The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Kathy Bergerson, held a family foster home license for her residence issued by the Children, Youth and Family Program Office of Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. As it relates to the license at issue, Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner in April 1987. In her home, Respondent was responsible for several developmentally disabled children and a developmentally disabled adult. Respondent's mother lives in an apartment adjoining the home and has access to the residence. Respondent's mother is a registered nurse. During the period since the licensure, the several incidents described in the following paragraphs occurred. Because the incidents involved Respondent or her home and the incidents were unexplained, Petitioner became concerned for the safety of the children in Respondent's care. The incidents at issue are as follows: Sometime during 1987 while one of the children was hospitalized, the child was discovered in what appeared to be a drug-induced sleep during a visit by Respondent. No harm to the child was demonstrated from the incident, and Respondent relayed the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Also, sometime in 1987, a housekeeper, provided by Metro-Dade County, allegedly assaulted Respondent's mother while attempting to steal toys and bed sheets from the home. No harm to the children was shown from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Then, early in 1988, Respondent received a delivery of medication which did not contain full amounts of the prescribed contents. The medication was delivered by a representative sent by Petitioner. No harm to the children was proven from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner. In July 1988, a report of the sexual abuse of the developmentally disabled adult living with Respondent was filed with Petitioner. The final disposition of the incident was not shown; however, neither Respondent nor Respondent's mother were classified as perpetrators of the alleged abuse. In September 1988, a child under Respondent's care, and custody was hospitalized after she became, untypically, lethargic and unresponsive when Respondent gave the child a dose of Panadol for her fever. Fearing that the child was allergic to the medicine, Respondent brought the bottle from which she had administered the medicine with them to the hospital, and reported her fear to the medical personnel at the hospital and to Petitioner. Although Petitioner asserted that the bottle of medicine was tested for its contents, the proof failed to demonstrate that a test was performed or the results of any such test. Respondent kept the medication for the children in a locked cabinet in her kitchen. Included in the drugs in the cabinet were Panadol, Valium and Benedryl. In addition to Respondent, Respondent's mother and nurses provided by Petitioner, on occasion, had access to the cabinet. While Petitioner contended that the Panadol given to the child was adulterated with Valium and Benedryl, the proof failed to indicate that the Panadol was altered, or that the child suffered from the ingestion of the medication. Petitioner asserted that it was unusual for a foster parent, such as Respondent, to have as many unexplained events reported within an almost two- year period. Therefore, based on the above incidents and what Petitioner perceived to be a pattern of unexplained incidents involving Respondent and her home, and after ordering a psychological evaluation of Respondent and her mother, Petitioner issued its notice of intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license on February 14, 1989. Petitioner alleged that Respondent was not capable of handling the stresses associated with maintaining a family foster home. At the hearing Respondent demonstrated a tendency to become overly excited; however, the proof failed to demonstrate that she is unable to handle the stresses of her life. Respondent is a caring person who has an obvious interest and concern for the children in her charge. She expressed deep concern over each of the incidents recited above and, in fact, reported the majority of the incidents to Petitioner. Although the incidents described above generate concern, was not shown that the safety of the clients was endangered by the incidents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: Recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order withdrawing its intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Park way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December 1989.
The Issue The basic issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Donna Vermeulen, is eligible to be relicensed as a family foster home.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was licensed as a family foster home in Dade County, Florida, for approximately 19 years. The Respondent had received all of the training that was required for such a license. In 1997, Rosemary Bridges was a foster care counselor employed by the DCFS. In June of that year, Ms. Bridges was assigned to be the foster care counselor for three of the four foster children who were living with the Respondent at that time. Shortly after her assignment as foster care counselor for those children, Ms. Bridges made her first visit to the Respondent's home to check on the status of the children. On her fist visit to the Respondent's home, Ms. Bridges found the home to be untidy and unclean. There were clothes everywhere, dishes piled up, and no linen on the children's beds. The children all looked unkempt. The hair was not combed on any of the children. Ms. Bridges thought the general condition of the Respondent's home was potentially hazardous to the health of the foster children and she considered the possibility of removing the foster children from the home. On the day of Ms. Bridges' first visit, a therapist was also present. Ms. Bridges and the therapist discussed the situation with the Respondent. On that day the Respondent's arm was in a cast, and the Respondent explained that, because she had a broken arm, she was not able to take care of the house and the foster children as well as she usually did. The foster children had been with the Respondent for a long time, and the Respondent wanted them to continue to stay with her. Following the discussion with the Respondent, Ms. Bridges decided not to remove the foster children from the Respondent's home. Instead, Ms. Bridges made arrangements with the Children's Home Society for the Respondent to receive services for herself and for the foster children. Ms. Bridges returned to the Respondent's home a month later. The condition of the home was the same as it was during the June visit. The foster children were again unkempt and unclean. At the time of the visit, Ms. Bridges was also concerned about reports of inappropriate activities involving the foster children and one of the Respondent's two sons.2 Ms. Bridges and the children's therapist continued to work with the Respondent in an effort to improve the situation in the Respondent's home. Sara Leidtke is a mental health counselor who works primarily with children in foster homes, doing intensive on-site therapy. In February of 1997, Ms. Leidtke began providing therapy to three of the foster children in the Respondent's home. Ms. Leidtke continued to provide therapy twice a week to those children while they were living with the Respondent.3 All three of the foster children were supposed to be taking medication prescribed by a physician at the clinic where Ms. Leidtke worked. The medication was to treat hyperactivity and depression. One of the foster children was having nightly episodes of bed-wetting. On numerous occasions Ms. Leidtke recommended that the Respondent take that child to the enuresis clinic for treatment. The same recommendation was made by the physician who was treating the child's psychological problems. The Respondent never took that foster child to the enuresis clinic. From February of 1997 through August of 1997, Ms. Leidtke was concerned about the personal hygiene of the three foster children to whom she was providing therapy services. Ms. Leidtke described her concerns in the following words:4 All three of the children exhibited poor hygiene while in the Vermeulen home. Their clothes were often soiled, their hair dirty, and they were often unbathed with a strong body order. This therapist worked with them on this and gave Mrs. Vermeulen a hygiene checklist to utilize with them. The children spent a great deal of time working on this during therapy, but this therapist had difficulty getting Mrs. Vermeulen to follow through with checklists on days that therapy did not take place. On a number of occasions, the children stated that they were not able to attend to their hygiene because they did not have toothbrushes or other personal items. [J.] stated numerous times that she did not ever wash her hair, and that she did not use deodorant/antiperspirant because the family shared one roll-on deodorant and she did not want to use it or could not find it. When asked about these difficulties, Mrs. Vermeulen stated that the children were lying and that she was waiting on a check to buy the items that they needed. On two separate occasions, this therapist arranged for a PsychSolutions Activities Coordinator to come to the home to do the children's hair, but Mrs. Vermeulen canceled both appointments. In August of 1997, Ms. Bridges made another visit to the Respondent's home. Again, the condition of the home was the same as it had been on the two prior visits. Again, the foster children were unkempt and unclean. Ms. Bridges decided, primarily because of the lack of improvement in the condition of the home and the lack of improvement in the care of the foster children, that the foster children should be relocated to another foster home. In the course of making arrangements for the relocation, Ms. Bridges discovered a several month supply of prescription medicines for the three foster children. The amount of the prescription medicines in the home confirmed that the foster children had not been taking the medicines with the frequency prescribed by the physician. On August 29, 1998, when Ms. Leidtke arrived at the Respondent's home, she found that the Respondent's other son, M. V., was sitting at the Respondent's home visiting with the Respondent. M. V. is the Respondent's adopted son. In August of 1997, M. V. was 18 or 19 years old. On that day, M. V. had apparently escaped from a residential treatment program, where he had been confined for approximately four years. M. V. was being treated because, approximately four years earlier, he had sexually assaulted one of the Respondent's foster children, as well as the Respondent's adopted daughter. The foster child who had been sexually assaulted by M. V. was still living in the Respondent's home. M. V.'s presence in the home was very upsetting to that child. Later the same day, the police were called and the police returned M. V. to the treatment facility from which he had escaped. On August 29, 1997, the DCFS removed the foster children from the Respondent's home and placed them in another foster home.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case denying the Respondent's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1999.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been guilty of violation of pertinent statutes and rules governing qualification and capability to hold a foster home license and to operate a foster home, in this case a "therapeutic foster home" and, if so, whether their application for renewal of licensure should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The above-named Petitioners were licensed as operators of a therapeutic foster home and as therapeutic foster parents. Due to an alleged abuse report, they became involved in a revocation proceeding with the Department concerning their previously-held license. Upon advice by personnel with Camelot, Inc. (Camelot), a private provider which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care, by contract, they voluntarily relinquished their previous license on February 6, 2006, in the belief that they would still be entitled to a formal proceeding to contest that the alleged abuse occurred, and their licensure entitlement. The Department declined to afford them a hearing on the issue, and they appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the First District. The Department was upheld. They then applied for a renewal of their therapeutic foster care license on August 10, 2006, for Lake County, Florida. An evaluation of the application was launched by the Department and ultimately the Department issued a denial of the license application. A timely request for an administrative proceeding to contest denial of that license was filed by the Giegers. The license denial was based initially upon the Department's determination that the Giegers had allegedly inappropriately punished children in their home and that they had some sort of business interest or income interest in being licensed foster parents, purportedly a violation of foster parenting rules. Sometime thereafter a supplemental basis for denial was served upon them by the Department wherein the Department alleged that the Petitioners had also violated Section 409.175(4) and (12)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), because they had a child placed in their home through a guardianship agreement that had not been approved by a court and were therefore acting as an unlicensed foster home. A response to that supplemental denial notice was made by the Petitioners. Therapeutic foster parents are trained to provide for children with difficult behavioral problems. The Giegers received this training and remained in compliance with the training updates and continued education necessary in order to continue their licensure in good standing. In addition to this, Mrs. Geiger is a trained mental health specialist, with a master's degree, who works for Lifestreams, a mental health provider, providing services to disturbed children. The Giegers were previously affiliated, as therapeutic foster parents, with the private provider, Camelot, which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care. They were licensed as therapeutic foster parents at that time, and accepted a number of severely disturbed children into their home over the years while they were affiliated with Camelot. When a foster parent has a child placed in their home, Camelot has a therapeutic system whereby a therapist is assigned to that child and is available for consultation at any time of day. If the primary therapist is unavailable, the supervisor of that therapist is available for consultation. Camelot's therapeutic personnel and various mental health professionals have been frequently in the Giegers' home to consult, monitor, and assist with the care and therapy of foster children placed there. A number of those therapeutic personnel testified. They established that the Giegers are excellent parents who have provided exemplary care to the foster children placed in their home. These people have training in mental health and related fields. Some hold master's degrees and have been trained to recognize abuse or evidence of it. Some are psychologists, specifically assigned as the mental health professional working with particular children placed in the Giegers' home. In 2005, a child, J.D., was placed in the Giegers' home by the Department. In addition to J.D., there were other children in the home, including Tyler, a non-foster care child placed privately by Camelot with the Giegers, as well as the Giegers' own adopted son. All of the children in the home had been abused prior to their placement with the Giegers. J.D.'s previous situation before coming to the Giegers' home was particularly egregious. He had been starved, locked in a closet, had his fingernails removed by his parents and otherwise was the victim of severe parental abuse before coming into foster care. His was a case of high public notoriety and appears to have been thus treated with a heightened level of attention by the Department, as compared to the case of other children. When J.D. arrived at the Giegers' home after his initial rescue from his earlier situation, he purportedly weighed 58 pounds and was only 4 feet 8 inches tall, at the age of 17 years. During the time he resided with the Giegers, he grew several inches and gained almost 80 pounds due to the care given him by the Giegers. He was placed on special vitamins and formula, in addition to his regular meals, in order to restore him to appropriate physical condition. Because of his physical condition, extra efforts were made by the Petitioners to assure his safety. They even placed him in a private school because they felt he would be at risk attending a large public high school, which he would otherwise have been required to attend. J.D. did well at the Giegers' home initially and it was planned for him to remain in their home after he reached 18 years of age, if he continued to adjust favorably to being a member of their family. He began "acting out" more severely, however, with problematic behaviors. Ultimately it was determined by both the Giegers and Camelot that he should not remain in their home after he turned 18 because of the adverse impact he was having on other children residing in the home. Before the determination was made that J.D. would not remain in the Giegers' home after he reached 18 years of age, the Department had praised the Petitioners' care of J.D. After that decision was made, an attorney for the Department suggested to Mrs. Gieger that she be hired by the Department to provide special services to J.D. Apparently there was a funding problem with regard to continuing J.D. in private school, and this was suggested as a means of funding the private school. Mrs. Gieger, however, did not feel this funding was appropriate because she was already being paid by Camelot for these services, and expressed this to the attorney, she therefore declined that offer. In December 2005 the Department decided to have J.D. re-evaluated by his original evaluator, a psychologist, Dr. Dykel. During his meeting with Dr. Dykel, J.D. apparently told Dr. Dykel that the Giegers had cursed in his presence and in the presence of other children, used racially derogatory language concerning Black children in the foster childrens' presence and that Mrs. Gieger had sat on him as a means of restraint or punishment. He also stated that he was being deprived of food. This meeting occurred on a Friday afternoon. After the meeting J.D. returned to the Giegers' home and made statements about what he had said to Dr. Dykel. Initially the Petitioners thought nothing about the statements, but on the following Tuesday an abuse report was called in indicating that the Giegers had inappropriately punished J.D. in the manner he had related to Dr. Dykel. The child Tyler, who had been placed in the Giegers' home was a child who suffered from severe mental health issues. He had been placed privately with Camelot by his father. He had set his father's and step-mother's bed on fire the previous Christmas because he did not receive a toy, a "PS2," that he asked to be given him for Christmas. There was testimony that he was told by J.D. that if he would make a statement against the Giegers to the Department that he would get the PS2 toy that he wanted. He was taken by Erica Summerfield, an investigator assigned by the Department to the case concerning the abuse report, to the "Child Advocacy Center," for a statement. He apparently made such a statement, of the above import, but then recanted it. Nonetheless, based only on the statement made by J.D. and by Tyler, Erica Summerfield made a determination that the abuse report should be determined to be "founded." As a result of her report (and apparently a past history of abuse reports concerning the Giegers' foster care facility, none of which had been proven to be "founded"), Camelot apparently suggested to the Giegers that they voluntarily relinquish their license, purportedly telling them that they would still have the ability to challenge the abuse report through a Chapter 120 hearing. They sought to obtain a Chapter 120 hearing and the Department denied their request. An appeal ensued and the denial by the Department was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Giegers filed an application to renew their license, which was denied. This proceeding ensued after that denial, when the Giegers requested a formal proceeding. The Department offered the testimony of Erica Summerfield who was a child protective investigator assigned to the investigation. She was the supervisor of the person who interviewed J.D. and Tyler, apparently the only sources of investigative information leading to her finding that abuse had occurred. Ms. Summerfield testified that her concerns about the Giegers led her to make a report finding that abuse had occurred because alarms had been placed on the bedroom doors of childrens' bedrooms in the Giegers home; that the Giegers had used excessive restraint against J.D. (allegedly held him on the floor and lay on him or sat on him); and that J.D. had been mentally injured by the Giegers and not provided with sufficient food. She also opined that Mrs. Gieger had made inappropriate statements to J.D. None of these purported findings are supported by credible evidence. Initially it is found that J.D.'s and Tyler statements to the interviewer, who then apparently related them to Ms. Summerfield, constitute, at best, "second-hand" hearsay. Neither the interviewer nor J.D., nor Tyler testified at the hearing, and Tyler later recanted his statements made to the interviewer. The Respondent's exhibits two, three, and four, the interview reports, were offered into evidence and were only admitted regarding a basis for the Department's course of conduct in the matter, but not for the truth of any facts depicted on the face of those exhibits. Concerning the alleged complaint, related to the interviewer, regarding lack of food, the credible persuasive evidence shows that J.D. actually grew several inches after being placed with the Giegers, even though doctors had opined that he would not grow much, if at all, because of the starvation that had occurred early in his life. He also gained substantial weight while being cared for by the Giegers, so that he essentially looked like a normal child by the time he left their care. He had been emaciated when he came to the Giegers' care and had been described as looking like a "concentration camp victim." He was described as being far smaller than a child of his age when he came to the Giegers' care, but seven months later appeared to be essentially a normal child in physical appearance. The evidence, in fact, clearly supports the determination that the Giegers did provide J.D. with appropriate nutrition during their care of him. The basis for the alleged abuse regarding his not being properly fed is simply not credible. The Giegers had also been accused by J.D. or Tyler, or both, with using inappropriate language, racial slurs and cursing in J.D.'s presence, purportedly causing him mental harm. However, mental health experts present in the Giegers' home on a weekly and almost daily basis had never heard any inappropriate language, including any inappropriate racial language or inappropriate cursing in the childrens' presence during their visits to the Giegers' home. Many of these visits were unannounced. Two of the counselors or mental health professionals often present in the home were African-American. They found no evidence of racial tension or racially derogatory language being used by the Giegers or in the Giegers' home. It was their belief that the Giegers did not exhibit any behavior which suggested racism. Further, there were no Black children placed in the Giegers' home during the time that J.D. was there. There is simply no credible evidence to support any finding that inappropriate language was used by Mr. or Mrs. Gieger in J.D.'s or other childrens' presence, of a racially derogatory nature or otherwise. Part of the basis for the abuse finding (and the reason for license denial) was excess restraint or "sitting on" J.D. as punishment. This position was based on the statements of the two children, J.D. and Tyler. One of them, Tyler, tearfully recanted his story shortly after he made the statement. Erica Summerfield testifying for the Department, admitted in her testimony that she was aware of his recantation. She also admitted that Tyler's parents had asked her more than once to allow him to be placed back in the Giegers' home. They also had disclosed to her that he had a habit of making inappropriate statements and lying. There is evidence that J.D. had told him that he would receive a toy he wanted very much if he would make a statement to the Department that J.D. had been abused by the Giegers. Most importantly, J.D. had identified the point in time when Ms. Gieger was supposed to have sat on him as during an occasion when he broke a window at the house. Other mental health providers who were in the home around that time reported never seeing any bruise marks or other evidence of injury to J.D. or at any other time. They also reported that Mrs. Gieger was especially careful of his safety because of the seriously debilitated condition of his body. Most importantly, however, during the time that the window was broken by J.D. and he was severely acting out, Mrs. Gieger was on the phone with a professional from Camelot who was helping her to calm or "de-escalate" J.D. and who remained on the phone with Mrs. Gieger during the entire incident. That expert heard nothing which indicated that Mrs. Gieger had sat on the child or in anyway inappropriately restrained him. Mrs. Gieger denied using physical restraints on the foster children at the hearing. The Department maintains, however, that in two prior reports discussed in Camelot's letter, report 1999-127436 and 2002-007021, the Giegers had admitted restraining foster children. In the 1999 incident the child purportedly sustained rug burns on the face while being restrained on the floor by Mr. Gieger. These reports are at best second-hand hearsay. Moreover, they are not reasons of which the Petitioners were provided notice, as part of the basis for the denial of their licensure application which triggered this proceeding. Moreover, both of those incidents were immediately reported by the Giegers themselves to the Department and, ironically, the Department did not see fit to make any determination at the time, or since, that those incidents amounted to abuse. No finding was made that those alleged incidents were "founded" abuse episodes. Moreover, the Department relies upon an incident where Mrs. Gieger purportedly stated that she used force against J.D. when he tried to grab her neck. She purportedly told Ms. Summerfield in an interview that she gave J.D. a "therapeutic bear hug" by grabbing his arm and turning him around. He fell to the floor as a result. Parenthetically, not even the Department claims that she forced him to the floor. Mrs. Gieger's testimony at hearing concerning this event was to the effect that she grabbed J.D.'s wrist in order to prevent him from striking her or grabbing her neck and that he just collapsed to the floor. The Department then maintains that foster parents are not permitted to use such "force" on foster children, such as grabbing J.D.'s wrist, because it equates this to the use of corporal punishment and that grabbing a child's arm or wrist could "traumatize" an already vulnerable foster child. Mrs. Gieger's testimony, however, indicates that the use of "therapeutic bear hug," even if it occurred, is part of an approved method of training which she had, which is designed to safely manage children who are acting out in a potentially dangerous way, until they can calm down. She testified that Camelot, the Department's contracting agent, had approved this training for her. Moreover, when a foster parent is in danger of attack by a 17-year-old, even a somewhat debilitated child, who threatened striking or grabbing the foster parent by neck or throat, to grab his arm or wrist to prevent such conduct is reasonable and does not constitute unreasonable restraint. Assuming this event occurred, to characterize the grabbing of a child's wrist, to prevent injury or potential injury to a foster parent or another, as excessive force or "corporal punishment" is nonsensical. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Gieger engaged in any excessive force or restraint amounting to abuse. A concern was raised by Dr. Dykle, the psychologist, who was fearful of the fact that alarms had been placed on childrens' rooms in the foster home. Ms. Summerfield based her finding that abuse had occurred, in part, on the report that the alarms had been placed on the doors of some of the childrens' rooms. Ms. Summerfield, however, admitted in her testimony that alarms are often and routinely placed on childrens' rooms in therapeutic foster care homes. The mental health experts who testified clearly established that in every therapeutic foster home such alarms must be placed on bedroom doors because of a safety concern for other children. Children who are placed in this type of home are often serious safety risks for themselves or for other children. They have often been found themselves to be perpetrators of inappropriate or violent conduct. Many times they are children who have been sexually abused and have themselves become sexual perpetrators. In fact, there was a child in the Giegers' home at the time J.D. was there who had set his parents' bed on fire because he did not get a desired toy for Christmas. Dr. Dykle's apparent grave concern about alarms being placed on the childrens' bedroom doors is surprising since it appears to be completely contrary to generally accepted, safe practice for therapeutic foster homes, something that he should have been aware of if he is indeed an expert in child abuse issues. Ms. Summerfield admitted that she was aware that this was a virtually universal safety practice in therapeutic foster homes and yet, paradoxically, used it as a factor in support of her finding that abuse had occurred, as a basis of denial of re-licensure. Ms. Summerfield also admitted that she had spoken with Camelot professionals who assured her that the Giegers had been exemplary foster care parents. She acknowledged that J.D. had made untrue statements in the past about other foster placements. She admitted that the only evidence of improper restraint, or any kind of abuse or neglect in the home, was essentially predicated on the statements of the two children who did not testify in this proceeding. She conceded that one of them had recanted and she knew of this well before the hearing. Mental health experts from Camelot who testified, established that it is a very frequent event for foster children placed in therapeutic foster homes to act out and to make false statements and accusations concerning their care-givers. They also indicated that J.D. had made such false allegations in the past against other caregivers. This was all information that a thorough investigation would have made known to the Department, at the time it was making the determination that there was a basis for a finding of abuse. The only witness other than Ms. Summerfield, presented by the Department, was Amy Hammett, the licensing official who actually signed the letter denying the license application. She testified that she did not review all of the documents that made up the Giegers' license application. Some other department employee had been assigned to the case and it had been later transferred to Ms. Hammett before the final decision was made. She had reviewed five relevant forms, but nothing else. She had no evidence to support the Department's position that the Giegers had relied upon the foster care services they provided for income to support their own family, other than the fact that they had taken a legal position in the appeal from the previous attempt at a Chapter 120 proceeding, to the effect that they had something in the nature of a property interest in their foster care license. This may have been a necessary position to take in an attempt to establish jurisdiction or standing in that proceeding, but other than that, and one statement attributable to Mr. Gieger that there was an adverse financial effect on the Giegers related to that proceeding, it was not established that the Giegers were relying on the income from foster care services to support their family. Rather, in the context of that statement and the Giegers legal position during the course of their appeal, the reference was most likely made in the context that the hiring of an attorney, with related expense, in prosecuting the first case, including an appellate proceeding, caused an adverse financial effect, which is understandable. That does not constitute credible, persuasive evidence that the Giegers were relying upon foster care services as income to support their own family and themselves in violation of any Department rule. Mrs. Gieger, indeed, testified under oath that they did not rely upon foster care income to support their family. Her testimony and that of others showing that they have successfully operated a well- managed, licensed home for a substantial period of time, shows that the Petitioners are financially capable of operating safely and successfully under a new license. There is no persuasive evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the credible evidence is persuasive in establishing that the Giegers provide quality therapeutic foster care and have not engaged in the abuse with which they are charged. Even J.D. expressed the desire to come back and live with the Giegers and, after he reached 18 years of age, he did so. This certainly does not support the existence of abuse. Moreover, Earnest Thomas, J.D.'s guardian ad litem established that the Giegers provided J.D. with excellent care. He was a frequent visitor in their home and paid close attention to J.D.'s well-being during times pertinent to this case. Further, the caseworker, Sheila Donato, was the person who took J.D. from the Giegers' home when he was removed by the Department. On this occasion she stated that he was tearful and crying when he left the Giegers' home and asked if he would be able to come back to their home for Christmas. There were no bruises or other evidence that he had been harmed in any way. She established that the fact that he returned to the Giegers home after he turned 18 years of age is evidence that he had never been abused while there. After the Giegers' foster care license had been relinquished voluntarily by them under the above-referenced circumstances, Tyler's parents executed "guardianship papers" placing Tyler in the custody or guardianship of the Giegers and they continue to allow Tyler to reside in their home. The Department maintains that this was an illegal placement because the Giegers were not a licensed foster care facility at that time and had not secured a court order allowing Tyler to be in their guardianship. The circumstances were, however, that Ms. Giegers' mother was the attorney who prepared the guardianship papers for the Giegers and for Tyler's parents to execute. She rendered an opinion to them that that was sufficient to justify allowing Tyler to remain in the Giegers' home. Ms. Gieger testified that she knew of other teachers and other individuals who had used similar documents to establish a basis to take custody of a child in their home. She believed that what she was doing was legal. There was no intent by her, or Mr. Gieger, to engage in any kind illegal custody, guardianship or circumvention of the foster care licensure requirements, or any other illegal act. There is no evidence that Tyler had been adjudicated dependent and subject to the custody of the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting a foster home license to the Petitioners, authorizing their operation as a therapeutic foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerri A. Blair, Esquire Lockett & Blair Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing is whether Respondent's foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact On July 1, 1995, Mildred Sands (Respondent) was issued a provisional foster home license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Petitioner), with an effective period of July 1, 1995 - June 30, 1996. Her license number is 0795-06-3. A provisional license is issued when all requirements for a license are not met and the licensee is given a specific time period to comply with the remaining requirements. Due to a court action involving a minor child, J. F., who was born on May 7, 1983, the court placed J. F. with Respondent. In order for the minor child to live with Respondent, Petitioner issued Respondent a provisional license. Prior to the placement, Respondent knew J. F.'s mother for several years on a personal basis. The mother and her children were at one time living with Respondent. Respondent is J. F.'s godmother and has interacted with her since J. F.'s birth. Prior to licensing, on June 12, 1995, Respondent signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Petitioner, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs for the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * 16. We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * 18. We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. Respondent signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement) on July 19, 1993, when she was initially licensed as a foster care provider and on June 12, 1995, during her re-licensure process. The Discipline Agreement signed on July 19, 1993, provides in pertinent part: The following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN in caring for your foster child. Failure to comply may result in an investigation and possible closure of your home. * * * Hitting a child with an object. Slapping or spanking a child, or ANY OTHER physical discipline. The Discipline Agreement signed on June 12, 1995, provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S)... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTIGATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. On February 14, 1995, Petitioner waived placement requirements in order for J. F.'s siblings to be placed with Respondent to keep the family unit together. J. F.'s siblings had been living with her grandmother who had become ill and was unable to care for the children. On September 1, 1995, Petitioner received a report of alleged child abuse allegedly committed by Respondent against J. F., who was 12 years old, at Respondent's foster home. Respondent was allegedly disciplining J. F. Within a short span of time that same day, Petitioner began an investigation. The minor child, J. F., had raised bruises, swelling, abrasions, and redness on the lower part of her legs. Also, J. F. had a small scratch on one of her legs and a scratch on her left arm. The injuries were purportedly inflicted by a ruler. No expert opinion was presented to confirm that the injuries were consistent with such an instrument, and no attempt was made to obtain the instrument used to commit the alleged abuse. Petitioner removed all the children from Respondent's home. Petitioner notified Respondent that it was revoking her foster home license due to the alleged excessive corporal punishment. The minor child, J. F., did not testify at the hearing. 1/ Respondent did not inflict the injuries to the minor child, J. F. 2/ Respondent did not use corporal punishment of any kind on the minor child, J. F. Respondent did not violate the Discipline Agreement. Respondent was responsible for the supervision and care of the minor child, J. F. Respondent was not aware of J. F.'s injuries and was, therefore, unable to notify Petitioner of the injuries or to obtain medical attention for J. F.'s injuries. Respondent had allowed the children's adult sibling, who was 19 years old, to live with her and the children. Respondent failed to notify Petitioner that the adult sister would be and was living in her home. In failing to notify Petitioner, Respondent violated the Bilateral Agreement, paragraph numbered 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the foster home license of Mildred Sands not be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1996.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioners are entitled to the renewal of their foster care license.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioners operated a shelter foster home in Dade County, Florida, pursuant to a license that was issued by the Department. Mr. Ezewike investigated allegations of neglect at the Petitioners' home. According to Mr. Ezewike, children residing at the home were left without adult supervision. Such children ranged in ages from a few months to teenager. Mr. Welch investigated allegations of verbal abuse against Petitioners. The report of these allegations was closed without classification. Thus the Petitioners were not identified as the perpetrators of verbal abuse. According to Mr. Blum, who also visited the home, children residing with the Petitioners were left without adult supervision. Mr. Blum observed that the interior of the house was dirty and messy. His report concluded that there were some indications of conditions hazardous to health as a result of the unkept home. Mr. Blum further observed that a refrigerator at the Grice home was encircled by a chain with a lock which prevented it from being opened. Mr. Blum also observed and overheard an interaction between Mr. Grice and some of the foster children. According to Mr. Blum, Mr. Grice used harsh and inappropriate language with the children. Jackie Hodge, supervisor of the licensing unit, received a report from another worker responsible for supervising the Grice foster home. Such report cited Mr. Grice for inappropriate and harsh language. According to Ms. Hodge, licensing standards, including the quality of care and supervision provided by foster parents, must be a part of the evaluation to determine the suitability of a home during a relicensing review. According to Ms. Hodge, the Department does not permit foster parents to be verbally abusive, including harsh or inappropriate language, with the children in their care. Ms. Hodge further explained that the condition of, and cleanliness of, the home are also part of a relicensing evaluation. Based upon the Department's practice, the failure to meet any of the licensing standards is grounds for denying a renewal of license. Ms. Hodge recommended that the Petitioners' home not be relicensed. Petitioners were timely notified of the Department's denial and timely requested an administrative review.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying Petitioners' request for licensure renewal. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4951 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioners: 1. None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 14 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Hilda Fluriach District 11 Legal Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Willie and Geraldine Grice 18830 N.W. 43rd Avenue Carol City, Florida 33055 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Bonita Jones-Peabody The Executive Building 3000 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33137
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondents' application for re-licensure of their therapeutic foster home should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Respondents have operated a licensed foster home since 1994 and have operated a therapeutic foster home since 2011. The Respondents' foster home was originally licensed under the supervision of Lee County Mental Health Center, which was the local agency responsible for placing children in the home. In 2009, responsibility for supervision of the home was transferred to "Florida MENTOR" (MENTOR), which also assumed the responsibility for placement of children in the home. The children placed in the Respondents' foster home have been between eight and 11 years of age. Children placed in therapeutic foster homes have significant special needs and can be emotionally unstable. A safe and supportive therapeutic environment is required for their protection. The Respondents' license was valid through September 30, 2011. On August 3, 2011, the Respondents applied for renewal of the license. Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13.027 requires that changes in a licensee's household composition or employment be reported within 48 hours of the event. When the application was filed, the Respondents disclosed that their adult daughter and her three children had been residing with them for approximately three weeks. Prior to the application, the Respondents had not advised MENTOR that there had been any change in household composition. Mr. Williams became unemployed in December 2010, but the Respondents failed to report the change in the employment prior to filing the application. MENTOR was concerned about the financial stability of the household due to additional residents in the home and the reduction in income related to the loss of Mr. Williams' employment. An applicant for re-licensure of a foster home is required to submit financial information sufficient to establish that the applicant has the resources required to provide a stable household and meet basic expenses. The financial information initially submitted by the Respondents with the application for re-licensure was incomplete and did not appear to be an accurate reflection of household expenses. Attempts by MENTOR to obtain additional information were resisted by Ms. Williams. MENTOR eventually determined that, although the household had sufficient income to support their own expenses, placement of a foster child into the Respondents' home would cause a financial hardship for the family. Foster parents are permitted, with approval of the supervising agency, to add payments received to board a foster child to their income calculation, but the Respondents have not obtained such approval. By the time of the hearing, the Williams' adult daughter and her children no longer resided in the home, but Mr. Williams remained unemployed and was selling scrap metal to obtain income. At the hearing, he testified that his scrap metal income had been declining as more unemployed people began to collect and resell scrap. In September 2011, MENTOR completed the re-licensing study, a 24-page document that outlines the history of the foster home, including abuse reports and licensing deficiencies, and the efforts of the licensee to correct such issues. Rule 65C-13.028(3)(i)2. requires that the re-licensing study include documentation related to the level of cooperation by the licensee with the case plans developed for the child placed in the foster home. The re-licensing study documented MENTOR's concerns about the physical safety of children residing in the home and the Respondents' willingness and ability to provide appropriate support to therapeutic foster children placed in the home. During a significant period in 2011, the Respondents maintained a collection of junk metal and other debris in the yard of the foster home. The junk was apparently being collected by Mr. Williams for sale to scrap dealers. Jodi Koch, a MENTOR therapist who was assigned to work with the children in the Respondents' home, testified at the hearing about her observations of conditions in the home and about her interactions with the Respondents. In November 2010, Ms. Koch observed a child begin to play with a rusty machete that the child discovered in the Respondents' yard, and she so advised Ms. Williams, who expressed her displeasure that Ms. Koch had exceeded her authority as a therapist. Ms. Koch reported her observation to MENTOR personnel. MENTOR officials, including the program director and re-licensing coordinator, discussed the unsafe conditions of the property with the Respondents. Suggestions that the Respondents relocate the debris or otherwise prevent access by children to the debris were initially ignored by the Respondents. On May 2, 2011, MENTOR issued a Written Notice of Violation (Notice) to the Respondents, documenting the hazardous conditions of the property. The Notice was hand-delivered on May 5, 2011, at which time the Respondents refused to read or sign the paper. On May 6, 2011, the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority issued a nuisance citation against the Respondents for the accumulation of junk and debris on their property. The violation was cured on May 13, 2011, but, on June 1, 2011, the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority issued a second nuisance citation for the same violation. That violation was not resolved until November 2011, after the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority had prosecuted the violation through a hearing, and more than a year after Ms. Koch observed the child with the machete. At the hearing, Ms. Williams asserted that Ms. Koch was a therapist and that she had exceeded her authority by reporting the observations of the property to the MENTOR officials, essentially the same position Ms. Williams asserted in 2011 when Ms. Koch reported the situation to MENTOR. The MENTOR re-licensing study also documented the failure of the Respondents to cooperate in therapeutic plans developed for the children placed in the home and to supervise the children properly. Ms. Williams often refused to cooperate with the therapeutic plans and goals Ms. Koch developed for the children in the Respondents' foster home. Ms. Williams apparently concluded that she was better able to address the needs of a therapeutic foster child than was Ms. Koch, but the evidence failed to support such a conclusion. Ms. Williams refused to implement standard behavioral therapies suggested by Ms. Koch and opined that they were a "waste of her time." Ms. Williams refused to allow one foster child to have toys purchased for the child by Ms. Koch. Ms. Williams claimed that the child would have destroyed the toys, but Ms. Koch testified they had been purchased to allow the child to have her own possessions for the first time in the child's life and to develop a sense of responsibility. The Respondents routinely put children to bed at an early hour as a means of discipline and refused to comply with Ms. Koch's direction to develop other disciplinary practices. In one discussion with Ms. Koch at the home, Ms. Williams discussed the circumstances of one foster child in the presence of another foster child, violating the confidentiality of the children. The Respondents failed to contact MENTOR staff to address behavioral issues exhibited by children placed in the home and instead called upon law enforcement authorities to respond when a child refused to comply with their directions. The Respondents failed to supervise one child placed in their home sufficiently to prevent the child from accessing pay- per-view pornography on cable television, resulting in a charge in excess of $700 on one bill. It was clear, based on Ms. Williams' testimony and demeanor at the hearing, that Ms. Williams disliked Ms. Koch. Much of Ms. Williams' presentation of evidence during the February 17 portion of the hearing was directed towards discrediting MENTOR and Ms. Koch. After completing the re-licensing study, MENTOR forwarded the application and study to the Department, which received the materials on October 5, 2011. Notwithstanding the continuing problems between MENTOR and the Respondents, MENTOR recommended in the study that the Respondents' home be conditionally re-licensed. The conditions, essentially intended to increase the possibility that the Department would approve the application for re-licensure, were as follows: Reduction in the licensed capacity from two therapeutic individuals to one therapeutic individual. Unannounced visits to monitor the home in terms of food content, refrigerator temperature, client supervision and safety concerns. Continuing monitoring of the foster parents ability to work in conjunction with service providers regarding the best interests of the child. Monitoring to ensure that the living situation of the additional four residents was resolved within six months. Ms. Williams was dissatisfied with the results of the study, disagreed with the proposed conditions, and refused to accept them. While MENTOR (as the supervising agency) was responsible for the evaluation of the application, the Department has the responsibility for the making the final determination regarding licensure or re-licensure of a foster home. The Department considered the MENTOR recommendation when making the licensing decision. The primary focus of the Department's decision was whether the Respondents could provide an appropriate and safe environment for a therapeutic foster placement. The Department has no financial interest in the decision and had no direct contact with the Respondents. As the regional licensing manager for the Department, Kristine Emden was tasked with the responsibility of reviewing the application and materials. Based on her review, Ms. Emden determined that the application should be denied. Ms. Emden based her decision on the Respondents' lack of cooperation with therapeutic programs developed for the children in their care, their failure to supervise children adequately or to maintain confidentiality regarding the children, and their lack of cooperation with the MENTOR personnel who attempted to resolve the identified deficiencies. Additionally, Ms. Emden considered the Respondents' response to issues related to the hazardous conditions of the premises, the lack of financial resources to support a therapeutic foster placement in the home, and the rejection of conditions proposed by MENTOR in the study. Ms. Emden was unable to identify any remedial measures that would alter the denial of the application for re-licensure. The Respondents failed to offer credible evidence to establish that the Department's denial of the application was incorrect or that the application should otherwise be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying the license application filed by the Respondents at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondents should be granted a family foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Alfonso and Lynda Zapata, applied to be licensed as a family foster home care with the Department through the Devereux Foundation. The Devereux Foundation maintains a network of foster homes to serve parents who need to temporarily place their children in foster care (private placements) and dependent children in the custody of the Department (public placements). Previously, Petitioners had been licensed as a family foster care home with the Department through Florida Baptist Children's Home (Florida Baptist). Like the Devereux Foundation, Florida Baptist maintains a network of foster homes to serve parents who need to temporarily place their children in foster care and dependent children in the custody of the Department. Petitioners had withdrawn form the relationship with Florida Baptist after a disagreement with Florida Baptist personnel over the removal of a child from their home and reunification of that child with her mother. In 2001, about half of the children placed in Florida Baptist's homes were placed by the Department in connection with cases of child abuse, or abandonment, while the other half were private placements by families whose circumstances necessitated that their children temporarily reside elsewhere. In July 2001, Petitioners had two foster children living in their home. One of these children, T.D., also known as J., had been placed in the Petitioner's home by the Department. The other, C.R., a three-month-old boy, had been privately placed in the home by Florida Baptist at the request of the child's mother, E.R., who was single. E.R. had placed her child in Florida Baptist care because she had enlisted in the United States Army and was undergoing basic training out of state. E.R. had enlisted in order to provide her family a better life. It was initially anticipated that E.R. would be gone six months, but due to injuries sustained during basic training, she was actually gone for eight or nine months. There was no evidence of abuse, neglect or abandonment on E.R.'s part. During C.R.'s stay, Petitioners developed a negative impression of E.R. They did not think that E.R. called or wrote frequently enough. Petitioners had commented to Florida Baptist staff that E.R. was an unfit mother, that Petitioners provided C.R. with a better home than E.R. could, that E.R. did not love C.R., and that Petitioners could love C.R. more than E.R. could. Petitioners' opinion was based on their belief that no really good mother would take a job which required her to be away from her child for extended periods and a belief that C.R.'s grandmother was physically abusive towards C.R. Unfortunately, Petitioners let their beliefs about appropriate parenting interfere in their duties as foster parents to aid in reunification of a child with that child's legal parents. Florida Baptist staff also believed that Petitioners had become too attached to C.R., which caused them to attempt to undermine the Department's later attempts to reunify mother and child at the planned time E.R. would return from basic training and be able to provide a home to C.R. In late July 2001, Florida Baptist staff also became concerned about other behavior exhibited by Petitioners involving confidentiality issues and concerned that the Department had removed T.D. (aka "J.") from Petitioners' home. The behavior concerning confidentiality arose because Mrs. Zapata had discussed the fitness of E.R. to be C.R.'s custodial parent with a Department employee. C.R. was not a Department placement. However, it should be noted that the discussion was with a Department employee involved in the fostering program. Such an employee could reasonably be viewed as a person to report any suspected abuse or neglect to. In this instance, the conversation did not involve a report of abuse or neglect, but concerned Petitioners' belief that E.R. was not a good mother. On the other hand, the evidence was unclear whether the same confidentiality requirements regarding public placements by the Department appertain to private placements by the parents. The incident does cast doubt on Petitioners' awareness and desire to comply with privacy considerations should they be licensed by the Department. During the month of July 2001, T.D., also known as "J.", lived in Petitioner's home. T.D. was a little less than a year old at the time and had been placed in Petitioner's home by the Department because of ongoing juvenile dependency proceedings. On July 31 or August 1, 2001, the Department counselor, Wendy Cheney, picked T.D. up at Petitioner's home to take him to a doctor's appointment. Ms. Cheney noticed that there were crumbs and dirt in the car seat in which Petitioners had placed T.D. Ms. Cheney also noticed that T.D.'s clothes and diaper bag had a strong odor of spoiled milk. A crust also appeared on the nipple of the baby bottle and the eye medicine bottle Mrs. Zapata gave her to take with T.D. to the physician's appointment. During the preceding month, Ms. Cheney had visited Petitioners' home on at least a weekly basis to monitor T.D.'s situation. On many of these occasions, Ms. Cheney also observed that T.D.'s clothes had the same sour milk smell she experienced during the doctor's appointment. She also noticed during these visits that the nipples of T.D.'s baby bottles were not properly covered. On one occasion, Ms. Cheney saw T.D. drop his pacifier and then observed Mrs. Zapata pick it up and replace it in T.D.'s mouth without washing it off. This is of particular concern, as Petitioners had a long-haired dog whose hair was apparent on the floor of Petitioners' home. The Department removed T.D. from Petitioners' home because of these observations. Again, these observations cast serious doubt on the quality of hygienic care provided by Petitioners to foster children. There was no evidence offered to contradict the apparent lack of good hygienic care provided to T.D. However, there was also no evidence that Petitioners' care of T.D. constituted neglect or abuse of T.D., since a finding of neglect or abuse requires demonstration of harm or significantly dangerous conditions. Because of these concerns, Florida Baptist staff agreed that C.R. should be removed from Petitioners' home at least until these issues sorted themselves out. On August 1, 2001, Florida Baptist social worker Sue Kiser telephoned Mr. Zapata and scheduled an appointment for 4:30 p.m., on August 2, 2001, to discuss the reunification of C.R. with E.R. Later that day, Florida Baptist staff decided that since E.R. had recently returned from basic training, the optimum way of accomplishing reunification was to have E.R. meet Ms. Kiser and C.R. at a previously scheduled medical appointment on August 2, 2001, following which C.R. and E.R. would stay together at another foster home. Florida Baptist social worker, Jackie Barksdale, communicated this plan by telephone to Mr. Zapata on August 1, 2001. Mr. Zapata became angry and stated that he refused to allow C.R. to leave his home and go to visit with E.R. He accused Ms. Barksdale of "screwing with" C.R.'s life and committing "child abuse." He promised that "heads would roll" and disparaged E.R.'s family. Ms. Zapata then got on the telephone. She also accused Ms. Barksdale of child abuse and threatened to call the abuse hotline on Florida Baptist. Since no abuse reports were made by Petitioners, these threats were made as a bluff in an attempt to coerce Florida Baptist to leave C.R. with Petitioners. Given this conduct, the staff of Florida Baptist felt they had little choice but to remove C.R. from Petitioner's home. C.R. was removed from Petitioners' home on August 2, 2001. C.R. stayed in the other foster home without incident for about five weeks. C.R. and E.R. were then reunited, and continue to live together as a family. No reports of any problems between C.R. and E.R. have been received since that time. These facts clearly demonstrate Petitioners' unwillingness to cooperate in reunification plans for a child and mother. Petitioners permitted their low opinion regarding C.R.'s mother to interfere with their duty as foster parents. There was no evidence that Petitioners' attitude regarding the parents of foster children would not cause future interference in reunification efforts should their application for licensure be granted. An abused child, V.V., was placed in shelter care with Petitioners. V.V. had sustained a broken arm from abuse she had suffered. She stayed less than three days with Petitioners because her crying kept them up at night and interfered with Mrs. Zapata's home schooling of her biological children. Petitioners acted appropriately in requesting the removal of the child when it became apparent that the placement could not work out and does not demonstrate a lack of qualification for licensure. Finally, a pregnant teenage girl who wished to place her child with Florida Baptist wanted to see the home her child was to live in. Florida Baptist arranged for the girl to look at Petitioners' home. After the visit, Petitioners asked Florida Baptist never to ask them to submit to such an inspection, as they felt they were under some heightened level of scrutiny. Florida Baptist staff explained that parents frequently made this request, and Petitioners repeated that they did not wish to undergo it again. Petitioners request is troubling since one of the duties of the foster parent is to work with the biological parent of a foster child. Again, Petitioners' negative attitudes toward the parents of foster children demonstrate that Petitioners' application for licensure should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the application for a foster care license submitted by Petitioners Alfonso and Lynda Zapata. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Room 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Alfonso Zapata Lynda Zapata 1947 Treeline Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Paul F. Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license because “skinny dipping” with a foster child at the foster home violates Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13. (All section references are to Florida Statutes (2001). All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. A foster home license is valid for a period of one year and must be renewed annually. Various privatized entities supervise licensed foster homes, review applications for foster home licenses, and make recommendations to Petitioner regarding the applications. However, the recommendations are not binding on Petitioner. Petitioner, rather than the private entity, is the licensing agency. For example, Petitioner rejected the recommendation from the private entity with responsibility for reviewing the application at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner first issued a foster home license to Respondent on January 28, 2000. Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a therapeutic foster home. A therapeutic license authorized Respondent to operate a foster home for children with psychological or emotional disorders and for children without such disorders. Therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Personal Enrichment through Mental Health, Inc. (PEMHS). PEMHS recommended that Petitioner issue the original foster home license on January 28, 2000, and a renewal license that Petitioner issued on January 28, 2001, for the second year. The second therapeutic foster home license expired on January 27, 2002. Petitioner never took action to discipline or revoke Respondent’s therapeutic foster home license. In July 2001, Respondent applied for a non- therapeutic foster home license. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorizes a licensee to operate a foster home only for children without psychological or emotional disorders. Non-therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Family Continuity Programs (Family Continuity). Family Continuity recommended that Petitioner approve the application for a non-therapeutic foster home license. However, Petitioner did not follow the recommendation of Family Continuity and denied the application. Petitioner's denial of Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is the proposed agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is not an application for a new license. Rather, it is an application for renewal of an existing license. Both the therapeutic license that Respondent held at the time of the application and the non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorize the licensee to operate a foster home for children without psychological or emotional disorders. By applying for a non-therapeutic foster home license before the expiration of his therapeutic foster home license, Respondent sought to renew his license to operate a foster home for children without psychological and emotional disorders. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks does not impose any requirements in addition to those that Respondent had already satisfied when Petitioner granted the therapeutic license to Respondent. The requirements for the therapeutic license are more stringent than those that must be met to qualify for a non-therapeutic license. The requirements for a therapeutic license are more comprehensive, and Petitioner requires an applicant for a therapeutic license to have more training than an applicant for a non-therapeutic license. A non-therapeutic license does not impose requirements in addition to those imposed for a therapeutic license. Petitioner proposes to deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license on the sole ground that Respondent went "skinny dipping" with two minor males. One of those males was a foster child assigned to Respondent. The foster child is a victim of past sexual abuse and has psychological and emotional disorders. The child suffers from oppositional defiance disorder and mood disorder. The symptoms of the disorders include self-injury, such as head banging, aggression, anger, and low self-esteem. However, many of the behavioral problems diminished during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. The "skinny-dipping" events occurred between six and nine times during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. During that time, the foster child was between 12 and 14 years old. The foster child swam nude in the swimming pool at Respondent's residence and bathed nude in the hot tub adjacent to the pool. On some of those occasions, Respondent was nude in the hot tub and swimming pool with the foster child and at other times the two were in the swimming pool and hot tub independently of each other while both were nude. The local sheriff's office investigated the foster home and found no indicators of abuse. Once PEMHS learned of the "skinny dipping" events, neither PEMHS nor Petitioner sought to revoke Respondent's therapeutic foster home license or to provide Respondent with remedial training. Rather, PEMHS removed the foster child from the foster home and refused to assign any more foster children to Respondent's foster home. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner sought the post-hearing deposition testimony of Dr. Cotter for several purposes. One of those purposes was to show the impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events. Another purpose was to show that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. The ALJ sustained Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the expert deposition testimony for the purpose of showing the impact on the foster child and for the purpose of showing that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter could not render an opinion concerning the actual impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events or whether those events were actually intended by Respondent as "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter did not intend to evaluate either the foster child or Respondent before rendering his opinions and, in fact, never evaluated either individual. Any expert opinion by Dr. Cotter concerning "grooming behavior" for pedophilia was not relevant to the grounds stated in the Notice of Denial. That expert opinion was relevant only to grounds not stated in the Notice of Denial. Nudity in a swimming pool and hot tub are not synonymous with "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Nudity and "grooming behavior" for pedophilia are separate grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license to operate a foster home. Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice prior to the administrative hearing that Petitioner sought to deny the renewal of Respondent's license on the separate ground that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a state agency from notifying a regulated party of the allegations against the party and then, at the hearing, proving-up other allegations. One of the primary functions of an ALJ is to assure that an administrative hearing is a fair hearing. Respondent was not prepared at the administrative hearing to submit evidence, including expert testimony, to refute any allegation not stated in the Notice of Denial. The admission of evidence relevant to allegations not stated in the Notice of Denial would have required a continuance of the administrative hearing to provide Respondent with an opportunity to refute the allegation. A continuance would have denied Respondent a remedy during the period of continuance, increased the economic burden on Respondent, and frustrated judicial economy. Nothing prevents Petitioner from bringing a separate proceeding against the licensee based on the allegation that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. The ALJ limited the testimony of Dr. Cotter to those grounds for denial that Petitioner stated in the Notice of Denial. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial states: After careful review and consideration, your application has been denied. Our decision is based on the following: Your admission that you and two minor boys, one of which was a foster child under your supervision, participated in several "skinny dipping" incidents during your recent licensure as a foster parent for Pinellas Enrichment Through Mental Health Services (PEMHS). As you are aware, the nature of a boy's early experiences may affect the development of his sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Therefore, foster parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities appropriate to the child's age. "Skinny dipping" in a hot tub with two minor boys violates the intent of this rule. These incidents reflect poor judgment for a person who is a licensed foster parent. Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Notice of Denial essentially states four grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license. One ground is the impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Another ground is nudity between a foster parent and a foster child. A third ground is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. The remaining ground is that Respondent provided recreational activities that were not appropriate to the foster child's age. No evidence shows that the "skinny dipping" events had any adverse impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Dr. Cotter did not evaluate the foster child to determine the actual impact of the events on the foster child. Contrary to the statements in the Notice of Denial, Petitioner's representative testified at the hearing that Petitioner did not consider the impact on the child that resulted from skinny dipping with Respondent. The preponderance of evidence shows that the actual impact of the foster care provided by Respondent during the 15 months in which the "skinny dipping" events occurred was positive. Many of the foster child's behavioral problems greatly diminished. The foster child made remarkable progress in his behavior both at home and at school. The foster child bonded with Respondent, and Respondent was an exemplary foster parent. The placement of the child with Respondent was so successful that Family Continuity published an article in their magazine about the successful match between the foster child and Respondent. Family Continuity considers Respondent to be an exemplary foster parent and wishes to have Respondent in its foster care program. If Petitioner grants the application for renewal, Family Continuity intends to return the foster child to Respondent for adoption. The second ground stated in the Notice of Denial is nudity between the foster parent and foster child. Without considering the impact on the foster child, Petitioner determined that being naked in the presence of a foster child, without more, was sufficient to close a foster home, remove a child, and revoke a foster home license. Petitioner cited no written statute or rule that prohibits nudity between a foster parent and foster child; or that establishes intelligible standards for regulating such nudity. Petitioner failed to submit competent and substantial evidence to explicate an unwritten policy that prohibits or regulates nudity. Rather, some evidence shows that nudity between foster parents and foster children is generally unavoidable and common. The third ground stated in the Notice of Denial is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. Several witnesses at the hearing and Dr. Cotter opined that Respondent exercised poor judgment. It is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner exercised poor judgment because Petitioner cited no written rule or policy that defines or prohibits "poor judgment." For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner must base a denial of a license application on a finding that the applicant violated a specific statute or rule. Petitioner cannot use the Notice of Denial to invent requirements that are not authorized by statute or rule. Petitioner cited no statute or rule that defines "poor judgment" or that establishes intelligible standards to guide the discretionary determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment. In the absence of intelligible standards, the determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment is necessarily an exercise of unbridled agency discretion. The use of unbridled agency discretion to make findings of fact violates fundamental principles of due process. Unbridled agency discretion creates the potential that agency decision-makers may define poor judgment by relying on their personal predilections rather than on those standards authorized by the legislature. Even if it were determined that poor judgment is a standard authorized by the legislature and that Respondent violated that standard, the determination is not dispositive of whether Petitioner should renew Respondent's license to operate a foster home. For example, representatives for Family Continuity and PEMHS agreed in their testimony that Respondent exercised poor judgment. However, Family Continuity recommends that Petitioner issue the non- therapeutic foster home license while PEMHS recommends against renewal of the license. The remaining allegation in the Notice of Denial is that "skinny dipping" is not an age-appropriate recreational activity. Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8a. states: 8. Recreation and community. a. The substitute parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities for children. The activities must be appropriate to the child's age and abilities. Swimming in a swimming pool and bathing in a hot tub are recreational activities within the meaning of Rule 65C- 13.010(1)(a)8a. Swimming nude and bathing nude in a hot tub with a nude adult are not appropriate for a child who is between 12 and 14 years old and whose psychological and emotional abilities are diminished by past sexual abuse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8 and granting Respondent’s application for a therapeutic foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gary A. Urso, Esquire 7702 Massachusetts Avenue New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Respondent's license to operate a family foster home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating foster home licenses in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Geraldine H. Daniels, operated a licensed foster care home at 2625 Northwest Third Street, Pompano Beach, Florida, from November 1994 until September 1998. At all times during such period the Respondent held a valid foster care license that expired on or about November 7, 1998. The Respondent sought to renew the foster care license but was denied by the Petitioner. The denial was timely challenged and the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. Foster home parents receive a "board rate" for children placed in their homes. This rate is to provide financial assistance to the foster home parent so that the child's needs may be met. A minor child known in this record as W.S. was placed in the Respondent's care in January 1998. The Respondent was paid the board rate for W.S. for the months of January through June 1998. During the same period of time, the Respondent collected SSI benefits for the child W.S. from the Social Security Administration. Such payments totaled $2,964. A second minor, P.H., was placed in the Respondent's foster care home in January 1998. The Respondent was paid the Department board rate for P.H. for January through September 1998. The Respondent applied for and received SSI benefits for P.H. beginning in July 1998. Although the Department paid the Respondent the monthly board rate for the minor, she collected the additional sums from SSI through December 1998. In August 1998 the Department notified the Respondent that she was not allowed to collect SSI benefits for children in her care. Subsequent to the notice, the Respondent continued to accept SSI benefits for P.H. The Department serves as the legal custodian for the children within the foster care program. As such, it is entitled to the SSI benefits for children within the system. Foster parents are entitled to the board rate that is established by the Department's uniform rate for dependent children. The Respondent made reimbursements to the Department after her home was closed in September 1998 due to the alleged fraudulent activity and lack of interaction with the children placed in the home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the Respondent's request for renewal of the foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Geraldine H. Daniels 2625 Northwest Third Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent, Delores Wilson, committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, whether her foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a foster parent in Florida, in or about 2003, after she applied for and was granted a foster care license through Camelot Community Care, Inc. (Camelot), a foster parent licensing agency located in Tampa, Florida. Prior to receiving a foster care license through Camelot, Respondent signed a Letter of Agreement with Camelot. Pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Agreement, Respondent agreed to comply with Camelot's policies. Additionally, the letter advised Respondent that if she violated the policies, foster children would be removed from her home, and the Department would make decisions regarding the revocation of her license. After Respondent was licensed, two foster children, T. and D., were placed in her home. T., a girl, was placed in Respondent's home in November 2003, and D., a boy, was placed there in December 2003. In November 2004, Camelot staff met with Respondent to discuss the foster children who had been placed in her home. At the time of this meeting, D. was 15 or 16 years old and T., who was about 18 years old, was pregnant and due to deliver the baby in a few months. D. had a history of sexually acting out. Because of D.'s history, Camelot's policy was that D. not be placed in a home with younger children. In light of D.'s history and Camelot's policy related thereto, during the November 2004 meeting, Camelot staff told Respondent that when T.'s baby was born, the baby could not live in the same house with D. Therefore, Camelot staff advised Respondent that she would have to choose whether she wanted to continue to work with D. (have D. remain in her home) or assist T. with her baby. Respondent was also told to notify Camelot when the baby was born. In December 2004, Respondent was informed that it was likely that T.'s baby would be adopted or put in foster care upon birth due to T.'s extensive disabilities. Respondent had also been told that the baby would not be given to the mother while she was in the hospital. On January 29 or 30, 2005, T., who was then 19 years old, gave birth to her baby at a hospital. It is unknown what happened at the hospital to alter the proposed adoption or foster care plan for the baby. However, while T. was in the hospital, the baby was given to her. On or about February 1, 2005, T. and the baby left the hospital. Both T. and her baby then went to Respondent's home and lived with her. The reason Respondent allowed T. and the baby to stay with her was because she wanted to help T. Despite regular communications with Camelot staff during the time period after the baby was born, Respondent never told anyone associated with Camelot or the Department that T. had given birth to the baby. Camelot found out about the birth of the baby only after being notified "indirectly" by another waiver support coordinator. D's initial placement with Respondent remained unchanged until February 7, 2005, when Camelot first received reports that T.'s baby was living with Respondent. On that day, Camelot removed D. from Respondent's home. On February 16, 2005, Camelot staff, D.'s waiver support coordinator, a Hillsborough Kids, Inc., case manager, and Respondent met to discuss the situation which resulted in D.'s being removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005. At this meeting, the subjects of the November 2004 and December 2004 meetings described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, were also reviewed and discussed. A summary of the February 16, 2005, meeting was reported in a letter dated February 28, 2005, written by Camelot's clinical director, who attended that meeting. A copy of the letter was furnished to several persons who attended the meeting, including Respondent. The letter expressly stated that anyone who had further comments or concerns should contact the clinical director. Respondent never contacted the clinical director or anyone at Camelot regarding the contents of the February 28, 2005, letter. The discussion at the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on D. and the circumstances surrounding his removal from Respondent's home. Camelot staff specifically discussed Respondent's decision to allow T. and T.'s baby to live with Respondent, after being told that this should not happen and her failure to notify Camelot that the baby had been born and was in her home. During this meeting, Respondent never denied the foregoing facts. Rather, Respondent explained that she allowed T. and her baby to stay with her was so that she (Respondent) could help T. As a result of Respondent's failure to disclose to Camelot staff that T. had given birth to the baby and that both T. and the baby were living with Respondent, Camelot placed Respondent's foster home license on inactive status in or about late February 2005. Camelot advised Respondent of this decision at the February 16, 2005, meeting. In addition to placing Respondent's license on inactive status, Camelot also recommended that Respondent not be re-licensed as a foster parent. Respondent's foster care license was set to expire on July 31, 2005. After Respondent's foster care license issued by Camelot expired, she applied to Florida Mentor, another foster care licensing agency, for licensure as a foster parent. Florida Mentor reviewed Respondent's application for foster care licensure. As part of its review, Florida Mentor conducted a home study, the results of which were summarized in a report titled, "Annual Re-Licensing Home Study-2005" (Home Study Report or Report), which was completed on or about October 27, 2005. During the review process, Florida Mentor learned that Respondent had been previously licensed by Camelot and that the license had been placed on inactive status and allowed to expire. Based on information obtained from the Department's licensure file on Respondent and/or information provided by Respondent, Florida Mentor also learned about the circumstances discussed in paragraph 13, that caused Camelot to remove a foster child from Respondent's home and to place her foster care license on inactive status. Florida Mentor staff met with Respondent and discussed the situation involving D., T., and T.'s baby that occurred when she was licensed by Camelot. Respondent did not deny that she had violated Camelot's policy and had brought T. and T's baby to her home when D. was still there. Instead, Respondent acknowledged that she realized that her decision to bring T.'s baby home resulted in her clients being removed from her home and Camelot's decision to place her license on inactive status. Notwithstanding Respondent's admitting that she had failed to adhere to Camelot's policy regarding allowing T.'s baby in her home when D. was still there, she expressed to the Florida Mentor staff her desire to continue to work as a foster parent. Florida Mentor staff acknowledged Respondent's desire to serve as a foster parent. However, in light of her failure to comply with Camelot's policies and procedures, Florida Mentor staff discussed with Respondent the importance of communication and honesty with the foster care agency and the adherence to the policies and decisions of the agency. Florida Mentor considered several factors in its review of Respondent's application for a foster care license. These factors included Respondent's prior foster care experience with Camelot, including her admission that her violation of Camelot's policy was the reason her license was placed on inactive status; Respondent's statement of her desire to be a foster parent; and her apparent understanding that it was important that she comply with the policies of the foster care agency. Based on its review of the application and the findings and conclusions in the home study report, Florida Mentor recommended that Respondent be re-licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Based on Florida Mentor's recommendation, Respondent was granted a new foster parent license, which was effective on November 1, 2005. It is that license which is at issue in this proceeding. Prior to issuance of Respondent's November 1, 2005, foster care license, Respondent was required to sign a Bilateral Service Agreement (Bilateral Agreement). That Bilateral Agreement set forth the terms and conditions with which all affected parties, the Department, the foster care agency, and Respondent must comply. The Bilateral Agreement was executed by Respondent and by a Florida Mentor staff person, on behalf of the Department, on October 4, 2005. Pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement, Respondent agreed to "notify the Department immediately of a potential change in . . . living arrangements or family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well being." In November 2005, after Respondent received her new foster care license, foster children were placed in Respondent's home. One child, M.J., was placed with Respondent on November 15, 2005. Two other children, S.C. and M.C., who were brothers, were place with Respondent on December 19, 2005. On January 8, 2006, M.J., S.C., and M.C., the three foster children who had been placed with Respondent in November and December 2005, were still living in Respondent's home. On January 8, 2006, a child protective investigator with the Department conducted a home study of Respondent's home. The purpose of the home study was to determine whether Respondent's home was a safe placement for her two grandchildren, and, if so, should the grandchildren be placed with Respondent. A placement for the two children was necessary because they had been taken from their mother, Respondent's daughter, for alleged abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The child protective investigator completed the home study on January 8, 2006, and reported the information she obtained during the home study on a seven-page Department form titled, "Caregiver Home Study." The completed Caregiver Home Study document was signed by Respondent and her son-in-law, Richard Davis, on January 8, 2006. Two categories included on the Caregiver Home Study form required Respondent to provide information regarding members of her household. One of the categories on the form required Respondent to provide the names of adults living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home. The other category required that Respondent also list or provide the names, sex, and ages of children living in her home. On the Caregiver Home Study form, Richard Davis, Respondent's son-in-law, was listed as an adult who lived in or was frequently in Respondent's home. Based on information Respondent provided to the child protective investigator on January 8, 2006, the child protective investigator recorded on the Caregiver Home Study form that there were two foster children living in Respondent's home, A.C. and his brother, M.C. On January 8, 2006, in addition to A.C. and M.C., there was a third foster child, M.J., also living with Respondent. However, although there were three foster children living with Respondent on January 8, 2006, she never told the child protective investigator that M.J. was living in her home. Therefore, M.J. was not listed on the Caregiver Home Study form as a child living in Respondent's home. The Caregiver Home Study form required that Mr. Davis, the other adult living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home, and Respondent sign the completed form. Both Respondent and Mr. Davis signed the Caregiver Home Study form on January 8, 2006. By signing the form, both Respondent and Mr. Davis acknowledged that to the best of their knowledge, "I have given the Department truthful information on all questions asked of me." On March 14, 2006, the assigned caseworker for A.C. and his brother M.C., two of the three foster children in Respondent's home, made an unannounced home visit to Respondent's home to check on those two children. During this visit, the case worker observed A.C. and M.C., as well as two other children there. The other two children the caseworker observed were Respondent's grandchildren who had been placed in Respondent's home after the Caregiver Home Study was completed on January 8, 2006. Respondent's two grandchildren had been placed with her since January 2006 and were still living with her on March 14, 2006. However, during the case worker's unannounced visit on March 14, 2006, Respondent told the caseworker that the two grandchildren did not live with her, but that she was babysitting them until their mother got off from work. After the March 14, 2006, visit to Respondent's home, the caseworker searched HomeSafe Net to determine the status of Respondent's grandchildren. That search revealed that the grandchildren were actually sheltered and living with Respondent. The caseworker also contacted an employee of the Safe Children Coalition, an agency which has a contract with the Department, to obtain information regarding the status of Respondent's grandchildren. An employee with Safe Children Coalition confirmed that the Sheriff's Office had placed Respondent's grandchildren with Respondent on January 8, 2006, and that, as of March 14, 2006, Respondent's grandchildren were still living with her. At the time of the March 14, 2006, 30-day visit, and at no time prior thereto, Florida Mentor was unaware that Respondent's grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent never notified Florida Mentor or the Department that her grandchildren had been placed with her and were living in her home. By failing to notify the Department or Florida Mentor of the change in the family composition, the people living in the home, Respondent violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. In order to provide for the safety and health of all the children placed in Respondent's care, it is imperative that the agency placing the foster children be immediately advised of any potential or actual change in the family composition, those living in the home. Since being licensed as a foster parent in Florida, Respondent repeatedly disregarded her obligation to advise the foster care agency of important and required changes. In three instances, Respondent failed to inform the appropriate agency of the changes in the composition of persons living in her home. The second and third incidents occurred after and while Respondent was licensed by Florida Mentor, after she had been specifically advised of the importance and need to communicate and be honest with the foster care agency and to adhere to the agency's policies. First, Respondent failed to advise Camelot staff when T.'s baby was born, and Respondent allowed T. to bring her newborn baby to Respondent's home to live. Respondent ignored or disregarded the directive of Camelot staff, who had told her that T.'s baby could not live in Respondent's home because of the sexual history of D., a foster child placed in Respondent's home. Respondent testified that D. was not in her home on February 1, 2005, when T.'s newborn baby was brought home, because Camelot had placed D. in respite care. According to Respondent, D. returned for one day, before he was permanently removed from her home and placed in another foster home. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 45 above, is not credible and is contrary to the competent evidence which established that D. was removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005, and then placed in another home. Even if D. were not physically in Respondent's house when T.'s baby was there, because D. was still a foster child placed in Respondent's home, she was responsible for notifying the Department of the change in the composition of her household. However, Respondent failed to notify Camelot or the Department and, in doing so, violated a Department rule and a specific directive of the foster care agency. In the second incident, Respondent failed to disclose to the child protective investigator that she had three foster children. Respondent testified that she was not untruthful to the child protective investigator about the number of foster children who were living in her home. According to Respondent, she never said how many foster children lived in her home. Instead, Respondent testified that the child protective investigator made that presumption after she (the investigator) saw two "yellow jackets" (files about the foster children) on a table in Respondent's house. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 47, is not credible and ignores the fact that Respondent signed the Caregiver Home Study form indicating that she had only two foster children living in the home. Moreover, having served as a foster parent for about ten years and in two states, Respondent knew the importance and significance of providing accurate information regarding the composition of the family and how that information might impact additional placements (i.e., the placement of her grandchildren) in Respondent's home. In the third instance, while licensed by Florida Mentor, Respondent failed to notify that agency or the Department of a change in the family composition (i.e., who is in the home) that occurred on January 8, 2006, when Respondent's two grandchildren were placed in her home. The agency first learned that Respondent's grandchildren lived with her only after a case worker made an unannounced visit to Respondent's home on March 14, 2006, and saw Respondent's grandchildren there, and later verified that the grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent does not deny that she failed to notify the Department that her grandchildren were living with her. However, Respondent testified that she never told the case worker that her grandchildren did not live with her and that she was babysitting them while their mother worked. This testimony by Respondent is not credible and is contrary to the credible testimony of the case worker and the supporting documentary evidence. Respondent was aware of the policy that required her to immediately notify the Department or foster care agency of a potential change in family composition. In fact, Respondent signed a Bilateral Agreement in which she agreed to provide such notification to the Department or the Department's representative. Nonetheless, on two occasions, after being licensed by Florida Mentor and having foster children placed in her home, Respondent failed to notify the Department of actual changes in her family's composition. Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement that required her to notify the Department or the foster care agency of any potential, and certainly any actual, changes in her family composition. This provision is designed to better ensure the health and safety of the foster children placed with foster parents, such as Respondent. There is no indication that the children placed in Respondent's home at the time relevant to this proceeding were harmed or injured. Nonetheless, the harm which the Department's policy is designed to prevent is not only possible, but more likely to occur when the composition of the foster parent changes and the Department is not notified of that change. Without such knowledge, the Department lacks the information it needs to make decisions regarding the placement and/or continued placement of foster children in a particular foster home. As a result of Respondent's failing to provide information relative to her family composition, she also failed to provide information necessary and required to verify her compliance with the Department's rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Delores Wilson's, foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.
