The Issue Whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Constanza D. Scott, is a black female. She began employment with respondent, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., d/b/a Sam's Club (Wal-Mart), on July 29, 1988, in its soft lines (men and women's apparel) department. The store is located in Tallahassee, Florida. She was a full-time employee and worked forty hours per week. Besides working full-time for Wal-Mart, beginning in August 1991 she worked "at least" twenty hours per week for Marriott Food Services at Florida State University, and she attended classes at an undisclosed Tallahassee college or university on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 1:30 p. m. until around 4:30 p. m. Petitioner's regular hours at Wal-Mart were from 5:00 a. m. to 1:00 p. m., Monday through Friday. From at least May 1991 until October 1991, her supervisor was Scott Cosby, an assistant store manager for the merchandising department. Cosby was replaced in October 1991 by Tim Strahan, Jr., who supervised petitioner until her termination on December 21, 1991. Wal-Mart refers to its procedure for handling disciplinary problems as performance coaching, and it involves a series of progressively sterner disciplinary measures taken against an employee. On the first occasion disciplinary action is warranted, the employee is given what is called verbal counseling. This type of action is not documented in writing and simply involves counseling by an employee's supervisor. If the problem persists, the employee is given a verbal warning, which is reduced to writing and placed in the personnel file of the employee. If a verbal warning does not result in the correction of the deficiencies, a written warning is issued, and the employee is required to prepare a responsive plan of action stating how the employee intends to correct the cited deficiencies. As a last resort, the employee is given a day off with pay, which is called a decision-making day, so that the employee can reflect on his or her performance and prepare a plan of action detailing how the deficiencies will be corrected. Thereafter, an employee is automatically terminated if further disciplinary action is required. On May 1, 1991, petitioner's supervisor (Scott Cosby) gave her a verbal counseling for "attendance problems." In response to this counseling, petitioner stated that she was very tired from school but would improve her attendance. On May 6, 1991, she was again cited for an "ongoing attendance problem." This is memorialized by a written verbal warning contained in her personnel file. On September 21, 1991, a second verbal warning was given by Cosby, this time for petitioner working overtime when Cosby apparently felt she could complete her work within the normal forty-hour week. Petitioner explained, however, that all overtime had been approved by the store manager. On October 7, 1991, Cosby again gave her a verbal warning for "not keeping up with 'basics of the business' consistently." In her action plan filed in response to this criticism, petitioner stated she would "do a better job of signing, cleaning, displaying, zoning and shrink wrapping," all specific duties of her job. During the week of November 11-15, 1991, petitioner was late to work every day. On one of those days, November 14, 1991, she telephoned an assistant store manager (Don Graves) and reported that her car would not start. She eventually came to work around 4:00 p. m. that afternoon. For her lack of punctuality, a written reminder was issued, which is the last step before decision-making day. On November 27, 1991, petitioner telephoned her team leader, Jennifer Christie, at 5:40 a. m. to say that her alarm clock had failed to go off and she would be late. Deciding not to accept any more excuses regarding her attendance and punctuality, Strahan, her supervisor since October, gave petitioner the day off with pay so that she could contemplate her future with the store. When she returned the next day, Wal-Mart agreed to accept petitioner's suggestion that her work hours be changed on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays to 7:00 a. m. to 2:00 p. m., and on Tuesdays and Thursdays to 7:00 a. m. to 12 noon. This was done in order to accommodate her other work and school activities. The number of store employees at any one time is governed by the store sales. In other words, payroll (staffing) cannot exceed a percentage of current sales. In order to stay within the required percentage, a specified number of hours are allocated to each department within the store, and the department assistant manager determines how many employees can be employed within the allocated hours. When sales drop, workers are laid off, and when sales pick up again, Wal-Mart increases its work force. In December 1991, Wal-Mart was faced with a reduction in force due to declining sales. On a storewide basis, six part-time and three full-time positions were eliminated. In the soft lines department, which had four full-time and three part-time employees, a decision was made to eliminate one part-time and one full-time position in order to stay within the department's allocated hours. Strahan was charged with the responsibility of selecting the positions to be eliminated. In doing so, he was able to transfer Joyce Willis, a part-time black female employee, to the "front" since she had experience in operating a cash register. Of the four full-time employees, Jennifer Christie, the team leader and a white female, and Armie Brown, a black female, had seniority over petitioner, and neither had attendance or punctuality problems. In addition, Strahan considered both of them to be more "dependable" than petitioner. The third employee, Joe Watson, a white male, was an experienced fork lift driver for the store, and Strahan desired to retain him in that position. Although petitioner had been given some training in the operation of a fork lift, unlike Watson she had no actual on-the-job experience in that position. The only remaining full-time position was filled by petitioner, who had less flexibility in her work hours than the others due to requirements of school and her second job, and unlike the others, she had a record of disciplinary action during the preceding seven months for attendance and punctuality problems. For these reasons, Strahan selected petitioner's position as the full-time slot to be eliminated. Petitioner was called to a meeting with Strahan and the team leader on December 21, 1991. At that meeting Strahan told petitioner that he was forced to eliminate her full-time position due to a reduction in force caused by declining sales. Petitioner asked "why me?" and if there were any other full- time slots in the store to which she could be transferred. When Strahan replied there were none, petitioner said "you're full of shit, fuck you," and walked out of the office. Had she not departed, Strahan was about to offer her a part-time position. Because petitioner left the store, however, Strahan had no choice except to terminate her employment. According to petitioner's Associate Exit Interview form, which is prepared whenever a position is eliminated or an employee leaves, petitioner remains eligible for re-employment "when vacancies occur which the store needs to fill." She was unaware of this, however, and has never made application to be rehired. This is probably because she left the store before Strahan had an opportunity to have her sign the form and give her a copy. There is no evidence that petitioner's position was ever reestablished, and if so, whether it was filled by a person outside petitioner's protected class. Petitioner alleges that her position was eliminated solely because of her race. The evidence, however, belies that contention. Accordingly, it is found that petitioner's race played no role in the employment decision taken by respondent. Petitioner also contended she was a hard worker who did her assigned tasks, and she did not deserve the criticisms noted in her personnel file. For example, a minute or two after 5:00 a.m. the front door was locked and any late employees were then required to go to the back door of the store to gain entry to the premises. This added another ten or fifteen minutes for petitioner to reach her work station. Petitioner says this made it appear that she was fifteen or twenty minutes late when in fact she had been tardy by only a minute or two. Even so, by her own admission she was late on "numerous occasions," including every day during the week of November 11, 1991. She also complained that she did not get along with Cosby, a former supervisor, and denied that he twice counseled her for poor attendance in May 1991, as reflected in her personnel file. Even if petitioner's assertion is true, however, that employee left Wal-Mart in October 1991, which was before many of the relevant events occurred. While petitioner is to be highly commended for her work ethic (at least sixty hours per week plus school), the pertinent criticisms in her personnel file were substantiated and were properly taken into account by respondent in making its employment decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-0318 Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 4-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5 and 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 9-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 12-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 17-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 20-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Covered in preliminary statement. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Constanza D. Scott 3250 West Tennessee Street, Lot 146 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Charles F. Henley, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 40593 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0593
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based upon race?
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deland Housing Authority (the Authority), provides subsidized housing to low-income families in Deland, Florida. Linda McDonnell has been the Executive Director of the Authority since approximately 1990. Petitioner, Marjorie R. Ross, a black female, was employed by the Authority as a Project Management Aide, beginning on or about June 14, 1993. At the time of Petitioner's hire, Greg Norton, the Public Housing Manager, was her immediate supervisor. Petitioner's job duties included, among others, maintaining residents' records and files, computing and inputting utility charges, preparing and issuing monthly rent statements to residents, and preparing 14-day notices (late rent notices). Petitioner's performance evaluation, for the period August 21 to December 21, 1993, rated her overall performance as "needs improvement." In comments attached to the evaluation, it was noted that Petitioner "tried to do too many things at once," causing decreases in her productivity. The comments also stated Petitioner "needs to make an effort to straighten her office each day" and that her "greatest shortfall as an employee is the manner in which she relates to the other employees." From the date of this evaluation, tension existed between Petitioner and McDonnell. For example, McDonnell cautioned Petitioner about speaking to persons outside the organization without permission. On September 26, 1994, McDonnell approached Petitioner to introduce a visiting HUD representative to Petitioner. Petitioner did not speak with the representative, despite McDonnell's repeated requests, because of McDonnell's previous instructions not to speak without permission. Petitioner received a written reprimand for her conduct. On July 25, 1995, McDonnell gave Petitioner a memo that documented Petitioner's habit of promising to create certain projects and failing to complete them. At the end of July 1995, Norton resigned from the Authority. On July 31, 1995, McDonnell conducted a staff meeting relating to Norton's resignation. During the meeting, McDonnell instructed Petitioner to only write receipts for rent checks, but to refrain from entering the receipts into the computer. Despite this instruction, Petitioner subsequently removed rent receipts from McDonnell's secretary's desk and entered them into the computer. As a result, Petitioner received a reprimand and was given a day off without pay. Petitioner received another written reprimand on September 27, 1995, for failing to follow established Authority policy regarding reporting absences. Authority policy required employees to complete an absentee report upon returning to work from an unscheduled absence. Petitioner failed to complete an absentee report upon returning from an unscheduled absence on September 25, 1995, and was not given pay for the absence. Petitioner applied for the position vacated by Norton as Public Housing Manager. The Authority hired Connie Grobstein, a white female, in September 1995. The stated reason for hiring Grobstein was her experience in grant writing; McDonnell stated that writing grants was an important part of the job. Grobstein had little if any experience with public housing. Grobstein became Petitioner's direct supervisor and Petitioner was asked to teach her the day-to-day operations of the office. During September 1995, Grobstein wrote several memos to McDonnell regarding Petitioner's work performance and attitude. On December 21, 1995, Petitioner received a written reprimand from Grobstein for, among other infractions, failing to timely issue 14-day notices. The reprimand stated, "any additional violations of Authority procedures will lead to further disciplinary actions up to and including termination." On February 6, 1996, Grobstein and Petitioner had a confrontation in front of a tenant regarding the start date of a lease. Even though her office was several doors away, McDonnell could hear Grobstein and Petitioner arguing about the lease. As a result of the incident, McDonnell terminated Grobstein.1/ Petitioner was suspended for one day as a result of the argument with Grobstein. While Petitioner was absent, McDonnell discovered that several resident files, which Petitioner was responsible for maintaining, were missing necessary documentation. McDonnell contacted the Authority's attorney, who advised McDonnell that she had no choice but to terminate Petitioner's employment. On February 12, 1996, Petitioner's employment was terminated. The stated reasons for her termination were: consistent problems with her work performance; the incident with Grobstein on February 6, 1996; refusing to follow instructions; giving out rent credits/reductions without approval; attempting to undermine McDonnell and the Authority; demonstrating a poor attitude and an unwillingness to cooperate with others; and failing to complete her work in a timely manner. Respondent maintains a disciplinary policy for Authority employees. Pursuant to this policy, employees may be discharged for, among other reasons, insolence or insubordination; failure to obey legitimate orders from a supervisor; mistreatment (verbal, psychological or physical) of a client or fellow employee; and neglect or willful disregard of the responsibilities, duties and work rules of a position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2003.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by Respondent, based upon her race, age, or sex in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who was born on June 14, 1956. At the time of the Respondent’s reduction in force in 1998, Petitioner was 41 years old. She is a quiet and reserved person. In 1978, Respondent hired Petitioner as a management trainee. Initially, she was assigned to the J. C. Penney store in Metairie, Louisiana. As a trainee, she worked in the children’s department in that store. Petitioner received several subsequent assignments in the Metairie store, as well as in other stores. She was eventually promoted to the position of senior merchandiser. A senior merchandiser has the same job duties as a merchandiser. The chief differences are that senior merchandisers are paid more and typically receive more difficult and important departments to manage due to a larger sales volume and quickly changing fashion orientation. The men’s and women’s departments in J. C. Penney stores are generally the most challenging, while the children’s and home departments are less challenging since their sales volume is lower and they are less fashion oriented. In late 1992, Petitioner received a transfer to the Pensacola store as the women’s senior merchandiser. In 1992, Don Gray was the Pensacola store manager. In March 1993, Jimmy Graham, an African American, became the assistant store manager/business planning manager in that store. While she was assigned as the women’s merchandiser in the Pensacola store, Petitioner worked very closely with Mr. Graham and had no complaints about Mr. Graham. Petitioner does not allege that Mr. Graham discriminated against her in any way. When Mr. Gray retired in 1994, John Phelps, a Caucasian, became the Pensacola store manager. (He is approximately ten years older than Petitioner.) Prior to his Pensacola assignment, Mr. Phelps had not been in a position to affect Petitioner’s career. At the time that Mr. Phelps moved to the Pensacola store, Respondent had employed Petitioner for approximately 16 years. Ordinarily, a strong merchandiser would be promoted to an assistant store manager assignment (sometimes called a “second level” assignment) after seven to ten years of experience. Petitioner’s failure to be promoted to an assistant store manager assignment in the 16 years prior to her working with Mr. Phelps demonstrates that she was not considered a strong manager by upper level corporate management at J. C. Penney. In the 1990s, Respondent had a numerical management appraisal system. A rating of ‘1’ was the best rating, indicating that the manager’s performance far exceeded the job requirements. A rating of ‘2’ was the next rating, indicating that the manager’s performance exceeded requirements in many key areas of the job. A rating of ‘3’ was the next rating, indicating that the manager’s performance met job requirements in each key area. The rating of ‘3’ was not a disciplinary rating and the employee receiving such a rating was considered to be a very good employee. In fact, Ratings of ‘2’ and ‘3’ were common in J. C. Penney, with the difference sometimes being the strictness of the store manager’s interpretation of the rating criteria. The lowest ratings were ‘4’ and ‘5.’ The evidence showed that Petitioner had more often than not been rated a ‘2’ in the years before she worked with Mr. Phelps. In March 1995, at his first opportunity to appraise Petitioner, Mr. Phelps rated Petitioner a ‘2.’ In that appraisal, which covered 1994, he commended Petitioner for her very strong sales, but indicated that her operation should be more balanced. Examples of this lack of balance were her high shrinkage, high markdowns, and high overstock position. All of these factors were negative performance measurements. Petitioner’s high sales and high markdowns were direct results of her high overstock position, which required that she offer her excess merchandise at very low prices. In the 1994 appraisal, Mr. Phelps also noted that Petitioner’s leadership characteristics needed development. Specifically, Mr. Phelps thought Petitioner needed to be more outgoing, communicate potential problems better with management, and give more feedback in discussions with management. Mr. Graham helped prepare and agreed with Petitioner’s 1994 appraisal. Like Mr. Phelps, Mr. Graham felt “some of [Petitioner’s] people skills lacked,” with her primary weakness in leadership and working with second level managers. He also testified that Petitioner missed deadlines and that her sales results were “average since they were in line with the results in other store departments.” In short, Petitioner sales results were good when the whole store had good sales results. For 1995, Petitioner was rated a ‘3.’ Petitioner’s rating was based upon the fact that she missed her sales goal, her investment goal, and her leadership development goals. Petitioner was again rated as needing development in the leadership category. Again, Mr. Graham helped prepare and agreed with Petitioner’s 1995 appraisal. Prior to 1996, even though Petitioner’s department ranked in the top three in sales, the women’s department had a lower percentage of the total store’s sales than Respondent’s company-wide business model anticipated. This lower percentage indicated that Petitioner was not generating as many sales in the women’s department as the department should generate, if managed well. Therefore in June 1996, due to these performance issues, Petitioner was moved from the women’s department to the children’s department because it was an easier department to manage. Ms. Thomas experienced no loss in pay or other benefits due to this lessened responsibility. When Petitioner began to manage the children’s department in Pensacola, she also began to work more closely with the store’s other Assistant Store Manager, Joseph Waslo, a Caucasian male. Petitioner had no complaints about Mr. Waslo. Petitioner does not allege that Mr. Waslo discriminated against her in any way. Petitioner was rated a ‘3’ on her 1996 and 1997 appraisals. The wording on these appraisals reflect that Petitioner had made some improvement in her job performance. The improvement was due in part due to the fact that she was handling an easier job assignment. Mr. Waslo helped prepare and agreed with each of these appraisals. In 1997, Merchandiser Jerry Joachim, a Caucasian male, experienced significant performance issues. Mr. Phelps counseled Mr. Joachim on several occasions. Mr. Phelps lowered Mr. Joachim’s appraisal rating to a ‘3’ for 1997. Petitioner did not have to require such counseling from Mr. Phelps. The evidence was clear that neither Petitioner’s nor Mr. Joachim’s appraisals were based on any foreknowledge of a future reduction in force by Respondent because such a reduction was unknown at the time of these appraisals. The evidence was also clear that Petitioner’s race, age, or sex played a role in the ratings and evaluations. In February 1998, Debra Kellum, a Caucasian female, became the district personnel manager for the district in which the Pensacola store is located. When she attained this position, she was informed that Respondent was going to conduct a company-wide, reduction in force, unfortunately affecting a portion of its merchandisers. This action was necessary to reduce costs and assist the company in its efforts to transfer certain job functions like inventory selection from the stores to a centralized location. As the district personnel manager, Ms. Kellum was given detailed instructions regarding how to rank the merchandisers in her district. These instructions did not permit any variance or independent judgment. According to the instructions that Ms. Kellum (and Respondent’s other district personnel managers) received, she was to review the last three annual appraisals for all merchandisers (including senior merchandisers) in her district. Those who had most recently been rated a ‘1’ were ranked first. Next were those who had most recently been rated a ‘2.’ Among the merchandisers most recently rated a ‘3’ Ms. Kellum was instructed to examine their appraisals in the two previous years. Those who had been rated a ‘1’ or ‘2’ in those years were ranked before those who had been rated a ‘3’ all three years. Those merchandisers who had been most recently rated a ‘4’ or ‘5’ were ranked last. Neither race, age, nor sex was a factor in the ranking or the reduction-in-force process. The goal and the effect of the policy was to retain a certain number of the most recently highest ranked merchandisers and lay-off the remainder, even if a particular employee had good ratings. Ms. Kellum followed these instructions and ranked the approximately 100 merchandisers in her district of 20 to 24 stores. After she had completed the ranking, both her District Manager Michael Tucker and a regional manager checked her results for accuracy. Because the new staffing plan provided for fewer merchandisers in the district than the district currently had, those who were ranked highly on the list were retained while those near the bottom of the list were given a severance package and were terminated. Because many merchandisers in the district had been rated a ‘3’ for all three years, no merchandisers employed in this district who had been rated a ‘3’ for all three years were retained. In fact, the reduction in force caused some merchandisers who were currently rated a ‘3’ but had been rated a ‘2’ in the last three years to be terminated. Because Petitioner had been rated a ‘3’ for the last three years, and therefore, was scheduled to be terminated with a severance package, she was subject to the reduction in force. Even if all the other three merchandisers in the Pensacola store had been terminated, Petitioner still would have been subject to the termination because the reduction-in-force process considered all merchandisers in the district as one group, and Petitioner was being assessed against both her co-workers in the Pensacola store and merchandisers in other stores in her district. Some men, Caucasians, and managers under 40 years of age who were in Petitioner’s district were terminated. An example of a young Caucasian male who was terminated was Keith Graber, a Caucasian male aged 33. Mr. Graber had most recently been rated a ‘3’ and had been rated both a ‘2’ and a ‘3’ in the prior two years. Some women, African Americans, and managers over the age of 40 who were in Petitioner’s district were retained. For example, William Turner, an African-American male aged 42; Ronnie Harris, an African-American male aged 46; Robert Butler, an African-American male aged 40; Clarence Cook, an African- American male aged 48; and Brenda Eccles, an African-American female aged 45, were retained. There was no evidence that the reduction-in-force procedures were in any way discriminatory or that the reduction- in-force procedures were not consistently followed in Petitioner’s district or applied incorrectly to her. No one in the Pensacola store, including Mr. Phelps, had any input regarding the need for or scope of the reduction in force or the procedures to be followed in conducting it. No one in the Pensacola store, including Mr. Phelps, knew who would be affected by the reduction in force until the morning of March 20, 1998. On March 20, 1998, District Manager Michael Tucker and Ms. Kellum informed Petitioner that she was scheduled to be terminated and that her last working day would be May 2, 1998. Petitioner did in fact work until May 2, 1998. She received $8,696.92 in severance pay. Fellow Pensacola merchandisers Jerry Joachim, Kimberly Vincent (a Caucasian female), and Glenn Castellucci (a Caucasian male) were not subject to the reduction in force because each had been rated a ‘2’ on at least one of the last three appraisals. The appraisals and ratings for each of these individuals were supported by appropriate rationales and were not the result of any discrimination. When Mr. Phelps learned that Petitioner would be terminated and that Mr. Joachim would not be, Mr. Phelps told Mr. Tucker he would prefer for Petitioner to be retained instead of Mr. Joachim. Ironically, the only person Petitioner accused of discriminating against her was Mr. Phelps. However, Mr. Phelps’ desire to retain Petitioner over Mr. Joachim was not considered because of management’s desire to consistently apply Respondent’s reduction-in-force criteria. When Mr. Joachim learned that his employment would not be ending, he requested the severance package in exchange for his resignation. Mr. Joachim told Mr. Phelps that he was making this request because he understood that Mr. Phelps was dissatisfied with his work and would be lowering his appraisal ratings and moving towards terminating him. That request was granted. With the departure of Mr. Joachim, the store would have only two merchandisers. The store was approved for three merchandisers. Therefore, through application of the reduction- in-force criteria, another higher-ranked merchandiser was reassigned to the store in order to replace Mr. Joachim. Petitioner’s position was not replaced. Mr. Phelps mentored several managers in the Pensacola store, including Mr. Graham, Chris Jackson (an African-American male), and Ms. Vincent. Mr. Phelps was instrumental in Mr. Graham and Mr. Jackson’s promotions to store manager (in 1997) and sales support manager (in 1996), respectively. Moreover, Mr. Phelps supported Ms. Vincent’s being designated as a “high potential” manager, thus creating additional career opportunities for her. Mr. Phelps consistently rated Mr. Graham and Ms. Vincent as ‘2’s. Mr. Phelps did not mentor Petitioner because she did not seek out his assistance, as the others had, which again was part of the problem in her leadership skills. There was no evidence which showed Mr. Phelps discriminated against Petitioner. In January 2001, Stan Lollar was promoted to senior department manager. At the time of the promotion, Mr. Lollar was 51 years old. The title “senior department manager” is the current title for the merchandiser position. Mr. Phelps recommended Mr. Lollar for the position and was instrumental in Mr. Lollar’s attaining it. At the time that he achieved this position, Mr. Lollar was older than Petitioner was when she was subject to the reduction in force. In 1997, Mr. Phelps promoted Nadine Mitchell from a non-supervisory position in the Pensacola store to a supervisory position. At that time, Ms. Mitchell was an African-American female aged 41. Due to the high attrition rate amongst merchandisers and the year-long training needed before a new hire is ready to perform as a merchandiser, Respondent began to seek applications for management trainees shortly after the reduction in force had been completed. These trainees were needed to assume the positions of retiring, resigning, and promoted merchandisers. Compared to the pre-reduction-in-force time period, Respondent significantly reduced its recruitment efforts because fewer future replacement merchandisers would statistically be needed. The fact that Respondent advertised for new manager trainees after the reduction in force does not demonstrate discrimination by Respondent since there is a legitimate underlying business reason for the continued recruitment. In 2003, Petitioner will earn at least $46,199 at her retail management position with Sports Authority in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner occupies a more senior position (a second level assignment) at Sports Authority than she did for Respondent. Prior to her employment at Sports Authority, Petitioner had been gainfully employed. No testimony was presented of any periods of unemployment or underemployment. At the time of her reduction in force from Respondent, Petitioner earned $45,224, less than her current income with Sports Authority. On January 23, 2003, FCHR issued its Determination, finding no cause to believe that either sex or age discrimination had occurred, but finding cause to believe that race discrimination had occurred. This determination occurred more than 180 days after the Charge had been filed. On February 24, 2003, Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief. Her Petition was filed more than four years after her employment with Respondent ended on May 2, 1998.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia Farris-Gruver, Esquire J. C. Penney, Inc. 6501 Legacy Drive, Mail Station 1111 Plano, Texas 75024 Lari Thomas 1055 Wonderwood Court Pensacola, Florida 32514-8512 Anthony Nathan Thomas, Sr. Qualified Representative 1055 Wonderwood Court Pensacola, Florida 32514-8512
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (“Walmart”), discriminated against Petitioner, Ramon Santiago Lopez (“Petitioner”), based upon his national origin or age, and/or terminated his employment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Walmart is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Walmart is a national retailer. Petitioner is a Cuban (Hispanic) male. He was 62 years old when he was hired by Walmart in November 2005 and was 72 years old at the time of his dismissal. Petitioner was initially hired to work at a store in Jacksonville, but transferred to Tampa. In June 2010, Petitioner requested a transfer back to Jacksonville and was assigned to Store 4444 on Shops Lane, just off Philips Highway and I-95 in Jacksonville. The store manager at Store 4444 was Scott Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s transfer request and testified that he “very much” got along with Petitioner. Petitioner confirmed that he never had a problem with Mr. Mallatt. Petitioner testified that when he first started at Store 4444, he had no problems. After about four months, however, he began reporting to a supervisor he recalled only as “Lee.” Petitioner described Lee as “kind of a maniac.” Lee would harass Petitioner and give him impossible assignments to accomplish. Petitioner testified that he complained repeatedly to Mr. Mallatt about Lee’s abuse, but that nothing was ever done about it. Eventually, Petitioner gave up complaining to Mr. Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt testified that Petitioner never complained to him about being discriminated against because of his national origin or age. Petitioner apparently did complain about being overworked, but never tied these complaints to any discriminatory intent on the part of Lee. Petitioner testified that Lee no longer worked at Store 4444 in January 2016. From 2010 to 2015, Petitioner worked from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in various departments, including Grocery, Dairy, Paper, Pet, and Chemical. In 2015, Petitioner spoke with Mr. Mallatt about working at least some day shifts rather than constant nights. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s request. In August 2015, Petitioner was moved to the day shift in the Maintenance department. As a day associate, Petitioner typically worked from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Assistant Store Manager April Johnson transferred to Store No. 4444 in October 2015. Petitioner reported directly to Ms. Johnson. On January 14, 2016, Petitioner was scheduled to work from 8:30 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. He drove his van into the parking lot of Store No. 4444 at approximately 7:58 a.m. He parked in his usual spot, on the end of a row of spaces that faced a fence at the border of the lot. Petitioner liked this spot because the foliage near the fence offered shade to his vehicle. Closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage, from a Walmart camera with a partial view of the parking lot, shows Petitioner exiting his vehicle at around 8:00 a.m. Petitioner testified that he could see something on the ground in the parking lot, 50 to 60 meters away from where his van was parked. The CCTV footage shows Petitioner walking across the parking lot, apparently toward the object on the ground. Petitioner testified there were no cars around the item, which he described as a bucket of tools. Petitioner stated that the bucket contained a screwdriver, welding gloves, a welding face mask, and a hammer. The CCTV footage does not show the bucket. Petitioner crosses the parking lot until he goes out of camera range.3/ A few seconds later, Petitioner returns into camera range, walking back toward his car while carrying the bucket of tools. When Petitioner reaches his van, he opens the rear door, places the bucket of tools inside, then closes the rear door. Petitioner testified that after putting the tools in the back of his van, he went to the Customer Service Desk and informed two female African American customer service associates that he had found some tools and put them in his car. Petitioner conceded that he told no member of management about finding the tools. Walmart has a written Standard Operating Procedure for dealing with items that customers have left behind on the premises. The associate who finds the item is required to take the item to the Customer Service Desk, which functions as the “lost and found” for the store. Mr. Mallatt and Ms. Johnson each testified that there are no exceptions to this policy. Petitioner was aware of the Standard Operating Procedure. On prior occasions, he had taken found items to the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner conceded that it would have been quicker to take the bucket of tools to the Customer Service Desk than to his van. However, he testified that he believed that he could have been fired if he had taken the tools to the desk before he had clocked in for work. Petitioner cited a Walmart policy that made “working off the clock” a firing offense. It transpired that the policy to which Petitioner referred was Walmart’s Wage and Hour policy, which states in relevant part: It is a violation of law and Walmart policy for you to work without compensation or for a supervisor (hourly or salaried) to request you work without compensation. You should never perform any work for Walmart without compensation. This language is plainly intended to prevent Walmart from requiring its employees to work without compensation. Petitioner, whose English language skills are quite limited, was adamant that this policy would have allowed Walmart to fire him if he performed the “work” of bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he was officially clocked in for his shift. Therefore, he put the tools in his van for safekeeping and informed the Customer Service Desk of what he had done. Petitioner was questioned as to why he believed it was acceptable for him to report the situation to the Customer Service Desk, but not acceptable for him to bring the tools to the desk. The distinction he appeared to make was that the act of carrying the tools from the parking lot to the desk would constitute “work” and therefore be forbidden, whereas just stopping by to speak to the Customer Service Desk associate was not “work.” The evidence established that Petitioner would not have violated any Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he clocked in. He could have been compensated for the time he spent bringing in the tools by making a “time adjustment” on his time card. Mr. Mallatt testified that time adjustments are done on a daily basis when associates perform work prior to clocking in or after clocking out. Petitioner merely had to advise a member of management that he needed to make the time adjustment. Mr. Mallatt was confident that the adjustment would have been granted under the circumstances presented in this case. Petitioner did not go out to retrieve the tools after he clocked in. Mr. Mallatt stated that employees frequently go out to their cars to fetch items they have forgotten, and that Petitioner absolutely would have been allowed to go get the tools and turn them in to the Customer Service Desk. Later on January 14, 2016, Ms. Johnson was contacted by a customer who said tools were stolen off of his truck.4/ Ms. Johnson had not heard anything about lost tools. She looked around the Customer Service Desk, but found no tools there. Ms. Johnson also called out on the store radio to ask if anyone had turned in tools. Finally, the customer service manager at the Customer Service Desk told Ms. Johnson that Petitioner had said something about tools earlier that morning. Ms. Johnson called Petitioner to the front of the store and asked him about the missing tools. Petitioner admitted he had found some tools in the parking lot and had placed them in his vehicle. Ms. Johnson asked Petitioner why he put the tools in his vehicle. Petitioner told her that he was keeping the tools in his car until the owner came to claim them. Ms. Johnson testified that Petitioner offered no other explanation at that time. He just said that he made a “mistake.” Ms. Johnson explained to Petitioner that putting the tools in his vehicle was not the right thing to do and that he should have turned them in to “lost and found,” i.e., the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner was sent to his van to bring in the tools. After this initial conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Johnson spoke with Mr. Mallatt and Mr. Cregut to decide how to treat the incident. Mr. Cregut obtained approval from his manager to conduct a full investigation and to interview Petitioner. Mr. Cregut reviewed the CCTV footage described above and confirmed that Petitioner did not bring the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cregut spoke with Petitioner for approximately an hour to get his side of the story. Petitioner also completed a written statement in which he admitted finding some tools and putting them in his car. Mr. Cregut described Petitioner as “very tense and argumentative” during the interview. As the interview continued, Mr. Cregut testified that Petitioner’s reaction to the questions was getting “a little bit more hostile [and] aggressive.” Mr. Cregut decided to try to build rapport with Petitioner by asking him general questions about himself. This tactic backfired. Petitioner volunteered that he was a Cuban exile and had been arrested several times for his opposition to the Castro regime. Petitioner then claimed that Mr. Cregut discriminated against him by asking about his personal life and prejudged him because of his activism. Mr. Cregut credibly testified that he did not judge or discriminate against Petitioner based on the information Petitioner disclosed and that he only asked the personal questions to de-escalate the situation. Mr. Cregut’s only role in the case was as an investigative factfinder. His report was not colored by any personal information disclosed by Petitioner. At the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Mallatt made the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. The specific ground for termination was “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues,” related to Petitioner’s failure to follow Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Mr. Mallatt testified that his concern was that Petitioner intended to keep the bucket of tools if no owner appeared to claim them. Mr. Mallatt credibly testified that had Petitioner simply taken the tools to the Customer Service Desk, rather than putting them in his vehicle, he would have remained employed by Walmart. Walmart has a “Coaching for Improvement” policy setting forth guidelines for progressive discipline. While the progressive discipline process is used for minor and/or correctable infractions, such as tardiness, “serious” misconduct constitutes a ground for immediate termination. The coaching policy explicitly sets forth “theft” and “intentional failure to follow a Walmart policy” as examples of serious misconduct meriting termination. Petitioner conceded that no one at Walmart overtly discriminated against him because of his age or national origin. He testified that he could feel the hostility toward Hispanics at Store 4444, but he could point to no particular person or incident to bolster his intuition. Petitioner claimed that his dismissal was in part an act of retaliation by Ms. Johnson for his frequent complaints that his Maintenance counterparts on the night shift were not adequately doing their jobs, leaving messes for the morning crew to clean up. Ms. Johnson credibly testified that Petitioner’s complaints did not affect her treatment of him or make her want to fire him. In any event, Ms. Johnson played no role in the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner’s stated reason for failing to follow Walmart policy regarding found items would not merit a moment’s consideration but for Petitioner’s limited proficiency in the English language. It is at least conceivable that someone struggling with the language might read the Walmart Wage and Hour policy as Petitioner did. Even so, Petitioner was familiar with the found items policy, and common sense would tell an employee that he would not be fired for turning in customer property that he found in the parking lot. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner had been working at Walmart for over 10 years. It is difficult to credit that he was completely unfamiliar with the concept of time adjustment and truly believed that he could be fired for lifting a finger to work when off the clock. Walmart showed that in 2016 it terminated three other employees from Store 4444 based on “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues.” All three were under 40 years of age at the time their employment was terminated. Two of the employees were African American; the third was Caucasian. Petitioner offered no evidence that any other employee charged with gross misconduct has been treated differently than Petitioner. At the hearing, Petitioner’s chief concern did not appear to be the alleged discrimination, but the implication that he was a thief, which he found mortally offensive. It could be argued that Mr. Mallatt might have overreacted in firing Petitioner and that some form of progressive discipline might have been more appropriate given all the circumstances, including Petitioner’s poor English and his unyielding insistence that he never intended to keep the tools. However, whether Petitioner’s dismissal was fair is not at issue in this proceeding. The issue is whether Walmart has shown a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner’s employment. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to follow Walmart policy. Mr. Mallatt’s suspicion regarding Petitioner’s intentions as to the tools was not unfounded and was not based on any discriminatory motive. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Walmart for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s age or national origin. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that his termination was in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. The employee who was allegedly retaliating against Petitioner played no role in the decision to terminate his employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart discriminated against him because of his age or national origin in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Southland Corporation is a corporation engaged in the operation of convenience food stores under the name "Seven Eleven Food Stores." Petitioner, Richard V. Ballard, was employed by Southland in March of 1984. Michael Jones, Supervisor of Southland, hired Ballard. Jones interviewed Ballard and reviewed his application prior to hiring him. At the time he interviewed Ballard, Jones noticed a gap on the application in Ballard's employment which he asked Ballard about. Ballard stated he had some operations on his arm and leg and that he had omitted a job with Huntley Jiffy Foods Stores where he had been terminated unfairly and had filed a handicap complaint against them. Jones asked him if he had left anything else out, to which Ballard replied no. Ballard had been previously employed part-time at Citgo, another convenience food store, and failed to reveal this on his application. He also failed to tell Jones about this previous employment when Jones questioned him prior to his being hired by Southland. Southland was aware that Ballard was handicapped when he was hired. In fact, Jones had a discussion with Ballard at the time he was hired about any possible limitations which would have an affect on his job performance. Ballard has cerebral palsy. Jones hired Ballard knowing that he was handicapped and knowing that he had filed a handicap complaint against Huntley Jiffy Foods. After he was employed, Ballard received two raises including a $0.20 merit increase, which was the highest increase for which he was eligible, and the increase was approved by Jones on May 25, 1984, effective May 11, 1984. Subsequent to his receiving the merit increase, Ballard was counseled for several incidents involving his job performance. On September 14, 1984, Jones became aware through a conversation with a former supervisor of Ballard's that Ballard had worked for Citgo previous to his working with Southland. Jones double-checked Ballard's application and found that he had omitted his employment with Citgo from his application and he had failed to disclose the Citgo employment to Jones during the interview. Ballard was suspended on September 14, 1984, pending a meeting with Jones on September 17, 1984. At the meeting on September 17, 1984, Ballard admitted that he had worked for Citgo and that he had omitted it from his application because he did not think he would be hired if he put it on his application because he would have been terminated from two previous jobs. Ballard had omitted two previous jobs in his application, Huntley Jiffy Foods and Citgo. The application which Ballard filled out contained the statement "I certify the facts set forth in my application for employment are true and complete. I understand that, if employed, false statements on this application shall be considered sufficient cause for dismissal." Southland has a policy prohibiting falsification of applications and providing for termination of employees for falsifying their applications. Southland had terminated employees other than Ballard for falsification of applications. While Ballard alleges that he was terminated because he had filed a discrimination complaint against Citgo, in fact, Jones had no knowledge at the time he terminated Ballard that Ballard had filed a charge against Citgo. Southland did not learn that Ballard had filed a discrimination charge against Citgo until sometime in October, 1984, after it terminated Ballard. Southland learned of the charge against Citgo from the documents Ballard filed charging retaliation in this case. Southland purchased a part of City Service (Citgo) in September, 1983, including the Kwik Mart facilities where Petitioner had worked previously. However, it did not incur liability for charges filed against City Service. The discrimination charge filed by Ballard against City Service is being defended by City Service. Southland is not involved in the that matter in any way.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by discharging Petitioner because of his age.
Findings Of Fact Respondent produces flexible packaging, develops technology to fill that packaging with liquids, and provides services to incorporate its flexible packaging systems into its customers' facilities. Respondent primarily produces "bag-in- box" products and manufacturing systems for customers such as Pepsi-Cola and Wendy's, as well as various customers in the milk, juice, and chemical business. Respondent operates two manufacturing facilities, one located at its headquarters in Romeville, Illinois, and another located in Union City, California. Petitioner was born on April 24, 1946. In 1996, Respondent hired Petitioner as a sales representative, and he served in that position until he was discharged on April 19, 2004. Petitioner initially was assigned to service the Upper Midwest Region and was based in Chicago, Illinois. In 1999, Respondent reassigned Petitioner to the Southeast Region. After his reassignment to the Southeast Region, Petitioner continued to live in the Chicago area for several years. However, in December 2002 or January 2003, Petitioner and Respondent mutually agreed that Petitioner would relocate to Florida. Because the move resulted from a mutual decision between Petitioner and one of Respondent's founders, Respondent paid $25,000 towards Petitioner's moving expenses. After the move, Petitioner continued to be responsible for the same geographical territory and the same customers as before the move. Joe Pranckus is Respondent's vice president of sales. At the time of Petitioner's discharge, the sales department consisted of a customer service department and four geographical sales territories: the Central, Western, Eastern and Mexico Regions. The Central and Western Regions (where Respondent's manufacturing facilities are located) each were overseen by a regional manager. The Eastern and Mexico Regions did not have regional managers. As Petitioner was located in the Eastern Region, Mr. Pranckus served as his direct supervisor. From 1999 until his dismissal, Petitioner was Respondent’s only sales representative in the Southeast. His primary responsibility was to maintain and increase Respondent’s business in that region of the country. The Rapak sales department as a whole is generally responsible for maintaining and increasing Respondent’s overall sales. This involves not only selling products and services, but also following up with customers to help them solve problems and otherwise to ensure their happiness. Because his primary responsibility was maintaining and increasing sales, Mr. Pranckus judged Petitioner almost exclusively by his year-to-date sales numbers as compared to the same period in the previous year. These numbers were calculated by Mr. Pranckus on a fiscal-year basis, from May 1st through April 30th. For the 2003-2004 fiscal year, Mr. Pranckus established a goal for Petitioner of 15 percent growth in sales. The minimum expectation was that Petitioner maintain at least the same amount of sales he had the previous year. During the 2003-2004 fiscal year, Mr. Pranckus e- mailed Petitioner his sales-versus-last-year figures on almost a monthly basis. By the end of June 2003, Petitioner had sold only 84 percent as much as he had sold through June 2002; by the end of July, only 87 percent as much as he had sold through July 2002; by the end of August, 91 percent; September, 81 percent; October, 90 percent; November, 85 percent; December, 87 percent; and by the end of March 2004 (eleven months into the fiscal year), he had sold only 88 percent as much as he had sold through the first eleven months of the 2002-2003 fiscal year. In short, as the fiscal year drew to a close, it was clear that Petitioner was going to suffer a net loss of business for the year. In late October 2003, Petitioner suffered a heart attack and underwent triple bypass surgery. Petitioner was unable to work for approximately two months while recovering from surgery. However, Petitioner returned to work in January 2004, initially working on a limited basis. Petitioner's sales numbers suffered because he lost some certain accounts owing to factors beyond his control (such as product quality and price issues). Nonetheless, Petitioner concedes that it was his job to replace his lost sales, no matter what caused his customers to switch suppliers. Mr. Pranckus typically holds one sales meeting each year for his entire staff. In February 2004, Mr. Pranckus held one of those meetings. At that meeting, Mr. Pranckus informed Petitioner that "changes would be made if [his] numbers didn't improve." In his application for unemployment compensation, Petitioner stated that Mr. Pranckus also warned him on March 10, 2004, that he needed to improve his sales numbers. Finally, Mr. Pranckus sent an e-mail to Petitioner on March 27, 2004. In that e-mail, Mr. Pranckus delivered the following written warning: Your territory is at a critical state. We can not continue along this path. Sales must be improved immediately or we will need to change. We agreed at our sales meeting to get this back on track. It is not showing up in the numbers and activity. Call me and let me know how we can help. On April 19, 2004, Mr. Pranckus discharged Petitioner because of his poor performance. His year-to-date sales figures were unacceptably low, as compared to the previous year, and Mr. Pranckus saw no evidence of plans or activity designed to improve matters. After Petitioner was discharged, he filed an application for unemployment compensation. On the application, Petitioner stated that he was discharged “for failure to achieve sales goals.” Later in that same application, in response to a request to “briefly summarize your reason for separation from this employer,” Petitioner wrote: “I did not achieve my sales goals.” Petitioner did not assert anywhere in his application for unemployment benefits that he was discharged because of his age. At the time of his discharge, Petitioner was 57 years old (almost 58). Mr. Pranckus did not know Petitioner’s exact age, but he would have guessed (based on physical appearance) that Petitioner was in his mid-50s at the time. Mr. Pranckus did not consider this to be “old.” In fact, Petitioner is not much older than Mr. Pranckus. Mr. Pranckus interviewed three individuals to fill Petitioner’s position. He ultimately selected Jim Wulff. Mr. Pranckus did not know their ages at the time of the interviews, but he would have guessed (again, by appearance) that Mr. Wulff was in his mid-50s and that the other two interviewees were in their mid- to late 40s and mid- to late 50s, respectively. In fact, Mr. Wulff was born on May 26, 1948, so he was 55 years old (nearly 56) when Mr. Pranckus hired him. Sales analysis from June 2003 showed that eight Rapak employees or representatives did not meet the 100 percent sales goal. Those listed were either Rapak non-supervising employees with direct responsibility for sales, supervising employees, or non-employee independent brokers. However, none of these employees, whether younger or older, was similarly situated to Petitioner at the time of his discharge. As an initial matter, there were four other non- supervisory employees with direct responsibility for sales: Dennis Hayes, Marvin Groom, Donald Young, and Keith Martinez. The other individuals responsible for sales were either supervisory employees or non-employee independent brokers. Because the two supervisors have management responsibilities and are responsible for their entire regions and the individuals who report to them, they are not judged primarily by whether they personally meet the 100 percent or 115 percent sales-versus- last-year objectives. Brokers, meanwhile, are not employees. Rather, they are independent contractors paid on a straight commission, so Respondent receives value from their services regardless of how much they sell. Mr. Hayes was the only other employee who performed the exact same job as Petitioner, but he reported to Regional Manager Dan Petriekis in the Central Region, not directly to Mr. Pranckus. Moreover, as of March 2004, Mr. Hayes had sold 127 percent as much as he had during the same period the previous year.1 Mr. Hayes is almost ten years older than Petitioner. Mr. Young was also responsible for sales, but he was semi-retired, serviced only one customer and received a base salary for his work. As of March 2004, however, Mr. Young had sold 115 percent as much as he had during the same period the previous year. Mr. Young is more than twelve years older than Petitioner. Finally, while Keith Martinez and Marvin Groom had some responsibility for sales, their positions were “radically different” from Petitioner’s. Whereas Petitioner could identify certain problems with Respondent’s machinery and products and would refer those problems to a service technician to assist his customers, Mr. Groom and Mr. Martinez were both originally hired as service technicians. Based on this experience, they could and did not only identify technical problems, but also performed the necessary maintenance and repair work on the spot, in addition to performing preventative maintenance. Petitioner, by contrast, has spent his entire working life as salesman. Accordingly, he was neither capable of, nor expected to, perform these additional maintenance and repair functions. As a result, Mr. Groom and Mr. Martinez received more leeway on their sales performance than Petitioner because they brought additional value to Respondent’s business that Petitioner could not offer. Nonetheless, as of March 2004, Mr. Groom was running at 100 percent versus the prior year and Mr. Martinez was running at 87 percent. Mr. Groom is roughly three years younger than Petitioner, and Mr. Martinez is 15 and one-half years younger than Petitioner. Respondent paid Petitioner $113,000 in salary and commissions during his last full calendar year of employment with Rapak. Petitioner was out of work for ten months after his dismissal. During that time, he received $8,000 in unemployment compensation from the State of Florida and $8,942.33 in severance pay from Respondent. In his new job, Petitioner projects that he will earn $100,000 in his first year but admits that he could make at least $113,000 because his compensation is once again dependent upon sales commissions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent committed no unlawful employment practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Winn Dixie, discriminated against Petitioner, Simon Rowland, on the basis of his disability (cerebral palsy) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an elderly man who has had cerebral palsy since birth. In August 2004, Petitioner went to work at the Dundee, Florida, Winn Dixie store as a courtesy clerk or bagger. His duties were to retrieve shopping carts from the parking lot, help customers, clean restrooms, and other general duties. He was not as fast a worker as others, but Winn Dixie accommodated him so that he could continue working. Petitioner claims that he was initially told he would work 20 to 25 hours per week. Winn Dixie asserts that he was given no indication of hours he might work. It is clear that Petitioner worked approximately ten hours per week during his employment. Lora Prine was the manager of the Dundee store, and Petitioner enjoyed working with Prine. Prine was later transferred to the Winter Haven store, and Petitioner asked to be transferred there, as well. There was no position open at first, but when a position became available, Prine contacted Petitioner to apply. When he was hired at the Winter Haven store, Petitioner was told that he would average between ten and 15 hours per week. While Petitioner was working at the Winter Haven store, Prine would make sure that his duties were consistent with his capabilities. She would make sure that Petitioner had assistance when lifting heavy objects, for example, when he was bagging groceries. Prine also allowed Petitioner to leave work early on many occasions due to illness and to miss work altogether at times, e.g., when he needed to visit his ailing brother in Gainesville. Petitioner freely admits that Prine and Winn Dixie accommodated him when he was working there. In November 2009, Petitioner was hospitalized for a week. The hospitalization involved an unnamed malady, but Petitioner was adamant that it did not involve a stroke. There is no evidence that Winn Dixie believes Petitioner suffered a stroke at that time. Upon release from the hospital, Petitioner was provided with portable oxygen. He said that the oxygen was supposed to be used while he was sleeping, but he used it a few times during the day right after he got out of the hospital. Prine learned from Petitioner's son that Petitioner was using oxygen. In mid-January 2010, Petitioner called Prine to see about coming back to work. Prine had just returned from medical leave and asked Petitioner to call her back in a few days. When Petitioner called back, he discussed his hospitalization and convalescence with Prine. He informed Prine of his need to utilize oxygen as a result of his illness. Prine suggested to Petitioner that maybe it was time for him to retire; Petitioner agreed with Prine that it was time. Prine annotated Petitioner's work file to indicate he was on retired status.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying Petitioner, Simon Rowland's, Petition for Relief in full. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2011.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether the Petitioner, Lee C. Smith, was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, Food Lion, Inc., on the basis of his marital status.
Findings Of Fact At all times in issue, Respondent, Food Lion, Inc., operated its food supermarket, No. 728, in Tampa, Florida. Petitioner, Lee C. Smith, was employed by Respondent as manager. Petitioner was discharged from employment with the Respondent on December 2, 1990. The "constructive advice memo" supporting the discharge indicated the action was being taken because of "dishonesty - fraud - reputation of manager." The background to the charge related that 9 checks, totalling $1,100.00 were cashed by Petitioner's wife and "possibly endorsed or OK'd by Mr. Smith." The memo went on to further state that the decision [to discharge] was based on current evidence "and also failure to maintain mgt. role." The memo further indicated that while in management training, Mr. Smith had a problem with returned checks and "was documented on same." The memo was signed by Mr. Legett and was also signed by the Petitioner on December 5, 1990. Petitioner claims that when he first learned of the check situation, during the period March through June, 1990, when he was a management trainee, on his own initiative and without prompting by anyone in authority, he notified his store manager and assistant manager of the situation and suggested they call in a tel-alert advising all Food Lion stores in the area not to cash any checks for his wife. He was not discharged at that time. He also claims that after he was promoted to manager, his wife again started passing bad checks without his knowledge. When he found out about them, in October and November, 1990, before he was discharged, he paid some of them off. He also instituted another tel-alert through the Dunedin store, where some of the checks had been written, but he did not alert the people in his own store not to cash them. Apparently, Mrs. Smith cashed some checks in Store 728 but only one was approved by Petitioner. An area-wide listing of dishonored checks shows some that were cashed by Mrs. Smith. This listing is sent to each store and probably came to Petitioner's store. Petitioner admits he may have seen it but most of the checks written by Mrs. Smith were approved by the assistant manager. Whenever he saw a check listing with his wife's name on it, he redeemed that check, but the listing he saw was for his store only. He claims not to have seen listings from other stores, but from time to time, the manager of other stores would call him to ask if they could take her checks. He claims always to have said no. None of the checks relied upon by Respondent in the discharge action were admitted in evidence. Petitioner claims that at the time in issue, he had no knowledge his wife was writing the bad checks. During this period, he and his wife were having domestic difficulties. Some of the time they were living together and some of the time they were separated. Even when they were separated, she continued to come into the store for purchases and to cash checks. Petitioner claims that as a result of his discharge by the Respondent he has been damaged in a total amount of between $452,122.55 and $518,122.55, including legal fees. These sums are based on his salary at the time of his discharge, modified by certain assumptions regarding sick pay, bonus, profit sharing and holiday pay. At the time of his discharge, Petitioner was earning $550.00 per week and claims he was due an increase to $610.00 per week. Therefore, he claims, his base salary for December, which he was not paid, would have been $2,440.00. Added to that, he claims is 2 percent for sick pay totalling $572.00, a 2 percent bonus of $572.00, a 15 percent profit sharing pay out of $4,290.00 and holiday pay for 6 days at $110.00 per day, for $660.00. This additional amount totals $6,094.00 which, when added to the base salary claimed due amounts to $8,534.00 for December, 1990, not paid to him because of his termination. His base salary of $610.00 per week for calendar year 1991, would have totaled $31,720.00 and his insurance benefit would have been an additional $1,242.60. This totals $32,962.60. Added to that, he claims are the bonuses, sick pay, profit sharing, profit forfeiture, holiday pay at $122.00 per day for 6 days, and two weeks vacation ($1,220.00) for a subtotal of $9,566.00. When this figure is added to his base for 1991, he claims his total income from Respondent would have been $42,528.60 for the year. However, when his actual earnings from Kash & Karry, with whom he found employment after he was discharged by Respondent, in the amount of $13,941.58 are deducted, his actual loss for calendar year 1991 is, he claims, $28,587.60. Following the same formula, using identical factors but with slightly different amounts for each due to a projected increase in weekly salary, the net loss to Petitioner is claimed to be $19,903.32 for calendar year 1992, and through March 5, 1993, the date of the hearing, his calendar year 1993 loss is claimed to be $6,474.39. The sum total of the yearly losses is $71,109.77 to which Petitioner has added a 1 percent per month interest figure which totals $19,910.73 for the 28 months in issue. The sum of these figures is $91,020.50. To this Petitioner has also added a 4 year loss of projected profit sharing pay outs had he stayed with Food Lion which he estimates at between $30,000.00 to $45,000.00 per year. At $30,000.00 the total would be $120,000 to which Petitioner has added an unexplained $200,000.00. Adding this to the $120,000.00, and the $91,020.50 amounts to $411,020.50 to which Petitioner has added 10 percent legal fees of $41,102.05 for a grand total of $452,122.55. Applying the same calculations to a loss of profit sharing figure of $45,000 per year for 4 years, and the unexplained $200,000.00 addition, with similar 10 percent legal fees and the actual claimed out of pocket loss described above, his claim amounts to $518,122.55. In support of his claim of Food Lion earnings, Petitioner submitted only one pay slip, for the period ending 12/01/90 which showed his regular earnings to be $1,100.00 and special earnings of $650.00 for the period. The evidence he presented is insufficient to support his monetary claim. His earnings at Kash and Karry are not questioned. Petitioner's wife's bad check activity first came to light when he was a manager trainee and he paid those checks off immediately. However, in the latter part of 1990, a loss prevention investigation was initiated into alleged cash shortages and bad checks at Petitioner's store. Mr. Satterfield, the Area Perishable Supervisor was told by the investigator that Petitioner was aware of his wife's passing of bad checks. Mr. Satterfield also talked to other employees. One of these, Mr. Koonce, cashed several checks for Mrs. Smith which had been approved by one of the managers. Petitioner was one of those approving managers on only one occasion. Based on that one approval, which he does not know to have been for a subsequently dishonored check, he merely assumed the Petitioner approved the others. An unsworn written statement to the investigator, Mr. Greer, by Kimberly Lantrip, an employee of another Food Lion store, indicates that Petitioner told the grocery manager it was OK to cash his wife's checks and hid the bad check register bearing his wife's name for several weeks when it came in. This evidence is clearly double and even triple hearsay evidence, however, and though admissible here, is of minimal probative value. Furthermore, neither were the checks themselves nor photocopies thereof were offered. Mrs. Smith, by sworn affidavit, also hearsay, indicated that at no time did Petitioner have any knowledge she had written checks in Food Lion stores, nor did he ever approve any for her or tell anyone else to cash them. This statement carries little evidentiary weight. Petitioner clearly had knowledge of his wife's prior check writing activity and, in fact, paid off several. He obviously failed to take appropriate action to correct her activity or to preclude her writing other checks at Food Lion stores. After the investigation, Satterfield met with Petitioner and other supervisors, and as a result of that meeting, where at least one supervisor recommended termination, Mr. Satterfield, who had observed Petitioner over the months in both training and as assistant manager and saw him do nothing wrong, nonetheless decided to put the Petitioner on indefinite suspension with pay pending further investigation. Mr. Satterfield then notified the Regional Supervisor and Mr. Legett, the Area Supervisor, of what he had done. The next he heard about it was when the constructive advice memo terminating Petitioner was issued. He thereafter had nothing more to do with the matter. Mr. Legett was satisfied at the way Petitioner took care of the first series of bad checks written by Petitioner's wife in the Spring of 1990. However, based on what he was told by Mr. Satterfield, and the information contained in the loss prevention investigation, he concluded that Petitioner was aware of the second series of bad checks his wife was writing and did not attempt to stop them. Based on this, which he found showed fraud and dishonesty on Petitioner's part, he decided to discharge Petitioner Before doing so, however, he discussed the matter with Food lion's Vice President for Personnel who agreed with the decision to discharge. While Petitioner's failure to take corrective action to preclude his wife from cashing any further checks at Food Lion stores reflects on his management ability and may support termination for that reason, absent a clear showing of his conspiracy with her, his encouragement of her actions, or his knowing acquiescence in her misconduct, it does not rise to the level of fraud or dishonesty. Regarding Petitioner's claim for damages, Mr. Legett indicates a proposed raise of $60.00 per week in 1990 is not justified. A maximum raise is $20.00 per 6 month increment based on performance. Not all managers get raises each year. In addition, continuing employees do not get paid for holidays they don't take off. If the time is not taken, it is lost. However, if a person is terminated, any unused accrued vacation time for that year is paid. By the same token, sick days are not compensated. Employees receive 2 percent of salary as a sick pay bonus at the end of the year unless too much sick leave is taken. In general, a sick day taken once a week results in a net loss, not earned bonus. Also, profit sharing is not a constant but varies year by year. In 1990 and 1991, the amount was 15 percent. The amount for 1992 had not been determined as of the hearing, but 15 percent is a maximum. In any case, employees do not become eligible to participate in the profit sharing plan until they have been with the company for 5 years. If the employee leaves before the five years are up, the accrued but unpaid profit sharing maintained in his name is forfeited and paid on a pro rata basis to other employees. The most Mr. Legett, an individual relatively high up in management, ever got was 2 percent. He has never received anywhere near 5 percent of his salary. Effective January 1, 1993, employees contribute $21.00 per month for insurance. Prior to that time, there was no contribution.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that Lee C. Smith's Petition for Relief from Unlawful Discrimination based on marital status, relating to his discharge from employment by Respondent, Food Lion, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-6047 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: None submitted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Respondent's counsel submitted Proposed Findings of Fact but failed to number them. They will be treated paragraph by paragraph, however, in this appendix. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and, except for references to hearsay evidence, incorporated herein. Mr. Koonce, the only individual interviewed by the investigator who appeared at hearing indicated he had seen Petitioner approve only one check for his wife and assumed from that, he had approved others. The balance of the hearsay evidence, though admissible for a limited purpose, is considered of minimal probative value. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but more a comment on the state of the evidence. Accepted only as to the showing that the issue of Petitioner's knowledge of his wife's check writing activities was a part of the related case involving discrimination based on race. Irrelevant to the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee C. Smith P.O. Box 260922 Tampa, Florida 33685-0922 Steven C. Ellingson, Esquire Arnold & Anderson 1200 Peachtree Center Cain Tower 229 Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Margaret Jones Clerk Commission of Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's termination of Petitioner constituted unlawful discrimination based on disability or retaliation.
Findings Of Fact Retailer Lil' Champ hired Petitioner on October 30, 1999. Respondent, The Pantry, Inc., acquired many of the Lil' Champ stores in 2003, including the store located in Williston, Florida, where Petitioner was employed. Following the acquisition, the Lil' Champ store in Williston became a Kangaroo Express. As of early 2009, Petitioner was employed as the store sales manager of the Williston Kangaroo Express (Store #1181). In this capacity, Petitioner reported to district manager William ("J.R.") Hancock. In addition to the routine job duties performed by all employees (waiting on customers, stocking shelves, cleaning, etc.) the store sales manager is also responsible for counting the daily receipts, reconciling the receipts with the PDI Daily Report, and preparing the bank deposit slip. According to corporate policy, the person who prepares the deposit and seals the bag must be the same person who carries the deposit to the bank. Only managers are provided with keys to the safe, and they are never permitted to delegate their banking responsibilities to non-management employees. Understandably, Respondent considers the preparation of the daily bank deposits to be one of the most essential functions of the store sales manager. The safes of Kangaroo Express stores are located in the floor, and it is ordinarily necessary to bend, squat or kneel to access the contents of the safe. Petitioner liked working for Kangaroo Express, and saw himself as a "company man," eager to do a good job for his employer. Not surprisingly, when Petitioner was asked by J.R. Hancock to assist in cleaning other Kangaroo Express stores, he readily agreed. It was while assisting in cleaning the Kangaroo Express store in Newberry, Florida, in February 2010 that Petitioner tore the meniscus in his left knee. Despite this injury, Petitioner continued working regular shifts at Store #1181. On May 7, 2010, Petitioner had arthroscopic surgery on his left knee in an effort to address the torn meniscus. According to employee staffing records introduced by Petitioner, he returned to work at Store #1181 on or about June 25, 2010, and worked through November 4, 2010, sometimes working back-to- back first and second shifts. On November 5, 2010, Petitioner had a second surgery on his left knee, followed by several weeks of physical therapy. On February 17, 2011, Respondent’s corporate risk manager (Dawn Titus) sent a memorandum to J.R. Hancock advising that Petitioner had been approved to return to work as sales manager, with certain restrictions. Specifically, Petitioner was prohibited from lifting objects weighing more than 25 pounds, and from kneeling and squatting. The memorandum stated that the restrictions would be accommodated on a temporary basis. The memorandum also stated: With these restrictions, George Shuler has been assigned to ring the cash register, complete daily/weekly paperwork, or any other job duty that may fall within his/her job description or as assigned by his/her supervisor. If anyone is of the opinion that the above restrictions are not being maintained, please contact me immediately at 800-476- 7574. Additionally, George Shuler will need to provide us, in writing, any charges in his/her work status via fax at: (919)238- 2680). The February 17, 2011, memorandum did not state that Petitioner was not to complete the daily bank deposits. To the contrary, the memorandum stated that Petitioner was to “complete daily/weekly paperwork, or any other job duty that may fall within his/her job description. . . .” Nor did the memorandum make mention of additional employee staffing to assist with accessing the floor safe as an accommodation to Petitioner’s temporary physical limitations. Upon being “cleared” to return to work, Petitioner resumed his duties as manager of Store #1181, including working the register, stocking the shelves, assisting with deliveries, and cleaning. The unrebutted testimony also established that upon his return, Petitioner continued to prepare the daily deposits and take them to the bank pursuant to company policy.1/ In order to perform his banking duties Petitioner was able to access the floor safe with the assistance of a small step ladder he used to lower himself down. It was not necessary for him to kneel or stoop to access the safe. Petitioner’s supervisor, J.R. Hancock, confirmed that Petitioner prepared the deposits upon his return to work, and that he was unaware of Petitioner failing to timely make a daily deposit or otherwise comply with corporate banking policies. On March 16, 2011, Petitioner was “written up” by J.R. Hancock for failing to schedule employees to meet the “needs of the business.”2/ This was the third time in as many years that Hancock had criticized the way Petitioner had scheduled employees, primarily because the labor hours for his store exceeded the corporate labor-scheduling model. Petitioner disagreed with J.R. Hancock’s criticisms of his staffing, and felt that Hancock was trying to force Petitioner to “schedule the store the way Hancock wanted to staff it, not the way I knew it should be staffed.” With respect to Hancock’s criticism of double-coverage on the morning shift, Petitioner testified that his store was a “morning store” with most customers coming in for coffee, which had to be frequently replenished.3/ As such, his store was more labor intensive during the morning shift, as opposed to the afternoon shift where most customers simply “grabbed a six-pack from the cooler.”4/ Since Petitioner disagreed with the criticisms leveled by J.R. Hancock on March 16, 2011, Petitioner refused to sign the employee conduct report prepared by Hancock. In addition, on March 21, 2011, Petitioner spoke with Respondent’s human relations department to complain about J.R. Hancock’s continued efforts to micromanage the staffing of Store #1181. The human relations employee Petitioner spoke with (Albert Smith) advised Petitioner to “work with” Mr. Hancock to resolve their differences. At hearing, Mr. Smith testified that he never told Hancock (or anyone in corporate) about his conversation with Petitioner. On March 17, 2011, Petitioner was examined by Edward Jaffe, M.D., who completed the “Florida Workers’ Compensation Uniform Medical Treatment/Status Reporting Form.” Dr. Jaffe reported that Petitioner had achieved his maximum medical improvement and had a 5 percent permanent impairment rating (body as a whole) which was attributable to the condition of his left knee. Dr. Jaffe affirmatively checked Item 23 of the report, authorizing Petitioner’s return to work with certain functional limitations and restrictions. The identified “joint and/or body part” subject to the restrictions was the “left knee.” The functional activities restricted included kneeling and squatting, but not bending. At hearing, Respondent asserted that the restriction relating to kneeling applied to both of Petitioner’s knees. This interpretation of Dr. Jaffe’s report is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Rather, the joint/body part affected by the limitations was specifically identified by Dr. Jaffe as the “left knee,” and the body part/system determined to be permanently impaired was also identified as the “left knee.” Following his visit to Dr. Jaffe on March 17, 2011, Petitioner continued performing his duties as manager of Store #1181 until March 23, 2011, when he received a call from Dawn Titus at corporate informing him that his employment with Respondent had been terminated. Petitioner’s district manager (J.R. Hancock) testified that he played no role in the decision to fire Petitioner. Rather, J.R. Hancock testified that while he was vacationing at Disneyworld he received a call from Ms. Titus advising him that Petitioner had been terminated because the company could not accommodate his permanent restrictions. Although J.R. Hancock had “written up” Petitioner on several occasions for exceeding the allotted weekly labor hours, he had not recommended to anyone at corporate that Petitioner be fired for that reason or any other reason relating to Petitioner’s job performance. It is found that Respondent summarily concluded that Petitioner could not perform the essential duties of the job based entirely upon Dr. Jaffe's report. However, the credible testimony of Petitioner established that he required no special accommodations in order to perform the essential functions of store manager (including accessing the floor safe), and in fact had been successfully performing those duties since returning to Store #1181 in February 2011. Following his termination on March 23, 2011, Petitioner filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the state of Florida. However, that claim was denied based upon a communication from TALX UC eXpress, acting as the duly authorized agent of The Pantry, Inc., advising that the claimant "is considered to have voluntarily quit after failing to return from an approved leave of absence."5/ At hearing, Petitioner amended his petition, sua sponte, to include a charge of retaliation. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that he was fired in retaliation for lodging a complaint about J.R. Hancock to the corporate human relations department. This record does not substantiate the claim of retaliation, since Mr. Smith credibly testified that he did not communicate the complaint to any other employees of Respondent. Similarly, the credible testimony of J.R. Hancock established that Hancock was not involved in the decision to terminate Petitioner. The credible evidence of record established that Petitioner was terminated by Respondent because Respondent considered Petitioner to be handicapped. Respondent made the decision to terminate Petitioner because of his handicap without regard to whether Petitioner was able to perform the essential functions of a Kangaroo Express store manager. Respondent made no inquiry as to whether Petitioner was actually performing the essential functions of the position, or whether any reasonable accommodations could be provided to allow Petitioner to perform the essential functions of the employment position. The following summarizes the timeline of events culminating in the termination of Petitioner’s employment with Respondent: 2/17/2010: Petitioner injured on job while doing extra duty (cleaning the Kangaroo store in Newberry)5/7/2010: Petitioner has a left knee arthroscopy, after which he returns to work at Store #1181.11/5/2010: Petitioner has a second surgery on his left knee, followed by several weeks of physical therapy.2/17/2011: Petitioner is permitted to return to work as sales manager with temporary restrictions.3/16/2011: Petitioner “written up” by J.R. Hancock for exceeding corporate staffing targets.3/17/2011: Petitioner is examined by physician who completes Workers Compensation Reporting Form, noting permanent functional limitations and restrictions.3/21/2011: Petitioner lodges complaint with Respondent’s human relations department about J.R. Hancock.3/23/2011: Petitioner is terminated by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and awarding Petitioner back pay from the date of his termination by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2012.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has been subjected to employment discrimination by termination, allegedly based upon race, and by retaliation, for filing a charge of discrimination.
Findings Of Fact On or about November 29, 2005, the Petitioner applied for a job as a part-time sales clerk with the Respondent. The Petitioner indicated that she was available to work on Sundays, Mondays, and Wednesdays from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. This was because she was already employed in another job. During the course of the hiring and orientation process, the Petitioner learned of the policies of the Respondent against harassment and discrimination of all types. She was instructed in those policies and acknowledged receipt of them. The Petitioner began her employment with the Respondent on December 27, 2005, as a part-time sales clerk at a convenience store (No. 31) in Milton, Florida. When she began her employment, the Store Manager was Bob Kukuk. The Assistant Managers for that store were Michael Morris and "Cynthia." There were also two other sales clerks, Cherie Dorey and Lugenia Word. Both Ms. Dorey and Ms. Word are white. Soon after the Petitioner was hired, Mr. Kukuk announced his resignation as store manager. On January 31, 2006, the Petitioner attended the new employee training session in Milton, Florida, which included training in the equal employment and non-harassment policies of the Respondent. During the question and answer session, concerning the harassment and discrimination portion of the training, the Petitioner told Training Manager, Robert Birks that she had a problem at her store involving a conflict with another employee. She felt that she was being required to do things that other employees were not required to do. Mr. Birks advised Ms. Myles that she should provide a written statement concerning her complaints to her supervisor and he provided her with pen, paper, and envelope to do so on the spot. The Petitioner wrote out a note and returned it to Mr. Birks in a sealed envelope and he gave the envelope to the District Advisor, Jamie Galloway on that same date. After reading the Petitioner's note, Ms. Galloway met with Petitioner on that same day to discuss her complaints. The Petitioner informed Ms. Galloway that Michael Morris, an Assistant Manager at her store, was telling employees that he was going to be the new store manager. The Petitioner told Ms. Galloway that she felt Morris did not like her because of her race. Ms. Galloway informed the Petitioner that, in fact, Morris would not be selected as store manager for store No. 31 and that Mr. Kukuk would be replaced with someone else other than Morris. She also informed the Petitioner that the Respondent had a zero tolerance for harassment and discrimination and that if the Petitioner had any problems with Mr. Morris that she should personally contact Ms. Galloway. In her capacity as District Advisor, Ms. Galloway supervised the day-to-day operations of a number of stores. In fact, during the above-referenced time period, Ms. Galloway was supervising her own normal district area, as well as that of another district manager who had resigned. The three sales clerks at store No. 31, Ms. Dorey, Ms. Word, and Ms. Myles were all reprimanded ("written-up") in February 2006, because of their cash registers being "short," or containing insufficient funds at the close of the business day or shift. The Petitioner was also counseled for insubordination on this occasion because she told Ms. Word, in front of customers, that she was not going to take out the trash because Mr. Morris and Ms. Dorey would be into work soon and "they never did anything anyway." Ms. Word confirmed that Ms. Myles had made that statement to the store management. Sometime in February 2006 the Petitioner expressed the desire to transfer to a store on the West side of Pensacola because she was no longer employed in her other job in the Milton area. She therefore wanted to work for Tom Thumb at a location closer to her residence. The Manager, Mr. Kukuk at that time, informed Ms. Galloway of this wish on the part of the Petitioner. Ms. Galloway contacted the District Advisor for the West side of Pensacola, Bill Jordan, to inquire whether any positions were available that would fit the Petitioner's schedule. Ms. Galloway followed up on the question with Mr. Jordan several days later, but Mr. Jordan said that he had no employment positions available at that time. The Petitioner then filed her Charge of Discrimination on February 16, 2006, (her first charge). In her Discrimination Charge the Petitioner maintains that she was constantly "getting written-up" for unnecessary matters by Mr. Morris, the Manager. In fact, however, she was written-up only once while Mr. Morris was the Assistant Manager of the store, as were Ms. Word and Ms. Dorey, the other clerks. Both Ms. Word and Ms. Dorey are white. Patricia Merritt was installed as the new store manager at store No. 31 on February 24, 2006. Ms. Merritt has worked for the Respondent for 17 years as a clerk, assistant manager, and manager. Ms. Merritt had the responsibility of managing the store, ascertaining that all duties involved in store operation were accomplished and supervising and monitoring the performance of other store employees. She imposed discipline, including termination if necessary, and also hired employees. Mr. Morris failed to appear for work, beginning the first week of March 2006. He was terminated from his employment with the Respondent on March 9, 2006. In February or early March, Ms. Merritt informed Ms. Galloway that she had overheard another employee referring to the Petitioner having filed a claim against the Respondent because of Mr. Morris. Prior to that time Ms. Merritt was unaware of any problem between Mr. Morris and the Petitioner. Between the time that Ms. Galloway met with the Petitioner on January 31, 2006, and the time she heard from store manager Merritt that the Petitioner was still having a problem with Morris in late February or early March, the Petitioner had not contacted Ms. Galloway to report any problem. After being advised of the matter by Ms. Merritt, Ms. Galloway advised Ms. Merritt to contact the Petitioner to find out her version of the events which occurred and to offer her a transfer to any one of five stores that Ms. Galloway was responsible for on the East side of Pensacola. Ms. Merritt met with the Petitioner and offered her the transfer opportunity, which the Petitioner refused at that time because she had a mediation pending. When Ms. Merritt began duties as store manager a misunderstanding occurred about the Petitioner's schedule. Ms. Merritt understood, mistakenly, that the Petitioner was available for fewer hours of work than she actually was. This resulted in the Petitioner being scheduled to work fewer hours for two or three weeks. Ms. Merritt was then informed of the Petitioner's actual scheduling availability by someone from the management office. On March 20, 2006, the Human Resource Manager, Sheila Kates, met with the Petitioner. The Petitioner complained about her reduced hours which Ms. Kates discussed with Ms. Merritt. As soon as Ms. Merritt realized that she had misunderstood the Petitioner's hours of availability she increased the Petitioner's hours on the work schedule. The Petitioner agreed that Ms. Merritt had been unaware about any problem between the Petitioner and Mr. Morris, when she reduced the Petitioner's work hours schedule because of her misunderstanding of the Petitioner's availability. Ms. Kates again offered to allow Ms. Myles to transfer to another store if she wished (apparently to help her avoid her apparent conflict with Mr. Morris), but the Petitioner again declined. Ms. Galloway, as part of her duties as District Advisor, conducted store inventory audits. She conducted a store inventory audit for Store No. 31 on May 30, 2006. During that audit she discovered that the store had a significant inventory shortage. Ms. Galloway therefore scheduled a "red flag" meeting the next day with each employee at the store, as well as meeting with them as a group to discuss inventory control. All of the employees at the store were counseled regarding the inventory shortage, including Ms. Myles and Ms. Word. Ms. Word, who is white, was issued a written reprimand on March 24th and April 24th, 2006, because of cash shortages. Ms. Word was subsequently terminated on June 16, 2006, for causing inventory shortages by allowing her friends to come in and take merchandise out of the store without paying for it, as well as for excessive gas "drive offs," or instances where people pumped gas into their vehicles and failed to pay for it. The Petitioner was given a $1.00 per hour raise by Ms. Merritt on or about April 2006. Ms. Merritt also changed the Petitioner from a part-time to a full-time employee in May 2006. This change enabled the Petitioner to become eligible for employee benefits. Ms. Merritt also, however, reprimanded the Petitioner for a cash shortage on July 14, 2006. The Petitioner admitted that her cash register was $48.00 dollars short on that day. The Petitioner complained to Ms. Galloway sometime in July of 2006 that Mr. Morris, the former store manager, and no longer an employee, had been vandalizing her car when he came to the store as a customer. Although these allegations were uncorroborated at that time, Ms. Galloway advised the Petitioner to call the police about the matter and to contact Ms. Kates directly, in the Human Resources office, if there were any more such incidents. The Petitioner filed a retaliation claim against the Respondent on August 7, 2006. Ms. Merritt had been considering the Petitioner for promotion to assistant store manager. The Petitioner completed a background check authorization for that position on September 19, 2006. Mark Slater is a Regional Manager for the Respondent. His duties include supporting the District Advisor's position, which includes recruitment, hiring and training of managers, reviewing sales trends, and reviewing any other financial trends, such as cash shortages, "drive offs" and inventory losses. In mid-October 2006, in the course of a routine review of reports from Store No. 31, Mr. Slater became aware of a possible problem regarding excessive gasoline drive offs, and an unusual purchase-to-sales ratio. Shortly after his review of those reports, Mr. Slater went to Store No. 31 to review the store's electronic journal. The electronic journal contained a record of all the store transactions. In his review of that journal, he focused on "voids," "no sales," and "drive offs," which could explain the irregularities that he had observed in his initial review. In his review of the "voids" at store No. 31 during the period in question, Mr. Slater noted quite a few voids for cigarette cartons, for large amounts, in a very short period of time. Specifically, in the course of seven minutes, he observed voids in the total amount of $406.23. He found this to be highly irregular and suspicious. Mr. Slater also looked at the drive-offs, because he had noticed some trends on that report as well. In reviewing drive-offs, he noticed that the same employee number was involved in both the voids and the drive-off transactions. Mr. Slater noted in his review that one drive-off was held on a void and then brought down as a drive-off, which appeared suspicious to him. Mr. Slater than matched up the electronic journal transactions with the security video tape that corresponded with that journal entry. In observing the video tape, Mr. Slater identified the transaction entered as a drive-off, but saw from the video tape that a customer had in fact come in and paid for the gas in question with cash. When he began his review Mr. Slater did not know which employee had the employee number that was used in association with the voids and the gasoline drive-offs. However, after he had concluded his investigation, he researched that number and found out that it was the number assigned to the Petitioner. Mr. Slater thus knew that the Petitioner had voided the drive- off transaction, as shown in the electronic journal, while the video tape showed that the Petitioner had actually served the customer who, in fact, did not drive-off without paying, but had paid $20.00 in cash for the gasoline in question. When she was asked about the security video showing the Petitioner accepting the $20.00 for the transaction which she had entered as a gas drive-off, the Petitioner responded that she did not recall it. Mr. Slater concluded that the Petitioner had not properly handled the transaction and took his findings to the Human Resources Manager, Sheila Kates. After consulting with Ms. Kates, the decision was made to terminate the Petitioner's employment. Prior to making his investigation and prior to making his conclusions, Mr. Slater was unaware of any issues between the Petitioner and Michael Morris. None of his findings and decisions regarding the situation with the Petitioner's voids and drive-offs had anything to do, in a retaliatory sense, with any issues or complaints the Petitioner might have had against Michael Morris or to the Respondent concerning Michael Morris. After being discharged for related types of conduct, neither Ms. Lugenia Word, who is white, nor the Petitioner, Ms. Myles, are eligible for re-hire by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the charges of discrimination and retaliation at issue in their entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Latarsha Myles 2103 Haynes Street, Apt. C Pensacola, Florida 30326 Cathy M. Stutin, Esquire Fisher & Philips LLP 450 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 800 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
