The Issue The issue in this case is whether the amendment to the Lee County Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance No. 05-20 is "in compliance," as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005),1 for the reasons set forth in the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing and Statement of Intent filed by the Department of Community Affairs ("the Department").
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state land planning agency and is statutorily charged with the duty of reviewing comprehensive plans and their amendments, and determining whether a plan or amendment is “in compliance,” as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Lee County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and has adopted a comprehensive plan that it amends from time to time pursuant to Section 163.3167(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Leeward is a Florida limited liability company that owns a portion of the real property that is the subject of the amendment at issue. The Amendment The amendment would change the future land use designation for 41.28 acres in the northeast quadrant of the Interstate 75 (I-75)/State Road 80 (SR 80) interchange from General Commercial Interchange to Urban Community, as shown on the FLUM. The General Commercial Interchange land use is described in the County Plan as “intended primarily for general community commercial land uses: retail, planned commercial districts, shopping, office, financial, and business.” It does not allow residential development. The Urban Community land use provides for a mix of residential, commercial, public, quasi-public, and limited light industrial uses. The standard density range for residential uses in the Urban Community category is one to six dwelling units per acre (du/a). The 41.28 acres affected by the amendment ("the amendment site") consist of 19.28 acres of lands along the Orange River owned by Leeward, a platted subdivision known as Dos Rios of approximately 11 acres, and the remaining acreage consists of right-of-way for SR 80 and I-75. Currently operating on Leeward's property is a vessel repair facility, a marina with wet and dry slips, and an ecotourism company. Leeward also has its office on the site. The Dos Rios subdivision includes 26 single-family lots. Apparently, only a few of the lots (the number was not established in the record) have been developed. Because residential land uses are not allowed in the General Commercial Interchange category, the Dos Rios lots were non-conforming uses. Maximum Allowed Density The County Plan provides residential density bonuses to promote various County objectives, such as the provision of affordable housing. With density bonuses, lands designated Urban Community can boost their density to a maximum of ten du/a. There was testimony presented by Leeward that the County has not often approved applications for density bonuses. Even if the practice of the County in approving density bonuses were relevant, the practice can change. It is reasonable for the Department to consider the maximum intensity or density associated with a future land use designation when determining whether a FLUM amendment is in compliance. Therefore, in this case, it is reasonable to consider the Urban Community land use designation as allowing up to ten du/a. The Department asserts that the amendment would allow the 41.2 acres affected by the amendment to have a total of 412 dwelling units (41.2 acres x 10 du/a). Leeward disputed that figure because the 41.2 acres includes road right-of-way and the Dos Rios subdivision. A hearing officer appointed to review a Lee County development order recently determined that right-of-way external to a development should not be included in calculating allowable units, and the County accepted the hearing officer's recommendation based on that determination. The definition of "density" in the County Plan supports the determination.2 Therefore, for the purposes of this case, the right-of-way in the northeast quadrant should not be included in calculating the maximum residential density that would result from the amendment. On the other hand, Leeward's argument that the Dos Rios subdivision acreage should not be included in the ten du/a calculation is rejected. For the purposes of an "in compliance" determination, it is reasonable for the Department to apply the maximum potential densities to all developable and re- developable acreage. Using 29 acres as the approximate acreage affected by the amendment when road right-of-way is subtracted, the amendment would create the potential for 290 residences in the northeast quadrant of the interchange. Adoption of the Amendment The amendment was initiated as part of the County's reexamination of the existing land use designations in the four quadrants of the I-75/SR 80 interchange. Following the County planning staff's completion of a study of the entire interchange, it recommended several changes to the County Plan, but no change was recommended for the northeast quadrant. Apparently, the amendment at issue was urged by Leeward, and, at a public hearing held on June 1, 2005, the Board of County Commissioners voted to adopt the amendment. Pursuant to Section 163.3184(6), Florida Statutes, the proposed amendment was forwarded to the Department for an "in compliance" review. Following its review, the Department issued its ORC Report on August 19, 2005. In the ORC Report, the Department objected to the proposed amendment based upon what it considered to be inappropriate residential densities in the coastal high hazard area (CHHA) and floodplain. The Department recommended that the County not adopt the proposed amendment. On October 12, 2005, another public hearing was held before the Board of County Commissioners to consider adoption of the amendment. At the public hearing, the County planning staff recommended that the land use designation in the northeast quadrant not be changed to Urban Community "due to the potential increase in density in the Coastal High Hazard Area." Nevertheless, the Board of County Commissioners approved the amendment. Representatives of Leeward appeared and submitted comments in support of the amendment at the public hearings before the Board of County Commissioners. On December 16, 2005, the Department issued its Statement of Intent to Find Comprehensive Plan Amendment Not in Compliance, identifying three reasons for its determination: (1) inconsistency with state law regarding development in the CHHA and flood prone areas, (2) internal inconsistency with provisions of the County Plan requiring the consideration of residential density reductions in undeveloped areas within the CHHA, and (3) inconsistency with the State Comprehensive Plan regarding subsidizing development in the CHHA and regulating areas subject to seasonal or periodic flooding. On January 5, 2006, the Department filed its petition for formal hearing with DOAH. Coastal High Hazard Area The Florida Legislature recognized the particular vulnerability of coastal resources and development to natural disasters and required coastal counties to address the subject in their comprehensive plans. [I]t is the intent of the Legislature that local government comprehensive plans restrict development activities where such activities would damage or destroy coastal resources, and that such plans protect human life and limit public expenditures in areas that are subject to destruction by natural disaster. § 163.3178(1), Fla. Stat. The statute also requires evacuation planning. Until 2006, the CHHA was defined as the "category 1 evacuation zone." § 163.3178(2)(h), Fla. Stat. In 2006, the CHHA was redefined as "the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model."3 Ch. 2006-68, § 2, Laws of Fla. The County Plan defines the CHHA as "the category 1 evacuation zone as delineated by the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council." Map 5 of the County Plan, entitled "Lee County Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA)," shows the entire amendment site as being within the CHHA. Nothing on Map 5, however, indicates it was produced by the Regional Planning Council. Daniel Trescott, who is employed by the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council and is responsible for, among other things, storm surge mapping, stated that the Category 1 evacuation zone is the storm surge level for the worst case scenario landfall for a Category 1 storm. He stated that the Category 1 storm surge for Lee County was determined by the SLOSH model to be 5.3 feet. Mr. Trescott stated that the 5.3 foot contour (shown on Plate 7 of the Regional Planning Council's "Hurricane Storm Tide Atlas - Lee County") more accurately delineates the CHHA than Map 5 of the County Plan. Although Mr. Trescott's testimony suggests a conflict between the County Plan's definition of the CHHA and Map 5's depiction of the CHHA, the two can be reconciled by a finding that Map 5 is a gross depiction of the CHHA for general public information purposes, but the precise location of the CHHA boundary is the one delineated by the Regional Planning Council, and the latter is controlling. Using the 5.3 contour on the amendment site, Leeward's witness, Michael Raider, estimated that there are approximately 16 acres of the amendment site within the CHHA. Applying the maximum allowable residential density under the Urban Community land use designation (with bonuses) of ten du/a means the amendment would result in a potential for 160 dwellings in the CHHA. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. and Rule 9J-5.012(3)(c)7., respectively, require each local government’s coastal management element to contain one or more specific objectives that "[d]irect population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high-hazard areas” and limit development in these areas. The parties' evidence and argument regarding whether the amendment was "in compliance" focused on these rules and the following goal, objective, and policy of the County Plan related to the CHHA: GOAL 105: PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY IN COASTAL HIGH HAZARD AREAS. To protect human life and developed property from natural disasters. OBJECTIVE 105.1: DEVELOPMENT IN COASTAL HIGH HAZARD AREAS. Development seaward of the 1991 Coastal Construction Control Line will require applicable State of Florida approval; new development on barrier islands will be limited to densities that meet required evacuation standards; new development requiring seawalls for protection from coastal erosion will not be permitted; and allowable densities for undeveloped areas within coastal high hazard areas will be considered for reduction. POLICY 105.1.4: Through the Lee Plan amendment process, land use designations of undeveloped areas within coastal high hazard areas will be considered for reduced density categories (or assignment of minimum allowable densities where ranges are permitted) in order to limit the future population exposed to coastal flooding. In the opinion of Bernard Piawah, a planner employed by the Department, the amendment is inconsistent with the goal, objective and policy set forth above because these provisions only contemplate possible reductions of residential densities in the CHHA and there is no provision of the County Plan that addresses or establishes criteria for increasing residential densities in the CHHA. Population Concentrations As stated above, Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. directs local governments to include provisions in their comprehensive plans to direct population concentrations away from the CHHA. The term "population concentrations" is not defined in any statute or rule. The term apparently has no generally accepted meaning in the planning profession. The word "population" has the ordinary meaning of "all of the people inhabiting a specific area." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1981). The word "concentration" has the ordinary meaning of "the act or process of concentrating." Id. The word "concentrate" means "to direct or draw toward a common center." Id. In the context of Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.012, the term "population concentrations" suggests a meaning of population densities (dwelling units per acre) of a certain level, but the level is not stated. Leeward argues that, because there is no state guidance on the meaning of the term "population concentrations," surrounding land uses should be examined to determine whether a proposed density would be "proportionate to its surroundings." According to Leeward, in order to be a population concentration, the density under review would have to be greater than the surrounding density. This comparative approach is rejected because the overarching Legislative objective is protection of life, which plainly calls for a straightforward consideration of the number of lives placed in harm's way. The Department, in its Proposed Recommended Order, states: By assigning either zero residential density to land by virtue of an Open Space land use designation, or a maximum density of one unit per acre by assigning a low density land use designation, the County Plan fulfills the mandates of State law that development be limited in and residential concentrations be directed away from the CHHA. Thus, not surprisingly, the Department does not consider one du/a to be a population concentration. A density of ten du/a is an urban density, as indicated by the fact that it is the maximum density allowed in the Urban Community land use designation and the highest density within the "standard density range" for the County's Central Urban land use designation. It is a generally known fact, of which the undersigned takes notice, that urban areas are areas where populations are concentrated. It is a another generally known fact, of which the undersigned takes notice, that ten dwelling units on one acre of land amounts to a lot of people living in a small space. Leeward, itself, described the residential density allowed under the Urban Community designation as "relatively intense." Leeward's Proposed Recommended Order, at 7. Whether measured by density alone (ten du/a) or by Leeward's estimate of 160 residences on 16 acres, the amendment places a population concentration in the CHHA. Offsets in the CHHA Leeward presented evidence that the County has been reducing residential densities, sometimes referred to as "down- planning," in other areas of the CHHA in Lee County. The reduction in dwelling units in the CHHA over the past several years may be as high as 10,000 units. The Department did not present evidence to dispute that there has been an overall reduction in dwelling units in the CHHAs of Lee County. Leeward argues that these reductions "offset" the increase in dwelling units in the CHHA that would result from the amendment and this "overall" reduction in densities in the CHHA must be considered in determining whether the amendment is "in compliance" with state law and with provisions of the County Plan related to directing population concentrations away from the CHHA. At the hearing and in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department argued that the consideration of offsets in the CHHA was improper and unworkable, but that argument conflicts with the Department's actual practice and official position as described in the January 2006 "Department of Community Affairs Report for the Governor's Coastal High Hazard Study Committee." In that report, the Department acknowledged there is no statutory or rule guidance regarding what the maximum density should be in the CHHA. The Report notes that some local governments have established maximum densities for the CHHA (e.g., Pinellas County, 5 du/a; Franklin County 1 du/a). The Department states in the report that it reviews amendments to increase density in the CHHA on a "case by case" basis, and explains further: When a Comprehensive Plan Amendment in the CHHA proposes a density increase, DCA's review considers the amount of the density increase, the impact on evacuation times and shelter space, and whether there will be a corresponding offset in density through "down planning" (generally accomplished through public acquisition). One of the visual aides used in conjunction with the 2006 report to Governor's Coastal High Hazard Study Committee, entitled "Policy Issue #2 - Densities in High Hazard Areas," also describes the Department's practice: Without locally adopted density limits, DCA conducts a case by case review of amendments without any defined numeric limit. DCA considers amount of density increase, impact on evacuation times and shelter space, and whether there will be a corresponding offset in density through "down planning" in other areas of the CHHA. These statements use the phrase "there will be a corresponding offset," which suggests that for an offset to be considered, it would have to be proposed concurrently with an increase in residential density on other lands within the CHHA. However, according to the director of the Department's Division of Community Planning, Valerie Hubbard, offsets in the CHHA do not have to be concurrent; they can include previous reductions. Furthermore, although the Department pointed to the absence of any criteria in the County Plan to guide an offset analysis, Ms. Hubbard said it was unnecessary for a comprehensive plan to include express provisions for the use of offsets. To the extent that this evidence of the Department's interpretation of relevant law and general practice conflicts with other testimony presented by the Department in this case, the statements contained in the report to the Governor's Coastal High Hazard Study Committee and the testimony of Ms. Hubbard are more persuasive evidence of the Department's policy and practice in determining compliance with the requirement that comprehensive plans direct population densities away from the CHHA and limit development in the CHHA. As long as the Department's practice when conducting an "in compliance" review of amendments that increase residential density in the CHHA is to take into account offsets, the Department has the duty to be consistent and to take into account the County's offsets in the review of this amendment. The County planning director testified that he believed the applicable goal, objective, and policy of the County Plan are met as long as there has been a reduction in residential densities in the CHHAs of the County as a whole. The Department points out that the planning director's opinion was not included in the County planning staff's reports prepared in conjunction with the amendment. However, it necessarily follows from the Board of County Commissioners' adoption of the amendment that it does not interpret Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4 as prohibiting an increase in residential density in the CHHA. Although these provisions make no mention of offsets, the Department has not required offset provisions in a comprehensive plan before the Department will consider offsets in its determination whether a plan amendment that increases density in the CHHA is in compliance. The wording used in Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4 requiring "consideration" of density reductions in the CHHA can be harmonized with the County planning director's testimony and with the County's adoption of the amendment by construing these plan provisions consistently with the Department's own practice of allowing increases in the CHHA when the increases are offset by overall reductions in dwelling units in the CHHA. Seeking to harmonize the amendment with the provisions of the County Plan is the proper approach because, as discussed later in the Conclusions of Law, whether an amendment is consistent with other provisions of the plan is subject to the "fairly debatable" standard which is a highly deferential standard that looks for "any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction." Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1997). Shelter Space and Clearance Time Prior to the hearing in this case, Leeward moved to strike certain statute and rule citations in the Department's petition related to shelter space and clearance time4 because they were not included in the Department's ORC Report. The motion was denied because, although Section 163.3184(8)(b), Florida Statutes, limits the Department's petition to issues raised in the "written comments" in the ORC Report, the statute does not indicate that the Department is barred from citing in its petition, for the first time, a rule or statute that is directly related to the written comments. The CHHA is defined in the County Plan as the category one "evacuation zone." It is the area most in need of evacuation in the event of a severe coastal storm. Shelter space and clearance time are integral to evacuation planning and directly related to the Department's comment in the ORC Report that the amendment would, "expose a substantial population to the dangers of a hurricane." Therefore, the Department was not barred from presenting evidence on shelter space and clearance time in support of this comment. The Department's practice when reviewing an amendment that increases residential density in the CHHA, described in its 2006 report to the Governor's Coastal High Hazard Area Study Committee, is to consider not only dwelling unit offsets in the CHHA, but also the effect on shelter space and clearance time. That report did not elaborate on how shelter space and clearance time are considered by the Department, but evidence that a comprehensive plan amendment would have a significant adverse effect on shelter space or clearance time could presumably negate what would otherwise appear to the Department to be an acceptable offset of residential density in the CHHA. On this record, however, the Department did not show that a significant adverse impact on shelter space or clearance time would be caused by this particular amendment.5 Special Planning Areas Leeward argues that, even if the amendment were determined to be inconsistent with Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4, that inconsistency should be balanced against other provisions in the County Plan that are furthered by the amendment, principally the provisions related to the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Planning Area and the Water- Dependent Use Overlay Zone. There is no authority for such a balancing approach that can overcome an inconsistency with an objective or policy of the comprehensive plan. Therefore, whether the amendment furthers the provisions of the County Plan related to the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Planning Area, Water-Dependent Use Overlay Zone, or other subjects is irrelevant to whether the amendment is consistent with Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4. On the other hand, the Department's contention that the amendment is inconsistent with the provisions of the County Plan related to the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Planning Area is contrary to the more credible evidence. 100-Year Floodplain The amendment site is entirely within the 100-year floodplain. In its Statement of Intent, the Department determined that the amendment was not in compliance, in part, because the amendment site's location in the 100-year floodplain made it unsuitable for residential development. In addition, the Department determined that the amendment caused an internal inconsistency with the following policies of the County Plan related to development in the floodplain: POLICY 61.3.2: Floodplains must be managed to minimize the potential loss of life and damage to property by flooding. POLICY 61.3.6: Developments must have and maintain an adequate surface water management system, provision for acceptable programs for operation and maintenance, and post-development runoff conditions which reflect the natural surface water flow in terms of rate, direction, quality, hydroperiod, and drainage basin. Detailed regulations will continue to be integrated with other county development regulations. According to Mike McDaniel, a growth management administrator with the Department, "we try to discourage increasing densities in floodplains and encourage that it be located in more suitable areas." The policies set forth above are intended to aid in the achievement of Goal 61 of the Community Facilities and Service Element "to protect water resources through the application of innovative and sound methods of surface water management and by ensuring that the public and private construction, operation, and maintenance of surface water management systems are consistent with the need to protect receiving waters.” Plainly, Goal 61 is directed to regulating construction and surface water management systems. There is no mention in this goal or in the policies that implement the goal of prohibiting all development or certain kinds of development in the 100-year floodplain. The Department's argument in this case regarding development in the 100-year floodplain is rejected because it ignores relevant facts and law. First, substantial portions of Lee County and the State are within the 100-year floodplain. Second, there is no state statute or rule that prohibits development in the 100-year floodplain. Third, the Department of Environmental Protection, water management districts, and local governments regulate development in the floodplain by application of construction standards, water management criteria, and similar regulatory controls to protect floodplain functions as well as human life and property. Fourth, there has been and continues to be development in the 100-year floodplain in Lee County and throughout the State, clearly indicating that such development is able to comply with all federal, state, and local requirements imposed by the permitting agencies for the specific purpose of protecting the floodplain and the public. Fifth, the Department "discourages" development in the floodplain but has not established by rule a standard, based on density or other measure, which reasonably identifies for local governments or the general public what development in the floodplain is acceptable to the Department and what development is unacceptable. Finally, the Department's practice in allowing offsets in the CHHA, as discussed previously, necessarily allows for development in the 100-year floodplain in that particular context.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission determining that the amendment adopted by Lee County in Ordinance No. 05-10 is "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2006.
The Issue The issue before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) in this proceeding is whether to grant the Petition to Establish the Arborwood Community Development District (Petition), dated November 17, 2003. The local public hearing was conducted for the purpose of gathering information in anticipation of rulemaking by FLWAC.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b) & (c), Florida Statutes (2007), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed as a real estate broker associate in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 3057283. At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed with Re/Max Professionals, Inc., a real estate corporation. At the time of hearing, Respondent was licensed with Access Realty of North Florida, Inc., a licensed real estate corporation. Respondent's address of record is 757 West Duval Street, Lake City, Florida 32055. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was the listing agent for a property known as 831 South West 5th Street, Live Oak, Florida (5th Street property). On March 4, 2008, Respondent listed the property as having a Commercial Intensive (CI) zoning. At the time of the listing, zoning classifications for property in Live Oak were not available on line, and could only be obtained by calling for the information. At the present time, George Curtis is employed by the City of Live Oak and handles inquiries regarding zoning for properties in the City of Live Oak. He does not recall receiving a telephone call from Respondent regarding the zoning classification for the 5th Street property. However, at the time of Respondent's inquiry, Mr. Curtis was just starting his employment with the city, and did not yet have an office. Inquiries were at that time directed to the City Clerk's office. Mr. Curtis could not state that no call was received by that office, or, if received, what information was given. The listing for the property states at the bottom, "[t]his information is deemed reliable, but is not guaranteed." Respondent listed the property zoning as CI after calling to inquire regarding the appropriate zoning for the property. While she testified that her call was to the Suwannee County office as opposed to the City of Live Oak, it is found that the call must have been made to the City, given the telephone call described below. The property described in the listing is not zoned CI, but rather Commercial Neighborhood (CN). In Live Oak, CI zoning is the most intense zoning district, and is limited to major arterial roads in the city. It is intended to meet the needs of a regional population. CN zoning is intended to provide for commercial use on a more limited scale, in terms of the size of the building that can be placed and the types of uses. It is intended to meet the needs of a neighborhood area. A funeral home would not be a permitted use for property zoned CN. It would require a zoning change. A funeral home would be permitted on a property zoned as commercial general (CG). The CG category is between CI and CN. In September 2008, Respondent contacted the City of Live Oak and was referred to George Curtis about the possible use of the property on SE 5th Street as a daycare. During their telephone conversation, he told her that in order to operate a daycare on the property, the owner would need to receive a special exception to the zoning requirements. He obtained her e- mail address and sent her an e-mail with attachments regarding obtaining special exceptions. Respondent believed, based upon their conversation, that the same would be true for any business to be located on the property. Mr. Curtis does not recall telling Respondent at that time that the property was not zoned as CI. On October 16, 2008, Respondent sent the following e- mail to Mr. Curtis: Hi George, the contract for a day care on 831 SW 5th Street, Live Oak (lots 14, 15, 16, Block E, Hildreth) fell through. I now have a pending contract but the buyers want to use the property for a funeral home. Do you see any problem with this? Anne The e-mail was sent at 5:01 p.m. At 5:22 p.m., Mr. Curtis sent the following reply: Hello Anne: I believe this property was Neighborhood Commercial between Green and Ammons on the south side of 5th. C-N does not have any allowances for a Funeral Home, even as a Special Exception. A petition could be proposed to the City Council for Residential- Office or Office Zoning that does allow for the Funeral Home (with also a Special Exception) but other criteria would have to be evaluated to be sure that parting and buffering requirements could be met after any zoning change took place--which is also a process that is not guaranteed but a possibility--there is no way to predict whether the rezoning and the special exception would be approved. This would probably be a 4-6 month process start to finish plus the associated fees to try. Funeral Homes are allowed by right in General Commercial Zoning but you have to front a major street (129/90/51, etc. to get considered for that zoning…) Hope this helps -- wish I had better news… Respondent claims that she never received this e-mail, and that she never deleted it from her computer. She testified that when she did not receive a response, she called the zoning office and was told that a special exception would be required for a funeral home. She passed this information on to Mr. Wright. On October 17, 2008, Russell Wright made an offer to purchase the property on S.W. 5th Street for $45,000. The contract (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) has been reduced and copied several times, and as a result, is illegible in most respects. However, it can be ascertained that the contract was made on October 17, 2008, and signed by the sellers on October 22, 2008. The contract specified that closing was to take place October 31, 2008, which it did. The contract also specified that the Buyers would pay $5,000 down, and the Sellers would finance the remainder at 8 percent, with payments of $485.31. As part of the closing, the Buyers and Sellers signed an Affidavit of Buyer and Seller Regarding Contract Compliance, which stated "all of the contingencies and conditions set forth in the contract (and all addendums thereto) between the Seller and Buyer have been satisfied, performed or waived by the Buyer and the Seller " Because of the condition of Petitioner's Exhibit 3, it cannot be determined whether the form contract made any representations regarding zoning and who was responsible for determining the appropriate zoning for the property. On October 23, 2008, Respondent sent an e-mail to Russell Wright with attachments labeled "Petition for Special Exemption," "How the Future Land Use Plan Map - Brochure," and "Sec. 12.2 Special Exceptions." The message in the e-mail reads: Hi Russ, here's the contact person who deals with the zoning in Live Oak, and the forms for filing. I received 1 of the forms back from you, the As Is Rider but I still need the corrected Lead based paint disclosure that I sent with the AS Rider in yesterday's fax. Please complete this form and fact back to me. The Seller's [sic] are going to close at 9:00 am on Friday 31st, please let me know as soon as possible a time that would be convient [sic] for you and your wife to attend. Regards, Anne. Mr. Wright acknowledged receiving an e-mail, but not the documents. He sent Respondent the other documents required for closing. After the closing, he called her and stated that he could not locate the paperwork related to special exceptions, and on November 3, 2008, she mailed it to him. With the paperwork was the following note: Dear Russell and Marcus: I have enclosed the paperwork for the Special exception. If you have any questions you may call George Curtis at 386-362-2276. Mr. Curtis is the development manager for the City of Live Oak. Regards, Anne Mr. Wright began making renovations on the property in order to open a funeral home. In July 2009, he began the process of getting his city occupational license. He could not obtain the license because the property was not zoned for his intended use. At that point, Mr. Wright contacted city officials, including George Curtis and the Mayor of Live Oak. Mr. Curtis advised Mr. Wright that he had sent an e-mail to Respondent advising her that a funeral home could not be operated on the property with its present zoning. Mr. Wright wrote to Respondent, demanding that she compensate him for the fact that he could not open the funeral home without a zoning change. The letter stated in pertinent part: The Mayor of Live Oak and Mr. George Curtis has informed me that I can apply for a zoning change so that My Wife and I can open our business. But it will cost $750.00 to file the initial papers. And that is NOT a guarantee. To date with the down payment and monthly payments and renovation cost, your dealings have cost us $25,000 plus pain and suffering and embarrassment. And we have property that we can't use for the intention it was purchased. Ms. Hurst, we are allowing you and your firm to settle this matter out of court. Ms. Hurst we will settle this matter for the amount of $50,000.00 which is damages plus pain and suffering. If you and ReMax Professionals, Inc., are not willing to settle with us out of Court, we will retain the Attorney with whom my Wife and I have consulted. . . . It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Wright chose to believe that he could open a funeral home on the property without any further administrative action either to change the zoning or to obtain a Special Exception for its intended use. Neither belief is consistent with the credible evidence that Respondent sent him information regarding Special Exemptions and the process to obtain them. All of the information given to him is consistent with his need to follow up with the City's zoning department, which he did not do. Based on the more persuasive evidence presented in this classic, "he-said, she-said" case, it is found that Respondent did not receive the October 17, 2008 e-mail from George Curtis, but believed that a Special Exemption would be required to operate a funeral home on the property, and that she supplied information to Mr. Wright to that effect. Mr. Wright's claim that Respondent represented that the property could be used as a funeral home with no further action is rejected.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Count One in the Administrative Complaint; finding a violation of section 475.25(1)(c), as alleged in Count Two; imposing a reprimand and fining Respondent $250.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: William Haley, Esquire Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson & Bullock, P.A. Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 Joseph A. Solla, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, within the past year, purchased two tracts of property 50 feet by 100 feet located at 614-620 Mandalay Avenue on Clearwater Beach. This property is zoned "CG" or "General Business" and there are four buildings on this property comprising five dwelling units. The land use plan for this location is commercial/tourist facilities. Petitioner submitted an artist's drawing of what the site could look like if the variance requested was granted. No building permits have been requested; accordingly, no specific plans have been submitted to establish the use to which the property would be put if the variance requested is granted. The proposal of Petitioner (such as it is) contemplates converting the ground floors of the existing structures to commercial use. If the existing buildings were so converted, with the upper floors remaining residential, the zoning code requires provision be made for twenty-eight off-street parking spaces. Since the existing five dwelling units would be credited (grandfathered) for having eight such parking spaces due to the construction having occurred before the zoning code was enacted, Petitioner is requesting a variance for the remaining twenty off-street parking spaces that would be required. Actually, there are no off-street parking spaces on this property but five or six parking spaces exist in the right-of-way for Mandalay Avenue. There are no off-street parking spaces on Mandalay Avenue in the vicinity of Petitioner's property and none are proposed to be provided by Petitioner. Mandalay Avenue is the main north-south artery on Clearwater Beach and is four-laned in the vicinity of Petitioner's property, which lies near the northern terminus of "CG" zoning. At the hearing before the Board one witness spoke in favor of the variance requested because the proposal by Petitioner was better than if the property was used for the construction of a high-rise residential unit, which the zoning would permit. Since no specific proposal is before the Respondent for the issuance of a permit, there is no assurance that granting the requested variance would preclude the construction of high-rise residential units. The dwellings occupying this property were constructed some thirty years ago and are expensive to maintain and are not a very attractive investment. Petitioner referred to several other businesses where variances in parking requirements have been granted when bars and restaurants on Mandalay Avenue were rebuilt or expanded; however, little evidence was presented that parking variances have been granted when a new use for the property was proposed.
The Issue The issue is whether the actions of Florida Housing concerning the review and scoring of the responses to Request for Applications 2019-102 (“RFA”), titled “Community Development Block Grant--Disaster Recovery (‘CDBG- DR’) to be Used in Conjunction with Tax-Exempt MMRB and Non- Competitive Housing Credits in Counties Deemed Hurricane Recovery Priorities,” were contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the RFA specifications.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: THE PARTIES Berkeley is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $6,500,000 in CDBG Development funding; $2,500,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; and $844,699 in non-competitive housing credits. The Berkeley Application, assigned number 2020-017D, was preliminarily deemed ineligible for consideration for funding. Brisas is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $5,000,000 in CDBG Development funding and $1,674,839 in non-competitive housing credits. The Brisas Application, assigned number 2020-056D, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Northside is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $7,300,000 in CDBG Development funding; $1,588,014 in non-competitive housing credits; and $24,000,000 in Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds (“MMRB”). The Northside Application, assigned number 2020-024D, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Beacon Place is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $6,925,500 in CDBG Development funding; $4,320,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $1,764,203 in non-competitive housing credits; and $24,000,000 in MMRB. The Beacon Place Application, assigned number 2020-045DB, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Bella Vista is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $8,000,000 in CDBG Development funding; $1,450,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $609,629 in non-competitive housing credits; and $13,000,000 in MMRB. The Bella Vista Application, assigned number 2020-038DB, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Solaris is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,420,000 in CDBG Development funding; $4,500,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; and $937,232 in non-competitive housing credits. The Solaris Application, assigned number 2020-039D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Metro Grande is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,175,000 in CDBG Development funding and $1,041,930 in non-competitive housing credits. The Metro Grande Application, assigned number 2020-041D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Sierra Bay is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,650,000 in CDBG Development funding; $3,300,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $1,074,173 in non-competitive housing credits; and $16,000,000 in MMRB. The Sierra Bay Application, assigned number 2020-040DB, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Bembridge is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $7,800,000 in CDBG Development funding; $564,122 in non-competitive housing credits; and $10,100,000 in MMRB. The Bembridge Application, assigned number 2020-046DB, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. East Pointe is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $4,680,000 in CDBG Development funding and $690,979 in non-competitive housing credits. The East Pointe Application, assigned number 2020-053D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Florida Housing is a public corporation organized pursuant to Chapter 420, Part V, Florida Statutes, and, for purposes of these consolidated cases, is an agency of the State of Florida. Florida Housing is tasked with distributing a portion of the CDBG-DR funding allocated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), pursuant to the State of Florida Action Plan for Disaster Recovery. THE COMPETITIVE APPLICATION PROCESS AND RFA 2019-102 Florida Housing is authorized to allocate low-income housing tax credits and other named funding by section 420.507(48). Florida Housing has adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60 to govern the competitive solicitation process. Rule 67-60.009(1) provides that parties wishing to protest any aspect of a Florida Housing competitive solicitation must do so pursuant to section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Funding is made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a request for applications. Rule 67-60.009(4) provides that a request for application is considered a “request for proposal” for purposes of section 120.57(3)(f). The RFA was issued on July 30, 2019, with responses due on August 27, 2019. The RFA was modified four times and the application deadline was extended to September 24, 2019. No challenges were made to the terms and specifications of the RFA. Section Five of the RFA included a list of 48 “eligibility items” that an applicant was required to satisfy to be eligible for funding and considered for funding selection. Applications that met the eligibility standards would then be awarded points for satisfying RFA criteria, with the highest scoring applications being selected for funding. No total point items are in dispute. Proximity Point items are contested as to the Beacon Place, East Pointe, and Bembridge Applications. Applicants could select whether they would be evaluated as Priority I, II, or III applications. All of the parties to these consolidated cases identified themselves as Priority I applications. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award an estimated $76,000,000 of CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding to areas impacted by Hurricane Irma, and in areas that experienced a population influx because of migration from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands due to Hurricane Irma. Florida Housing will award up to $66,000,000 for CDBG Development funding and an additional $10,000,000 for CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding. Applicants were not required to request CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding. Forty-four applications were submitted in response to the RFA. A Review Committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (the “Board”). The Review Committee found 34 applications eligible for funding. The Review Committee found 8 applications ineligible, including that of Berkeley. Two applications were withdrawn. The Review Committee developed charts listing its eligibility and funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. On December 13, 2019, the Board met and accepted the recommendations of the Review Committee. The Board preliminarily awarded funding to 12 applications, including those of Sierra Bay, Solaris, Metro Grande, East Pointe, and Bembridge. Petitioners Berkeley, Brisas, Northside, Beacon Place, and Bella Vista timely filed Notices of Protest and Petitions for Formal Administrative Hearing. THE BERKELEY APPLICATION As an eligibility item, the RFA required applicants to identify an Authorized Principal Representative. According to the RFA, the Authorized Principal Representative: must be a natural person Principal of the Applicant listed on the Principal Disclosure Form; must have signature authority to bind the Applicant entity; (c) must sign the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form submitted in this Application; (d) must sign the Site Control Certification form submitted in this Application; and (e) if funded, will be the recipient of all future documentation that requires a signature. As an eligibility item, the RFA required applicants to submit an Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment form executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. As an eligibility item, the RFA also required applicants to submit a Site Control Certification form executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. In section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A of the RFA, the applicant is directed to enter the contact information of its Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley entered the name, organization, and contact information for Jennie D. Lagmay as its Authorized Principal Representative, in response to section 3.e.(1). The name of Jennie D. Lagmay was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form required by the RFA. The Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment form and the Site Control Certification form were executed by Jonathan L. Wolf, not Jennie D. Lagmay, the designated Authorized Principal Representative. On both forms, Mr. Wolf is identified as “Manager of Berkeley Landing GP, LLC; General Partner of Berkeley Landing, Ltd.” Jonathan L. Wolf is listed on the Principal Disclosure Form. Aside from section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A, Jennie D. Lagmay’s name is not found in the Berkeley Application. Florida Housing determined that the Berkeley Application was ineligible for an award of funding for three reasons: 1) the Authorized Principal Representative listed was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form; 2) the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form was not signed by the Authorized Principal Representative; and 3) the Site Control Certification was not signed by the Authorized Principal Representative. Two other applications for this RFA were found ineligible for identical reasons: Thornton Place, Application No. 2020-020D; and Berkshire Square, Application No. 2020-034D. In these, as in the Berkeley Application, Jennie D. Lagmay was named as the Authorized Principal Representative in section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A, but Jonathan L. Wolf executed the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form and the Site Control Certification form as the Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley concedes it made an error in placing the name of Ms. Lagmay in section 3.e.(1), but argues that this constituted a minor irregularity that should have been waived by Florida Housing. Berkeley contends that the entirety of its Application makes plain that Jonathan D. Wolf is in fact its Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley argues that Florida Housing should waive the minor irregularity and determine that the Berkeley Application is eligible for funding. Berkeley points out that only two members of the Review Committee, Rachel Grice and Heather Strickland, scored the portions of the Berkeley Application that led to the ineligibility recommendation. Ms. Grice determined that the Authorized Principal Representative listed in the Berkeley Application was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form. Ms. Strickland determined that neither the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form nor the Site Control Certification form was executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. Neither Ms. Grice nor Ms. Strickland conducted a minor irregularity analysis for the Berkeley Application. Rule 67-60.008, titled “Right to Waive Minor Irregularities,” provides as follows: Minor irregularities are those irregularities in an Application, such as computation, typographical, or other errors, that do not result in the omission of any material information; do not create any uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the competitive solicitation have been met; do not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants; and do not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public. Minor irregularities may be waived or corrected by the Corporation. Berkeley contends that because a minor irregularity analysis was not conducted by the Review Committee members, the Board was deprived of a necessary explanation for the preliminary recommendations of Ms. Grice and Ms. Strickland. Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Allocations, agreed that the Review Committee members did not perform a minor irregularity analysis but testified that none was required given the nature of the discrepancy in the Berkeley Application. Ms. Button performed a minor irregularity analysis as Florida Housing’s corporate representative in this proceeding and concluded that the error could not be waived or corrected without providing an unfair competitive advantage to Berkeley. Ms. Button testified that the fact that the person identified as the Authorized Principal Representative was not the same person who signed the certification forms could not be considered a minor irregularity because the application demonstrated conflicting and contradictory information, creating uncertainty as to the applicant’s intentions. She stated that Florida Housing is required to limit its inquiry to the four corners of the application. Ms. Button stated that Florida Housing cannot take it upon itself to decide what the applicant intended when the information provided in the application is contradictory. Berkeley points to the fact that the Application Certification and Acknowledgement form, signed by Mr. Wolf, includes the following language: “The undersigned is authorized to bind the Applicant entity to this certification and warranty of truthfulness and completeness of the Application.” Berkeley argues that it should have been clear to Florida Housing that Mr. Wolf is the person authorized to bind the company and that the inclusion of Ms. Lagmay’s name in section 3.e.(1) was in the nature of a typographical error. Florida Housing points out that the Application Certification and Acknowledgement form also includes the following language below the signature line: “NOTE: Provide this form as Attachment 1 to the RFA. The Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form must be signed by the Authorized Principal Representative stated in Exhibit A.” Florida Housing notes that the Site Control Certification form includes similar language: “This form must be signed by the Authorized Principal Representative stated in Exhibit A.” Berkeley contends that Florida Housing was well aware that Jonathan L. Wolf has been the named Authorized Principal Representative on multiple applications filed under the umbrella of Wendover Housing Partners, the general developer behind Berkeley. In at least one of those previous applications, Ms. Lagmay, an employee of Wendover Housing Partners, was identified as the “contact person.” Ms. Button responded that Review Committee members are specifically prohibited from using personal knowledge of a general development entity in a specific application submitted by a single purpose entity. She further testified that if Florida Housing employees were to use their personal knowledge of an experienced developer to waive errors in a specific application, applicants who had not previously submitted applications would be at a competitive disadvantage. Ms. Button testified that Berkeley was established as a single purpose entity in accordance with the RFA’s requirements. She testified that she has known general developers to structure these single purpose entities in different ways, depending on the requirements of an RFA. An applicant might designate an employee, such as Ms. Lagmay, as a principal to give her experience as a developer. Again, Ms. Button emphasized that Florida Housing is not in a position to decide what the applicant “really meant” when there is a discrepancy in the information provided. Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing has determined in prior RFAs that an applicant was ineligible because the person identified as the Authorized Principal Representative was not the same person who signed the certification forms. Florida Housing rightly concluded that there are only two possible ways to interpret the Berkeley Application. If Ms. Lagmay was the Authorized Principal Representative, then the application is nonresponsive because she was not listed on the Principal Disclosure form and she did not sign the required certification forms. If Ms. Lagmay was not the Authorized Principal Representative, the application is nonresponsive because no Authorized Principal Representative was identified. There is no way to tell from the four corners of the application which of these alternatives is the correct one. Florida Housing cannot step in and cure the defect in the application by making its own educated guess as to the intended identity of the Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of ineligibility was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA, or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE SIERRA BAY APPLICATION The parties stipulated to the facts regarding the Sierra Bay Application, which are incorporated into this Recommended Order. Florida Housing deemed the Sierra Bay Application eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, preliminarily selected Sierra Bay for funding. In order to demonstrate site control, the RFA required execution of the Site Control Certification form. Site control documentation had to be included in the application. One way to demonstrate site control was to include an “eligible contract.” The RFA required that certain conditions be met in order to be considered an “eligible contract.” One of those requirements was that the contract “must specifically state that the buyer’s remedy for default on the part of the seller includes or is specific performance.” Sierra Bay acknowledged that the site control documentation included within its application did not meet the “eligible contract” requirement because it failed to include language regarding specific performance as a remedy for the seller’s default. Sierra Bay agreed that the omission of the specific performance language was not a minor irregularity and that Sierra Bay’s Application is ineligible for funding under the terms of the RFA. THE SOLARIS APPLICATION The RFA specified that a Local Government, Public Housing Authority, Land Authority, or Community Land Trust must hold 100 percent ownership in the land of any qualifying Priority I application. The RFA defined “Community Land Trust” as: A 501(c)(3) which acquires or develops parcels of land for the primary purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity through conveyance of the structural improvement subject to a long term ground lease which retains a preemptive option to purchase any such structural improvement at a price determined by a formula designed to ensure the improvement remains affordable in perpetuity. The RFA provided that if a Community Land Trust is the Land Owner, the Community Land Trust must provide the following documentation as Attachment 2 to the application to demonstrate that it qualifies as a Community Land Trust: The Community Land Trust must provide its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws demonstrating it has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier and that a purpose of the Community Land Trust is to provide or preserve affordable housing; and The Community Land Trust must provide a list that meets one of the following criteria to demonstrate experience of the Community Land Trust with owning property: (i) at least two parcels of land that the Community Land Trust currently owns; or (ii) one parcel of land that the Community Land Trust owns, consisting of a number of units that equals or exceeds at least 25 percent of the units in the proposed Development. The RFA required that the proposed development must be affordable in perpetuity. For purposes of the RFA, “perpetuity” means 99 years or more. Solaris identified Residential Options of Florida, Inc. (“Residential Options”), as the Community Land Trust owner in its Priority 1 Application. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application included the Articles of Incorporation of Residential Options (“Original Articles”), filed with the Division of Corporations on July 30, 2014. The purpose of the corporation as stated in the Original Articles was as follows: Said corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, including for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of any future federal tax code. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application also included Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Residential Options (“Amended Articles”), filed with the Division of Corporations on September 20, 2019. The Amended Articles retained the boilerplate statement of purpose of the Original Articles, but added the following paragraph: This shall include the purpose of empowering individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities to successfully obtain and maintain affordable and inclusive housing of their choice and to provide affordable housing and preserve the affordability of housing for low- income or moderate income people, including people with disabilities, in perpetuity. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application also included the Articles of Incorporation of ROOF Housing Trust, Inc. (“ROOF Housing Trust”) filed with the Division of Corporations on July 17, 2017. The purpose of the corporation as stated in these Articles includes the following: “to acquire land to be held in perpetuity for the primary purpose of providing affordable housing for people with developmental disabilities.” Finally, Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application included Articles of Merger, which were filed with the Division of Corporations on September 10, 2019. The Articles of Merger indicated that the Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust had merged, with Residential Options standing as the surviving corporation. The petitioners contesting the Solaris Application raise several issues. The first issue is whether the RFA requires only that the entity named as the Community Land Trust have been in existence in some form as of June 28, 2018, or whether the entity had to exist as a Community Land Trust as of that date. The Community Land Trust named in the Solaris Application, Residential Options, existed prior to June 28, 2018, but not as a Community Land Trust. The second issue is whether the June 28, 2018, date applies only to the existence of the Community Land Trust or whether the RFA requires that the Community Land Trust have been in existence and have had a stated purpose to provide or preserve affordable housing and have met the ownership experience criteria as of June 28, 2018. It is questionable whether Solaris would be eligible for funding if the RFA required the latter, because Residential Options did not have a stated purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing prior to its merger with ROOF Housing Trust, at least no such purpose as could be gleaned from the four corners of the Solaris Application. The third issue is whether the RFA’s definition of “Community Land Trust” requires the qualifying entity to have existing ground leases at the time of the application. Florida Housing and Solaris concede that Residential Options did not have operative ground leases at the time Solaris submitted its application. Hurricane Irma struck Puerto Rico and Florida in September 2017. Ms. Button testified that in creating this RFA, Florida Housing wanted to weed out opportunistic community land trusts created only for the purpose of obtaining this funding. Florida Housing initially proposed an RFA requirement that the community land trust have existed as of September 2017, but discovered through workshops with interested parties that the early date would exclude legitimate Community Land Trusts that had been established in response to the storm. Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing’s intent was to make this RFA as inclusive as practicable. Florida Housing therefore selected June 28, 2018, as a date that would exclude opportunists without penalizing the genuine responders to the natural disaster. Both Florida Housing and Solaris point to the text of the RFA requirement to demonstrate that the date of June 28, 2018, should be read to apply only to whether the Community Land Trust existed as of that date. Solaris argues that the RFA states three independent criteria for eligibility: 1) that the Community Land Trust “has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier”; 2) that a purpose of the Community Land Trust is1 to provide or preserve affordable housing; and 3) the Community Land Trust must demonstrate its property ownership experience, one means of doing which is to name at least two parcels of land that the Community Land Trust currently owns. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the first criterion by providing its Articles of Incorporation showing it has existed since July 30, 2014. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the second criterion by providing its Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, which stated the purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the third criterion by identifying two properties in Immokalee, Independence Place, and Liberty Place as parcels that it currently owns. Florida Housing thus reached the conclusion that Residential Options met the definition of a Community Land Trust in the RFA as of June 28, 2018. Florida Housing argues that, according to the definition in the RFA, a Community Land Trust must be a 501(c)(3) corporation, which Residential Options clearly is. It must acquire or develop parcels of land, which it has done. Finally, it must have the “primary purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity through conveyance of the structural improvement subject to a long term ground lease.” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing’s interpretation of the RFA’s Community Land Trust definition was that if Residential Options had the primary purpose of providing affordable housing in perpetuity through the use of long term ground leases, the definition has been met even if Residential Options had not actually entered into any ground leases at the 1 Both Florida Housing and Solaris emphasize that the second criterion is stated in the present tense, which suggests that it does not intend a backward look to June 28, 2018. time it submitted its application. This is not the only way to read the RFA’s definition, but it is not an unreasonable reading, particularly in light of Florida Housing’s stated intent to make the RFA as inclusive as possible in terms of the participation of legitimate community land trusts. Sheryl Soukup, the Executive Director of Residential Options, testified via deposition. Ms. Soukup testified that in 2017, Residential Options realized there was a need for housing for people with disabilities and decided to become a nonprofit housing developer of properties that would be kept affordable in perpetuity. To that end, ROOF Housing Trust was created to act as the community land trust for the properties developed by Residential Options. The two companies had identical Boards of Directors and Ms. Soukup served as Executive Director of both entities. In its application to the IRS for 501(c)(3) status, ROOF Housing Trust included the following: The organization does not own any property yet. ROOF Housing Trust intends to own vacant land, single family homes, and multi-family units. Some of the units will be provided as rental units. ROOF Housing Trust will sell some of the houses for homeownership, while retaining the land on which they are located. The land will be leased to homeowners at a nominal fee to make the purchase price affordable, using the community land trust model. Ground leases and warranty deeds not been developed yet [sic], but will be based on the sample documents provided by the Florida Community Land Trust Institute.[2] Ms. Soukup described ROOF Housing Trust as “a vehicle by which Residential Options of Florida could act as a community land trust…. [I]t was always the intention of Residential Options of Florida to develop and put into 2 The ROOF Housing Trust 501(c)(3) application was not a part of the Solaris Application. It was included as an exhibit to Ms. Soukup’s deposition. a community land trust property so that it would remain affordable in perpetuity for use by people of intellectual and development [sic] disabilities.” Residential Options acquired the aforementioned Independence Place and Liberty Place properties but never conveyed ownership to ROOF Housing Trust. Residential Options acted as a de facto community land trust. No ground leases have yet been entered into because the properties are at present rented directly by Residential Options to persons with developmental disabilities. Ms. Soukup testified that at the time ROOF Housing Trust was created, the Board of Residential Options was undecided whether to create a separate entity to act as a community land trust or to incorporate that function into the existing entity. The decision to incorporate ROOF Housing Trust was based on the Board’s intuition that a separate corporation would “allow us the most flexibility in the future.” In any event, Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust were functionally the same entity. Ms. Soukup testified that plans to merge the two companies emerged from a situation in which Collier County refused to allow Residential Options to convey its two properties to ROOF Housing Trust. The Board that controlled both companies decided that there was no point in maintaining separate legal entities if ROOF Housing Trust could not perform its main function. As noted above, Articles of Merger were filed on September 10, 2019. Northside points to minutes from Residential Options’s Board meetings in August and September 2019, as indicating that the Board itself did not believe that Residential Options was a community land trust prior to the merger with ROOF Housing Trust. Northside contends that the September 2019 merger was initiated and completed mainly because Residential Options had been approached about serving as the Community Land Trust for the applications of Solaris and Sierra Bay in this RFA. Northside points to the “frenzied activity” by Residential Options to create an entity meeting the definition of Community Land Trust in the days just before the September 24, 2019, application deadline. Northside argues that Residential Options is the very kind of opportunistic community land trust that the June 28, 2018, date of creation was intended to weed out. Northside’s argument is not persuasive of itself, but it does point the way to an ultimate finding as to the Solaris Application. Both Florida Housing and Solaris gave great emphasis to Ms. Soukup’s testimony to refute the suggestion that Residential Options acted opportunistically. Ms. Soukup was a credible witness. Her explanation of the process by which Residential Options first created then merged with ROOF Housing Trust dispelled any suggestion that Residential Options was a community land trust created solely to cash in on this RFA. The problem is that Ms. Soukup’s explanation was not before the Review Committee when it evaluated the Solaris Application. The only information about Residential Options that the Review Committee possessed was Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application. The dates of the merger documents and Amended Articles certainly give some credence to the suspicions voiced by Northside. However, the undersigned is less persuaded by the implications as to the intentions of Residential Options than by the contradictions between Florida Housing’s statements of intent and its reading of the RFA in relation to the Solaris Application. The decision to find the Solaris Application eligible for funding founders on the first issue stated above: whether the RFA requires only that the Community Land Trust have been in existence in some form as of June 28, 2018, or whether it had to exist as a Community Land Trust as of that date. Ms. Button testified that the June 28, 2018, date was settled upon as a way of including community land trusts created in the wake of Hurricane Irma, while excluding those created to cash in on this RFA. During cross- examination by counsel for Northside, Ms. Button broadened her statement to say that Florida Housing’s intention was to exclude entities that had not been involved in affordable housing at all prior to June 28, 2018. Nonetheless, the RFA language is limited to Community Land Trusts. The RFA states: “The Community Land Trust must provide its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws demonstrating that it has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier…” The Solaris Application shows that Residential Options existed prior to June 28, 2018, but not as a Community Land Trust. Residential Options did not become a Community Land Trust until it completed its merger with ROOF Housing Trust and filed the Amended Articles on September 20, 2019. Ms. Button’s statement of intent is accepted as consistent with the plain language of the RFA: the date of June 28, 2018, excludes Community Land Trusts created subsequently. It is inconsistent for Florida Housing to also read the RFA language to say that the qualifying entity need not have existed as a Community Land Trust prior to June 28, 2018. It would be arbitrary for Florida Housing to set a date for the creation of Community Land Trusts then turn around and find that the date does not apply to this particular Community Land Trust. Ms. Soukup’s testimony was that Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust were effectively a single entity and that Residential Options was in fact operating as a community land trust prior to the September 10, 2019, merger. However, Ms. Soukup’s explanation was not before the Review Committee, which was limited to one means of ascertaining whether an entity was a Community Land Trust prior to June 28, 2018: the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. Residential Options’s Original Articles included no language demonstrating that it was a Community Land Trust prior to the September 10, 2019, merger with ROOF Housing Trust and the filing of the Amended Articles on September 20, 2019.3 As set forth in the discussion of the Berkley Application above, Florida Housing is required to limit its inquiry to the four corners of an application. It was contrary to the provisions of the RFA for Florida Housing to find that Residential Options’s mere existence as a legal entity prior to June 28, 2018, satisfied the requirement that the Community Land Trust must demonstrate that it existed prior to June 28, 2018. Ms. Button’s own testimony demonstrated that Florida Housing intended to exclude Community Land Trusts created after June 28, 2018. ROOF Housing Trust existed as a Community Land Trust in 2017, but ROOF Housing Trust was not the Community Land Trust named in the Solaris Application. Ms. Soukup’s explanation of the circumstances showed that Residential Options was well intentioned in its actions, but her explanation was not a part of the Solaris Application that was before Florida Housing’s Review Committee. THE METRO GRANDE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Metro Grande Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, the Metro Grande Application was preliminarily selected for funding. Petitioner Brisas contends that the Metro Grande Application should have been found ineligible for failure to include mandatory site control documentation. Metro Grande submitted a Priority I application that was not seeking Land Acquisition Program funding. The site control requirements for such applicants are as follows: 3 This finding also disposes of Solaris’s arguments regarding the legal effect of corporate mergers. The RFA provided one simple way of demonstrating whether an entity was a Community Land Trust as of June 28, 2018. Florida Housing’s Review Committee could not be expected to delve into the complexities of corporate mergers to answer this uncomplicated question. The Local Government, Public Housing Authority, Land Authority, or Community Land Trust must already own the land as the sole grantee and, if funded, the land must be affordable into Perpetuity.[4] Applicants must demonstrate site control as of Application Deadline by providing the properly executed Site Control Certification form (Form Rev. 08-18). Attached to the form must be the following documents: A Deed or Certificate of Title. The deed or certificate of title (in the event the property was acquired through foreclosure) must be recorded in the applicable county and show the Land Owner as the sole Grantee. There are no restrictions on when the land was acquired; and A lease between the Land Owner and the Applicant entity. The lease must have an unexpired term of at least 50 years after the Application Deadline. Metro Grande did not include a deed or certificate of title in its application. In fact, no deed or certificate of title for the Metro Grande site exists. Miami-Dade County owns the Metro Grande site. Miami-Dade County acquired ownership of the Metro Grande site by eminent domain. The eminent domain process culminated in the entry of four Final Judgments for individual parcels which collectively compose the Metro Grande site. The Final Judgments were not attached to Metro Grande’s Application. There was no requirement in the RFA that Metro Grande include these Final Judgments in its application. The Final Judgments were produced during discovery in this proceeding. In its application, Metro Grande included a Land Owner Certification and Acknowledgement Form executed by Maurice L. Kemp, as the Deputy Mayor of Miami-Dade County, stating that the county holds or will hold 100 percent ownership of the land where Metro Grande’s proposed 4 The RFA defined “Perpetuity” as “at least 99 years from the loan closing.” development is located. Additionally, in its application, Metro Grande stated that Miami-Dade County owned the property. The RFA expressly states that Florida Housing “will not review the site control documentation that is submitted with the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process unless there is a reason to believe that the form has been improperly executed, nor will it in any case evaluate the validity or enforceability of any such documentation.” Florida Housing reserves the right to rescind an award to any applicant whose site control documents are shown to be insufficient during the credit underwriting process. Thus, the fact that no deed or certificate of title was included with Metro Grande’s site control documents was not considered by Florida Housing during the scoring process. Ms. Button testified that while this was an error in the application, it should be waived as a minor irregularity. The purpose of the documentation requirements was to demonstrate ownership and control of the applicant’s proposed site. There was no question or ambiguity as to the fact that Miami- Dade County owned the Metro Grande site. Florida Housing was not required to resort to information extraneous to the Metro Grande Application to confirm ownership of the site. The Land Owner Certification and Acknowledgement form, executed by the Deputy Mayor as the Authorized Land Owner Representative, confirmed ownership of the parcels. Metro Grande’s failure to include a deed or certificate of title, therefore, created no confusion as to who owned the property or whether Miami-Dade County had the authority to lease the property to the applicant. There was no evidence presented that the failure to include a deed or certificate of title resulted in the omission of any material information or provided a competitive advantage over other applicants. Brisas contends that the RFA was clear as to the documents that must be included to satisfy the site control requirements. Metro Grande failed to provide those documents or even an explanation why those documents were not provided. Florida Housing ignored the fact that no deed or certificate of title was provided, instead relying on information found elsewhere in the application. It is found that Metro Grande failed to comply with an eligibility item of the RFA, but that Florida Housing was correct to waive that failure as a minor irregularity that provided Metro Grande no competitive advantage, created no uncertainty as to whether the requirements of the RFA were met, and did not adversely affect the interests of Florida Housing or the public. Brisas has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE BEACON PLACE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Beacon Place Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Beacon Place was not preliminarily selected for funding. The RFA provides that an application may earn proximity points based on the distance between its Development Location Point and the selected Transit or Community Service. Proximity points are used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference. Beacon Place is a Large County Application that is not eligible for the “Public Housing Authority Proximity Point Boost.” As such, the Beacon Place Application was required to achieve a minimum Transit Point score of 2 to be eligible for funding. Beacon Place must also achieve a total Proximity Point score of 10.5 in order to be eligible for funding. Beacon Place must achieve a total Proximity Point score of 12.5 or more in order to receive the RFA’s Proximity Funding Preference. Based on the information in its Application, Beacon Place received a Total Proximity Point score of 18 and was deemed eligible for funding and for the Proximity Point Funding Preference. The Beacon Place Application listed a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as its Transit Service. Applying the Transit Service Scoring Charts in Exhibit C of the RFA, Florida Housing awarded Beacon Place 6 Proximity Points for its Transit Service. The Beacon Place Application listed a Grocery Store, a Pharmacy, and a Public School in its Community Services Chart in order to obtain Proximity Points for Community Services. Using the Community Services Scoring Charts in Exhibit C of the RFA, Florida Housing awarded Beacon Place 4 Proximity Points for each service listed, for a total of 12 Proximity Points for Community Services. Beacon Place has stipulated, however, that the Public School listed in its application does not meet the definition of “Public School” in the RFA and Beacon Place should not receive the 4 Proximity Points for listing a public school. The RFA defines a “Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop” as: [a] fixed location at which passengers may access public transportation via bus. The Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop must service at least one bus that travels at some point during the route in either a lane or corridor that is exclusively used by buses, and the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop must service at least one route that has scheduled stops at the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop at least every 20 minutes during the times of 7am to 9am and also during the times of 4pm to 6pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, on a year- round basis. Additionally, it must have been in existence and available for use by the general public as of the Application Deadline. The Beacon Place Application included Metrobus Route 38 (“Route 38”) as a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop. Route 38 has scheduled stops at the location identified in the Beacon Place Application at the following times during the period of 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. Monday through Friday: 7:01, 7:36, 7:56, 8:11, 8:26, 8:41, and 8:56. Brisas and Northside contend that Route 38 does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop because there is a gap of more than 20 minutes between the 7:01 a.m. bus and the 7:36 a.m. bus. Applicants are not required to include bus schedules in the application. Florida Housing does not attempt to determine whether an identified stop meets the RFA definitions during the scoring process. During discovery in this litigation, Florida Housing changed its position and now agrees that Route 38 does not satisfy the definition. Nonetheless, the standard of review set forth in section 120.57(3) is applicable to Florida Housing’s initial eligibility determination, not its revised position. All parties stipulated that Route 38 meets the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as to scheduled stops during the hours of 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. Monday through Friday. If the bus stop listed by Beacon Place does not also meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as to scheduled stops during the hours of 7 a.m. to 9 a.m., Beacon Place would not be entitled to any Transit Service Proximity Points and would be ineligible for funding. Beacon Place cannot contest the fact that there is a 35 minute gap between the 7:01 and the 7:36 buses. Beacon Place has attempted to salvage its situation by comparing the language used in the RFA definition of a Public Bus Stop with that used in the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop. The RFA defines Public Bus Stop in relevant part as [a] fixed location at which passengers may access one or two routes of public transportation via buses. The Public Bus Stop must service at least one bus route with scheduled stops at least hourly during the times of 7am to 9am and also during the times of 4pm and 6pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, on a year round basis…. Florida Housing has interpreted the “hourly” requirement of the Public Bus Stop definition to mean that a bus must stop at least once between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., and at least once between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. Beacon Place suggests that Florida Housing should interpret the “every 20 minutes” requirement for a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop similarly, so that a bus must stop at least once between 7:00 a.m. and 7:20 a.m., once between 7:20 a.m. and 7:40 a.m., and once between 7:40 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. Florida Housing has rejected this interpretation, however, noting that the language in the two definitions is explicitly different. Ms. Button testified that if Florida Housing had intended these two distinct definitions to be interpreted similarly, it could easily have worded them differently. It could have required a Public Bus Stop to have stops “at least every 60 minutes,” rather than “hourly.” It could have required a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop to have “three stops per hour” rather than “every 20 minutes.” Ms. Button observed that the purpose of the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop definition is to award points for serving the potential residents with frequent and regular stops. The idea was to be sure residents had access to the bus during the hours when most people are going to and from work. Florida Housing’s interpretation of “every 20 minutes” is consonant with the plain language of the phrase and reasonably serves the purpose of the definition. Florida Housing also rejected the idea that the failure of the identified stop to meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop in the RFA should be waived as a minor irregularity. Ms. Button testified that allowing one applicant to get points for a stop that did not meet the definition would give it a competitive advantage over other applicants, including some potential applicants who did not apply because they could not satisfy the terms of the definition. Because the bus stop listed by Beacon Place does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop, Beacon Place is not entitled to any Transit Service Proximity Points and is thus ineligible for funding. Brisas and Northside have demonstrated that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility for Beacon Place was contrary to the specifications of the RFA. Florida Housing’s original recommendation would have been contrary to the terms of the RFA. THE EAST POINTE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the East Pointe Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, East Pointe was preliminarily selected for funding. Bella Vista challenged Florida Housing’s action alleging that the Medical Facility selected by East Pointe did not meet the definition found in the RFA. East Pointe proposed a Development in Lee County, a Medium County according to the terms of the RFA. Applicants from Medium Counties are not required to attain a minimum number of Transit Service Points to be considered eligible for funding. However, such applicants must achieve at least 7 total Proximity Points to be eligible for funding and at least 9 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. The East Pointe Application identified three Public Bus Stops and was awarded 5.5 Proximity Points based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart in Exhibit C to the RFA. However, East Pointe has stipulated that Public Bus Stop 1 listed in its application does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Stop because it does not have the required scheduled stops. Based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart, East Pointe should receive a total of 3.0 Proximity Points for Transit Services for Public Bus Stops 2 and 3. East Pointe listed a Grocery Store, a Medical Facility, and a Public School in its Community Services Chart. Based on the Community Services Scoring Charts in Exhibit C to the RFA, East Pointe received 1 Proximity Point for its Grocery Store, 4 Proximity Points for its Medical Facility, and 3 Proximity Points for its Public School, for a total of 8 Proximity Points for Community Services. East Pointe listed Lee Memorial Health System at 3511 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, Ft. Myers, Florida, as its Medical Facility. The RFA defines “Medical Facility” as follows: A medically licensed facility that (i) employs or has under contractual obligation at least one physician licensed under Chapter 458 or 459, F.S. available to treat patients by walk-in or by appointment; and (ii) provides general medical treatment to any physically sick or injured person. Facilities that specialize in treating specific classes of medical conditions or specific classes of patients, including emergency rooms affiliated with specialty or Class II hospitals and clinics affiliated with specialty or Class II hospitals, will not be accepted. Additionally, it must have been in existence and available for use by the general public as of the Application Deadline. If East Pointe’s selected Medical Facility does not meet the definition of “Medical Facility” in the RFA, East Pointe will lose 4 Proximity Points, reducing its total Proximity Points to 7. The East Pointe Application would still be eligible but would not receive the Proximity Funding Preference and, therefore, would fall out of the funding range of the RFA. Bella Vista alleged that East Pointe should not have received Proximity Points for a Medical Facility because the Lee Community Healthcare location specified in its application “only serves adults and therefore only treats a specific group of patients.” Lee Community HealthCare operates nine locations in Lee County, including the “Dunbar” location that East Pointe named in its application. Lee Community Healthcare’s own promotional materials label the Dunbar location as “adults only.” Robert Johns, Executive Director for Lee Community Healthcare, testified by deposition. Mr. Johns testified that as of the RFA application date of September 24, 2019, the Dunbar office provided services primarily to adults 19 years of age or over, by walk-in or by appointment. A parent who walked into the Dunbar office with a sick or injured child could obtain treatment for that child. A parent seeking medical services for his or her child by appointment would be referred to a Lee Community HealthCare office that provided pediatric services. Mr. Johns testified that the Dunbar office would provide general medical treatment to any physically sick or injured person who presented at the facility, including children. Children would not be seen by appointment at the Dunbar facility, but they would be treated on a walk-in basis. The RFA requires a Medical Facility to treat patients “by walk-in or by appointment.” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing reads this requirement in the disjunctive. A Medical Facility is not required to see any and all patients by walk-in and to see any and all patients by appointment. Florida Housing finds it sufficient for the Medical Facility to see some or all patients by walk-in or by appointment. Ms. Button opined that the Dunbar office met the definition of a Medical Facility because it treated adults by walk-in or appointment and treated children on a walk-in basis. Florida Housing’s reading is consistent with the literal language of the RFA definition. While it would obviously be preferable for the Dunbar facility to see pediatric patients by appointment, the fact that it sees them on a walk-in basis satisfies the letter of the RFA provision. Bella Vista has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE BEMBRIDGE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Bembridge Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Bembridge was preliminarily selected for funding. Bembridge proposed a development in Collier County, a Medium County in RFA terms. As an applicant from a Medium County, Bembridge was required to achieve at least 7 total Proximity Points to be eligible for funding and at least 9 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. Medium County applicants are allowed, but not required, to claim both Transit Service points and Community Service points. As to Community Services, the RFA provides that an applicant may receive a “maximum 4 Points for each service, up to 3 services.” The RFA goes on to state: Applicants may provide the location information and distances for three of the following four Community Services on which to base the Application’s Community Services Score.[5] The Community Service Scoring Charts, which reflect the methodology for calculating the points awarded based on the distances, are outlined in Exhibit C. In its Application, Bembridge listed four, not three, Community Services. Bembridge was one of six Applicants that mistakenly submitted four Community Services instead of three. The Review Committee scorer reviewing Community Services in the applications stated on her scoring sheet: “After removing points for the service with the least amount of points, all still met the eligibility requirement.” 5 The four listed Community Services were Grocery Store, Public School, Medical Facility, and Pharmacy. Florida Housing interpreted the RFA as not specifically prohibiting an applicant from listing four Community Services, but as providing that the applicant could receive points for no more than three of them. As to the six applicants who submitted four Community Services, Florida Housing awarded points only for the three Community Services that were nearest the proposed development.6 Bembridge received 3 Proximity points for its Grocery Store, 3.5 Proximity Points for its Pharmacy, and 4 Proximity Points for its Public School, for a total of 10.5 Proximity Points for Community Services. Thus, as originally scored, Bembridge met the Proximity Funding Preference. Florida Housing did not score the Medical Facility listed by Bembridge, which was the farthest Community Service from the proposed development. Ms. Button testified that this fourth Community Service was treated as surplus information, and because it did not conflict with any other information in the application or cause uncertainty about any other information, it was simply not considered. Ms. Button likened this situation to prior RFAs in which applicants included pharmacies as Community Services even though they were not eligible in proposed family developments. Florida Housing disregarded the information as to pharmacies as surplus information. It did not consider disqualifying the applicants for providing extraneous information. Ms. Button also made it clear that if one of the three Community Services nearest the proposed development was found ineligible for some reason, the fourth Community Service submitted by the applicant would not be considered. The fourth Community Service was in all instances to be disregarded as surplusage in evaluating the application. 6 When queried as to whether the fourth Community Service was removed because it was worth the fewest points, as the reviewer’s notes stated, or because it was farthest away from the proposed development, Ms. Button replied that the distinction made no difference because the service that is farthest away is invariably the one that receives the fewest points. Florida Housing did not consider disqualifying Bembridge and the other five Applicants that mistakenly listed an extra Community Service in their applications. Ms. Button stated, “They provided in all of them, Bembridge and the others that were listed in this, they did provide three Community Services. And so I don’t think it is reasonable to throw out those applications for providing a fourth that we would just not consider nor give benefit to for those point values.” Bella Vista contends that Florida Housing should have rejected the Bembridge application rather than award points for the three nearest Community Services. Ms. Button testified that this was not a reasonable approach if only because there was nothing in the RFA stating that an application would be rejected if it identified more Community Services than were required. Ms. Button also noted that this was one of the first RFAs to allow applicants to select among four Community Services. She believed the novelty of this three-out-of-four selection process led to six applications incorrectly listing four Community Services. She implied that the Community Services language would have to be tweaked in future RFAs to prevent a recurrence of this situation, but she did not believe it fair to disqualify these six applicants for their harmless error. The Review Committee scorer did not perform a minor irregularity analysis relating to the fourth Community Service provided by Bembridge and the other applicants. Ms. Button opined that the addition of an extra Community Service amounts to no more than a minor irregularity because it provided no competitive advantage to the applicant and created no uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the RFA have been met. The RFA allows up to six proximity points for Transit Services. It specifically provides: Up to three Public Bus Stops may be selected with a maximum of 2 points awarded for each one. Each Public Bus Stop must meet the definition of Public Bus Stop as defined in Exhibit B, using at least one unique bus route. Up to two of the selected Public Bus Stops may be Sister Stops that serves the same route, as defined in Exhibit B. The RFA defines “Sister Stop” as: two bus stops that (i) individually, each meet the definition of Public Bus Stop, (ii) are separated by a street or intersection from each other, (iii) are within 0.2 miles of each other, (iv) serve at least one of the same bus routes, and (v) the buses travel in different directions. The Bembridge Application listed two Public Bus Stops, the definition of which is set forth at Finding of Fact 107 above. Based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart, Bembridge received a total of 1.0 Proximity Point for Transit Services for its two Public Bus Stops. Numerous questions were asked at the hearing about whether Bembridge’s identified bus stops were “Sister Stops” as defined in the RFA, and the evidence on that point was not definitive. However, whether they are Sister Stops is irrelevant because each stop identified by Bembridge independently met the definition of “Public Bus Stop” in the RFA and was therefore eligible for Transit Proximity Points. Bella Vista has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order as to RFA 2019-102 finding that: The Berkeley Application is ineligible for funding; The Sierra Bay Application is ineligible for funding; The Solaris Application is ineligible for funding; The Metro Grande Application is eligible for funding; The Beacon Place Application is ineligible for funding; The East Pointe Application is eligible for funding and entitled to the Proximity Funding Preference; and The Bembridge Application is eligible for funding. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Craig D. Varn, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. Suite 820 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Amy Wells Brennan, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. Suite 300 109 North Brush Street Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Anthony L. Bajoczky, Jr., Esquire Ausley & McMullen, P.A. Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 3-231 1400 Village Square Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen, P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP Suite 750 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On December 27, 1993, Universal Outdoor, Inc. ("Universal") entered into a twenty year lease agreement with the Greater Hollywood Jaycees pursuant to which Universal was authorized to erect an outdoor advertising sign on property owned by the Jaycees in the general vicinity of the southwest corner of Hollywood Boulevard and Interstate-95 (the "Site") within the city limits of Hollywood, Florida. The site is located at an extremely busy intersection. A railroad track separates the Site from the Interstate. To the immediate south and west of the Site is a city owned golf course. A building which serves as the Jaycees meeting hall and headquarters is located on the Site. There is a catering business that operates out of the building, at least on a part time basis. The Jaycees acquired the Site from the City of Hollywood on or about December 15, 1965. As best can be determined from the evidence in this case, the Site was owned by the government before it was acquired by the Jaycees. After securing the lease from the Jaycees, Universal applied to the City of Hollywood for a city building permit (the "Building Permit") to construct an outdoor advertising sign on the site. The city issued the requested Building Permit on February 2, 1994. The Hollywood City Commission, as well as the City's Building and Zoning Department, had to approve the issuance of the Building Permit. In deciding to issue the Building Permit, the City Commission and its Building Department apparently concluded that a sign was not inconsistent with the zoning for the Site. On or about February 3, 1994, Universal submitted an application (the "Sign Application") to the Department for a state Outdoor Advertising Sign permit for the Site. The Department denied the Sign Application in a notice dated February 15, 1994 (the "Denial Notice") stating that the Site was "in unpermitable zoning." At some point after the Sign Application was filed with the Department, Universal assigned all of its interest and rights under the lease, the Building Permit and the Sign Application to Hancock. The transfer apparently occurred sometime around the end of February. The circumstances and conditions of the transfer of interest from Universal to Hancock are not entirely clear. The president of Hancock is the brother of one of the principals of Universal. Thus, there is some question whether the transfer was an arms-length deal. At one point during the hearing, Hancock suggested that it never received formal notification of the Department's denial of the Sign Application. However, the evidence is clear that Hancock was aware when it obtained an interest in the Site that a state permit was necessary and that a hearing had been requested in connection with Universal's Sign Application. The building permit obtained from the City of Hollywood was apparently valid for only a limited time. In order to obtain a building permit for a sign, Hancock claims that the City of Hollywood required the permit applicant to make a donation of $20,000 to the Hollywood Boys Club. It is not clear when or whether such a payment was made by either Universal or Hancock. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, the parties have stipulated that a timely request for an administrative hearing was submitted in connection with the Denial Notice. However, it does not appear that any case involving Universal was referred to DOAH. In any event, it is clear that no hearing was scheduled to be conducted on the denial of the Sign Application prior to the date that the Building Permit was to expire. Faced with the imminent expiration of the Building Permit and convinced that the City had correctly determined that the zoning allowed the sign, Hancock proceeded with construction of the sign beginning in approximately the end of April. An inspector for the Department noticed the sign under construction and issued a Notice of Violation on May 2, 1994 for erecting the sign without an Outdoor Advertising Permit from the Department. Hancock promptly halted all construction activity. At the time the Sign Application was filed with the Department in February, the Site was zoned "OS" by the City of Hollywood. The "OS" designation is a for an "open space district". The "OS" designation for this parcel appears to have been an error since the existing uses are inconsistent with that designation. The Department denied the Sign Application because the Site was not specifically zoned either industrial or commercial. In reaching this determination, the Department did not confer with the City of Hollywood nor did it make any investigation to determine what uses were permitted in the "OS" zoning district. While the City Zoning Code included certain areas specifically designated "commercial" and "industrial," it is not clear that the city intended these terms to coincide with the use of the terms in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. "Commercial" is defined in the City Zoning Code as "any activity where there is an exchange of goods or services for monetary gain. . ." The "OS" designation allowed a number of uses which arguably fell within this definition, including camp grounds, cemeteries, golf courses, horse farms, riding stables and other similar uses. On or about April 6, 1994, the City of Hollywood passed four ordinances which cumulatively had the effect of repealing the City's prior zoning code and replacing it with a new code. There is some confusion regarding the applicable zoning for the Site under the new Zoning Code. The City's Official Zoning Map reflects that the property was rezoned "GU", which is a government use district. The adjoining golf course, which is publicly owned, is also zoned "GU". The City Planning Department has acknowledged that the "GU" designation is only applicable to government-owned property. Such designation is clearly not applicable to this Site. Furthermore, the default zoning of "RS- 1" (single family residential) is not consistent with the subject property's comprehensive land use plan designation and is inconsistent with the present use of the property. As a result of the ambiguities resulting from the newly passed zoning ordinances, the Site should be treated as unzoned as of April 6, 1994. There is at least one commercial use on the same side of the Interstate within 800 feet of the Site. In addition, there are more than three separate commercial uses within 1600 feet of the Site, each visible from the main traveled way, that are within 1600 feet of each other and within 600 feet of the right of way of the adjacent Interstate. Consequently, the Site qualifies as a "commercial-unzoned" area as defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Only the City Commission has the power to rezone property and, as of the date of the hearing in this matter, no such action had been taken with respect to the Site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order granting the application for a state Outdoor Advertising Sign permit for the Site. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1995.
The Issue Whether small-scale amendments to the City of Fernandina Beach Comprehensive Plan, adopted by Ordinances 2017-13 and 2017-15 on June 6, 2017 (the “FLUM Amendments”), are “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Standing Petitioner, Ronald Ross, resides and owns property within the City. Mr. Ross submitted written comments concerning the FLUM Amendments to the City during the period of time beginning with the transmittal hearing for the FLUM Amendments and ending with the adoption of same. Respondent is a Florida municipal corporation with the duty and authority to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan, pursuant to section 163.3167, Florida Statutes (2017). The Subject Properties Together the FLUM Amendments affect eight contiguous parcels located at the corner of North 2nd Street and Broome Street, which runs perpendicular to, and dead ends at, North Front Street, the City’s historic waterfront. The subject properties are located two blocks east of North Front Street. The structure at 211 Broome Street is an existing single-family home built circa 1900. The structure at 205 Broome Street is a vacant single- family home built circa 1900. The parcel at 224 North 2nd Street contains a multi- family structure. The remaining parcels are vacant and undeveloped. The Amendments are owner-initiated. Existing Conditions Residential uses are not allowed in the IND land use category. As such, the residential uses on the subject parcels are non-conforming to the regulations for that category. The residential uses at 211 Broome Street and 224 North 2nd Street are “grandfathered” from the prohibition on residential uses, and are allowed to continue as non-conforming uses until such time as any one of a number of criteria are met. Significant redevelopment of the structure would trigger the requirement to conform to allowable uses. The residential structure at 205 Broome Street is vacant, in disrepair, and cannot be redeveloped for a residential use in the IND category. The FLUM Amendments The FLUM Amendments change the FLUM category for each of the eight parcels from IND to CBD. The purpose of the IND land use category is to “recognize the existing industrial development, appropriate open air recreation activities, and the animal shelter, and to ensure the availability of land for industrial and airport purposes.” Industrial uses include “airport dependent uses, manufacturing, assembling and distribution activities; warehousing and storage activities; green technologies, general commercial activities; integral airport related support services such as rental car facilities, parking facilities; and other similar land uses.” The CBD category is designed to “accommodate single- family or duplex residential uses, either ‘stand alone’ or in a mixed residential and business structures; offices; commercial retail; personal service establishments; restaurants; transient accommodations; commercial parking facilities; civic uses; and cultural uses.” The CBD allows other uses, such as indoor recreation, multi-family, marinas, daycare centers, and educational facilities, subject to certain conditions. The maximum density of residential uses in CBD is 34 units per acre (34/acre). The maximum intensity of non-residential uses in both IND and CBD is a floor area ratio (”FAR”) of 2.0. The Community Redevelopment Area All of the subject properties are located within the City’s Waterfront Area Community Redevelopment Area (“Waterfront Area CRA”). Section 163.360, Florida Statutes, authorizes local governments to undertake community redevelopment projects in areas designated as slum or blighted, or areas with a shortage of affordable housing. The local government must first adopt, by resolution, findings that slum, blight, or inadequate housing exists. See § 163.355, Fla. Stat. Following adoption of this “Finding of Necessity,” the local government, or community redevelopment agency, may adopt a community redevelopment plan for the area, following review and comment by the local planning agency, and an advertised public hearing. Once a community redevelopment area (“CRA”) is designated, the local government may issue redevelopment revenue bonds; approve investments, acquisitions, demolition, removal, or disposal of property in the area; approve community policing innovations; and exercise the power of eminent domain. The statute provides a financial benefit for CRAs known as tax increment financing, or “TIF.” The incremental increase in ad valorem value of properties within the CRA, derived from investment in the CRA, must be deposited in a trust fund established by the local government. TIF revenues may only be utilized for redevelopment projects within the CRA boundary. The City adopted a “Finding of Necessity” to establish a CRA in 2004. The City found the following statutorily- enumerated blighted conditions in its waterfront district: inadequate street layout and parking facilities; unsanitary or unsafe conditions; deterioration of site and other improvements; and inadequate and outdated building density patterns. In June 2004, the City established the Waterfront Area CRA including the marina, shrimping and seafood processing area, and adjacent residential areas, including the subject properties. The total acreage of the Waterfront Area CRA is 37.364 acres. In its 2005 resolution approving the Waterfront Area CRA Redevelopment Plan (Redevelopment Plan), the City found, “The Plan will afford maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the municipality as a whole, for the rehabilitation or redevelopment of the Area by private enterprise.” Challenges to the Plan Amendments Internal Inconsistency Petitioner first challenges the FLUM Amendments as inconsistent with Housing Element Policy 3.01.01, which reads as follows: The City shall perform a housing needs assessment by December 2013. Information contained in the assessment should include, but not be limited to, information regarding housing trends; the number, type and condition of existing housing units; identification of substandard housing units; the number and types of housing units needed in the future for all income ranges based on growth projections; and shortages and/or deficiencies in the existing housing stock. The housing needs assessment should be updated a minimum of every five (5) years. It is an undisputed fact that the City has not conducted the housing needs assessment mandated by the subject policy. Petitioner maintains that the FLUM Amendments, which allow the subject properties to be developed (or, redeveloped, as the case may be) for residential densities as high as 34/acre, conflict with the policy. Petitioner’s argument on this point is essentially that the FLUM Amendments are not supported by relevant data and analysis in the form of the assessment called for in the policy. That argument is separate and apart from the issue of whether the FLUM Amendments create an internal inconsistency with the policy. The cited policy does not prohibit the City from adopting any plan amendment until the assessment is completed. Petitioner presented no expert witness testimony regarding internal inconsistency between the FLUM Amendments and the cited policy. The record does not support a finding that the FLUM Amendments are inconsistent with Housing Element Policy 3.01.01. Petitioner next contends the FLUM Amendments are inconsistent with Housing Element Policy 3.02.08, which reads as follows: The City shall establish a City-wide neighborhood planning program to encourage the stabilization and preservation of residential areas throughout the City and strengthen linkages between neighborhoods and City government. The parties stipulated that the City has not implemented the neighborhood planning program called for in the policy. Petitioner’s argument on this point is that without the neighborhood planning program, the City cannot assess the impact of the FLUM Amendments on the medium density residential neighborhood to the east of the subject properties.3/ The policy in question does not prohibit the City from adopting plan amendments until the neighborhood planning program is implemented. Petitioner introduced no expert witness testimony regarding internal inconsistency between the FLUM Amendments and the cited policy. The evidence does not support a finding that the FLUM Amendments are inconsistent with Housing Element Policy 3.02.08. Data and Analysis Petitioner’s last argument is the FLUM Amendments are inconsistent with section 163.3177(1)(f), which requires as follows: All . . . plan amendments shall be based upon relevant and appropriate data and an analysis by the local government that may include, but not be limited to, surveys, studies, community goals and vision, and other data available at the time of adoption of the . . . plan amendment. The City’s Senior Planner, Kelly Gibson, testified in deposition that the FLUM Amendments are supported by the Findings of Necessity supporting creation of the Waterfront Area CRA, the Redevelopment Plan, and the historic development patterns of the Waterfront Area CRA. One of the City’s stated purposes of creating the Waterfront Area CRA is to “afford maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the municipality as a whole, for the rehabilitation or redevelopment of the Area by private enterprise.” Applicants for the change in land use designation of 205 and 211 Broome Street seek to redevelop the deteriorated residential structure at 211 Broome Street. The applicants will not invest in redevelopment of the property under the IND designation because that designation prohibits residential uses. The FLUM Amendments will encourage redevelopment by allowing the applicants to invest in the dilapidated structure. Further, the FLUM Amendments afford the applicants more flexibility in development of the vacant lots because, while the IND land use category is limited to the uses described in paragraph 14, above, the CBD category allows single-family and duplex residential uses, offices, commercial retail, personal service establishments, restaurants, transient accommodations, commercial parking facilities, civic uses, and cultural uses. The applicants for change in the land use designation of properties located at 224 North 2nd Street, and the adjoining vacant lots, seek to reinvest in the existing non-conforming multi-family residential structure. The FLUM Amendments encouragement redevelopment by allowing the reinvestment sought by the applicants. Likewise, the FLUM Amendments provide flexibility for infill development of the adjoining vacant lots. The Redevelopment Plan includes initiatives and programs for the Waterfront and “Transitional Areas.” The subject properties are located within a Transitional Area of the Waterfront Area CRA. One of the purposes of the Redevelopment Plan is to “encourage opportunities for new development by allowing a broader mix of uses in the . . . transitional areas[.]” Further, the Plan states, “It is critical that the strategies are prioritized to initiate growth of tax increment revenues to the Agency – a primary or seed funding source for many of the redevelopment efforts identified in this Plan.” Objective 2 of the Redevelopment Plan is to promote a mix of uses within the CRA. This section states, “The existing Future Land Use and Zoning designations along the waterfront and adjacent areas limit the type of allowable uses to industrial uses. Such limitations may be a primary impediment to redevelopment of the CRA.” The Redevelopment Plan further states, “[T]he City should take a proactive position in accommodating a broader mix of uses with design controls.” The CBD category allows a broader mix of uses than the IND category. See paragraphs 14 and 15, above. Further, the FLUM Amendments remove the impediment to redevelopment of the subject properties created by the prohibition on residential uses in the IND category. Petitioner elicited testimony from the City’s experts that there are minimal differences between the uses allowed within the existing zoning category of the subject properties and the zoning category sought under the applicant’s concurrent rezoning request. Petitioner proved that the uses allowed within the CBD zoning category, which are not allowed in the existing I-1 (Light Industrial), are residential, daycare centers, group homes, and bed and breakfast inns. The issue in this case is not the breadth of the zoning category, but that of the FLUM category.4/ The FLUM Amendments are supported by both the Findings of Necessity establishing, and the Redevelopment Plan for, the Waterfront Area CRA.5/ Finally, Petitioner points to Future Land Use (FLU) Policy 1.07.10 to support his argument that the FLUM Amendments are not supported by data and analysis. FLU Policy 1.07.10 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: A proposed amendment to the FLUM to increase the land area within the Central Business District land use category shall demonstrate the suitability of the proposed site based on: The need for additional land area within the Central Business District land use category; Consistency of the land area with the characteristics of the Central Business District; and Consistency of the land area with the characteristics of the downtown. Petitioner presented the lay testimony of former City Mayor and Councilman Greg Roland, distinguishing the location and characteristics of the downtown and the CBD from those of the subject properties. In the same vein, Petitioner grilled both Ms. Gibson and Mr. McCrary in deposition regarding what data and analysis support a need for additional land in the CBD. The testimony and other evidence regarding this policy was largely irrelevant because Petitioner did not allege, in either his Petition or the pre-hearing stipulation, that the FLUM Amendments were internally inconsistent with FLU Policy 1.07.10. The testimony regarding compliance with FLU Policy 1.07.10 was relevant to Petitioner’s contention that the FLUM Amendments are not based on relevant and appropriate data. However, as explained below, the issue is whether the FLUM Amendments are supported by data available at the time the amendments were adopted, not whether non-existent data may be contrary to the amendments. Petitioner did not prove beyond fair debate that the FLUM Amendments are not based upon relevant and appropriate data and analysis in violation of section 163.3177(1)(f).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the City of Fernandina Beach Comprehensive Plan Amendments adopted by Ordinances 2017-13 and 2017-15 on June 6, 2017, are “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2017.
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the entitlement of the Intervenors, Mr. and Mrs. Mayer, to be granted zoning variances, in keeping with the provisions of Section 131.016(e), City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, to vary from the conditions set forth in Section 131.044, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, dealing with the area and dimension regulations for RS-50, Single-Family Residents. In particular, the Intervenors would request that the front setback line be reduced from 25 feet to roughly feet and that a variance concerning the area covered by the dwelling be increased from 25 percent to 33.7 percent. 1/
Findings Of Fact On November 12, 1980, the Intervenors requested that they be granted the variances set out in the Issues Statement of this order. The terms and details of that variance application may be found as part of the City's Composite Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. A public hearing was conducted on this request and that hearing was held on January 15, 1981. The taped transcript of that hearing may be found as the City's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Following that hearing, a decision was made by the Board of Adjustment and Appeal for the City of Clearwater, Florida, to grant the variance requests. The Petitioners in this cause were opposed to that grant of variance and requested a hearing. The matter was forwarded from the City of Clearwater to the Division of Administrative Hearings and on March 25, 1981, a hearing de novo was conducted to consider this dispute. At the time of the hearing, the Petitioner, Barbara Beakes, was presented as a witness and identified the claim of the Petitioners as being one of opposition to the project in question which requested variances, for reason that it obscured her view of the water; caused a decrease in the value of her property and in addition to her attorney, expressed opposition to the area of coverage to be involved with the proposed building project of the Intervenors and to the front setback line at issue. The Intervenors, Ray and Christine Mayer, who reside at 940 El Dorado Avenue, Clearwater Beach, Florida, through their project, would desire to construct a garage which would be approximately 15.4 feet from the front property line as opposed to the 25 foot front setback line required of the City of Clearwater. The construction in question would not advance the building line in the direction of the street. Moreover, the distance from the street to the front of the building had originally been 13.1 feet when present front setback lines were not in effect. The Intervenors have also requested what they deemed to be a variance from the requirement of maximum lot coverage by their residence, varying it from 25 percent to the 33.7 percent proposed by their construction. As stated in a preceding footnote, it was determined at the hearing that the new requirement for maximum lot coverage is 42 percent and it having been agreed by the parties that the area coverage in question is only 33.7 percent, the necessity for variance on that issue no longer exists. Intervenors' Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, are photographs depicting the nature of the structure in question in various stages of construction and modification. Notwithstanding the Petitioner Beakes' complaint that her view was obstructed by the construction, there was no specific proof related to the clear space requirement of Section 131.200, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Requirements, and in fact her view is already obstructed by a fence which now exists on the Mayers' property and the constriction proposed by the Mayers would not materially change that circumstance. The proof on the issue of decreased property value offered by Petitioner Beakes does not seem to be a specific criterion addressed by the variance ordinance.
The Issue Whether Appellants were wrongfully denied a variance of 16-17 parking spaces that could allow an existing 2170 square foot restaurant to transfer and use its 2-COP State alcoholic beverage license at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard on Clearwater Beach, in the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact Appellants own real property on the north corner of South Gulfview Boulevard and First Street on Clearwater Beach. The property is in a zoning district designated as CR-28 (Resort Commercial District/Commercial Tourist Facilities), and is primarily used by Appellants to operate a motel business. The surrounding land uses to the north, south and east are primarily motel. To the west is a public parking lot and the beaches. In May 1990, Appellants leased a portion of the ground floor to James B. Mayes so that he could operate a restaurant known as Britt's Beachside Cafe at that location. In order to build a restaurant on premises, 2170 square feet of gross floor area was improved by the lessee. Pursuant to code, 11 parking spaces were needed for the restaurant to meet parking space requirements for an eating establishment at this site. The parking space calculation was made according to the formula of one space per 100 square feet of gross floor area, the general parking formula for restaurants, with a 50 percent reduction allowed for Clearwater Beach locations. Prior to the opening of the business, only 9 off-street parking spaces were allocated to Britt's Beachside Cafe. During May 1990, a variance of 2 parking spaces was requested by Appellants and granted by the Development Code Adjustment Board. At that time, Britt's Beachside Cafe was involved with food and non-alcoholic beverage sales. With the approved variance, the restaurant was granted an occupational license and a certificate of occupancy for the operation of the restaurant at this location. Previously, Mr. Mayes operated his restaurant in a larger motel with a smaller parking lot and fewer parking spaces approximately 60 feet north of the subject property for almost four years. The former restaurant had 120 seats for patrons as opposed to the current 84 seats. Beer and wine was sold in the restaurant under a 2-COP State alcohol beverage license. The beverage license was acquired because this location was exempt from the current city parking requirements under a grandfathering provision of the Clearwater Code. In addition, Mr. Mayes' restaurant was exempt from the code requirement that 51 percent of sales had to be from food and non-alcoholic beverages because the business existed before the ordinance went into effect. When the restaurant moved, the exemption from current parking space requirements remained with the original location, and the exemption from the 51 percent sales from food and non-alcoholic beverages for the business was removed. The 2-COP State alcohol beverage license for Britt's Beachside Cafe, however, was attached to the business and could easily transfer to the new location if local zoning laws permitted its use there. In order to have the alcoholic beverage license transferred to the new business location, the state requires the business to continue with its compliance with local zoning and development laws. To accomplish this, the restaurant is required to have one parking space per 40 square feet of gross floor area, with the 50 percent reduction formulated and allowed for a Clearwater Beach location. As Britt's Beachside Cafe is currently operating under the 11 parking space requirement, 16-17 more parking spaces are needed for the business to transfer the beverage license to the new business location. The actual number of parking spaces for the restaurant on location is During site review prior to the granting of the certificate of occupancy, city staff improperly counted four illegal parking spaces along First Street as legitimate, non-conforming off-street parking spaces. The restaurant caters primarily to persons walking to the restaurant either from adjacent motels or the beach. Few automobiles are driven and parked at Britt's Beachside Cafe. Even when the business was located in the other motel with more seating and fewer parking spaces, parking was never a problem in the area. There is considerable public parking immediately adjacent to Appellant's property, both across the street, and approximately one block to the north. When restaurant patrons are unable to use the parking spaces on location, they park in these convenient public spaces. Since Mr. Mayes relocated his restaurant, he has served beer and wine on premises, without charge. It has always been his intent to transfer his 2- COP State alcoholic beverage license to this new location if permitted to do so through a parking space variance. The City's requirement that the restaurant acquire more off-street parking spaces is factually unnecessary if the sole purpose of the ordinance is to provide parking for the restaurant patrons. At the old location, parking was never a problem. Likewise, no problems exist at the new location. As the restaurant no longer seeks to expand, the major differences a parking variance would make are that Mr. Mayes could charge for the beer and wine served and use his 2-COP license. When Appellants proceeded through the first phase of the approval process to obtain a decision from the Planning and Zoning Board, their conditional use application met with approval. It was determined, however, that the preliminary approval would be subject to the obtainment of a parking space variance, which needed to be decided by the Development Code Adjustment Board. Accordingly, the application proceeded to the second phase. If granted in the second phase, Appellants would go to the City Commission for a variance from the separation requirement. The application for a variance that removes the requirement for 16-17 additional parking spaces to enable the sale of beer and wine on premises was denied by the Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The appeal was filed based upon the allegation that the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board departs from the essential requirements of law. The Code of Ordinances of the City of Clearwater requires additional parking for establishments with alcoholic beverage licenses, which by nature of their license only, can be converted from restaurants to taverns or night clubs. Mr. Mayes' restaurant, which is subject to the additional parking space requirement because of the type of alcoholic beverage license he seeks to transfer, is already prevented from converting to a tavern or a night club by virtue of the restaurant's location in the CR-28 zoning district. In the CR-28 zoning district, all alcoholic beverage sales for consumption on premises shall be located only within a hotel or motel in conjunction with a 4-COP license or within a restaurant deriving 51 percent or more of its gross revenue from the sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. The restrictive requirement that a 2-COP license be used solely to accompany a restaurant business, as opposed to a tavern or night club in the special CR-28 zoning district, is balanced by the Clearwater Code provision that reduces the required number of parking spaces by 50 percent for Clearwater Beach locations and the opportunity to have a business that sells alcoholic beverages in a resort commercial district. The 2-COP license was acquired prior to the restaurant's move to its current location. If Appellants request for a parking space variance is denied, Mr. Mayes' application for transfer of his beverage license to a new location will likely be denied by the state, pursuant to Section 561.331, Florida Statutes. The request for the variance is based primarily on Mr. Mayes' desire for greater financial return on his business and to keep his 2-COP license attached to the restaurant. The Development Code Adjustment Board has granted parking variances to other 2-COP restaurants before and after Appellants' application in the same zoning district. These variances were based on applications and evidence presented at Board hearings.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this appeal are whether the Appellants have standing to bring this appeal, and (2) whether the development plan application met the applicable criteria for approval under Section 30-3.46 of the City's LDC in light of the standard of review outlined in Section 30-3.57 of the City's LDC.
Findings Of Fact The Property The property consists of approximately 0.50 acres located at 422 Northwest Third Avenue, Gainesville, Florida (the Property). The Property currently has a Residential Low- Density (RL) future land use (FLU) category under the City's Comprehensive Plan. The RL FLU category includes five implementing zoning districts, and the Property is in the Residential Conservation (RC) zoning district. The Property is not located within the boundaries of the Pleasant Street Historic District. Blackwater owns the Property and submitted a minor development plan application, identified as AD-17-00143, for three buildings with six dwelling units and associated parking, stormwater facilities, and utility improvements. The three buildings have two dwelling units each, which is a use allowed by right in the RC zoning district. The use is described in Section 30-4.16 of the City's LDC as "Multi-family, small scale (2-4 units per building)." The Property was conveyed to Blackwater by a warranty deed recorded January 15, 2014. The warranty deed describes parcel 14518-002-000 as the east one-half of lot 7 and all of lots 8 and 9 in the south half of block 27 of "Brush's Addition to Gainesville," according to the Plat recorded in "Plat Book 'A,' Page 88 of the Public Records of Alachua County, Florida." Issues on Appeal The Appellants raised and argued four issues in this appeal. Whether the Property is a parcel or lot that can be developed under the City's LDC. The Appellants argue that the Property is not a "parcel" and also not a "lot" under the City's LDC. The LDC definitions are found in Section 30-2.1 of the City's LDC, which states: Parcel means a unit of land within legally established property lines. Legally established property lines means those lines created by a recorded plat, minor plat or lot split, those units of land recognized as lots formed prior to 1961 as recorded on a map kept by the building division, and those lots recognized by the county code enforcement department at the time of any annexation. Lot means a parcel of land contained within property lines of a specific area, including land within easements and building setback lines of the area, but excluding any land within street right-of-way. The Appellants contend that the Plat of Brush's Addition to Gainesville (the Plat) legally established property lines. The Appellants further contend the definitions mean that only the lots created by the Plat are parcels. In other words, the "unit of land within legally established lines" cannot consist of more than one of the originally platted lots. This is not the City's interpretation of its own LDC. The Property, as described by the warranty deed, is a parcel within the property lines first established on the Plat. As argued by the City and Blackwater during oral argument, the Appellants' interpretation is not reasonable and "could stop all multifamily development in the [C]ity." The City's interpretation of its own LDC is not clearly erroneous and has foundation in reason. Also, approval of the development plan was not an ultra vires act since the City was required to make a decision on the development plan application in accordance with the provisions of its LDC. Whether the Property meets minimum lot width standards under the City's LDC. The Appellants' second argument is that the development plan fails to meet the required minimum lot width standard under Section 30-4.17 of the City's LDC. The Appellants argue that since Lots 8 and 9 on the Plat are each 50 feet wide, then the permitted use should be "single-family," which has a minimum lot width of 35 feet. Based on the above finding, the Property is a parcel or lot that may be developed under the City's LDC. The Property's lot width is 125 feet, which meets the minimum width standard for the proposed "multi-family, small scale (2-4 units per building)" use. Whether the requirements for a masonry wall and Type B landscape buffer apply to the Property and the development plan. Section 30-4.8.D.2.e of the City's LDC provides: A decorative masonry wall (or equivalent material in noise attenuation and visual screening) with a minimum height of six feet and a maximum height of eight feet plus a Type B landscape buffer shall separate multi- family residential development from properties designated single-family residential. The Appellants argue that the development plan should be required to meet this buffer standard because the RC zoning district is residential, and the Property abuts single-family dwellings. Under the LDC provision, the buffer is required to separate multi-family developments from properties "designated single-family residential." The City argues that designations refer to a property's FLU category as designated in the City's Comprehensive Plan. The Appellants argue that "designated single-family residential" simply refers to a single-family dwelling. Policy 4.1.1 of the City's Comprehensive Plan describes certain FLU categories such as Single-Family (SF). Policy 4.1.4 of the City's Comprehensive Plan provides that the City can amend land use "designations" under certain circumstances. Policy 4.2.1 of the City's Comprehensive Plan provides that the City shall adopt regulations that separate uses with performance measures, such as "buffering of adjacent uses by landscape." Based on the language of the City's Comprehensive Plan, it is a reasonable interpretation that use of the term "designated" refers to the FLU category. The Property and the abutting single-family dwellings have the same FLU category designation of RL. Thus, the masonry wall and Type B buffer requirements of Section 30-4.8 of the City's LDC do not apply to this development plan. Whether the Property's development plan meets applicable parking standards under the City's LDC. The Appellants argue that the development plan must provide 13 parking spaces, and it only provides nine parking spaces, which does not meet the parking standards of Sections 30- 7.2 and 30-7.5 of the City's LDC. In addition, the Appellants argue that the parking must be paved because the City's LDC only allows gravel parking areas with ten or fewer parking spaces. Under Section 30-7.5 of the City's LDC, the development plan must provide 13 parking spaces. The development plan provides nine parking spaces on the Property and four on-street spaces approved by the City, for a total of 13 parking spaces. The nine parking spaces on the Property satisfy the requirement of allowing gravel parking areas with ten or fewer parking spaces. Standing Appellants Vanessa Burt and Suzi Rumsey are the only residents who own property within 400 feet of the Property. Appellants Jason Atkins-Tuffs and Lauren Atkins are recent new home buyers in the Pleasant Street Neighborhood. Mr. Atkins-Tuffs is concerned that the development plan would not be a "good fit for our growing historic downtown family neighborhood." Appellant Dotty Faibisy is an almost 20-year resident and is concerned that the development plan "is a poor fit for the Historic Pleasant Street Neighborhood." Appellants John Rehfuss and Caroline Rehfuss are residents since 2013 in the Pleasant Street Historic District and are concerned that the development plan "is going to be a poor fit, both aesthetically and functionally, for our neighborhood." Appellant Tan Silva is a 23-year resident, who lives outside of but "on the edge" of the Pleasant Street Historic District and feels that compatible development should be maintained. Appellant Furman Wallace is an 84-year resident of the Pleasant Street Neighborhood. He is concerned with the character and type of buildings in the Pleasant Street Neighborhood. Appellant Thomas Hawkins was a 12-year resident of the Pleasant Street Neighborhood and is currently building a new home in the neighborhood. Mr. Hawkins is concerned that the development plan does "not compliment the neighborhood's historic architecture" and is not consistent with the City's LDC requirements.
