Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, filed an Administrative Complaint in prosecution of a probable cause finding by the Board of Pilot Commissioners, an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating entry into the profession of harbor piloting and enforcing the practice standards for that profession for those already licensed. The Respondent at all times material hereto, was admitted as a licensed pilot in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0000033. The Respondent resides in Jacksonville, Florida and practices his profession by piloting vessels in and out of the port of Jacksonville. On February 26, 1987, the motor vessel, Fernpasset, was approaching the port of Jacksonville for the purpose of discharging a load of Volkswagon automobiles. The Fernpasset is a Liberian registered car carrier having a gross tonnage of 9841 tons, a length of 536 feet, with an 89.5 foot beam. The vessel is somewhat unique in that it has a very large "sail area" or wind-affected profile as a necessary part of its structure, which extends approximately ninety percent of the vessel's total length and at a height of approximately sixty feet above the water line. This represents a much larger wind-affected profile for this vessel, as compared to more conventional cargo ships. The Jacksonville Harbor is reached by navigation of the St. Johns River channel inland from the Atlantic Ocean. At the point where the river and river channel reaches the Atlantic Ocean are two jetties, composed of granite rocks, serving as a breakwater at the entrance to the harbor. The harbor entrance has a north jetty and a south jetty. The north jetty projects waterward from the land for approximately 2,400 yards. The south jetty projects out into the water approximately 1,400 yards. Buoy number seven in the St. Johns River channel is located nine hundred yards inside the jetties. At approximately 1800 hours on February 26, 1987, the Fernpasset commenced preparation for entering the port of Jacksonville. The chief mate made VHF radio contact with the Jacksonville pilot station at about this time and gave the dispatcher at the pilot station, at his request, his estimated time of arrival at the sea buoy, his deep draft, approximately twenty-two to twenty- four feet, and what the weather conditions were at sea. During the initial radio contact between the Fernpasset and the pilot dispatcher, Errol M. Hatton, at approximately 1815 hours, the dispatcher asked First Officer (Chief Mate) Oleson whether he wanted to pick the pilot up inside the jetties or at the sea buoy. He replied that it would pick up the pilot inside the jetties. The vessel's master, Ole Brakstaad, agreed to that procedure. After this initial contact, and after the arrangement with the Fernpasset was made that it would pick the pilot up inside the jetties, the dispatcher called the Respondent, Captain Register and informed him of the job and the boarding arrangement. Prior to the Fernpasset arriving in the port area, the Jacksonville area had experienced moderate to severe weather from the northeast with "northeasters" blowing for approximately a week, with choppy and rough seas. Indeed, the official log of the M/V Fernpasset reveals that wind conditions on February 26, 1987, while at sea, varied from wind force four through wind force six and seas varied from sea scale four through sea scale five. Just two hours before the initial radio contact with the pilot station, at approximately 1600 hours, the Fernpasset was experiencing winds from the Northeast at force five, gusting at six. The sea had a heavy swell running at that time. Wind force six is approximately twenty-two to twenty-seven nautical miles per hour. Sea scale five consists of waves running eight to twelve feet high. See Respondent's exhibit two, (Brakstaad's Deposition). After Captain Register arrived at the pilot's station, the dispatcher, Mr. Hatton, spoke with the vessel approximately two more times, checking on its estimated time of arrival and having the vessel confirm that it would pick up the pilot inside the jetties. This arrangement had already been made before Captain Register had been called at his home by the dispatcher and told to report for duty to pilot the Fernpasset into the harbor. Captain Register did not participate in the conversation that set up this arrangement because he was at home and not on duty at the time. The evidence does not reflect that this choice was anything but freely made by the master of the Fernpasset and it does not indicate that Captain Register had any reason to believe that the master of the vessel had not freely chosen to pick up the pilot inside the breakwater, especially in view of the fact that inclement weather conditions were prevailing, with the attendant danger involved in boarding a pilot in heavy seas. In any event, the master of the vessel, Captain Ole Brakstaad, commenced conning his vessel into the entrance to the St. Johns River. He used his radar and the navigational markers to line up the vessel to transit between the north and south jetties. The vessel's master had assumed control of the vessel's movement from the Chief Mate at approximately 1900 hours. At approximately 1943 hours, the vessel passed the sea buoy preparing to enter the entrance channel to the river. At 1944 hours, several rudder commands were given to the helmsman and the vessel "steadied up" on course 278 degrees, lined up to enter the channel. At about this time, the winds had shifted to north- northeast at approximately 16 knots. As the vessel entered the channel, the master and the chief mate were unable to see the range lights. At 1946 hours, the master ordered a slow ahead "bell" to reduce the ship's speed to 10 knots for transiting the channel. The range lights were still not visible to the master or chief mate. As the vessel passed buoys three and four, it was centered in the channel. The wind speed increased to approximately eighteen knots from the northeast. In order to counteract the effect of the wind and strong current, which was in a southerly direction, the master ordered the helmsman to come to starboard to course 283 degrees, in order to remain centered in the channel. The master determined that the vessel was being "set" to the south by the combined forces of the northeast wind and the southerly current and therefore had to steer further north to compensate for the set. He ordered courses of 285 degrees, 290 degrees and finally 295 degrees. At 1953 hours, he increased the vessel's speed from slow ahead to half speed ahead to provide for greater maneuverability. At approximately 1954 hours, he ordered full speed ahead, with an emergency bell, to the engineer after realizing that his ship was sideways in the channel and still being set to the south. At 1955 hours, however, the Fernpasset grounded on her port side on the St. Johns River entrance channel south jetty. Before he could contact the pilot, however, he received a call from the pilot boat stating that the Captain should proceed into the channel at a speed of 10 knots. The master informed the pilot that his vessel had run aground and that he needed tug assistance. At approximately 2015 hours, Captain Register boarded the grounded vessel. Captain Register was only able to board the vessel after great difficulty because of the rough weather. After he got aboard, he assisted in towing the vessel off the breakwater and out to sea and in assessing damages. The practice of boarding a pilot requires the vessel being boarded to slow down and make a "lee" or sheltered area on one side of the vessel, sheltered from winds and waves, to help the pilot boat approach and place the pilot aboard the ship. The pilot boat is a fifty-two foot boat, specially designed, with a platform over the deckhouse or cabin upon which the pilot stands in order to catch a rope ladder thrown over the side of the ship to be boarded. The ladder must be caught on the up-roll of the pilot boat so as to avoid the pilot's being crushed between the pilot boat and the side of the ship while he is on the rope ladder. Boarding a pilot is dangerous under any circumstances, and especially so during heavy, severe weather. Weather conditions off the mouth of the St. Johns River are usually much worse as to the wind and rough waves than inside the jetties. Captain Elija Guillory is a shipmaster who has an unlimited Master's License for any type of vessel. He has been a master mariner for twenty-five years. He is currently the master of the tanker, Neches. He has entered and exited the port of Jacksonville many times. In fact, he enters the Jacksonville port approximately one and one-half times per month on trips between Houston and Corpus Christi, Texas and Jacksonville. He is also a licensed pilot for the port of Houston, Texas. Captain Guillory was accepted as an expert in shipmaster's duties and practices. Captain Guillory's testimony establishes that the master of a vessel always makes the final decision about when and where to pick up a pilot. He is the person best able to, and responsible for, determining the safety of a given situation, both as to his vessel and the pilot's safety. Captain Guillory testified that, if it be assumed that a northeast wind of Beaufort force five or six, with a heavy swell, was operating that it would be a "borderline situation" as to the safety of picking up a pilot outside the jetties under those conditions. He testified that it would depend on the characteristics of the vessel and circumstances aboard the vessel. On his own ship, which has about thirty-five feet of free-board, (less area exposed to the northeast wind), he felt he would be able to have boarded the pilot outside. A car carrier, however, has a large "sail area" of approximately sixty feet above the water line extending approximately ninety percent of the length of the vessel. This might have made it risky to slow or stop a ship with that much sail area, with a strong wind blowing, in order to pick up a pilot outside the jetties in view of the southerly set caused by both the wind and current. Captain Guillory established that it is regular practice for him and other shipmasters to tell the pilot where he will pick the pilot up during episodes of rough weather. In nice weather, he gives the pilots a choice about where they are to be picked up. He established that that is the standard practice between shipmasters and pilots for East coast United States ports. Finally, Captain Guillory opined that the Captain of the vessel should not have decided to enter the port without a pilot. In any event, it is the practice of master mariners to make the decision at sea, before entering the port, as to the safety of the vessel, the crew and the boarding pilots. It is customary and common for the master to make a decision that, due to bad weather conditions, he will pick the pilot up inside the jetties at the port of Jacksonville. This is decided after the master has made an independent evaluation of all the safety factors to consider. Although the United States Coast Pilot, volume four, states that the pilot boarding area for Jacksonville is between the sea buoy and the outermost entrance channel buoy, this is merely a guide for optimum conditions. Pilots are normally and customarily boarded where ever the master feels it is safe to do so under then-prevailing conditions. In this instance, the master of the vessel made the final decision as to where to board the pilot. That decision was made before the pilot had been informed that the vessel to which he was assigned was approaching the sea buoy and that it was time for him to go on duty and prepare to board the vessel. He did not participate in the decision about picking up the pilot inside the jetties.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, Captain Clifton A. Register, should be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1988. APPENDIX PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Reject as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted in part, but not as dispositive of any material issue presented. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not in and of itself dispositive of any material issues presented. Accepted, but not in and of itself dispositive of any material issues presented. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence of record, with the exception of the similarity consisting of the sea buoy being one and one-half miles from the entrance to the port between two rock jetties or breakwaters, which is not in and of itself dispositive of any material issues presented. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Even if Port Everglades was a port of essentially the same configuration as the Port of Jacksonville, which the record does not establish, the weather and sea conditions and condition and configuration of the vessel involved at the particular day and time in question has a great deal to do with consideration of what safe piloting practices are for such conditions. Rejected as subordinate to the hearing officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as having little or no weight in finding facts and concluding the law applicable to this case, because of the subjective circumstances involved in deciding whether safe piloting practices have been observed, as delineated above. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 (904) 488-0062 Gary A. Bubb, Esquire Toole, Bubb, & Beale, P.A. 25th Floor Southern Bell Tower Post Office Box 1500 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Louella Cook, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether the application of the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami should be granted in whole or in part or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In their Prehearing Stipulation, the parties stipulated to the following facts, which are deemed admitted: The Cargo Carriers Association is a Florida not-for- profit corporation with its principal office in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the Cargo Carriers Association is to promote, advance, and secure laws, rules, and regulations concerning vessels utilizing the navigable waters of the State of Florida, in particular the Port of Miami and Port Everglades, in order that the waters, harbors, and ports of the state and the environment and property of all persons be protected to the fullest possible extent consistent with sound financial principles. A substantial number of the members of the Cargo Carriers Association are affected by the rates of pilotage currently set for the Port of Miami, inasmuch as they are required by Florida law, Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, to utilize and compensate the Port of Miami pilots whose rates are established by the Board, and they are, in fact, utilizing and compensating pilots in accordance with the rates established for the Port of Miami. Accordingly, the Cargo Carriers Association is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the Board's Decision dated March 9, 2000. The Board is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Section 310.151, Florida Statutes, which is invested with the authority and responsibility to determine the rates of pilotage at the various ports of Florida, including the Port of Miami. Section 310.151, Florida Statutes (2000). The Pilots' Association is an association of harbor pilots that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes and that performs the pilotage services at the Port of Miami. The offices of the Pilots' Association and its affiliate, Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., are located in Miami, Florida. In October 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board an application for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami. On October 28, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board convened a fact-finding public hearing on the Pilots' Association's application in Miami, Florida, at which numerous interested persons provided comments and testimony, both for and against the Pilots' Association's requested rate increase. On November 29, 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board a version of its application that, in its words, "has been edited to correct scrivener's errors." On December 9, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board completed its review and investigation of the Pilots' Association's application and presented its written findings to the Board as required by Rule 61E13-2.007(4), Florida Administrative Code. On January 21, 2000, the Board met in Miami, Florida, to review the rate increase application of the Pilots' Association and heard comments and testimony from persons who supported or opposed the application in whole or in part. At the conclusion of this meeting, the Board preliminarily determined to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part with a phased-in increase in rates. The Board's written decision was filed with the agency's clerk on March 9, 2000. The Cargo Carriers Association timely filed its petition for a proceeding under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1999). The Pilots' Association requested in its application a 10 percent increase in the rate for draft charges, for tonnage charges, for shifting or anchoring charges, and for minimum fees, effective immediately, with an additional increase of 5 percent in these rates and fees six months after the effective date of the initial increase. The requested increase would result in a total 15.5 percent increase in pilotage rates and minimum fees at the Port of Miami. The Board hired an Investigative Committee composed of two consultants, one a Certified Public Accountant and the other a retired Coast Guard officer, to examine the Pilots' Association's application in light of the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1999). The Investigative Committee held a public hearing in which it received testimony from interested parties. The Investigative Committee Report was presented to the Board at the public hearing on January 21, 2000. The Board included in its written Decision findings of fact and comments with respect to each of the criteria set forth in Section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes (1999), 3/ an analysis and statement of its decision to approve an increase in the pilotage rates at the Port of Miami, and an order specifying the approved increases. The Board stated its intention to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part and to increase the rates of pilotage at the Port of Miami 3 1/2 percent for draft charges, tonnage charges, shifting or anchoring charges, and the minimum fees, effective on the date of its order, 4/ with an additional 3 percent rate increase in each of the charges effective 12 months from the effective date of the first increase and another 3 percent increase in each of the charges effective 24 months after the effective date of the first increase. This increase is 63.16 percent of the increase requested by the Pilots' Association. The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. Section 310.151(5)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2000). 5/ In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 11 of the report. 6/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. 7/ A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "net income of pilots" refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 12 and 13 of the report, with the following modification to the depreciation adjustment included in the calculation of the pilots' total compensation if the requested rate increase were approved in toto and the resulting modification in the projected "adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot": The depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2000 was decreased from $6500.00 to $1600.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2000 of $340,800.00; the depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2001 was decreased from $6500.00 to $4800.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2001 of $340,000.00. The Investigative Committee Report included in the computation of average net pilot income the value of health and retirement benefits, pension valuation, and discretionary costs such as political contributions, lobbying expenses, and business promotion expenses. The Investigative Committee identified the actual total pilot compensation for pilots at the Port of Miami, including adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs but not for depreciation, as $308,200.00 for 1998, and it projected the total pilot compensation for 1999, 2000, and 2001, without a rate increase, as $288,200.00, $296,200.00, and $290,200.00, respectively. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Since 1993, the Pilots' Association has tried to maintain a roster of 18 active pilots at the Port of Miami, although this number has fluctuated from time to time. Currently, there are 17 pilots and one deputy at the Port of Miami. Excluding adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs, compensation in 1997 and 1998 for pilots at the Port of Miami was $281,000.00 and $278,000.00, respectively; compensation at Port Everglades was $329,000.00 and $344,000.00, respectively; compensation at the Port of Palm Beach was $154,000.00 and $230,000.00, respectively; and compensation at the Port of Jacksonville was $250,000.00 and $254,000.00, respectively. Because of the exclusions noted above, these amounts understate actual compensation. Compensation for the Port of Miami pilots increased 38.4 percent between 1989 and 1996. In 1989, pilot income at the Port of Miami was $203,000.00, and, in 1990, it was $181,000.00. The pilots received an effective 32 percent rate increase as a result of a 26 percent rate increase in 1992 and a 5 percent rate increase in 1993, and gross pilotage revenue increased 72 percent between 1989 and 1996, an increase primarily attributable to an increase in the number of larger vessels using the port. As a result of the revenue increase, pilot income rose to over $281,000.00 in 1997. In addition to piloting, the pilots at the Port of Miami carry out the duties of Harbor Master, which involve coordinating all of the ship traffic in the port. The pilots receive no additional compensation for this service. Reasonable operating expenses of pilots. Section 310.151(5)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 13 through 16 of the report. In the report, the Investigative Committee found that, with the exception of the costs associated with the Pilots' Association's retirement plan, the operating expenses included in the Pilots' Association's application were reasonable. The Investigative Committee Report included a detailed discussion of the Pilots' Association's retirement plan. The retirement plan of the Pilots' Association is a non-qualified plan under the Internal Revenue Code and is unfunded and, therefore, contingent on the future operations at the Port of Miami. The plan is in the form of a consulting agreement between the Pilots' Association and its retirees, pursuant to which each pilot who reaches 55 years of age and completes 20 years of service as a full-time active pilot, and who agrees to act in the best interests of the Pilots' Association, is eligible to be paid up to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, provided that the aggregate amount paid to retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the annual total gross pilotage revenue. The payments are to be made from future pilotage revenue. The total costs associated with retired pilot compensation and benefits (equity buy-outs, surviving spouse accrual, and health insurance) included in the Investigative Committee Report for 1998 were $2,093,086.00, of which $1.4 million was attributable to payments to 11 retirees for consulting services. The Investigative Committee questioned the reasonableness of this operating expense at page 16 of its report, although it noted that there are similar plans in other Florida ports. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In 1998, payments to the five retired pilots at Port Everglades totaled $962,714.00. The retirement plan for the Port Everglades pilots has the same limits as the plan for the pilots at the Port of Miami: A Port Everglades retiree's benefit is limited to 50 percent of the income of an active pilot, and the aggregate benefits paid to Port Everglades retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the pilots' annual gross revenue. The plan at Port Canaveral limits the aggregate benefits paid to retirees to 33 1/3 percent of gross annual revenue; the limitation at the Port of Jacksonville for current retirees is 28 percent of gross annual revenue and 22 percent for new retirees. There are no aggregate limits on the amounts paid to retirees at the ports in Charleston, South Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia. Pilotage rates in other ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 16 and 17 of the report, and stated its intention to confine its comparative rate analysis to ports in Florida and the southeastern seaboard. It was noted in the Investigative Committee Report that, in 1998, the Port of Miami was ranked the seventh highest of 12 Florida ports with respect to the cost for piloting both a standard large and a standard small vessel and the eighth highest out of the 12 Florida ports in the amount of revenue per handle. 8/ As part of its comparison of pilotage rates in other ports, the Investigative Committee included in its report a chart based on 1998 data setting out the number of handles in each of the 12 Florida ports surveyed, together with 1998 revenue, average handle time, number of pilots, revenue per handle, and revenue per handle hour for each of the 12 ports. In 1998, the Port of Miami had 8,909 handles, revenue of $8,433.539.00, average handle time of 2.0 hours, 18 pilots, revenue per handle of $947.00, and revenue per handle hour of $473.00. Based on 1998 data, Port Everglades, the port closest geographically to the Port of Miami, had 10,168 handles, revenue of $6,899,006.00, average handle time of 1.9 hours, 16 pilots, revenue per handle of $679.00, and revenue per handle hour of $357.00. In its Decision, the Board recognized that pilotage rates cannot be considered in a vacuum and that a rate increase or decrease is not justified simply because a rate is comparatively low or high. Rather, the Board found that consideration must be given to the size and number of vessels using the port, the time required to service the vessels, and the characteristics of the port that impact positively or negatively on the gross revenue and net income derived from the rate structure. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. The Investigative Committee determined that Port Everglades was the closest and most relevant competitive port to the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami handles primarily cruise ships, excluding daily cruise ships, and container cargo vessels. Port Everglades handles both container cargo vessels and vessels containing bulk and neo-bulk products such as petroleum, cement, steel, and lumber, as well as a mix of large cruise ships and smaller, daily cruise ships. Port Everglades is one of the largest petroleum ports in the southeastern United States. The Port of Miami handles fewer but generally larger vessels than Port Everglades. The distance between the sea buoy 9/ and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in the Port of Miami is approximately six miles; the distance between the sea buoy and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in Port Everglades is approximately two miles. In Port Everglades, the distance from the sea buoy to the channel is short, so that there is little room to position the vessel properly for entry into the channel. The channel is, however, straight. In the Port of Miami, there is a 40-degree turn mid- channel. Currently, Port Everglades has 16 pilots and two deputies. A comparison of the pilotage rates in the Port of Miami and in Port Everglades shows that, without considering the rate increase proposed by the Board, the current draft rate in the Port of Miami is 38 percent higher than that in Port Everglades and the current tonnage rate is 7.5 percent higher in the Port of Miami than in Port Everglades. With the Board's proposed rate increase, the draft rate at the Port of Miami is roughly 40 percent higher than that at Port Everglades, and the tonnage rate is roughly 16 percent higher. Without a rate increase, total pilotage fees at the Port of Miami are 18 percent higher for small vessels and 14 percent higher for large vessels than the total pilotage fees at Port Everglades. Using the cruise ship Enchantment of the Seas as an example, without the rate increase, pilotage fees are $5,700.00 per trip in and out of the Port of Miami, or $260,000.00 annually; with the Board's proposed rate increase, pilotage fees are $6,270.00 per trip, or $326,000.00 annually. In contrast, the pilotage fees for the Enchantment of the Seas at Port Everglades are $5,150.00 per trip in and out of the port, or $268,000.00 annually. 10/ The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. Section 310.151(5)(b)5., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 18 of the report. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing as that sought in pilots, it being recognized that in order to attract to the profession of piloting, and to hold the best and most qualified individuals as pilots, the overall compensation accorded pilots should be equal to or greater than that available to such individuals in comparable maritime employment. Section 310.151(5)(b)6., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 18 and 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded in its Final Order that the profession most comparable to that of a port pilot is that of a captain of a large United States-flagged vessel. The Investigative Committee further recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded that pilot compensation should be equal to or greater than $203,000.00, represented by the Investigative Committee in its report as the annualized compensation of a "U.S. master." The Investigative Committee found, further, that the skills, risks, and working conditions of a ship's captain and a pilot are considerably different in that a pilot must have a wider range of technical skills to pilot a variety of vessels of different sizes; a pilot assumes more physical risks because of the need to board and disembark each vessel; a pilot is constantly in a stressful situation while piloting a vessel into port; and a pilot is a private businessman rather than an employee and must face all of the attendant risks and obligations. In its Decision, the Board established the "floor" compensation for pilots at approximately $200,000.00 to $220,000.00, which represents the wage of the highest-paid ship's master on a United States-flagged ship. 11/ The Investigative Committee found in its report that the amount of compensation above the floor established by the Board depends on several factors, including the size of the ships calling on the port, the difficulty of the port, the cost of living in the surrounding community, and pilot compensation in other United States ports. Finally, the Board expressly recognized in its Decision that, unlike ships' masters, pilots are not employees of a corporation but are independent businessmen, with all of the financial risks that status implies. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. 12/ The education and training of a pilot and a ship's master is, in many cases, the same. A ship's master operating on the high seas, however, has the responsibility for the ship's well-being 24 hours a day, seven days a week during the course of the voyage. The scope of responsibility of a ship's master requires a wider array of skills than those of a pilot; he or she must make judgments regarding matters extending beyond the navigation of the ship. The ship's master is responsible for the ship's crew and, if the ship is a cruise ship, for the welfare of the passengers, and he or she must deal with the hazards of the ship catching fire, disease onboard, and a variety of other matters requiring non-technical skills. A ship's master must have navigational skills and must be knowledgeable about many ports throughout the world and many weather systems. Even when a ship is being piloted into port, the ship's master retains the ultimate responsibility for the ship, and the ship's master will sometimes dock the ship once the pilot has brought it to the docking area. Pilots are licensed to operate in a particular port, and they must have an intimate knowledge of that port. Because pilots must handle almost every vessel calling at the Port of Miami, they must be familiar with the peculiarities of numerous types and sizes of vessels, and they must continually take courses to keep up with the changing technology used on new vessels. Consequently, the knowledge and skills required of a pilot are more specialized and more narrowly focused than those required of a ship's master. When a vessel is ready to come into the Port of Miami, the pilot is taken to the vessel, which, depending on its size, may be located two-to-three miles east of the sea buoy. The pilot must, therefore, board and disembark from a vessel in open water. A pilot at the Port of Miami must guide vessels, sometimes exceeding 1,000 feet in length, through a 500-foot wide channel cut in rock, make a 40-degree turn, and guide the vessel into the port's turning basin and, ultimately, to its berth. There is little maneuvering room, and the pilot must deal with the ever-changing winds, currents, and tides that affect a vessel's passage to the berthing area. For ships of 1,000 feet or longer, there is adequate but not generous room for maneuvering in the turning basin. The number of large vessels using the Port of Miami has increased since 1989. Piloting large vessels increases the complexity of the pilot's job and increases the potential for an accident, necessarily increasing the amount of stress experienced by pilots routinely bringing such vessels into the Port of Miami. A pilot must direct the crew of a vessel when bringing the vessel into and through the channels leading to the turning basin and from the turning basin to the berths, and his or her success depends on his ability to communicate instructions to crewmembers. This communication is becoming more difficult because crewmembers are recruited from many different countries, including those from Eastern Europe, and they may or may not understand English. The stress experienced by a pilot is significantly increased when he must depend on crewmembers who do not understand English, because disaster could result if the pilot's instructions are not followed precisely. The stress experienced by pilots when they are on the job is much more intense, though of shorter duration, than that experienced by ship's masters. A pilot at the Port of Miami will pilot between six and 18 ships each week and is on-call 24 hours each day while on piloting duty, under conditions that are physically and mentally stressful. The pilots at the Port of Miami are not employees of the Pilots' Association. Rather, the Pilots' Association is operated as a partnership of the pilots, and it is funded from the pilotage revenue at the Port of Miami. There are significant operating expenses deducted from gross pilotage revenue before the pilots are paid. The Pilots' Association owns and maintains a building at the far eastern end of the Port of Miami that houses the pilots' business office and also contains bedrooms, restrooms, a lounge, and a chart room for use by the pilots. The Pilots' Association employs office staff to handle billing and accounting functions. The Pilots' Association owns and operates four pilot boats used to transport pilots to and from vessels arriving at and departing from the Port of Miami, and it employs six full- time boat operators. Replacement costs for the pilot boats exceed $2 million. The pilots must absorb rising fuel costs, which cannot be passed on as a surcharge to those using the port and are also responsible for the costs of maintaining the boats. The pilots provide communications services to the vessels entering the Port of Miami, and the Pilots' Association maintains three Federal Communications Commission licenses, a marine coastal station, a high power UHF repeater, and VHF radios in all of the pilot boats. The pilots have invested approximately $50,000.00 in communications equipment that they make available to the Port of Miami, including a 100-watt VHF long range radio and tower, as well as the UHF repeater, and they also maintain the equipment. In addition, the pilots employ dispatchers who handle the radios. The pilot's income is a function of the volume and size of traffic in and out of the port, and they are, consequently, affected by decisions made by the Port of Miami authorities with respect to services to be provided vessels using the port and with respect to port charges. The financial risks faced by the pilots at the Port of Miami are, for the most part, shared by all independent business owners. However, even though pilots of the Pilots' Association are the only pilots allowed to provide services in the Port of Miami and even though pilotage rates are highly regulated and, to an extent, non-competitive, pilots, unlike most private independent business owners, cannot pass on increases in operating expenses; rather, the pilots must absorb these increases until, and unless, an application for a rate increase is approved. 13/ The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. Section 310.151(5)(b)7., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that all-inclusive pilot compensation for the pilots at the Port of Miami would increase 8.76 percent if the increase requested by the Pilots' Association were approved by the Board. As a result, the compensation of pilots at the Port of Miami would still be lower than that of the pilots at Port Everglades, but only slightly. The Investigative Committee noted that an opening at any of the four major Florida ports, the Port of Miami, Port Everglades, Tampa, and Jacksonville, draws 20 to 30 applicants from all over the United States. The Investigative Committee observed that, with or without a rate increase, any of these four ports would attract qualified pilots because they are likely to find more attractive compensation and working and living environments than provided by their present situations. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Projected changes in vessel traffic. Section 310.151(5)(b)8., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 20 and 21 of the report. The Investigative Committee accepted the estimated handles provided by the Pilots' Association in its application, which reflects an increase from 8,909 handles in 1998, to an estimated 9,200 handles in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Investigative Committee noted in its report that the number of cruise passengers at the Port of Miami has remained steady since 1991 and that, although the number of handles decreased between 1992 and 1995, there was steady growth in cargo tonnage between 1988 and 1998. Even with the decrease in the number of handles, the average revenue per handle increased from $545.00 in 1990 to $978.00 in 1998, accounting for a 73 percent increase in the gross annual revenue and a 79 percent increase in the average revenue per handle. The Investigative Committee found that the data suggests that the increase in the pilots' average revenue per handle, and, therefore, its gross annual revenue, is more a function of the increase in the size of the vessels calling at the Port of Miami than a function of the 32 percent rate increase in 1992 and 1993. The Investigative Committee found in its report, and the Board recognized in its Decision, that Port Everglades and the Port of Miami have a strong competitive relationship and that a large increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami might result in a decision by Maersk Shipping, a large shipping company currently calling at the Port of Miami and at Port Everglades, to consolidate its operations and use Port Everglades rather than the Port of Miami, resulting in a material decrease in the revenue of the Port of Miami pilots. Prior to the rate increase proposed by the Board, Maersk Shipping paid the pilots at the Port of Miami $1.08 million each year in pilotage fees. A change in operations to Port Everglades would result in a decrease in each pilot's annual income of approximately $48,000.00, with a $24,000.00 decrease in each retiree's benefits. 14/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In choosing ports of call, ship owners, particularly cargo lines, consider many factors, including marketing factors, the availability of berths, the availability of terminal space, the availability of inland transportation, and port congestion, as well as port costs. Port costs, also known as port call expenses, at the Port of Miami are composed of many elements in addition to pilotage fees, such as terminal fees ($8,800.00) 15/ , dockage fees ($3,349.00), wharfage fees ($3,400.00), tug boat fees ($3,009.00), agent fees ($1,500.00), custom and agriculture entry fees ($1,995.00), and harbor fees ($162.00), for a total of $5,570.00; pilotage fees at the Port of Miami for a standard large vessel, according to 1998 data, were $1,085.40, or approximately 15-to-20 percent of port call expenses for a standard large vessel. Therefore, while pilotage fees are a significant part of the mix of port call expenses considered by ship owners in determining whether to call at the Port of Miami, pilots have no control over most of the fees and tariffs comprising port call expenses or over the many other factors that might influence the competitive posture of the Port of Miami vis-à-vis Port Everglades or changes in vessel traffic in the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami consists of Lummus and Dodge Islands, and it is run by the Miami-Dade County Seaport Department. The port rates at the Port of Miami increased approximately 30 percent between 1991 and 1998, generating a revenue increase of approximately 76 percent. Operating expenses increased approximately 44 percent during that time period, but, in general, the port's rate increases have gone primarily to finance improvements in the port's infrastructure and to provide its customers with facilities to accommodate their larger vessels. The port has also received a number of federal and state grants to fund construction programs to improve the port, as well as federal funds for the Port of Miami's dredging program. POMTOC, the Port of Miami Terminal Operating Company, recently received approval to raise its gate fee and empty container storage fee 2.7 percent. The Miami-Dade County Seaport Department also increased its harbor fee for large vessels from $195.00 in 1999 to $235.00 in 2000. In addition, the majority of the port's tariff items increased between 1999 and 2000. Competition is very aggressive among the ports along the eastern seaboard of the United States and along the Gulf of Mexico. As one response to the competitive nature of the market, the Port of Miami has, since 1998, entered into volume incentive agreements with several of its largest customers. The purpose of these agreements is to increase the level of activity at the port by offering a reduction in the port's tariff rate, while at the same time having a guaranteed minimum level of revenue for the port. The Port of Miami has entered into volume incentive agreements with Carnival Cruise Lines, Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Seaboard Marine, Maersk, Columbus Lines, and Chilean, and it is in the process of negotiating other such agreements. As a result of the agreements, these lines have brought additional business to the port or have brought new lines to the port. Cost of retirement and medical plans. Section 310.151(5)(b)9., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 22 through 25 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee determined that the estimated cost of the medical plan available to active and retired pilots for 1999, 2000, and 2001 was $8,125.00, $8,235.00, and $8,400.00, respectively, for each active pilot (or a gross for active pilots of $143,000.00, $140,000.00, and $148,000.00, respectively), and $4,636.00, $5,083.00, and $5,083, respectively, for each retiree (or a gross for retirees of $51,000.00, $61,000.00, and $61,000.00, respectively). The Pilots' Association funds both a money purchase pension plan and a 401k plan for all of its employees, after they have completed one year's service. The total annual contribution averages $6,000.00 per employee. Because the pilots are members of a partnership, they are not considered Pilots' Association employees. Their retirement plan is unfunded, and, as noted above, is in the form of a lifetime consulting agreement pursuant to which eligible pilots receive income that is limited to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, with the aggregate payments to retirees capped at 20 percent of the pilots' gross annual revenue. A surviving spouse of a retired pilot is entitled to receive 25 percent of an active pilot's income for life. The equity interests of retiring pilots in the Pilots' Association are also purchased by the Pilots' Association. These benefits result in an aggregate cost to the Pilots' Association of $2,093,086.00 per year. The Investigative Committee valued the pension plan at a conservative $30,000.00 per year, a figure that the Board accepted over objections by the Pilots' Association. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Physical risks inherent in piloting. Section 310.151(5)(b)10., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 25 and 26 of the report. The Investigative Committee found that boarding a vessel at sea is the most difficult and dangerous aspect of a pilot's job, and that several pilots were injured between 1996 and 1999. Pilots board vessels in the open sea under many different conditions, with considerable risk, and the pilot often receives minimal support from a vessel's crew. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. Even though they may refuse if conditions are unsafe, as a general rule pilots board and disembark from vessels in the open sea, in all kinds of weather, day and night, on rope ladders that are not fixed, that are sometimes not consistent with standards established by the International Maritime Organization, and that are sometimes in poor repair. Whenever possible, the vessels turn to create a lee, or sheltered side, where the pilot can board and disembark from the vessel with less risk, although it is always possible, even in a calm sea, for a cross swell to hit the vessel during boarding or disembarking. Another point at which a pilot is physically at risk is upon moving from the ladder to the deck of the vessel. Many cruise ships have pilot doors low on the side of the vessel to shorten the distance a pilot must ascend or descend a ladder to board and disembark from the ship. Once the pilot is on board the vessel, he is escorted to the bridge, which is accessible only by stairs, sometimes totaling 100 steps in many modern cargo ships. Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. Section 310.151(5)(b)11., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 26 and 27 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee identified several special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the Port of Miami. It recognized that, due to the velocity and direction of the currents, the proximity of the Gulf Stream presents a variety of challenges to pilots as vessels approach the Outer Bar Channel and that the Gulf Stream, together with northerly winds and a flooding current, make transiting the jetties especially difficult. Because the channel bottom is hard coral from the sea buoy to the berths, it is extremely difficult to handle large, deep-draft vessels to and from the gantry berths, and the current and wind conditions require special handling of these vessels when they dock or turn. In addition, reefs lining the approaches to the Port of Miami are unmarked, and the background light from Miami-Dade County makes it difficult to identify land and navigational marks. Weather can cause hazards to navigation in the Port of Miami, with rapidly changing wind conditions resulting from thunderstorms and with changing tidal conditions resulting from heavy rains. In addition, northwesterly and northeasterly winds cause heavy sets on a flood tide for vessels passing through the jetties. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. 16/ The complexity of the waterway poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. Waterway complexity at the Port of Miami includes the amount of crossing traffic, turns in the channel, converging traffic from different channels, background lighting, and the large number of small pleasure craft in and around the channels. The hard rock bottom of the channels poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. The channel is dredged in a "U" shape, forming a narrow underwater trench through which vessels must pass, and vessels can be seriously damaged if they come into contact with the sides of the trench. Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. Section 310.151(5)(b)12., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board determined that there were no such factors. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the Board's finding. The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. Section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 28 and 29 of the report and in the attachments thereto. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") had increased 17.8 percent since January 1, 1993, the date of the last pilotage rate increase, and 22.9 percent since October 1991, the date of the Pilots' Association's last application for a rate increase. In reaching its conclusion that some increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami is justified, the Board noted in its Decision that it considered it compelling that the CPI had increased 17.8 percent since the last rate increase and that pilotage rates at the Port of Miami had not increased for seven years. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Taken in its entirety, the evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association and the Pilots' Association in this proceeding with respect to the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.1151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2000), yielded findings of fact in addition to those found by the Board in its Decision. There was not sufficient credible and persuasive evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association to support a finding of fact contrary to the findings of the Board in its Decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pilotage Rate Review Board consider the additional facts established by the evidence presented at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in determining, in accordance with its interpretation of its statutory mandate, its expertise, and the appropriate policy considerations, whether the Decision on the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association Pilotage Rate Increase Application in the Port of Miami, filed March 9, 2000, will result in fair, just, and reasonable pilotage rates at the Port of Miami. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2001.
Findings Of Fact By application dated May 10, 1987, and subscribed to on December 18, 1987, the Petitioner applied to the Department for approval and licensing of a seaplane airport site for his own private usage (P-2) . The Petitioner is appropriately licensed as a seaplane pilot. The location of the proposed airport is Pate Lake, located near Caryville, in Washington County, Florida. Pate Lake is approximately one mile by three-quarters of one mile in size, large enough to accommodate the Petitioner's proposed airport. The Petitioner's seaplane is currently and would remain based on the west side of the lake, where the Petitioner owns a parcel of land. The Petitioner has utilized Pate Lake as a base of operation for the seaplane on an irregular basis for several years. The seaplane is a single-engine Balanca Citaba, similar in size to a Piper Cub. The plane carries a maximum of two persons, including the pilot. The engine produces 150 horsepower and has a muffled exhaust. There was no reliable evidence which would indicate the decibel level or amount of noise that is generated by the seaplane on takeoff, however the noise at landing is minimal because landings are accomplished with the engine thrust significantly reduced. Pate Lake is relatively remote with limited population, however the population residing near the water is generally concentrated on the western side of the lake. The lake is used primarily for fishing and other recreational activities. A public boat ramp is also located on the west side of Pate Lake, approximately 400 to 500 feet from the Petitioner's property, according to a map prepared by the Department and introduced by the Petitioner (P-12). The number and type of recreational users of the lake depend on the weather and time of year, with an estimated 15 to 20 fishing boats on the lake simultaneously when conditions warrant. In December, 1987, an on-site inspection of the proposed airport area was performed by Larry Parker, an aviation specialist with the Department. Parker determined that the site was feasible for use as proposed by the Petitioner and "can meet the requirements set forth in Airport Licensing and Zoning Rule Chapter 14-60" (P-4). By letter dated December 30, 1987, the administrator for the Washington County Commission advised the Department that there were no restrictions which would prohibit the establishment of the seaplane base (P-5). There is no relevant zoning ordinance applicable to Washington County. By letter dated March 2, 1988, the Petitioner was advised by the Federal Aviation Administration that the proposed airport would "not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft" provided that operations were limited to VFR (visual flight rules) weather conditions, and that the airport were limited to private use. The F.A.A. specifically "did not consider the interaction of sea plane operations with surface craft traffic..." (P-6). On May 2, 1988, the department issued a "Notice of Intent" to approve the airport and issue the license (P-3). A public meeting was subsequently held on June 8, 1988, at which time an unknown number of persons apparently objected to the Department's intended approval of the license application. On June 16, 1988, a resolution was adopted by the Washington County Board of County Commissioners at which time the Board expressed opposition "to the permitting of a Seaplane operation on Pate Pond" (P-8). The resolution clearly indicates that the Board acted, at least in part, in the belief that "a commercial Seaplane operation is contemplated on the lake..." and that property owners in the area objected to the proposal. By memo dated July 11, 1988, Larry Parker, the district aviation specialist for the Department forwarded materials from the public meeting to his supervisor, Bobby Grice (P-9). At that time, Parker reiterated his opinion that the proposed airport site met "the safety standards as outlined in Rule 14-60", and that the Petitioner could operate in a safe manner from Pate Lake. By letter dated July, 27, 1988, the Petitioner received notice from the Department that it intended to deny his application for approval of his Pate Lake seaplane base (P-10). The Department stated that the denial was based on the County Commission resolution of June 16th, which "the department accepts...as equivalent to zoning refusal by the Washington County Commission." Further the Department cited comments "submitted by many of the nearby landowners and they are opposed to a seaplane base on Pate Lake on the basis of noise and safety." The Department's action followed the recommendation of Mr. Grice to deny the application. Mr. Grice based his recommendation on safety concerns related to utilization of the recreational lake as a seaplane base. Mr. Grice has visited the Pate Lake area, but has not viewed the Petitioner's seaplane in operation. At the administrative hearing the Department presented the testimony of several persons who reside on or near Pate Lake. The property owners had on infrequent occasions heard or seen a seaplane, allegedly the Petitioner's, flying over their homes at an altitude they believed to be unreasonably low or in a manner which caused what they felt was excessive noise. 1/ No one recalled more than two such incidents over the several years that the Petitioner has utilized the lake as a seaplane base. Other complaints were directed towards the maintenance of the Petitioner's property, which was identified by one witness as an "eyesore". Concerns were voiced related to the witnesses fear of property value depreciation, but there were no facts to support the theoretical depreciation. One witness, a helicopter instruction pilot who visits the area on occasion, observed the seaplane, approximately seven or eight months prior to the hearing, take off and land twice on the same day. The witness testified that the pilot on both occasions flew at an excessively low altitude over the houses on the west side of the lake. The witness estimated the altitude over the houses to be less than 500 feet, an altitude which he believed was a "major judgement error" of the pilot, because an emergency maneuver at that altitude, if necessary, would have been difficult to accomplish. However, the witness, who has no experience with seaplane operations, did not register the incident with any regulatory agency, although he believed it to be a violation of minimum safe altitude regulations. He has not otherwise viewed the seaplane in operation. One witness, a seasonal resident of the lake area who utilizes the lake for fishing, recalled an incident in January or February, 1988, where the Petitioner's plane landed on the lake while the witness was fishing from a small boat in the same vicinity as where the Petitioner was attempting to land. The witness had not heard the plane's approach due to the lack of engine noise until the plane began landing. Although uninjured, he was fearful for his safety during the incident. The witness explained that he was concerned about the personal safety of boaters in the water during the times the seaplane was landing, because the noise level is minimal, and boaters may not be aware of the aircraft's approach. There was no explanation or response offered by the Petitioner to the allegations of the Department's witnesses other than assertions that a seaplane could be operated in such a manner as to prevent low flight over residences and minimize risk to users of the lake. Although there was testimony related to lakes, similar or smaller than Pate Lake, which are allegedly licensed as private seaplane airports, the testimony did not provide evidence sufficient to provide for an accurate comparison between other lakes and Pate Lake.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's application for licensure of Pate Lake as a seaplane base be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1988.
Findings Of Fact The tug TUSKER is a 120-foot LOA, 396 DWT riveted and steel hull motor vessel, single screw, single deck design with two Polar Atlas diesel engines each rated at 800 BP at 375 RPM. The TUSKER was built in Scotland in 1956, is registered in Canada and was designed and equipped for ocean towing. On February 6, 1981, her draft was 14'6". The propeller is 11'4" in diameter with an 11'3" pitch righthand and turns in a fixed Kort nozzle. The Kort nozzle can be described as an open-end cylinder or ring around the propeller one of whose functions is to keep towlines from becoming fouled in the propeller. The nozzle increases the propeller's thrust but reduces somewhat the effectiveness of the rudder. The TUSKER is equipped with a single rudder, conventional type, mounted on centerline, aft of propeller and Kort nozzle. She is also equipped with a Donkin steering engine on which is superimposed a Sperry automatic pilot and remote controlled steering mechanism. The steering system is hydraulic and can be actuated electrically or mechanically. Normal mechanical operation is effected using the steering wheel on the bridge. Electric power is used to actuate the hydraulic system (which moves the rams which in turn move the rudder right or left) in the three other systems by which the vessel may be steered. One is automatic pilot. Another works off the automatic pilot system with the automatic pilot disengaged and the hydraulic system actuated by a remote control dial attached to a flexible cable. With this system the helmsman can move around the bridge carrying his steering mechanism in one hand. This mode operates on a self-synchronous follow-up system where the operator moves the dial on the remote control and a self-synchronous motor causes the hydraulic system to actuate the rudder to follow the dial. This is the system that was in operation at all times here relevant. The third system of steering, which is also electrically actuated, is a toggle switch, or joy stick, near the wheel which the helmsman moves left or right as he wants the rudder to go. When the lever is held to the right, that hydraulic system is actuated to move the rudder to the right until the lever is returned to neutral or a stop is reached. To move the rudder back to midships the lever is held left (if the rudder is right) until the rudder angle indicator shows the rudder to be back where desired. The barge LIQUILASSIE is a converted tanker 307 feet long with a 60- foot beam and a cargo capacity of 5000 tons. This tank barge can be towed or pushed and is equipped with a notch in her stern to facilitate pushing. Upon entering Tampa Bay on the evening of 5 February 1981 the LIQUILASSIE was in ballast and was drawing six feet forward and nine feet aft. Saltwater was used for ballast. The tug TUSKER and the tank barge LIQUILASSIE had departed Halifax, Nova Scotia, for Tampa and the trip was uneventful until arrival off Tampa on the evening of 5 February 1981. Shortly before reaching the sea buoy the tug changed position from towing the LIQUILASSIE on a 1200-foot line to the pushing mode with the tug's bow secured in the notch in the stern of the LIQUILASSIE. Warwick G. Cahill, Respondent, a licensed Tampa Bay deputy pilot, boarded the TUSKER in Egmont Channel around 10:00 p.m. the evening of 5 February 1981 to pilot the tug and barge to Misener's Marine, a shipyard immediately south of Gandy Bridge on the east side of Tampa Bay. At this time the weather was clear, the tide was rising, winds were southerly at ten knots or less and the seas were light. No significant change occurred in the weather from the time the pilot boarded the TUSKER until the LIQUILASSIE made contact with Gandy Bridge. Pilot Cahill assumed the conn of the TUSKER with Captain Sanderson, the master of the tug, steering using the remote control hand-held dial. The engines were controlled directly from the bridge telegraphs. General discussion with Captain Sanderson revealed that the tug was single screw and that the flotilla combination TUSKER-LIQUILASSIE was slow to turn. At this time the rudder angle indicator was inoperative due to a burned out coil and no spare coil was on board. As a result the pilot could not look at the rudder angle indicator to ascertain the position of the rudder at any given moment. The pilot requested a steering light be installed on the bow of the barge so its rate of movement in a turn could be seen against the background lighting ashore. This was done. Respondent was born in Australia and sailed on foreign flag ships from 1966 until 1970 when he came ashore in the United States and subsequently acquired American citizenship. He resumed maritime employment in 1976 sailing as an ordinary seaman on tugs operated by Gulf Coast Transit Company. He worked his way up from ordinary seaman to master, acquiring his master's license 25 June 1979. From this time until he was appointed a deputy pilot in Tampa Bay in November 1980, he served as master on five tugs operated by Gulf Coast Transit Company. All of these tugs are twin screw vessels varying from 175 gross tons to 435 gross tons. Respondent's master's license authorizes him to sail as master on U.S. vessels up to 1000 gross tons. When he was appointed deputy pilot Respondent was required, as were all other such appointees, to sail as an apprentice with a certified pilot for at least thirty days and thereafter be approved by the Tampa Bay Pilots Association to pilot vessels of not more than 23 feet draft and 500 feet length. After sixty days of piloting this class vessel, a deputy pilot, after approval by the Tampa Bay Pilots Association, is authorized to pilot vessels of not more than 23 feet draft and of unlimited length. Respondent was at this stage as a deputy pilot on 6 February 1981. During the transit of the lower half of Tampa Bay the tug with 14 feet 6 inch draft and barge with the maximum draft of nine feet were navigated outside the channel and did not enter a cut channel until they reached Cut E channel. From the time the pilot came aboard, the tug was running at full speed with shaft RPM at about 110. At this propeller speed and draft of LIQUILASSIE, Captain Sanderson estimated the speed through the water at eight knots. Because of the stiff and slow handling of the tug and barge combination Captain Sanderson suggested to Pilot Cahill before reaching Cut F that at the sharp turns in the channels ahead it might be necessary to slow the tug in order to negotiate these turns. Respondent replied that there was plenty of water outside the channel going into Cut G from Cut F and that they would try that turn without slowing. The turn from Cut F to Cut G is a left turn slightly less than 90 degrees. As he passed between buoys 5F and 6F the pilot directed the helmsman into a left turn which was negotiated without difficulty. The tug and barge settled on Cut G range. The turn into Cut J from Cut G is a turn to the right of about 90 degrees. Here, the depth of the water outside the channel is sufficiently shallow that the TUSKER could ground if she got too far out of the channel. Upon approaching this turn Respondent had someone proceed to the bow of the LIQUILASSIE to stand by the anchors. He reduced speed to slow ahead approximately 1400 yards before reaching turn buoys 5G and 6G (Tr. p. 449) and ordered the helmsman to bring the flotilla to the right. The turn started a little too soon or the flotilla turned too fast, and the helmsman was ordered to slow the rate of turn. As the flotilla straightened the pilot directed more right rudder as the barge and tug were moving into buoy 9J. The flotilla did not respond to the right rudder and the engines were kicked ahead to increase the turning moment. Buoy 9J passed down the side of the flotilla (or was run over by the tug) before the flotilla finally was straightened out in Cut J channel (Tr. p. 451). While proceeding up Cut J channel at slow speed immediately following this incident, the captain directed the steering gear be checked to see if the rudder was answering the commands given through the remote control steering dial. This was the second time since the tug had assumed the pushing position off Tampa Bay that the steering was checked. The first time was shortly after the tug entered the notch when the captain directed the chief engineer to observe the rams on the rudder stock to see if the rudder was moving right and left as directed. On both occasions the rudder was observed by the chief engineer to move from full left to full right to amidships without apparent difficulty. On both occasions the chief engineer so reported to the captain. After straightening out in Cut J the flotilla resumed full speed. At this time, and during most of the transit of Tampa Bay, the current was flooding, i.e., was pushing the vessel northward in the general direction of travel. Misener's Marine is located north of Port Tampa on the east side of Tampa Bay and immediately south of the Causeway approach to Gandy Bridge. To enter Misener's Marine from the south, the preferred course, according to the unrebutted testimony of Respondent, is to continue past Cut K on the same course until the vessel is aligned with the draw span of Gandy Bridge, at which point course is changed to head for the draw span. Before reaching the draw span, course is changed to the right approximately 70 degrees to parallel the bridge as the channel into Misener's Marine is entered. The intended course, after making this turn, as indicated by Respondent on Exhibit 7, is parallel to and 200 yards south of Gandy Bridge. As the flotilla passed Port Tampa the captain remarked that they were moving at a lively clip. Respondent responded that he would slow down before starting the turn. No effort was made to ensure a crew member was standing by to let go the anchors as had been done when approaching Cut J. When one-half mile from the bridge, as observed on the radar screen, the pilot ordered speed reduced to slow and the captain moved the telegraphs to dead slow. At this time the flotilla was moving through the water at eight knots and over the ground at approximately 8.5 knots. The current in this part of the bay was setting northerly towards the bridge about 0.5 knots and it was approximately 40 minutes before high tide and slack water. High tide at Gandy Bridge on 6 February 1981 occurred at 3:07 a.m. (Exhibit 13). When the radar range to the bridge was just over one-quarter mile Respondent directed the helmsman to bring the flotilla to the right. When the response to this command appeared slow and the flotilla was one-quarter mile from the bridge Respondent ordered hard right rudder. Although Respondent testified that at one-quarter mile distance from the' bridge he didn't believe the flotilla would make the turn without hitting the bridge, he ordered the engines ahead full to increase the turning force (Tr. p. 459). When the captain exclaimed they were going to hit the bridge the pilot ordered engines stopped, then full astern. The captain moved the engine controls as directed. As the engines were ordered reversed the pilot left the rudder right full until most of the way had been taken off the flotilla. During this time the bow of the barge continued to move right slowly. As the barge closed on the bridge the pilot shifted the rudder to left full shortly before the bow of the LIQUILASSIE made contact with the third and fourth bridge supports to the east of the center span. At the time of contact at approximately 2:25 a.m., February 6, 1981, the flotilla was making an estimated speed over the ground of approximately one knot. The bow of the barge went under the road span and fetched up on the third and fourth bridge supports to the east of the center span. Continued backing for a few minutes failed to free the barge from the bridge supports. Respondent's witness, Captain John Graham, predicated his opinion that Respondent committed no error on the assumption that he commenced the turn into Misener's Marine at a distance of one-half mile from Gandy Bridge. His testimony (Tr. p. 337) was that "He [Respondent] ran out of options at a quarter-mile except for what he did: full astern. He was already hard starboard. There was no time--his other option was drop the anchor. That's too late." This assumption of distances from the bridge at which certain events occurred is not supported by the evidence and is in conflict with the findings made above, that the tug reduced speed when one-half mile from Gandy Bridge and the command to change course to the right was given to him just over one-quarter mile from the bridge. This finding is consistent with Respondent's testimony that he started the commencement of the turn approaching Gandy Bridge just before he reached the one-quarter mile point and increased to right full rudder at one-quarter mile. In his report of the accident, CG-2692 (Exhibit 15), Respondent also says that rudder was ordered hard right at a distance of one- quarter mile from the bridge. Had Respondent ordered the engine full astern one-quarter mile from the bridge when he realized collision with the bridge was likely, the flotilla would have been stopped before hitting the bridge. Instead of ordering the engines full astern Respondent first ordered full ahead to increase the turning force. Only after he realized this added force would not turn the barge fast enough did he order the engines stopped, then full astern. Local authorities were notified of the collision and ultimately the Highway Patrol regulated vehicular traffic over the damaged bridge. The damage to the bridge supports and barge was stipulated to be approximately $250,000. Shortly after the collision, high tide at Gandy Bridge occurred and thereafter the tide began falling. The bow of the LIQUILASSIE was caught on the piling and it was feared that additional damage to the piling would result as the tide receded and more of the weight of the barge was placed on the piling. The LIQUILASSIE collided with the bridge on a course approximately 30 degrees to the right of normal to the bridge and remained in that position until freed with the assistance of a passing tug at 5:15 a.m. After being freed from the bridge the tug was put on the port bow of the barge to help turn the LIQUILASSIE to the right some 90 degrees to enter Misener's Marine where the flotilla was moored. Immediately after mooring, Coast Guard investigators, in company with the chief engineer and Respondent, checked the steering gear and found the rudder responded fully to the right and left in response to electrically generated commands from the bridge. The time to go from full left to full right was measured and found to be 25 seconds (Exhibit l) On February 12, 1981, while moored at Misener's Marine, the steering gear was again checked for operation from full right to full left and vise versa (approximately 35 degrees rudder angle) for four cycles and the average time from full right to full left was 24.25 seconds (Exhibit 3). The radar on the TUSKER is mounted directly over the wheelhouse. While in the notch of the LIQUILASSIE the distance from the radar to the bow of the LIQUILASSIE would be approximately 110 yards. (307 feet, length of the LIQUILASSIE, plus the distance from the bow of the TUSKER to the radar. No evidence of this latter distance was presented.) Accordingly, when hard right rudder was ordered at a radar range from the bridge of one-quarter mile (500 yards) the bow of the LIQUILASSIE was less than 400 yards from the bridge. If the speed of the flotilla was six knots over the ground and the flotilla remained on course towards the bridge at this speed, 400 yards would be traversed in two minutes. For the bow of the flotilla to reach the intended tract 200 yards south of Gandy Bridge at this same speed over the ground would take just under one minute. Respondent presented an expert witness who testified generally regarding hydraulic steering systems. He had never been aboard the TUSKER to observe the steering mechanism but opined that a leak between the high pressure and low pressure lines could cause what he termed hydraulic stall. This could occur if debris under the valve seat prevented a valve from seating properly and allowed some of the pressure to bleed off from high pressure to low pressure lines. This could reduce the pressure in the high pressure lines, reducing the pressure being applied to the ram to turn the rudder and thereby decrease the force available to turn the rudder. This could result in a rudder not reaching the full right position while the tug was underway when maximum force opposing a rudder turn exists, but allow the rudder to turn to full right or left when dockside in still water. Other witnesses had testified to movement of the large wheel in the wheelhouse while the ship was being steered with the portable steering dial. The expert opined that this movement of the wheel was indicative that oil was leaking from the high pressure lines through the wheel and could cause hydraulic stall. The chief engineer by deposition (Exhibit 16a) testified that in his experience a hydraulic steering system either worked or it didn't and he was unaware of any such system that would one time allow the rudder to go full right or left position and the next time, under the same command, the rudder would go only part way. In the instructions for the Donkin steering mechanism attached to Chief Engineer Michael Ingham's deposition, which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 16a-e, the Donkin manual, listed as Exhibit 13 to Ingham's deposition, states in part as follows: Under the heading STARTING: 2. Put the change-over cock "B" on the bridge in power position. (When moving gear by local power control the change-over cock should always be in power otherwise the bridge hand wheel will be driven round by the power pump as soon as the control valve is moved.) Under the list of possible faults which may develop in the steering gear and How to locate them and their remedy, the same Exhibit 13 states: Steering gear will not work in either Power, Hand or Local Control. Shortage of oil causing air locks. (See Charging Instructions) Non-return valves (shuttle valves) on the telemotor side of the bridge unit not operating through being fouled with foreign matter or faulty. Drain oil out of bridge unit and examine valve. Steering Gear works in power but not in hand. Non return valves on hand pump side of bridge not seating through foreign matter or otherwise faulty. Remove oil from bridge unit, dismantle and clean thoroughly. Steering gear working erratically. Some- times going hardover, sometimes stopping short and sometimes moving on its own without the hand wheel being moved. 1. Buffer spring connecting the tiller to the hunting gear levers seized or wrongly adjusted. Dismantle spring, clean the stays and make sure they are free to work in the guide plates, assemble and adjust so that all the nuts just come up to the plates as the shoulders on the stays touch the plates. These instructions for the Donkin steering mechanism tend to support the testimony of the chief engineer that the steering mechanism doesn't work fully on one rudder change and only partly on another. No evidence was presented that the change-over cock on the bridge was in power position. On the other hand, no evidence was presented that someone had moved this lever from the position in which it was supposed to be set when the steering was placed in the power mode. Prior to departure from Halifax the Canadian Coast Guard inspected the steering system, particularly the emergency steering, and found it working properly. For the purpose of determining if the Respondent exercised prudence in piloting the TUSKER as the flotilla approached the Gandy Bridge, it is not essential that the steering be found to be operating correctly or erratically. If the latter, the Respondent was, or should have been, made aware of possible difficulties in making a sharp turn to the right as he had recently experienced that very problem while, making the turn from Cut G into Cut J.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Richard L. Hensch submitted to the Department of Transportation (DOT) an Airport Site Approval and License Application dated December 8, 1987, for a private seaplane base on Lake Fairview in Orange County. On the application, Mr. Hensch indicated that flight activities that would be conducted from the proposed site could be sight-seeing flights, seaplane rides and tours and occasional seaplane instruction. Mr. Hensch plans to offer these activities to the public and charge fees for them. Attached to the Application was a letter dated December 17, 1987, from Ms. Sharon Smith, the Orange County Zoning Director, in which she states: Please be advised that insofar as Orange County Zoning requirements are concerned, our department has no jurisdiction over the use of water bodies of lakes; rather such use falls under the jurisdiction of the State of Florida. This letter was written at the request of the Petitioner. While the above-referenced application was under consideration by DOT, Petitioner applied for and received from the County tentative approval for an occupational license for his proposed operation. F.A.A. airspace determination approval letter for the proposed site was dated June 1, 1989. A Notice of Intent about the "proposed Private Seaplane Base" was issued by the Department of Transportation on June 21, 1989. A public meeting in connection therewith was conducted on August 28, 1989. Bronson Monteith, working for the DOT in Orange County, conducted the public meeting and recommended site approval relying on the letter by Orange County, dated December 17, 1987, as to the zoning. The Orange County Commission at its meeting held on August 14, 1989, objected to the placement of a seaplane base at Lake Fairview based on a determination by the zoning director and the county attorney's office that the proposed seaplane base did not comply with the zoning ordinance. The Lake Fairview area property is zoned predominantly residential, R- 1A, R-1AA with some C-2, R-T and R-3 zoning within the lake. Included within the commercial-type operations along and on the lake are jet-ski, sailboat and other watercraft rentals. Airports can be located only by special exception in A1 and A-2, agricultural zoning districts, and are permitted outright in I-5, Industrial Airport Zoning District. None of the lake area or shoreline areas are zoned A-1, Z-2 or I-5. During August of 1989, the Assistant Zoning Director, Joanne McMurray, who as Acting Zoning Director, received a memorandum from Mr. Hartman, Acting Director of the County's Administrative Services Office, about the seaplane base proposal whereby she researched the zoning regulations as to airport facilities and zoning districts and permitted uses. She determined the proposed seaplane site would not comply with the Orange County zoning requirements. Ms. McMurray had received information from the county legal department that Zoning had jurisdiction to govern the use of lakes. Lacy Moore, DOT's Chief of Airport Inspection, indicated that licensing followed site approval and was subject to annual renewal. Licensing was subject to revocation or denial of renewal if zoning changes occurred that made the airport out of compliance with zoning. DOT sought clarification from the County as to whether the proposed site was in compliance with the Orange County zoning regulations. Phillip N. Brown, Orange County Administrator, sent a letter to Mr. Moore dated October 30, 1989, advising that the proposed seaplane site was not a permitted use in the County zoning district for Lake Fairview. As a result of Mr. Brown's letter, Petitioner's application was denied on November 1, 1989, based on failure to comply with local zoning requirements. An "airport" is defined by the Orange County Zoning Ordinance as "any area of land or water designated and set aside for the landing and taking off of aircraft and utilized or to be utilized in the interest of the public for such purpose." No amendments to the zoning ordinance or zoning district map have been enacted since the filing of Petitioner's Application of December 8, 1987. On or about November 11, 1988, Ms. Smith, Orange County Zoning Director, by letter, stated that there were no zoning regulations in force in connection with another unrelated application for site approval and licensure of a private seaplane base on Big Sand Lake in Orange County, Florida. Licensed private airports have been authorized by DOT to provide services to the public such as airplane rides and flight instruction and charge fees. At the formal hearing held on this matter, several residents of the Lake Fairview area expressed opposition to the proposed seaplane site and indicated their concerns as to noise and safety because of extensive activity on the lake. Some people spoke in favor of the seaplane base indicating operational safety. Members of the public, including lake residents and others who spoke at the hearing, were not under subpoena by either party.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by the agency head denying site approval for a private seaplane base on Lake Fairview in Orange County, Florida, because it does not comply with applicable county zoning as required by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-6714 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,10 (discussed in Preliminary Statement). Rejected as argument: 8,11. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: 1,2,3,4,5 COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Brian D. Stokes, Esquire Post Office Box 538065 Orlando, Florida 32853-8065 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, MS 58 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint in the manner specified therein and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is now, and has been since November 2, 2006, a Department-licensed state pilot. Respondent's license (License No. SP177), which is current and active, authorizes him to pilot vessels in and out of the Port of Palm Beach (Port). The Port has 17 berths at which vessels can dock. The navigable portions of the Port consist of an inner and an outer channel, two turning basins, and three slips. To aid mariners traversing the Port, there are navigation markers (herein referred to as "Beacons"), which are sequentially numbered in ascending order from east to west with odd-numbered markers to the port side and even-numbered markers to the starboard side of inbound vessels. The Tropic Carib (Ship) is a foreign-flagged container ship owned by Tropical Shipping (Tropical). With an overall length of 525 feet and a gross registered tonnage of 10,825, it is the largest vessel regularly accommodated at the Port. It is equipped with bow and stern thrusters and a Becker rudder and is otherwise designed to handle well in harsh conditions. At 12:50 p.m. on August 3, 2011, at around high water slack, the Ship was offshore, just to the east of the entrance to the Port's outer channel, drawing 21 feet four inches forward and 23 feet aft, when Respondent boarded and took command of the vessel from the Ship's captain for the final leg of its journey. The Ship was bound for the Port's Berth 7 (Assigned Berth) to offload its cargo. The Assigned Berth is a 464-foot, north-south oriented marginal wharf that lies directly on the western end of the Port's main turning basin (Main Turning Basin), into which the inner channel flows.2/ As the Ship, with Respondent on the bridge and in command,3/ entered the outer channel heading west to the Assigned Berth following the much smaller, 31-foot pilot boat (Pilot Boat) that had carried Respondent out to the Ship, there was no evidence of any storms in the area.4/ Precipitation, in the form of a light drizzle, was first encountered as the Ship was travelling in the inner channel between Beacon 8 and Beacon 10. Respondent, at this time, also observed lightning in the distance. He saw one bolt that struck a Port transformer5/ and another bolt that struck approximately one-half mile north of the Port causing a small explosion. After seeing these lightning strikes, Respondent decided to inquire as to whether the lightning had impacted the availability of Tropical's Port-based line handlers to assist with the mooring of the Ship at the Assigned Berth. He did not have the capability of communicating directly with Tropical's Port-based personnel, so he radioed the pilot of the Pilot Boat (Boatman), who did have such capability, and asked her to make this inquiry on his behalf. Respondent did not hear back from the Boatman until the Ship had passed Beacon 10 and was approaching Beacon 12, beginning its turn to the southwest toward the Assigned Berth. The Boatman informed him that the line handlers had been ordered to take cover, as a precautionary measure, due to the lightning in the area and therefore were not at the Assigned Berth waiting for the Ship to arrive. Respondent, however, did not receive any report from the Boatman, who was in front of him on the Pilot Boat, that there were any squally conditions ahead about which Respondent needed to be concerned in navigating the Ship to its ultimate mooring position. By the time Respondent heard back from the Boatman, the intensity of the rain had increased somewhat, but weather conditions had not worsened to the extent that Respondent's ability to maneuver the Ship was impacted. Visibility was still good and the winds, which were predominantly westerly, did not present a problem. The Ship was about ten minutes away, under ordinary circumstances, from its intended destination to the southwest alongside the Assigned Berth. Respondent had the Ship continue on course, in a southwesterly direction, toward the Assigned Berth, a decision that was reasonable under the circumstances that existed at the time. That line handlers might still be unavailable when he arrived did not make heading toward the Assigned Berth a foreseeably more risky or imprudent choice than any other option that Respondent may have had at the time. Respondent had no reason to believe that, if there no line handlers at the Assigned Berth to catch and secure the Ship's mooring lines, the Ship, equipped as it was, would not be able to hover in the water alongside the Assigned Berth and wait for the line handlers to appear. Moreover, even if there were stronger than anticipated westerly winds and the Ship, for some reason, were unable to hold its position, it would be blown, not toward, but away from the Assigned Berth, in the direction of the center of the Main Basin. A few minutes later, as the Ship was approaching the Assigned Berth, it ran into a sudden and unexpected rain squall, with west-southwesterly wind gusts over 30 knots and blinding rains which reduced visibility to zero. Radio communications from the boatswain at the bow of the Ship, who was providing Respondent with needed information concerning the Ship's position in relation to the Assigned Berth, became garbled and unreliable. Reasonably fearing an allision if the Ship continued its forward motion under these conditions, Respondent prudently ordered that the port anchor be dropped, with 1.5 shots (135 feet) on deck,6/ and that the Ship's engines be put astern, orders that were followed. After determining, from the prop wash that he saw on the starboard side of the vessel, that the Ship was no longer closing on the Assigned Berth, Respondent ordered slow ahead, but the Ship's bow thrusters were overcome by the wind, causing the bow of the Ship to swing and the anchor to drag. As a result, the Ship's starboard stern corner touched the sandy bottom approximately 30 feet west of Beacon 12 in the northern part of the Main Turning Basin, where recorded water depths are from 13 to 15 feet and, at high water slack, are generally three to four feet higher. The grounding produced minor, cosmetic damage to the Ship's rudder. No other damage to the Ship was sustained. The squally conditions lasted a mere two minutes. When the weather cleared, Respondent ordered engines ahead. The Ship proceeded to its mooring position alongside the Assigned Berth, where it was serviced by the Tropical line handlers, who had emerged from the shelter they had sought from the lightning. Thereafter, at the recommendation of the Ship's captain, Tropical had divers inspect the underbody of the Ship. The inspection revealed the damage to the rudder caused by the grounding of the Ship during the rain squall (Grounding Incident).7/ Respondent was notified by Tropical of the outcome of the divers' inspection at around 3:30 p.m. on August 3, 2011, and, within a matter of minutes of receiving such notification, he telephonically reported the Grounding Incident to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and to the Department's Pilot Consultant/Investigator, Lieutenant Commander Galen Dunton, USCG (Ret.).8/ The following day, Respondent provided Commander Dunton with a written report of the incident, as required by section 310.111 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G14-15.002. On August 30, 2011, Commander Dunton issued his Investigative Report concerning the Grounding Incident. It contained the following "Conclusions" and "Recommendation": Conclusions: It is concluded that Captain Hansen was operating under the auspices of his state license and therefore subject to disciplinary action by the State of Florida. The proximate cause [of the grounding of the Ship on August 3, 2011] is unknown. The most probable cause was the failure of the pilot to seek a better position within the [Main] Turning Basin to anchor instead of trying to come alongside the intended berth. The pilot made an error in judgment in deciding to approach the berth without any line handlers to assist versus seeking a better position within the [Main] Turning Basin to anchor and ride the storm out. Had the pilot proceeded further to the SW in the [Main] Turning Basin and then anchored,[9] he may not have grounded or at least bought more time to ride out the storm. The anchor began to drag once the bow started to swing with the wind, and as a result the stern quickly touched bottom near Beacon #12. There is evidence of a violation of FS 310.101(1)(a) on the part of the pilot, in that he failed to make allowances for the wind by anchoring off the berth instead of seeking a better position within the [Main] Turning Basin. There is evidence of a violation of FS 310.101(1)(k) on the part of the pilot in that he failed to (1) seek a better position to anchor within the [Main] [T]urning [B]asin, (2) [a]ttempted to approach the berth knowing that there were no line handlers available, practices not in keeping with the acceptable standards of safe piloting. Recommendation: It is recommended that 1. This case be forwarded to the Probable Cause Panel and that probable cause be found to exist for the following violations: FS 310.101(1)(a) on the part of the pilot in that he failed to make allowances for the wind by anchoring off the berth instead of seeking a better position within the [Main] Turning Basin. FS 310.101(1)(k) on the part of the pilot in that he failed to (1) seek a better position to anchor within the [Main] [T]urning [B]asin, (2) [a]ttempted to approach the berth knowing that there were no line handlers available, practices not in keeping with the acceptable standards of safe piloting.[10] The probable cause finding Commander Dunton recommended was made, and an Administrative Complaint, based on this finding, was thereafter filed. Respondent subsequently requested a "formal hearing" on the allegations against him. This administrative proceeding ensued, with the final hearing being held on February 27, 2012. Ultimate Finding The evidence presented at the final hearing did not clearly and convincingly establish that, in having the Ship approach the Assigned Berth and anchor where it did during its inbound journey through the Port on August 3, 2011, Respondent failed to exercise the care a reasonable and prudent Department- licensed pilot would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances or otherwise violated some professional standard of care or safety he was obligated to follow as a Department- licensed pilot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Pilot Commissioners dismiss the Administrative Complaint against Respondent in its entirety. S DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2012.
Conclusions This cause came on to be heard before the Pilotage Rate Review Board (Board) at regularly scheduled meetings held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on April 29, 1998 and in Boca Grande, Florida on May 19, 1998, pursuant to a Recommended Order entered by ALJ Linda M. Rigot on February 94, 1998. Exceptions to the Recommended Order were filed by the Port Everglades Pilots' Association (PEPA). Responses to the Exceptions were filed by the South Florida Cargo Carriers Association, Inc. (SFCCA). Both PEPA and SFCCA appeared at the Fort Lauderdale meeting through counsel and extensive argument was heard on the Exceptions. The Board's rulings on the Exceptions, made after a review of the complete record (including the prehearing stipulation, the transcript, exhibits and the submissions of the parties), are set forth below. Preliminary Statement-The Standards to be Applied in Reviewing the Findings of Fact Contained in a Recommended Order It is a settled rule of administrative law in this state that the findings of fact of an administrative law judge may not be rejected or modified, "unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based on competent substantial evidence." Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes. Accord Belleau v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 695 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Martuccio v. Dept. Of Professional Regulation, 622 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Freeze v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 510 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Florida case law holds that an agency reviewing a recommended order is not authorized to reevaluate the quantity and quality of the evidence presented as at DOAH final hearing beyond a determination of whether the evidence is competent and substantial. Brogan v. Carter, 671 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 19963. A reviewing agency may not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of witnesses, as those are evidentiary matters within the province of the ALJ as the finder of the facts. Martuccio, supra, at 609; Heifetz v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Consequently, if the record of the DOAH Proceedings discloses any competent substantial evidence to support the findings of fact made by the ALJ in the Recommended Order, the Board is bound by such factual findings. Bradley. supra, at 1123. There is, however, a fundamental difference, first elucidated in McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d 569, 578-579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), between evidentiary findings of fact, which involve resolving conflicts of perception, judging credibility of witnesses and drawing permissible inferences therefrom and those ultimate factual findings which are usually couched in terms of statutory or rule language and which resolve the legal issues between the parties.2 As the court in Mcdonald, supra, stated at 346 So. 2d at 579 an ALJ's findings as to credibility, weight and other matters which are susceptible of "ordinary methods of proof "should be accorded-great deference. However, the court went on to hold that an AlJ's findings regarding matters of opinion and issues which must be resolved by reference to agency expertise, because they are "infused by policy considerations," are entitled to agency deference but with "correspondingly less weight."3 The agency must be circumspect, however, in exercising its authority to reject an ALJ's findings even if they could be labeled as "ultimate findings of fact." If factual disputes underlying an ultimate issue of fact can be resolved by "ordinary methods of proof " then an agency may not reject or modify an ALJ's ultimate factual findings without finding that they also were not supported by competent substantial evidence and complying with the requirements of Section 120.57(1); see Harac v. Dept. of Prof. Reg. Board of Architecture, 484 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986); Dunham v. Highlands County School Board, 652 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1995). If, in an appropriate instance, the question as to what legal standards should be applied to ultimately resolve the issues involves policy considerations (at least to the extent an agency has discretion to interpret its statutes and rules), it follows that an ALJ's findings as to such mixed questions of law and fact should be entitled to weight only to the extent they correctly apply the agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate, not simply the interpretation of that mandate by the witnesses at the hearing or even by the ALJ herself.4 The policy reason for not allowing an ALJ's ultimate findings of fact to always obtain practicable immutability and thus usurp an agency's ability to explicate its positions and interpretations of law in its own jurisprudence, is clear. Agencies, such as the Board, are appointed to oversee and implement the police power of the state and have obtained expertise in doing so. The agency is well aware of its own history and policy, as well as the legal positions set forth therein. ALJ's are likely not to have this intimate familiarity with the policy issues that comes with enforcing a regulatory scheme on a regular basis. Bearing the aforementioned principles in mind the Board hereby renders its rulings on the Exceptions. B Rulings on Exceptions Rejection of PEPA's Exceptions The Board hereby rejects PEPA's Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 5, 9 10, 12, and 13 insofar as the ALJ's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. Exception 7 was withdrawn Exceptions 16-20 and 22-23 are addressed to the ALJ's Conclusions of Law, were treated as legal argument, and thus require no rulings by the Board. Exception 21 to the ALJ's proposed Conclusion of Law 89 was addressed by the Board as an exception to a proposed finding of fact insofar as COL 89 is actually a factual finding. After properly recasting COL 89 as a finding of fact, the Board determines that the finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the Exception is rejected. The Board's rejection of Exception 5 is based upon its reading of the ALJ's findings to mean that the amount of time spent by pilots on clerical and administrative tasks, while "extensive" was not suffciently documented as to place a numerical amount (hourly, daily or monthly) upon the time spent. The reason for this separate discussion is that the Board finds that the ALJ's finding, while correct, could be somewhat misleading. The Board also sets forth its reasoning below on several of the legal issues raised by PEPA as part of those Exceptions which were rejected by the Board. PEPA asserted, as the basis for several of its Exceptions, that the Board had made certain legal conclusions in earlier rate cases that may have been contradicted by the analysis of the ALJ in the Recommended Order. PEPA argued that certain of the ALJ's findings are thus erroneous because they contradict other, earlier, conclusions of the Board. While it is true that stare decisis and a respect for precedent are recognized in administrative law (albeit to a lesser degree than in traditional judicial fore), there must be an order of the Board that has precedential value before these principles may be invoked. Here PEPA points to various "orders" of the Board which were entered in previous rate application review proceedings in support of its position. Where PEPA's argument misses the point is that none of these previous "orders" ripened to Board precedent due to the fact that no Section 120.569 and 120.57 proceedings-ever occurred in those previous rate proceedings. Thus the findings of the Board in those previous proceedings were based only upon the untested-in an evidentiary sense-material submitted to the Board by the applicants and their opposition at a Board meeting- see Section 310.151(3), Florida Statutes. Until the Board has the benefit of a record which has gone through the crucible of a evidentiary proceeding under Chapter 190 and a judicially reviewable final order is entered, the holdings of the Board in unchallenged rate orders are only persuasive and not precedential in nature. The Board further agrees with PEPA (Exception I ) that the determination as to what constitutes a "reasonable operating expense" as that term is used in Section 310.15 l (5)(b)3, Florida Statutes, is a legal conclusion which requires the Board to interpret the statute and apply it to the pilot lobbying and political expenses found by the ALJ; Schnmsher v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 694 So. 2d 856, 860-862 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1997), Macpherson v. School Board of Monroe County, 505 So. 2d 682, 683-684 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987). To the extent that the ALJ placed the determination of what is a "reasonable operating expense" in her findings of fact her Recommended Order is erroneous. Here, however, although the ALJ erroneously found that lobbying expenses and political contributions by pilots are not "reasonable operating expenses" as a finding of fact, the Board finds that they should be so treated as a matter of law. Thus the ALJ's findings, while erroneously labeled, reached the correct result. Therefore the Exception was properly rejected. As has been long held by the Public Service Commission, lobbying expenses as well as political and charitable contributions are not to be considered as reasonable operating expenses for purposes of determining the rate base for rate setting purposes, PSC Docket # 950495-WS, Order # PSC-96-1320- FOF-WS at 150-153; PSC Docket # 960234-WS, Order # 97-0847-FOF- WS at 66-71. The rationale for such a decision is based upon the fact that, while for tax and accounting purposes such expenses are appropriately classified as ordinary business expenses and/or may be deductible from taxable income, to place the burden of paying for such discretionary expenditures upon the user of the regulated service is inappropriate. The Board accepts this reasoning. The Board's ruling when rejecting PEPA's Exception 2 is based upon an identical analysis. Once again, the Board determines for rate setting purposes, as a matter of law, that the present value of the unfunded portion of PEPA's pilot retirement program must be considered as a "book" component of pilot income if, as was found by the ALJ, its value can be reasonably quantified-see Sections 3] 0.151 (5)(b) 2 and 9, Florida Statutes. A similar position has been taken by the PSC- see Rule 25-14.012, F. A. C. Acceptance of PEPA's Exceptions The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 3. The Exception addresses Proposed Findings of Fact 25 and 49-52. The Board finds that the ALJ's finding in the first sentence of Finding of Fact 25 is not supported by competent substantial evidence and, to the extent that the final sentence of Finding of Fact 25 and Findings of Fact 49-52 are based upon that specific finding, they are not accepted by the Board.5 Nevertheless PEPA does not dispute that the ALJ's a projected range of increase in annual revenue growth from 5.9% and 7.3% at the port is reasonable and is supported by the facts. As a result, the Board, based upon the remaining testimony and data, accepts the ALJ's projected range for the growth of revenue at the port. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 6 to Finding of Fact 33 to the extent that it objects to the ALJ's findings that the examination and licensing process of a deep-sea deck officer is comparable to that of a Florida licensed pilot. While the findings of the ALJ in the other areas of "comparability" are accepted by the Board, there was no evidence from any source as to the examination and licensing procedures of pilots and deep- sea officers from which the ALJ could have drawn her conclusion. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 8 to Finding of Fact 39 to the extent that it objects to the "explicit" recognition of the similarity of "deep-sea masters and harbor pilots'' (E.S.) in 33 CFR Part 407. While the Board would agree that the provision of the CFR compares "deep-sea masters and Great Lakes pilots"(E. S.) it does not, on its face, generally address "harbor pilots." The remainder of the Finding of Fact appears to be simply a discussion of the CFR provision which7 as a provision of law, speaks for itself. The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 11 to Findings of Fact 56-58. The ALJ's conclusory statement in the first sentence of FOF 56 that "the job of piloting does not present any serious physical risks" is simply not supported by the record. While the Board accepts the ALJ's other findings, it is clear (and not disputed by any of the experts in navigation and seamanship) that there are serious risks in piloting in periods of heavy weather and/or at night. The remainder of the Finding is accepted by the Board. Similarly, the second sentence in FOF 57 regarding embarkation and disembarkation is flawed because of its categorical finding that such actions are not particularly dangerous. Once again, had the ALJ qualified her finding with a reference to "under normal circumstances" or "in fair weather" the statement would be unexceptional and would be supported by the record. The rest of the Finding is accepted by the Board. The Board also finds that the ALJ's conclusion in the last sentence of FOF 58 that the Board members were not engaged in a strenuous act when they boarded a vessel at Port Everglades during the initial rate hearing is not supported by any evidence adduced at the hearing. The remainder of FOF 58 is accepted by the Board. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 14 to Findings of Fact 72-74. There was competent substantial evidence in the record to sustain the ALJ's findings. The findings are, however, struck because the ALJ has failed to give effect to a stipulation (Pre- Hearing Stipulation at p. 9 ¶20) contained in the Pre-Hearing Stipulation entered into between the parties.6 In the Pre-Hearing Stipulation the parties agreed that to certain facts contained in various tables in the Investigative Report did not require proof at the hearing. Notwithstanding this fact, the ALJ found a revised "handle" time in her Recommended Order which was different (1 hour per vessel as opposed to 1.5 hours) than that contained in the stipulation. The Board finds that, as asserted by PEPA, this was error, Schrimsher, supra at 694 So. 2d 856, 863; Coq v. Fuchs Baking Company, 507 So. 2d 138, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).7 The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 15. The evidentiary findings in FOF 75-76 are supported by the evidence in this proceedings and are unexceptional. Nevertheless, the provisions of Section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes, specifically grant to the Board the discretion to apply the CPI or other economic indicators to a rate change request. Thus the ALJ's statement that "the CPI and employment cost index (sic) are not suitable bases of comparison for measuring pilotage rates" does appear to "read out" this discretionary statutory factor from consideration in all rate cases. The Board can not agree with this position as a matter of law The Board does find, however, that while not the sole factor in determining the rates in these proceedings that the CPI is of material value in the consideration of the rates to be established at Port Everglades. C Conclusion With the foregoing amendments, the Board accepts the Findings of Fact of the ALJ and the same hereby become the Findings of Fact of the Board. II
The Issue Whether Respondent's license should be revoked as set forth in the Notice of Intent to Revoke License.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating yacht salesmen and brokers. Such authority includes the discipline of yacht salesman as set forth in Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent has been licensed as a yacht salesman in the State of Florida. Respondent first applied for licensure in June of 1994. This license request was granted and Respondent was issued a license for the two-year period 1994-1996. In June of 1996, Respondent applied to renew the license. This license request was also granted and Respondent was issued a yacht salesman's license for the period 1996-1998. On or about April 28, 1997, Respondent was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, a federal violation, and a felony. As a result, Respondent was sentenced and incarcerated. In July of 1998, Respondent applied to the Department to renew the yacht salesman's license. Based upon the information submitted to Petitioner at the time he sought renewal, the Department had no direct information of the felony conviction. In telephone conversations with the Department staff, Respondent did not disclose he had been incarcerated, was living in a halfway house as part of his sentence, and was a convicted felon. In August of 1998, a third party advised the Department that Respondent had the felony conviction. Thereafter, upon such notice, Petitioner took action to seek revocation of Respondent's license. The license renewal for 1998 filed by Respondent was executed on July 7, 1998. Technically, his license expired on June 14, 1998, but he was afforded a grace period within which to process the renewal. To this end the Department attempted to accommodate the renewal applicant. On the license renewal card Respondent submitted conflicting answers. To question (3) which read: Have you been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, since initial licensure? Respondent answered "Y." To question (4) which read: Has any judgment or decree of a court been entered against you or is there now pending any case in this or any other state, in which you were charged with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing? Respondent answered "N." An undated letter from Respondent accompanied the renewal card which referred to a prior correspondence with the Department of June 6, 1996, as the explanation for question (4). As to question (3), the letter stated: "a conviction was made on 4/28/98 in the U.S. District Court Southern Florida." Respondent's answer to question (4) was false. Moreover, the manner in which Respondent answered the two questions did not disclose that Respondent had been convicted of a felony or conspiracy to commit wire fraud. More telling of Respondent's attempt to mislead the Department, however, is his failure to disclose any of the foregoing circumstances during telephone conversations with staff seeking to assist him to renew the license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order revoking Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Florida Land Sales, Condos, Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Scott K. Edmonds, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Tracy J. Sumner, Esquire Tracy J. Sumner, P.A. 1330 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
