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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. EAST GATE MOTOR INN, 79-002013 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002013 Latest Update: Nov. 04, 1980

The Issue The parties entered into a stipulation which was read into the record and acknowledged by both parties. This stipulation and the testimony presented resolved the factual issues. The primary issue is the legal issue, whether a sign owned by a business, related to services furnished by the business, and not more than 100 feet from the business is exempted from the provisions of Section 479.11(6), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The State of Florida owns the right-of-way in question. The State obtained tie right-of-way when the property was outside tie city limits of any incorporated area and before construction of the East Gate Motor Inn. The property of East Gate Motor Inn, together with the signs and lamp posts in question, are now and were at the time of the Notice of Violation within the city limits of Kissimmee. Federal regulations require the State of Florida to obtain a wider right-of-way in connection with federal-aid primary highways in unincorporated areas. East Gate Motor Inn owns the sign and two posts with lights in question. The structures are located within the right-of-way of State Road 500 (US Highway 192), which is a federal-aid primary highway. The structures involved are used solely in connection with the merchandise, services and entertainment furnished by the East Gate Motor Inn and are not more than 100 feet from the parking area routinely used in its business. The parties stipulated to the introduction into evidence of Exhibits 1 through 5.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends to the agency head that a final order be entered directing that the signs in question be removed from the State's right-of-way. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John L. O'Donnell, Jr., Esquire Suite 1475, Hartford Building 200 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 479.11479.16
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. RAYMOND T. GRADY, JR., 84-003844 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003844 Latest Update: Mar. 01, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Raymond T. Grady, Jr., held registered specialty contractor license number RX DO32138 issued by petitioner, Department of Profession Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. 1/ According to the official records of petitioner, Grady was first licensed in 1977. He later qualified F & L Contracting, Inc., a contracting company doing business in Palm Bay, Florida, in February, 1982. The 1983 annual report filed by F & L Contracting, Inc., with the Department of State reflected that Grady was secretary-treasurer and resident agent of the corporation while a Fred James Henderson served as president. Grady continued to qualify F & L Contracting, Inc. until February 27, 1984, when he notified petitioner that he was no longer its qualifying agent. Presently, his license is on an inactive status. Fred James Henderson did business under the name of F & L Contracting, Inc., F & L Contractors, Inc. and F & L Construction, Inc. All had the same street address and telephone number and were the same for all practical purposes. Only F & L Contracting, Inc. was qualified by Grady with the State. On or about August 25, 1983, Lyman and Dawn Crowshaw of 356 Holiday Park, Palm Bay Florida, entered into a contract with F & L Contractors, Inc., to have a utility room added to their residence for a price of $5,835. The contract was negotiated by Henderson. When the contract was signed, Henderson gave the Crowshaws his business card which reflected the name "F & L Contracting, Inc.," and had the same telephone number and address as F & L Contractors, Inc. Under the agreement, Lyman Crowshaw gave F & L Contractors, Inc. a check in the amount of $1,945 as the first of three payments for the work. The check was deposited into the bank account of F & L Contracting, Inc., the company which Grady had qualified. Because Henderson held no license from the State, he could not pull job permits in the City of Palm Bay. Therefore, it was necessary for Grady to sign all applications and pick up the permits on behalf of Henderson. In this regard, the city building officials perceived Grady to be the individual who qualified Henderson to do business as a contractor. For this reason, the official notified Grady that no permit could be pulled on the Crowshaw job because of a setback restriction on Crowshaw's property. When Crowshaw learned of this, he immediately requested a refund of his money, but Henderson did not oblige. After the Crowshaws sent a letter to F & L Contracting, Inc. on November 18, 1983 demanding payment, and their attorney did the same on January 4, 1984, Henderson and his wife finally executed a promissory note on January 11, 1984 promising to pay the Crowshaws $500 per month plus 18 percent interest until the $1,945 was repaid. Henderson signed the note individually and as president of F & L Contractors, Inc. Mr. Crowshaw received one $500 payment on January 21, 1984 from Henderson. After he received no other payments, Crowshaw filed a complaint against Grady in an effort to recover his money. That prompted the instant proceeding. The Crowshaws and Grady had never seen each other prior to the final hearing. The Crowshaws did have two telephone conversations with someone who represented himself to be Grady in late 1983 and early 1984, and in those conversations, Grady assured them that he would get Henderson to repay the money owed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and that his license be suspended for one year, unless Grady obtains a signed release from the Crowshaws indicating restitution has been made. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DOANLD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1985.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57455.227489.129
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS vs 1015 APARTMENTS, 00-002746 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jul. 03, 2000 Number: 00-002746 Latest Update: Jan. 09, 2001

The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 509.032, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated April 3, 2000.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing, regulating, and inspecting public lodging establishments to protect public safety. To accomplish this purpose, Petitioner employs persons trained to respond to citizen complaints about public lodging establishments. Such inspectors visit and inspect the premises about which complaints are made, gather facts, and make reports to document their findings. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Sean Sylvester Grovesnor ("Grovesnor") as a Sanitation and Safety Specialist assigned to its Division of Hotels and Restaurants. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent 1015 Apartments was a licensed public lodging establishment within the meaning of Section 509.013(4)(a), Florida Statutes, operating under license control number 16-04182H, and located at 1015 Northeast 17th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304-2465. Responding to a complaint on or about February 10, 2000, Grovesnor visited 1015 Apartments. Grovesnor's inspection revealed various violations. Specifically, Grovesnor observed: balcony railing supports in disrepair in front of Apartment No. 204; no smoke detector in Apartment No. 201; an exit sign hanging from exposed wires by Apartment No. 205; a broken window on south side of the building; water stained ceiling tiles in living room of Apartment No. 201; holes in kitchen cabinets in Apartment no. 201; cold water knob in Apartment No. 201 would not work; faucet head not properly attached to the bathtub in Apartment No. 201; mildew and mildew holes in bathroom ceiling of Apartment No. 104. the sewer line clean out pipe cover was missing in the parking lot. Respondent was informed that all violations must be corrected by February 17, 2000. On or about February 18, 2000, Grovesnor made a callback/reinspection visit for the purpose of determining whether Respondent had corrected the violations noted on the previous visit. None of the violations previously noted had been corrected. Each of the above-described violations constitutes a separate and distinct potential hazard to the health and/or safety of individuals on the premises. The balcony railing violation was corrected on March 17, 2000, by Tim's Welding of Fort Lauderdale.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the above-specified provisions of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code, and that Respondent be required to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan R. McKinley, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles F. Tunnicliff Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jean Pierre-Louis 1015 Northeast 17th Avenue Apartment 205 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304-2465

Florida Laws (6) 120.57509.013509.032509.211509.215509.261 Florida Administrative Code (4) 61C-1.00461C-3.00161C-3.00261C-4.010
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REVERENDS WILLIAM AND JACQUELINE CARACTOR vs CINDY CAMMAROTA, QUAIL OAKS APARTMENTS, AND FRANK RESNICK (PRESIDENT) CHURCHHILL FORCE PROP, 91-007743 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Dec. 02, 1991 Number: 91-007743 Latest Update: Nov. 13, 1992

The Issue Whether Cindy Cammarota and Quail Oaks Apartments violated the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance (Ord. 88-9 as amended) by discriminating on grounds of race and religion against Petitioners, Reverends William and Jacqueline Caractor with respect to an attempted eviction action.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Cammarota is the resident manager of Quail Oak Apartments. Respondent Quail Oak is an apartment complex in Hillsborough County which is subject to the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance. Petitioners, who are black, are husband and wife. They are ordained ministers, who reside in Quail Oaks. They have used the community center at the apartment complex for services and frequently pray with other residents. They wear clerical garb and read their Bible in common areas at the complex. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Cammarota knew Petitioners were ministers at Mt. Carmel African Methodist Espiscopal Church. On July 30, 1990, a written rental agreement was entered into between Quail Oaks, lessor, and Petitioners, lessees, for an apartment at the complex. The term of the lease was from September 1, 1990 through August 31, 1991. At the option of Quail Oaks, payment of rent could be accepted conditionally by means of a personal check from the lessees. If the check was rejected for insufficient funds, Quail Oaks could require rent plus late charges to be paid by cashier's check, certified check or money order. In addition, Quail Oaks could terminate the lease for nonpayment of rent. Prior to leaving for vacation in November 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor issued a check in the amount of $645.00 for the November rent. The check was drawn upon the personal checking account belonging to her and her husband at Citizens and Southern National Bank (C & S). It was payable upon demand to Quail Oaks. Although a C & S counter check was used, all of the information on the check was correct. This check was accepted by Respondent Cammarota on behalf of Quail Oaks. It was presented to Barnett Bank of Tampa (Barnett) for collection and the bank was instructed to deposit the funds in Quail Oaks' account at the bank. Barnett Bank did not exercise ordinary care in regard to the check as required by the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead of collecting the funds from the payor bank, Barnett returned the check unpaid to Quail Oaks on November 5, 1990. Notice of the bank's dishonor was sent to Quail Oaks in a notice of debit with respect to the instrument together with the check itself. No reason was given by the bank for the dishonor. The provisional settlement of the check made by Barnett with Quail Oaks was revoked and the amount of credit given was charged back to Quail Oaks' account. Respondent Cammarota, who managed the Quail Oaks account with Barnett, misinterpreted this activity in the account as nonpayment of rent. A "three day notice" was issued by Quail Oaks to Petitioners for payment of rent or possession of the premises on November 7, 1990. The deadline for payment was November 13, 1990. Petitioners received actual notice on November 16, 1990, when they returned from vacation and found the notice posted on the front door of their apartment. A message concerning the matter was also on their answering machine. The message advised them that their check had been returned for insufficient funds. Petitioners went to their bank to determine why their check had not been honored. They had always paid their rent on time and they were concerned about the current state of affairs. The C & S Bank investigated the matter and discovered the check had never been submitted to it for payment. While Petitioners were present, a representative of the bank telephoned Respondent Cammarota and told her a bank error must have occurred as sufficient funds had always been available in Petitioners' account to cover the check, which had never been submitted to C & S for collection. Once Petitioners established that insufficient funds was not the basis for a dishonor of their personal check, they went to Respondent Cammarota to discuss the resolution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota was asked to resubmit the personal check for payment. She refused and requested a money order that included additional charges for the costs Quail Oaks incurred as a result of Barnett Bank's dishonor of the check. Respondent did not believe Petitioners' claim that the original check was a good check. Petitioners advised that they would not pay additional charges because they had complied with all of their responsibilities. They asked for the return of the original check and offered to pay the rent only by money order. Respondent Cammarota refused this potential solution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota did not believe Petitioners were at the office in order to make the check good. She did not believe that Petitioners were merely asserting their legal rights under the lease and negotiable instruments law. As a result, she was suspicious and unyielding during the discussion. She wanted them to pay late fees in order to remain in possession of their apartment. Petitioners, who were tired from their journey and surprised by Respondent Cammarota's lack of receptiveness to very reasonable requests, became somewhat excited by the fact that the process to remove them from their home had begun and they were being told to pay more money than they legally owed to remain in possession. In their response to the situation, Petitioners reminded Respondent Cammarota that they were Reverends. A suggestion that Respondent Cammarota should listen to God was construed by her as "preaching". The excited utterances from Petitioners caused the leasing agent in the office to ask them to leave, which they refused to do until they had read the notice of debit Respondent had received from Barnett Bank about their check. After the notice of debit was read and returned to Quail Oaks, Petitioners began to take their leave. At this point, Respondent Cammarota said something like, "And you people call yourself ministers". On November 20, 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor gave Quail Oaks a second November 1990 rent payment in the form of a money order. A letter dated the same day from Quail Oaks advised Petitioners that the money order could not be accepted because their account had already been turned over to Quail Oaks' attorney for eviction proceedings. On November 21, 1990, eviction proceedings were filed against Petitioners by Respondent Quail Oaks for nonpayment of rent. On November 28, 1990, Petitioners filed a housing discrimination complaint against Respondents. Attempts to resolve the housing discrimination complaint through conciliation was unsuccessful. Respondent Cammarota uses the term "you people" in conversation whenever she refers to two or more people in her presence. Ordinarily, it is not used to differentiate blacks from whites. In her conversation with the Petitioners, however, the term referred to their race or religion or both. It is Respondent Cammarota's opinion that ministers should behave differently than the Petitioners were behaving when they were asserting their legal rights in her office on November 16, 1990. Respondents did not articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the eviction action for non-payment of rent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of County Commissioners enter a Final Order finding that an unlawful discriminatory housing practice occurred when Respondent Cammarota, agent for Respondent Quail Oaks, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners because of race or color and religion. That Respondents be required to pay a $500 fine to Hillsborough County. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See See HO HO #2. #11. 4. Accepted. See HO #3. 5. Accepted. See HO #5. 6. Accepted. See HO #10. 7. Accepted. See HO #11. 8. Accepted. See HO #12. 9. Accepted. See HO #13. 10. Accepted. See HO #14. 11. Accepted. See HO #14. 12. Accepted. See HO #14. 13. Accepted. See HO #18. 14. Accepted. See HO #20. 15. Accepted. See HO #21. 16. Accepted. 17. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Docket speaks for itself. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #22. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and loose agreements. Rejected. Inconclusive evidence. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. #17. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Redundant. 49.-57. Rejected. Irrelevant. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #5, #7 and #8. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. See HO #12. Accepted. See HO #13-#14. Rejected. Self serving. Accepted. See HO #21. Accepted. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to lease. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and legal test for unlawful discrimination. COPIES FURNISHED: Cretta Johnson, Director Hillsborough County Equal Opportunity and Human Relations Department P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 John McMillan, Esquire Levin & McMillan 9385 N. 56th Street, #200 Temple Terrace, FL 33617-5594 Catherine P. Teti, Esquire Assistant County Attorney P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 Reverend William Caractor Qualified Representative 4747 W. Waters Avenue #3807 Tampa, FL 33614

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.65
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. MELWEB SIGNS, INC., 85-001746 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001746 Latest Update: Dec. 10, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Department issued permit number AM146-10 to the Respondent, Melweb Signs, Inc., on May 2, 1984. This permit authorized the erection of an outdoor advertising sign on I-95 approximately 4,000 feet south of Orange Avenue in St. Lucie County. A sign was erected pursuant to this permit. The Respondent's application for the subject permit represented that the sign site applied for was in an area that was zoned commercial or industrial. The Respondent's manager had inquired of county representatives what the zoning was at the sign site, and was informed that the area was zoned commercial. The Respondent's manager also had a map that showed the area to be zoned commercial or industrial, but this map was not a zoning map. It had been issued by a local canal district. When the Respondent's application was filed, the Department's inspector had been shown the map the Respondent's manager had, and when the inspector inquired of the county what the zoning was, she was informed that the area was zoned commercial or industrial. In reliance on the Respondent's map and on the information received from the county, as well as on the Respondent's application, the permit was approved. The Respondent had certified on its application that the sign to be erected would meet all of the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Subsequently, the correct zoning for the subject site was brought to the attention of the Department's inspector. The Respondent agrees that the area is actually zoned agricultural (A-I) not commercial or industrial. Thus, the Department issued its notice of intent to revoke the Respondent's permit on April 11, 1985.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permit number AM146-10 held by the Respondent, Melweb Signs, Inc., be revoked, and that the sign erected by the Respondent on I-95 approximately 4,000 feet south of Orange Avenue in St. Lucie County, be removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 10th day of December, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings 1985. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 10th day of December, APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 85-1746T Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Nevertheless, none of the Respondent's proposed findings address the provisions of Section 479.08, Florida Statutes, authorizing permit revocation when "the permittee has violated any of the provisions of this chapter." COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire P. O. Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57479.08479.11479.111
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. RINCON DE LOS RECUERDOS, INC., 80-001879 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001879 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1981

Findings Of Fact Early on the morning of February 12, 1980, Detective Edward Hanek of the Miami Police Department arrived at 533 Southwest 12th Avenue, the address of respondent's bar, Rincon de los Recuerdos. On the sidewalk in an alcove in front of the bar lay the bloody corpse of Guillermo Tey. Detective Hanek tried both doorways into the bar from Southwest 12th Avenue but found both outer doors locked. At both doorways, he was able to reach through the iron bars of the outer doors, push open unlocked wooden doors, and see the interior of the bar. Detective Hanek "followed a blood trail leading from the body to the south door" (R. 24) on Southwest 12th Avenue. Another blood trail led away from the bar. A rear entrance to the bar also featured a locked iron outer gate and a wooden door behind it, unlocked. Nahir Gil arrived at the bar in a police car and opened the back door at Detective Hanek's request. Inside were glasses and bottles of beer "that appeared to be left in a hurry." (R. 26). Balls on a pool table and change strewn on the bar had the same Flying Dutchman quality. At the scene of the crime, Mr. Gil told Detective Hanek that he had closed the bar at one o'clock, or ten minutes of, that morning; that he sent about ten customers away when he closed; that he did not know of the deceased; and that he did not know the barmaid Anna's last name or where she lived. Later the same morning, at the Miami Police Station, Detective Hanek interviewed Mr. Gil further and Mr. Gil executed a sworn statement at 6:36 a.m., on February 12, 1980, in which he stated inter alia: that this girlfriend, Melba Bernal, and her sister from Pereira, Columbia, were in the United States without visas, as far as he knew; that he and his brother Manuel owned the bar; that he had spent the day of February 11, 1980, drinking in the bar; that he closed at one instead of three o'clock on the morning of the 12th, because he was drunk, and failed to gather the day's receipts from the cash register for the same reason; that he did not know Guillermo Tey; that he did not know Anna's last name or where she lived; and that he had not seen "anybody lying on the sidewalk with blood coming out." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, p. 6. Mr. Gil indicated that his girlfriend had once worked in the bar. He answered, "Yes, sir" to Detective Hanek's question, "What you told me you know, is all you know?" Later on in the day, Mr. Gil told Detective Hanek that he had heard two gunshots and seen a man lying on the sidewalk just before he closed the bar. Through his lawyer, Mr. Gil got Anna's last name, Vasquez, and address to Detective Hanek. The following day, Detective Hanek visited Ms. Vasquez's apartment, only to learn that she had recently moved. Nahir Gil admitted to Detective Hanek that Anna was an illegal alien and admitted to John Clayton, an agent of the United States Border Patrol, that the Bernal sisters had been smuggled into this country. Subsequently, one sister returned to Colombia and the other married Nahir Gil. The parties stipulated that respondent's license, No. 23-00932-2COP, was current at all relevant times; that a certificate of incumbency filed on or about July 7, 1978, reflected that Geoberto Gil owned half of respondent's stock and that Nahir Gil owned the other half; that Geoberto Gil transferred fifty shares, all of his interest in respondent, to Manuel Salvador Gil on April 10, 1979, and resigned as director on the date; and that, as recently as April 10, 1979, Nahir Gil acted as secretary of respondent corporation.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is recommended that petitioner dismiss the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis E. LaRosa, Esquire The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas B. Duff, Esquire 1407 Biscayne Building 19 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130

Florida Laws (2) 561.29837.06
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AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES vs EAGLES NEST FOUNDATION OF VOLUSIA COUNTY, INC., OWNED AND OPERATED BY DELORES KRAMER, 11-004383 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Aug. 25, 2011 Number: 11-004383 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 2012

Conclusions This matter comes before the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (the Agency) for entry of a Final Order based on Petitioner's Motion for Final Order. This case arose out of an Administrative Complaint filed by the Agency charging Respondent Eagles Nest with one count of violating Florida Law and Administrative Code and asking for the revocation of its license. After Respondent requested a hearing, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On December 6, 2011, the parties entered into a signed Settlement Agreement and on December 8, 2011, the Division relinquished jurisdiction back to the Agency and closed its case file. In its Motion for Final Order, Petitioner asserts that Respondent has failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement in that it has not relinquished its license as required. Petitioner further asserts that under paragraph 9 of the Settlement Agreement, breach of the Settlement Agreement results in the automatic revocation of Petitioner's license and denial by the Agency of any subsequent license sought by Delores Kramer or any business owned or operated by Dolores Kramer. A copy of Petitioners Motion was served on counsel for Respondent on January 10, 2012, bu Respondent has not filed any response or objection to Petitioner’s Motion. It is hereby found as a Finding of Fact that Respondent has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement that it entered into on Decembe 6, 2011. It is further found as a Conclusion of Law that Respondent's failure to comply triggers the provisions of the Settlement Agreement that call for revocation of APD-11-4871-FO | Filed February 27, 2012 12:52 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Respondent’s license and will result in the denial by the Agency of any future application by Respondent Delores Kramer, or any business owned or operated by Delores Kramer, for a license. Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Respondent's license number 11-12-035 is REVOKED. It is further ORDERED that any future application by Delores Kramer or any business owned or operated by Delores Kramer shall be denied in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 9 c | DONE AND ORDERED, the 2/ day of Lb. 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. We4ap i prey Michael P. Hansen, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities APD-11-4871-FO | 2 RIGHT TO APPEAL A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review. To initiate judicial review, the party seeking it must file one copy of a “Notice of Appeal’ with the Agency Clerk. The party seeking judicial review must also file another copy of the “Notice of Appeal,” accompanied by the filing fee required by law, with the First District Court of Appeal in Tallahassee, Florida, or with the District Court of Appeal in the district where the party resides. Review proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Notices must be filed within thirty (30) days of the rendition of this final order.’ Information about some sources of possible legal assistance may be found at: hito://apd.myflorida.com/customers/legal/resource-listing. htm. Copies furnished to: APD Area 12 Office Eagles Nest Foundation Delores Kramer 1525 Carr Street Deland, Fl 32720 Claudia Llado, Clerk Jonathan Grabb, Esq. Division of Administrative Hearings Agency for Persons with Disabilities CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of this Final Order was provided to the above- named individuals at the listed addresses, by U.S. Mail or electronic mail, this 2) day of E. Lh. , 2012. ane 0 WRAL Percy W. Mallison, Jr., Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Fl 32399-0950 ‘ The date of the “rendition” of this Order is the date that is stamped on its first page. The Notices of Appeal must be received on or before the thirtieth day after that date. APD-11-4871-FO | 3

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs PEACOCK ELECTRIC CO., 89-005007 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fernandina Beach, Florida Sep. 12, 1989 Number: 89-005007 Latest Update: Mar. 16, 1990

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's outdoor advertising sign on State Road 200, 5.37 miles east of U.S. Highway 17, should be removed because it does not have a permit for said sign.

Findings Of Fact Ronald L. Peacock, owner of Peacock Electric Company, had his employees erect a two-sided sign on State Road 200, 5.37 miles east of U.S. Highway 17. Mr. Peacock acknowledges that he did not have a permit for the sign and that he knew he needed a permit at the time he had the sign erected. He testified that he just hoped he would not get caught. State Road 200 is a federal aid primary road. After he was first notified that the sign was erected without a permit, Mr. Peacock filed an application for a permit. The application was rejected because it did not contain the necessary fees, the permission of the landowner, or the local building permit. Additionally, the location of the sign is 942 feet from an existing permitted sign. The sign is five feet from the right-of-way. Mr. Peacock removed the sign after this action was filed by DOT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and subject matter of these proceedings. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. As relevant to this case, Section 479.105, Florida Statute, states: Any sign which is located adjacent to the right-of-way of any highway on the State Highway System outside an incorporated area or adjacent to the right-of-way on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign was erected, operated, or maintained without the permit required by S. 479.07(1) having been issued by the department, is declared to be a public nuisance and shall be removed as provided in this section. * * * (d) If, after a hearing, it is determined that a sign has been wrongfully or erroneously removed pursuant to this subsection, the department, at the sign owner's discretion, shall either pay just compensation to the owner of the sign or reerect the sign in kind at the expense of the department. In this case, the sign was erected without a permit and Mr. Peacock has correctly been denied a permit. The sign has been removed as required. The sign owner has not proven that the sign was erroneously removed. Hence, the sign cannot be reerected.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order and therein order the removal of the sign in question and deny any request for reerection of the sign without a permit. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Gardner Attorney at Law Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Ronald L. Peacock Peacock Electric Company Route 1, Box 137-D Fernandina Beach, FL 32034 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458

Florida Laws (3) 120.57479.07479.105
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