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RAY MAYO vs DAYCO PRODUCTS, INC., 02-002749 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Jul. 11, 2002 Number: 02-002749 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 2003

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race and/or disability by terminating his employment in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent manufactures rubber hoses for the automotive industry. Petitioner is a black male who began working for Respondent on February 17, 1999. Petitioner's job as a molder required him to work with his hands and arms pinning rubber hoses onto metal pins and removing the hoses from the pins after they cooled down. The job was dangerous and physically stressful to Petitioner's hands and wrists. After working for Respondent for approximately three months, Petitioner suffered a job-related injury. Respondent sent Petitioner to a physician who diagnosed Petitioner as having sprained hand and wrist muscles. The physician prescribed anti-inflammatory medicine for Petitioner and recommended that he return to work on light duty. For the next several months, Petitioner worked as a molder in an area of Respondent's plant that caused less physical stress on the muscles and ligaments in Petitioner's hands and wrists. Petitioner had no problems working in that area. In time, Respondent began to experience a decrease in the number and type of orders that it received from its customers. The change in demand for Respondent's products resulted in a reorganization of the production line, a smaller number of available positions, and in some cases, layoffs of employees. Eventually, Respondent moved Petitioner's work station back to his original position which was physically more stressful. After a couple of months, Petitioner suffered another work-related injury. Respondent told Petitioner that he would have to continue working as assigned because there was no other work or lighter duty available. Petitioner continued to work in the more physically stressful area of Respondent's plant. On one occasion, Respondent took Petitioner to the hospital because he was experiencing pain. Petitioner did not go back to work until he saw a physician who specialized in treating Petitioner's type of injury. Petitioner eventually was diagnosed as having bi- lateral carpel tunnel syndrome. The doctor recommended that Petitioner work on light duty until he could have surgery. Respondent accommodated Petitioner's needs by allowing him to work on light duty pending the proposed surgery. Respondent has a substance abuse policy to maintain a work place that is free from the use of illegal drugs and the use of alcohol. The policy provides for assistance for employees who develop an addiction to drugs or alcohol and who voluntarily seek assistance before the company has knowledge of the problem. If an employee tests positive for illegal drugs or alcohol use while on the job, the employee is subject to immediate termination. Respondent's substance abuse policy provides for drug and alcohol screening under the following circumstances: after any injury that requires outside medical attention; after any incident that results in damage to other associates, company property, or a pattern of personal injuries; upon observance of abnormal or erratic behavior while at work or a significant deterioration in work performance; upon reasonable suspicion due to observable phenomena, direct observation of use, or a report of use by a reliable and credible source; and (e) pursuant to random drug screening. Petitioner never tested positive for illegal drugs or alcohol use while he was working for Respondent. He never even went to work under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol. However, on August 22, 2000, Petitioner voluntarily advised Respondent that that he had a substance abuse problem and that he desired to participate in the assistance referral program. On August 23, 2000, Petitioner met with Respondent's human resource manager and occupational nurse. The nurse reviewed the company's substance abuse policy and assistance referral program with Petitioner. Additionally. the nurse advised Petitioner as follows: (a) he would have to enroll in a treatment program; (b) he would have to provide Respondent with weekly letters from the treatment program, furnishing information about Petitioner's progress in the program; and (c) he would be subject to random drug screens for two years. The human resource manager advised Petitioner that he would be discharged if he failed to comply with and successfully complete the treatment program. Petitioner indicated that he understood Respondent's requirements for participation in the assistance referral program. Petitioner elected to enroll in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program sponsored by Marion Citrus Mental Health. Petitioner missed his first appointment at the treatment center because he lacked transportation. Petitioner eventually began attending the treatment program three nights a week. He continued to work light duty at Respondent's plant during the day. Petitioner did not furnish Respondent with documentation showing that he had enrolled in the substance abuse treatment program. Instead, Petitioner advised Respondent's occupational nurse that he had signed a release at Marion Citrus Mental Health so that she could call his mental health counselor to verify his attendance in the program. Meanwhile, Respondent continued to reorganize and downsize its operations. When there were more employees restricted to light duty than light duty positions available, Respondent assisted the employees in filing workers' compensation claims and allowed them to stay at home on medical leave for up to 12 weeks. In time, Respondent could no longer accommodate Petitioner's physical injury with a light duty position. Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim and began staying at home on medical leave on September 11, 2000. On September 11, 2000, Respondent's occupational nurse called Petitioner's mental health counselor at Marion Citrus Mental Health. The nurse learned that Petitioner had kept an appointment at the mental health facility on September 7, 2000. The nurse also learned that Petitioner had not signed a release of information form that would allow the counselor to share any other information about Petitioner's treatment program. On September 12, 2000, Respondent's occupational nurse sent Petitioner a letter. The purpose of the letter was to remind Petitioner that he was required to furnish Respondent with a written statement from the substance abuse treatment facility each week. According to the letter, the written statement was supposed to include Petitioner's treatment plan schedule. The letter advised Petitioner that to remain employed, he would have to keep Respondent fully informed about his progress in and completion of the treatment program. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner called Respondent's occupational nurse to advise her that he could not keep his appointment at Marion Citrus Mental Health that week. Petitioner advised the nurse that he was taking medication that made him dizzy and that he had transportation problems, which made it difficult for him to attend the treatment program. On September 15, Petitioner went to Respondent's plant to see the occupational nurse. Because he claimed that he had not received the letter dated September 12, 2000, the nurse read the letter to him and gave him a copy of it. Once again the nurse explained Respondent's assistance referral program to Petitioner, advising him that Respondent would not tolerate future missed appointments at Marion Citrus Mental Health. The nurse also gave Petitioner a rapid drug screen, the result of which was negative. On November 15, 2000, Respondent sent Petitioner another letter regarding his failure to furnish Respondent with evidence of his attendance at and completion of a treatment program. The letter advised Petitioner that he had to furnish the information on or before November 27, 2000, or risk having his employment terminated. Petitioner received Respondent's November 15, 2000, letter but did not furnish Respondent with the requested information. Petitioner did not call Respondent to explain his failure to do so. In a letter dated November 27, 2000, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was discharged. Petitioner furnished Respondent with a letter dated December 4, 2000, from Marion Citrus Mental Health. The letter states that Petitioner had been enrolled in substance abuse outpatient counseling beginning August 31, 2000, and that he was progressing well. There is no evidence that Respondent applied its substance abuse policy to non-minority employees differently than it did to Petitioner or other minority employees. Additionally, there is no evidence that Respondent treated non-minority employees who had workers' compensation claims differently than it treated Petitioner or other minority employees who were home on medical leave due to a workers' compensation injury. In fact, Petitioner admitted during the hearing that he had no proof that Respondent discriminated against him based on his race. During the relevant time period, Respondent had approximately 52 employees (half black and half white) that suffered a workers' compensation injury. Employees with workers' compensation injuries were allowed to remain on family medical leave for 12 weeks. Employees who returned to work within the 12-week period were guaranteed a job. Subsequent to the 12-week period, employees with workers' compensation injuries were not officially terminated unless they were unable to return to work after 12 months.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ray Mayo 708 Southwest Second Street Ocala, Florida 34471 Kade Spencer Dayco Products, Inc. 3100 Southeast Maricamp Road Ocala, Florida 34471 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 29 U.S.C 791 Florida Laws (7) 120.569760.01760.10760.11760.20760.22760.37
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PHARMACY vs DAVID J. MOTON, JR., R.P.T., 12-001190PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 03, 2012 Number: 12-001190PL Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2024
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BOARD OF NURSING vs. PAULA KAY SPEARS, 89-003219 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-003219 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 1989

Findings Of Fact Respondent is Paula Kay Spears. She is a licensed registered nurse and holds license number 1435502. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent was employed as a registered nurse at Lakeland Regional Medical Center in Lakeland, Florida. Caren Hicks worked as a unit coordinator in the cardiovascular surgery unit of the hospital where Respondent was also employed as a registered nurse. Hicks and Respondent worked together for approximately five years. In April of 1988, Hicks witnessed Respondent using for the first time what Hicks believed to be a drug commonly called "crank". Hicks also used the substance on that occasion. Hicks purchased the substance from Respondent on only one later occasion; although she and Respondent engaged in joint use of the substance on several subsequent occasions. They ingested the substance by "snorting" it through the nose. Hicks provided crank on some occasions for the joint use of herself and Respondent. The two used the drug while on duty in the cardiovascular unit to which they were assigned. The last occasion of their joint usage of the drug was September 11, 1988. When she nasally inhaled the drug, Hicks observedthat her pulse rate and energy level increased. While she experienced fatigue when the effects of the drug wore off, Hicks never experienced any sense of confusion. She compared the effects of the substance to that of a drug commonly called "speed". Tommy Smith is the head nurse for the cardiovascular unit where Respondent and Hicks were employed in September of 1988. He confronted Respondent with the accusation that she and Hicks had used crank while on duty. Respondent denied the charge. Smith offered Respondent continued employment in her position, provided she submit to drug screening and rehabilitative treatment for drug abuse. Respondent rejected the offer. Subsequently, Respondent's employment with the hospital was terminated. Later, Smith made the same offer to Hicks. Hicks accepted the offer, attended a drug rehabilitation program and is still employed at the hospital. Expert testimony of Martin Zfaz, M.D., establishes that crank is a form of methamphetamine, a central nervous system stimulant which is regulated in accordance with Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, as a controlled substance and a schedule II drug. Crank, over a period of time, can cause confusion in the user's mental acuity. Depression follows use of the drug when its effects wear off. Usage can lead to dependence, with the possibility of resultant acute psychosis. Poor, impaired or confused judgement in the user can result. The substance is highly addictive, with limited medical use. Medical uses for crank include treatment for narcolepsy and hyper- activity in children. The substance is also prescribed as a balance to phenobarbital medication of epileptic patients. Although it depresses appetite, its usage for this purpose has decreased. Use of crank would have a negative effect on a medical nurse's judgement and performance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Nursing finding Respondent in violation of Section 464.018(1)(i) and Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that such Final Order suspend Respondent's license pending Respondent's completion of a drug dependency evaluation and provision by her of a report of that evaluation to the Board and demonstration to the Board that she is capable of safely practicing the profession of nursing. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that such Final Order place Respondent's license on probationary status for a period of three years upon satisfaction of the foregoing requirements for termination of license suspension with specific conditions of such probation to include periodic drug dependency reevaluations and reports as may be determined by the Board and payment of an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-2. Accepted. 3. Weight of the evidence demonstrates that Respondent ingested the drug by "snorting" it. Finding rejected. 4.-14. Accepted 15. Rejected. Not consistent with the weight of the evidence. 16.-17. Rejected, unnecessary to result reached. Respondent's Proposed Findings. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Mon), Esq. Department of Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Paula Kay Spears 1240 Sarasota Avenue Lakeland, FL 33805 Kenneth Easley, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Judie Ritter Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Professional Regulation 504 Daniel Building 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, FL 32201

Florida Laws (2) 120.57464.018
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs STEVEN PATRICK GARTH, R.N., 16-001694PL (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Mar. 24, 2016 Number: 16-001694PL Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs BARBARA J. REUTZEL, RN., 18-002171PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Apr. 30, 2018 Number: 18-002171PL Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2024
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STEPHANIE DECELESTINO vs BOARD OF NURSING, 15-007253 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port St. Lucie, Florida Dec. 18, 2015 Number: 15-007253 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 2016

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner, in response to a question on the application for licensure as a practical nurse, knowingly misrepresented a material fact by denying prior participation in an alcohol recovery program for treatment of alcohol abuse, and, if so, whether Respondent has grounds to deny Petitioner's application.

Findings Of Fact On December 10, 2014, Petitioner Stephanie DeCelestino ("DeCelestino") submitted an Initial Application for Licensure to Respondent Board of Nursing (the "Board"). Because DeCelestino is a licensed practical nurse ("LPN") in another state, she applied for a Florida LPN license by endorsement (a process which allows an applicant to avoid sitting for another examination). The Board is responsible for reviewing such applications and determining which should be certified for licensure to the Department of Health ("Department"), and which denied. Under the heading "Criminal History," the application which DeCelestino completed asked a single question: "Have you EVER been convicted of, or entered a plea of guilty, nolo contendre, or no contest to, a crime in any jurisdiction other than a minor traffic offense?" DeCelestino answered, "NO." Under the heading "Health History," the application which DeCelestino completed contained five questions, as follows: In the last five years, have you been enrolled in, required to enter into, or participated in any drug or alcohol recovery program or impaired practitioner program for treatment of drug or alcohol abuse that occurred within the past five years? In the last five years, have you been admitted or referred to a hospital, facility or impaired practitioner program for treatment of a diagnosed mental disorder or impairment? During the last five years, have you been treated for or had a recurrence of a diagnosed mental disorder that has impaired your ability to practice nursing within the past five years? In the last five years, were you admitted or directed into a program for the treatment of a diagnosed substance- related (alcohol/drug) disorder or, if you were previously in such a program, did you suffer a relapse in the last five years? During the last five years, have you been treated for or had a recurrence of a diagnosed substance-related (alcohol/drug) that has impaired your ability to practice nursing within the past five years? DeCelestino answered "NO" to all five questions. The Department orders a criminal background check on all applicants. The results for DeCelestino suggested that she had an undisclosed criminal history. Accordingly, by letter dated December 23, 2014, the Department notified DeCelestino that her application might contain false information and invited her to "modify [her] response to the criminal history question" and provide "a typed self explanation of each charge" together with "all available court dispositions" among other items. DeCelestino complied. By letter dated February 7, 2015, DeCelestino informed the Department (as she would later testify credibly at hearing) that she had been arrested in Tennessee on February 14, 2014, for committing a crime after "consuming large amounts of alcohol." For this offense, DeCelestino had been sentenced, on April 22, 2014, to six months' probation on the conditions that she "continue counseling" and have no contact with the victim. The mandatory "counseling" consisted of attending Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") meetings, which DeCelestino did from April to September 2014. Later, DeCelestino voluntarily received group counseling through ADAP Counseling Services ("ADAP") in Florida, which she completed on November 9, 2014. DeCelestino disclosed these facts to the Department in her February 7, 2015, correspondence, writing: "I attended AA meetings and a strict counseling group here in Florida called Adap." Together with her letter, DeCelestino furnished the Department with a copy of the Order for the Expungement of Criminal Offender Record dated November 20, 2014, by which the Tennessee court having jurisdiction over her criminal offense had dismissed the charge and ordered "that all PUBLIC RECORDS relating to such offense . . . be expunged and immediately destroyed." She also submitted an Application Update on which she switched her answer to "Yes" in response to the criminal history question. The Board accepted DeCelestino's explanation of the criminal charge and does not currently allege that she knowingly misrepresented a material fact by denying the arrest in Tennessee, given that the record thereof had been expunged. On June 30, 2015, however, the Board executed a Notice of Intent to Deny DeCelestino's application for certification as a practical nurse by endorsement, relying upon other grounds in support of such proposed action. In the notice, the Board alleged: As part of a pretrial intervention agreement, the applicant was required to attend substance abuse counseling sessions. The applicant was discharged from the sessions on or about November 9, 2014. The Board accused DeCelestino of having attempted to obtain a license by bribery, misrepresentation, or deceit when she denied, in response to the first health history question on the application, having participated in an alcohol recovery program for treatment of alcohol abuse that occurred within the past five years. The Board's factual allegations are not entirely accurate. The counseling provided by ADAP, which DeCelestino completed on November 9, 2014, was not court ordered, but rather involved services that DeCelestino sought on her own. There is no evidence in the record persuasively establishing that these services were provided as part of a "drug or alcohol recovery program" for the purpose of treating "drug or alcohol abuse."1/ Perhaps more important, there is no persuasive evidence supporting a finding that DeCelestino knew that the ADAP counseling services met these criteria, even assuming that they did, which to repeat was not proven. The undersigned accepts as credible DeCelestino's testimony that she did not interpret the health history question as an inquiry about such counseling as she received at ADAP. As for her court ordered attendance at AA meetings, which DeCelestino was "required to enter into," the undersigned accepts as credible her testimony that she did not consider AA to be an "alcohol recovery program . . . for treatment of drug or alcohol abuse." There is, to explain, no evidence in the record establishing the nature of AA meetings, and, although the undersigned has a general idea of what AA does given that it is a well-known organization with which most adults in the U.S. have at least a passing familiarity through common experience and exposure to the popular culture, it is not clear to the undersigned that AA constitutes an "alcohol recovery program" within the meaning of the health history question.2/ Because the question does not unambiguously inquire about AA, DeCelestino's conclusion that nondisclosure of her attendance at AA meetings was permissible is arguably correct and at worst an honest mistake. Based on DeCelestino's credible testimony, which the undersigned credits, it is found that DeCelestino had no intention of deceiving the Board in hopes her attendance at AA meetings or ADAP counseling sessions would not be discovered. She readily disclosed this information when asked for an explanation of her criminal background, even though no issue had been raised concerning her response to the health history question. Had she intended to conceal her participation in an "alcohol recovery program," DeCelestino surely would not have mentioned AA or ADAP in her February 7, 2015, letter to the Department because she could have responded truthfully to the inquiry about her criminal charge without doing so. The order sentencing her to probation, recall, required her to "continue counseling" but said nothing about attending an "alcohol recovery program." The fact that she volunteered the information while making no attempt to update her application to conform thereto persuasively corroborates her testimony that she did not understand the health history question to be asking about AA meetings or ADAP counseling. Determinations of Ultimate Fact DeCelestino is not guilty of attempting to procure an LPN license by knowing misrepresentations, which is a disciplinable offense and grounds for denial of licensure under section 464.018(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order approving DeCelestino's application for licensure by endorsement as a practical nurse unless it determines that she might be impaired as a result of alcohol abuse, in which case a referral should be made pursuant to section 456.076(3) with further proceedings to follow in accordance therewith. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2016.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.60120.68456.072456.076464.018
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ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs PATRICIA GADSON, 98-002713 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jun. 12, 1998 Number: 98-002713 Latest Update: Apr. 02, 1999

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Board's termination of Respondent's employment should be upheld.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Patricia Gadson, age 51, was employed as a department secretary by Petitioner, the Escambia County School Board. She worked for the School Board of Escambia County from April 12, 1968, through January 27, 1998.1 She was employed by the Board for twenty-nine years and nine months. Throughout this period of time, Ms. Gadson worked as a school or administrative secretary at various locations throughout the school system. Prior to 1994, Ms. Gadson was a successful employee who received good evaluations of her work. However, sometime prior to January, 1994, several departments were consolidated as a result of downsizing. Ms. Gadson was assigned as the sole administrative secretary for six departments working for four different supervisors. Ms. Gadson found her new job very stressful. The stress resulted in her missing work frequently due to illness and medical treatment. After being examined by her own and the School Board's psychiatrists, Ms. Gadson was diagnosed with depression and took a six-week leave of absence to recuperate. She was not involved with drugs at this time. However, sometime in 1996, approximately two years before her discharge in 1998, Ms. Gadson was introduced to crack cocaine by her sister. She did not refuse the drug and eventually became addicted. She used the drug with full knowledge of the Board's drug-free workplace policy and its policy of zero tolerance for such use. As a result of her addiction, Ms. Gadson's life spiraled downward. She had increased absences from work and deteriorating job performance. In fact, her supervisors had already decided to terminate her for her poor performance. However, her supervisors recognized that she was exhibiting the symptoms of someone suffering from substance abuse and instructed her to take a drug test on November 3, 1997. Ms. Gadson fully cooperated in taking the test. On the way home, Ms. Gadson volunteered to Dr. Larry Reed, one of her supervisors, that the test would be positive. The test came back positive for crack cocaine since Ms. Gadson had last smoked crack on November 2, 1997, the day before her drug test. As a result she was terminated on January 27, 1998, retroactive to December 5, 1997, for violation of the School Board's drug-free workplace policy and for having tested positive for an illegal drug. Ms. Gadson has not smoked crack since November 2, 1997. With the assistance of Dr. Reed, her supervisor, Ms. Gadson was admitted to an out-patient rehabilitation program at the Pavilion Chemical Dependency Hospitalization Program on November 12, 1997. She was discharged from that program on November 26, 1997. She continued the recommended program of treatment in the Aftercare Program until approximately February 1998. She stopped attending the aftercare program in order to care for her grandmother who is an invalid. Ms. Gadson is willing to voluntarily undergo regular drug testing in order to demonstrate her continued abstinence should she be reinstated. The School Board maintains and strictly follows a "zero tolerance" policy for use of illegal drugs. When an employee or student is found to have used illegal drugs, they are automatically terminated or expelled after exhaustion of any due process procedures available irrespective of any mitigating factors. The discipline which would be imposed on an employee for violation of the Board's drug policy was set forth in a memo from the superintendent. The memo was given to all employees, including Ms. Gadson. Additionally, the drug policy was made part of an employee's contract. This policy was applied to Ms. Gadson in this case. The School Board has not adopted the disciplinary part of the drug policy as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1997). However, the Board has adopted a disciplinary rule and has incorporated that rule in the contract it has with the union. The zero tolerance policy is generally applicable to all employees and, as stated in the School Board's answer, it implements the School Board's drug-free workplace policy, authorized under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and School Board Rule 6Gx17-2-62. The severity of the discipline is meant to emphasize the serious nature of drug use in relation to education, the students and the school, and its employees must set an example. Indeed, the very intent of the zero tolerance rule is to announce to all concerned that the sole penalty for illegal drug use is termination. Illegal drug use in a school setting is a serious misconduct warranting termination. The Board's "policy" of termination for illegal drug use by an employer falls within the disciplinary rule of the Board. Therefore the School Board's zero tolerance drug use policy is already implemented by Board rule. The rule adequately defines the discipline imposed for employee misconduct and need not define specific instances which warrant termination of any other type of discipline. Respondent's use of cocaine violated the Board's policy and her employment contract. The District has consistently terminated employees found in possession of or using controlled substances with or without evidence of prior disciplinary problems. No exceptions have ever been allowed with one exception related to arbitration. Violation of the Board's drug-free workplace program constitutes cause for termination. Additionally, even without the Board's zero tolerance policy, the use of crack cocaine over an extended period of time by a school employee which causes the employee's performance to fall below acceptable levels constitutes cause for termination. Therefore, superintendent's recommendation for termination of Respondent should be upheld.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Respondent, Escambia County School Board, terminating the employment of Patricia Gadson. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1999.

Florida Laws (9) 112.0455120.52120.54120.57163.01186.50420.04440.101440.102
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