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, to discuss Ms. Wagner’s impending retirement. As Ms. Powers filled out a retiree insurance data sheet, Ms. Wagner told her that she had enrolled in the Investment Plan. Ms. Powers cautioned her about the risks involved in the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner assured her that she understood the risks. Ms. Powers checked the “Investment Plan” box on the insurance form. Ms. Wagner signed the form, attesting to her understanding that she had made the election to move from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. Ms. Wagner testified that, after the March 4, 2019, conversation with Mr. Kantrowitz, she received several emails from EY financial planners. She understood these emails as indirect confirmation that she had successfully elected to move to the Investment Plan. During cross-examination, Ms. Wagner conceded that none of these communications affirmatively stated that she was now in the Investment Plan. The third-party Plan Choice Administrator for the Investment Plan is Alight Solutions. FRS members who wish to utilize their second election have multiple options: they may complete and mail in a hard copy form; they may submit a second election form on the MyFRS.com website; or they may log into their account on the MyFRS.com website and go through the process of submitting and confirming their second election online. Fla. Admin. Code R. 19-11.007(3). If an FRS member successfully utilizes the online MyFRS.com process for submitting a second election, an “election confirmation” page appears that informs the member that the election has been received by Alight Solutions. Ms. Wagner had no specific recollection of receiving an electronic confirmation that her election to move to the Investment Plan had been successfully submitted or that it had been received by Alight Solutions. If an FRS member successfully submits an election form to Alight Solutions, a hard copy letter is mailed to the member confirming receipt. Ms. Wagner had no specific recollection of receiving any type of correspondence confirming receipt of her Investment Plan election via conventional mail. Ms. Wagner retired from the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office on April 3, 2019. The parties stipulated that the SBA has no record of receiving a second election from Ms. Wagner during her term of employment with an FRS-participating employer. On April 8, 2019, Ms. Wagner logged onto the MyFRS.com website and saw that she was still enrolled in the Pension Plan. Ms. Wagner immediately phoned the number for the EY financial planners and was transferred to a “solutions person” named Nichole. Ms. Wagner explained to Nichole that on March 4, 2019, she had elected to move her retirement account from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan via the MyFRS.com website. She provided Nichole with the chronology of events from March 2019 as she remembered them. Nichole told Ms. Wagner that she would research the matter and get back to her within two weeks. Ms. Wagner testified that on or about April 22, 2019, Nichole phoned her to say that she could find no record of anything Ms. Wagner claimed to have done on the MyFRS.com website. Nicole told Ms. Wagner that she would need more time, possibly another two weeks, to do further research on the matter. Ms. Wagner told Nichole how upset she was. Nichole assured Ms. Wagner that she would do her best to find out what happened. Nichole also stated that she would send Ms. Wagner a form to request that the SBA intervene. Ms. Wagner subsequently filed a Request for Intervention, which was received by the SBA on May 17, 2019. Ms. Wagner testified that after she filed her Request for Intervention, but before the SBA responded, she attempted to contact Nichole. Her call was answered by an unnamed EY planner who stated that he would remain on the line while putting her through to a solutions person. Ms. Wagner began speaking with the solutions person but was interrupted by the EY financial planner, who stated that he had found notes by Mr. Kantrowitz indicating that she had changed from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. It is highly likely that the unnamed EY financial planner was referencing the EY call summary log notes quoted at Finding of Fact 18. As found above, Mr. Kantrowitz’s contemporary notes reflected what he was told by Ms. Wagner. The notes do not constitute an independent confirmation that Ms. Wagner successfully completed her second election. The SBA submitted into evidence a spreadsheet titled “Participant Web Activity Detail.” SBA witness Allison Olson testified that this document was produced by Alight Solutions in response to her request for all records of Ms. Wagner’s March 4, 2019, activity on the MyFRS.com website. Ms. Olson is the Director of Policy, Risk Management, and Compliance in the Office of Defined Contribution Programs. She credibly testified that she is familiar with reading the Alight Solutions spreadsheets and that she saw nothing on Ms. Wagner’s page indicating that Alight Solutions received her Investment Plan election. Petitioner’s information technology expert, Philip Schwartz, testified that the document provided by Alight Solutions was a “program log,” a high level program that runs to handle a particular task such as an accounting function. Mr. Schwartz testified that he suggested to his client that she request the “server log” for the relevant date. The server log captures every keystroke and click made by a user such as Ms. Wagner, even in situations in which the server is too busy to complete the requested function. Mr. Schwartz believed the program log was insufficient because it showed only which page of the website Ms. Wagner was on at a given moment, not which buttons she clicked or whether she had hit the “send” button. Mr. Schwartz’s suggestion was that Ms. Wagner might have done everything necessary to complete the second election but that the MyFRS.com server may not have recorded her election. The server log would have provided a more accurate representation of Ms. Wagner’s intentions. Ms. Olson testified that, after an informal hearing attempting to resolve the case, she requested a server log from Alight Solutions. The company responded that it did not have the server log. Ms. Olson testified that the program log would indicate the second election had it been completed by Ms. Wagner. Ms. Olson stated that FRS members are always advised to follow through and make sure their election has been received. Mr. Schwartz testified that there is no industry standard as to the length of time a program log should be kept. He has known companies to hold them for as long as a year, but has also known companies to keep them for only 90 days. Mr. Schwartz testified that there is no legal requirement for a company such as Alight Solutions to maintain a program log at all. Mr. Schwartz testified that he did not have enough knowledge of Alight Solutions’ terminology to state whether the program log indicated that Ms. Wagner’s election had been received. Thus, there is no evidence to contradict Ms. Olson’s credible testimony that the Alight Solutions program log did not indicate receipt of Ms. Wagner’s Investment Plan election. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Ms. Wagner intended to make her second election on March 4, 2019, and to move her retirement account from the Pension Plan to the Investment Plan. The preponderance of the evidence also establishes that Ms. Wagner failed to complete her second election and that Alight Solutions, the Plan Choice Administrator for the Investment Plan, did not receive her election.1/ The evidence was insufficient to show that the SBA or any entity or person acting on its behalf or as its agent made any representation to Ms. Wagner that her second election had been received by the Plan Choice Administrator.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Florida Retirement System Investment Plan Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2020.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by corruptly using his position as Sheriff of Flagler County to obtain a benefit for himself or others; or section 112.3148(8), by failing to report a gift valued in excess of $100.00; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James L. Manfre, served as Flagler County Sheriff from January 2001 through January 2005 (Respondent’s first term). Respondent was re-elected Sheriff in 2012 and began his second term on January 8, 2013. Respondent is a member of the Florida Bar. Between his first and second terms, Respondent was engaged in the private practice of law, with a primary focus on land use matters. While in private practice, Respondent represented two clients involved in cases with the Florida Ethics Commission. One client was a complainant who alleged misuse of position by a public official. Former Undersheriff, Frederick Staly, served as Flagler County Undersheriff with Respondent from January 2013 to April 17, 2015. Respondent chose Staly as Undersheriff, in part, because he had almost 40 years’ experience in law enforcement, and had most recently served as Undersheriff in Orange County, Florida. Undersheriff Staly advised Respondent on matters pertaining to policy and personnel decisions. In December 2012, just prior to Respondent’s second term, Respondent and Undersheriff Staly attended a one-day ethics training seminar for new law enforcement personnel. Linda Tannuzzi has been employed by the Flagler County Sheriff’s Office (FCSO) since 2001. Ms. Tannuzzi was Accounting Specialist in the FCSO Finance Department during both Respondent’s first and second terms. Ms. Tannuzzi’s responsibilities included processing the monthly FCSO credit card bill for payment. Ms. Tannuzzi’s general practice was to check the listed charges on the monthly FCSO credit card statement against the receipts submitted by employees. In the event no receipt was submitted, Ms. Tannuzzi would obtain missing receipts from either the employee or the vendor (e.g., hotel at which employee stayed). The practice of the Finance Department was to pay all credit card charges accompanied by a signed receipt from the employee. During all times pertinent hereto, the Sheriff’s office maintained a policy on credit card purchases. Pursuant to the policy, the Sheriff “will make only agency-related purchases and return receipts to Finance.” The policy did not define “agency-related purchases.” Further, the policy advised: Using an agency credit card during an ongoing investigation requires the following be adhered to: Food only in amount specified by per diem rate, must include overnight stay. No cash advances. No car rentals without approval of Sheriff. Travel voucher to be completed upon return. Receipts to be attached to travel voucher. (emphasis added). This portion of the policy did not clearly apply to use of the agency credit card outside of ongoing investigations. Respondent was issued an FCSO credit card for use during both his first and second terms. Ms. Tannuzzi never questioned any receipt submitted by Respondent until October 2013. She assumed all Respondent’s receipts were valid. However, no one instructed her to process Respondent’s credit card charges differently from other employees. Pursuant to section 112.061, at all times relevant hereto, state employees were allowed the following amounts for meals while traveling on business overnight: breakfast, $6; lunch, $11; and dinner, $19. These amounts are referred to as the per diem rates. Respondent was subject to section 112.061 at all times relevant hereto. Use of Agency Credit Card In May 2013, Respondent attended a National Law Enforcement conference in Washington, D.C. On May 14, 2013, Respondent dined at a restaurant called the “Madhatter” with his wife, as well as some sheriff’s deputies and their spouses. The total bill for the meal was $235.76, which Respondent paid for with the FCSO credit card. The tab included one alcoholic beverage. Upon returning from the conference, Respondent submitted the signed receipt to Finance for processing. Other than the meals for FCSO employees, the purchase did not serve a public purpose. Each of the meals for FCSO employees exceeded the per diem rate. In July 2013, Respondent attended the National Association of School Resource Officers conference in Orlando and stayed at the Rosen Shingle Creek hotel. On July 16, 2014, Respondent dined with his wife at an onsite restaurant. Respondent charged the total bill of $86.50, which included alcohol, to his room at the hotel. With the exception of Respondent’s meal, the purchase did not serve any public purpose. The cost of Respondent’s meal exceeded the per diem rate. Upon his return, Respondent submitted his receipt from the Rosen Shingle Creek hotel to Finance for processing. In August 2013, Respondent attended the Florida Sheriff’s Association conference in Marco Island, Florida, and stayed at a Marriott hotel. Respondent made the following room charges during his stay: On August 3, 2013, meals for himself, Undersheriff Staly, and their wives, including alcohol, totaling $158.50, and, separately, two alcoholic beverages totaling $12.46; on August 4, 2013, two meals and alcohol, totaling $62.21; and on August 7, 2013, two meals totaling $54.58. Upon his return, Respondent submitted the Marriott hotel receipt to Finance for processing. Other than Respondent’s and Undersheriff Staly’s meals, the purchases did not serve any public purpose. The amount for each of Respondent’s meals exceeded the per diem rate. Public Records Request/FCSO Audit In October 2013, the independent accounting firm of Carr, Riggs, and Igram began a routine financial audit of the FCSO for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2013. Also in October 2013, the FCSO received a public records request, or requests, seeking information from the FCSO pertaining to Respondent’s travel expenditures. In order to fully respond to the public records request(s), Ms. Tannuzzi had to obtain a detailed receipt of Respondent’s Madhatter restaurant charges from May 2013, and detailed receipts of Respondent’s restaurant and bar charges, which were reflected as room charges on the July and August 2013 hotel receipts. In mid-October 2013, Respondent had a meeting with Undersheriff Staly, the FCSO Director of Finance, and the FCSO attorney. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss charges Respondent made with the FCSO credit card. During that meeting, Respondent was advised to reimburse FCSO for all non-agency personnel meal charges and his meal charges exceeding the approved per diem rate. The Finance Director was instructed to calculate the amounts owed by Respondent. On October 31, 2013, Respondent reimbursed FCSO $344.03 for “personal meals” charged to the FCSO account. At hearing, Respondent maintained that his staff, mainly his Undersheriff and Finance Director, had the duty to inform and advise him of his obligations with respect to use of the FCSO credit card, and that they failed to perform that duty. Thus, Respondent pled ignorance as to the appropriate use of the agency credit card, and argued that when the issues were brought to his attention, he reimbursed the amounts owed and instituted new policies to provide clear guidance to all FCSO personnel. Respondent assumed no responsibility for, and was neither contrite nor apologetic for, his use of the agency credit card. Respondent assigned fault to the Director of Finance for not keeping accurate accounts and “keeping track of these amounts and [telling] me if I was over the per diem rate.” Respondent’s attitude was best reflected in his own words: I assumed and trusted that she knew what she was doing and would come to me when the money was owed. That was my assumption, that she was competent to do that. It was simple addition and subtraction that all she had to do was tell me what it was. I never refused to pay back any amounts when I was asked to. It is not my job to be the director of finance. My job was to be a sheriff and create a community that is safe, and I assumed that she was doing her job. Unfortunately, to my detriment, she was not. Respondent admitted that he knew the charges exceeded the per diem rate for meals. Apparently, he did not intend to pay for them unless requested. Use of Agency Vehicles In January 2013, Respondent drove an FCSO unmarked Ford Crown Victoria to Destin, Florida, to attend a Florida Sheriff’s Association conference. Respondent’s wife accompanied him to the conference. When the conference ended, Respondent drove the FCSO vehicle to visit his in-laws in Pensacola, Florida, then on to New Orleans for a personal trip. On May 3, 2013, Respondent drove an FCSO white Dodge Charger to Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, for a vacation with his wife. Respondent returned to Florida from Pigeon Forge on May 7, 2013. In August 2013, Respondent drove an FCSO white Dodge Charger to Virginia to view colleges with his son. During the trip, the vehicle suffered minor damage in a parking lot. Upon Respondent’s return from Virginia, Undersheriff Staly observed Respondent, along with the owner of a local body shop, in the parking lot inspecting the vehicle. Undersheriff Staly inquired whether there was anything wrong with the vehicle. In response to Undersheriff Staly’s inquiry, Respondent disclosed what had transpired. Respondent indicated that the accident did not occur in Flagler County, which Respondent knew to be “a problem.” Respondent consulted with Undersheriff Staly regarding the procedure to deal with the minor damage to the vehicle. Staly recommended Respondent write an internal report. With respect to damage to FCSO vehicles, the policy in effect at the time required officers to document damage on an incident report and report it to the Division Director through the chain of command. Respondent did not file a report pursuant to either the policy or Undersheriff Staly’s advice. The policy also required all officers to report vehicle damage to Fleet Maintenance. Respondent did report the damage to Fleet Maintenance. Respondent released a statement (in response to press inquiries about damage to the vehicle) explaining that he did not take his personal vehicle on this trip because it had a mechanical problem. Respondent testified at final hearing that his personal vehicle had a mechanical problem. At all times relevant hereto, FCSO maintained a policy on use and assignment of agency vehicles, Policy 41.3. Policy 41.3 stated, “Agency vehicles are assigned by Division Directors to individual member’s [sic] based on the criteria of their job performance.” There is no Division Director with respect to Respondent. Under Use of Vehicles, Policy 41.3 states, “The Sheriff allows personnel who have been assigned an Agency vehicle use of that vehicle while off duty with the following provisions[.]” The policy requires officers to obtain permission from their supervisor in order to take an FCSO vehicle out of the county. Respondent has no supervisor. Respondent’s position is that Policy 41.3 applied only to use of marked vehicles. On October 17, 2013, Respondent reimbursed FCSO $667 for use of the agency vehicle for personal travel to Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. Use of the agency vehicle for the trip to Virginia was publicly questioned in 2014. At that time, Respondent was advised by Undersheriff Staly to reimburse FCSO for the mileage. However, Respondent asked Staly to follow up with an attorney for the Florida Sheriff’s Association (which he did), who provided the same advice. Respondent reimbursed FCSO for use of the agency vehicle to Virginia on July 10, 2014, when he issued a check for $223.50. At final hearing, Respondent maintained that reimbursement was not necessary and was only made “in an abundance of caution on the advice of counsel.” Unreported Gift Respondent’s stay in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, in May 2013, was courtesy of Undersheriff Staly. Staly owns three cabins in a private vacation resort in Pigeon Forge. The resort has a gated entrance, and just inside the entrance is a management office where guests check in. The resort includes amenities such as a playground, a miniature golf course, and a clubhouse. Undersheriff Staly pays commercial property insurance, and pays for utilities and cable television at a commercial rate. He also pays tangible personal property tax. Undersheriff Staly contracts with “Accommodations by Parkside,” a vacation rental management company, to manage the cabins. He pays a management fee to Accommodations by Parkside for each rental booking. Undersheriff Staly must reserve the cabins for his personal use through Accommodations by Parkside. He does not have direct access to any of the cabins. Undersheriff Staly reserved one of the cabins, “Suite Mountain View,” for Respondent to use from May 3 through May 7, 2013. The particular cabin usually rents for $430 per night during the applicable season. Undersheriff Staly offered Respondent use of the cabin for the cleaning fee of $75. The décor at Suite Mountain View does not include any family photographs or other items personal to the Stalys. Respondent paid Accomodations by Parkside $90.20 for use of the cabin during the specified dates, which included the cleaning fee and sales tax. Constitutional officers are required to file with the Florida Commission on Ethics a Form 9 Quarterly Gift Disclosure for quarters ending in March, June, September, and December of each year. Respondent did not report any gift on Form 9 for the quarter ending June 2013. Sometime in October 2013, Respondent participated in a conference call hosted by the Florida Sheriff’s Association covering a variety of ethics topics. Following the conference call, Respondent remarked to Undersheriff Staly, “I think I may have a problem with your cabin,” and stated something to the effect of “I think I was supposed to report it.” Staly advised Respondent to report it and informed Respondent the cabin rented for $430 per night. On a separate date, Respondent again discussed with Undersheriff Staly reporting use of the cabin as a gift. At that time, Respondent stated he was going to report it at a value of $44 per night. Undersheriff Staly advised against that method of valuing the cabin. Respondent’s response was something to the effect of “forty-four dollars sounds better than the $430, or a $1,200 gift.” On May 27, 2014, seven months after Respondent verbally questioned whether he should report use of the cabin as a gift, Respondent filed a Form 9 Quarterly Gift Disclosure on which he reported use of the cabin as a gift received from Undersheriff Staly May 3 through May 5, 2013, at a monetary value of $132.00, calculated based on a rate of $44 per night. On December 16, 2013, Carr, Riggs, and Ingram released its Auditor’s Report of FCSO for fiscal year ending October 2013. Of note, the report found that “certain expenditures charged to the Office’s credit card were not in accordance with allowable travel costs under Section 112.061.” In response to the public attention focused on Respondent’s use of the FCSO credit card and agency vehicles, Respondent instituted new FCSO policies in 2014. FCSO General Order 152, which took effect on January 10, 2014, prohibited non-authorized use of agency credit cards, and listed authorized and unauthorized charges. The policy defined “food and restaurant purchases” as unauthorized, as well as “alcohol, unless approved by a Senior Commander or designee for an operational necessity.” FCSO General Order 046, which took effect April 4, 2014, prohibited driving agency vehicles out of state while off- duty, unless on official business with prior approval. In May 2014, Respondent attended a Law Enforcement Officers’ Memorial service in Tallahassee, Florida, and stayed at the Four Points Sheraton hotel. During his stay, Respondent charged drinks at the bar and two breakfast buffets to his room. When Respondent checked out of the hotel on May 5, 2014, Respondent presented his personal credit card for the incidentals. The hotel clerk “swiped” Respondent’s credit card, which was approved for a charge of $50.39, the total of Respondent’s bar and restaurant charges to his room. Respondent received from the hotel clerk a receipt showing charges for his room and tax only. Due to a clerical error at the hotel, the FCSO credit card was billed for Respondent’s incidentals, as well as his lodging. The error was discovered later that same month when the FCSO credit card bill was processed. The $50.39 charge for incidentals was correctly transferred to Respondent’s personal credit card on May 27, 2014.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, James L. Manfre, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, in his use of the agency credit card; and section 112.3148, Florida Statutes, by failing to report a gift; and imposing a total civil penalty of $6,200, and subjecting Respondent to public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2016.
The Issue Whether the Respondent violated Section 106.09(1), Florida Statutes, by accepting four cash contributions in excess of the legal limit.
Findings Of Fact 1. Respondent was a candidate for the Orlando City Commission, District 5, in the March 2010 election. 2. On July 13, 2009, Respondent filed his 2009 Q2 campaign treasurer’s report covering the period of April 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009. Respondent certified that the report was true, correct, and complete. Respondent’s report listed four $100 cash contributions received on May 15, 2009.' The four cash contributions were from Virginia Howell, Enrique Howell, Judith White, and Sam Cahman. 3. On July 20, 2009, Alana Brenner, the Orlando City Clerk, sent Respondent a letter notifying him that she discovered what appeared to be several items on his 2009 Q2 report which may be election law violations. Ms. Brenner listed the four excessive cash contributions as possible violations. . 4. On the bottom of page 23 of the June 2008 Candidate’s Handbook (Handbook), it states in bold letters that effective January 1, 2008, the maximum contribution a person can accept in cash or by means of a cashier’s check is $50. 5. Respondent testified in his November 5, 2009, affidavit that he possessed and had read the Handbook. | 6. On August 29, 2009, Respondent sent the Commission’s investigator, Cedric Oliver, a letter that stated: In response to Commission Daisy Lynum’s complaint to the election office in regards to the acceptance of four cash contribution[s] of $100.00, the Vibert White Campaign committee has taken steps to reverse this benign and small error. Due to our mistake in following the guidelines of an older election manuscript that allows for $100.00 cash gifts we failed to consult the newer " Respondent mislabeled the 2009 Q2 report as a G1 report. Faa004 (7/09) instructional guide that allows for only $50.00 cash offerings. Thus, we are sending the contributions back to the donors. 7. Despite Respondent’s promise to send back the excessive cash contributions, there was no record of the cash being returned to the contributors. 8. On October 12, 2009, after the complaint was filed in this case, Respondent filed an amended 2009 Q2 campaign report. Respondent certified the report was true, correct, and complete. On the report, Respondent changed the four May 15, 2009, $100 cash contributions to four August 11, 2009, $100 check contributions. 9. There was no record of the four checks being deposited in Respondent’s campaign bank account. 10. Respondent’s conduct was willful. Respondent accepted the four excessive cash contributions while showing reckless disregard for whether he was prohibited from accepting cash contributions in excess of $50.
Conclusions For Commission Eric M. Lipman General Counsel 107 W. Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, FL 32399 For Respondent Frederic O’Neal - PO Box 842 Windermere, FL 34786
Appeal For This Case This order is final agency action. Any party who is adversely affected by this order has the right to seek judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by filing a notice of administrative appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the Clerk of the Florida Elections Commission at 107 West Gaines Street, Suite 224, Collins Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, and by filing a copy of the notice of appeal with the appropriate district court of appeal. The party must attach to the notice of appeal a copy of this order and include with the notice of appeal filed with the district court of appeal the applicable filing fees. The notice of administrative appeal must be filed within 30 days of the date of this order is filed with the Commission. ‘The date this order was filed appears in the upper right-hand corer of the first page of the order. Copies furnished to: Eric M. Lipman, General Counsel Vibert White, Respondent (certified mail) Frederic O’Neal, Attorney for Respondent (certified mail) Daisy W. Lynum, Complainant Florida Division of Elections, Filing Officer Faa004 (7/09) ae
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission revoke the registration of Ronald W. Hoffman as a registered real estate salesman. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of August, 1977. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Mr. Ronald W. Hoffman 722 Lithia Road Brandon, Florida 33511 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, An Agency of the State of Florida, Petitioner, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 3140 HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY vs. CASE NO. 77-679 RONALD W. HOFFMAN, Respondent. /
