The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhoni"), a Jewish woman who identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin, at all times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium"), which is located in Miami Beach, Florida. She purchased this unit in 2009 and a second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least as of the final hearing, was in New York City. The Condominium is a relatively small community consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and, specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property. Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"), a representative body whose three members, called "directors," are elected by the unit owners. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years. From July 2010 until April 2011, she held the office of vice- president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was the president of the Board. Simhoni's term as president was cut short when, in May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Carmen Duarte be removed from office, effective immediately. The run-up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused friction between neighbors. Without getting into details that aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critics were not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which—— understandably——led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten over her recall election defeat, which she blames on false, unfair, and anti-Semitic accusations against her. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the "Act"). Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." (Emphasis added). The applicable law will be discussed in greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of fact that follow. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus. Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in fact, a homeowner. Contrary to what some might intuit, the Act is not an all-purpose anti-discrimination law or civility code; it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g., racial or religious hostility. To the extent the Act authorizes charges based on alleged post-acquisition discrimination, such charges must involve the complete denial of services or facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term or condition of ownership——the right to use common areas, for example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover, the denial of access to common services or facilities logically must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access to the services or facilities in question. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that she was subjected to anti-Semitic slurs during her tenure as Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors——none of whom then held an office on the Board——were in no position to (and in fact did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and facilities under the Association's control, even if their opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board, Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil and insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly to dislike her. Simhoni was hurt by this. That impolite, even mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval; it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination under six categories. Most of these allegations do not implicate or involve the denial of common services or facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of detail at which the charges were made. The Mastercard Dispute. As Board president, Simhoni obtained a credit card for the Association, which she used for paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as repair costs. In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an agreement with the issuer to personally guarantee payment of the Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions in procuring this credit card were undertaken in accordance with the Condominium's By-Laws, but there is no evidence suggesting that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co-sign the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have volunteered. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to reimburse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this nonpayment to anti-Semitism. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much money, if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Association has withheld payment based on Simhoni's religion or national origin. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing "service" or "facility" available in common to the Condominium's owners and residents. Nonpayment of the alleged debt might constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of action at law or in equity, but these would belong to Simhoni as a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the Condominium. In short, the Association's alleged nonpayment of the alleged debt might give Simhoni good legal grounds to sue the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and received——but not for housing discrimination. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate, pursuant to section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. By statute, the Association was obligated to issue the certificate within ten business days——by October 4, 2017, in this instance. Id. The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and delivering the certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the certificate one-week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the delay to anti-Semitism. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if based on religion, national origin, or another protected criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake that it is such a service. Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to the complete deprivation thereof; and (iii) there is, at any rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in issuing Simhoni a certificate was the result of discriminatory animus. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the Association is required to provide but, rather, one that may be provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of the units for roaches, as a common expense, and the apartments were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the door, and the owner would be billed individually for this extra service. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled, the new Board decided, as a cost-control measure, to discontinue the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open his door for the exterminator. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during the phaseout. Simhoni blames anti-Semitism for the missed pest control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover, Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pest control, which would have been provided to her if she had simply made arrangements to permit access to her unit. Short-term Rentals. Article XVII of the Condominium's Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and Use Restrictions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8 of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium, which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In other words, the Declaration prohibits short-term, or vacation, rentals, which are typically for periods of days or weeks. Short-term rentals can be lucrative for owners, especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel lodgings. On the flip side, however, short-term rental activity is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in preserving the peace, quiet, and tidy appearance of the neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whether or not to permit short-term rentals has divided the owners into competing camps. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short-term rentals. Accordingly, while she was Board president, the Association did not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a blind eye to short-term rentals even before Simhoni became a director.) This laissez-faire approach did not sit well with everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short-term rentals provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaration's ban on short-term rentals. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short-term rentals was an act of religion-based housing discrimination. Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners are being forced to stop engaging in short-term rental activity; that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making complaints about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal restrictions on short-term rentals. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such as the prohibition of short-term rentals conceivably could be enforced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treatment, selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in connection with the Association's restoration of the short-term rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Association is trying to stop short-term rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason, namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the Declaration to be given full force and effect. The Feud with Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and Ms. Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors. As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami Beach for engaging in short-term rentals without the required business tax receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger. None of this, however, amounts to housing discrimination because the Floreses' actions did not completely deprive Simhoni of common facilities or services, even if such actions were motivated by anti-Semitism, which the greater weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over the Condominium's facilities or services that they could have denied Simhoni access to them. Simhoni argues in her proposed recommended order, apparently for the first time, that the Floreses' conduct created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Floreses' conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is there sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Floreses' conduct. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association failed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof leaks. Simhoni asserts that, using Association funds, the Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of non-Jewish owners. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows, however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and that the Association never instructed the roofing contractor not to make needed repairs. Simhoni, in short, was not denied the service of roof repairs. As for the alleged damage to Simhoni's unit, section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains falls outside of her duty to repair. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the question of whether the Association is obligated to repair Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, it is sufficient to find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory reason to refuse, as it has, to perform the interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner formerly resided in Montrose Apartments at 563 West Montrose Street, Apartment 18, Clermont, Florida. Petitioner alleges that he is a handicapped/disabled person by virtue of a mental disability, who was "illegally" evicted from Montrose Apartments because of his handicap/disability. At all times relevant to this proceeding Francisco Guzman, Jr., owned and managed Montrose Apartments. Mr. Guzman was unaware of Petitioner's alleged handicap/disability. At no time during Petitioner's tenancy at Montrose Apartments did Petitioner notify management of the apartment complex that he had a handicap/disability. Furthermore, Petitioner never provided management with documentation verifying that he had a handicap/disability. Petitioner alleged that in early 2009, he requested that Respondent make plumbing repairs in his apartment unit and that Respondent refused to comply with those requests. He further alleged that Respondent did not take his maintenance requests seriously and treated other tenants at Montrose Apartments more favorably than he was treated. Petitioner admitted that he did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009. According to Petitioner, he withheld the rent because Respondent failed to make the requested plumbing repairs. In correspondence from him to a "Ms. Smith," Mr. Guzman indicated that on "Sunday [March] 22, 2009," he had posted a three-day notice on Petitioner's apartment, because he had not paid his March 2009 rent. Also, Mr. Guzman acknowledged that he had not been able to repair Petitioner's bathroom sink because he had been unable to gain access to Petitioner's apartment. Finally, Mr. Guzman indicated that he believed Petitioner was "avoiding [him] since he is unable to pay the rent." Petitioner did not pay rent for his Montrose Apartment unit in March and April 2009, even after Respondent notified him several times that the rent was past due and should be paid. Respondent began eviction proceedings against Petitioner in or about late April or early May 2009, by filing a Complaint for Eviction ("Eviction Complaint") with the County Court of Lake County, Florida. The Eviction Complaint was assigned Case No. 2009-CC001534. Respondent filed the Eviction Complaint against Petitioner after, and because, he did not pay the March and April 2009 rent for his Montrose Apartment unit. On May 5, 2009, a Final Judgment for Possession and Writ of Possession were entered against Petitioner. The Writ of Possession was served on Petitioner and enforced. On or about May 8, 2009, the apartment unit previously rented to Petitioner was turned over to Mr. Guzman. Petitioner alleges and asserts that: (1) he is disabled/handicapped due to a mental disability; (2) he was evicted because of his handicap/disability; and (3) Respondent knew Petitioner was handicapped/disabled. Nevertheless, Petitioner presented no competent evidence to support his claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Luis Bermudez' Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2010.
The Issue The issue presented by the Motion and supplemental Motion to Dismiss is whether the Golden Gate Area Taxpayers Association (Association) has standing to maintain this challenge to the applications for consumptive use permits sought by Collier County (County) and the City of Naples (City) from the South Florida Water Management District (District).
Findings Of Fact The County filed its application number 08158A with the District for modification of consumptive use permit number 11-00249-W, on or about August 15, 1988. The City filed its application number 08137-H with the District for modification of consumptive use permit numbers 11-00017-W & 11-00018-W, on or about August 15, 1988. After review, the District staff issued its recommendation to grant the County and City's consumptive use permit applications, with limiting conditions, on or about January 24 and 25, 1989. The Association filed its Petition and Amended Petition herein on February 8, 1989, and March 6, 1989, respectively, challenging the issuance of these consumptive use permits. The Association did not allege any basis upon which standing could be established in its Petition or Amended Petition. There is no allegation in either document which describes the Association, alleges its purpose, scope or interest, the number of members in the Association and the number of its members adversely affected by the issuance of these permits, or the reason why the relief sought is appropriate for it to receive. Discovery was allowed to proceed in order to determine if there was a basis, notwithstanding these deficiencies in the Petition and Amended Petition, upon which the Association could establish its standing at final hearing. The District preserved its right to renew its objection to the Association's standing throughout this proceeding, and timely sought a determination thereon, after discovery had been concluded, but before the commencement of final hearing. This action is specifically maintained by the Association, and not by individual members thereof, or non-member property owners. However, the Association has not asserted that its substantial interests will be adversely affected by issuance of these permits. The Association is not an existing legal user of water in Collier County. The Association does not own, lease or otherwise control lands impacted by the permits sought by the County and City. The membership of the Association varies throughout the year as members pay their annual dues. The current membership of the Association totals 59, according to its Amended Second Response to First Interrogatories from Respondent Collier County filed on October 30, 1989, but it had reached a total membership of approximately 200 at times, according to the President of the Association, as dues are paid each year. The Association alleged in the motion hearing held on October 30, 1989, that 13 of its current members are adversely affected by the proposed issuance of these permits. However, in response to Interrogatories served by Hearing Officer Donnelly, the Association indicated that only 5 members were affected, and in response the District's Interrogatories the Association indicated that 6 of its members were affected. Thus, the Association's estimate of the number of its members who would be affected by issuance of these permits is uncertain, inconsistent, unreliable and lacks credibility. The nature of that adverse effect is stated to be damage to domestic wells, degradation of water quality, and a decline in water quantity, according to affidavits filed by the Association on October 13, 1989, in response to Interrogatories from Hearing Officer Donnelly. The only provision in the Association's by-laws upon which it relies in this proceeding to support its standing is found at Article V, Section 4, which states, "The corporation reserves the right to seek judicial relief in the furtherance of its aims and purpose." The only provision in its articles of incorporation which have been relied upon by the Association in this regard were cited during the motion hearing on October 30, 1989, and provide generally that the Association's purpose is to inform its members about the ongoing activities of government, particularly local government. It is clear that the Association is a taxpayer's association which has taken action in the past regarding tax assessments, and represented the views of its members in matters relating thereto. There is no other allegation or explanation of record regarding the purpose, scope, or interest of the Association, or factors which would support a finding that the relief sought herein is appropriate for the Association to receive on behalf of its members. The Association's exhibit list and amended exhibit list filed herein do not contain any exhibits which would clarify or explain its purpose, scope or interest in these matters, its total membership and number of adversely affected members, or how the relief which it seeks in this proceeding is appropriate for it to receive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the District issue a Final Order dismissing the Petition, as amended, which has been filed herein by the Association, based upon the Association's lack of standing. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd of November, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd of November, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH Case Number 89-2100) Ruling on the Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 6 2-4. Adopted in Finding 9. 5. Adopted in Finding 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Grimm, Director Golden Gate Area Taxpayers Association 3093 52nd Street, S.W. Naples, FL 33999 Mark G. Lawson, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Collier County Courthouse 3301 Tamiami Trail East, Building F Naples, FL 33962-4976 Elizabeth D. Ross, Esquire South Florida Water Management District P. O. Box 24680 West Palm Beach, FL 33416-4680 David W. Rynders, Esquire City of Naples 735 Eighth Street South Naples, FL 33940 John Wodraska Executive Director P. O. Box 24680 West Palm Beach, FL 33416-4680
The Issue The issue in this case is the appropriate penalty to impose on the Respondent for: proceeding on a job without obtaining the applicable local building department permits and inspections, in violation of section 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes1/; failing to notify a customer of the Florida Homeowners’ Construction Recovery Fund, in violation of section 489.1425; and failing to place his license number on a construction contract, in violation of section 489.119(5)(b).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the construction industry pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes.2/ At all times material to these proceedings, the Respondent was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license CGC 12754. At all times material hereto, the Respondent was the primary qualifying agent of Charles Boyd Construction, Inc. (“Charles Boyd Construction”). The Respondent’s license is current and active. The Respondent has been subject to prior discipline. On September 21, 1988, the Construction Industry Licensing Board (CILB) issued a Final Order against the Respondent in case 78033 that imposed an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500 for violating sections 489.129(1)(j) and (m), 489.105(4), and 489.119, Florida Statutes, in 1983 and 1984. On or about December 3, 2012, Joanie Miller Drobnie entered into a contract with Respondent, d/b/a Charles Boyd Construction, for renovations to her residence located at 452 Banana River Boulevard, Cocoa Beach, Florida. The original contract price was $173,000. Charles Boyd Construction accepted $175,000. The additional funds represented amounts for extras on the job. On or about January 2, 2013, the Respondent, d/b/a Charles Boyd Construction, obtained Building Permit 13-0366 from the City of Cocoa Beach Building Department for the installation of new windows. Charles Boyd Construction proceeded on interior renovations and performed additional construction contracting services requiring proper licensure without obtaining applicable local building department permits and inspections. The contract at issue failed to contain a statement notifying Ms. Drobnie of her rights under the Florida Homeowner’s Construction Recovery Fund. The Respondent’s license number does not appear on the contract. The Petitioner and Respondent agree, based on the facts and circumstances in this case, that discipline should not exceed an administrative fine of $7,000, payment of the Petitioner’s costs of $487.93, and completion of a live, approved seven-hour continuing education course.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Licensing Board enter a final order: finding that the Respondent violated section 489.129(1)(o) and, by failing to comply with sections 489.1425 and 489.119(5)(b), violated 489.129(1)(o); imposing an administrative fine of $7,000; assessing costs in the amount of $487.93; and requiring the Respondent to complete an approved, live seven-hour continuing education course in addition to any otherwise-required continuing education, with an emphasis on chapter 489 and the rules implementing it. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Based on the undisputed facts included in pleadings filed in this proceeding and on the documentary evidence attached to the Association's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the following findings of fact are made: On or about April 16, 1999, Ms. Thornhill filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in which she accused the Association of housing discrimination on the basis of handicap and coercion. The complaint was apparently based on the Association's attempts to make Ms. Thornhill remove a set of steps leading from the terrace of her apartment. In June 1999, the Association filed a civil lawsuit against Ms. Thornhill in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, styled Admiral Farragut Condominium Association v. Maria Thornhill, Case No. 99-15567 CA 22. On or about September 21, 1999, Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, filed Defendant, Maria Thornhill's Answer to Complaint. Included in the answer was a Counterclaim filed by Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, against the Association, in which she sought injunctive relief and damages against the Association pursuant to Section 760.35(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. 1/ She asserted in the Counterclaim that she had filed a discrimination complaint against the Association with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which had been referred to the Commission and that this complaint was still pending before the Commission. Ms. Thornhill alleged in the Counterclaim that the Association had engaged in housing discrimination against her on the basis of her handicap because it had refused to accommodate her disability by giving her permission to retain the steps she had installed leading from the terrace of her apartment. Ms. Thornhill also alleged that the Association had "authorized or acquiesced in a series of actions intended as harassment and retribution" against Ms. Thornhill for having filed a housing discrimination complaint. The factual and legal bases on which Ms. Thornhill requests relief in the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission and in the Counterclaim filed in circuit court are virtually identical.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint filed by Maria T. Thornhill to enforce rights granted by the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.30 through 760.37, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2000.
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact In June 2016, Gaudina and Grand Lifestyle executed a document, entitled “GLC III/LLLP Lease – Basic Rental Agreement or Residential Lease” (lease), in which Gaudina leased from Grand Lifestyle a residence at 3346 East Dale Street, Leesburg, Florida, in the Lakeside Village mobile home park (premises). The lease provided that Gaudina pay to Grand Lifestyle $656.00 per month to lease the premises. The lease further provided that at the end of three consecutive years of living at the premises, Grand Lifestyle would provide Gaudina the option of purchasing the premises for $1,000.00. Gaudina testified that his primary residence is in Colorado, but that he wished to lease the premises so that he had a residence when he visited his wife, who lived nearby in Lake County, Florida. As he did not reside permanently at the premises in Leesburg, Gaudina subleased the premises to another individual, possibly in violation of the lease. That individual reported to Gaudina numerous issues with the premises, which Gaudina testified he brought to the attention of Grand Lifestyle.2/ Both parties testified that they sought various remedies in other courts concerning these issues. The undersigned finds that these issues are not relevant to Gaudina’s allegations concerning discrimination under the Florida FHA. Gaudina testified that he possesses a disability that requires use of an emotional support animal. The only evidence Gaudina submitted in support of this contention was a letter, dated February 24, 2015, from Emilia Ripoll, M.D. (Ripoll), located in Boulder, Colorado, and a “Health Care Provider Pet Accomodation Form,” also from Ripoll. This letter states: Mr. Jan Gaudina is currently my patient and has been under my care since 1998. I am intimately familiar with his history and with the functional limitations imposed by his medical condition. Due to his diagnosis of bladder cancer and bilateral ureter cancer, Jan has certain emotional limitations including stress which may cause his cancer to recur. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his ability to cope and live independently, I have prescribed Jan to obtain his pet for emotional support. The presence of this animal is necessary for the mental health of Jan. The Health Care Accomodation Form prescribed the use of Gaudina’s dog, a golden retriever, as an emotional support animal. Gaudina did not present the testimony of Ripoll or any other health care provider concerning his alleged disability. The letter and form, which are inadmissible hearsay that Gaudina failed to corroborate with admissible non-hearsay evidence, attempt to establish that Gaudina required an emotional support animal to prevent a recurrence of cancer. The undersigned cannot consider these documents to support a finding that Gaudina is disabled and in need of an emotional support animal. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.213(3).3/ Therefore, the undersigned finds that Gaudina has failed to establish that he suffers from a disability that requires the accommodation of his golden retriever as an emotional support animal. Principe, the owner of Grand Lifestyle, testified that the prospectus for the premises restricted pet ownership to pets that weigh less than 20 pounds. The parties acknowledged that a golden retriever weighs in excess of 20 pounds. Principe testified that, during a telephone conversation, Gaudina asked whether he could bring his golden retriever to the premises, but never mentioned his alleged disability. Principe also testified that he asked Gaudina whether Gaudina’s golden retriever was a trained service dog. Gaudina testified that his golden retriever was not a “service dog,” as defined under section 413.08, Florida Statutes.4/ Principe further testified that Gaudina rarely visited the premises. Gaudina testified that, in total, he visited the premises in Leesburg three or four times over the period of approximately one year. Gaudina presented no credible evidence that he qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Further, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Jan Gaudina, did not prove that Respondent, Grand Lifestyle Communities III/IV, LLLP, committed discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Center Lake Owner's Association, Inc. ("Center Lake"), discriminated against Petitioner, James Schweim ("Schweim"), on the basis of his purported disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Schweim is a white male who at all times material hereto resided at Center Lake. Schweim provided some evidence of his medical condition at final hearing, but did not affirmatively establish a disability, per se. Notwithstanding that fact, a review of the facts will be made concerning the merits of Schweim's claim. Center Lake is the homeowner's association for the Center Lake subdivision located in Manatee County. The association has been in existence since 1986. The subdivision is subject to various deed restrictions as set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Centre1/ Lake, recorded at O.R. Book 1168, Page 1508, in the public records of Manatee County, Florida. Of significance to this proceeding, Section 11 of the deed restrictions is relevant. Section 11, as it will be referred to herein, states in whole: Vehicles. No vehicle of a subdivision resident shall be parked in the subdivision except on a paved driveway, or inside a garage. No vehicle shall at anytime be parked on grass or other vegetation. No trucks or vehicles which are used for commercial purposes, other than those present on business, nor any trailers, may be parked in the subdivision unless inside a garage and concealed from public view. Boats, boat trailers, campers, vans, motorcycles and other recreational vehicles and any vehicle not in operable condition or validly licensed shall be permitted in the subdivision only if parked inside a garage and concealed from public view. No maintenance or repair of any boat or vehicle shall be permitted upon any Lot except within an enclosed garage. Beginning some time in 2004, Schweim and Center Lake commenced a dispute concerning Schweim's alleged violation of the provisions of Section 11. Specifically, Schweim was accused of parking a recreational vehicle (the "RV") on his property in violation of the deed restriction. There is no dispute between the parties that Schweim owns a 23-foot recreational vehicle, which is kept on his property (at 3550 65th Avenue Circle East). As a result of the 2004 dispute, the parties entered into a Settlement Stipulation signed by Center Lake and its attorneys on December 6 and 7, 2004, respectively. Schweim's attorney signed the document on November 24, 2004; Schweim and his wife signed on that same date. The Settlement Stipulation was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. Schweim asserted that the version of the Settlement Stipulation entered into evidence was not the version he signed, but the most persuasive evidence is that it is the same version. Schweim does not agree that all the terms and conditions in the Settlement Stipulation were extant at the time he signed, but he could not produce a copy of any other version of the document for comparison. In the Settlement Stipulation, Schweim agreed to move the RV from his property and not to bring it onto the property except for loading or unloading. In exchange, Center Lake agreed to voluntarily dismiss its then-pending lawsuit against Schweim. Despite the resolution of the aforementioned lawsuit, Schweim did not remove his RV from his property. Instead, Schweim kept the RV on the property and, ultimately, filed a discrimination action against Center Lake because of their efforts to have him remove the RV. That action is the subject of the instant proceeding. Schweim does not dispute that he is keeping the RV on his property in violation of the deed restrictions. Rather, Schweim suggests that he should be allowed to do so on three bases: One, that he is proposing a fence on his property that will cover the RV and make it hidden from view from the street; Two, that there are other residents of the subdivision who are also in violation of the deed restrictions; and, three, that he is disabled and needs the RV parked on his property to accommodate his disability. As to his first reason, Schweim's proposal is simply that, a proposal. There is no evidence that the fence proposed by Schweim would satisfy the requirements of the deed restriction. Further, Center Lake has no confidence, based on its history with Schweim, that he would follow through with the proposal. There is some evidence that other residents in the area appear to be in violation of the deed restrictions. However, there was no evidence presented at final hearing that those residents had refused to move their vehicles upon filing of a complaint. That is, the homeowner's association tends not to take any action unless a homeowner files a formal complaint concerning a violation. In Schweim's case, several complaints were filed as to his RV. There was also some discussion at final hearing as to the appropriate licensure for the RV. Any vehicle not properly licensed is not allowed to be parked in the subdivision based on the deed restrictions. However, Schweim says the license is currently up-to-date and that is no longer an issue. Concerning Schweim's disability, he presented the following facts: At age 23, Schweim suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen, causing long-term damage; In 1991, Schweim had a ruptured disc; Surgical fusion of his disc was performed in 2002 and again in 2004; In 2009, Schweim underwent a lumbar fusion. As a result of those events, Schweim has what he describes as an acute medical condition limiting his ambulatory abilities. At the final hearing, Schweim negotiated the hearing room slowly and with some difficulty. Judy Schweim, a nurse, testified that she transports Schweim to doctor's appointments and other medical situations. At times, Schweim's back will "go out," and she is responsible for getting him to medical treatment as soon as possible. Schweim produced evidence that he has received a Florida parking permit for disabled persons. The application for the permit indicates his condition as "severe limitation in a person's ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." A doctor's order dated May 6, 2004, indicates that it is "medically necessary for [Schweim] to have ready access to a walk-in vehicle to accommodate his disability." An August 19, 2010, memo from Dr. Tally at the Neuro Spinal Associates, P.A., and a September 27, 2010, memo from the Dolphin Medical Group, state essentially the same thing. None of the hearsay documents were sufficient to establish a disability, per se. Schweim says that his disability makes it necessary for him to have the RV parked in his yard so that, when necessary, he can use it to get medical treatment. Schweim says that when his back goes out, he needs a vehicle that he can walk into while standing up. He cannot sit down into an automobile at those times. The incidences of Schweim's debilitating back pain only occur every couple of years. When not experiencing that pain, Schweim is able to drive his red car, described by neighbors as a "hot rod," without any problem. Schweim drove a motorcycle for years, but says he has not driven it for quite some time. Schweim said that an ambulance was not a viable option for him when he has the back pain, because the ambulance will not take him where he needs to go, i.e., straight to a particular doctor, rather than the emergency room. There is no competent evidence to support that contention. Schweim candidly admits that the only time he needs the RV is when he has an episode with his back and that such episodes are few and far between. And while it is true that an episode may occur at any time, there is insufficient evidence to support Schweim's claim that the RV is integral to him receiving prompt and appropriate medical care.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, James Schweim, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Bayhead Landings Property Owners Association, Inc.; Kimberly Lee, president; William Barthle, Architectural Review Committee (ARC) member; and Tony Kolka, ARC member, discriminated against John and Kimberly Whitt,1/ on the basis of Mr. Whitt's physical handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act), and, if so, the relief to which Petitioners are entitled.
Findings Of Fact Bayhead Landings Subdivision (Bayhead) is a deed- restricted community for which the Bayhead Landings Property Owners Association, Inc., was organized to operate and administer. Deed restrictions have been in place since 1990 and will continue in place until at least January 2031.4/ It remains unclear how many Bayhead parcels front the lake in question. There are four to five existing docks in that lake; however, none of those existing docks extend more than 80 to 100 feet into the lake. The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Bayhead provide in pertinent part: 6.(a) For the purpose of further insuring the development of said land as a residential/agricultural area of highest quality and standard, and in order that all improvements on each lot shall present an attractive and pleasing appearance from all sides of view, there shall be a Committee consisting of no less than three (3) persons appointed to review plans and specifications, . . . . (b) The Committee reserves the exclusive power and discretion to control and approve all of the buildings, structures and other improvements on each lot or parcel in the manner and to the extent set forth herein. No residence, . . . or other structure or improvement, regardless of size or purpose . . . shall be commenced, placed, erected or allowed to remain on any lot or parcel, . . . unless and until building plans and specifications covering same showing the shape, height, size, location and orientation on the lot, floor plans, square footage, front, side and rear elevations, materials to be incorporated and exterior color schemes . . . have been submitted to and approved in writing by the Committee. * * * (d) As a prerequisite to consideration for approval, and prior to commencement of the contemplated work, a complete set of plans and specifications must be submitted to the Committee. . . . . The purpose of the ARC is to ensure that any development in Bayhead maintains the "community standards and deed restrictions" and is of the "highest quality and standard." To ensure that goal is met, the ARC is to receive a complete set of plans and specifications prior to the work starting. Mr. Whitt has a physical handicap as defined by the Act, section 760.22(7)(a). Mr. Whitt is confined to a wheelchair for mobility. The Whitts' backyard property has a significant slope downhill or drop-off towards the lake. The area between the house and the lake is muddy for a long distance, the terrain is uneven, and it is not suitable for a wheelchair to traverse. No evidence was received as to the actual distances between the house and either the drop-off area or where the terrain becomes uneven in the Whitts' backyard. The water level in the lake has been relatively low for some time; however, there is some water in it now. On September 7, 2010, Mr. Whitt submitted a proposed estimate and architectural review application to Respondents' ARC, seeking approval to construct a stationary dock on the Whitts' property (dock application). This dock application was the first received by the ARC in many years, and there is no evidence of any prior applications to build a stationary dock.5/ The dock application (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) included a three-page proposal (Proposal) from Coastal Construction; Gulfside Docks6/ that included the following "SPECIFICATIONS": Timber Piles 2.5CCA • Frame/Stringers/Caps 2" x 8" • Dock Lumber Pressure Treated .40 • Dock Bolts 5/8" HDG • SS Nails/Screws The Proposal also contained the following "STATIONARY DOCK" information: Construct new 300' x 5' dock with 20 x 16 head. We will add 2" x 2" lumber along perimeter of dock to act as bumper system Decking will be #1 pressure treated decking. Stainless Steel Screws will be used to secure deck boards The dock application did not contain any specific references to the dock being "wheelchair accessible"; however, it did contain information about a bumper system. The second proposal (Petitioners' Exhibit 10) contained the same "SPECIFICATIONS." The second proposal contained similar information regarding the "STATIONARY DOCK"; however, the language regarding the bumper system was altered to reflect "Install 2" x 2" wheel chair safety bumper around entire perimeter of dock - Approx. 663'LF. Stainless steel screws will be used as fasteners." On September 19, 2010, William Barthle, a member of the ARC, sent an e-mail to Mr. Whitt. The e-mail provided Mr. Whitt with a portion of Bayhead's deed restrictions and requested "WE NEED A DIAGRAM OF DOCKS [sic] PLACEMENT ON PROPERTY AS REFERENCED IN DOCS." On September 27, 2010, Mr. Whitt sent a plat map to the ARC with a hand-drawn dock sketched on it. The hand-drawing was not to scale and failed to provide detailed measurements of where the dock was to begin in relation to the residence or shed that were already on the property. Further, there was no rendering of what the dock itself would look like. On October 10, 2010, the ARC sent Mr. Whitt a letter requesting four specific items in order for the ARC to consider the dock application, including: Square footage of dock Height of dock The exact location of the dock on your property (distance from your house and distance from property line on each side, distance from any setback easement, or wetlands buffer boundary) A letter from Southwest Florida Water Management District approving the placement, length and location (starting/ending) of the dock Mr. Whitt's June 22, 2011, response letter (eight months later) to the request failed to provide the requested information. As of December 12, 2012, the Whitts had not provided the requested information. Mr. Barthle and Graeme Woodbrook both served on the ARC when the Whitts' dock application was submitted. Both gentlemen credibly testified that the Whitts' dock application failed to provide enough information to allow them to make a decision about it. Further, Mr. Woodbrook admitted he has some physical limitations and is sympathetic to people who have disabilities. While both men knew Mr. Whitt was confined to a wheelchair, neither knew why Mr. Whitt had to use it. Other ARC applications were admitted into evidence. These ARC applications involved: painting the exterior of a primary residence (two separate requests); landscaping in the front yard of a residence for a non-permanent 6' x 8' fish pond; replacing a playground set; resurfacing a pool deck, patio, and front porch entry; resurfacing a driveway; and extending a present screen porch. Of the three ARC applications that involved some type of new construction (fish pond, playground set, and porch extension), each contained pictures, dimensions, and/or diagrams sufficient for the reviewer to appreciate where the project was being constructed in relation to the house and property lines.7/ As of December 12, 2012, Respondent had neither approved nor rejected the Whitts' dock application. That application is simply not complete without the requested information. The dock application remains "pending," awaiting receipt of the requested information. The Whitts' position that they have provided everything that the builder has provided them is insufficient to provide the ARC with the requisite information to know where the dock will begin on the Whitts' property; how far out the dock will extend into the lake; and what the structure will look like.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Whitt. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2013.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice.
Findings Of Fact Several years prior to 2007, Petitioner, Wanda Hutcheson, leased one side of a duplex apartment from LGMS. The apartment was located on 3359 Greenbrier Circle, in Gulf Breeze, Florida. During the time that LGMS owned the property, the property manager found her to be a responsible tenant who paid her rent on time. Indeed, the manager felt that she had improved the look and value of the property because she had done extensive landscaping in her front yard. The increase in value was not shown by the evidence. At the time, Petitioner’s landlord knew that she had a mental disorder known as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). In part, the extensive yard work done by Petitioner was due to her OCD. She regularly watered her yard with the shared sprinkler system that served both apartments in the duplex. However, the electricity for the water pump that operated the sprinkler system was hooked into the electrical system for the apartment adjoining Petitioner’s apartment. The sprinkler system was operated by a switch located either by or in the electrical box for the adjoining apartment and the electrical box for her apartment. Petitioner was frequently in the area of those boxes. Respondent, Sand Dunes Property, LLC (Sand Dunes), is a limited liability company owned and operated by Respondents, Robert and Justin MacFarland. In 2006, Sand Dunes purchased several parcels of rental property from LGMS, including the apartment leased by Petitioner. In February 2006, prior to Sand Dunes’ purchase of the property, the MacFarlands visited the premises they were about to purchase and met Petitioner. At that time, Petitioner told the Respondents that she had OCD. She neither requested nor indicated the need for any special accommodations from the Respondents regarding her lease. The evidence did not show that the Respondents knew or were aware that OCD could be a disability that might significantly interfere with a person’s life activities. To them, Petitioner did not seem mentally disabled and appeared able to carry out her daily activities. She appeared to live her life as any other person might. In fact, among other things, Petitioner drove a car, occasionally worked cleaning houses, performed yard work, had the electrical part of her apartment’s sprinkler system transferred to her electrical system, paid her lease and cared for other people’s children. Around March 2006, subsequent to the purchase of the property by the Respondents, Peter Bouchard moved into the apartment next to Petitioner’s apartment. Shortly after he moved in, Petitioner was watering her yard with the sprinkler system. Mr. Bouchard saw her and turned off the sprinkler system. He told her he did not believe in watering the grass and that he did not want his yard watered. He told her that as long as the pump was hooked to his electrical box that she could not use the sprinkler system since he was paying for the electricity used in its operation. He suggested that she could have the pump transferred to her electrical box if she wanted to continue to use the system. Petitioner called Respondents and left a message about the need to transfer the electrical connection for the sprinkler system to her electrical box and to make sure it was alright for her to pay to have the system transferred. The evidence did not show that she related the details of Mr. Bouchard’s actions to Respondent’s. She did not receive a response to her message and eventually paid for the system to be transferred to her electrical box. At some point, even though she did not own the sprinkler systems components, she removed the sprinkler heads from Mr. Bouchard’s side of the yard. She capped the pipe where the heads had been and filled the hole. She did not tell anyone that she had removed the sprinkler heads, but kept the sprinkler heads in her apartment. Additionally, during March 2006, Petitioner complained to Santa Rosa Animal Control about Mr. Bouchard’s two dogs being abused by him and barking. She also complained about the two dogs of the neighbor who lived behind her, Jodi Henning. Both of these incidents were investigated by Animal Control and no abuse was discovered. In fact, the dogs never barked or only barked for a short time when the investigator visited the duplex on two occasions. Petitioner’s actions appeared to be in retaliation for Mr. Bouchard’s refusal to permit her to use the sprinkler system. Finally, at some point, Petitioner while on her front porch saw Mr. Bouchard’s son walking to his apartment. She told the boy that she would cause Mr. Bouchard’s dogs to be removed for abuse and then would have him removed for the same reason. The comment upset both the boy and Mr. Bouchard. On April 3, 2006, Sand Dunes mailed a written offer to enter into a new lease with Petitioner. The offer was made to Petitioner because her lease would terminate on May 30, 2006. The offer was conditioned upon an increase in the monthly rent on Petitioner’s apartment. The offer stated, “Please let us know by May 1st of your decision so that we may set up an appointment to review and sign your new lease agreement.” The intent of the letter’s language was to not be contractually bound until a new lease was signed by the parties. There was no evidence that Respondents treated any other potentially continuing tenant differently. Around April 4, 2006, Mr. MacFarland left a message for Petitioner regarding a maintenance check on her apartment’s air conditioner. Petitioner returned the call and left a message that she could not be present at the time suggested and asked that the work be performed at another time. Petitioner received the written offer of renewal on April 5, 2006, and attempted to accept the offer by leaving a message on Respondent’s telephone. After the first message, Petitioner left town to attend a family function out of state. Around April 6, 2006, air-conditioning maintenance checks were performed on nine of ten units owned by the Respondents in the Greenbrier area. Around April 6 or 7, 2006, Respondents were contacted by Mr. Bouchard. Mr. Bouchard complained about Petitioner to the MacFarlands. He told them that Petitioner had stolen the sprinkler heads out of his side of the yard and that she turned off the electricity to his apartment. He showed them a photograph of the unlocked electrical box to his unit. He also relayed to Respondents that Petitioner had repeatedly accused him of abusing his dogs, not properly vaccinating his dogs and had repeatedly reported him to Animal Control for animal abuse and barking dogs. Apparently, Mr. Bouchard complained enough about Petitioner to Respondents to make them believe that Respondent was a particularly disruptive and vengeful tenant. At some point, Respondents became aware of Jodi Henning’s problems with Petitioner. Ms. Henning lived in a different complex from Petitioner. However, her backyard adjoined Petitioner’s backyard. She called the Sheriff's Department on Ms. Hutcheson on a few occasions for problems she had with Petitioner. None of the incidents amounted to an arrest. During an evening in March 2005, Ms. Henning’s dogs were inside with her. They had not been outside. Ms. Henning answered the door. Petitioner, who was quite angry, complained about Ms. Henning’s dogs and told her that she had made an enemy of Petitioner and that she would make Ms. Henning’s life miserable. Ms. Henning called the Sheriff’s Department. The 911 operator asked if Petitioner was drunk. Ms. Henning said that Petitioner was not drunk, but just crazy and mean. Petitioner was told by law enforcement personnel that Santa Rosa County Animal Control should be contacted if she had an issue with a neighbor's dog. She then filed a complaint with Santa Rosa County Animal Control about Ms. Henning’s dogs. Petitioner made a similar complaint in April 2006. Neither complaint was found to have merit by the investigator for Animal Control. Additionally, Ms. Henning felt that she could not go out in her yard without Petitioner coming out to watch her. Petitioner never engaged in any physically, aggressive behavior. However, Ms. Henning felt she became threatening to the point she was afraid. Petitioner had told both Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard that she had OCD. However, based on their observation of her, neither thought that Petitioner was disabled by her condition. They both thought that she was simply nosy and mean. On the other hand, there were former neighbors who thought Petitioner was a nice person and a good neighbor. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that these neighbors’ opinions were known to the Respondents during the time the offer to lease was outstanding. Mr. MacFarland obtained copies of "call reports" received by Animal Control regarding Ms. Henning and Mr. Bouchard's dogs. Those reports consisted of complaints in March 2005 about Ms. Henning's two dogs, and in March 2006 concerning Ms. Henning's two dogs and Mr. Bouchard's two dogs. On April 10, 2006, Respondents sent a letter on Sand Dunes' stationary revoking the earlier offer to lease her apartment after expiration of her lease. Based on the Respondents limited knowledge about Petitioner during the time the offer to lease was outstanding, their conclusion was neither unreasonable nor discriminatory. Thereafter, the Respondents were entitled to rely on the expiration of the lease by its terms and the peaceful return of the premises. Petitioner received the revocation letter around April 12, 2007, when she returned home from out of state. No explanation was given in the letter for the withdrawal of the offer to lease. Petitioner called Mr. MacFarland on the date she received the revocation letter. She was very distraught and tearful. During the long conversation, the only explanation Respondent recalled from Mr. MacFarland as to why Respondents withdrew their offer was that he did not like her. Petitioner also was told to communicate with their lawyer, Keri Anne Schultz, Esquire. Petitioner went to Ms. Schultz's law office to discuss the situation with her. Ms. Shultz was not in the office. Petitioner was told by the receptionist that she could not wait in the office for Ms. Schultz to return. Ms. Hutcheson wanted to write Ms. Schultz a note regarding renting the duplex. Mr. Bordelon, Ms. Schultz's partner, threatened to call the police if Petitioner remained at the office. Petitioner left the office. Thereafter, the only communication from the MacFarlands or their attorney was legal notices to vacate the premises. Petitioner did attempt to send them information on OCD. The evidence was not clear whether the Respondents received the information or reviewed it. Petitioner refused to vacate the premises and an eviction action was filed in June 2006. A hearing was held in the Circuit Court in June and July of 2006. By court order dated August 17, 2006, Respondents were awarded possession of the property on August 31, 2006, at 11:59 p.m. Unfortunately, Petitioner, due to ill health, did not begin to vacate the premises until a few days prior to forcible removal. She was not finished moving on September 5, 2006, five days after the Respondents were to be put in possession of the property. The Respondents had the Sheriff’s Deputy remove Petitioner from the premises, telling her that she should have been out a long time ago. The MacFarlands, with a little help from Mr. Bouchard, removed the rest of Petitioner’s possessions to the curb. During the removal, the bottom of a box Mr. Bouchard was carrying came undone and some of the contents fell onto the pavement. One jar of food was broken. All of these events were very distressful to Petitioner. Upon learning that she would be evicted, Petitioner began seeing Dr. Bingham in May 2006. Eventually, she was involuntarily committed for a short time and has been seeing Dr. Bingham every two or three weeks for the last year. The apartment remained vacant for several months after the eviction. Eventually, Mr. Bouchard moved into the unit at a lower rate of rent than he paid for his old apartment but higher than the amount Petitioner would have paid if the new lease had taken effect. As indicated, between February 2006 and April 2006, Mr. and Mrs. MacFarland's only contact with Petitioner was a visit to her duplex apartment with the realtor selling the property and some voice mails exchanged between them concerning the sprinkler and air conditioning systems. Respondents had little knowledge regarding Petitioner. Even though the evidence demonstrates that Respondents could have acted more kindly and could have better informed themselves about the circumstances of Petitioner, there was no evidence that the withdrawal of the offer to renew was made based on an intent to discriminate against Petitioner because of her mental disability. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Melissa A. Posey, Esquire Melissa A. Posey, P.A. 201 East Government Street, Suite 36 Pensacola, Florida 32502 Robert and Justyn MacFarland Sand Dune Properties 7173 Blue Jack Drive Navarre, Florida 32566 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
