The Issue Whether the application of the Fort Pierce Pilots Association for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Fort Pierce should be granted in whole or in part, or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the hearings on April 26- 28 and August 23, 2011, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties Petitioner ACL is the largest user of the Port of Fort Pierce (the Port). ACL operates three vessels on a regular "liner" schedule operating six days per week from the Port to a few foreign ports. Approximately 95 percent of the vessel traffic at the Port is generated by these three vessels. ACL is affected by the rates of pilotage set for the Port since it is required by chapter 310, Florida Statutes, to utilize and compensate a state-licensed pilot each time one of its vessels enters or departs the Port. The rates that must be paid by ACL are established by Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Pilotage Rate Review Committee. Accordingly, ACL is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the former Board's preliminary decision set forth in the Notice of Intent. Petitioner IRT owns the terminal at the Port, as well as warehouses, offices and equipment at the Port. The pilotage rate increase preliminarily approved by the Board in the Notice of Intent will make the pilotage rates at the Port higher for the small vessels which can utilize the Port than the rates these same size vessels would pay at the Port of Palm Beach, Port Canaveral and/or Port Everglades. This is significant because IRT competes to attract new business from vessel owners and/or operators whose vessels call on South Florida. Accordingly, IRT is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the Board's preliminary decision set forth in the Notice of Intent. The Pilotage Rate Review Committee (formerly the Pilotage Rate Review Board), Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR), is a state agency created by section 310.151, Florida Statutes. It is established as part of the Board of Pilot Commissioners, and consists of seven members. With regard to an application for a change in pilotage rates, the Committee must investigate and determine whether a rate change will result in fair, just and reasonable rates of pilotage pursuant to chapter 310, Florida Statutes, and rules implementing those provisions. The decisions of the Committee however, are made independent of the Board of Pilot Commissioners, and are not appealable to the Board of Pilot Commissioners. Intervenor Fort Pierce Pilots Association (FPPA) is an association of harbor pilots with one member, William Wetzel, LLC. Captain William Wetzel is, in turn, the sole member of William Wetzel, LLC and is the state-licensed pilot for the Port. The FPPA, through Captain Wetzel and occasionally a cross-licensed pilot from the Port of Palm Beach, perform the pilotage services at the Port. The Florida State Pilots Association, Inc. (FSPA) has a business address in Tallahassee, Florida. FSPA is a voluntary organization representing the interests of Florida’s 97 state- licensed harbor pilots, who participate in the FSPA through the 11 local pilot associations that serve Florida’s deepwater ports. The Piloting Profession Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, sets forth a comprehensive body of regulation addressing the practice of piloting in this state. The purpose of such regulation, as elsewhere in the country, is to ensure the efficient movement of maritime commerce while guarding against vessel incidents that could injure persons and property, as well as the state’s economy and environment. From this standpoint, the most dangerous part of any sea voyage for the ship and for the public at large is when the ship is moving into or out of port. In the maritime industry, the crew of a vessel, which is employed by the ship’s owner or operator, is under significant pressure to bring that vessel into and out of port efficiently and without delays. In light of the risks posed if those economic interests were to override public safety, Florida, and every other state with a significant maritime industry, requires vessels to utilize the services of an independent state-licensed pilot. The pilot is a mariner with many years of experience who is thoroughly familiar with every facet of a particular port and who has the skills necessary to maneuver a wide variety of ships. Because the pilot is not employed by the vessel owner, the pilot can exercise independent judgment, free from the pressures normally associated with the ship’s business operations. The value added by the pilot in terms of safety is widely recognized throughout the maritime industry, as evidenced by the fact that even ships calling on U.S. ports for which a pilot is not required by state law, i.e., U.S.-flagged vessels, routinely use the services of the port’s state-licensed pilots. The risks faced by pilots are unique. Pilots are transferred from their pilot boat out at sea onto and off of large moving vessels. Once the pilot boat maneuvers alongside the vessel, the pilot typically boards the ship by stepping from the pilot boat onto a ladder hanging from the ship’s side. Unfortunately, pilots are frequently injured and sometimes killed in the course of this dangerous transfer, particularly in bad weather. One expert in the piloting profession testified that over the course of a 30-year career, a pilot has a one-in-20 chance of being killed in a boarding accident. Once on board, the pilot must familiarize himself or herself with the ship’s navigational equipment, performance characteristics, and mechanical condition. The pilot conducts a conference with the ship’s master, during which the two exchange technical information on the ship, as well as details of the planned passage. If the vessel is fit for the transit, the pilot then “takes the conn,” assuming navigational control of the vessel and directing the ship’s movements by giving verbal commands on steering and engine power to the ship’s crew. The crew will have varying levels of maritime experience and often speak little or no English. The pilot must deal with a wide variety of ships and equipment. The vast majority of ocean-going vessels are flagged in foreign countries rather than the U.S., thus avoiding a great deal of regulation, as well as taxation. Piloting Selection and Training A mariner wanting to become a state pilot in Florida must await an opening declared by the state’s Board of Pilot Commissioners in one or more ports where he or she has an interest in serving. If the mariner is determined to have sufficient experience and qualifications, the next step in the process of deputy pilot selection is successful completion of a very difficult written examination, designed and administered by the State of Florida. This comprehensive two-day examination encompasses International & Inland Rules of the Road, Seamanship & Shiphandling, Federal & State Pilotage Laws, and port-specific Chart Work & Local Knowledge, and requires the candidate to reproduce from memory a complete and accurate chart of the port and its channels. These examinations are extremely difficult, and candidates will have typically spent several months and hundreds of hours in preparation. Only about 20 percent of those who sit for the exam will pass. The examination, however, is not one where the applicant is only required to achieve a minimum score to demonstrate basic competency. Rather, in Florida, the goal of the deputy pilot candidate is to achieve the top score among all candidates taking the exam. This is because the DBPR Secretary will be presented with a list of the top five scores on the exam and will typically appoint as the deputy pilot the person scoring highest. Once the DBPR Secretary has selected a deputy pilot to fill an opening at a Florida port, the deputy is issued a 12-month temporary certificate. The temporary certificate becomes permanent when the deputy has proven suitable in all respects for continued training as a state pilot. Once in receipt of the temporary certificate, the deputy pilot then begins a minimum two-year training program at the port, as approved and monitored by the Board of Pilot Commissioners. Under the supervision of the fully licensed pilots of the port, this training program allows the deputy pilot to initially handle smaller vessels of limited size and tonnage, with gradual increases in size and tonnage over time. While in training, the deputy earns only a portion of what a full pilot would earn. The Board of Pilot Commissioners approves each deputy pilot’s advancement to a higher level in the training program, after thorough review of the records and the recommendations of the local pilots in the port. Some deputy pilots “wash out” of training and fail to complete the program, never becoming pilots. Upon completion of all training, the deputy pilot must pass yet another rigorous exam administered by the state before he or she can be appointed and licensed by DBPR as a full state pilot for the specific port in which the deputy pilot has trained. The Rate Application and Review Process On or about March 30, 2009, the FPPA submitted an application (the Application) to the former Board, requesting an increase in pilotage rates at the Port. The Application sought an increase in the rates of pilotage at the Port over a four- year period, as follows: 157% in year one, 13.9% in year two, 16.7% in year three and 18.7% in year four. The total requested increase from year one to year five was 206%, from a $150.00 minimum fee before the Application, to a $608.00 minimum fee after the final requested year four rate increase. As prescribed by statute and the Committee’s rules, two contract consultants were assigned to be the Investigative Committee. One consultant, Richard Law, is a CPA, and has served as an investigative consultant on pilotage rate proceedings for DBPR for 16 years. The other consultant, Galen Dunton, is a retired Coast Guard commander with 18 years of experience as an investigative consultant for DBPR in pilotage matters. The Investigative Committee made its initial visit to the Port on July 10, 2009. During this process of investigation, several interested persons provided comments in opposition to the requested rate increase. Following the investigation, the Investigative Committee submitted its findings to the former Board on September 8, 2009. The FPPA requested the following pilotage rate increases in its application: Draft Charge $12.50 Year 1 $26.60 Year 2 $30.25 Year 3 $35.20 Year 4 $41.20 (min. of 10 feet) Tonnage $.015 (min. of 1667 GT) $.060 $.0685 $.080 $.098 Total Min. Fee $150.00 $386.00 $439.50 $512.00 $608.00 % Increase 157% 13.9% 16.7% 18.7% On December 11, 2009, at a Board public meeting, a number of interested persons provided comments and testimony in opposition to and in support of, the requested change in rates. Captain Wetzel, as well as representatives of both Petitioners, addressed the Board. The Investigative Committee included in its Report findings and comments relating to each of the criteria enumerated in section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes (2009). The Board reviewed the Investigative Committee’s findings and the statutory criteria and approved the requested rate increase for Year 1 only. The increases requested for Years 2, 3 and 4 were denied. The statutory criteria reviewed by both the Investigative Committee and the Board (now Committee) consisted of the following: (5)(a) In determining whether the requested rate change will result in fair, just, and reasonable rates, the board shall give primary consideration to the public interest in promoting and maintaining efficient, reliable, and safe piloting services. The board shall also give consideration to the following factors: The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "net income of pilots" refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. Reasonable operating expenses of pilots. Pilotage rates in other ports. The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing as that sought in pilots, it being recognized that in order to attract to the profession of piloting, and to hold the best and most qualified individuals as pilots, the overall compensation accorded pilots should be equal to or greater than that available to such individuals in comparable maritime employment. The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. Projected changes in vessel traffic. Cost of retirement and medical plans. Physical risks inherent in piloting. Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. § 310.151(5), Fla. Stat. On March 31, 2010, the Board issued a Notice of Intent to approve in part and deny in part the application by FPPA to increase the pilotage rates at the Port. In its decision, the Board determined findings of fact with respect to each of the criteria listed in section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes. In granting the FPPA’s requested rate increase for the first year the Board approved the following charges at the Port, effective May 1, 2010: A draft charge of $26.60 per draft foot, measured up to the next 1/10th foot, with a minimum charge for ten (10) feet; i.e., $266.00; A tonnage charge of $.0600 per Gross Registered Ton (GRT) with a minimum charge for 2000 GRT, i.e., $120.00; Docking/undocking fees are eliminated; Shifting rates are increased as follows: Same Slip - $250.00 Different Slip - $386.00 A towed barge charge of .0300 per GRT with no minimum charge. Pursuant to section 310.151(5)(a), the Committee “shall give primary consideration to the public interest in promoting and maintaining efficient, reliable, and safe piloting services” when dealing with a requested pilotage rate change. However, the Board is also required to consider additional specific factors in determining whether to approve or deny a requested rate change. Statutory Pilotage Rate Review Criteria The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. (section 310.151(5)(b)1, Florida Statutes) In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on page C-1 of the Investigative Committee Report. Among other things, the Investigative Committee observed with respect to this criterion: The pilots are essential to the safe movement of vessels within the pilotage waters of the State. In addition to their navigation and supervisory skills, they must be knowledgeable of local weather, hazards, silting, speed and direction of currents, and timing and direction of tidal movements. They provide development of safety and operational guidelines for the port operation and participate in the process of port and professional regulations. Petitioners assert that this record does not support a finding that the use of a state-licensed pilot at the Port is "essential" to safety at the port. Petitioners argue that the captains of ACL's three small vessels have more experience entering and exiting the Port than does Captain Wetzel, and that the use of a state-licensed pilot, although mandated by law, does not increase safety for ACL's vessels, the Port, or the public at large. Petitioner's contention in this regard is rejected. As noted above, harbor pilots must not only possess excellent navigational skills, they must also be knowledgeable of a host of constantly-changing variables that affect the safe transit of vessels within their home port. Moreover, even if the current captains of ACL's three vessels have more experience entering and exiting the Port than does Captain Wetzel, there is no assurance that those same captains will continue in the employ of ACL in the future. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion. A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, “net income of pilots” refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. (section 310.151(5)(b)2, Florida Statutes) There are approximately 1,200 state-licensed harbor pilots in the United States. The average compensation for a state-licensed pilot nationally is about $400,000.00 per year. However, state regulatory boards do not set pilot compensation, they set pilotage rates. Thus, a pilot’s compensation depends upon how much revenue is generated by the vessel traffic in that port, net of operating expenses. The pilot in a small port like Ft. Pierce would not be expected to make the same amount as a pilot in a larger port, such as Miami or Tampa. In these larger ports, large draft and tonnage vessels generate higher pilotage fees and this revenue supplements the cost of bringing in smaller vessels. In Ft. Pierce, that is not possible because of the physical limitations of the Port, which will not accommodate large vessels. Higher minimum rates therefore have to be set in Ft. Pierce because of the small size of the vessels, and to compensate a Palm Beach pilot (cross-licensed for Ft. Pierce) for making the two-hour plus drive to Ft. Pierce to handle a vessel if the Ft. Pierce pilot is unavailable for some reason. In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee, as reflected on page C-2 of the Investigative Committee Report, as corrected at the public hearing, which set the pilot’s net income for years 2007 and 2008 at $112,800.00 and $92,700.00 respectively. In the "Analysis and Decision" section of the Notice of Intent, the Board also stated: Further, the pilots are charged with maintaining or securing adequate pilot boats, office facilities and equipment, and other equipment and support services necessary for a modern, dependable piloting operation. Although the Pilot currently has an arrangement with the Port’s largest user regarding the use of a converted crew boat, the evidence presented to the Board shows that in some aspects this assignment has been less than satisfactory. The Board opines that an increase in pilotage rates sufficient to permit the Pilot to procure an adequate pilot boat and/or secure such services is warranted. (Notice of Intent, p. 10, 11) Compared to the typical piloting operation in which the pilots in a port provide their own pilot boat to ferry them to and from transiting ships, the Investigative Committee determined that Captain Wetzel’s operating expenses were very low, since ACL had been providing the pilot boat in Ft. Pierce. In its Notice of Intent, the Board approved the first year schedule of rate increases only, specifically noting that the increase was intended in part to address the unsatisfactory pilot boat arrangement between FPPA and ACL: Based upon these findings, the Board determines that the proposed three-year schedule of rate increases sought by the Pilot should not be granted in its entirety at this time. The Board finds that a more modest increase to account for the progressively higher operating costs, inflation, and to permit the Pilot to obtain or secure pilot boat services, will provide fair, just and reasonable rates, and will continue to ensure that sufficient back-up pilots will be available to serve Fort Pierce. Accordingly, the Board approves the requested first-year schedule of increase only. (Notice of Intent, p. 12) The FPPA application projected the pilot boat as an expense of $325,000.00, with annual depreciation of $32,500.00. After the issuance of the Board’s decision in March 2010, granting only the first year of the FPPA’s requested rate increase, circumstances dictated that the FPPA purchase a less expensive pilot boat than the one anticipated in the FPPA rate application.2/ Specifically, when Captain Wetzel began to look for a suitable pilot boat, he was significantly hindered by the pending challenge to the Board’s decision. Pursuant to section 310.151(4)(b), the difference between the old rate and the new rate for each vessel movement was being deposited into an escrow account pending resolution of the Petitioners’ challenge, so the increased cash flow could not be relied upon by a lender to secure the loan necessary to obtain the desired $325,000.00 boat. Captain Wetzel and the Petitioners discussed the possibility of continuing to use the Kacey Lynn (owned by I.R.T) as a pilot boat, but negotiations were unsuccessful. Captain Wetzel then had to obtain his own pilot boat and settle on getting a much less expensive one that will not be as durable or long-lived as necessary. Ultimately, FPPA purchased a temporary pilot boat from Ameracat for about $92,000.00 and it was delivered to Captain Wetzel in mid-May 2010. As noted, the evidence established that the type of pilot boat purchased by Captain Wetzel will have a shorter lifespan than a typical pilot boat, because it will not be able to withstand the banging and pounding that occurs when a pilot boat comes alongside a commercial vessel. In order to purchase the Ameracat pilot boat, Captain Wetzel had to withdraw money from his retirement account so he could pay cash for the boat. Petitioners do not take issue with the Board’s decision that an increase in pilotage rates in Ft. Pierce is warranted so that Captain Wetzel can procure an adequate pilot boat. However, they contend that Captain Wetzel’s decision to purchase a pilot boat that cost significantly less than the one contemplated in the Application results in undue income to Captain Wetzel, which should result in the rates being decreased to reflect reduced expenses, including the boat’s purchase price, maintenance costs and interest expense. As will be discussed in greater detail infra, FPPA’s projected costs as set forth in the Application were accurate at the time submitted. The evidence of record does not support a finding that Captain Wetzel intended to mislead the Board in the projected cost of $325,000.00 for a pilot boat, or that he does not intend to purchase a more durable replacement once the escrowed funds from the approved rate increase are released. Rather, given the circumstances of the administrative challenge to the rate increase, Captain Wetzel acted reasonably and of necessity in purchasing a less expensive, temporary pilot boat. Petitioners' contention that Captain Wetzel’s purchase of a pilot boat costing less than the one projected in his rate application will result in undue income to Captain Wetzel (justifying elimination or reduction in the approved rates) is not supported by the greater weight of evidence in this record, and is rejected. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the preceding paragraphs. Reasonable Operating Expenses of Pilots (section 310.151(5)(b)3, Florida Statutes) In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee shown on pages C-2 and C-3 of the Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Prior to the rate increase under challenge in this proceeding, the pilotage rates in effect at the Port were unchanged since their initial adoption in 1980 -– a minimum draft and tonnage charge of $150.00 plus a docking/undocking fee of $60.00, for a total minimum pilotage fee of $210.00. In late 2007, ACL stopped having the pilot perform docking and undocking of ACL’s vessels and discontinued payment of the corresponding $60.00 fee to the pilot, reducing the effective minimum pilotage fee for ACL and most other vessels to $150.00. A rate increase application in 2003 filed by the previous Ft. Pierce pilot was withdrawn, based upon an informal, unwritten agreement that Petitioners would provide an old crew boat formerly used on the Great Lakes (the Kacey Lynn) to ferry the pilot to and from vessels at no cost, dropping the $75.00 fee previously charged to the pilot for each use of the crew boat. At that time, the Port was primarily being served by cross-licensed pilots from other ports, as the permanent pilot in Ft. Pierce was injured and unable to continue working. In light of the circumstances, the cross-licensed pilots were not eager to invest in a pilot boat and other infrastructure, so use of the Kacey Lynn, while not ideally suited for safely transferring the pilot to or from a transiting ship, was a useful accommodation while a new permanent pilot was sought for Ft. Pierce. For non-ACL vessels, IRT billed the owners of some of those vessels from $75.00 up to $150.00 for the use of the Kacey Lynn to ferry the pilot to or from a ship. In the only other Florida port in which the pilots do not provide their own pilot boats, Pensacola, the pilot is ferried to and from transiting ships by a tug company that charges $400.00 per trip. As set forth in its application, FPPA’s projected pilot boat cost of $325,000.00 with $32,500.00 per year depreciation is reasonable, especially when compared to the costs of pilot boats serving other ports. Credible testimony established that a pilot boat in a major port would cost $1.2 million to $2 million, with annual maintenance costs typically at 5% of the purchase price. The pilot association in Jacksonville, Florida, recently spent $1.2 million on a pilot boat, while pilots in Miami purchased a pilot boat several years ago for approximately $600,000.00. More recently, the Miami pilots association rebuilt two of their pilot boats at a cost of approximately $350,000.00. In comparison to the cost of pilot boats in other ports, FPPA’s projected operating costs as set forth in its application are relatively conservative. As noted above, Captain Wetzel's purchase of a temporary pilot boat (with correspondingly lower operating expenses) for use during the pendency of this administrative challenge does not render the projected operating expenses in the application unreasonable. Pilotage Rates in Other Ports (section 310.151(5)(b)4, Florida Statutes In the Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on pages C- 4 through C-7 of the Investigative Committee Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Petitioners assert that Table 4 on page C-6 of the Investigative Committee Report understates the FPPA's revenue per handle hour by overstating the FPPA's average "handle time." "Handle time" is generally defined as the time "that the pilot takes the conn to the time he relinquishes it", i.e., the time that the pilot is actually directing the guidance of the navigation of a vessel. According to Petitioners, the average handle time for pilots operating in the Port is closer to 30 minutes per handle than the 1.5 hours per handle used by the Investigative Committee. When a handle time of 30 minutes per handle is applied, Petitioners argue, the FPPA is currently earning $370.00 per handle hour, rather than the $123.00 per handle hour shown in the Investigative Committee Report.3/ There is evidence in this record that until recently, there has not been a statewide standard for measuring handle times. Although the Board of the Florida State Pilots Association recently adopted a definition, the data appearing in Table 4 of the Investigative Committee Report relies upon older historical data (2007 and 2008), which in some cases may be outdated due to the change in the size of ships using various ports.4/ As such, it would be inappropriate to compare the Ft. Pierce revenue per handle hour using a handle time of 30 minutes without also updating the handle times of the other ports used in the comparison. Approval of the Year 1 rate increase would not create a competitive disadvantage at the Port. The pilotage fee is a very small and relatively insignificant factor in the overall decision on whether to bring a ship into a particular port. In light of the considerable operating costs of a commercial vessel, the $175.00 difference between the new minimum pilotage fee in Ft. Pierce and the lower minimum pilotage fee in Palm Beach (the closest competing port) would not be significant enough to warrant shifting a subject vessel from Ft. Pierce to Palm Beach. The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. (section 310.151(5)(b)5, Florida Statutes In the Notice of Intent the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on pages C7 and C8 of the Investigative Committee Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or as a supplement to, the facts relied on by the Board in its decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Time spent on actual piloting duty includes handle time, transit time to and from the vessel, and administrative time related to that handle. Time spent on other essential support services generally involve matters pertaining to the port in question, e.g., dealing with the Coast Guard on port security or safety issues, dealing with the Army Corp of Engineers regarding the ship channel, etc. In its Report, the Investigative Committee considered "handle time' to be the time the pilot is actually engaged in traveling to a ship, piloting the ship, and returning to home port, i.e., dock to dock. The Investigative Committee did not attempt to verify the historical data regarding handle time but did utilize a shorter figure of 1.5 hours per handle.5/ No compelling evidence was presented that indicates that this 1.5 hour handle time figure was grossly incorrect. While ACL operates a “liner service” with a published schedule that its ships adhere to most of the time, actual arrival and departure times for ACL ships frequently vary from this schedule. Moreover, the pilot must be available to respond to vessels requiring his assistance 24-hours a day, seven days a week. Although the Petitioners argue that actual handle time might make a part-time job for the Ft. Pierce pilot, it does not matter if it is an hour or two hours, it is still a huge time commitment throughout each week to be available and on call to serve the needs of the port. The Investigative Committee also observed: The schedule varies for each day of the week. On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays he must “mobilize” early in the mornings to meet vessels arriving at 7:00 A.M. and then re-mobilize later in the afternoon to handle the 5:00 P.M. departures. Consequently, the two-step mobilizations increase his daily time requirements by an amount greater than the average handle times. The schedule also requires additional standby time between some of the back-to-back handles. (Investigative Committee Report, P. C-7) The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing. (section 310.151(5)(b)5, Florida Statutes) In its Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee, reflected on page C-8 of the Investigative Committee Report, supplemented as follows: As was discussed in the Port Everglades Order, supra, the Board accepts the proposition that the pre-pilot career path is the same for persons who remain as senior bridge officers on American-flagged ships and for those who become pilots. As was noted in the Port Everglades Order, however, pilots are not employees but are rather professional consultants and self-employed business persons who take the risks and accept the benefits of such status. In addition, section 310.151(5)(b)6, F.S., sets the wage rate of “comparable professions” as the floor for pilot income – not the ceiling. As was also noted in the Port Everglades and Tampa Orders, the Board has accepted that the wage rate of senior masters on American-flagged ships varies greatly and, thus, the Board can find no specific number to use as the only acceptable “floor” for pilot compensation. The Board, thus, uses the range of masters’ salaries as a range of “floors” on pilots’ income to be applied depending on the amount of vessel traffic at a port, the characteristics of a port, and the need for pilotage services at a port. Thus, a pilot’s berth at the major ports, such as the Port of Tampa Bay, Port Everglades, Miami, Jacksonville or Palm Beach would be considered as akin to the most prestigious, responsible, and highly paid masters’ berths (Master, Mates and Pilots scale – c. $220,000.00 - $230,000.00 per year) while lesser ports, with correspondingly lesser amounts of traffic and need for pilotage services would have a lower “floor” for income. Nonetheless, the Board also finds that the pilotage rates need to be sufficient to ensure that licensed pilots remain willing and financially able to serve the ports of this State. As reflected in the Report of the Investigative Committee, the current Pilot’s schedule has grown to a full-time position, with no backup pilot available. Thus, the Pilot must rely on cross-licensed pilots from Palm Beach for backup, who currently earn substantially more at their home port. Accordingly, the Board finds that the rates must be increased sufficiently to continue to attract cross-licensed pilots to serve as back up at Fort Pierce, and eventually, if traffic warrants, candidates for a deputy pilot position. (Notice of Intent, pages 7, 8) The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. While background as a master or mate is useful, a pilot must possess superior close-quarter ship handling skills and the ability to handle a wide variety of vessels. Foreign licensed mariners are not allowed to become a pilot in Florida. There was contradictory evidence on the prevailing annual compensation for masters serving on US-flagged ships of comparable skill and standing to Florida state-licensed pilots, ranging from $143,000.00 - $181,000.00 (inclusive of wages and benefits) to $300,000.00 for union personnel. However, it is significant that these are salaried positions that do not require the employee to invest in infrastructure or training, or to directly participate in the economic risks of the business. Petitioners argue that there are other maritime industry positions, in addition to master of a U.S.-flagged vessel, which are comparable in professional skill and standing as that of a Florida state-licensed pilot. Specifically, Petitioners assert that masters and deck officers of inland vessels and U.S.-flagged integrated tug and barge units (ITBs) require a comparable level of professional skill and standing. Petitioners' witness on this issue opined that the master of an "upper end" inland vessel (e.g., jumbo barge) would make a salary ranging from $116,000.00 to $131,000.00, while a deck officer would make less than $100,000.00. Similarly, the annual salary for the master of a "premier" ITB would range from $106,000.00 to $132,000.00, while senior mates would have total compensation of less than $100,000.00. Generally, pilots receive about 50% more in total compensation than masters on US-flagged ships. This disparity is necessary in order to motivate the most desirable professional mariners (a master or chief mate with 10-12 years of experience) to leave their current maritime employment, including giving up valuable pension benefits, to take on the risks of self-employment as a pilot. This career change entails significant physical risks, civil and criminal liability risks in the event of accidents, investment in infrastructure, management of a business, etc. While Petitioner may be correct that masters and deck officers in other maritime industries are generally compensated less than state-licensed pilots, those employees bear none of the risks of self-employment. The pool of professional U.S. mariners qualified to move into the pilot career path is relatively small -– a little over 2,000, and ports across the U.S. compete against each other to attract the best individuals to piloting. Indeed, ports within Florida compete with each other for the best qualified candidates. While large Florida ports historically would have had 20-30 applicants for a pilot opening, the number of applicants for even large ports like Miami and Jacksonville has decreased in the last 4-5 years. Most recently there were only 11 mariners testing for two openings at Jacksonville and eight mariners testing for three openings in Miami. The pilot in a small port like Ft. Pierce would not be expected to receive the same compensation as the master of a large container ship (or a pilot in a large Florida port like Tampa or Miami), but the compensation must still be high enough to attract and retain a qualified pilot and to pay for cross- licensed pilots as back-up. Pilots in the port of Palm Beach, where each of the five pilots recently worked about 600 handles per year (similar to the number of pilot handles in Ft. Pierce), netted annual income of approximately $150,000.00. Even in a best case scenario, Captain Wetzel’s net income would only match those of Palm Beach pilots, and it is more likely that, due to increased expenses, it will still fall below that level even with the approved rate increase. The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. (section 310.151(5)(b)7, Florida Statutes) In the Notice of Intent, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee as reflected on page C-9 of the Investigative Committee Report. The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to this criterion. At the hearing before the former Board, Petitioners disputed the need for any pilotage rate increase to enable the FPPA to purchase and operate its own pilot boat. As of the time of the administrative hearing, the pilot had already purchased a temporary pilot boat, and Petitioners assert that the increase approved by the former Board should be reduced to cover the expenses relating to the pilot boat actually purchased, and operating such boat, but not provide for an increase in net revenue (compensation) to the pilot. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 34-40 above, the Petitioners' contention in this regard is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. In addition, the undersigned notes that the operating expense projections contained in the Application were merely that. . . projections. Moreover, the expense projections, including the $325,000.00 expenditure for a pilot boat, were expressly predicated upon approval of the rate increases requested in the application.6/ Although an applicant must certify that the statements contained in a pilotage rate change application are true and correct when made, expense projections set forth in an application are not binding on the applicant, and the Board (now Committee) has no authority to compel the expenditure of specific funds identified in an application. Given the Board's denial of the requested rate increases (with the exception of Year 1) it was not unreasonable for Captain Wetzel to refrain from making the specific expenditures projected in the application, particularly for a $325,000.00 pilot boat. As noted above, the projections when made were reasonable, but changed circumstances necessitated adjustment of those expenditures. In the Notice of Intent, the Board did not "earmark" a specific portion of the revenue increase for the purchase of a pilot boat, but rather recognized the need for "a modest increase to account for the progressively higher operating costs, inflation, and to permit the Pilot to obtain or secure pilot boat services . . ." (Notice of Intent, p. 12) Projected changes in vessel traffic. (section 310.151(5)(b)8, Florida Statutes) Cost of retirement and medical plans. (section 310.151(5)(b)9, Florida Statutes) Physical risks inherent in piloting. (section 310.151(5)(b)10, Florida Statutes) Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. (section 310.151(5)(b)11, Florida Statutes) Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. (section 310.151(5)(b)12, Florida Statutes) The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. (section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes) The record of the hearing held before DOAH does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Notice of Intent with respect to the criteria set forth in 310.151(5)(b)8-12, and 310.151(5)(c), above. Taken in its entirety, the evidence presented by the Petitioners, Respondent and Intervenors in this proceeding with respect to the statutory factors set forth in section 310.151(5)(b) and (c), yielded findings of fact in addition to those found by the Board in its Notice of Intent. There was not sufficient credible and persuasive evidence presented by the Petitioners to support any findings of fact materially contrary to the findings of the Board in its Notice of Intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pilotage Rate Review Committee consider the additional facts established by the evidence presented at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in determining, in accordance with its interpretation of its statutory mandate, its expertise, and the appropriate policy considerations, whether the decision on the PFFA Pilotage Rate Increase Application in the Port of Ft. Pierce, filed March 30, 2009, will result in fair, just, and reasonable pilotage rates at the Port of Ft. Pierce. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner owes sales and use tax (plus penalties and interest) to the Department of Revenue (Department), as alleged in the Department's November 1, 1999, Notice of Decision.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the Stipulations of Fact set forth in the parties' Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation: 1/ Mr. Wiviott is a very successful, "hands-on" entrepreneur who presently owns approximately five or six businesses. Since 1958, when he and his brother opened a carpet store in Milwaukee, Mr. Wiviott has owned approximately 30 different businesses (including nine restaurants and a yacht service business), many of which he has sold "for literally millions of dollars of profit." Approximately two-thirds of the businesses that he has owned he has "started from scratch." There have been instances where Mr. Wiviott has invested in businesses that were in industries in which, at the time of his investment, he had no prior experience. In these instances, he overcame his lack of experience by being "extremely industrious" and doing "research." When Mr. Wiviott has needed to consider a "feminine viewpoint" in making a business decision, he has used Mrs. Wiviott, his wife of 43 years, as a "sounding board." For the past 35 years, William Becker has been Mr. Wiviott's accountant. In 1991 or 1992, Mr. Wiviott purchased two "brand new" boats as business investments. The boats were sold to Mr. Wiviott together as a package. Mr. Wiviott paid a total of $1.1 million for the two boats. The larger of the boats was a 63-foot sport fisherman. Although unfinished, it was seaworthy. Mr. Wiviott named this boat the "Choice One." Mr. Wiviott named the other boat, a 56-foot sport fisherman, the "Choice Too." Mr. Wiviott accepted delivery of the Choice One and Choice Too in the Bahamas. He did not pay any sales tax on his purchase of the boats. After accepting delivery, Mr. Wiviott brought the boats to Fort Lauderdale. In 1993, Mr. Wiviott explored the possibility of entering (for the first time) the yacht charter business. He spoke to various people involved in the industry, including two charter brokers (Bob Offer and Bob Saxon) and a charter yacht owner (Bernie Little). He also had discussions with Mr. Becker. Together, he and Mr. Becker made cost and revenue projections. He ultimately made a "value judgment" to go into the business. Mr. Wiviott retained the services of Mr. Offer to help him find a suitable yacht for the business. One of the yachts that Mr. Offer showed Mr. Wiviott was the Fifty-One, a Washington State-built, Fort Lauderdale- based "mega" yacht owned by an Italian national, Dr. Moretti. The Fifty-One's interior design made it particularly well suited for chartering. It had four levels, including a sky deck/lounge equipped with a complete kitchen (to complement the galley located on the bottom level). There were five staterooms that could comfortably accommodate ten charter guests. Each of the regular staterooms had its own head. The master stateroom had "his and her" heads. There was also a stateroom for the captain, as well as quarters for six other crew members (the number needed to properly service a charter party). The Fifty-One had not been well maintained during the time it had been owned by Dr. Moretti. Although Dr. Moretti had made the Fifty-One available for charter, the yacht had a poor reputation among charter brokers and, as a result, it just "sat at the dock," unchartered, while under Dr. Moretti's ownership. In October of 1993, Mr. Wiviott offered to purchase the Fifty-One from Dr. Moretti for $5.1 million, subject to a satisfactory marine survey and sea trial. Dr. Moretti initially rejected the offer, but subsequently agreed to sell the Fifty- One at Mr. Wiviott's offering price (which was considerably less than the $9 million that Dr. Moretti had paid for the Fifty-One a year and a half earlier). Before the deal was consummated, Mr. Wiviott contracted with a marine survey company, Patton Marine, Inc. (Patton), to perform a thorough inspection of the Fifty-One. Patton performed an extensive pre-purchase survey of the Fifty-One, which included various sea trials and other tests (conducted in Fort Lauderdale and off the Fort Lauderdale coast). The survey revealed that the Fifty-One had various "deficiencies." Most of these "deficiencies" were "small items" and were remedied before the sale was finalized. The most serious of the remaining "deficiencies" was the excessive amount of interior vibration. Notwithstanding the known "deficiencies" that remained, Mr. Wiviott thought that, at $5.1 million, the Fifty- One was a good buy. At worst, he believed, he "could make a pretty good profit" by reselling the Fifty-One. Mr. Wiviott retained Robb Maass, whom Mr. Wiviott was told was the "top marine attorney in the [Fort Lauderdale] area," to assist him in forming a Florida corporation which would purchase the Fifty-One and operate a yacht charter business. With Mr. Maass' assistance, B. W. Marine, Inc. (Petitioner) was organized under the laws of the State of Florida, effective January 20, 1994, with Mr. Wiviott as its sole officer, director, and shareholder. Petitioner's principal corporate address was, at the time of incorporation, and has remained, 757 Southeast 17th Street, #389, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316. On January 28, 1994, shortly after Petitioner's incorporation, Petitioner closed on the purchase of the Fifty- One. No Florida or other state sales tax was paid on the purchase. The newly purchased yacht (which had been registered in the Cayman Islands by the previous owner, Dr. Moretti) was immediately registered with the United States Coast Guard, and it thereafter began to fly an American flag. Based upon on Mr. Maass’ advice, Petitioner also took steps to obtain a "certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the coastwise trade" for the Fifty-One. It was not until the following year, however, that the United States Congress (passing a bill introduced by Florida Congressman E. Clay Shaw, Jr.) authorized the Secretary of Transportation to issue such a "certificate of documentation." 2/ After taking delivery of the yacht in the Bahamas, Petitioner imported the Fifty-One into Florida. It did so because Mr. Wiviott wanted the Fifty-One to be marketed in the south Florida area and to have access to the exceptional yacht repair and maintenance facilities that were available there. The South Florida area is where the "mega" yacht charter brokers (who, in most instances, effectively "make[] the decision [as to] which boat a charter client is going to use") are concentrated and where the reputation (or, as Mr. Wiviott put it in his hearing testimony, the "aura" or illusion") of a "mega" yacht is established (in part, by the owner, captain, and crew "pander[ing]" to the broker community during showings of the yacht). It is therefore important for a "mega" yacht available for charter to have a presence in the south Florida area so that it can seen by, and shown to, the "mega" charter brokers who are concentrated there. Although most "mega" yachts are marketed in Florida, "the chartering experience [generally occurs] elsewhere," in such places as New England (in the summer) and the Caribbean and Mediterranean (in the winter). Aware of this, Mr. Wiviott, at the time that the Fifty-One was imported into Florida, had no expectation that that the Fifty-One would be used exclusively for charters in Florida waters. Mr. Wiviott wanted the Fifty-One to be imported into Florida without Petitioner having to pay any use tax. Mr. Maass advised Mr. Wiviott that Petitioner would not have to pay Florida use tax if it registered with the Department as a "dealer" and used the Fifty-One "only . . . for bare boat charter[s]." Mr. Maass cautioned Mr. Wiviott that "[t]here could be no personal recreational use, no personal use aboard the boat whatsoever." Before importing the Fifty-One into Florida, Petitioner registered with the Department as a "dealer" that would be engaging in "bare boat" charter operations in Florida. Mark Newcomer was the first captain of the Fifty-One under Petitioner's ownership. Mr. Wiviott considered Captain Newcomer to be, not a "charter captain," but a "yard captain," that is, a captain "who specializes in repairs, maintenance and upgrades of yachts." Captain Newcomer was hired by Petitioner "to take delivery [of the Fifty-One] and to oversee the renovation and retrofit[ting] of the yacht." He was responsible for ensuring that the Fifty-One was brought up to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) standards. Obtaining certification that the Fifty-One met ABS standards was an "essential part" of any campaign to effectively "market[] the boat" for charter. Mr. Wiviott did not have any intention of continuing Captain Newcomer's employment with Petitioner following completion of "the renovation and retrofit[ting] of the yacht." Captain Newcomer brought the Fifty-One into Florida on or about February 1 or 2, 1994, and docked it at a Fort Lauderdale marina (either Pier 66 Marina or the Bahia Mar Marina). On February 3, 1994, Captain Newcomer moved the Fifty- One to the Bradford Marine Shipyard (Bradford Marine), a Department-registered Fort Lauderdale repair facility able to service boats up to 150 feet in length. The Fifty-One underwent repairs and improvements at Bradford Marine until February 12, 1994, by which time the work that had to be done with it out of the water had been completed. At Bradford Marine, Petitioner had to pay a 20 to 30 percent "surcharge on all outside vendors that c[a]me in." On February 13, 1994, Captain Newcomer moved the Fifty-One to the Bahia Mar Marina (Bahia Mar), a more cost- effective location, to do (with the help of others) the remaining repair and improvement work on the yacht (which could be done with the yacht in the water). Because Captain Newcomer was "very good friends" with the dockmaster at the Bahia Mar, he and those he supervised were allowed to perform work on the Fifty-One (involving the use of noise-generating power tools) that would have otherwise been prohibited. The Fifty-One remained at the Bahia Mar until March 14, 1994, undergoing repairs and improvements. On March 15, 1994, Captain Newcomer, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott (and with less than a full crew), took the Fifty-One on a cruise to the Jockey Club, a "private club" that was part of a "condominium complex resort" located in Miami. He did so pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Wiviott, with whom he spoke to on a daily basis regarding the repair and improvement work that was being done on the Fifty-One under his (Captain Newcomer's) supervision. Mr. Wiviott wanted "to take the boat out to stretch it out [and to] see the progress that Captain Newcomer was making." Furthermore, Mr. Wiviott thought that it was important for Petitioner's charter business for the Fifty- One "to be seen." Near the Jockey Club, the Fifty-One ran aground "in the mud," where it "sat . . . for about eight hours until the tide came back in." After the Fifty-One arrived at the Jockey Club, divers "g[o]t under the boat and clean[ed] the prop[eller]s [and] clean[ed] the drivetrain." The Fifty-One remained docked at the Jockey Club for three days. On March 17, 1994, the Fifty-One returned to the Bahia Mar to undergo further repairs and improvements. By mid-April of 1994, the work necessary to bring the Fifty-One up to ABS standards had been completed. Petitioner therefore applied for, and on April 19, 1994, was issued, an ABS "Class Certificate." The Fort Lauderdale Charter Broker's Boat Show (1994 Boat Show) was held at Pier 66 Marina (Pier 66) from April 14, 1994 to April 20, 1994. The Fifty-One was one of the boats entered in the 1994 Boat Show, and it remained at Pier 66 for the entire show. Mr. Wiviott was aboard throughout the event to show the boat to charter brokers and others. Captain Newcomer helped Mr. Wiviott show the boat. Food and drinks were served. Fresh flowers adorned the boat. The crew wore their dress uniforms. After the end of each day's session, Mr. Wiviott stayed aboard the Fifty-One overnight in lieu of spending company money to rent a hotel room. Following the 1994 Boat Show, from April 20, 1994 until April 28, 1994, the Fifty-one was taken on a "shakedown" cruise to Key West and back to Fort Lauderdale, during which it was run at various speeds and systems were "overloaded" to determine whether they worked properly. At the time of the cruise, the Fifty-One was not equipped with all of the staff and other accoutrements necessary to provide the "five star service" that those who charter "mega" yachts pay to receive. During the cruise, the boat docked at the Ocean Reef Club, an exclusive private resort community in Key Largo; the Galleon Marina, a public facility in Key West; Fisher Island; and the Jockey Club. There were a "few breakdowns" during the cruise, including a "crane breakdown" at the Ocean Reef Club. With the help of vendors, the necessary repairs were made. Aboard during the cruise, in addition to Captain Newcomer and a partial crew, was Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott; Mr. Wiviott's brother, Howard Wiviott; Howard's wife; Mr. Becker, whose firm provided Petitioner with accounting services (primarily through the efforts of Stacey Torchon, one of its accountants); and Mr. Becker's wife. There was no marine surveyor, no representative of a registered repair facility, and no "mega" yacht charter broker aboard during the cruise. 3/ Mr. Becker and his wife did not remain aboard for the entire cruise. They disembarked in Key Largo on April 23, 1994. During the time that he was aboard, Mr. Becker spoke to Captain Newcomer and the crew about the financial and accounting procedures that needed to be followed in conducting Petitioner's charter operations, information that Mr. Becker could have provided by telephone from his California office. (Stacey Torchon, who was "more involved [than Mr. Becker] in the day-to-day operations" of Petitioner, never met personally with any Fifty-One crew member; rather, she communicated with the crew by telephone.) While they were aboard, Mr. Becker and the other guests Mr. Wiviott had invited to take part in the cruise (referred to, collectively, hereinafter as the "Invited Guests") ate, relaxed, and enjoyed the hospitality and ambiance. The Invited Guests' presence on the Fifty-One during the "shakedown" cruise was not solely for the purpose of furthering Petitioner's charter business. Mr. Wiviott was motivated by personal reasons in inviting them aboard. The assertion (made by Petitioner in its Proposed Recommended Order) that one of the purposes of the "shakedown" cruise was to determine, through the feedback given by the Invited Guests, "whether the Petitioner was delivering the chartering experience in terms of comfort, ambiance and service that people willing to spen[d] $50,000 per week would expect" simply does not ring true. Mr. Wiviott knew full well that the Fifty-One, with a "yard captain" at the helm and less than a full crew, was not equipped to provide such service. He did not need to take the "Fifty-One" on a lengthy cruise with family and friends to find this out. Had Mr. Wiviott really wanted to learn if the Fifty-One offered a "chartering experience" for which someone would be willing to pay $50,000.00, he would have asked "mega" yacht charter brokers, not family and friends, to come aboard the Fifty-One for a cruise and give him their feedback. On April 28, 1994, following the "shakedown" cruise, the Fifty-One returned to the Bahia Mar, where, in the ensuing days, defects discovered during the "shakedown" cruise were remedied. By May 7, 1994, the Fifty-One was ready for charter. The Fifty-One, at that time, was not the only vessel in Petitioner's fleet. Shortly after acquiring the Fifty-One, Petitioner had purchased (in Florida) the Choice One and Choice Too 4/ from Mr. Wiviott. Petitioner paid Mr. Wiviott $1,138,804.28 for the Choice One. Inasmuch as the purchase was made under Petitioner's sales tax exemption certificate (that Petitioner had obtained from the Department based upon its representation that it intended to use the Fifty-One exclusively for "bare boat" charter operations in Florida), no Florida sales tax was paid. At the time of the purchase, Mr. Wiviott envisioned that Petitioner would use the Choice One as a "chase boat" for the Fifty-One (from which charterers and guests could fish). The Choice One, however, was never used by Petitioner for this purpose because it turned out that it was not feasible to do so. The Choice One wound up sitting at the dock in Fort Lauderdale, leaving only "to be stretched" or moved to another docking facility by its captain (initially Steven Ernst and then later Carl Roberts). Before its sale by Petitioner in 1995, the Choice One was chartered on only one occasion, during which time it remained at the dock in Fort Lauderdale (positioned so that those aboard could view a passing "boat parade"). The Fifty-One was chartered on a more frequent basis. Of the 15 charters of the Fifty-One during the Audit Period, however, only two (the Gerardo Cabrera and Jean Foss charters) were in Florida waters. The Gerardo Cabrera charter was the first charter of the Fifty-One following the completion of the "renovation and retrofit[ting] of the yacht." It started in Fort Lauderdale on May 18, 1994, and ended in Fort Lauderdale on May 21, 1994. The captain of the Fifty-One for the Gerardo Cabrera charter was Jon Cheney, who had replaced Captain Newcomer on May 7, 1994. The charter agreement between Petitioner (as the "Owner") and Mr. Cabrera (as the "Charterer") was dated May 13, 1994, and read, in pertinent part, as follows: In consideration of the covenants hereinafter contained, the Owner agrees to let and the Charter[er] agrees to hire the Yacht from noon on the 18th of May 1994 to noon on the 21st of May 1994 for the total sum of $18,000.00 + expenses + 6% FSST ($1,080 Dollars) of which amount $18,000 + $1,080 + $5,000 (ADVANCE toward expenses) for a total of $24,080 shall be paid on the signing of this Agreement . . . . The Owner agrees to deliver the Yacht at Bahia Mar Yachting Centre, Ft. Laud. on the 18th day of May 1994 in full commission and working order, outfitted as a yacht of her size, type and accommodations, with full equipment, inclusive of that required by law, and fully furnished, including galley and dining utensils and blankets; staunch, clean and in good condition throughout and ready for service; and agrees to allow demurrage pro rata to the Charterer for any delay in delivery. . . . The owner's insurance policy does not cover Charterer's protection and indemnity during the term of the Charter. . . . * * * The Charterer agrees to accept the yacht delivered as hereinbefore provided and to pay all running expenses during the term of the charter. The Charterer, his agents and employees have no right or power to permit or suffer the creation of any maritime liens against the yacht, except the crew's wages and salvage. The Charterer agrees to indemnify the Owner for any charges or losses in connection therewith, including reasonable attorney's fees. * * * The Charter[er] agrees to redeliver the yacht . . . to the Owner at Bahia Mar Yachting Centre, Ft. Lauderdale, FL . . . . The Charter[er] agrees that the yacht shall be employed exclusively as a pleasure vessel for the sole and proper use of himself, his family, guests and servants during the term of this charter and shall not transport merchandise or carry passengers for pay, or engage in any trade nor in any way violate the Revenue Laws of the United States, or any other Government within the jurisdiction of which the yacht may be at any time, and shall comply with law in all other respects. * * * 11. It is mutually agreed that full authority regarding the operation and management of the yacht is hereby transferred to the Charter[er] for the term thereof. In the event, however, that the Charterer wishes to utilize the services of a Captain and/or crew members in connection with the operation and management of the yacht, whether said Captain and/or crew members are furnished by the Owner or by the Charterer, it is agreed that said Captain and/or Crew members are agents and employees of the Charterer and not of the Owner. In the further event that local United States Coast Guard or other regulations require the Owner exclusively to provide a Captain and/or crew, or the Owner wishes to provide his own Captain and/or crew, the Owner agrees to provide a Captain who is competent not only in coastwise piloting but in deep sea navigation, and to provide a proper crew. The Captain shall in no way be the agent of the Owner, except that he shall handle clearance and the normal running of the yacht subject to the limitations of this charter party. The Captain shall receive orders from the Charterer as to ports to be called at and the general course of the voyage, but the Captain shall be responsible for the safe navigation of the yacht, and the Charterer shall abide by his judgment as to sailing, weather, anchorages, and pertinent matters. The Charterer assumes total control and liability as if the Charterer were the owner of the yacht during the term of the charter. . . . This agreement, by "industry standard," is "considered a 'bare boat' charter agreement." On May 13, 1994, Mr. Cabrera (as "Employer") also entered into a separate "Yacht Employment Agreement" with Captain Cheney (as "Yacht Captain"). It provided as follows: WHEREAS, Charterer has under charter the yacht FIFTY ONE pursuant to his bare boat charter party agreement wherein it is Employer's obligation to furnish the said yacht with a competent master and crew; and WHEREAS, Yacht Captain is a competent master, having over two years' experience in the coastal and inland waters of FLORIDA and THE BAHAMAS and is able to furnish a crew for the management and navigation of the said yacht; and WHEREAS, the parties desire to reduce their agreement to written term; NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the premises and of the agreements hereinafter contained, it is agreed as follows: Employer hereby hires yacht Captain as the Master of the said yacht to act as such Master as long as the yacht is under charter to Employer. Yacht Captain agrees to furnish 6 crew men to assist in operating and navigating the said yacht. The Captain and crew, if any, shall be properly uniformed. The crew to comprise the following: [left blank] Yacht Captain shall be paid for his services and the services of his crew a total sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION and Employer shall furnish the Yacht Captain and his crew, quarters and food, during the term of this Agreement. The term of this Agreement shall commence on the 18th day of MAY 1994, or at such time that the yacht shall be ready to sail pursuant to the bare boat charter party agreement with the Owner and shall terminate on the 21st day of MAY, 1994, unless sooner terminated by the termination of the yacht party agreement for any reason whatsoever. In the event that the yacht charter party agreement is sooner terminated, the Master and crew will receive a pro-rated share of the agreed compensation for their services. After collecting from Mr. Cabrera all the monies Mr. Cabrera owed under both the charter agreement and the "Yacht Employment Agreement," Rikki Davis (the broker representing Mr. Cabrera) handed these monies over to Mr. Offer (the broker representing Petitioner). (It is commonplace in the "mega" yacht chartering industry "to have the amount paid for the use of the vessel under [a] bare boat charter agreement and amount for the captain and crew paid together by the charterer as a lump sum."). Mr. Offer, in turn, forwarded the monies he was given by Ms. Davis to Petitioner. The Gerardo Cabrera charter was the only charter that took place before the captain and crew of the Fifty-One became employees of Papa's Yacht Services, Inc. (Papa's), Petitioner's sister corporation, which, like Petitioner, was incorporated in Florida and has maintained a Florida corporate address from its inception. Papa's was formed solely for the purpose of enabling Petitioner to be in "compliance [with] the bare boat charter concept." Papa's dealings with Petitioner was Papa's sole source of revenue. Petitioner paid Papa's a "management fee" for providing a captain and crew for the Fifty-One. Although the Fifty-One's captain and crew had become Papa's employees, Petitioner continued to pay for their health insurance and provide them with free room and board on the Fifty-One at all times during the Audit Period, except when the Fifty-One was under charter and the charterers provided the captain and crew with room and board. Having a full-time captain and crew aboard a "mega" yacht available for charter, even when the yacht is not under charter, is essential to conduct successful charter operations. The captain and crew must be available, on the vessel, to host the "mega" yacht charter brokers who come aboard between charters (sometimes with little or no advance notice) and to perform those everyday tasks necessary to maintain the vessel. To attract and keep qualified onboard personnel, it is necessary to provide them with, as part of their compensation package, free room and board on the "mega" yacht. Doing so is the "standard in the industry." The Fifty-One was chartered by Jean Foss from December 27, 1995 to January 3, 1996, approximately a year and a half after Papa's had become the employer of the Fifty-One's captain and crew. Ms. Foss cruised to the Bahamas during the charter. The charter originated and concluded in Fort Lauderdale. "[T]he only reason [the Fifty-One] was in Florida [for the charter was] because [Ms. Foss] wouldn't fly to the Bahamas." The charter agreement between Petitioner (as the "Owner") and Mr. Foss (as the "Charterer") was similar to the charter agreement into which Mr. Cabrera and Petitioner had entered. It was dated August 15, 1995, and read, in pertinent part, as follows: TERM, HIRE & PAYMENTS: In consideration of the covenants hereinafter contained, the OWNER agrees to let and the CHARTERER agrees to hire the Yacht for the term from 12 noon . . . on the 27th day of December, 1995 to 12 noon . . . on the 3rd day January, 1996 for the total sum of $44,800 + All Expenses of which amount $22,400.00 shall be paid on the signing of this AGREEMENT and the balance thereof as follows: remaining 50% deposit (US$22,400.00) and Florida State Sales Tax of 6% US$2,668 for a total sum of $25,088.00 due by 24 November, 1995. DELIVERY. The OWNER agrees to deliver the yacht to CHARTERER at Fort Lauderdale, Florida at 12 noon . . . on the 27th day of December, 1995, in full commission and in proper working order, outfitted as a yacht of her size, type, and accommodations, with safety equipment required by law, and fully furnished, including gallery and dining utensils and blankets; staunch, clean and in good condition throughout and ready for service, and agrees to allow demurrage pro rata to the CHARTERER for any delay in delivery. . . . * * * 5. RUNNING EXPENSES. The Charterer agrees to accept the yacht as delivered as hereinbefore provided and to pay all shipboard expenses during the term of the charter period. * * * 8. RE-DELIVERY and INDEMNIFICATION. The CHARTERER agrees to redeliver the yacht, her equipment, and furnishings, free and clear and of any indebtedness for CHARTERER's account at the expiration of this charter, to the OWNER at Fort Lauderdale, Florida at 12:00 noon on the 3rd day of January, 1996 in as good condition as when delivery was taken, ordinary wear and tear and any loss or damage for which the OWNER is covered by his own insurance, and CHARTERER's insurance (if any) set forth in Paragraph 3 of this AGREEMENT, excepted. . . . * * * 10. RESTRICTED USE. The CHARTERER agrees that the yacht shall be employed exclusively as a pleasure vessel for the sole and proper use of himself, his family, passengers and servants, during the term of this charter, and shall not transport merchandise, or carry passengers for hire, or engage in any trade, nor any way violate the Revenue Laws of the United States, or any other Government within the jurisdiction of which the yacht may be at any time, and shall comply with the laws in all other respects. * * * 12. CHARTERER'S AUTHORITY OVER CREW. It is mutually agreed that full authority regarding the operation and management of the yacht is hereby transferred to the CHARTERER for the term thereof. In the event, however, that the CHARTERER wished to utilize the services of a captain and/or crew members in connection with the operation and management of the yacht, whether said captain and/or crew members are furnished by the OWNER or by the CHARTERER, it is agreed that said captain and/or crew members are agents and employees of the CHARTERER and not of the OWNER. In the further event that local United States Coast Guard or other regulations require the OWNER exclusively to provide a captain and/or crew, or the OWNER agrees to provide a proper captain who is competent not only to coastwise piloting, but in deep sea navigation, and to provide crew, the captain shall in no way be the agent of the OWNER, except that he shall handle clearance and the normal running of the yacht subject to ports to be called at, and the general course of the voyage. The captain shall be responsible for the safe navigation of the yacht, and the CHARTERER shall abide by his judgment as to sailing, weather, anchorages, and pertinent matters. The captain and crew shall be selected by the CHARTERER with the approval of the OWNER or the OWNER's Agent. CHARTERER is aware that he has a choice of captains. CHARTERER has full right to terminate the captain and/or crew; however, replacements shall be hired as under Paragraph 12 of this AGREEMENT. . . . Ms. Foss also entered into a "Yacht Services Agreement." The agreement, dated August 16, 1995, was with Papa's, which agreed to provide a seven person crew for the Fifty-One for the charter period (December 27, 1995, through January 3, 1996). Ms. Foss, in turn, agreed to pay Papa's $11,200.00 for such crew services and, in addition, to provide the captain (Arthur "Butch" Vogelsang) and crew with food and quarters aboard the Fifty-One during the charter period. Petitioner collected and remitted to the Department the sales tax owed by Mr. Cabrera and Ms. Foss on their rentals of the Fifty-One. No Florida sales tax was due on any of the other 13 charters of the Fifty-One during the Audit Period because they all took place outside Florida. In the case of 11 of these 13 other charters, like in the Jean Foss charter, the charterer entered into a charter agreement with Petitioner for the rental of the Fifty-One, as well as a separate agreement with Papa's for employment of a captain and crew for a fee (that "represent[ed] the actual cost [to Papa's] of the crew"). Typically, the total amount due under both agreements was sent to Petitioner, and Mr. Becker's firm (which also provided accounting services to Papa's) "moved the [portion of the] funds" due Papa's to Papa's bank account. Two charterers during the Audit Period (Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Faisal Aziz of Saudi Arabia) refused Mr. Wiviott's request that they enter into two separate agreements, one (with Petitioner) for the rental of the Fifty- One and another (with Papa's) for employment of a captain and crew. Instead, they insisted on signing a single document, a Mediterranean Yacht Brokers Agreement (or MYBA Agreement), wherein Petitioner agreed to provide both the Fifty-One and a captain and crew. Not wanting to lose the business, Mr. Wiviott, on behalf of Petitioner, entered into these MYBA Agreements, notwithstanding that he had been instructed by Mr. Maass "not [to] take MYBA contracts." The MYBA Agreement between Petitioner (as "Owner") and Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company (as "Charterer") was dated December 16, 1995, and provided that: the "charter period" would begin 12:00 noon on March 3, 1996, and end 12:00 noon on March 17, 1996; the "cruising area" would be the Caribbean; the "port of delivery" would be Guadeloupe; the "port of re- delivery" would be Grenada; the crew would consist of a captain and six other crew members; the charter fee would be $48,000.00 per week for a total (for 2 weeks) of $96,000.00; the "Advance Provisioning Allowance" would be $48,000.00; and the "delivery/re-delivery fee" would be $6,857.00. In addition, it contained the following "clauses," among others: CLAUSE 1 AGREEMENT TO LET AND HIRE The OWNER agrees to let the Yacht to the Charterer and not to enter into any other Agreement . . . for the Charter of the Yacht for the [s]ame period. The CHARTERER agrees to hire the Yacht and shall pay the Charter Fee, the Security Deposit, the Advance Provisioning Allowance and any other agreed charges in cleared funds, on or before the dates and to the Account specified in this Agreement. * * * CLAUSE 6 CREW The OWNER shall provide a suitably qualified Captain acceptable to the insurers of the Yacht and a suitably experienced Crew, properly uniformed, fed and insured. The OWNER shall ensure that no member of the Crew shall carry or use any illegal drugs on board the Yacht or keep any firearms on board (other than those declared on the manifest) and shall ensure that the Captain and Crew comply with the laws and regulations of any country into whose waters the yacht shall enter during the course of this Agreement. The MYBA Agreement between Petitioner (as "Owner") and Prince Aziz (as "Charterer") was dated March 19, 1996, and provided that: the "charter period" would begin 12:00 noon on April 2, 1996, and end 12:00 noon on April 9, 1996; the "cruising area" would be the Caribbean; St. Maarten would be the "port of delivery" and "the port of re-delivery"; the crew would consist of a captain and six other crew members; the charter fee would be $50,000.00; and the "Advance Provisioning Allowance" would be $10,000.00. It contained the following additional provisions, among others: 30. AGREEMENT TO LET The OWNER shall let the yacht for the charter period and agrees not to enter into any other agreement for the charter of the yacht for the same period, and agrees not to sell the yacht before completion of the charter period, unless otherwise agreed by the Charterer. * * * 32. CREW The Owner shall provide a properly qualified Captain approved by the insurers of the yacht and a properly qualified crew, uniformed and insured. . . . Upon the advice of Mr. Maass, Petitioner assigned to Papa's its MYBA Agreements with Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Aziz. It also entered into "Bareboat Charter Agreements" with Papa's for the rental of the Fifty-One for the same periods covered by the MYBA Agreements (notwithstanding that the MYBA Agreements expressly prohibited Petitioner from doing so). According to what Mr. Maass told Mr. Wiviott, by Petitioner taking such action, "the MYBA contract[s] could be accepted without violating the requirement that [Petitioner] engage only in bare boat chartering." The written assignment of the MYBA Agreement with Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company was dated December 16, 1995, the same date as the MYBA Agreement, and read, in pertinent part, as follows: BW Marine owns the vessel "Fifty-One," a 125 foot motoryacht, bearing official number 1020419 (the "Vessel"); BW Marine entered into a Yacht Charter Party Agreement dated December 16, 199[5] (the "Charter") between BW Marine and Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company (Charterer"); BW Marine desires to assign to Papa's Yacht Services, and Papa's Yacht Services agrees to accept, all BW Marine's right, title, and interest in and to the Charter; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual covenants contained herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: Assignment BW Marine assigns to Papa's Yacht Services all its right, title, and interest in and to the Charter. Papa's Yacht Services accepts the assignment and assumes all obligations of BW Marine under the Charter. Payment For administrative convenience, Charterer shall pay BW Marine the charter hire under the Charter. BW Marine, in turn, shall remit the surplus of these funds over the lease amount due from Papa's Yacht Services to BW Marine under that certain Bare Boat Charter Agreement between the parties of even date herewith. . . . Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company was not a signatory to this written assignment (and no other document offered into evidence reflects that Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company consented to the assignment). 5/ The written assignment of the MYBA Agreement with Prince Aziz was dated March 19, 1996, the same date as the MYBA Agreement. It was identical to the December 16, 1995, written assignment of the MYBA Agreement with Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company (with the exception of the dates contained therein). Prince Aziz was not a signatory to this written assignment (and no other document offered into evidence reflects that Prince Aziz consented to the assignment). The first "Bareboat Charter Agreement" between Petitioner (as "Owner") and Papa's (as "Charterer") was dated December 16, 1995, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Owner owns the vessel "Fifty-One," a 125 foot motorcoach bearing official number 1020419 (the "Vessel"); and Charterer desires to charter the Vessel from Owner and Owner is willing to make the Vessel available to Charterer for such purpose, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: Term Owner agrees to let and Charterer to hire, the Vessel for a term commencing March 3, 1996, and ending March 17, 1996. Payment Charterer shall pay Owner charter hire of One Hundred Two Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars ($102,857.00), plus state sales tax, if applicable. Control The Vessel is chartered on a bare boat or demise basis. Owner hereby transfers to Charterer full authority regarding the operation and management of the Vessel for the charter term. Charterer is solely responsible for retaining a master and crew. Guest Limitation When the Vessel is underway, the number of persons on board the Vessel, other than the master and crew, shall be limited to the Charterer (or the Charterer's representative, if Charterer is a corporation) and twelve (12) guests. * * * Delivery Owner agrees to deliver the Vessel at Guadeloupe. Redelivery Charterer shall redeliver the Vessel to Owner at Granada at the end of the charter term, in as good condition as when delivery was taken, ordinary wear and tear excepted. . . . * * * 9. Expenses Charterer shall pay all running expenses during the term of the charter. Charterer shall pay for routine maintenance and repair of the Vessel during the charter term. * * * 12. Non-Assignment Charterer agrees not to assign this Agreement or subcharter the Vessel without the consent of the Owner in writing, which Owner may withhold in Owner's sole discretion. . . . The second "Bareboat Charter Agreement" between Petitioner and Papa's was dated March 19, 1996, and was identical to the first "Bareboat Charter Agreement" between them (with the exception of the charter period, charter cost, and delivery/redelivery locations). The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Papa's ever entered into a sub-charter agreement with either Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company or Prince Aziz. Both Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Aziz paid Petitioner the entire charter fee prescribed under their respective MYBA Agreements. They did not make any payments to Papa's. Petitioner paid Papa’s a “management fee” for providing the captain and crew during these charters. On one of the 15 charters during the Audit Period, Mr. Wiviott was aboard the Fifty-One as a guest of the charterer, the Choice Meat Co., Inc., a company that he and his son, Greg Wiviott, owned. Choice Meat Co., Inc., paid the "going charter rate" for the rental, but no broker's commission because "there was no broker to pay." There were occasions during the Audit Period, when the Fifty-One was not under charter, that Mr. Wiviott, members of his family (including his wife; children; grandchildren; his bother, Howard; and Howard's wife), and his friends used the Fifty-One outside Florida for non-business-related, personal purposes, sometimes for "one or two weeks at a time." For instance, in June of 1994 (after the Gerardo Cabrera charter and before the next charter, which began on July 21, 1994), when the Fifty-One was in New England, the Wiviott family was aboard for approximately "a couple of weeks." At the end of that summer, just before the Fifty-One returned from New England to Fort Lauderdale, the family again used the Fifty-One, this time "for a week or so." In November of 1994, around the Thanksgiving holiday, the Fifty-One traveled to the Caribbean so that the family could use it there for recreational purposes. The Fifty-One remained in the Caribbean for ten to 14 days with the family aboard. After the Wiviott children and grandchildren got off, the Fifty- One went on to the Virgin Islands, where Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott's friends came aboard and were entertained by the Wiviotts. In January of 1995, some time "shortly after the 1st," when the Fifty-One was in St. Maarten (where it was based for the winter), the Wiviott family once again spent time aboard the Fifty-One. The foregoing instances of out-of-state, non-charter, non-business-related use of the Fifty-One by the Wiviott family occurred when Captain Cheney was in command of the vessel. The Wiviott family continued to make such use of the Fifty-One during the time Captain Elario was captain. When Captain Elario took over the Fifty-One in St. Lucia (from Paul Canvaghn, who had been captain for only a day or two), Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott were aboard the vessel. They remained on board for approximately a week as the Fifty-One cruised the Caribbean. During that week, Mrs. Wiviott swam, laid in the sun, relaxed, and ate meals prepared by the Fifty- One's chef. She did not perform any tasks designed to further Petitioner's charter business. Subsequently, while Captain Elario was still captain, Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott took a non-charter, non-business-related trip on the Fifty-One to the Bahamas. Also during the time Captain Elario was captain, when the Fifty-One was in Hilton Head, South Carolina, Mr. Wiviott's brother, Howard, and Howard's wife, came aboard, and they remained on the yacht as it traveled to Norfolk, Virginia. Howard and his wife did not perform any tasks designed to further Petitioner's charter business while aboard the Fifty- One. Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott's daughter, along with her two young children, stayed overnight on the Fifty-One when, while under Captain Elario's supervision, it was docked at the Capital Marina in Washington, D.C. During the daughter's and children's stay, there was a party celebrating the youngest child's birthday. Indicative of the amount of time that Mr. and Mrs. Wiviott spent aboard the Fifty-One were the clothing and other personal items that (as a convenience) they stored (in a locker) on the Fifty-One (so that they would not have to bring these items with them each time they boarded the vessel). (These items were moved from the locker to another area on the Fifty- One, when necessary, to accommodate charterers using the stateroom in which the locker was located). Whenever the Fifty-One returned to Florida, it underwent needed repairs and maintenance. It also cruised the waters of the south Florida area, docking at various facilities. It did so not only "to be stretched," but to gain additional exposure among "mega" yacht charter brokers. In addition, while in Florida, the Fifty-One was stocked with supplies and provisions (including rack of lamb, veal, lobster tails, baked goods, gourmet foods, specialty items, wines, bath and beauty products, and party supplies) to be available for use by those on board when the Fifty-One was outside Florida, including not only charterers (such as Mutual of Omaha Marketing Company and Prince Aziz) and their guests, but also Mr. Wiviott, his family, and friends (when they were on board the Fifty-One for non-business-related, personal purposes). The Fifty-One, while in Florida, was also provided with fuel for charter, as well as non-charter, non-business related, trips outside Florida. Petitioner's charter business proved to be unprofitable. Expenses far exceeded revenues. (Petitioner, however, was able to sell the Fifty-One for more than the purchase price it had paid, receiving approximately $5.7 million, excluding commissions, for the Fifty-One in February of 2000.) By letter dated October 11, 1996, the Department informed Petitioner that it was going to audit Petitioner's "books and records" for the Audit Period. Petitioner was selected for audit because it had reported only a relatively small amount of taxable charter revenue on the Florida sales and use tax returns it filed during the Audit Period. The Department's "audit findings" were that the Fifty-One "was purchased for [a] dual purpose, for leasing and to be used by the shareholder" and therefore "the vessel and other purchases [made by Petitioner during the Audit Period under its sales tax exemption certificate, including its purchase of the Choice One] are taxable at the cost price." Based upon these audit findings, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, in which it advised Petitioner that Petitioner owed $430,047.95 in sales and use taxes, $215,023.97 in penalties, and $169,672.70 in interest through July 18, 1997, for a total of $814,744.62, "plus additional interest of $141.39 per day . . . from 07/18/97 through the date [of] payment." By letter dated April 22, 1998, Petitioner protested the Department's proposed assessment. On November 1, 1999, the Department issued its Notice of Decision sustaining the proposed assessment and announcing that, as of October 6, 1999, Petitioner owed the Department $929,270.52, with "interest continu[ing] to accrue at $141.39 per day until the postmarked date of payment." Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Chapter 120 Administrative Hearing on the Department's proposed action.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order sustaining its assessment against Petitioner in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2001.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent has been a licensed pilot in the State of Florida, with license number 000050, and has operated as a pilot on Tampa Bay. Respondent received his state license in 1971, and also holds a federal license to serve as: Master of freight and towing vessels of not more than 1000 gross tons upon oceans; master of uninspected motor vessels of not more than 300 gross tons upon oceans; . . . first class pilot of steam and motor vessels of any gross tons upon Tampa and Hillsborough Bays to Tampa and Port Tampa, Florida, including Alafia River. . . . Count I On January 9, 1984, Respondent served as pilot aboard the foreign registered vessel Pennsylvania Rainbow as it sailed outbound from the International Minerals and Chemical Dock. The Pennsylvania Rainbow has a gross tonnage of 13,962, is 527.3 feet long and 81.4 feet wide. During the course of his pilotage duties, Respondent made a radio transmission substantially as follows: "Security, Security--Trico 1 outbound with Trico 3 and 4." Respondent is Trico 1, and Trico 3 and 4 are other members of Tampa Tri-County Pilots Association who do not have state pilot or deputy pilot licenses and who Respondent has sought to designate as "apprentice pilots." After the initial security call by Respondent, both Trico 3 and 4 also gave security calls aboard the Pennsylvania Rainbow. These security calls were overheard by licensed pilots on Tampa Bay who were approximately 15 miles away at the time and were concerned that persons without state licenses were being allowed to pilot the Pennsylvania Rainbow since the custom on Tampa Bay is that the person handling the vessel is usually the one who makes radio transmissions. At no time did the licensed pilots who testified actually see Trico 3 or 4 piloting the vessel. The foreign registered vessel Golden Laurel sailed inbound on January 22, 1984 to the loading berth at I.S. Joseph Company in Port Tampa with Respondent as pilot and Captain Tu Ting Kuo as master. The Golden Laurel has a gross tonnage of 29,729, and is 738.1 feet long and 105.6 feet wide. Respondent was accompanied by at least one unlicensed person whom he had sought to designate as an "apprentice." The unlicensed person was allowed to give commands which Respondent would overrule if such commands were not correct. Respondent remained on the bridge at all times in the immediate vicinity of the quarter- master and did correct the orders given by the unlicensed person on several occasions. The foreign registered vessel Trade Unity was inbound to the loading berth at I.S. Joseph Company on February 20, 1984 with Respondent as pilot, accompanied by an unlicensed person. The Trade Unity has a gross tonnage of 35,897 and is 770.14 feet long and 105.3 feet wide. With the permission of the master, Respondent allowed the unlicensed person to handle the Trade Unity in order to gain experience and practice. The unlicensed person gave commands which Respondent would overrule if necessary. On four occasions in June and July, 1984, Respondent served as pilot aboard the foreign registered vessel Marcona Conveyor as it arrived at and departed from Port Tampa. The Marcona Conveyor has a gross tonnage of 32,607, is 831.2 feet long and 106.2 feet wide. According to the master of the vessel, Capt. Charles D. Paden, Respondent permitted unlicensed persons to give commands for routine maneuvers of the vessel. Respondent would stand by on the bridge and intercede if necessary. Respondent permitted unlicensed persons to practice "piloting" by giving commands for the handling of the Golden Laurel, Trade Unity and Marcona Conveyor, but he contends that he remained on the bridge at all times, "acknowledged" or approved all such commands and overruled incorrect commands when necessary. Respondent also allowed unlicensed persons to practice radio transmissions and give security calls aboard the Pennsylvania Rainbow. His practice was to obtain the permission of the ship's master before allowing unlicensed persons to practice, and to introduce the unlicensed persons, whom he referred to as "apprentices," to the master. Respondent told the masters that he was the pilot of the vessel and would remain in control, while his "apprentices" practiced, by acknowledging their commands and interceding to change their commands whenever necessary. There is no approved apprenticeship program for pilots in Florida and Respondent's "apprentices" held no form of state authorization to practice or perform piloting. Respondent's practice of allowing unlicensed persons to gain hands-on ship handling experience by making radio transmissions and giving commands added an additional person to the normal chain-of-command on these foreign vessels, thereby increasing the risk of operation by increasing the potential for problems in communication. This is particularly significant with the non- English speaking crews on these foreign ships. Count II On February 28, 1984 Respondent piloted the foreign registered vessel Atropos Island in a shift from Gardinier Wharf in the Alafia River to Gadsden Anchorage. The Atropos Island has a gross tonnage of 10,019 and is 479.14 feet long and 75.08 feet wide. At the time it left the Gardinier dock, the ship was fully ballasted but had a forward draft of only 4 to 5 feet, a midship's draft of 8 to 9 feet, and an aft draft of 13 feet 9 inches. The propeller was half out of the water, with the upper half of the hub showing. After taking on cargo the loaded draft of the ship on leaving Tampa Bay was 31 feet. The weather on the morning of February 28, 1984 was overcast with winds out of the northwest at 20 to 30 miles per hour, with gusts to 40 miles per hour. Upon his arrival at the Atropos Island, Respondent monitored the weather broadcast, classified the vessel and waited for the ship to take on maximum ballast. He ordered three tugs to assist the Atropos Island in turning around in the Gardinier turning basin. It took twenty- five minutes for the vessel to complete its turn and begin to transit the Alafia River Channel. After completing the turn the tugs were ordered to release some of their lines. The Atropos Island did not go aground in the turning basin, although the vessel was blown toward the south bank of the basin by the winds to the extent that the tug Hillsborough, with a draft of 12 to 13 feet, could not get between the Atropos Island and the bank to push the vessel away from the bank. The tugs then put additional lines up to the vessel and pulled her into the middle of the turning basin. In transiting the Alafia River Channel, Respondent used a "crabbing" maneuver and this transit took approximately 1 1/2 hours, rather than the normal time of 20 minutes, due to this maneuver, the weather conditions, and Respondent's desire to await the assistance of larger tugs which he had ordered. "Crabbing" was described as a common piloting maneuver, particularly with vessels in light condition in a narrow channel such as the Alafia River Channel which is only 200 feet wide and approximately 2.8 miles long. When crabbing a vessel proceeding westerly through a channel with the wind out of the north- northwest, one tug would be on the starboard bow, the weather side of the vessel. As the vessel's stern begins to drag down, causing the vessel to go broadside, the pilot would put the rudder left, decrease the vessel speed and back the tug. The tug then acts like a spring line to pull the vessel up into a position almost parallel to the channel, at which point the pilot would slow the vessel and order the tug to stop backing. The maneuver would be repeated each time the wind caused the vessel to go off course in the channel. The evidence presented does not support the charge that the Atropos Island was grounded several times while proceeding down the Alafia River Channel. After considering all of the evidence presented, it appears that this crabbing maneuver used by Respondent was misinterpreted by the tug captains and by those who overheard radio transmissions by Respondent, which may have been "excited" due to the bad weather and difficult conditions in the channel during this transit. Significantly, the shipping agent for the Atropos Island testified that he discussed this transit with the captain of the Atropos Island the next day, and the captain stated the vessel did not run aground at any time while Respondent was piloting the vessel. The captain must account to the vessel's owner for all damage to the vessel the next time it is in dry dock and the owner will hold the captain liable for all unreported damage. Thus, it is not likely the captain of a vessel would not report a grounding if he thought one had occurred in order to protect himself from such liability. After completing the transit of the channel, the Atropos Island arrived at the location known as "Hillsborough Cut-C" where Respondent anchored the vessel and awaited larger tugs. The larger tugs, Yvonne St. Phillip and Gloria, arrived to assist the Atropos Island in turning at Cut-C, along with the smaller tugs Hillsborough and Pasco. The wind was still out of the north- northwest and the Atropos Island was heading west into the wind, having dropped its port anchor. Respondent had ordered the Hillsborough to take a position on the port bow of the Atropos Island and had positioned the Pasco on the port stern while they awaited the larger tugs. When the larger tug Yvonne St. Phillip arrived, Respondent ordered it to relieve the Pasco and the second larger tug, Gloria, was positioned on the port bow next to the Hillsborough. The Yvonne St. Phillip was pushing on the stern and the Gloria did not immediately put a line up at the bow. With the larger tug pushing in this manner at the stern, the bow of the Atropos Island began to come around toward the Hillsborough. The captain of the Hillsborough lost track of the location of the Atropos Island's anchor chain and became concerned that the anchor chain might be underneath his tug. The Hillsborough still had a line up to the Atropos Island at the time. There is conflicting testimony whether the Hillsborough's line snapped due to its being stretched tighter and tighter during this maneuver, whether it was severed by the bow of the Atropos Island, or whether Respondent ordered the line cut on purpose in order to release the Hillsborough so it could get out of the way. There is also conflicting testimony whether the Hillsborough was thereafter pushed aground by the Atropos Island or by the Gloria's wheel-wash. The captain of the Hillsborough believes that the Atropos Island pushed him aground. It was clearly established that the Hillsborough went aground at Cut-C and began to list at a 45 degree angle causing its captain great concern for the safety of his crew, and it is also established that its line to the Atropos Island parted. This occurred while the Hillsborough was assisting the Atropos Island at Cut-C. The Pasco later pushed the Hillsborough off ground. Respondent did not file a marine casualty report for any of the events occurring on the morning of February 28, 1984. Although there were winds of up to 40 miles per hour on the morning of February 28, 1984, there was other shipping traffic in the area. The conditions were not so severe as to preclude other vessels from moving, and Respondent checked the weather conditions and fully ballasting the vessel before leaving the dock. The weather did become more severe than forecast, making the maneuvers more difficult, but Respondent reacted to the worsening conditions by slowing his transit of the channel, ordering larger tugs and anchoring for a time at Cut-C.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing a one month suspension and one thousand dollar fine against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Hanlon, Esquire David C. Banker, Esquire Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601 J. Micheal Shea, Esquire Post Office Box 2742 Tampa, Florida 33601 W.B. Ewers, Esquire Post Office Drawer 9008 Coral Springs, Florida 33075 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, while acting as pilot aboard the M/V Itanage in the St. John's River, Jacksonville, Florida on August 29, 1990, engaged in a practice which did not met acceptable standards of safe piloting. (F.S.A. s. 310.101(1)(k))
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pilot in the State of Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 1) Respondent has been issued license number SP0000032. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 2) On or about August 29, 1990, Respondent was piloting the M/V Itanage outbound in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 4) The Itanage is a 12,000 gross ton, Brazilian registered diesel powered container vessel. (Transcript p. 164) From May 1988 to August 1990 the Itanage entered and exited the port of Jacksonville under pilotage fifteen times without navigational incident. (Transcript pp. 21, 22) The same crew abroad the Itanage at the time of the allision was on the Itanage on its previous voyage of the Itanage. (Transcript p. 22) Respondent has piloted the Itanage or similar vessels many times previously. (Transcript p. 355) The Itanage was equipped with an overhead rudder angle indicator which is visible from the bridge wing. The rudder angle indicator exhibits the degree angle of the rudder and is color coded red for port and green for starboard so the pilot can glance up and see whether port or starboard rudder is applied. 2/ (Transcript pp. 166, 167) Each bridge wing of the Itanage was equipped with an RPM indicator which shows whether the engine was going ahead or astern and the number of revolutions per minute. (Transcript p. 168) The Itanage was equipped with an engine room telegraph which was operated by the second mate to communicate engine commands to the engine room. 3/ On August 29, 1990, the docking master, Captain Meers, undocked the vessel from Jacksonville Port Authority berths 3 and 4, turned, headed down the river on slow ahead, and disembarked around Coastal Petroleum. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 2) Respondent assumed responsibility for directing the ship at 1454 hours with the vessel parallel to and favoring the west bank of the river. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 8; engine bell book, Transcript p. 175) It was a clear day, the ride was at or near slack water, the weather was perfect. (Transcript pp. 92. 169, 170, 198) Respondent gave commands to the second mate who remained positioned by the engineroom telegraph on the bridge. The second mate repeated the commands in English then repeated the commands to the helmsman in Portuguese. (Transcript pp. 195, 337); Statement of Second Mate) The second mate spoke very little English and the helmsman did not speak any English. (Transcript p. 331) At 1454 the Respondent ordered course 320 degrees and slow ahead, which was executed. At approximately 1456, Respondent ordered a course of 310 degrees and full speed ahead. (Transcript pp. 82, 83, 191, 192; DPR Report p. 8; engine bell book; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mate; Statement of Captain Steele) Respondent's orders issued at 1456 were executed, and the engine speed was set at full ahead and the Helmsman steered 310 degrees. (Transcript p. 186; DPR Report p. 8; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mater; engine bell book; Statement of Captain Steele; Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 8) Respondent was in the wheelhouse and observed the master-gyro-compass. (Transcript p. 331; Statement of Captain Steele) Because the view forward was blocked by the deck cargo, Respondent went to the starboard wing to observe Buoy 71. (Statement of Captain Steele) At 1455 Respondent ordered "10 degrees port" from the starboard wing. (Transcript pp. 337, 338; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) The helmsman steered 10 degrees to port (left). (Transcript p. 192; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) After the order of "10 degrees port", Respondent remained on the starboard wing and had a radio conversation using a hand held marine radio with the master of the tug "Ann Moran" which took approximately 45 seconds about a ship they had handled the previous day. (Transcript pp. 338, 340, 247) At 1456 as Itanage approached Buoy 71, at point "D" on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1, from the starboard bridge wing, Respondent ordered hard right (starboard) rudder and engine ahead full. (Transcript p. 343) This was to start the turn around Buoy 71. (Transcript p. 384) Captain Steele did not at that time, however, go to the pilot house. Captain Steele remained on the wing to observe the response of the vessel. (Transcript p. 395) After a few seconds, Captain Steele observed the bow of the vessel swinging to port (left) not to starboard (right). (Transcript p. 345) He immediately rushed to the pilot house, repeating his hard starboard (right) rudder order as he did so. (Transcript p. 345) The rudder angle indicator in the pilot house, however, indicated the actual position of the rudder was passing from port (left) 20 degrees to starboard when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. (Transcript p. 345) Captain Steele did not alter the prior order for ahead full. Captain Steele reached the helm console and grabbed the helm. By that time, the helm was already in the hard starboard position. The only explanation as to how the rudder got to 20 degrees port (left) was that when Captain Steele gave the command hard to starboard, the helmsman actually went hard to port (left), then the helmsman realized his error and was correcting it when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. No one suggests that any other command was given which would account for the port swing of the vessel. (Transcript p. 235) Captain Steele again went to the wing to observe the response of the vessel. When it became apparent the vessel would not make the turn, Steele ordered full astern and ordered both anchors dropped. The vessel continued to make way in a sweeping curve alliding with the Shell Oil Terminal on the western edge of the Chaseville turn at approximately 1459 hours. The allision was not caused by a mechanical failure, weather, or tide. (Transcript p. 69). The allision was set up by the helmsman's turning the ship to port (left) instead of starboard (right). However, the Respondent contributed to this error by failing to give the steering command, "Right, full rudder," as required by the Rules of Road. See 33 USC 232. The Coast Guard conducted an investigation and prepared a report (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the second page of which is a data sheet taken from the ship's bridge. This data sheet contains a diagram of the ship's turning circle to both port (left) and starboard (right) at half and full speeds. An overlay in proper scale was prepared and attached to Hearing Officer Exhibit 1 at the point where the turn was executed, Point D. The scaled extract of the Coast Guard report is attached to the back of Hearing Officer Exhibit 1. The overlay reveals that the vessel could not make the turn at full speed from Point D because the vessel's course takes it almost exactly to the point of allision. If the vessel's course is offset slightly to the left due to the helmsman's mistake and the vessel's turning circle adjusted for less speed, as would have occurred if the vessel went from half speed to full speed when the order for the turn was given, the vessel's projected track would again place the vessel at the point of the allision. The primary cause of the allision was Respondent's use of full speed in the turn. Although there was controversy about whether the vessel proceeded north the entire way at full speed or whether full speed was ordered as the turn was ordered approaching Buoy 71 (Point D on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1), there is no controversy that Captain Steele intended to execute the turn at full speed. The distance from where Captain Steele assumed control of the ship to where it came to rest is approximately 1 and 1/8 nautical miles. According to the logs, the vessel covered this distance in between four and five minutes. In order to cover that distance in that time, the ship was at or close to its full speed, adjusted for a dirty hull, of 15 knots. The advance and transfer of the ship was extended at full speed in such a way that the vessel could not make the turn in the sea room available. Referring again to the overlay, the vessel could have turned within the searoom available from Point D at half speed. The ship might have completed the turn at half speed from a point left of and forward of Point D, its track as the result of the helmsman's error, particularly with the reserve of thrust available to assist in turning after the emergency developed. The Chaseville turn is a tight turn without a great amount of sea room, and requires care to be exercised by pilots. (Transcript pp. 354, 362, 170, 171). The Respondent's failure to maintain proper speed caused the allision with the Shell Oil Terminal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Pilot commissioners issue a final order suspending Captain Henry A. Steele for three (3) months and levying a civil penalty of $5,000 against him. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Respondent, Thomas A. Baggett has been licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot in Tampa Bay for fifteen (15) years and at all times pertinent to this proceeding was licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot. On February 5, 1984, at about 0620 hours, while Captain Baggett was piloting M/V Triton C outbound from the Gardinier Wharf in Hillsborough County, Florida, the M/V Triton C ran aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay on the east side. The M/V Triton C is a Liberian bulk carrier with an approximate length and width of 576.7 feet and 81 feet, respectively, with a gross tonnage of 17,823 tons. At the time of grounding, the M/V Triton C had a forward draft of 29 feet, 11 inches and an aft draft of 30 feet and 1 inch. The M/V Triton C was experiencing no engine or navigational equipment problem before it ran aground. All aids to navigation, including ranges and buoys, were in place and working properly at the time of the grounding. The M/V Triton was travelling at a speed of 11.7 knots. Range lights, when properly aligned, provide a way for the pilot or anyone navigating a vessel to know the vessel is in the center of the channel. On the morning of February 5, 1985, shortly before the grounding of the M/V Triton C, Captain Baggett gave orders for the turn from CUT E into CUT D, or from a heading of 198 degrees to a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett ordered the wheel 20 degrees to starboard and then eased to 10 degrees. Captain Baggett then ordered the quartermaster to midship the wheel and steady the vessel on 213 degrees. He gave no instructions to the quartermaster concerning the use of the range lights for navigating the center of the channel. At this point the confusion begins. Captain Baggett testified that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees, an appropriate course for the transit of CUT D, while he was present and he observed the M/V Triton C as being on the ranges for about 2 minutes before going into the chart room. As he stepped back into the chart room, he glanced at the compass and observed that the vessel was on a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett gave no further instructions or orders other than "hard to starboard" when he came out of the chart room 15-20 seconds later and noticed the bow swinging to port, the rudder indicator showing 20 degrees rudder and the ranges being already opened. Captain Baggett testified that upon giving the order "hard to starboard" the quartermaster pulled the wheel and went "hard to port" and the vessel almost immediately went aground. The mate and quartermaster tell a different story. The master was below and not present on the bridge at the time of grounding. The mate testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees, and that Captain Baggett remained in the chart room for 40 seconds to 1 minute and came out as the vessel went aground. The quartermaster testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room immediately upon the vessel steadying up on 213 degrees, and did not stay to watch the course or range for 2 minutes. He further testified that Captain Baggett was in the chart room for 5-6 minutes; that he came out of the chart room as the vessel went aground; and, Captain Baggett gave no order of "hard to starboard". The quartermaster at the time of the grounding was Maheswaran Gnanasundran and the mate was Siburs Ioannas. As evidenced by the depositions, both were foreign; neither spoke English and each required an interpreter at the deposition. The master of the M/V Triton C on the day of grounding was Stamatios Stanou, a citizen of Greece, and required an interpreter for his deposition. Captain Baggett experienced a communication problem with quartermaster Gnanasundran in the beginning of the turn out of CUT E to CUT D, and earlier with another quartermaster at the beginning of the turn out of Hilisborough A CUT into Hillsborougn C CUT who was on duty just prior to quartermaster Gnanasundran. The M/V Triton C was at a heading of 206 degrees immediately after grounding and did not move significantly from that heading while grounded. Both the mate and the quartermaster testified that the M/V Triton C, after steadying up, stayed on the course heading of 213 degrees during the entire time and was on the same course heading when the vessel went aground. The mate testified that as the M/V Triton C began to run aground it began to list to the right, and its heading as it finally came to rest aground was 206 degrees. The master of the M/V Triton C testified that the wind was out of the northwest at 15 knots, with full tide, and the current being with M/V Triton C at about 2 knots. Captain John C. Hanson, an investigator for petitioner, testified that at the time of grounding, based on tidal information and weather reports, the wind was out of the northwest and there was an ebb tide running in a southerly direction which would tend to set the M/V Triton C in a southerly direction to the east of CUT D. Captain Hanson further testified that these conditions would have an effect on navigation. Captain Baggett testified that there was an ebb tide in a southwest direction and that it would tend to set to the southwest but at that point in time, it would have had very little effect on the M/V Triton C. Therefore, he did not make any allowances for the tide, wind, or a combination of them. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 shows the mean lower low water depth outside of the confines of the channel in the area of grounding to be 24 feet to 25 feet. Captain Hanson testified that the chart was current but that the depth of the water in a Particular area could be deeper, depending upon tides and winds. Captain Baggett testified that soundings taken on February 5, 1985, during the morning of grounding, put the depth of the water at the bow (point of grounding) and stern to be 25 feet and 37 feet, respectively and, that he visually observed, after daylight the stern of the vessel as being located in the ship channel of CUT D. The ship channel in CUT D has an approximate width of 400 feet with shoaling on both sides. Captain Hanson boarded the M/V Triton C 3 days after the grounding and testified that he plotted the position where the vessel went aground by taking "crossbearings of fixed structures, (no floating aids) and one radar range to one of the radar structures." Captain Hanson plotted the position of the M/V Triton C to be on the east side of CUT D, at a point 450 feet from the centerline of the CUT D approximately 1325 yards from a midpoint between buoys 1E and 2E. For an exact position see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The crossbearings used to locate the exact position of the M/V Triton C are shown on the chart on the right side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The left side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 is an enlargement of CUT D prepared by Captain Hanson showing the various courses the M/V Triton C could have taken from a point abeam of buoys 1E and 2E to the position of grounding based on the speed of the M/V Triton C at 11.7 knots. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates that if the point of grounding was 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, as Captain Hanson testified, and, the M/V Triton C grounded on the heading of 206 degrees, then, at that heading, the stern of a vessel 576.7 feet long could not have reached the channel. Captain Hanson's testimony concerning his method of locating the position of the M/V Triton C, the crossbearing used and the calculations went unrebutted. With a vessel drafting 29 feet 11 inches forward and the point of grounding being 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, the depth of the water outside the confines of the channel along the heading taken by the M/V Triton C was deeper than 25 feet or the grounding would have occurred sooner and at a point closer to the east bank of CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the quartermaster that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees after making the turn from CUT E to CUT D and steered that course for five to six minutes while Captain Baggett was in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room, because the vessel would have travelled beyond the point of grounding in 5 to 6 minutes. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the mate that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees and that the vessel went aground within 40 seconds to 1 minute while Captain Baggett was still in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room because the vessel could not have travelled to the point of grounding in 40 seconds to 1 minute from the time it made the turn out of CUT E into CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of Captain Baggett that the vessel steadied up on a heading of 213 degrees in the center of CUT D and that he viewed the ranges in line for 2 minutes before going to the chart room and that "almost immediately" upon coming out of the chart room 15 to 20 seconds later the vessel went aground was incorrect as to how long he stayed after the vessel steadied up before going into the chart room because in that time frame the turn, causing the vessel to go aground would have been so sharp the vessel would have gone aground at a heading significantly less than 206 degrees. The most believable evidence demonstrates that Captain Baggett was in the chart room 2-3 minutes prior to grounding. Captain Baggett went into the chart room to make his time and distance calculations because light was more readily available. Captain Baggett could have made the time and distance calculations without going into the chart room. While Captain Baggett was in the chart room, he was facing away from the chart room entrance and did not look at the rudder indicator, the ranges, or otherwise determine if his orders were being properly carried out. Captain Baggett's expertise as a pilot was available to the mate and quartermaster while he was in the chart room had either of them been aware of a problem and requested his assistance. But, his expertise as a pilot was not totally available to the vessel due to his position in the chart room. Where the crew is unfamiliar with the harbor and its lights and there is a language problem, courses are usually given on compass rather than instructions on the range lights.
Findings Of Fact The Board of Pilot Commissioners, Respondent, is charged with the responsibility of regulating licensed state pilots and certified deputy pilots in the State of Florida. Respondent is also charged with the responsibility and given the authority to license state pilots in various ports in Florida including the Port of Tampa. Section 310.061, Florida Statutes, provides, inter alia, that there shall not be more than 22 licensed state pilots for Tampa Bay. The number of deputy pilots which may be certified by Respondent is not specified by statute. Respondent may certify as many as necessary to meet the demand for pilot services. Currently, there are 20 licensed state pilots for Tampa Bay and four certified deputy pilots. No applications for pilot or deputy pilot for Tampa Bay have been accepted by Respondent for at least the past two years. Captain Gary Murphy applied to take the state pilot examination in 1980 and was qualified to do so. He is still on Respondent's mailing list to be notified when applications for Tampa will next be accepted. Captain Murphy is a member of TRICO. Respondent does not accept applications for state pilot positions in any port, including Tampa Bay, nor is an examination administered until Respondent has first declared an opening or openings for state pilots for the particular port. TRICO was founded by Captain David Rabren to provide piloting and shipping services on Tampa Bay. The other Petitioners signed membership agreements with TRICO. TRICO began operations January 1, 1984, and is an association of pilots who contract with the ship owners to provide certain piloting services in Tampa Bay. These include docking and undocking vessels and other piloting services on vessels these pilots are legally entitled to pilot. Only Captain Rabren of TRICO is a licensed state pilot for Tampa Bay and authorized to pilot foreign ships into and out of the port. Captains Murphy, Cropper, and Farrell all hold first-class pilots licenses issued by the U. S. Coast Guard for Tampa Bay and they all meet the statutory criteria for experience needed to sit for the Tampa Bay state pilot examination. If the proposed rule becomes effective, none of these Petitioners will be qualified to sit for the state pilot licensing examination. By Chapter 84-185, Laws of Florida, Section 310.071 was amended by extensive modification of Subsection (1)(b) and renumbering Subsection (2) to Subsection (3). Section 310.071, Florida Statutes, establishes the qualifications of applicants for licensure as state pilots and certification for deputy pilots. Following the effective date of Chapter 84-185 of October 1, 1984, Respondent issued proposed Rule 21SS-5.125, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Thomas A. Baggett, Respondent, is a Tampa Bay Pilot licensed by the State of Florida and holds license number 000045. He was so licensed at all times relevant to the charges here involved. On December 13, 1985, the United States Coast Guard held a hearing concerning the Coast Guards charge of negligence against Baggett for his piloting of the T/B Bulkfleet Pennsylvania. At that hearing Baggett pleaded guilty to and was found guilty of the charge that he was negligent while piloting the T/B Bulkfleet Pennsylvania on November 19, 1985, which resulted in this vessel running aground in the vicinity of Cut "C" Channel, Hillsborough Bay, Florida. At the time of the grounding of the T/B Bulkfleet Pennsylvania, Baggett was acting under the authority of his Coast Guard license number 486856 and was subject to the jurisdiction vested in the Coast Guard under 46USC 7703 or 7704.
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1982, Petitioner applied to Respondent to take the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination for the Port of Miami. Prior to that time, Petitioner had served as an apprentice pilot in the Port of Miami from January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1971. Petitioner was terminated from his position as an apprentice pilot with the Port of Miami in 1971, and has not piloted any ships in the Port of Miami or any other port in the state since that time. At the time of his application to take the pilot's examination, Petitioner was over 18 years of age, had been awarded a high school diploma, and was in good physical and mental health. Petitioner had also obtained a valid first class unlimited pilot's license issued by the United States Coast Guard in 1971. In addition to Petitioner, three other persons, William A. Arata, Stephen E. Nadeau, and Robert K. Brownell, also applied to take the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination for the Port of Miami. Arata submitted his application to sit for the examination on November 19, 1982. At that time, Arata had been licensed as a deputy pilot for the Port of Miami since January 28, 1980. In addition, he possessed an unlimited first class pilot'S license for the Port of Miami and had successfully completed the deputy pilot training program for that port. On November 24, 1982, Nadeau submitted his application to sit for the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination. Nadeau had been licensed as a deputy pilot in the Port of Miami since July 23, 1980, possessed an unlimited first class pilot's license for the Port of Miami, and had successfully completed the Port of Miami deputy pilot training program. Brownell applied on November 29, 1982, to sit for the same pilot's examination. At that time, Brownell had been licensed as a deputy pilot for the Port of Miami since July 31, 1980, also possessed an unlimited first class pilot's license for the Port of Miami, and had successfully completed the Port of Miami deputy pilot training program. In accordance with the provisions of Section 310.071, Florida Statutes, the applications of Petitioner, Arata, Nadeau, and Brownell were submitted to the Department of Professional Regulation which, in turn, submitted those applications to Respondent for a determination of eligibility to sit for the licensing examination. Respondent ultimately determined and advised the Department of Professional Regulation that all four applicants were qualified to sit for the licensing examination. All four applicants took the examination on January 31, 1983, and each of them received a passing grade. In accordance with Rule 21-8.09, Florida Administrative Code, the Department of Professional Regulation ranked the grades received by the applicants from highest to lowest. Petitioner received the lowest grade of the four applicants. Accordingly, since Respondent had certified three openings to be filled for licensed state pilots in the Port of Miami, the Department of Professional Regulation, act some time between February 1, 1983, and May 6, 1983, issued state pilot licenses for the Port of Miami to Captains Arata, Nadeau, and Brownell. There is in force in the Port of Miami a Deputy Pilot Training Program which has been approved by Respondent. The minimum time required for completion of the program, which is a prerequisite for applying for a state pilot's license, is two years. One of the requirements of the program is that participants obtain a first class unlimited pilot's license from the United States Coast Guard. This license allows the holder to pilot coastwise vessels which sail under the American flag. A state pilot's license standing alone permits the holder only to pilot ships sailing under foreign flags. In order to acquire a first class unlimited pilot's license, an applicant must possess another maritime license, such as a master's or male's license, must meet age and sea experience requirements, and must pass an examination prepared and administered by the United States Coast Guard. In addition, a condition to obtaining a first class unlimited pilot's license is that the applicant must possess a radar observer's certificate. The Florida State Pilot's Association, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation composed of 59 licensed state pilots from every port in Florida with the exception of Jacksonville and Fort Pierce. Captains Arata, Nadeau, and Brornell are members of that organization. The purpose of the organization is to represent the interests of its members at local, state, and federal levels.
Findings Of Fact By application dated October 7, 1987, Petitioner applied to DOT for approval of a seaplane base on Deerpoint Lake in Bay County, Florida. The application originally provided for limited commercial flying and use by visiting seaplanes upon invitation by Petitioner. Petitioner also has submitted an October 21, 1987 letter from the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) granting airspace approval and an October 29, 1987 letter from the Bay County Commissioners stating that no zoning existed in Bay County which would prohibit the location of the seaplane base at Deerpoint Lake. The application was subsequently amended to limit use of the proposed seaplane base to Petitioner's personal, non-commercial use, and at formal hearing, Petitioner bound himself to accept approval of a seaplane base permit restricted exclusively to his private usage and to flying only during daylight hours, and under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) which call for an altitude of 1,000 feet and three miles of visibility. By a resolution dated August 16, 1988, the Bay County Board of County Commissioners adopted a resolution opposing Petitioner's seaplane base. By letter dated August 30, 1988, DOT denied Petitioner's application because of zoning, noise, and safety. Petitioner owns land on a peninsula in the Highpoint area of Deerpoint Lake. Deerpoint Lake is a freshwater lake approximately seven miles long and approximately two miles across at the point it runs up into Bayou George. The landing area proposed by Petitioner would be 200 feet wide and 7,000 feet long, running in an east/west direction with a ramp and hangar located on the peninsula. Although Petitioner testified that the area is large enough to provide multiple landing areas, the landing approaches would be generally over Bayou George. The proposed site would permit takeoffs and landings of Petitioner's presently owned seaplane without flying over anyone's house at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet. Petitioner's seaplane is a four place Aeranca with a 145 horsepower engine. It has no wheels and is equipped with pontoons for water landings. The plane has a muffled exhaust, self contained fuel tanks, and does not discharge emissions into the water. Takeoff time takes approximately 15 seconds at full power with two people on board. Eight hundred feet is necessary for takeoff which produces the loudest noise the plane makes. Landing is accomplished at a low power setting, is generally silent, and requires only 400 feet. DOT has assembled no factual or scientific data for noise. The witnesses are not in agreement as to the volume of noise produced by this plane and there was no reliable evidence which would indicate the decibel level generated at takeoff, but similar descriptions from several pilot that Petitioner's takeoff is "no noisier than an average motor boat, if muffled" is credible and accepted. In weighing the evidence presented with regard to the noise factor, the testimony of several local residents who testified concerning their opinions that the noise made by Petitioner's seaplane upon takeoff and landing was "excessive" has been discounted because these respective opinions are largely not credible either because the witness had no experience with seaplanes, or because the witness was prejudiced against the Petitioner's project as a whole. Specifically, no witness had made a complaint about noise until after the hangar was built. Some witnesses erroneously assumed that Petitioner had erected his hangar without a building permit and further believed an unfounded rumor that the Petitioner must be starting a flying school, or they considered the hangar an "eyesore", or they felt "betrayed" that a neighbor would establish a flying school base. Deerpoint Lake is a low population density area, almost exclusively residential in nature. DOT has done no survey of any kind with regard to the recreational uses of this lake, however evidence adduced at hearing shows that it is used primarily for recreational fishing and water sports. The largest number of fishing boats traceable to lake visitors at one time is twelve, but this does not account for additional abutting owners' boats which are launched without trailers. The concentration of boaters tends to be 3-4 miles away from Petitioner's property. However, there are also private boat ramps on both sides of Petitioner's property. Deerpoint Lake is also a reservoir area and a source of potable water for the county. There are some power poles in the vicinity of Petitioner's property. Some poles support a new power line and others are only the remains of an abandoned power line. The old power poles are generally cut off to be only 3-4 feet above the waterline, and some are just even with the waterline. Both sets of power poles and the power line limit where seaplanes can take off and land on the surface of the water itself, although there is testimony that, under ideal conditions (i.e. if all conditions are met and no flying or boating rules are disobeyed), Petitioner's standard plan for takeoffs and landings would not encounter either power line or poles upon takeoff or landing. There is, of course, no guarantee that all conditions will be favorable all of the time. The more probable danger presented by the poles is that if a seaplane had to taxi or otherwise take evasive action on the surface of the water so as too avoid a fishing boat, swimmer, or water-skier, the plane could encounter a cut-off pole. Petitioner first located his plane on Deerpoint Lake in July, 1984 and has accomplished approximately 25 safe takeoffs and landings therefrom since that time. Since becoming aware of the need for a site permit, he has voluntarily not taken off or landed on the lake. He has never had an accident there, but two other planes have. Neither of the situations, planes, or pilot in these two accidents is comparable to Petitioner's circumstances. Neither accident involved recreational users of the lake. Bobby R. Grice, who ultimately denied the application on behalf of DOT, expressed "just my personal opinion" that boaters could not hear a plane on its final approach. He has fished on Deerpoint Lake. He is not familiar with he operation of seaplanes, the visibility from them, or FAA rules. Two witnesses complained about Petitioner's coming too close to their homes during landings. By County Ordinance 89-02, enacted January 17, 1989, the Bay County Board of County Commissioners prohibited seaplanes on Deerpoint Lake, but also provided for a variance procedure for those landowners in Petitioner's location. As of the date of formal hearing, Petitioner had not applied for, or received, a variance from the county. The October 29, 1987 letter obtained by the Petitioner from the County (see Finding of Fact No. 1) stating there were no zoning impediments to the application at that time has been superseded by the 1989 ordinance Mr. Frank Duke, Chief Planner for Bay County, was unable to give a firm and competent opinion on whether or not the Petitioner's application to DOT was consistent with the existing 1978 Bay County Comprehensive Plan, because he had never personally observed the Petitioner's property on Deerpoint Lake. Nonetheless, it is clear that if Petitioner were to apply to Bay County for a seaplane base variance on Deerpoint Lake, Petitioner's proposed use would have to be reviewed in relationship to the County Comprehensive Plan.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner'S seaplane base application. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of September, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4932 The following specific rulings are made pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S., upon the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF): Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, (12 is accepted as modified to conform to the record), 13, 15, 19 a-b, 20, 22, 24. Accepted except for material subordinate, unnecessary or cummulative to the facts as found: 6, 16, 21, 23. What is rejected is also not dispositive of the issue at bar. Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary: 9,10. Accepted in part; the remainder is rejected as not proven: 14, 17, 18. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted except for material subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found: 1, 2, 4, 5. Rejected as subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found: 3, 6, 7, 8. Moreover, these proposals are largely reiteration of unreconciled testimony or legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr. Senior Attorney Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Bonnie K. Roberts, Esquire Post Office Box 667 Bonifay, Florida 32425 Ben C. Watts, Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether the application of the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami should be granted in whole or in part or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In their Prehearing Stipulation, the parties stipulated to the following facts, which are deemed admitted: The Cargo Carriers Association is a Florida not-for- profit corporation with its principal office in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the Cargo Carriers Association is to promote, advance, and secure laws, rules, and regulations concerning vessels utilizing the navigable waters of the State of Florida, in particular the Port of Miami and Port Everglades, in order that the waters, harbors, and ports of the state and the environment and property of all persons be protected to the fullest possible extent consistent with sound financial principles. A substantial number of the members of the Cargo Carriers Association are affected by the rates of pilotage currently set for the Port of Miami, inasmuch as they are required by Florida law, Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, to utilize and compensate the Port of Miami pilots whose rates are established by the Board, and they are, in fact, utilizing and compensating pilots in accordance with the rates established for the Port of Miami. Accordingly, the Cargo Carriers Association is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the Board's Decision dated March 9, 2000. The Board is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Section 310.151, Florida Statutes, which is invested with the authority and responsibility to determine the rates of pilotage at the various ports of Florida, including the Port of Miami. Section 310.151, Florida Statutes (2000). The Pilots' Association is an association of harbor pilots that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes and that performs the pilotage services at the Port of Miami. The offices of the Pilots' Association and its affiliate, Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., are located in Miami, Florida. In October 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board an application for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami. On October 28, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board convened a fact-finding public hearing on the Pilots' Association's application in Miami, Florida, at which numerous interested persons provided comments and testimony, both for and against the Pilots' Association's requested rate increase. On November 29, 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board a version of its application that, in its words, "has been edited to correct scrivener's errors." On December 9, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board completed its review and investigation of the Pilots' Association's application and presented its written findings to the Board as required by Rule 61E13-2.007(4), Florida Administrative Code. On January 21, 2000, the Board met in Miami, Florida, to review the rate increase application of the Pilots' Association and heard comments and testimony from persons who supported or opposed the application in whole or in part. At the conclusion of this meeting, the Board preliminarily determined to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part with a phased-in increase in rates. The Board's written decision was filed with the agency's clerk on March 9, 2000. The Cargo Carriers Association timely filed its petition for a proceeding under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1999). The Pilots' Association requested in its application a 10 percent increase in the rate for draft charges, for tonnage charges, for shifting or anchoring charges, and for minimum fees, effective immediately, with an additional increase of 5 percent in these rates and fees six months after the effective date of the initial increase. The requested increase would result in a total 15.5 percent increase in pilotage rates and minimum fees at the Port of Miami. The Board hired an Investigative Committee composed of two consultants, one a Certified Public Accountant and the other a retired Coast Guard officer, to examine the Pilots' Association's application in light of the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1999). The Investigative Committee held a public hearing in which it received testimony from interested parties. The Investigative Committee Report was presented to the Board at the public hearing on January 21, 2000. The Board included in its written Decision findings of fact and comments with respect to each of the criteria set forth in Section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes (1999), 3/ an analysis and statement of its decision to approve an increase in the pilotage rates at the Port of Miami, and an order specifying the approved increases. The Board stated its intention to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part and to increase the rates of pilotage at the Port of Miami 3 1/2 percent for draft charges, tonnage charges, shifting or anchoring charges, and the minimum fees, effective on the date of its order, 4/ with an additional 3 percent rate increase in each of the charges effective 12 months from the effective date of the first increase and another 3 percent increase in each of the charges effective 24 months after the effective date of the first increase. This increase is 63.16 percent of the increase requested by the Pilots' Association. The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. Section 310.151(5)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2000). 5/ In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 11 of the report. 6/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. 7/ A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "net income of pilots" refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 12 and 13 of the report, with the following modification to the depreciation adjustment included in the calculation of the pilots' total compensation if the requested rate increase were approved in toto and the resulting modification in the projected "adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot": The depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2000 was decreased from $6500.00 to $1600.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2000 of $340,800.00; the depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2001 was decreased from $6500.00 to $4800.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2001 of $340,000.00. The Investigative Committee Report included in the computation of average net pilot income the value of health and retirement benefits, pension valuation, and discretionary costs such as political contributions, lobbying expenses, and business promotion expenses. The Investigative Committee identified the actual total pilot compensation for pilots at the Port of Miami, including adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs but not for depreciation, as $308,200.00 for 1998, and it projected the total pilot compensation for 1999, 2000, and 2001, without a rate increase, as $288,200.00, $296,200.00, and $290,200.00, respectively. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Since 1993, the Pilots' Association has tried to maintain a roster of 18 active pilots at the Port of Miami, although this number has fluctuated from time to time. Currently, there are 17 pilots and one deputy at the Port of Miami. Excluding adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs, compensation in 1997 and 1998 for pilots at the Port of Miami was $281,000.00 and $278,000.00, respectively; compensation at Port Everglades was $329,000.00 and $344,000.00, respectively; compensation at the Port of Palm Beach was $154,000.00 and $230,000.00, respectively; and compensation at the Port of Jacksonville was $250,000.00 and $254,000.00, respectively. Because of the exclusions noted above, these amounts understate actual compensation. Compensation for the Port of Miami pilots increased 38.4 percent between 1989 and 1996. In 1989, pilot income at the Port of Miami was $203,000.00, and, in 1990, it was $181,000.00. The pilots received an effective 32 percent rate increase as a result of a 26 percent rate increase in 1992 and a 5 percent rate increase in 1993, and gross pilotage revenue increased 72 percent between 1989 and 1996, an increase primarily attributable to an increase in the number of larger vessels using the port. As a result of the revenue increase, pilot income rose to over $281,000.00 in 1997. In addition to piloting, the pilots at the Port of Miami carry out the duties of Harbor Master, which involve coordinating all of the ship traffic in the port. The pilots receive no additional compensation for this service. Reasonable operating expenses of pilots. Section 310.151(5)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 13 through 16 of the report. In the report, the Investigative Committee found that, with the exception of the costs associated with the Pilots' Association's retirement plan, the operating expenses included in the Pilots' Association's application were reasonable. The Investigative Committee Report included a detailed discussion of the Pilots' Association's retirement plan. The retirement plan of the Pilots' Association is a non-qualified plan under the Internal Revenue Code and is unfunded and, therefore, contingent on the future operations at the Port of Miami. The plan is in the form of a consulting agreement between the Pilots' Association and its retirees, pursuant to which each pilot who reaches 55 years of age and completes 20 years of service as a full-time active pilot, and who agrees to act in the best interests of the Pilots' Association, is eligible to be paid up to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, provided that the aggregate amount paid to retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the annual total gross pilotage revenue. The payments are to be made from future pilotage revenue. The total costs associated with retired pilot compensation and benefits (equity buy-outs, surviving spouse accrual, and health insurance) included in the Investigative Committee Report for 1998 were $2,093,086.00, of which $1.4 million was attributable to payments to 11 retirees for consulting services. The Investigative Committee questioned the reasonableness of this operating expense at page 16 of its report, although it noted that there are similar plans in other Florida ports. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In 1998, payments to the five retired pilots at Port Everglades totaled $962,714.00. The retirement plan for the Port Everglades pilots has the same limits as the plan for the pilots at the Port of Miami: A Port Everglades retiree's benefit is limited to 50 percent of the income of an active pilot, and the aggregate benefits paid to Port Everglades retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the pilots' annual gross revenue. The plan at Port Canaveral limits the aggregate benefits paid to retirees to 33 1/3 percent of gross annual revenue; the limitation at the Port of Jacksonville for current retirees is 28 percent of gross annual revenue and 22 percent for new retirees. There are no aggregate limits on the amounts paid to retirees at the ports in Charleston, South Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia. Pilotage rates in other ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 16 and 17 of the report, and stated its intention to confine its comparative rate analysis to ports in Florida and the southeastern seaboard. It was noted in the Investigative Committee Report that, in 1998, the Port of Miami was ranked the seventh highest of 12 Florida ports with respect to the cost for piloting both a standard large and a standard small vessel and the eighth highest out of the 12 Florida ports in the amount of revenue per handle. 8/ As part of its comparison of pilotage rates in other ports, the Investigative Committee included in its report a chart based on 1998 data setting out the number of handles in each of the 12 Florida ports surveyed, together with 1998 revenue, average handle time, number of pilots, revenue per handle, and revenue per handle hour for each of the 12 ports. In 1998, the Port of Miami had 8,909 handles, revenue of $8,433.539.00, average handle time of 2.0 hours, 18 pilots, revenue per handle of $947.00, and revenue per handle hour of $473.00. Based on 1998 data, Port Everglades, the port closest geographically to the Port of Miami, had 10,168 handles, revenue of $6,899,006.00, average handle time of 1.9 hours, 16 pilots, revenue per handle of $679.00, and revenue per handle hour of $357.00. In its Decision, the Board recognized that pilotage rates cannot be considered in a vacuum and that a rate increase or decrease is not justified simply because a rate is comparatively low or high. Rather, the Board found that consideration must be given to the size and number of vessels using the port, the time required to service the vessels, and the characteristics of the port that impact positively or negatively on the gross revenue and net income derived from the rate structure. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. The Investigative Committee determined that Port Everglades was the closest and most relevant competitive port to the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami handles primarily cruise ships, excluding daily cruise ships, and container cargo vessels. Port Everglades handles both container cargo vessels and vessels containing bulk and neo-bulk products such as petroleum, cement, steel, and lumber, as well as a mix of large cruise ships and smaller, daily cruise ships. Port Everglades is one of the largest petroleum ports in the southeastern United States. The Port of Miami handles fewer but generally larger vessels than Port Everglades. The distance between the sea buoy 9/ and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in the Port of Miami is approximately six miles; the distance between the sea buoy and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in Port Everglades is approximately two miles. In Port Everglades, the distance from the sea buoy to the channel is short, so that there is little room to position the vessel properly for entry into the channel. The channel is, however, straight. In the Port of Miami, there is a 40-degree turn mid- channel. Currently, Port Everglades has 16 pilots and two deputies. A comparison of the pilotage rates in the Port of Miami and in Port Everglades shows that, without considering the rate increase proposed by the Board, the current draft rate in the Port of Miami is 38 percent higher than that in Port Everglades and the current tonnage rate is 7.5 percent higher in the Port of Miami than in Port Everglades. With the Board's proposed rate increase, the draft rate at the Port of Miami is roughly 40 percent higher than that at Port Everglades, and the tonnage rate is roughly 16 percent higher. Without a rate increase, total pilotage fees at the Port of Miami are 18 percent higher for small vessels and 14 percent higher for large vessels than the total pilotage fees at Port Everglades. Using the cruise ship Enchantment of the Seas as an example, without the rate increase, pilotage fees are $5,700.00 per trip in and out of the Port of Miami, or $260,000.00 annually; with the Board's proposed rate increase, pilotage fees are $6,270.00 per trip, or $326,000.00 annually. In contrast, the pilotage fees for the Enchantment of the Seas at Port Everglades are $5,150.00 per trip in and out of the port, or $268,000.00 annually. 10/ The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. Section 310.151(5)(b)5., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 18 of the report. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing as that sought in pilots, it being recognized that in order to attract to the profession of piloting, and to hold the best and most qualified individuals as pilots, the overall compensation accorded pilots should be equal to or greater than that available to such individuals in comparable maritime employment. Section 310.151(5)(b)6., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 18 and 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded in its Final Order that the profession most comparable to that of a port pilot is that of a captain of a large United States-flagged vessel. The Investigative Committee further recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded that pilot compensation should be equal to or greater than $203,000.00, represented by the Investigative Committee in its report as the annualized compensation of a "U.S. master." The Investigative Committee found, further, that the skills, risks, and working conditions of a ship's captain and a pilot are considerably different in that a pilot must have a wider range of technical skills to pilot a variety of vessels of different sizes; a pilot assumes more physical risks because of the need to board and disembark each vessel; a pilot is constantly in a stressful situation while piloting a vessel into port; and a pilot is a private businessman rather than an employee and must face all of the attendant risks and obligations. In its Decision, the Board established the "floor" compensation for pilots at approximately $200,000.00 to $220,000.00, which represents the wage of the highest-paid ship's master on a United States-flagged ship. 11/ The Investigative Committee found in its report that the amount of compensation above the floor established by the Board depends on several factors, including the size of the ships calling on the port, the difficulty of the port, the cost of living in the surrounding community, and pilot compensation in other United States ports. Finally, the Board expressly recognized in its Decision that, unlike ships' masters, pilots are not employees of a corporation but are independent businessmen, with all of the financial risks that status implies. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. 12/ The education and training of a pilot and a ship's master is, in many cases, the same. A ship's master operating on the high seas, however, has the responsibility for the ship's well-being 24 hours a day, seven days a week during the course of the voyage. The scope of responsibility of a ship's master requires a wider array of skills than those of a pilot; he or she must make judgments regarding matters extending beyond the navigation of the ship. The ship's master is responsible for the ship's crew and, if the ship is a cruise ship, for the welfare of the passengers, and he or she must deal with the hazards of the ship catching fire, disease onboard, and a variety of other matters requiring non-technical skills. A ship's master must have navigational skills and must be knowledgeable about many ports throughout the world and many weather systems. Even when a ship is being piloted into port, the ship's master retains the ultimate responsibility for the ship, and the ship's master will sometimes dock the ship once the pilot has brought it to the docking area. Pilots are licensed to operate in a particular port, and they must have an intimate knowledge of that port. Because pilots must handle almost every vessel calling at the Port of Miami, they must be familiar with the peculiarities of numerous types and sizes of vessels, and they must continually take courses to keep up with the changing technology used on new vessels. Consequently, the knowledge and skills required of a pilot are more specialized and more narrowly focused than those required of a ship's master. When a vessel is ready to come into the Port of Miami, the pilot is taken to the vessel, which, depending on its size, may be located two-to-three miles east of the sea buoy. The pilot must, therefore, board and disembark from a vessel in open water. A pilot at the Port of Miami must guide vessels, sometimes exceeding 1,000 feet in length, through a 500-foot wide channel cut in rock, make a 40-degree turn, and guide the vessel into the port's turning basin and, ultimately, to its berth. There is little maneuvering room, and the pilot must deal with the ever-changing winds, currents, and tides that affect a vessel's passage to the berthing area. For ships of 1,000 feet or longer, there is adequate but not generous room for maneuvering in the turning basin. The number of large vessels using the Port of Miami has increased since 1989. Piloting large vessels increases the complexity of the pilot's job and increases the potential for an accident, necessarily increasing the amount of stress experienced by pilots routinely bringing such vessels into the Port of Miami. A pilot must direct the crew of a vessel when bringing the vessel into and through the channels leading to the turning basin and from the turning basin to the berths, and his or her success depends on his ability to communicate instructions to crewmembers. This communication is becoming more difficult because crewmembers are recruited from many different countries, including those from Eastern Europe, and they may or may not understand English. The stress experienced by a pilot is significantly increased when he must depend on crewmembers who do not understand English, because disaster could result if the pilot's instructions are not followed precisely. The stress experienced by pilots when they are on the job is much more intense, though of shorter duration, than that experienced by ship's masters. A pilot at the Port of Miami will pilot between six and 18 ships each week and is on-call 24 hours each day while on piloting duty, under conditions that are physically and mentally stressful. The pilots at the Port of Miami are not employees of the Pilots' Association. Rather, the Pilots' Association is operated as a partnership of the pilots, and it is funded from the pilotage revenue at the Port of Miami. There are significant operating expenses deducted from gross pilotage revenue before the pilots are paid. The Pilots' Association owns and maintains a building at the far eastern end of the Port of Miami that houses the pilots' business office and also contains bedrooms, restrooms, a lounge, and a chart room for use by the pilots. The Pilots' Association employs office staff to handle billing and accounting functions. The Pilots' Association owns and operates four pilot boats used to transport pilots to and from vessels arriving at and departing from the Port of Miami, and it employs six full- time boat operators. Replacement costs for the pilot boats exceed $2 million. The pilots must absorb rising fuel costs, which cannot be passed on as a surcharge to those using the port and are also responsible for the costs of maintaining the boats. The pilots provide communications services to the vessels entering the Port of Miami, and the Pilots' Association maintains three Federal Communications Commission licenses, a marine coastal station, a high power UHF repeater, and VHF radios in all of the pilot boats. The pilots have invested approximately $50,000.00 in communications equipment that they make available to the Port of Miami, including a 100-watt VHF long range radio and tower, as well as the UHF repeater, and they also maintain the equipment. In addition, the pilots employ dispatchers who handle the radios. The pilot's income is a function of the volume and size of traffic in and out of the port, and they are, consequently, affected by decisions made by the Port of Miami authorities with respect to services to be provided vessels using the port and with respect to port charges. The financial risks faced by the pilots at the Port of Miami are, for the most part, shared by all independent business owners. However, even though pilots of the Pilots' Association are the only pilots allowed to provide services in the Port of Miami and even though pilotage rates are highly regulated and, to an extent, non-competitive, pilots, unlike most private independent business owners, cannot pass on increases in operating expenses; rather, the pilots must absorb these increases until, and unless, an application for a rate increase is approved. 13/ The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. Section 310.151(5)(b)7., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that all-inclusive pilot compensation for the pilots at the Port of Miami would increase 8.76 percent if the increase requested by the Pilots' Association were approved by the Board. As a result, the compensation of pilots at the Port of Miami would still be lower than that of the pilots at Port Everglades, but only slightly. The Investigative Committee noted that an opening at any of the four major Florida ports, the Port of Miami, Port Everglades, Tampa, and Jacksonville, draws 20 to 30 applicants from all over the United States. The Investigative Committee observed that, with or without a rate increase, any of these four ports would attract qualified pilots because they are likely to find more attractive compensation and working and living environments than provided by their present situations. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Projected changes in vessel traffic. Section 310.151(5)(b)8., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 20 and 21 of the report. The Investigative Committee accepted the estimated handles provided by the Pilots' Association in its application, which reflects an increase from 8,909 handles in 1998, to an estimated 9,200 handles in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Investigative Committee noted in its report that the number of cruise passengers at the Port of Miami has remained steady since 1991 and that, although the number of handles decreased between 1992 and 1995, there was steady growth in cargo tonnage between 1988 and 1998. Even with the decrease in the number of handles, the average revenue per handle increased from $545.00 in 1990 to $978.00 in 1998, accounting for a 73 percent increase in the gross annual revenue and a 79 percent increase in the average revenue per handle. The Investigative Committee found that the data suggests that the increase in the pilots' average revenue per handle, and, therefore, its gross annual revenue, is more a function of the increase in the size of the vessels calling at the Port of Miami than a function of the 32 percent rate increase in 1992 and 1993. The Investigative Committee found in its report, and the Board recognized in its Decision, that Port Everglades and the Port of Miami have a strong competitive relationship and that a large increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami might result in a decision by Maersk Shipping, a large shipping company currently calling at the Port of Miami and at Port Everglades, to consolidate its operations and use Port Everglades rather than the Port of Miami, resulting in a material decrease in the revenue of the Port of Miami pilots. Prior to the rate increase proposed by the Board, Maersk Shipping paid the pilots at the Port of Miami $1.08 million each year in pilotage fees. A change in operations to Port Everglades would result in a decrease in each pilot's annual income of approximately $48,000.00, with a $24,000.00 decrease in each retiree's benefits. 14/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In choosing ports of call, ship owners, particularly cargo lines, consider many factors, including marketing factors, the availability of berths, the availability of terminal space, the availability of inland transportation, and port congestion, as well as port costs. Port costs, also known as port call expenses, at the Port of Miami are composed of many elements in addition to pilotage fees, such as terminal fees ($8,800.00) 15/ , dockage fees ($3,349.00), wharfage fees ($3,400.00), tug boat fees ($3,009.00), agent fees ($1,500.00), custom and agriculture entry fees ($1,995.00), and harbor fees ($162.00), for a total of $5,570.00; pilotage fees at the Port of Miami for a standard large vessel, according to 1998 data, were $1,085.40, or approximately 15-to-20 percent of port call expenses for a standard large vessel. Therefore, while pilotage fees are a significant part of the mix of port call expenses considered by ship owners in determining whether to call at the Port of Miami, pilots have no control over most of the fees and tariffs comprising port call expenses or over the many other factors that might influence the competitive posture of the Port of Miami vis-à-vis Port Everglades or changes in vessel traffic in the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami consists of Lummus and Dodge Islands, and it is run by the Miami-Dade County Seaport Department. The port rates at the Port of Miami increased approximately 30 percent between 1991 and 1998, generating a revenue increase of approximately 76 percent. Operating expenses increased approximately 44 percent during that time period, but, in general, the port's rate increases have gone primarily to finance improvements in the port's infrastructure and to provide its customers with facilities to accommodate their larger vessels. The port has also received a number of federal and state grants to fund construction programs to improve the port, as well as federal funds for the Port of Miami's dredging program. POMTOC, the Port of Miami Terminal Operating Company, recently received approval to raise its gate fee and empty container storage fee 2.7 percent. The Miami-Dade County Seaport Department also increased its harbor fee for large vessels from $195.00 in 1999 to $235.00 in 2000. In addition, the majority of the port's tariff items increased between 1999 and 2000. Competition is very aggressive among the ports along the eastern seaboard of the United States and along the Gulf of Mexico. As one response to the competitive nature of the market, the Port of Miami has, since 1998, entered into volume incentive agreements with several of its largest customers. The purpose of these agreements is to increase the level of activity at the port by offering a reduction in the port's tariff rate, while at the same time having a guaranteed minimum level of revenue for the port. The Port of Miami has entered into volume incentive agreements with Carnival Cruise Lines, Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Seaboard Marine, Maersk, Columbus Lines, and Chilean, and it is in the process of negotiating other such agreements. As a result of the agreements, these lines have brought additional business to the port or have brought new lines to the port. Cost of retirement and medical plans. Section 310.151(5)(b)9., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 22 through 25 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee determined that the estimated cost of the medical plan available to active and retired pilots for 1999, 2000, and 2001 was $8,125.00, $8,235.00, and $8,400.00, respectively, for each active pilot (or a gross for active pilots of $143,000.00, $140,000.00, and $148,000.00, respectively), and $4,636.00, $5,083.00, and $5,083, respectively, for each retiree (or a gross for retirees of $51,000.00, $61,000.00, and $61,000.00, respectively). The Pilots' Association funds both a money purchase pension plan and a 401k plan for all of its employees, after they have completed one year's service. The total annual contribution averages $6,000.00 per employee. Because the pilots are members of a partnership, they are not considered Pilots' Association employees. Their retirement plan is unfunded, and, as noted above, is in the form of a lifetime consulting agreement pursuant to which eligible pilots receive income that is limited to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, with the aggregate payments to retirees capped at 20 percent of the pilots' gross annual revenue. A surviving spouse of a retired pilot is entitled to receive 25 percent of an active pilot's income for life. The equity interests of retiring pilots in the Pilots' Association are also purchased by the Pilots' Association. These benefits result in an aggregate cost to the Pilots' Association of $2,093,086.00 per year. The Investigative Committee valued the pension plan at a conservative $30,000.00 per year, a figure that the Board accepted over objections by the Pilots' Association. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Physical risks inherent in piloting. Section 310.151(5)(b)10., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 25 and 26 of the report. The Investigative Committee found that boarding a vessel at sea is the most difficult and dangerous aspect of a pilot's job, and that several pilots were injured between 1996 and 1999. Pilots board vessels in the open sea under many different conditions, with considerable risk, and the pilot often receives minimal support from a vessel's crew. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. Even though they may refuse if conditions are unsafe, as a general rule pilots board and disembark from vessels in the open sea, in all kinds of weather, day and night, on rope ladders that are not fixed, that are sometimes not consistent with standards established by the International Maritime Organization, and that are sometimes in poor repair. Whenever possible, the vessels turn to create a lee, or sheltered side, where the pilot can board and disembark from the vessel with less risk, although it is always possible, even in a calm sea, for a cross swell to hit the vessel during boarding or disembarking. Another point at which a pilot is physically at risk is upon moving from the ladder to the deck of the vessel. Many cruise ships have pilot doors low on the side of the vessel to shorten the distance a pilot must ascend or descend a ladder to board and disembark from the ship. Once the pilot is on board the vessel, he is escorted to the bridge, which is accessible only by stairs, sometimes totaling 100 steps in many modern cargo ships. Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. Section 310.151(5)(b)11., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 26 and 27 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee identified several special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the Port of Miami. It recognized that, due to the velocity and direction of the currents, the proximity of the Gulf Stream presents a variety of challenges to pilots as vessels approach the Outer Bar Channel and that the Gulf Stream, together with northerly winds and a flooding current, make transiting the jetties especially difficult. Because the channel bottom is hard coral from the sea buoy to the berths, it is extremely difficult to handle large, deep-draft vessels to and from the gantry berths, and the current and wind conditions require special handling of these vessels when they dock or turn. In addition, reefs lining the approaches to the Port of Miami are unmarked, and the background light from Miami-Dade County makes it difficult to identify land and navigational marks. Weather can cause hazards to navigation in the Port of Miami, with rapidly changing wind conditions resulting from thunderstorms and with changing tidal conditions resulting from heavy rains. In addition, northwesterly and northeasterly winds cause heavy sets on a flood tide for vessels passing through the jetties. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. 16/ The complexity of the waterway poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. Waterway complexity at the Port of Miami includes the amount of crossing traffic, turns in the channel, converging traffic from different channels, background lighting, and the large number of small pleasure craft in and around the channels. The hard rock bottom of the channels poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. The channel is dredged in a "U" shape, forming a narrow underwater trench through which vessels must pass, and vessels can be seriously damaged if they come into contact with the sides of the trench. Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. Section 310.151(5)(b)12., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board determined that there were no such factors. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the Board's finding. The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. Section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 28 and 29 of the report and in the attachments thereto. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") had increased 17.8 percent since January 1, 1993, the date of the last pilotage rate increase, and 22.9 percent since October 1991, the date of the Pilots' Association's last application for a rate increase. In reaching its conclusion that some increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami is justified, the Board noted in its Decision that it considered it compelling that the CPI had increased 17.8 percent since the last rate increase and that pilotage rates at the Port of Miami had not increased for seven years. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Taken in its entirety, the evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association and the Pilots' Association in this proceeding with respect to the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.1151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2000), yielded findings of fact in addition to those found by the Board in its Decision. There was not sufficient credible and persuasive evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association to support a finding of fact contrary to the findings of the Board in its Decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pilotage Rate Review Board consider the additional facts established by the evidence presented at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in determining, in accordance with its interpretation of its statutory mandate, its expertise, and the appropriate policy considerations, whether the Decision on the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association Pilotage Rate Increase Application in the Port of Miami, filed March 9, 2000, will result in fair, just, and reasonable pilotage rates at the Port of Miami. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2001.
