Findings Of Fact Based on the undisputed facts included in pleadings filed in this proceeding and on the documentary evidence attached to the Association's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the following findings of fact are made: On or about April 16, 1999, Ms. Thornhill filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in which she accused the Association of housing discrimination on the basis of handicap and coercion. The complaint was apparently based on the Association's attempts to make Ms. Thornhill remove a set of steps leading from the terrace of her apartment. In June 1999, the Association filed a civil lawsuit against Ms. Thornhill in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, styled Admiral Farragut Condominium Association v. Maria Thornhill, Case No. 99-15567 CA 22. On or about September 21, 1999, Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, filed Defendant, Maria Thornhill's Answer to Complaint. Included in the answer was a Counterclaim filed by Ms. Thornhill, through her attorney, against the Association, in which she sought injunctive relief and damages against the Association pursuant to Section 760.35(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. 1/ She asserted in the Counterclaim that she had filed a discrimination complaint against the Association with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which had been referred to the Commission and that this complaint was still pending before the Commission. Ms. Thornhill alleged in the Counterclaim that the Association had engaged in housing discrimination against her on the basis of her handicap because it had refused to accommodate her disability by giving her permission to retain the steps she had installed leading from the terrace of her apartment. Ms. Thornhill also alleged that the Association had "authorized or acquiesced in a series of actions intended as harassment and retribution" against Ms. Thornhill for having filed a housing discrimination complaint. The factual and legal bases on which Ms. Thornhill requests relief in the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission and in the Counterclaim filed in circuit court are virtually identical.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint filed by Maria T. Thornhill to enforce rights granted by the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.30 through 760.37, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of housing discrimination against Respondent based on her race and disabilities, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is African-American, although the record fails to disclose any physical or mental disability. Due to her pending eviction at an apartment complex known as the Tennis Club in Fort Lauderdale, Petitioner visited the Venice Cove apartment complex, also in Fort Lauderdale, in the summer of 2002. Deciding that she liked Venice Cove, Petitioner applied for a one bedroom apartment on September 16, 2002. In accordance with its customary practice, Respondent obtained a credit report and learned that Petitioner owed a utility payment, possibly a cable television box. Respondent advised Petitioner that she would have to satisfy this debt to rent an apartment, and Petitioner did so. At some point, Petitioner decided that she wanted a two bedroom/two bathroom apartment, and Respondent tentatively assigned her a unit of this type, pending final approval of her application to lease. Petitioner changed her preferences for type of apartment several times. Respondent was able to accommodate immediately all but one of these preferences. In early December, Petitioner mentioned to Respondent's representative that she was being evicted from the Tennis Club. This is the first time that Petitioner disclosed any eviction to Respondent. Examining the file, Respondent's representative realized that she had failed to order the more thorough credit report that Respondent had been using since November 2002. This report would reveal evictions, among other things. Respondent's representative ordered the more thorough credit report, which revealed that Respondent had been evicted three times. Respondent's policy precluded renting to a person with this rental history, and Respondent's representative promptly informed Petitioner that she was denying Petitioner's application. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent denied Petitioner's application on the basis of Petitioner's race or any disability from which she may suffer.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Elvira Williams 1515 Northwest 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Kristine A. Sawyers Law Offices of Lowenhaupt & Sawyers 7765 Southwest 87th Avenue Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33173
The Issue Whether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020) (FFHA), was timely filed.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2020 versions.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above. The Lease Petitioner, Ross Couples, leased a house located at 11635 Meadowrun Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property), from Respondent Xuan Ren. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed the Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA) and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease arrangements. On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner executed a year lease for the Property from January 15, 2018, to January 15, 2019. The lease included the following provision for its renewal: 18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. … A new lease is required for each period of lease. At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner another lease agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another 12-month lease, nor did Petitioner move out. As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month-to- month arrangement.4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the HOA. On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager and Respondent Cloud. In that email, Petitioner made numerous complaints and mentioned the need for a larger hot water heater for his hydrotherapy tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a new lease. On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the current leasing arrangement had 4 No written lease agreement for the month-to-month arrangement was offered into evidence. been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before May 15, 2019. Petitioner did not move out of the Property on or before May 15, 2019. On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action against Petitioner in the appropriate court. A final judgment in the eviction action was rendered on June 6, 2019, and a writ of possession was issued for the Property on June 7, 2019. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019. Housing Complaints Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents. On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner, and specifically finding "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. … No evidence was found to support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict him." The HUD Letter does not indicate Petitioner could re-open the HUD case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. It does not mention the FFHA or FCHR, and it does not provide any instruction or information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing discrimination laws.5 Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jordan, told him he had a year from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork." 5 The HUD Letter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint. This proceeding does not involve either of those situations. Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission.6 It is unclear when this conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan's role was at HUD, and whether the discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is hearsay and not corroborated by any non-hearsay evidence or documentation. There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of possession of the Property to file an FFHA discrimination complaint with FCHR. The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing Commission" on June 10, 2020, regarding his FFHA claim. He admits he did not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rather, at that time, he spoke with an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out and returned. There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in his Response that he filed the Complaint with FCHR on June 10, 2021. Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint is dated July 22, 2020, and indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the Complaint on July 21, 2020. Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020. Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified the Complaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020. 6 The undersigned is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See § 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “Commission” to mean the Florida Commission on Human Relations).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2021. Ross Joseph Couples Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Teuber Law, PLLC Post Office Box 49885 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Timothy Cloud D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Mahshie & DeCosta 1560 Matthew Drive, Suite E Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Suite 202-200 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Xuan Ren D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Paul Edward Olah, Esquire Law Offices of Wells Olah, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 808 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, within the meaning of and in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2005), by requiring Petitioners to submit a second application for the approval of a condominium purchase.
Findings Of Fact It is undisputed that Petitioner, Allan Kangas, has no handicap and is not a disabled person. At the conclusion of Petitioners' case-in-chief, Mr. Kangas testified that he has no handicap. The undersigned, sua sponte, entered an ore tenus order on the record dismissing the case brought by Mr. Kangas. Petitioner, Anna Kangas, is an elderly female and the mother of Mr. Allan Kangas and Mr. Sheldon Kangas, the latter being the representative in this proceeding for the named Petitioners. It is undisputed that Mr. Sheldon Kangas is not handicapped, but that Mrs. Kangas is handicapped, within the meaning of Section 760.22(7), Florida Statutes (2005), because of Alzheimer's disease. Respondent is a condominium association lawfully incorporated as a Florida corporation (Association). Respondent must operate in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, and Declaration of Condominium (condominium documents). The condominium documents require the Association to approve each purchase of a condominium. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Sheldon Kangas and Mrs. Anna Kangas contracted with Ms. Mary Cox to purchase condominium unit 15, located at 23 Hatchett Creek Road. Ms. Cox is a real estate agent and a co-owner of unit 15. Ms. Cox notified Ms. Pat Williamson, Association Secretary, of the prospective purchase. For the reasons stated herein, Respondent did not discriminate against the prospective purchasers, but approved the purchase of condominium unit 18 in a timely manner after the purchasers changed their purchase contract from unit 15 to unit 18. The prospective purchasers completed an application for approval of the purchase of unit 15 sometime between December 8 and 10, 2005. The Association conducted a meeting to approve the proposed purchase on December 10, 2005. During the meeting on December 10, 2005, the purchasers informed the Association that they wished to purchase unit 18, located at 29 Hatchett Creek Road, rather than unit 15. Unit 18 was owned by Mr. Brian Isaac. Ms. Cox did not object to releasing the purchasers from the contract for the purchase of unit 15. The Association informed the purchasers that a new application for unit 18 would be required. The purchasers completed a new application under protest. At a meeting conducted on January 3, 2006, the Association approved the application for the purchase of unit 18. The purchase of unit 18 closed on January 25, 2006. The purchasers seek reimbursement of living expenses incurred for hotel rooms and meals during the delay caused by the requirement for a second application. The purchasers are not entitled to reimbursement. The purchase of unit 18 was the first time the Association had required a second application. However, it was also the first time a purchaser had changed his or her choice of units after submitting an application. The Association did not discriminate against Mrs. Kangas because of her handicap. The record evidence contains no justifiable issue of law or fact to support the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David G. Muller, Esquire Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. 630 South Orange Avenue, Third Floor Sarasota, Florida 34236 Shelden Kangas Allan Kangas 4578 Manor Drive Sarasota, Florida 34233
The Issue Whether Respondent, Lake Bentley Shores, Inc. (Respondent), engaged in unlawful housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female who, at all times material to the allegations of this case, resided in a first floor condominium, Unit A-3, in Lake Bentley Shores. The legal owner of Unit A-3, Lake Bentley Shores, is Jose Anglada (Mr. Anglada). Mr. Anglada employed CDC Properties of Central Florida, LLC (CDC), to manage his unit. CDC was responsible for the day- to-day management of the unit and collected rent payments due to the unit owner. In contrast, A1A Property Management (A1A) was the on-site property manager for the Lake Bentley Shores condominium community. The Lake Bentley Shores condominium community was governed by Respondent, a condominium association organized under the laws of Florida. In addition to retaining a management firm to address the daily workings of the condominium property, Respondent also retained U. S. Security Associates, Inc. to provide night-time security services for the condominium community. The security company reported to A1A daily regarding security issues. At all times material to the allegations of this case, U. S. Security Associates, Inc. employed Mr. Goodkind and assigned him to the Lake Bentley Shores condominium property. Mr. Goodkind was not Respondent’s employee. Mr. Goodkind was not A1A’s employee. Mr. Goodkind was not CDC’s employee. All leasing arrangements between Petitioner and the Unit A-3 owner were handled by CDC. Any complaints regarding the unit were to be made to CDC. Petitioner never filed a written complaint to Respondent regarding the offensive or inappropriate behavior toward her committed by Mr. Goodkind. On January 10, 2012, Petitioner made a verbal complaint to Steve Allen, A1A’s on-site manager, regarding Mr. Goodkind’s alleged sexual harassment toward Petitioner. Mr. Allen took action to notify U. S. Security Associates, Inc. Mr. Goodkind was immediately removed from the Lake Bentley Shores assignment. Thereafter, Petitioner made no written or verbal complaints regarding sexual harassment to Respondent, A1A, or CDC. Lake Bentley Shores comprises of 160 condominium units. Some of the units, like Unit A-3, share a wall with a utility/storage closet. Such closets house water heaters. Water heaters must be inspected regularly to assure no leakage. Historically, leaking water heaters were a maintenance issue at the condominium property. Although Respondent has rules and regulations regarding resident conduct on the Lake Bentley Shores property, it delegates the routine operation of the condominium property to A1A. At all times material to the allegations of this case, A1A directed U. S. Security Associates, Inc. (through its night-time security employee) to assure noise levels during the night-time hours were appropriate, to regularly “walk” the Lake Bentley Shores property to assure the safety of residents, and to observe and report any suspicious activity. Included in the areas to “walk” were the utility/storage closets previously described. Thus, it was common for Mr. Goodkind to enter the closets, walk around the buildings, observe the parking areas, and to listen for noises to assure the tranquility of the property. Excessive noise from any unit was not acceptable. Prior to the allegations of this case, Mr. Goodkind worked as a security guard at the Lake Bentley Shores property for approximately four years. During that time he established himself as a conscientious enforcer of the noise regulations, he kept a log of vehicles entering and exiting the property, and made efforts to reduce vandalism or theft. Mr. Goodkind did not sexually harass Petitioner. At no time did Mr. Goodkind peer into Petitioner’s windows, peep through any hole, or follow Petitioner except in the manner appropriate for the performance of his routine duties as a security officer. Mr. Goodkind did, however, confront a resident or guest of Unit A-3 to seek reduction in the noise level emanating from the unit. CDC initiated eviction proceedings against Petitioner due to failure to pay rent and damage to Unit A-3. Respondent had no involvement in the eviction. A1A had no involvement with or connection to the eviction other than a report made to CDC that gave notice of a broken window visible from the exterior of the unit. Petitioner eventually moved out of Unit A-3 after reaching an agreement with CDC. Petitioner presented no credible evidence that Mr. Goodkind harassed her in any manner. Mr. Goodkind did not interfere with Petitioner’s enjoyment of her residence. Petitioner presented no credible evidence that Respondent harassed her in any manner or suffered any damages as a result of such alleged behavior. Respondent did not interfere with Petitioner’s enjoyment of her residence. Petitioner presented no credible evidence that A1A as Respondent’s agent harassed her in any manner. A1A did not interfere with Petitioner’s enjoyment of her residence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful housing practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing her complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard L. Bradford, Esquire Bradford and Bradford, P.A. Suite 196 150 East Bloomingdale Avenue Brandon, Florida 33511 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William E. Roberts, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. One Lake Morton Drive Post Office Box 3 Lakeland, Florida 33802 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Miller, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. One Lake Morton Drive Post Office Box 3 Lakeland, Florida 33802
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Christina Viering, discriminated against Petitioner, Bahiyyih Watson, on the basis of Watson's race and/or religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bahiyyih Watson ("Watson") is a light-skinned Black American3/ female. Watson is an adjunct professor at Valencia Community College, where she teaches cultural anthropology. Watson holds a Ph.D. in anthropology. Watson practices the religion known as Yoruba, which has a tradition of Orishas and places a great emphasis on ancestors. The religion emphasizes African traditions and a respect for elders as well. At all times relevant hereto, Watson was residing in a house at 1830 Dover Road, Winter Park, Florida (the "House"). The House is owned by Respondent, Christina Viering ("Viering"). The House is a three-bedroom house in a residential neighborhood. It has a dining room, living room, kitchen and sun room, each of which was considered a common area for all residents. On August 2, 2008, Watson and Viering entered into a legal document erroneously entitled, "Assignment of Lease" (hereinafter the "Lease"), which called for Viering to rent a room in the House. The Lease has a term of six months, i.e., from August 30, 2008, until February 28, 2009. Viering identified the Lease as a month-to-month lease, but there is no language in the Lease to confirm that description. There is a document attached to the Lease entitled, "Tenant Policies," setting forth various issues relating to the Lease. The attachment contains a provision which states: "MONTH TO MONTH LEASE TERMINATING WITH PROPER NOTICE. WHEN TERMINATING YOUR LEASE, A 30 DAY WRITTEN NOTICE IS REQUIRED." The provision does not explain how it would be interpreted in contravention of the plain language of the Lease. There is nothing in the Lease specifying a particular room for Watson, but the parties testified that Watson occupied the bedroom with a bath, presumably the master suite. The Lease did not identify a specific room for Viering. Viering testified that she resided at the House during the term of the Lease between her and Watson, but did not sleep there every night. Watson said Viering never slept at the House while she, Watson, was there. One neighbor who lived across the street said she believed Viering lived at the House during the time Watson lived there. Another neighbor said she never saw Viering's car at the House overnight and only rarely during the day. The greater weight of the evidence suggests that Viering was at the House only sporadically and probably did not reside there as a residence. At the time Watson signed the Lease, she was working as an adjunct professor at Valencia Community College. She was in the process of submitting an application, including extensive paperwork, to become a tenured professor at the University of South Florida. The application process was intense and required considerable concentration and attention to detail to complete. The application was the most important matter in Watson's life at that time. One of her reasons for selecting the House as a residence was because it was on a quiet street and appeared to be a place where she could work without major distractions. Viering was made aware of this situation. On or about March 17, 2008, another resident, Abbey Nichols, moved into one of the other bedrooms in the House. On October 17, 2008, yet another resident, Kristen Bryan, moved into the third bedroom. Both of the two new tenants were young (twenty-ish) Caucasian women who were of the Christian faith. Each of the new tenants entered into an agreement identical to the Lease, but with different dates of residency. The two new tenants were not inclined to help Watson clean or maintain the House. Viering testified that she slept overnight at the House only two or three times a month. When she slept there, she slept in the Florida room at the rear of the House. The washer and dryer were located in the Florida Room. Again, Watson does not remember Viering ever staying overnight at the House, taking her meals there, or otherwise treating it as her place of residence. Landlord-Tenant Disputes Almost immediately upon Watson taking residence in the House, she and Viering began to have disputes about various and sundry issues. For example: Watson complained that Viering was moving her personal belongings around; Viering said she only moved items off the kitchen table so that she could wash the tablecloth. Watson said that Viering had thrown away some of Watson's kitchenware; Viering said she threw away a styrofoam cup when she was cleaning the kitchen. The disputes soon escalated. On September 17, 2008, less than one month into the six-month lease, Viering sent Watson a notice to vacate the premises within 30 days. The parties must have worked out an agreement, however, because Watson remained in the House after the proffered termination date. The relationship between Viering and Watson, however, did not improve. They continued to disagree about things and communication between the two seemed quite strained. On or about November 8, 2008, Viering went to the House to check on a leak which had been reported. A neighbor from across the street, Ms. Wilson, accompanied her as she looked around the House. Viering testified under oath that while doing the inspection, she noticed mail in Watson's room that appeared to belong to Viering. When she inspected the mail and determined that it belonged to her, Viering was concerned about possible identity theft. Viering then went to the local post office and requested an address change so that her mail would not go to the House. Wilson remembers the event somewhat differently: She says that Viering said she (Viering) believed Watson had some of her mail and wanted to go into the room to check. Watson saw Viering take some mail that she claimed belonged to her, but Watson never personally identified the names on the letters. Watson denies ever having mail that belonged to Viering. The only certain fact concerning this situation was that Viering did go into Watson's room and retrieved some mail. It is not certain who the mail belonged to or whether Viering identified the mail as hers before going into Watson's room. Plumbing Problems Two days later, one of the tenants reported to Viering that the plumbing at the House was stopped up. Viering told the tenants that it was their responsibility to call a plumber and get the stoppage cleared up. She took this stance because, some ten years prior, some of Viering's tenants had flushed items down the toilet, causing a back-up in the plumbing. Viering believed her current tenants had done the same. One of the young tenant's fathers then called Viering and suggested that the plumbing problem could be caused by roots growing into the pipes, and, if so, then the problem would be the landlord's responsibility. Viering agreed then to call the plumber herself. Jamaal Crooks, a plumber working for Bryan Plumbing, came to the House on November 14, 2008, to work on the problem. He went into the House, but only into the hallway bathroom. He did not enter Watson's room or the bathroom in her room. Crooks then went outside and used a cable to reach inside the main sewer line. He pulled three tampons out of the line, thus, clearing the blockage. Crooks could not say if there were more tampons in the line at that time, but the ones he removed were sufficient to allow the sewage to flow. Crooks apparently gave Viering a bill for his services at that time. The amount on the bill was $178.00. Viering demanded that Watson pay the bill or that she at least pay her one-third share. Viering did not believe she should share in the cost, because she was not staying at the House on a permanent basis. That testimony contradicts her statements that she was at the House regularly and that it was her residence at that time. Watson refused to pay the bill, because she did not feel responsible for the stoppage. Some six days later, Bryan Plumbing issued another invoice in the amount of $178.00. The invoice included a note that said, "Tenant refused to pay bill. Christina was present the whole time." It is unclear from the testimony why this invoice was issued if a bill had been presented on the day of service. Viering ultimately paid the plumbing bill and asked each of her tenants to pay a portion of it. Watson said the plumbing worked for only four or five hours after Crooks left the premises. Viering says the plumbing was working for up to a week. It is clear the plumbing problem was not totally resolved. When a tenant would attempt to shower or flush the toilet, sewage would back up into the bathtub and shower stall. The tenants were afraid to drink water from the faucet because they did not know if it was contaminated or not. As will be discussed below, the two Caucasian tenants left the House soon after the November 14, 2008, plumbing issue. Watson, who could not afford to move and had no friends or family with space to accommodate her, remained at the House. There was no working toilet, so Watson had to find other means of performing daily hygiene. She would bathe as well as possible at local stores or gas stations. She would drive to stores to use their restrooms. At night when the stores were closed, she would reluctantly go into the backyard and dig a hole to use as a latrine. By that time she was becoming physically ill from all the stress. When she needed to vomit, she would have to use the hole in the ground for that purpose as well. Watson endured this situation for almost three weeks before finally finding another place to live. On December 19, 2008, a little over a month after the initial plumbing problem, Crooks came back to the House to fix the plumbing again. By that time, all three tenants, including Watson, had already moved out of the House. Although Crooks had no independent recollection of being at the House on that date, he identified a written statement he had made on that date saying he had "found more tampons in line [sic]." Crooks could not say if the tampons were left over from the prior visit, but inasmuch as the plumbing was not working in the interim, that is probable. Notices to Vacate On November 12, 2008, just two days after receiving her initial notice about the plumbing problem, Viering gave all three tenants a Lease Violation Warning setting forth certain alleged violations and giving the tenants three days to come into compliance. Two days later, on the day the plumbing was initially fixed, Viering gave each tenant a 30-day notice to vacate the premises. The basis for the notices, as set forth in another letter from Viering to the tenants, was that a police officer had advised her that she should evict the three tenants. Viering said that action was "radical" and that she opted for a 30-day notice of termination of the Leases instead. On the same day she gave the tenants the 30-day notice, she gave each of them a seven-day notice which specified lease violations. The notice to Bryan set forth the following violations: Failure to maintain plumbing Failure to pay share of utilities and repairs Unauthorized guests on property Unauthorized overnight guests Harassment by unauthorized guests Disturbing the peace Failure to maintain sanitary conditions The notice to Nichols set forth very similar violations, to wit: Failure to maintain premises in a sanitary manner Negligent use of plumbing Failure to pay plumbing repair Unauthorized guests on the property Unauthorized overnight guests on the property Destruction of property belonging to the landlord or permitting another person do so The notice given to Watson contained the following alleged violations: Failure to maintain plumbing Failure to comply with payments due [sic] Share of utilities to be paid Share of repair to plumbing Disposal of garbage in sanitary manner Maintaining the premises in sanitary condition Unauthorized overnight guests on a regular basis Harassment to me by yourself and guests On the same date that Viering gave the tenants their seven-day notices and 30-day termination notices, she gave Watson two additional letters: One was a letter advising Watson that her security deposit amount was being increased by an additional $100.00; the second was a demand to have Viering's dresser (which Watson was using) ready to be picked up on the upcoming weekend. Religious Controversy The rash of notices on November 14, 2008, indicates some irrationality on Viering's part. It also indicates that the landlord-client relationship was not working effectively. On that same day, Watson called the police to report Viering for harassment. While waiting for the police, Watson went into the backyard to avoid contact with Viering. Viering, however, came into the backyard and confronted Watson. Watson remembers Viering coming toward her with something in her hand, raised above her head. Viering was chanting some incantations and acting bizarre. Viering remembers only that she wanted to talk to Watson and was going to use her cell phone to videotape Watson as she talked. As she approached Watson, she recited the Lord's Prayer to cover herself with God's protection.4/ On November 15, 2008, one day after the aforementioned notices, Viering posted a Notice of Non-Renewal at the House, advising Nichols that her lease would not be renewed and that Nichols must vacate the premises no later than December 1, 2008. On that same day, Viering cut out cross-shaped designs from some magazines and posted them around the House. Viering did so as a part of her Christian religious beliefs, thinking there was "evil" in the House and hoping to eradicate it. When Watson took the crosses down because she considered them offensive, Viering made replacement crosses. Watson says Viering used paper from Watson's room to make the crosses; Viering says she used liner paper from her dresser and a Home Depot catalogue. The crosses were placed on various windows around the House. Watson states that she sent Viering a letter complaining that the crosses were traumatizing to her as a black woman. Viering does not remember any complaint from Watson about the crosses. Watson's written missive to Viering on this subject could not be produced. Watson says she also left voice messages on Viering's telephone. Viering said that she does not remember any such message, but since Watson sent her so many text and emails that were harassing in nature, Viering would frequently delete messages before reading them. The following day, Sunday, November 16, 2008, Viering returned to the House and put up wooden crosses in the front flower beds. She also painted black crosses on each slat of the privacy fence behind the House and on some windows in the House. The crosses were accompanied by messages such as, "The pure white light of Christ" and other inspirational sayings from Viering's Christian literature. The black crosses were crudely painted using a paper towel because Viering could not find a paint brush. Watson arrived home after dark and found the large cross in the front yard and the crosses painted on all the windows, which frightened her, so she asked a male neighbor to accompany her into the House to make sure no one was there. Inside the House, there were numerous crosses painted on windows and doors. All of this made Watson extremely frightened, so she called the police. She was told that unless the crosses were on fire, they could not investigate. Additional Disputes On November 17, 2008, Viering provided additional notices to the tenants: Watson was advised that her bedroom would be inspected, that she should return all items that were not her property, and that she should remove her property from the common areas of the House. Bryan received yet another Notice of Termination, effective immediately. Both Bryan and Nichols moved out of the House shortly thereafter. At some point, Watson remembers receiving a written notice telling her to vacate within seven days. The reason for the notice was that Viering had gotten into a confrontation with a black woman outside the House and presumed that the woman was Watson's friend. In fact, the woman was the mother of one of Bryan's friends.5/ Viering had borrowed a bicycle off the front porch of the House. The bike belonged to a young man who was visiting Bryan, and he thought someone had stolen the bike. The young man's mother accosted Viering for taking the bike without asking. That altercation appears to have been the genesis of the notice to Watson. On November 19, 2008, Watson contacted the Seminole County Sheriff's Office and filed a complaint against Viering. The complaint was for harassment and violation of landlord- tenant laws. Watson also contacted every state agency she could think of to seek some sort of redress from the conditions she was living in. She called, by her account, the Public Works department, the Utilities Commission, Health and Safety, and Sanitation, to name a few. None of the agencies acknowledged jurisdiction over the matter. On December 9, 2008, Viering received a letter from a local television station stating that a consumer had filed a complaint alleging denial of basic services by Viering. Thereafter, the television station broadcasted a consumer human-interest story concerning Watson's plight. At some point in time, Watson filed a Petition for Temporary Injunction against Viering, claiming some sort of violence by Viering. The Injunction proceeding was dismissed on January 6, 2009, when Watson failed to appear at the court hearing on the matter. By that date, Watson was no longer residing at the House. On or about November 30, 2008, Watson had vacated the House, ending the relationship between herself and Viering. Watson alleges discrimination based on her race due to the fact that she received more notices than the other (Caucasian) tenants from Viering. However, Watson was the longest serving tenant and had the most interaction with Viering, so there is no way to establish discrimination based solely on the number of notices. Watson alleges religious discrimination based on the bizarre behavior of Viering, such as placing crosses and religious sayings around the House, chanting the Lord's Prayer or other incantations, and referencing evil in the House. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Viering was aware of Watson's religion, Yoruba. Although Viering was in Watson's room on occasion and must have seen Watson's shrines, there is no evidence that Viering was aware of what the shrines stood for. Watson claims discrimination based on the fact that Viering was less tolerant of her than of the white, Christian tenants. The other tenants did not testify at final hearing, so it is impossible to compare their treatment to Watson's. Viering clearly acted in a very strange and unusual fashion. She was not a pleasant landlord. However, her actions appear to be based on her own personality and demeanor, rather than on any intent to discriminate based on race or religion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Bahiyyih Watson in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a place of public accommodation, violated Section 760.08, Florida Statutes (2006), by failing to accommodate Petitioner, an individual with a disability.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the formal hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Shawn Sutton, is physically disabled and entitled to the protection of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent is the owner of Golden Corral Restaurant, which is a structure for public accommodation. On July 8, 2007, Petitioner, accompanied by his parents, grandmother and siblings, visited Respondent restaurant for the purpose of eating therein. The total number in the group that accompanied Petitioner was approximately 15. Prior to July 8, 2007, Petitioner's family was a frequent customer of Respondent restaurant and had eaten there on approximately 50 occasions. There had never been a request for special accommodations for Shawn Sutton on any previous occasion. Respondent has a sign on the front door of the restaurant that reads as follows: "Please remain with your party until seated. For guests with special needs, please see the manager. Golden Corral." Respondent is a buffet restaurant. Patrons pay for meals upon entry and prior to being seated. Respondent has a seating policy that requires all persons on the same receipt of payment to remain seated together until a waitress takes their beverage order, verifies that all persons in the party are included on the receipt, and delivers a plate to each person. The members of a party are then free to sit wherever they choose. On July 23, 2007, after a visit to the same restaurant on that day, Petitioner's mother emailed Golden Corral three times complaining about rudeness and lack of professionalism on the part of restaurant employees. In one email, she makes her only reference to the matter at issue in this case, indicating that when told that her son was disabled, a restaurant employee, "Tangie," "changed the entire tone and tried to accomidate [sic] us the best she could." While Petitioner's disability is such that he needs assistance carrying his plate (and food) from the buffet line to his seat, he is able to feed himself without assistance. On July 8, 2007, the entire family sat together and Petitioner was able to eat after his mother and grandmother assisted him in obtaining his food. The evidence revealed that Petitioner's mother's complaint was substantially directed to the "rudeness" she perceived from Respondent's employees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief for failure to establish an unlawful discriminatory act by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maureen M. Deskins, Esquire Butler, Pappas, Weihmuller Katz and Craig, LLP 777 South Harbor Island Boulevard Suite 500 Tampa, Florida 33602 Jerry Girley, Esquire The Girley Law Firm, P.A. 125 East Marks Street Orlando, Florida 32803
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Lakeview of Largo Condominium Association, Inc., et al. (Lakeview or Respondent), violated chapter 70, Pinellas County Code of Ordinances, as alleged in the discrimination complaint (Complaint) filed by Francis Dandrea (Mr. Dandrea or Petitioner); and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the relevant stipulated facts and the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing. The parties agree that the Federal Act (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), the Florida Fair Housing Act (sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2019)),2 and “the Pinellas County Code mirror one another, so the same legal arguments apply to all counts of the Complaint.”(*) The Lakeview campus consists of 12 to 14 acres of land and six residential buildings with approximately 60 condominiums in each building, for a total of 312 units. There are laundry facilities (a washer/dryer unit) on each floor for residents to use. Residents are not allowed to use laundry facilities found on the different floors of each building, but must use the facilities on their floor. If the laundry facilities on their floor are in use, 1 At the hearing, the parties jointly offered an additional exhibit, Exhibit Q, which was admitted into evidence. 2 Unless stated otherwise, all Florida statutory citations will be to the 2019 version of the Florida Statutes. No legislative changes have been made to sections 760.20 through 760.37 since 2013. residents must wait until the laundry facilities are available. In 2004, Petitioner was 71 years old, and his wife, Dolores Dandrea, was 70 years old when they purchased Lakeview Condominium No. 6113. On April 13, 2004, Petitioner and Mrs. Dandrea executed the following statement: I have read the frequently asked questions and answer sheet and understand my responsibilities as an owner.3 Lakeview’s Rules and Regulations (the “Rules”), Section VIII, paragraph three provides: “No new washer or dryer installations will be permitted within the units as of January 1, 1994 Upon the sale of the unit, washers and/or dryers within the unit must be removed.”(*) The Rules do not provide who (buyer or seller) is to remove the washer and dryer upon sale of a condominium unit. (*) Petitioner and Mrs. Dandrea resided in Condominium No. 6113 for nine years. In those nine years, Petitioner testified he had never thought about the Rules, specifically about the washer/dryer unit, as they were “very close” or “right next door” to the first floor laundry facility. In 2013, Condominium No. 6110 was listed for sale. Petitioner either knew or became aware that there was a washer/dryer unit in that condominium, a main purchasing point for Petitioner. On March 29, 2013, Petitioner executed an “AS IS” residential contract for the sale and purchase of Condominium No. 6110. The contract clearly listed additional personal property included in the sale: refrigerator(s); microwave oven; washer; dryer; and blinds. It is undisputed that the washer/dryer unit was installed prior to the Dandrea’s purchase of Condominium No. 6110. (*) An “Estoppel Letter”4 requested by the title company provided there were no violations against Condominium No. 6110 at the time of the sale. 3 As part of Lakeview’s screening process, all new residents have to acknowledge a “55+ Community Frequently Asked Questions and Answer Sheet DBR Form 33-032.” 4 The “Estoppel Letter” provides that the buyers are “Francis and Dolores D’Andrea”. Petitioner and Mrs. Dandrea moved from Condominium No. 6113 into Condominium No. 6110 in late April or early May 2013. A washer/dryer unit was in Condominium No. 6110, as specified in the purchase agreement. Petitioner’s current unit (Condominium No. 6110) is a dwelling within the meaning of the Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 3602(b), because it is within a multi-unit building occupied as a residence by several families. (*) On October 24, 2018, Lakeview’s community association manager, Frank Fundora, notified Petitioner and Mrs. Dandrea of their non-compliance with the Rules regarding the presence of the washer/dryer unit in Condominium No. 6110. (*) On January 22, 2019, Mr. Fundora, on behalf of Lakeview, sent the Dandreas a letter that “required” them to attend a Lakeview Compliance Committee hearing to explain their position as it related to the washer/dryer unit in their condominium. The hearing was held on February 6, 2019.5 On February 21, 2019, Mr. Fundora, on behalf of Lakeview, advised the Dandreas that they were found in non-compliance of the Rules by the Compliance Committee. (*) That violation was reported to the Lakeview Board of Directors (Board), who requested the washer/dryer unit be removed from Condominium No. 6110 within 14 days of the letter. Additionally, the Dandreas were notified that the non-compliance (the failure to remove the washer/dryer unit) would lead to a monetary fine of up to $100 per day to a maximum of $1,000. (*) The Dandreas did not remove the washer/dryer unit from Condominium No. 6110. On March 14, 2019, Mr. Fundora, on behalf of Lakeview, notified the Dandreas of the fine assessment of $100 per day for the violation of the 5 The January 22, 2019, letter provided the hearing would be on February 5, 2019, however the February 21, 2019, Lakeview letter to the Dandreas provided the hearing took place on February 6, 2019. Rules, up to a maximum of $1,000 fine, consistent with chapter 718, Florida Statutes. The fine was placed on Petitioner's account in an amount of $1,000 on March 22, 2019. (*) Petitioner, via letter to the Board dated April 19, 2019,6 requested a reasonable accommodation from the Rules pursuant to the Act. (*) The letter provides7: Dear Sirs, I respectfully request a conversation with you asap [sic] about reasonable accommodations at our condo complex…[sic] I am enclosing letters from our doctors stating that we should not get rid [of] our washer/dryer due to our medical complications and conditions. Respectfully, Francis Dandrea Along with the April 19, 2019, reasonable accommodation request, Petitioner submitted supporting documentation from medical professionals setting forth the medical conditions of both Petitioner and Mrs. Dandrea as the basis for the reasonable accommodation request. (*) The parties stipulated that the medical documentation below was provided in Petitioner’s request for a reasonable accommodation. That documentation provided: 11/06/2018 To whom it may concern, Francis Dandrea suffers from generalized arthritis in addition to medical diagnoses of emphysema and intermittent atrial fibrillation. His wife is limited functionally by polymyalgia rheumatic. Removing the washer/dryer from their condo would creat [sic] a physical hardship and is not recommended. 6 The certified letter was “signed for” by Mr. Fundora on April 22, 2019. 7 This letter was written in all capital letters. The text is provided in sentence format. Please share this communication with the patient. Signed by: /es/ JOHN H HULL, MD GERIATRICS & EXTENDED CARE 11/07/2018 05:41 Analog Pager: [Omitted] Digital Pager: [Omitted] And: 12/12/2018 To Whom It May Concern: Mrs. Dolores D’Andrea is under my medical care for 5 years. She asked me to write this letter. She has multiple medical conditions. It came to my attention that recently washer and dryer was [sic] required to be removed from her unit. Patient has urinary incontinence. It is absolutely important for her to have washer and dryer nearby, so she can wash her clothes because of frequent accidents. Also she has polymyalgia rheumatica, and it is very difficult for her to walk down the hall to a washer and dryer units that located down the hall in apartment area. [sic] It would be medically necessary for her to have washer and dryer in her apartment. If any questions, please feel free to call my office 727-584-7706. Sincerely, Helen Brvenik, M.D. Petitioner testified to his multiple infirmities: osteoarthritis; atrial fibrillation; and a bulging disc. Petitioner also provided that he had had surgery on both knees (“not replacements”), and he had to give up golf three years ago. Petitioner also testified that his wife has neurological problems, including double vision for which she had surgery, and anxiety issues. On April 24, 2019, two days after receipt of Petitioner’s request for a reasonable accommodation, Mr. Fundora, on behalf of the Lakeview Board, informed the Dandreas that Lakeview had denied the requested accommodation. Further, the Board voted to give the Dandreas until May 8, 2019, to comply with the Rules by removing the washer/dryer unit. If the Dandreas refused to do so, their right to use the common recreational facilities would be suspended. (*) Petitioner did not remove the washer/dryer unit, and on May 8, 2019, Lakeview suspended Petitioner's rights to the common recreational facilities. (*) Petitioner filed the Complaint against Lakeview with the PCOHR on May 13, 2019. (*) On September 8, 2019, the PCOHR issued a Determination of Reasonable Cause and Charge of Discrimination. (*) Those individuals who testified at the hearing either are friends of Petitioner, serve (or have served) on Lakeview’s Board, or are employed by Lakeview. However, none of them are health care professionals, and their observations are just that, observations without any medical training or knowledge of Petitioner’s health issues. Mr. Fundora testified that Lakeview did not have a process in place for the type of reasonable accommodation requested by Petitioner. However, Lakeview had, in the past, received reasonable accommodation requests for emotional support animals, large vehicles, and motorcycles. Those requests have been handled on a case-by-case basis.8 A request for additional medical information to support or discredit the requested accommodation for Petitioner (or Mrs. Dandrea) was never sought. There is no dispute that Lakeview objected to the Dandreas retaining the washer/dryer unit. Lakeview’s denial of the request for a reasonable accommodation within two days of the request appears to be solely based on observations made by non-medically trained residents or Board members who 8 At least one request for an emotional support animal was approved, while another was denied when the supporting documentation was found to be fabricated. had seen Petitioner (and Mrs. Dandrea) walking around the Lakeview complex at some time. These witnesses attempted to give opinions from their observations, yet they were not qualified to do so as they did not know if the requested accommodation was medically necessary. Lakeview has not articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for withholding the reasonable accommodation request. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that having the washer/dryer unit within Petitioner’s condominium is a reasonable accommodation; and necessary to afford Petitioner (and Mrs. Dandrea) the opportunity to the use and enjoy their home.
The Issue Whether the Hernando County Housing Authority (Respondent) unlawfully engaged in a discriminatory housing practice against Peggy Troiano (Petitioner) on the basis of her disability by refusing to provide Section 8 funding for a housing unit being occupied by Petitioner and the housing unit's owner, Petitioner’s daughter, Julia Williams.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner was an individual participant in a tenant-based voucher arrangement under the Section 8 Housing Program funded by HUD and administered by Respondent. Petitioner is an individual claiming that she is disabled because of a toxic injury that requires her to live isolated in a non-toxic environment. Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s claim of disability and it is, therefore, found that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of applicable law. Julia Williams is Petitioner’s daughter who, at all relevant times, owned the house located at 15141 Pomp Parkway, Weeki Wachee, Hernando County, Florida (“15141 Pomp Parkway unit”). Ms. Williams is specially trained to deal with toxic injury and is paid through a federally-funded, consumer-directed program to provide assistance to Petitioner. Respondent is a public housing agency that administers the Section 8 Housing Program as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which recodified the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. As a recipient of funding from HUD for its Section 8 Program, Respondent is required to comply with HUD Section 8 regulations, as well as all Federal, State, and local fair housing laws and regulations. In order to receive funding from HUD, Respondent is required to sign an annual contributions contract (ACC) wherein it agrees to follow the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). If Respondent does not follow the C.F.R. or HUD’s guidelines, HUD has the right to terminate Respondent’s Section 8 program funding. In addition, HUD could make Respondent repay any funding used for ineligible housing. On March 17, 2014, during the annual reexamination for her Section 8 voucher, Petitioner signed, under the penalty of perjury, a summary report which identified her as the only household member permitted to live in any unit under her Section 8 voucher. Around the time of the annual reexamination, Petitioner was living at a unit on Philatelic Drive with plans to move into and rent a unit at 15141 Pomp Parkway. The Pomp Parkway unit was owned, but not being occupied, by Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams. In April of 2014, Petitioner asked Respondent for permission to rent the unit from her daughter. Petitioner and her daughter spoke with Respondent’s officials about her request. Generally, a public housing agency, such as Respondent, cannot approve a unit for participation in the Section 8 program if it is owned by a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, sister, or brother of any member of the participant’s family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.306. Respondent, however, ultimately approved Petitioner’s rental of the Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 program, even though it was owned by Petitioner’s daughter, pursuant to a limited exception under 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d), which provides an express exception to the rule if “the [public housing agency] determines that approving the unit would provide reasonable accommodation for a family member who is a person with disabilities.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.306(d). Also, during April of 2014, Petitioner and Ms. Williams were working on constructing a caregiver suite for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit and had discussions with Respondent’s staff about it. There are documents purportedly created during this time frame summarizing several conversations between Respondent, Petitioner, and Ms. Williams. The documents state that Respondent’s officials had a conversation with Petitioner and her daughter wherein they discussed the requirements for a live- in aide and that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that Ms. Williams could never live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Respondent also contends that Petitioner and Ms. Williams were warned that, even if Ms. Williams was approved as a live-in aide, Ms. Williams could not live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On the other hand, Petitioner contends that the alleged conversations warning her that her daughter could not reside in the home did not occur during this time frame, and that she and her daughter continued to renovate the house to specifications suitable to accommodate Petitioner's disability with the expectation that her daughter would ultimately be able to reside in the home after renovations were complete. Upon consideration of the credibility of the witnesses and timing of the purported documents, the undersigned finds that the testimony and documents regarding these alleged April conversations are unreliable and do not support a finding that the conversations and warnings actually occurred during the April time frame. The evidence is also insufficient to support Petitioner's contention that Respondent was somehow responsible for Petitioner's expectation that her daughter would be able to both act as Petitioner's caregiver and live in the home while Petitioner was receiving rent vouchers under the Section 8 program. Petitioner was the only person that Respondent approved to live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under her Section 8 voucher. In May of 2014, Petitioner’s daughter entered into a one-year residential lease with Petitioner and a Housing Assistance Payment Contract (HAP Contract) with Respondent. According to the HAP Contract, Petitioner was the only person able to reside in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without the express, written consent of Respondent. At the time the HAP Contract was signed, Petitioner advised Respondent that she would be the only person living in the unit. Ms. Williams, as the landlord, signed a check cashing agreement with Respondent wherein she agreed Petitioner would be the only person occupying the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Also, Petitioner’s income verification summary report provides that Petitioner is the only person allowed to live in a unit covered by her Section 8 voucher. In early May of 2014, Ms. Williams moved into the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without notice to Respondent. Petitioner has never received written approval from Respondent to have Ms. Williams live and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit under the Section 8 voucher program. By letter dated June 17, 2014, Petitioner submitted an HCHA Live-in Aide Request Verification Form, along with letters from her doctor. Petitioner also requested that her daughter Julia Williams serve as her live-in aide. Approval for a live-in aide is a different process than the approval process to have someone added to the household. While Petitioner's request for a live-in aide stated that Petitioner was living at 15141 Pomp Parkway, it did not mention that Petitioner's daughter was the owner of the dwelling, nor did it include a specific request that Ms. Williams be allowed to move into and occupy the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that she owned. Upon receipt of the written request for a live-in aide by Petitioner, Respondent began its investigation to determine whether Petitioner met the qualifications for a live-in aide and whether Ms. Williams met the qualifications to serve as a live- in aide. Respondent has implemented 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 into its written policy regarding live-in aides, which provides: LIVE-IN ATTENDANTS A family may include a live-in aide provided that such live-in aide: Is determined by the [public housing agency] to be essential to the care and well-being of an elderly person, a nearly-elderly person, or a person with disabilities, Is not obligated for the support of the person(s), and Would not be living in the unit except to provide care for the person(s). Under the C.F.R., a public housing agency is required to approve a live-in aide, if needed, as a reasonable accommodation for an elderly or disabled person. 24 C.F.R. § 982.316 (“The PHA must approve a live-in-aide if needed as a reasonable accommodation” to a family with an elderly or disabled person.). By letter dated June 27, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner of the approval of her request for her daughter to serve as her live-in aide. Although Respondent was aware that a home occupied by an owner was not eligible for a Section 8 voucher at the time it gave its permission for Petitioner's daughter to serve as Petitioner's live-in aide, the letter did not speak to that issue. Rather, the June 27, 2014, letter, signed by Donald Singer, stated: Pursuant to your letter dated June 17, 2014 requesting a reasonable accommodation for a live in aide. Your letter also ask [sic] that the live in aide be your daughter, Julia Williams based upon her qualifications as presented. After reviewing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) regulations for Live-in Aides and the Housing Authority's Section 8 Program Administrative Plan for Live in Aides our office has determined that your daughter, Julia Williams meets the program qualification(s) to act as your Live in Aide. Therefore our office is approving Julia E. Williams as your Live in Aide effective immediately. Should you have any questions regarding this action/letter please contact our office at 352-754-4160. By email on August 11, 2014, Petitioner notified Mr. Singer that she and her live-in aide, Julia Williams, intended to live at the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. On August 11, 2014, Petitioner’s daughter Julia Williams was still the owner of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit. Under 24 C.F.R. § 892.352, a unit being occupied by its owner is deemed “ineligible” and a public housing agency is prohibited from providing funding for such unit. The C.F.R. provides a limited exception for shared housing that allows an owner to occupy a unit funded by Section 8. Under that limited exception, however, the Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.615(b)(3). Based upon the prohibition under the C.F.R. which forbids a public housing agency from funding a unit occupied by an owner who is a blood relative of the Section 8 participant, by letters dated August 22, 2014, Respondent notified Petitioner and Ms. Williams that the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was “ineligible housing” that could not be funded. The letters also informed Petitioner that Julia Williams' approval as a live-in aide did not supersede HUD regulations and that, because Julia Williams was occupying the unit, Respondent was terminating the HAP contract effective September 30, 2014. The only reason Respondent terminated the funding for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit was because the C.F.R. does not allow Respondent to continue funding a unit occupied by its owner. Prior to the August 22nd letters, Respondent was advised by HUD that Respondent did not have any discretion in funding “ineligible housing.” HUD approved the draft of the August 22nd letters. The evidence does not support a finding that either Respondent or HUD waived or should otherwise be prevented from applying the limitations and requirements of the law that a Section 8 participant cannot be a blood relative of the resident owner. Respondent would have been willing to continue Petitioner’s housing assistance as long as Petitioner met program requirements and the housing was deemed eligible housing under the C.F.R. through the issuance of a new three-bedroom voucher for a different unit, or by having Petitioner live in the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit without Ms. Williams both owning and occupying the unit. By letter dated August 27, 2014, Respondent provided Petitioner with a new Section 8 voucher and voucher packet information so that Petitioner could start searching for a new rental unit where Ms. Williams could continue to serve as Petitioner’s live-in aide under Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher. The new voucher was required to be returned to Respondent by September 30, 2014. There was no testimony that Petitioner returned the new Section 8 voucher to Respondent by September 30, 2014, or that Ms. Williams moved out of 15141 Pomp Parkway by that date. On September 4, 2014, before the funding was terminated for the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit, Petitioner filed a complaint for discrimination. Petitioner emailed a signed three-bedroom voucher on October 30, 2014, a month after funding under the new voucher expired, for the rental of the 15141 Pomp Parkway unit that had already been deemed ineligible housing as defined by 24 C.F.R. § 982.316. That voucher is not valid and the facts fail to support a finding that Respondent’s refusal to allow Petitioner to participate in the Section 8 voucher program while occupying a unit owned and occupied by her daughter was because of Petitioner’s disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED the 22nd day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable to Petitioner for discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact In June 2016, Gaudina and Grand Lifestyle executed a document, entitled “GLC III/LLLP Lease – Basic Rental Agreement or Residential Lease” (lease), in which Gaudina leased from Grand Lifestyle a residence at 3346 East Dale Street, Leesburg, Florida, in the Lakeside Village mobile home park (premises). The lease provided that Gaudina pay to Grand Lifestyle $656.00 per month to lease the premises. The lease further provided that at the end of three consecutive years of living at the premises, Grand Lifestyle would provide Gaudina the option of purchasing the premises for $1,000.00. Gaudina testified that his primary residence is in Colorado, but that he wished to lease the premises so that he had a residence when he visited his wife, who lived nearby in Lake County, Florida. As he did not reside permanently at the premises in Leesburg, Gaudina subleased the premises to another individual, possibly in violation of the lease. That individual reported to Gaudina numerous issues with the premises, which Gaudina testified he brought to the attention of Grand Lifestyle.2/ Both parties testified that they sought various remedies in other courts concerning these issues. The undersigned finds that these issues are not relevant to Gaudina’s allegations concerning discrimination under the Florida FHA. Gaudina testified that he possesses a disability that requires use of an emotional support animal. The only evidence Gaudina submitted in support of this contention was a letter, dated February 24, 2015, from Emilia Ripoll, M.D. (Ripoll), located in Boulder, Colorado, and a “Health Care Provider Pet Accomodation Form,” also from Ripoll. This letter states: Mr. Jan Gaudina is currently my patient and has been under my care since 1998. I am intimately familiar with his history and with the functional limitations imposed by his medical condition. Due to his diagnosis of bladder cancer and bilateral ureter cancer, Jan has certain emotional limitations including stress which may cause his cancer to recur. In order to help alleviate these difficulties, and to enhance his ability to cope and live independently, I have prescribed Jan to obtain his pet for emotional support. The presence of this animal is necessary for the mental health of Jan. The Health Care Accomodation Form prescribed the use of Gaudina’s dog, a golden retriever, as an emotional support animal. Gaudina did not present the testimony of Ripoll or any other health care provider concerning his alleged disability. The letter and form, which are inadmissible hearsay that Gaudina failed to corroborate with admissible non-hearsay evidence, attempt to establish that Gaudina required an emotional support animal to prevent a recurrence of cancer. The undersigned cannot consider these documents to support a finding that Gaudina is disabled and in need of an emotional support animal. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.213(3).3/ Therefore, the undersigned finds that Gaudina has failed to establish that he suffers from a disability that requires the accommodation of his golden retriever as an emotional support animal. Principe, the owner of Grand Lifestyle, testified that the prospectus for the premises restricted pet ownership to pets that weigh less than 20 pounds. The parties acknowledged that a golden retriever weighs in excess of 20 pounds. Principe testified that, during a telephone conversation, Gaudina asked whether he could bring his golden retriever to the premises, but never mentioned his alleged disability. Principe also testified that he asked Gaudina whether Gaudina’s golden retriever was a trained service dog. Gaudina testified that his golden retriever was not a “service dog,” as defined under section 413.08, Florida Statutes.4/ Principe further testified that Gaudina rarely visited the premises. Gaudina testified that, in total, he visited the premises in Leesburg three or four times over the period of approximately one year. Gaudina presented no credible evidence that he qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Further, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Jan Gaudina, did not prove that Respondent, Grand Lifestyle Communities III/IV, LLLP, committed discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of Petitioner’s alleged disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, and dismissing his Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2019.