The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (“Walmart”), discriminated against Petitioner, Ramon Santiago Lopez (“Petitioner”), based upon his national origin or age, and/or terminated his employment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Walmart is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Walmart is a national retailer. Petitioner is a Cuban (Hispanic) male. He was 62 years old when he was hired by Walmart in November 2005 and was 72 years old at the time of his dismissal. Petitioner was initially hired to work at a store in Jacksonville, but transferred to Tampa. In June 2010, Petitioner requested a transfer back to Jacksonville and was assigned to Store 4444 on Shops Lane, just off Philips Highway and I-95 in Jacksonville. The store manager at Store 4444 was Scott Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s transfer request and testified that he “very much” got along with Petitioner. Petitioner confirmed that he never had a problem with Mr. Mallatt. Petitioner testified that when he first started at Store 4444, he had no problems. After about four months, however, he began reporting to a supervisor he recalled only as “Lee.” Petitioner described Lee as “kind of a maniac.” Lee would harass Petitioner and give him impossible assignments to accomplish. Petitioner testified that he complained repeatedly to Mr. Mallatt about Lee’s abuse, but that nothing was ever done about it. Eventually, Petitioner gave up complaining to Mr. Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt testified that Petitioner never complained to him about being discriminated against because of his national origin or age. Petitioner apparently did complain about being overworked, but never tied these complaints to any discriminatory intent on the part of Lee. Petitioner testified that Lee no longer worked at Store 4444 in January 2016. From 2010 to 2015, Petitioner worked from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in various departments, including Grocery, Dairy, Paper, Pet, and Chemical. In 2015, Petitioner spoke with Mr. Mallatt about working at least some day shifts rather than constant nights. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s request. In August 2015, Petitioner was moved to the day shift in the Maintenance department. As a day associate, Petitioner typically worked from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Assistant Store Manager April Johnson transferred to Store No. 4444 in October 2015. Petitioner reported directly to Ms. Johnson. On January 14, 2016, Petitioner was scheduled to work from 8:30 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. He drove his van into the parking lot of Store No. 4444 at approximately 7:58 a.m. He parked in his usual spot, on the end of a row of spaces that faced a fence at the border of the lot. Petitioner liked this spot because the foliage near the fence offered shade to his vehicle. Closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage, from a Walmart camera with a partial view of the parking lot, shows Petitioner exiting his vehicle at around 8:00 a.m. Petitioner testified that he could see something on the ground in the parking lot, 50 to 60 meters away from where his van was parked. The CCTV footage shows Petitioner walking across the parking lot, apparently toward the object on the ground. Petitioner testified there were no cars around the item, which he described as a bucket of tools. Petitioner stated that the bucket contained a screwdriver, welding gloves, a welding face mask, and a hammer. The CCTV footage does not show the bucket. Petitioner crosses the parking lot until he goes out of camera range.3/ A few seconds later, Petitioner returns into camera range, walking back toward his car while carrying the bucket of tools. When Petitioner reaches his van, he opens the rear door, places the bucket of tools inside, then closes the rear door. Petitioner testified that after putting the tools in the back of his van, he went to the Customer Service Desk and informed two female African American customer service associates that he had found some tools and put them in his car. Petitioner conceded that he told no member of management about finding the tools. Walmart has a written Standard Operating Procedure for dealing with items that customers have left behind on the premises. The associate who finds the item is required to take the item to the Customer Service Desk, which functions as the “lost and found” for the store. Mr. Mallatt and Ms. Johnson each testified that there are no exceptions to this policy. Petitioner was aware of the Standard Operating Procedure. On prior occasions, he had taken found items to the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner conceded that it would have been quicker to take the bucket of tools to the Customer Service Desk than to his van. However, he testified that he believed that he could have been fired if he had taken the tools to the desk before he had clocked in for work. Petitioner cited a Walmart policy that made “working off the clock” a firing offense. It transpired that the policy to which Petitioner referred was Walmart’s Wage and Hour policy, which states in relevant part: It is a violation of law and Walmart policy for you to work without compensation or for a supervisor (hourly or salaried) to request you work without compensation. You should never perform any work for Walmart without compensation. This language is plainly intended to prevent Walmart from requiring its employees to work without compensation. Petitioner, whose English language skills are quite limited, was adamant that this policy would have allowed Walmart to fire him if he performed the “work” of bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he was officially clocked in for his shift. Therefore, he put the tools in his van for safekeeping and informed the Customer Service Desk of what he had done. Petitioner was questioned as to why he believed it was acceptable for him to report the situation to the Customer Service Desk, but not acceptable for him to bring the tools to the desk. The distinction he appeared to make was that the act of carrying the tools from the parking lot to the desk would constitute “work” and therefore be forbidden, whereas just stopping by to speak to the Customer Service Desk associate was not “work.” The evidence established that Petitioner would not have violated any Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he clocked in. He could have been compensated for the time he spent bringing in the tools by making a “time adjustment” on his time card. Mr. Mallatt testified that time adjustments are done on a daily basis when associates perform work prior to clocking in or after clocking out. Petitioner merely had to advise a member of management that he needed to make the time adjustment. Mr. Mallatt was confident that the adjustment would have been granted under the circumstances presented in this case. Petitioner did not go out to retrieve the tools after he clocked in. Mr. Mallatt stated that employees frequently go out to their cars to fetch items they have forgotten, and that Petitioner absolutely would have been allowed to go get the tools and turn them in to the Customer Service Desk. Later on January 14, 2016, Ms. Johnson was contacted by a customer who said tools were stolen off of his truck.4/ Ms. Johnson had not heard anything about lost tools. She looked around the Customer Service Desk, but found no tools there. Ms. Johnson also called out on the store radio to ask if anyone had turned in tools. Finally, the customer service manager at the Customer Service Desk told Ms. Johnson that Petitioner had said something about tools earlier that morning. Ms. Johnson called Petitioner to the front of the store and asked him about the missing tools. Petitioner admitted he had found some tools in the parking lot and had placed them in his vehicle. Ms. Johnson asked Petitioner why he put the tools in his vehicle. Petitioner told her that he was keeping the tools in his car until the owner came to claim them. Ms. Johnson testified that Petitioner offered no other explanation at that time. He just said that he made a “mistake.” Ms. Johnson explained to Petitioner that putting the tools in his vehicle was not the right thing to do and that he should have turned them in to “lost and found,” i.e., the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner was sent to his van to bring in the tools. After this initial conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Johnson spoke with Mr. Mallatt and Mr. Cregut to decide how to treat the incident. Mr. Cregut obtained approval from his manager to conduct a full investigation and to interview Petitioner. Mr. Cregut reviewed the CCTV footage described above and confirmed that Petitioner did not bring the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cregut spoke with Petitioner for approximately an hour to get his side of the story. Petitioner also completed a written statement in which he admitted finding some tools and putting them in his car. Mr. Cregut described Petitioner as “very tense and argumentative” during the interview. As the interview continued, Mr. Cregut testified that Petitioner’s reaction to the questions was getting “a little bit more hostile [and] aggressive.” Mr. Cregut decided to try to build rapport with Petitioner by asking him general questions about himself. This tactic backfired. Petitioner volunteered that he was a Cuban exile and had been arrested several times for his opposition to the Castro regime. Petitioner then claimed that Mr. Cregut discriminated against him by asking about his personal life and prejudged him because of his activism. Mr. Cregut credibly testified that he did not judge or discriminate against Petitioner based on the information Petitioner disclosed and that he only asked the personal questions to de-escalate the situation. Mr. Cregut’s only role in the case was as an investigative factfinder. His report was not colored by any personal information disclosed by Petitioner. At the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Mallatt made the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. The specific ground for termination was “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues,” related to Petitioner’s failure to follow Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Mr. Mallatt testified that his concern was that Petitioner intended to keep the bucket of tools if no owner appeared to claim them. Mr. Mallatt credibly testified that had Petitioner simply taken the tools to the Customer Service Desk, rather than putting them in his vehicle, he would have remained employed by Walmart. Walmart has a “Coaching for Improvement” policy setting forth guidelines for progressive discipline. While the progressive discipline process is used for minor and/or correctable infractions, such as tardiness, “serious” misconduct constitutes a ground for immediate termination. The coaching policy explicitly sets forth “theft” and “intentional failure to follow a Walmart policy” as examples of serious misconduct meriting termination. Petitioner conceded that no one at Walmart overtly discriminated against him because of his age or national origin. He testified that he could feel the hostility toward Hispanics at Store 4444, but he could point to no particular person or incident to bolster his intuition. Petitioner claimed that his dismissal was in part an act of retaliation by Ms. Johnson for his frequent complaints that his Maintenance counterparts on the night shift were not adequately doing their jobs, leaving messes for the morning crew to clean up. Ms. Johnson credibly testified that Petitioner’s complaints did not affect her treatment of him or make her want to fire him. In any event, Ms. Johnson played no role in the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner’s stated reason for failing to follow Walmart policy regarding found items would not merit a moment’s consideration but for Petitioner’s limited proficiency in the English language. It is at least conceivable that someone struggling with the language might read the Walmart Wage and Hour policy as Petitioner did. Even so, Petitioner was familiar with the found items policy, and common sense would tell an employee that he would not be fired for turning in customer property that he found in the parking lot. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner had been working at Walmart for over 10 years. It is difficult to credit that he was completely unfamiliar with the concept of time adjustment and truly believed that he could be fired for lifting a finger to work when off the clock. Walmart showed that in 2016 it terminated three other employees from Store 4444 based on “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues.” All three were under 40 years of age at the time their employment was terminated. Two of the employees were African American; the third was Caucasian. Petitioner offered no evidence that any other employee charged with gross misconduct has been treated differently than Petitioner. At the hearing, Petitioner’s chief concern did not appear to be the alleged discrimination, but the implication that he was a thief, which he found mortally offensive. It could be argued that Mr. Mallatt might have overreacted in firing Petitioner and that some form of progressive discipline might have been more appropriate given all the circumstances, including Petitioner’s poor English and his unyielding insistence that he never intended to keep the tools. However, whether Petitioner’s dismissal was fair is not at issue in this proceeding. The issue is whether Walmart has shown a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner’s employment. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to follow Walmart policy. Mr. Mallatt’s suspicion regarding Petitioner’s intentions as to the tools was not unfounded and was not based on any discriminatory motive. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Walmart for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s age or national origin. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that his termination was in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. The employee who was allegedly retaliating against Petitioner played no role in the decision to terminate his employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart discriminated against him because of his age or national origin in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a custodial worker with Respondent because of her race, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, an African-American female, was hired by Respondent in the fall of 1994, as a custodial worker and she continued in that position until October 17, 1995, when she was terminated. On or about October 12, 1995, Rollins College (Respondent) received two letters of complaint regarding Petitioner's conduct and work performance. One of these was from a group of students living in a dorm which Petitioner was assigned to clean. The other letter was from the parent of a student living in another dorm assigned to Petitioner. These letters were not the first complaints Respondent had received regarding Petitioner's work performance. After receiving the letters, Petitioner was placed on a three-day suspension by Tom Waters, Director of Respondent's Facilities Management Department. After investigating the complaints, Respondent, on October 17, 1995, terminated Petitioner's employment. Prior to the termination of her employment, Petitioner attended a training and safety meeting of custodial workers. During that meeting, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Frank Pravdik placed his hand on Petitioner's uniform shirt and stated words to the effect that the shirt was "nasty." Pravdik was generally known to be a difficult person to work under. He was eventually terminated by Respondent because of his abrasive management style. Fredrick Wooden, called as Petitioner's witness, assisted with the management of the custodial workers prior to his retirement. He often disagreed with Pravdik's style of management. In the case of Petitioner, he did not believe that any disciplinary actions taken against her were unwarranted, and Respondent had legitimate grounds to terminate her employment. Wooden further believed that Pravdik treated all subordinate employees equally, if not with respect. On November 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Orlando Human Relations Department. The Charge of Discrimination indicated that Petitioner believed that Respondent discriminated against her because of her race. Petitioner testified that the Charge of Discrimination was incorrect. Petitioner did not actually believe that the termination of her employment was related to her race. However, she permitted a representative of the Orlando Human Relations Commission to complete for her the Charge of Discrimination. The Charge does not allege a claim of retaliation nor does it allege that Petitioner ever complained about Pravdik's behavior to Respondent. While Petitioner testified that she first visited the Orlando Human Relations Department prior to the date of her termination, the Charge is signed, dated and notarized on November 20, 1995, three days after the effective date of her termination. After the Commission issued a No Cause Determination in this matter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent terminated her employment in retaliation for complaining about Pravdik. Petitioner again testified that the Petition for Relief was also incorrect stating her case was not about whether Respondent had a right to terminate her employment, but instead was about whether Pravdik violated her civil rights for impermissibly touching her person and calling her shirt "nasty."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gloria J. Holloway 397 Chaucer Lane, South Lake Mary, Florida 32746 Sharon Moultry, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Mark Van Valkenburgh, Esquire Winderweedle, Haines, Ward & Woodham 250 Park Avenue South, 5th Floor Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male and is part of a group of persons protected from unlawful discrimination. Petitioner was formerly employed by Respondent and served initially as an usher for Respondent’s business. Respondent operates theaters and concessions in Florida, and employs a number of individuals, none of whom are employed on a “full-time” schedule. Only the manager, Cindy Palmer, is considered a full-time employee. During the school year when attendance at the theaters may be presumed to be down, Respondent offers fewer hours to its employees. Conversely, during the summer months, employees may be offered more hours. Respondent’s employees are asked to fill out a form that indicates the amount of hours they are available to work and the days upon which those hours may be assigned. Pertinent to this case, Petitioner advised Respondent that he was available to work only on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and Tuesdays. Petitioner asked that he be given 40 hours per week. When Petitioner applied for employment with Respondent he was required to answer a number of questions. One of the questions, aimed at addressing the seasonal aspect of Respondent’s work demands, asked: “During slow periods when school is in session, there may be only 10 to 15 hours a week to work. Is this ok?” Petitioner answered “yes.” Petitioner failed to show that any employee was given more hours than he during the slow work periods. Respondent did not cut Petitioner’s hours during his employment at the theater. Respondent did not fail to consider Petitioner for any promotion or wage increase that he applied for during his employment. Petitioner presented no evidence that any employee was more favorably treated in the assignment of hours or promoted over him. Petitioner did not apply for any promotions. Petitioner’s verbal interest in seeking additional skills was never formalized or written to management. Despite postings of methods to complain to upper management regarding the theater operations, Petitioner never notified Respondent of any problems at the theater that would have suggested racial discrimination on Respondent’s part. In fact, when he completed an investigative form on an unrelated matter, Petitioner did not disclose any type of inappropriate behavior by any of Respondent’s employees. Petitioner’s response to the question, stated that he “hadn’t seen anything inappropriate, just bad attitude.” During the period July 2010 through November 2011, Petitioner received a number of “write-ups” citing performance deficiencies. Similar “write-ups” were issued to non-black employees. Petitioner did not establish that he was written up more than any other employee. More important, Petitioner did not establish that the deficiencies described in the write-ups were untrue. Respondent’s Employee Handbook (that Petitioner received a copy of) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race. Methods to complain to upper management, including a toll-free number, were open to Petitioner at all times material to this case. Except for the filing of the instant action, Petitioner never availed himself of any remedy to put Respondent on notice of his claim of discrimination, nor the alleged factual basis for it. Petitioner was directed to leave the theater after a verbal disagreement with his supervisor, Ms. Palmer. Petitioner’s take on the matter is that he was fired by Respondent. Respondent asserts that Petitioner voluntarily quit based upon his actions and verbal comments to Ms. Palmer. Regardless, Petitioner’s race had nothing to do with why he ultimately left employment with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2012.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Macia Poole, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Westminster Village of Pensacola, on account of her sex or due to retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 3, 2015, Petitioner’s Employment Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief were transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations for a formal administrative hearing to be held in accordance with section 120.57, Florida Statutes. On April 10, 2015, a Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference was entered which set the final hearing for June 1, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., Central Time, (10:00 a.m., Eastern Time), at video teleconference sites in Pensacola, at the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, Video Teleconferencing Room, 700 South Palafox Street, Suite 305, Pensacola, Florida, and in Tallahassee, at the Division of Administrative Hearings, the DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida. On May 4, 2015, one Subpoena Duces Tecum and four Subpoenas Ad Testificandum were issued at the request of Petitioner. On May 14, 2015, Petitioner electronically filed her Notice of Appearance in this proceeding. On May 26, 2015, Petitioner filed a Request to Reschedule Video Hearing. The Request made no allegation of an inability to attend the hearing, only that her attendance would be an “inconvenience.” The Request was denied. The filing of the Request is convincing evidence that Petitioner knew that the final hearing was scheduled to be heard in accordance with the Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference. On June 1, 2015, at the scheduled date, time, and place, the final hearing was convened. Mr. Moran, representing Respondent, Westminster Village of Pensacola, made his appearance. Petitioner did not appear. The final hearing was recessed for twenty minutes to allow Petitioner to appear. During the recess, the undersigned confirmed that the Division had not received any communication from Petitioner of exigent circumstances that may have interfered with her appearance at the final hearing. After twenty minutes had passed, the final hearing was re-convened. Petitioner was not in attendance. Respondent was prepared to proceed, and had its witnesses in attendance at the Pensacola video location. Mr. Moran confirmed that he had received no emails from Petitioner, that being their normal form of communication. At 9:25 a.m., Central Time, (10:25 a.m., Eastern Time), the final hearing was adjourned. There was no evidence presented at the final hearing in support of Petitioner’s Employment Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Westminster Village of Pensacola, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Macia Poole, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-01235. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brian J. Moran, Esquire Moran Kidd Lyons Johnson, P.A. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 900 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Macia Deanne Poole Apartment 176 6901A North 9th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32504 (eServed) Christopher R. Parkinson, Esquire Moran, Kidd, Lyons, and Johnson, P.A. 111 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Brent Cutlip is a principal of Two Men and a Truck.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Kenneth K. Scott be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth K. Scott 8342 Gardenia Circle, No. 4 Pensacola, Florida 32534 Brent Cutlip Two Men and a Truck 7280 Plantation Road, No. 1 Pensacola, Florida 32504 Brent Cutlip Two Men and a Truck 379 West Michigan Street, Suite 200 Orlando, Florida 32806 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act against Petitioner pursuant to Chapter 70 of the Pinellas County Code, as amended, and Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a black female, is a member of a protected group. Respondent is an employer as defined in the Pinellas County Code, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Respondent hired Petitioner as a telemarketer on December 8, 1997. Petitioner's job required her to call the telephone numbers on a list furnished by Respondent. After making the call, Petitioner was supposed to solicit the booking of vacations in time-share rental units by reading from a script prepared by Respondent. The script included an offer to sell potential customers three vacations in three locations for $69. When Respondent hired Petitioner, she signed a copy of Respondent's "New Employee Policy and Procedures" manual. Petitioner admits that this manual required her to book 25 vacations each pay period after a two-week training period. She also admits that the manual required her to only use the prepared script, including preplanned rebuttals to customer questions when talking over the telephone. Petitioner understood that during the two-week training period, she would be required to book 14 vacations or be terminated. She knew that Respondent's supervisors would monitor her sales calls. Petitioner sold four vacation packages in her first week at work with no complaints from her supervisors. In fact, one of Respondent's supervisors known as Mike told Petitioner, "You got the juice." On December 15, 1997, Mike monitored one of Petitioner's calls. Petitioner admits that she did not use the scripted rebuttals in answering the customer's questions during the monitored call. Instead, she attempted to answer the customer's questions using her own words. According to Petitioner, she used "baby English" to explain the sales offer in simple terms that the customer could understand. After completing the monitored call on December 15, 1997, Mike told Petitioner to "stick to the shit on the script." Mike admonished Petitioner not to "candy coat it." Petitioner never heard Mike use profanity or curse words with any other employee. Before Petitioner went to work on December 16, 1997, she called a second supervisor known as Kelly. Kelly was the supervisor that originally hired Petitioner. During this call, Petitioner complained about Mike's use of profanity. When Kelly agreed to discuss Petitioner's complaint with Mike, Petitioner said she would talk to Mike herself. Petitioner went to work later on December 16, 1997. When she arrived, Mike confronted Petitioner about her complaint to Kelly. Petitioner advised Mike that she only objected to his language and hoped he was not mad at her. Mike responded, "I don't get mad, I get even." When Petitioner stood to stretch for the first time on December 16, 1997, Mike instructed her to sit down. Mike told Petitioner that he would get her some more leads. Mike also told Petitioner that she was "not the only telemarketer that had not sold a vacation package but that the other person had sixty years on her." Petitioner was aware that Respondent had fired an older native-American male known as Ray. Respondent hired Ray as a telemarketer after hiring Petitioner. When Petitioner was ready to leave work on December 17, 1997, a third supervisor known as Tom asked to speak to Petitioner. During this conversation, Tom told Petitioner that she was good on the telephone but that Respondent could not afford to keep her employed and had to let her go. Tom referred Petitioner to another company that trained telemarketers to take in-coming calls. Tom gave Petitioner her paycheck, telling her that he was doing her a favor. During Petitioner's employment with Respondent, she was the only black employee. However, apart from describing the older native American as a trainee telemarketer, Petitioner did not present any evidence as to the following: (a) whether there were other telemarketers who were members of an unprotected class; (b) whether Petitioner was replaced by a person outside the protected class; (c) whether Petitioner was discharged while other telemarketers from an unprotected class were not discharged for failing to follow the script or failing to book more than four vacations during the first ten days of employment; and (d) whether Petitioner was discharged while other telemarketers from an unprotected class with equal or less competence were retained. Petitioner was never late to work and never called in sick.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the City's Human Relations Review Board enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Boudreau Vacation Break 14020 Roosevelt Boulevard Suite 805 Clearwater, Florida 33762 Donna Conway 3156 Mount Zion Road No. 606 Stockbridge, Georgia 30281 William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Stephanie Rugg, Hearing Clerk City of St. Petersburg Community Affairs Department Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment action as alleged by Petitioner and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male. He identifies himself variously as a "Caribbean black," "Jamaican," and "Rastafarian." Respondent conducts its business at Port Everglades, a major Florida seaport (Port Everglades or the Port). Respondent's business is to service passenger and commercial shipping by transporting and loading cargo in and about Port Everglades. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the applicable statutory provisions. Petitioner was employed by Respondent from August 13, 2002, until October 29, 2003, when he was terminated. At all relevant times, Lizabeth Divers (Divers) has been Respondent's Director of Human Resources. In that capacity she was responsible for Respondent's personnel matters as well as its compliance with the FCRA. Her job includes, at all relevant times, hiring and firing; employee discipline; implementing company polices; and receiving and investigating complaints lodged verbally or in writing by employees about any matters affecting their employment.1 At all times material to this case, Petitioner was aware of his right to lodge complaints verbally or in writing with Divers with respect to any matter affecting his employment, including any alleged unlawful employment practice. At no time prior to his termination did Petitioner do so. The record contains no persuasive evidence concerning the composition of Respondent's workforce by race, national origin, religion, or any other classification relevant to Petitioner's claim against Respondent under the FCRA. As previously noted, Petitioner was employed by Respondent from August 13, 2002, until October 29, 2003, when his employment was terminated by Divers for violating a company policy prohibiting possession of firearms or other weapons on Port property (the weapons policy). All of Respondent's employees, including Petitioner at all times material to this case, gain access to Port Everglades only by passing a security checkpoint. A security guard thereupon confirms that the individual has current port identification and parking decal. Once cleared to enter the Port, Respondent's employees have access to the entire Port, and are generally not under direct supervision as they perform their jobs. Respondent's weapons policy is grounded in reasons that were obvious to any employee, and which had to have been obvious to Petitioner. The need for such a policy is self-evident. There is no evidence that any other person employed by Respondent has ever violated the weapons policy. At relevant times Petitioner was licensed by the state to carry a concealed weapon. State licensure does not constitute authorization for Petitioner to ignore Respondent's weapons policy. Petitioner had no job-related reason to carry a gun. Petitioner's job was to drive a truck known to seaport workers as a "mule." Mules are used to transport cargo from one location to another. Petitioner's basic job duty was to drive box loads of material from one location to another at Port Everglades. Petitioner was qualified to do his job and performed his duties adequately with no prior disciplinary record. Divers was unaware of Petitioner's alleged violation of the weapons policy until the start of the business day on Monday, October 29, 2003. At that time, it was brought to her attention that one or more of Petitioner's co-workers had confronted him over the weekend regarding a bulge at his waist, and that Petitioner had confirmed that the bulge was a gun. Divers felt this alleged violation of the weapons policy was a serious accusation which, if true, would warrant immediate termination. She also felt that it posed a potentially life-threatening situation. Divers determined that Petitioner was scheduled to work that day. Divers immediately left her office and proceeded to the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BCSO) Port Everglades precinct to advise of the potential security threat. Divers sought BCSO's assistance in addressing this unprecedented and potentially dangerous situation. BCSO immediately provided assistance in the form of three armed deputies. Each officer drove his police vehicle to intercept Petitioner on Port grounds. The officers interviewed Petitioner in the presence of Divers. Petitioner freely admitted that he regularly concealed his gun in his vehicle. Petitioner had access to his vehicle throughout his shift. The officers verified Petitioner's concealed weapons permit. Divers informed Petitioner and the officers that she was terminating Petitioner's employment. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner protested this action or complained that it was motivated by race, national origin, or religion. Instead, the evidence established that Divers made a decision she was authorized to make, i.e., to terminate Petitioner for his admitted violation of the weapons policy. The officers disassembled Petitioner's gun, placed it in the trunk of Petitioner's vehicle, and escorted Petitioner off the Port property. There is no evidence regarding who, if anyone, was hired to replace Petitioner following his termination. Petitioner has failed to show that any other similarly situated employee who violated the weapons policy was treated differently from Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and denying all relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2005.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner timely filed a complaint of discrimination in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Prior to November 28, 2007, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. On November 26, 2008, the Petitioner sent a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The TAQ was submitted via facsimile transmission and was not signed. The Petitioner believed she was complying with the directives of the FCHR website and that follow-up assistance (from the FCHR) would not be required. The Petitioner did not understand that a signature was required, notwithstanding the place for same (along with a date) on page 2 of the TAQ. The Petitioner maintains that the FCHR website instructions were unclear and that she erroneously relied on the directions that did not specify she was required to sign the TAQ. The Petitioner filed a signed Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR on January 14, 2009. On February 5, 2009, the Petitioner received a "Notice of Receipt of Complaint" from the FCHR. At the same time, a copy of the complaint was furnished to the Respondent, who was then, presumably, put on notice of the Petitioner's charge. The FCHR did not advise the Petitioner that the TAQ had to be signed. In the course of its review of the instant charge, the FCHR entered a determination of "untimely." Per the FCHR's assessment, the charge of discrimination was filed more than 365 days from the last incident or act of discrimination. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondent. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Levitt, Esquire Allen, North & Blue 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Marie C. Perez 517 29th Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Julie Wells is the principal of AccuStaff.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Van Gandy be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julie Wells AccuStaff 5710 North Davis Highway, Suite 5 Pensacola, Florida 32503 Van Gandy 8580 Vickie Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Superior Optical Shop (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01– and 509.092, Florida Statutes, by subjecting Petitioner, Janice Jennings (Petitioner), to discrimination in employment and by discharging Petitioner in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s discriminatory employment practices.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent is a corporation with its corporate headquarters located in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Respondent operates an optical shop in a Veteran’s Administration (V.A.) Hospital located in Lake City, Florida. At its Lake City location, Respondent fills prescriptions written by eye physicians at the V.A. Hospital, assists patients with choosing frames, and fits patients with their prescription eye glasses. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is fast-paced, with a constant stream of patients, averaging 50-to-60 patients a day. If the optical shop is running behind schedule, it is problematic because often physicians at the V.A. Hospital are waiting to see the patients served by the optical shop. In 2009, Petitioner interviewed for a position at Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City, Florida. During her interview, Petitioner advised Respondent that she had competent computer skills and significant experience working in an office environment and with eye doctors. On May 27, 2009, Respondent hired Petitioner as a part- time clerk at the optical shop. Petitioner was terminated prior to working 90 days for Respondent. When Petitioner was hired, two full-time employees worked at the optical shop: office supervisor, Jean Hartup, and optician, Kathleen Denton. Ms. Hartup has been employed with Respondent for approximately five years. Ms. Denton has been with the optical shop for approximately two and a-half years. As office supervisor, Ms. Hartup can be distant with employees and “hard” at times. She can also be “direct” when speaking to employees. Ms. Hartup demonstrates these traits with all of the employees at the optical shop. Ms. Hartup has written up Ms. Denton in the past and the two have had personality conflicts. Both Ms. Hartup and Ms. Denton assisted with training Petitioner. Evidence indicated that Petitioner received adequate training to perform the tasks she was assigned to perform as a clerk. She often had to be re-trained on the same tasks. Respondent’s optical shop in Lake City is a very small room, approximately ten-feet by ten-feet square inside the V.A. Hospital. There are two small desks in the shop and it is very crowded. Petitioner was aware of the small working environment at the time she accepted employment with Respondent as a part- time clerk. Past and present employees at the optical shop have had to share desk space. Sometimes work has to be performed in the hallway because of the small office space. All new hires for Respondent are subjected to a 90-day probationary period. As explained in Respondent’s “Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits,” of which Petitioner was aware: There will be a 90-day probationary period during which time the employer may terminate the employee at any time for any reason or for no reason regardless of any other provision of these policies. Sick leave and personal days are accrued but cannot be used during this period. Respondent’s Employee Handbook of Office Policies and Benefits also provides: [Respondent] does not and will not tolerate any employee discriminating against their work peers for any reason i.e., race, color, religion, sex, national origin or handicap. Any known verifiable discrimination will be grounds for immediate termination. Once on the job, Petitioner was not proficient on the computer and, despite repeated training, failed to show any improvement and was slow in performing her job duties. Because of this, service to patients at the optical shop slowed down and the optical shop was frequently behind, resulting in physicians having to wait for patients being served by the optical shop. Ms. Hartup became frustrated with Petitioner’s unsatisfactory job performance and the resulting delays. In addition, Petitioner began to show a lack of interest in her job and even stated that she “didn’t really need a job; she just wanted to be out of the house.” Despite repeated training and opportunities to improve her work performance, Petitioner failed to improve. Petitioner was given a notebook with information from the American Board of Opticians for review but she failed to read it or return it to Respondent. Prior to the end of her employment with Respondent, Petitioner called Respondent’s corporate headquarters in Mississippi and spoke to Mary Walker. Petitioner complained to Ms. Walker that Ms. Hartup was being too hard, was impatient, and was expecting too much of her. Petitioner did not raise concerns with Ms. Walker that she was being discriminated against based on her race, or that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race. In fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner ever complained of race discrimination or a hostile work environment based on race discrimination while she was still employed by Respondent. During that first telephone conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Walker suggested to Petitioner that she should talk to Ms. Hartup about the problems. Petitioner assured Ms. Walker that she would. Two days later, Ms. Walker called Ms. Hartup and inquired whether Petitioner had discussed her concerns with Ms. Hartup. Petitioner, however, had not spoken to Ms. Hartup about her complaint. Ms. Walker gave Ms. Hartup the authority to run the optical shop at Lake City, including making hiring and firing decisions. Ms. Walker did not discipline Ms. Hartup because of Petitioner’s complaints. Rather, Ms. Walker told Ms. Hartup to handle the situation regarding Petitioner’s complaints. Ms. Hartup then met with Petitioner and they spoke about Petitioner’s concerns that Ms. Hartup was being too harsh and about Petitioner’s poor work performance. As a result of that meeting, Ms. Hartup felt the situation had been resolved. Petitioner subsequently advised both Ms. Denton, as well as Ms. Walker at Respondent’s headquarters, that the conversation with Ms. Hartup had gone well and that their issues had been resolved. Petitioner’s work performance, however, did not improve. Prior to the end of her 90-day probationary period of employment, Respondent terminated Petitioner from employment for poor work performance, for failing to reach her capabilities as an employee, and because her poor work performance was a detriment to Respondent’s Lake City optical shop. Petitioner testified that, from her point of view, she truly felt as though she had been discriminated against because of her race. That testimony, however, was without further support and was unpersuasive, especially in view of the fact that there is no evidence that Petitioner ever mentioned to anyone during her employment with Respondent that she believed she was being discriminated against. There was otherwise no evidence presented at the final hearing that would support a finding that Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaint against Ms. Hartup. Further, the evidence produced at final hearing does not support a finding that either the manner in which Petitioner was treated during her employment with Respondent, or her termination from that employment, was based on Petitioner’s race. Respondent filled the position of part-time clerk left vacant after Petitioner’s termination by hiring a Native- American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2010.
