The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offense set forth in Petitioner's letter of agency action dated March 9, 2012, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, New Life was issued individual Medicaid provider number 140680900. At all times material hereto, New Life was enrolled as an assisted living facility. At all times material hereto, New Life had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA (Agreement). Under the Agreement, New Life was authorized to provide assistive living services to Medicaid recipients. The Florida Medicaid Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, effective July 2009, hereinafter Handbook, provides, among other things, requirements of Medicaid home health services providers and sets forth pertinent Medicaid policies and service requirements. The Handbook is provided to each Medicaid provider upon enrollment into the Medicaid program and is available online. Each provider is expected and presumed to be familiar with the Handbook. The Handbook was incorporated by reference into rule 59G-4.025, Assistive Care Services. No dispute exists that, at all times material hereto, New Life was an assistive care services provider as defined by the Handbook. The Handbook provides in pertinent part: Recipients receiving Assistive Care Services must have a complete assessment at least annually . . . or sooner if a significant change in the recipient's condition occurs . . . . An annual assessment must be completed no more than one year plus fifteen days after the last assessment. An assessment triggered by a significant change must be completed no more than fifteen days after the significant change. The assessment for a resident of a ALF . . . must be completed by a physician or other licensed practitioner of the healing arts (Physician Assistant, Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, Registered Nurse) acting within the scope of practice under state law, physician assistant or advanced registered practitioner. * * * The assessment for ALF [assisted living facility] residents must be recorded on the Resident Health Assessment for Assisted Living Facilities, AHCA Form 1823. * * * Along with the annual assessment requirement, all recipients receiving ACS [Assistive Care Services] must have an updated Certification of Medical Necessity for Medicaid Assistive Care Services, AHCA- Med Serv Form 035, July 2009, signed by a physician or other licensed practitioner of the healing arts (Physician Assistant, Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, Registered Nurse) and the Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 036, July 2009, completed and available in the recipient's case file at the facility. * * * Every ACS recipient must have a service plan completed by the ACS service provider. The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 036, July 2009, shall be used for each recipient receiving ACS. The form must be included in the recipient's case file at the facility. The ALF, RTF [residential medical facility] and AFCH [adult family care home] are responsible for ensuring the service plan is developed and implemented. * * * The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services (AHCA-Med Serv Form 036) must be completed within 15 days after the initial health assessment or annual assessment, be in writing and based on information contained in the health assessment. . . . * * * A new service plan is required on an annual basis or sooner if a significant change in the recipient's condition occurs. The new service plan must be completed no more than 15 days after the annual assessment or an assessment because of a significant change in the recipient's condition. * * * In addition to records required by the applicable licensure standards, ACS records that must be kept include: Copies of all eligibility documents; Health Assessment Forms, AHCA Form 1823 . . .; Certification of Medical Necessity for Medicaid Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 035; The Resident Service Plan for Assistive Care Services, AHCA-Med Serv Form 036; and The Resident Service Log, AHCA-Med Serv Form 037. This documentation must be maintained at the facility, kept for at least five years, and be made available to the Agency for Health Care Administration monitoring or surveyor staff or its designated representative, upon request. . . . * * * ACS documentation may be in electronic format. The original, signed . . . documents must be kept in the recipient's case file in the facility . . . for audit, monitoring and quality assurance purposes. . . . Handbook at P 2-7 through 2-11. AHCA's investigator performed a site visit at New Life on December 8, 2011. The investigator reviewed case files of residents for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011 (service-period). AHCA's investigator found deficiencies in the case files of seven residents at New Life: M.B.; R.F.; E.H.; R.J.; I.M.; K.L.; and J.S. Additional documents, not contained in the case files during the site visit, were provided subsequent to the site visit. Regarding Resident M.B., the Health Assessment and the Resident Service Plan were dated August 17, 2010, which was after the service-period; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated March 28, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident M.B. lacked the Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service- period. As to Resident R.F., the Health Assessment was dated January 1, 2011, which was within the service-period but not up- to-date; the Resident Service Plan was up-to-date; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated March 1, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident R.F. lacked the Health Assessment and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. Regarding Resident E.H., the Health Assessment was dated January 24, 2011, and was up-to-date; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated September 27, 2002, with no more recent Certification of Medical Necessity. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident E.H. lacked the Resident Service Plan and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. As to Resident R.J., the parties stipulated that the Health Assessment was up-to-date; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated February 29, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident R.J. lacked the Resident Service Plan and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. Regarding Resident I.M., the Health Assessment and the Resident Service Plan were up-to-date; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated March 1, 2012, which was not within the service-plan and after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident I.M. lacked the Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period. As to Resident K.L., the Health Assessment was dated March 1, 2012, which was not within the service-period and after the site visit; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was provided, but the date as to the year was unintelligible even though the month and day were intelligible, i.e., March 1. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident K.L. lacked the Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service- period. Regarding Resident J.S., the Health Assessment was dated August 22, 2009, which was not within the service-period; the Resident Service Plan was not provided; and the Certification of Medical Necessity was dated February 29, 2012, which was not within the service-period and was after the site visit. The evidence demonstrates that the case file of Resident J.S. lacked the Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service period. The Director and owner of New Life is Ethel Newton. Ms. Newton has been the Director and owner for the past 13 years. She was not familiar with the Health Assessment form, the Resident Service Plan form, or the Certification of Medical Necessity form. Ms. Newton advised AHCA's investigator that she was not familiar with the forms and admitted same at the hearing. Ms. Newton historically depended upon the assistance of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) to complete any required forms. She depended upon DCF until 2005 when DCF closed its local office which had been assisting her. After DCF closed its local office, Ms. Newton depended upon the residents' case managers at New Horizons, an agency where the residents' physicians are located, to complete any required forms. Five of the seven residents had case managers at New Horizons; J.S. and E.H. did not have case managers at New Horizons. E.H. is no longer a resident at New Life. Ms. Newton is willing to cooperate with AHCA and do whatever it takes to have the required forms completed timely and correctly. The evidence does not demonstrate that Ms. Newton intentionally failed to complete the required forms. None of the seven residents were harmed as a result of the deficiencies in the documentation. No evidence was presented demonstrating that New Life has any prior administrative sanction or penalty. No evidence was presented demonstrating that New Life has any prior violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order: Finding that New Life Assisted Living, Inc., d/b/a New Life Assisted Living Facility, violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e) by failing to have in the case files of Resident M.B., Resident K.L., and Resident J.S. a Health Assessment, Resident Service Plan, and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; by failing to have in the case file of Resident R.F. a Health Assessment and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; by failing to have in the case file of Resident E.H. and Resident R.J. a Resident Service Plan and Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; and by failing to have in Resident I.M.'s case file a Certification of Medical Necessity for the service-period covering January 1, 2011, through November 30, 2011; Requiring New Life Assisted Living, Inc., d/b/a New Life Assisted Living Facility to enter into a corrective action plan; and Imposing a fine against New Life Assisted Living, Inc., d/b/a New Life Assisted Living Facility in the amount of $1,750.00. S DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2012.
Conclusions 1. The STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (“AHCA”), was notified by Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services that the Medicare billing number for the above-referenced provider was revoked April 28, 2010. 2. In accordance with Section 409.913(14) if a provider has been suspended or terminated from participation in the Medicaid program or the Medicare program by the Federal Government or any other state, the agency must immediately suspend or terminate, as appropriate, the provider’s participation in the Florida Medicaid program for a period of no less than that imposed by the Federal Government or any other state, and may not enroll such provider in the Florida Medicaid program while such foreign suspension or termination remains in effect. 3. On April 13, 2012, AHCA issued a letter to Respondent, terminating the Respondent’s participation in the Medicaid program. See ATTACHMENT A. AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 1 of 4 Filed September 25, 2012 3:12 PM Division of Administrative Hearings A & 33 4. On May 14, 2012, C.A.D.C. CORP., d/b/a MIRACLE REHAB CENTER, (“Respondent”), filed The Request for a Formal Hearing concerning Miracle Rehab Center, with the Division of Administrative Hearings. See ATTACHMENT B. 5. On June 18, 2012, Respondent received a favorable CMS revocation appeal decision. As such, the underlying cause of action which precipitated Florida Medicaid to terminate Respondent is moot, or the revocation was overturned on appeal. See ATTACHMENT C. 6. On July 12, 2012, AHCA issued a letter to Respondent, rescinding the sanctions in the above-styled matter. See ATTACHMENT D. 7. Based on the foregoing, this file is hereby CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED on this ao* day of opheol , 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. ; lizabeth ee Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 2 of 4 A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Christopher A. Parelia, Qualified Representative The Health Law Offices of Anthony C. Vitale, P.A. 2333 Brickell Avenue Suite A-1] Miami, Florida, 33129 Telephone: (305) 358-4500 Facsimile: (305) 358-5113 Email: CParrella@vitalehealthlaw.com (Via Facsimile and Email) Tracie L. Hardin, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Bureau of Finance and Accounting 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Bureau of Health Quality Assurance 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 9 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Mike Blackburn, Bureau Chief Medicaid Program Integrity 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (interoffice Mail) Eric W. Miller, Inspector General Medicaid Program Integrity 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Via U.S. Mail) Florida Department of Health Medical License #299992712 (Via Email Only) AHCA v. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1. No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 3 of 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by facsimile and email, or the method designated, on this the Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 AHCA vy. C.A.D.C. Corp., d/b/a Miracle Rehab Center (C.1, No: 12-2049-000) Final Order — Page 4 of 4
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner overpaid Medicaid reimbursements to Respondent for inpatient hospital services due to the lack of medical necessity for such services and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 226-bed community hospital in Sanford. It is an acute-care hospital with an emergency department. At all material times, Respondent has been an authorized Medicaid provider. For inpatient services, Respondent receives, under Medicaid, an all-inclusive per diem rate for all goods and services provided during a 24-hour period, less any third-party payments. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for the regulation of the Medicaid program in Florida. Petitioner is required to perform Medicaid audits of providers and to recover any overpayments. Pursuant to this authority, Petitioner conducted an audit of Respondent for the period from January 1, 2001, through March 31, 2002. Pursuant to its procedures, Petitioner duly informed Respondent of the audit, obtained from Respondent relevant medical and hospital records, issued a Provisional Agency Audit Report on January 24, 2006, obtained additional information from Respondent pertinent to the provisional findings, and issued a Final Agency Audit Report on October 19, 2006, which claimed a total overpayment of $286,357.54 based on Medicaid payments made to Respondent on behalf of 35 different recipients. (The report indicates two separate denials for each of four recipients, so 39 total transactions are listed.) The dispute in this case concerns the medical necessity of the inpatient hospitalization of each recipient. The Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook) states that the purpose of the Medicaid program is "to provide medically necessary inpatient and outpatient services to recipients in the hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. This case involves paid claims for inpatient, not outpatient, services. The Handbook defines inpatient services as those services "rendered to recipients who are admitted to a hospital and are expected to stay at least 24 hours and occupy a bed, even though a bed is not actually utilized because the recipient is discharged or transferred to another hospital." Handbook, page 1-1. The Handbook provides that the day of admission is covered, but the day of discharge is not covered, unless it is also the day of admission. Handbook, page 2-22. The Handbook defines "grace days" as non-medically necessary days following the day of formal discharge when the recipient continues to occupy a hospital bed until an outside facility or residence can be found. These days are not reimbursable by Medicaid except for children under 21 years of age on "Department of Children and Families hold . . .." Medicaid will pay up to 48 hours of inpatient stay beyond the formal discharge day for these children while an alternative placement is located. The Handbook incorporates the limitation of medical necessity as follows: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or service medically necessary or a covered service. Note: See Appendix D, Glossary, in the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, for the definition of medically necessary. Handbook, pages 2-1 to 2-2. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, defines "medically necessary" as follows: Means that the medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: Meet the following conditions: Be necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain; Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; Be consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational; Be reflective of the level of service that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available; statewide; and Be furnished in a manner that is not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. "Medically necessary" or "medical necessity" for inpatient hospital services requires that those services furnished in a hospital on an inpatient basis could not, consistent with the provisions of appropriate medical care, be effectively furnished more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient facility of a different type. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a medical necessity or a covered service. The Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, Appendix D, page D-10. E. A. was admitted on January 6, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. A.'s acute exacerbation of chronic bronchitis from January 6-8. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining ten days of E. A.'s hospitalization. (All calculations of duration of hospitalizations omit the day of discharge, pursuant to the above-cited provision from the Handbook. In this case, for instance, E. A. was discharged on January 19.) E. A., a 60-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), emphysema, and hypertension. He had been unable to eat for the preceding four days due to respiratory distress. At the time of his admission, E. A. had been living for a short while with his sister, who was suffering from cancer. His relevant history included a shotgun wound to the left lung 30 years earlier. Respondent states in its proposed recommended order that E. A.'s chest X-rays showed acute infiltrate demonstrating pneumonia, although the discharge summary reveals that chest X-rays fail to reveal this condition, but acknowledged that sputum grain stains revealed a polymicrobial infection. More to the point, the X-ray reports dated January 6 and 8 note: "no focal infiltrate." However, the discharge summary described E. A.'s prognosis as poor because he was in "end-stage lung disease." In the emergency department, after treatment with bronchodilators, E. A.'s oxygen saturation rate was only 87 percent--not 94-100 percent, as mistakenly stated by Petitioner's expert, Dr. Ellen Silkes, an otolaryngologist whose practice is largely limited to outpatients. This low rate of oxygen saturation evidences hypoxia. E. A.'s arterial blood gases bore a pH of 7.28, evidencing, on the facts of this case respiratory acidosis, which results from excessive retained carbon dioxide due to poor lung function. E. A. was started on Albuterol and Atrovent by nebulizer at four-hour intervals, as well as a corticosteroid intravenously every six hours to relieve the swelling in the lungs. He received oxygen by nasal cannula. On January 10, the physician's notes state that E. A. still suffered from "severe COPD" secondary to smoking with bronchospasms. According to the notes, the first day that E. A. showed any improvement was January 12. On January 14 and 16, E. A. was still retaining excessive carbon dioxide and remained hypoxic, but showed some improvement by January 16 in terms of arterial blood gases. The physician's note for January 17 states that E. A. could be discharged as soon as arrangements for home health care were completed. E. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 6-17. His hospitalization after January 17 was not medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied January 9-16, given that the day of discharge is excluded. Thus, for E. A., Petitioner should have denied two days, not all ten days. A. A. was admitted on June 19, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat A. A.'s gastrointestinal bleeding from June 19-20. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 12 days of A. A.'s hospitalization. (Some of Petitioner's calculations are incorrect. For instance, in this case, Petitioner does not deny July 2-5, even though, undoubtedly, its position as to the lack of medical necessity as to the earlier dates would mandate the same position as to the later dates. This recommended order does not disturb Petitioner's implicit acceptance of the medical necessity of any dates, even when it appears to be in error.) A. A., a 51-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain, diarrhea, and black tarry stools. His recent history included bloody vomit and a diagnosis, a few months earlier, of a pulmonary embolism. A. A. had discontinued taking Coumadin, a blood thinner, due to nosebleeds. A. A. had been diagnosed with AIDS in 1998 and had lost 30 pounds in one month. At admission, A. A.'s hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were critically low at 5.1 and 15.5, respectively, and remained critically low the following day when, after A. A. received transfusions of two units of packed red blood cells, his hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were only 6.8 and 20.0, respectively. Dr. Silkes denied the hospitalization after June 20 because an upper gastrointestinal endoscopy revealed, on June 19, no acute bleeding, and a bleeding scan the following day was negative. However, according to the physician's notes, A. A. was continuing to experience diarrhea on June 20, even though he was starting to feel better. The course of treatment of A. A. was complicated by his recent history of pulmonary embolism and his inability to report an accurate history. By June 21, A. A.'s severe anemia had been corrected, but he was diagnosed with candida, an opportunistic fungal infection common in AIDS patients. This diagnosis would explain the vomiting of blood. Generally, the treatment dilemma posed by A. A. was that efforts to increase his clotting time to stop the bleeding raised the risk of pulmonary embolism. The physicians debated whether to install a Greenfield filter to stop the passage of a blood clot. The filter is introduced under X-ray control through the femoral vein into the inferior vena cava, where it is anchored, so that it allows the passage of blood, but not the passage of a blood clot. But the Greenfield filter is contraindicated in the presence of A. A.'s fever of 101 degrees and elevated white blood counts. Physicians introduced Coumadin to minimize the risk of clots, but A. A.'s low platelet count required the discontinuation of Coumadin on June 30. A. A.'s International Normalization Ratio (INR) was 4.2, which is well above the range of 2.0-3.0 and thus indicative of the fact that A. A.'s blood was taking too long to clot. The standard of care in 2001 precluded safe outpatient management of a complicated patient such as A. A., given his twin risks of pulmonary embolism and bleeding, either of which could result in his death. A. A.'s Coumadin could not safely have been adjusted on an outpatient basis. The physicians restarted the Coumadin on June 24 and doubled its dosage the following day. As they were working on adjusting the blood thinner, though, A. A. continued to suffer nightly fevers of 103 degrees, and the physicians needed to monitor him closely for the next week for this reason too. On June 28, A. A. reported that he was feeling better, but the physicians needed to monitor him for a recent reduction in his Coumadin dosage. A. A. was reported as "alert and comfortable" on July 2. A. A.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from June 19 through at least July 2. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization. T. B. was admitted on May 15, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat T. B.'s esophageal cancer and tuberculosis from May 15-17 and The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the ten days that Dr. Silkes denied of the remaining 14 days of T. B.'s hospitalization. (It is unclear why Petitioner denied only ten days when Dr. Silkes denied May 18-20 and May 22-June 1--a total of 14 days, or 13 days exclusive of the day of discharge. But, as noted above, in cases such as this, the recommended order will consider only whether up to ten days within this period are allowable as medically necessary.) T. B., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with difficulty swallowing. He had visited a physician in February 2001 with the same complaint, and the physician had recommended an upper gastrointestinal series. Due to financial constraints, T. B. did not undergo this procedure until late April, when he was found to have a high-grade obstruction consistent with a tumor. T. B.'s recent history included the loss of 25 pounds. An endoscopy with biopsy performed on May 16 revealed a high-grade carcinoma of the esophagus. The physician planned to commence preoperative chemotherapy and radiation therapy to shrink the lesion, but, based on sputum collected on May 18, it was discovered that T. B. had mycobacterium tuberculosis. Physicians had suspected the tuberculosis from the time of admission when they placed T. B. in a negative airflow isolation room. Treatment of the tuberculosis necessarily preceded the preoperative chemotherapy recommended for T. B.'s carcinoma. The sputum sample revealed rare acid-fast bacilli, for which the standard of care in 2001 typically required two to three weeks of treatment before isolation precautions could be discontinued. T. B. remained in isolation at least through May 31. In addition, T. B. suffered significant pain from the carcinoma. By May 23, he was on patient-controlled analgesia in the form of a morphine pump, which is not available outside of an acute-care hospital. T. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from May 15 through at least June 1. Petitioner improperly denied all ten days of this hospitalization that it denied. R. B. was admitted on December 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat R. B.'s respiratory failure from December 3, 2001, to January 2, 2002, and January 8, 2002. Based on Petitioner's prehearing stipulation, the dispute concerns only seven days' hospitalization. R. B., a 59-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with acute respiratory distress and respiratory failure. She was immediately intubated. Her family insisted upon aggressive treatment of, among other things, her bilateral pneumonia caused by a virulent staph infection. R. B. required a tracheotomy on December 20 due to the difficulty in weaning her from the ventilator. She required the placement of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube on January 1. The discharge summary describes R. B. as "very frail and fragile" and her hospitalization as "very prolonged and complicated." On December 23, when R. B. was finally weaned from the ventilator, her family agreed to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) code for her. The dispute arises from an incident on January 3 when R. B. fell when trying to get out of bed. Her mental status deteriorated, probably due to malignant disease. Physicians ruled out sepsis in the bloodstream, but X-rays revealed multiple nodules in the lung and liver. On January 8, a CT- guided lung biopsy of one of the nodules confirmed malignant disease. Two days later, the physician stated that a consultation with hospice was indicated. Upon the agreement of the family, R. B. was discharged to her home under hospice care on January 12. Dr. Silkes is substantially correct in her opinion. The diagnostic work after January 2 only supported the poor prognosis that had become obvious to R. B.'s family ten days earlier and certainly was not palliative in nature. R. B.'s hospitalization after January 2, 2002, was not medically necessary--except for January 8, which Dr. Silkes initially conceded, and an additional two days, which Petitioner conceded in its prehearing stipulation. Petitioner properly denied seven days of this hospitalization. J. B. was admitted on January 5, 2002. Petitioner does not contest a 23-hour observation on January 5, but this would generate a reimbursement considerably smaller than that sought by Respondent for inpatient services for that day, so Petitioner has essentially denied the entire hospitalization, which consists of 16 days. J. B., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and atrial fibrillation with fast ventricular rate. He had been diabetic for 25 years. He had been laid off from construction work in August 2001, and had arthritic knees which prevented his return to work. Since losing his job, J. B. had been feeling poorly and had lost 20 pounds. J. B.'s pulse at the time of his arrival was 165, and it dropped to 105 within his first six hours at the hospital. J. B.'s relevant history included congestive heart failure, edema of the extremities, and nocturnal dyspnea. A chest X-ray on the day of admission revealed a dense mass in the left lobe. Physicians started a calcium channel blocker to regulate J. B.'s rapid heart beat and a diuretic to eliminate his excess fluids and swelling. J. B. was feeling much better by January 7, as the physicians had controlled his rapid heart beat. On that day, J. B. underwent a stress test, which was negative. However, a CT scan performed on January 8 and reported the following day revealed a left hilum mass that proved to be advanced carcinoma. The physicians decided that J. B. needed a bronchoscopy to biopsy the lung mass and a thoracentesis, in which a needle is inserted between the ribs to extract fluid for the purpose of determining the fluid's source. However, J. B.'s atrial fibrillation complicated their plans. On January 8, J. B. remained in atrial fibrillation, and the physicians were considering starting him on Coumadin because patients with atrial fibrillation are at high risk of clotting due to the poor expulsion of blood into the ventricle. Introduction of this blood-thinning agent before other invasive procedures requires first that the physicians stabilize the patient. This dilemma delayed the introduction of the blood- thinning agent and prevented treating J. B. as an outpatient. Once stabilized on Coumadin, J. B. underwent the two diagnostic procedures on January 11. They revealed that he was suffering from stage IV squamous cell carcinoma, according to a physician's report dictated on January 14 and transcribed the following day. The physician ordered additional CT scans to determine the extent of the metastatic disease before deciding on a course of treatment. A whole body bone scan was performed on January 15 and was essentially negative. However, the carcinoma had metastasized to the left hilum and, by report dated January 15, a physician noted that J. B. would not benefit from surgery, chemotherapy, or radiation, although palliative radiation could offer him some relief. An IV port for chemotherapy (not radiation) was placed on January 16--not January 6, as noted by Dr. Silkes in her report. Coumadin had been discontinued in advance of the procedure and resumed on the day of the procedure, but required adjustment for the next several days, as J. B.'s INR was too low, indicative of excessive clotting. Although the administration of the chemotherapy through the IV port could have been done on an outpatient basis, J. B. was comfortable at all times after January 15, and with no effective treatment possible, his hospitalization remained medically necessary until the physicians were able to adjust his Coumadin so that his INR reached the normal range. J. B.'s hospitalization was medically necessary from January 5 through January 22, on which date he was discharged. Petitioner improperly denied the 16 days of inpatient services. N. C. was admitted on February 8, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. C.'s intracranial hemorrhage from February 8-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 21 days of N. C.'s hospitalization. N. C., a 40-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with a complaint of passing out and no significant medical history. N. C. was a single mother of a developmentally disabled child. Her father resided in a nursing home and suffered from dementia, so her siblings were her decisionmakers concerning care. At admission, N. C. was already in a vegetative state, suffering from a massive intracranial hemorrhage. Her blood pressure was 213/107. She was immediately intubated and given Mannitol to reduce intracranial pressure and Dilantin to prevent seizures. On February 8, a neurologist evaluated N. C. and found her a poor candidate for surgery to evacuate the intracranial hematoma due to the likelihood of extensive consequent neurological deficits. The neurologist discussed the possibilities and the "extremely poor" prognosis with the siblings, who decided not to pursue surgery and instead allow N. C. to be "managed medically." The physicians asked the siblings to consider a DNR code for N. C. N. C. made no meaningful progress in the following days. Respondent was unable to contact her siblings until February 19, and they asked for two days within which to make the decision whether to place N. C. on a DNR code. On February 22, they decided to place N. C. on a DNR code and withdraw the ventilator. Three days later, the physician discussed with the siblings the possibility of placement in a nursing home. Three days after this discussion, the siblings agreed on inpatient hospice care for N. C. On March 4, IV fluids and medications and the nasogastric feeding tube were withdrawn, and N. C. was transferred to a nursing home under hospice care. N. C.'s hospitalization was medically necessary through February 22 because a nursing home cannot accept a patient on a ventilator, N. C.'s course following the stroke could reasonably be observed for a couple of weeks to determine if improvement--however unlikely--might take place, and the siblings reasonably required this long to make this difficult decision. From February 23 through discharge, the inpatient services provided N. C. were no longer medically necessary, so Petitioner properly denied nine days of the 21 days that it denied for this recipient. N. Ch. was admitted on May 23, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat N. Ch.'s cellulitus and osteomyelitis from May 23 to June 24. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 46 days of N. Ch.'s hospitalization. N. Ch., a 38-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with wounds to both legs and loss of feeling in both feet and a history of fractures to both tibias 20 years ago followed by osteomyelitis four years ago. Despite considerable hospital treatment to both legs, consisting of antibiotics, hyperbaric oxygen, debridement, and skin grafts, drainage of the wounds persisted. Four grainy wounds on both legs penetrated to the bone, and N. Ch. had suffered some bony damage from the persistence of these infected wounds. A physician performed a surgical debridement of the wounds on May 26, and a vacuum- assisted closure device was applied to the wound on the following day. This device produces negative air pressure to stimulate a chemical change in the tissues to enhance the migration of new blood vessels and granulation tissue over the area of the wound. The pump was changed often. On June 22, N. Ch. underwent a second debridement and a pump was reapplied to the wounds on June 24. The issue in this case involves the use of hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an inpatient basis. On June 7, a physician reasonably recommended 20, 90-minute hyperbaric oxygen treatments. The treatments, which accelerate wound healing, began the next day. Dr. Silkes correctly finds no medical necessity after N. Ch. became stable after the second debridement. Although he later suffered some fever, apparently from his reaction to an antibiotic, and gastroesophagael reflux, as well as some adverse reactions to IV and peripherally inserted central catheter lines, N. Ch. could have been managed as an outpatient after June 24. Nothing suggests that the vacuum-`assisted closure device requires hospitalization, and hyperbaric oxygen treatment clearly does not require hospitalization. Respondent contends that inpatient services remained medically necessary after June 24 because Medicaid would not pay for hyperbaric oxygen treatment on an outpatient basis. Medical necessity is driven by medical, not legal, considerations. If the sole reason for hospitalization is to obtain a medically necessary good or service that Respondent has restricted to the inpatient setting, then the provider community improperly circumvents Petitioner's restriction. If there is no other reason to continue to hospitalize a recipient, such as N. Ch., the decision to do so in order to obtain for him a concededly medically necessary service--that does not otherwise require hospitalization--is unwarranted. Petitioner properly denied the 46 days of inpatient services for N. Ch. after June 24. J. C. was admitted on February 24, 2002. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. C.'s coronary artery disease and lymphoma on February 24 and March 3-8. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent does not contest Petitioner's denial of the "last two days," which apparently are March 9-10. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining six days of hospitalization from February 25 through March 2. J. C., a 61-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with worsening chest pain over the past two weeks and a history of coronary artery disease. She also had an undiagnosed mass on her neck. She had previously failed outpatient treatment and was admitted to the hospital. Two weeks earlier, J. C. was to have had an outpatient biopsy of the neck mass, but the anesthesiologist declined to administer anesthesia until her unstable angina was addressed. J. C. went to her primary care physician, who referred her to a cardiologist, but, prior to seeing him, J. C. went to the emergency department. On February 25, the physician's notes indicate that J. C. was stable and without chest pain. The cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization on February 26 and found 100 percent blockage of the left anterior descending artery, 80 percent blockage of the proximal circumflex, and other narrowings that were not amenable to angioplasty and stenting, so he recommended coronary artery bypass grafting. Heart surgery could not proceed until physicians learned the nature of the neck mass. A biopsy was performed on February 28, which revealed B-cell malignant lymphoma. The oncologist preferred to commence chemotherapy after the bypass operation, so this was performed on March 3. J. C. was extubated on March 4, but developed acute respiratory distress on March 5 and required a transfusion the following day. However, Dr. Silkes is correct in finding the hospitalization from February 25 through March 2 medically unnecessary. The procedures performed during this period could have been done on an outpatient basis. The record does not support Respondent's argument that her unstable angina required inpatient management. Petitioner properly denied these six days of inpatient services. R. LaB. was admitted on April 2, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last day of inpatient service on April 12. This is the first case considered in this recommended order handled by Dr. Alan Yesner, an internist whose practice is more evenly divided between inpatients and outpatients than is Dr. Silkes' practice. R. LaB., a 47-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with abdominal pain of two days' duration and a history of COPD, hypertension, and diabetes. She was rushed to abdominal surgery to reduce an incarcerated hernia. The surgery was long. R. LaB. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation. Dr. Yesner is correct in opining that R. LaB.'s hospitalization after April 11 was not medical necessary. She was stable and on appropriate medication, so Petitioner properly denied one day of inpatient service for R. LaB. J. L. was admitted on June 12, 2001. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the seven days of inpatient services. J. L., a 47-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with complaints of a gradual increase of abdominal girth and was found to have blood in his stool. Lab work indicated an elevated INR, elevated bilirubin, and bacteria in his urine. The physician concluded that J. L. suffered from primary biliary cirrhosis, for which he had been treated since at least 1998. J. L. admitted that he had become noncompliant with his medication after a divorce. A CT scan revealed a probable stone obstructing the right ureter, causing urine to back up and flood the right kidney. A successful laser lithotripsy was performed on June 17 with the complete fragmentation of the stone and the installation of a stent, which would facilitate drainage, to be removed a few days later. J. L. tolerated the procedure well, and on the next day he reported feeling better without any pain in his flank. Dr. Yesner notes the "late schedule" of the lithotripsy, but Respondent did not have a lithotripter in 2001 and had to schedule it for use at the hospital. The hospitalization was medically necessary through June 17 due to the pain, advanced kidney disease, and potential kidney problems presented by the blockage, prior to its surgical fragmentation. Petitioner should have denied two days, not seven days. C. M. was admitted on April 2, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of admission for 23-hour observation only on April 2 for end-stage sarcoidosis, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 31 days of C. M.'s hospitalization, which concluded with her death. C. M., a 55-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with shortness of breath and weakness. She is a Jehovah's Witness, so she declines blood transfusions on religious grounds. By April 4, C. M.'s blood gases, although not within normal ranges, were out of critical ranges. C. M. suffered respiratory failure and required intubation on April 16. Her hemoglobin gradually dropped after this, but treatment was limited to iron and vitamins due to the refusal of the patient to accept a blood transfusion. This treatment was unsuccessful. The family supported C. M.'s decision not to accept a blood transfusion, but insisted on full, aggressive treatment, including CPR. C. M. went into cardiac arrest on May 3 and CPR failed to revive her. Dr. Silkes states that Respondent should have arranged for hospice care during the first day of hospitalization. C. M. was not then on a ventilator, so a hospice would not have objected to taking C. M. on that ground, but her respiration was critically impaired for the first three days of her hospitalization and her prognosis was not such as to render hospital care medically unnecessary. It was medically necessary to stabilize C. M.'s respiration during these first three days, but her hemoglobin issues could have been addressed by home health care for the next 11 days. The medical necessity of inpatient services resumes, though, after C. M.'s respiratory failure of April 16 and continues to the end of her hospitalization. The first three days of inpatient services were medically necessary, the next 11 days of inpatient services were not medically necessary, and the last 17 days of inpatient services were medically necessary, so Petitioner should have denied 11 days, not 31 days. M. M. was admitted on March 3, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat acute asthmatic bronchitis with a history of coronary artery bypass graft, asthma, sarcoidosis of the lung, and diabetes from March 3-12, which Petitioner later extended to March 13. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days of M. M.'s hospitalization, which Respondent's expert frankly conceded was difficult to justify. As Dr. Yesner noted, M. M. was stabilized on oral medication by March 11, and he allowed a couple of additional days to monitor her. M. M. experienced hypoglycemia on March 16, but this is a condition that, according to Dr. Yesner, is not unusual with the Prednisone that M. M. was taking, and hypoglycemia is typically managed on an outpatient basis. Petitioner properly denied the last three days of M. M.'s hospitalization. J. P. S. was admitted on January 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. P. S.'s obstruction of the common bile duct. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the last three days of his hospitalization. J. P. S., a 54-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe jaundice and a history of diabetes, congestive heart failure, and triple coronary artery bypass graft performed in 1997, although he displayed no significant cardiac abnormalities during this hospitalization. During the initial examination, J. P. S. went into respiratory arrest and required intubation. The gastroenterologist found J. P. S. ready for discharge, from a gastroenterological perspective, on January 13. but J. P. S. immediately developed COPD symptoms, including shortness of breath and edema. According to the physician notes, J. P. S. was sufficiently stable for discharge on January 15, but a note for the next day says to hold the discharge pending cardiac evaluation. Respondent discharged J. P. S. three days later, after physicians could monitor the level of Digoxin to ensure that J. P. S. was safe for discharge. P. S.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner improperly denied the last three days of inpatient services. J. P. was admitted on December 8, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of services to treat J. P.'s fever from December 8-12. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 14 days of J. P.'s hospitalization. J. P., a 27-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with high-grade fevers and severe headaches and a history of AIDS. Dr. Silkes approved the treatment of the fever until it ended on December 12. The fever was likely caused by J. P.'s toxoplasmosis of the central nervous system. This is an opportunistic condition not unusual in immunocompromised patients. Candida fungal infection likely caused J. P.'s complaints of pain on swallowing, as this too is an opportunistic condition. Additionally, a blood culture revealed a staph infection. Through December 18, J. P. was continuing to experience fevers of up to 101 degrees. At the same time, it was necessary to address the toxoplasmosis before it extended to other organs. This required the sequential administration of IV antibiotics and careful, continual monitoring of the patient for his clinical response to treatment. On December 20, J. P. underwent a bone marrow biopsy to rule out the extension of toxoplasmosis in the bone marrow or the presence of tuberculosis. This test was negative, which was a precondition for discharge. The pathology report was "received" on December 21, but not "printed" until December 27. However, J. P. did not complete his IV administration of Doxycycline until December 23, when the medical necessity for his inpatient services ended. Petitioner should have denied three days, not 14 days. W. P. was admitted on June 18, 2001. Dr. Silkes would allow only a 23-hour observation on the day of admission for the treatment of lung cancer and tuberculosis. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of 13 days of his hospitalization from June 18 through July 1 (even though he was not discharged until July 13). W. P., a 59-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with severe coughing up of blood and a recent loss of 40 pounds. A chest X-ray at admission revealed a large mass in the upper left lobe of the lungs. Lab work suggestive of anemia correlated with a malignancy as its source. Sputum to test for acid fast bacillus was taken, and a consult was immediately arranged with a pulmonary specialist to consider a bronchoscopy and to take a biopsy. A CT scan of the chest on June 18 revealed abnormal soft tissue density filling the right upper lobe, two tumors, and numerous nodes. The bronchoscopy on June 19 revealed 80 percent obstruction of the right main bronchus secondary to an endobronchial lesion and 100 percent obstruction of the right upper lobe. A biopsy of the right mainstem bronchus revealed a squamous cell carcinoma. A physician noted in his consultation report that W. P. was to complete his metastatic survey on the day of the report--June 22--after which they would discuss palliative treatment. The report states that the patient understands that he will unlikely live more than six months. Subsequently, acid fast bacillus, which had originally not been detected, was found, so W. P. was placed in isolation on June 26. He had been experiencing elevated white blood counts and fevers. He was placed on antituberculosis treatment, which, as noted above, typically takes two or three weeks until the patient can be removed from isolation. July 10 was W. P.'s first day without fever. On this date, Respondent sent his records to the Health Department to facilitate a transfer to a tuberculosis hospital. He was discharged on July 13. W. P.'s entire hospitalization was medically necessary. Petitioner should not have denied any of the 13 days that it denied. M. Pr. was admitted on December 18, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. Pr.'s coronary artery disease from December 18-27. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. Pr.'s hospitalization. M. Pr., a 58-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a recent cardiovascular accident while out of state. A cardiac catheterization revealed severe triple vessel coronary artery disease. On December 19, M. Pr. underwent a four-vessel bypass. Post-operatively, however, M. Pr. fell while on the commode. The dispute in this case arises due to the unavailability of rehabilitation facilities that would take M. Pr. after his fall. He was suitable for discharge on December 28, but no facility could be found to receive him. These are "grace days," as noted in the Handbook and are available, on a limited basis, for persons under 21 years of age, but, by negative implication, are unavailable for adults. Thus, medical necessity dictated that Respondent discharge M. Pr. on December 27, so the inpatient services are not reimbursable after December 28, given that the day of discharge is not allowable. Dr. Silkes' determination was correct in this case. Petitioner properly denied seven days' inpatient services for M. Pr. A. R. was admitted on December 30, 2001. Petitioner has denied the entire 14 days of A. R.'s hospitalization, although Dr. Silkes approved one day's inpatient services, on the day of admission, for the treatment of ovarian cancer. A. R., a 63-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with vomiting on the day of admission, progressive abdominal distension, anorexia, weight loss over the past month, and a 15-year history of bronchial asthma. A CT scan of A. R.'s thorax at the time of admission revealed a large collection of fluid in the abdominal cavity. At this time, a physician removed 4.5 liters of fluid from the cavity, and A. R., not surprisingly, began to feel much better. A report on January 3--delayed probably due to the holidays-- indicated the presence of scattered malignant cells in the withdrawn fluid compatible with carcinoma. Metastatic ovarian cancer was subsequently confirmed. A. R.'s case was complicated by the withdrawal of this large volume of fluids, which required continual monitoring of her electrolytes, and the sudden exacerbation of her dementia on January 2, which would impede outpatient services, as well as the initiation of chemotherapy. The dementia, which had been progressive for the past six months, was likely a reaction to the carcinoma. By January 11, a physician recommended hospice placement given A. R.'s incurable tumor. A. R.'s daughter agreed on this day to hospice placement. This is the day that medical necessity for inpatient services ended. Petitioners should have denied three days, not 14 days. The remaining days were medically necessary. E. S. was admitted on May 4, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat E. S.'s pancreatitis and multisystem failure from May 4-23. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining 24 days of her hospitalization, which ended with her death. E. S., a 64-year-old female, presented to the emergency department with nausea and abdominal pain and a history of hypertension and abuse of alcohol and tobacco. She was found to have elevated pancreatic enzymes. On May 8, E. S. underwent a laparoscopic removal of her gallbladder, which she tolerated well, but soon afterwards suffered respiratory failure. E. S. was then placed on a ventilator. Problems with malnourishment and then kidney failure precluded a successful weaning her off the ventilator. On May 23, the family agreed to a DNR code. May 23 marks the last day that Dr. Silkes found that E. S.'s hospitalization was medically necessary. Care after this date was entirely supportive and not medically necessary; however, no hospice or skilled nursing facility would take E. S. because she could not be weaned off the ventilator. The unavailability of an alternative, less costly setting does not automatically render the inpatient care of a recipient medically necessary. The circumstances dictate whether inpatient services to such a patient are medically necessary. Here, it is impossible to find that services after May 23 were medically necessary. Dr. Silkes was correct in her opinion. Petitioner properly denied all 24 days of inpatient services for E. S. D. S. was admitted on March 24, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat D. S.'s osteomyelitis of the right foot from March 24-25 and March 30-April 10. (Originally, Dr. Silkes allowed only March 24-25 and March 30-April 6, but, on February 7, 2007, she revised her opinion to allow the additional four days to April 10.) In its prehearing statement, Petitioner conceded that only three of the original ten denied days remained at issue, as it was agreeing that an additional seven days were medically necessary. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining three days, although it is not clear what three days Petitioner is contesting. D. S., a 57-year-old female, presented at the emergency department with a "hole in the right foot" and a history of diabetes. She dropped a can of juice on her foot on January 1, and the foot had become progressively infected since that time. On the day of admission, she underwent surgery for the removal of fourth and fifth metatarsal bones and toes of the right foot. She did not heal properly and required followup surgery on April 7 to trim some of the necrotic flap, as the physicians considered the possibility of a below-knee amputation. On April 13, the surgeon probed the wound, found no hidden pockets, and discharged D. S. Regardless what three days that Petitioner continues to find were not medically necessary, the entire hospitalization was medically necessary. J. W. was admitted on August 20, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat J. W.'s multiple organ failure from August 20 to September 14. The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining two days of J. W.'s hospitalization, at which time he died. J. W., a 48-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with a two or three-day history of progressive congestive heart failure with pulmonary edema, atypical chest pain, and increasing abdominal girth. His history included nonischemic cardiomyopathy with minimal coronary artery disease, chronic alcohol abuse, pulmonary hypertension, chronic atrial fibrillation requiring anticoagulation therapy, hepatitis B and C, chronic renal insufficiency, and chronic congestive heart failure with multiple hospitalizations. On admission, his INR was 6.6, indicative of very slow clotting. Despite the care of numerous consultants, J. W. suffered increased respiratory failure on September 5, at which time he was intubated. He received a Greenfield filter on September 7 to prevent further pulmonary clots. Starting September 10, and continuing everyday thereafter, J. W. required dialysis due to renal failure. J. W. was on total parenteral feeding as of September 14. The family, whose availability had been a problem, agreed to a DNR code on September 17. Respondent claims in its proposed recommended order that a DNR code is a precondition to hospice care, but no competent evidence establishes this fact. Dr. Silkes and Petitioner properly denied the last two days because they were not medically necessary. M. W. was admitted on June 10, 2001. Petitioner does not contest the medical necessity of inpatient services to treat M. W.'s ventricular fibrillation and complications from June 10- The parties' dispute concerns the medical necessity of the remaining seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W., a 31-year-old male, presented to the emergency department with cardiopulmonary arrest after his wife found him slumped on the sofa, seizing. On arrival, he was found to be in ventricular fibrillation, and he was intubated. Physicians restored a normal rhythm, but M. W. suffered a seizure in the emergency department, so he was given large doses of Dilantin. M. W. had suffered brain damage from cerebral anoxia. M. W. was extubated on June 13, and his breathing remained stable. He remained in normal sinus rhythm. M. W. began to receive Librium on June 13 to sedate him. The cardiologist proposed a cardiac catheterization, but M. W. refused. An EKG on June 15 found a conduction defect in M. W.'s heart that was suggestive of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. The cardiologist then determined, on June 16, that M. W. required an electrophysiology study to rule out Wolff Parkinson White syndrome. In 2001, Respondent lacked the equipment to perform this study, for which M. W. remained too confused to participate on June 18 anyhow. Physicians continued to monitor M. W.'s cardiac rhythm, and, when a bed opened at Florida Hospital, Orlando, which had the necessary equipment, Respondent promptly transferred M. W. on June 22. During the transfer, the cardiac monitor continued to check M. W.'s rhythm due to the risk of another cardiac incident until the underlying cardiac abnormality was assessed and treated. Petitioner improperly denied the final seven days of M. W.'s hospitalization. M. W. had suffered a serious cardiac event. Physicians had not yet ruled out all possible reasons for the event and needed to address a promising possibility of Wolff Parkinson White syndrome, so M. W. remained at risk for another event. He was confused from the brain damage. All of these factors militate in favor of finding that the remaining seven days of inpatient services were medically necessary. E. A. $1666.62 R. B. $5703.18 N. C. $7332.66 N. Ch. $38,332.26 J. C. $4888.44 R. LaB. $833.31 J. L. $1666.62 C. M. $9166.41 M. M. $2499.93 The total overpayment is $104,309.97, which breaks down as follows: J. P. $2444.22 M. Pr. $5703.18 A. R. $2444.22 E. S. $19,999.44 J. S. $1629.48
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding overpayments totaling $104,309.97 during the audit period and requiring that Respondent repay this amount, imposing an administrative fine of $1000, requiring Respondent to prepare a corrective action plan, and reserving jurisdiction to remand the case to the Division of Administrative Hearing for a determination of Petitioner's entitlement to statutory costs, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig H. Smith, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dr. Andrew C. Agwunobi, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32304-0551 William Blocker, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Daniel Lake, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tracy Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated federal and state laws addressing Medicaid payments, and, if so, what is an appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the single state agency charged with the administration of the Medicaid program in Florida pursuant to Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and federal law. One of AHCA's duties is to recover overpayments. Overpayments are any amounts paid to providers that were not authorized. Dr. Valente, during all times pertinent, was a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida. She was an authorized Medicaid Provider and held provider number 253493200. As such, she was on notice of Medicaid billing policy and rules. AHCA conducted a generalized analysis of obstetricians in Florida who submitted Medicaid claims during the period January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2005. AHCA investigated over-billing in three different categories: (1) excessive prenatal visits, (2) billing for Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening (Screening) more than once during a pregnancy, and billing for the W1992 Screening during the second and third trimesters. The W1992 Screening was and is only applicable to the first trimester of pregnancy. Dr. Valente was one of the obstetricians AHCA found to have over-billed in the three categories. With regard to Category 1, excessive prenatal visits, the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook provides, at page 2-53, that "Antepartum visits are limited to a maximum of 10 for low-medical risk recipients and 14 for high-medical risk recipients. Payment for antepartum care is based on a total amount for complete care. Antepartum care is prorated, based on an average standard of 10 visits for a low-medical risk recipient or 14 for a high-risk recipient. Reimbursement for the 10 or 14 visits is the maximum reimbursement for the full course of antepartum care. If additional visits are provided, payment is considered to have already been made, and the provider may not bill the additional visits to Medicaid or the recipient." For Category 1, the audit searched for instances when Dr. Valente billed for excessive prenatal visits 38 times, as follows: Patient 1: This was a high-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 16 visits, which was two more than the 14 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $102.00 more than allowed. Patient 2: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Therefore, according to AHCA, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. However, Dr. Valente stated, and medical records indicated, that Patient 2 was a high-risk patient even though her claimed Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook diagnosis code, 642.43, a code for high risk, did not appear on the billing submission. Upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 3: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente asserted that the patient was a high-risk patient because of high blood pressure. However, in the billing submission there is no code indicating high risk. Dr. Valente claimed at the hearing that it should have been coded 645.13. That is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 4: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente claimed the patient had an iron deficiency and should have been coded 281.2. That is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 5: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. The medical record revealed that Patient 5 was obese with poor sugar control, and Dr. Valente asserted she should have been coded 642.43, which is high risk. She did not use this code in the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 6: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. Dr. Valente stated that this was a high- risk patient because she was suffering from oligohydramnious. Dr. Valente did not code this on the bill. The code she claimed, 656.93, is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 7: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for patients who are not high risk. This patient had lung problems. Dr. Valente asserted she should have been coded 496.0 and 491.2 instead of the V22.0 presented on the bill. Codes 496.0 and 491.2 are not high-risk codes. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 8: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for a patient that was not high risk. Dr. Valente suspected a possible birth defect and coded the patient 759.9 and 655.23. Code 655.23 is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente did not use this code in the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 9: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for only five visits, thus never reaching the ten visit threshold. The assertion that Dr. Valente over-billed with regard to Patient 9 was not proven. Patient 10: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the records revealed decreased fetal movement, codes 655.73 and V28.4. Code 655.73 is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente did not put this code on the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, this charge was permissible. Patient 11: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 12: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $50.00 more than allowed. Patient 13: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 14: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 12 visits, which was two more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $100.00 more than allowed. Patient 15: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 16: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 17: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 12 visits, which was two more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $104.00 more than allowed. Patient 18: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 19: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 20: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not dispute AHCA's finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 21: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente said this patient was at risk for cervical cancer and entered diagnosis codes 795.0 and 795.09. These are not high- risk codes. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 22: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente stated, and the records revealed, that the patient had a psychiatric disorder and, therefore, should have had a diagnosis code of 648.43, which is high risk. Dr. Valente did not assert this code on the bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, the amount billed was permissible. Patient 23: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. This patient's baby had dilated kidneys. The patient was coded 655.0, which is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 24: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. AHCA asserted that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente's records indicated that this patient had impending pre-eclampsia, which she coded 642.03, as hypertension. This is a high-risk code. Dr. Valente failed to assert that code on the Medicaid bill. However, upon consideration of all of the evidence, Dr. Valente did not bill more than was permissible. Patient 25: This was a high-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 15 visits, which was one more than the 14 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $50.00 more than allowed. Patient 26: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 27: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed for a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the patient had a heart murmur and was asthmatic requiring medicine, which is code 493.0. She billed for 493.0, a high-risk code, and, therefore, was entitled to see the patient 14 times. Dr. Valente only saw the patient 11 times. Therefore, Dr. Valente did not bill more than allowed. Patient 28: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits that she coded V22.0. She said the patient had a childhood seizure disorder and should have been coded 345.0, which is high risk. Therefore, Dr. Valente did not bill more than allowed. Patient 29: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente found this patient to have high-risk viral cells and assigned diagnosis code 622.1. According to the Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook, this is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 30: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 31: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 32: AHCA asserted that this was a low- risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which is one more than permitted. Dr. Valente stated that this patient had a mild pregnancy-induced hypertension and should have been assigned diagnosis code 642.43, which is high risk. However, no such code was assigned. The only code assigned on the Medicaid bill was V22.0. This is not a high-risk code. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 33: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente stated that the patient was an alcohol abuser and that the patient developed decreased fetal movement late in the pregnancy. Dr. Valente assigned the code 655.43, which is a high- risk code. The patient was entitled to 14 visits. Dr. Valente billed for 11, which was within the allowed limits. Patient 34: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 35: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 36: AHCA asserted this was a low-risk patient and that Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente decided that the patient's baby was not reactive to a stress test, and the patient had to be induced. Dr. Valente coded this 658.03, which is not high risk. AHCA's witness, Dr. Franz, agreed with this. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 37: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. Patient 38: This was a low-risk patient. Dr. Valente billed for 11 visits, which was one more than the 10 allowed. Dr. Valente did not contest this finding. Therefore, Dr. Valente billed Medicaid $52.00 more than allowed. The total amount over-billed in Category 1 was $1,602.00. Category 2 addressed billing for the Screening more than once during a pregnancy. The Physician Coverage and Limitation Handbook provides for Florida's Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening. It states, "The Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening should be offered at the first antepartum visit. The antepartum visit that includes completion of the Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening is reimbursed once per pregnancy by billing code W1991 antepartum visit plus Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening, or W1992 antepartum visit plus Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening performed during the first trimester of pregnancy." Therefore, for Category 2, the audit searched for situations where there was more than one Healthy Start prenatal visit per pregnancy. In other words, a W1991 might be billed or a W1992 might be billed, but both could not be billed during a single pregnancy. The audit asserts this occurred nine times as follows: Patient 1: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $148. Patient 2: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $98. Patient 3: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 4: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a H1001, which is the Screening during the first trimester for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $104. Patient 5: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 6: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 7: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 8: Dr. Valente billed for the W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, and then billed for a W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $100. Patient 9: Dr. Valente billed for the W1991, which is an antepartum visit with the Screening after the first trimester, and then billed for a W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester for the same recipient. This overpayment was in the amount of $150. The total amount overpaid in Category 2 was $1,000. Dr. Valente pointed out that even though she over-billed in this category, she should have received $50 on each occurrence for an office visit. Although this may be true, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this forum to make recommendations with regard to that. Category 3 included a search for billings for W1992, which is the Screening during the first trimester, that were made subsequent to the end of the first trimester. AHCA defines the first trimester as the first 13 weeks of a pregnancy. The Screening form says the first trimester is determined to be 13 weeks (or 91 days) from the date of the last menstrual cycle. The audit asserted 61 instances of billing for the Screening, subsequent to the first trimester. In determining whether the Screening was accomplished later than the first trimester, 181 days were subtracted from the delivery date. This meant that a Screening provided less than 181 days before delivery was, perforce, beyond the first trimester. The auditors found 61 instances where this occurred. Dr. Valente agreed that she screened subsequent to the first trimester for patients number 2-8, 11-14, 16-18, 20-22, 25-31, 33-36, 38, 40, 43-46, 48-49, 51-54, and 56-61. This amounted to 44 over-bills at $50 and two at $49.34, for a total of $2,298.68. When evaluating the audit at this point, it is helpful to recall that the medical records of the patients were not available when the final audit was issued, but they were available at the time of the hearing. The Medicaid bills for the Healthy Start Prenatal Risk Screening Instruments are typically submitted before the baby is born. Thus, the physician at the time of submission cannot know the actual delivery date with mathematical precision. Accordingly, the physician has to estimate the due date using the date of the last menstrual period (LMP); by ultrasounds; and by following the progress of the pregnancy. Moreover, babies arrive before their predicted due date as well as after. The disputed cases in Category 3 are discussed below. Patient 1: The estimated delivery date (EDD) was July 9, 2003. The actual delivery date was May 15, 2003. The EDD on December 3, 2002, was determined by ultrasound to be nine weeks and by LMP to be ten weeks. The Screening date was December 3, 2002. This was well within the 13-week window for the Screening. Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 9: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 10: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 15: An ultrasound on this patient on June 18, 2003, indicated the patient was nine weeks pregnant. The Screening was accomplished on the same day. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 19: This patient did not agree to the screening. If the patient does not agree to the Screening, AHCA is not permitted to pay for the Screening. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 23: The Screening for this patient is dated February 26, 2003, according to the Screening form signed by the patient. The delivery date provided to AHCA is incorrect because due to an absence of fetal heartbeat the patient experienced a "Suction D&E followed by sharp D&C of the uterine cavity." This occurred about the 13th week, on March 28, 2003. In other words, there was no delivery. However, the Screening was not signed at the bottom and that is a reason for rejecting payment. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 24: The Screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 32: This patient declined screening, so Dr. Valente over-billed $49.34. Patient 37: The Screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 39: This patient declined screening, so Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00. Patient 41: The Screening date for this patient was October 30, 2002. The first ultrasound on this patient was provided on the same day and indicated the baby was at 12.7 weeks with an EDD of May 9, 2003. The baby was delivered April 19, 2003, which means it came earlier than anticipated and that the Screening was accomplished during the first trimester. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 42: The screening form is completely absent for this patient. Accordingly, Dr. Valente over-billed $50.00 for this patient. Patient 47: The Screening for this patient listed on the AHCA spreadsheet was May 8, 2003. However, the form indicates it was signed by the patient on March 27, 2003. The patient's LMP was February 13, 2003, and the first ultrasound indicated the patient was eight and one-half weeks pregnant on April 10, 2003. Even if the Screening was accomplished May 8, 2003, as alleged, it was accomplished in the first trimester. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. Patient 55: The alleged Screening was accomplished August 7, 2003. The Screening date is unreadable as to month, but the day is 31. Dr. Valente's testimony is that it was in March and that the patient was at 11 weeks and three days. This appears more correct than AHCA's allegation. Accordingly, Dr. Valente did not improperly bill for this patient. The over-payment alleged was a total of $3,048.68. The evidence indicates that on five occasions Dr. Valente was correct in her assertion that the Screening for five of the patients, at $50.00 per patient, was actually within the first trimester. Accordingly, it is found that Dr. Valente only owes $2,748.02 for Category 3. A request for records was sent to Dr. Valente via certified mail to the address she maintained on file with AHCA, on or about October 29, 2007. This provided Dr. Valente with the preliminary audit findings and invited her to illuminate or explain the findings so they could be adjusted if appropriate. The letter was returned. AHCA found a more current address and sent the same letter, and it was delivered to that address in Jacksonville on December 6, 2007. The receipt was signed by Dr. Valente's father. Eventually, Dr. Valente received the materials and called AHCA Investigator Terri Dean, who was listed as the contact point in the letter sent to Dr. Valente. Dr. Valente informed Investigator Dean that she could not get the records. Accordingly, the audit became final as written on March 21, 2008, and was provided to Dr. Valente. The report stated that Dr. Valente owed $6,118.68 for overpayments and should pay a $500.00 fine for failure to provide records. Dr. Valente provided the records about six months later, in late September or early October of 2008. AHCA reviewed the records and determined that there were overpayments in the amount of $7,344.00. Because litigation was already underway, AHCA did not attempt to extract the additional amount from Dr. Valente.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order requiring Dr. Grace Valente, M.D.: to pay the sum of $5,350.02 for the purpose of reimbursing improperly billed Medicaid services; to pay a fine of $1,500 for failing to provide medical records in a timely fashion; and to pay interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the sum of $5,350.02, from March 21, 2008, the date of the final audit report; and interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the sum of $1,500 from the date the final order is entered, until the sums are paid completely. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: William Blocker, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grace Valente, M.D. 3474 Paddle Point Spring Hill, Florida 34609 Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Holly Benson, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary' evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: DHRS administers the Program which is jointly funded by the state and federal government under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The Program is voluntary and is subject to both state and federal laws, rules and regulations. The Program does not reimburse providers such as Dr. Clement for all services rendered. Only those services which are determined to be medically necessary or which the state has determined it wishes to provide are covered by the Program. The services to be rendered and the fees to be paid for those services are set forth in the policy manuals and fee schedules which are given the provider when he enrolls in the Program. Under the Program, the provider files claims in accordance with the policies set forth in the manual. Those claims are computer processed and it is assumed that the provider is submitting the claims in accordance with the policies. The computer system is not programmed to reject all erroneous claims. Therefore, the provider is automatically reimbursed based upon claims submitted. The Program operates on the honor system and must "pay and chase" providers who submit improper claims. Under the Program the state is required to protect the integrity of the Program by reviewing providers for possible fraud and abuse. The Program utilizes a Surveillance Utilization and Review System (SURS) which compares a provider's Medicaid practice with that of his peers. This system takes the provider's computer generated claims history and compares it both quantitatively and qualitatively with the average practice of his peers. When a potential problem is detected, the provider's practice is further reviewed to determine if fraud or abuse has occurred. On November 4, 1983, Dr. Clement signed a provider agreement with DHRS and operated under this provider agreement at all times material to this proceeding. In signing this provider agreement, Dr. Clement agreed to "submit requests for payment in accordance with program policies" and to, "abide by the provisions of the Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. In billing under the Program, Dr. Clement is expected to provide services in accordance with generally accepted practices of his profession of dentistry. Those services for which a provider may submit claims are set forth in the Children's Dental Services Manual (HRSM 230-22), a copy of which was provided to Dr. Clement when he entered the Program. In addition to the manual, Dr. Clement was provided with an EDS Billing Handbook which explained the mechanics of submitting a claim. HRSM 230-22 is merely a compilation of procedures for which the Program will reimburse the provider along with the reimbursement rate for each procedure. The manual utilizes procedures and codes utilized by the American Dental Association, is prepared with technical assistance of dental consultants, and is reviewed by various dental associations. The manual is designed for use by dental providers who are knowledgeable in the field of dentistry and are utilizing generally accepted principles of dentistry. In 1985 a SURS Level I Review report, comparing Dr. Clement with his peer group of general dentists providing services to children, indicated possible inappropriate billing of the Program. Because of the nature and extent of the billing problems, Dr. Clement's case was referred to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) of the State of Florida's Auditor General's Office for possible criminal prosecution. DHRS took no further action pending the criminal investigation. Criminal charges were subsequently filed against Dr. Clement as a result of the MFCU investigation and Dr. Clement's case was referred back to the Medicaid Office of Program Integrity for review of nine possible areas of program policy violations which were not part of the criminal prosecution. The Program thereupon conducted its own investigation into possible abuse by Dr. Clement. Using the preliminary investigation done by an HRS dental consultant who reviewed Dr. Clement's practice for MFCU, and the original Level I Review report, a DHRS investigator reviewed ad hoc computer reports of claims submitted by Dr. Clement for specific dental procedures. Based upon the computer analysis of claims submitted, as well as the advice of the dental consultant, the Program identified nine areas of Dr. Clement's practice of Medicaid billing which were not in compliance with Medicaid billing procedures or generally accepted standards of dental practice. On sixty-six occasions, Dr. Clement submitted claims and was paid for procedures such as examinations, prophylaxis and fluoride treatment at intervals of less than six months. HRSM 230-22 recommends that such procedures be performed no more frequently than once every six months, and this recommendation is recognized under generally accepted standards of dentistry. This recommendation is applicable to both private pay patients and Medicaid patients who are generally indigent. Although such treatment may be necessary on occasions at shorter intervals, Dr. Clement offered no evidence to justify the frequency or the necessity of providing such procedures at intervals of less than the recommended six months. On two hundred and eighty six occasions, Dr. Clement improperly filed claims and received payment for consultations. HRSM 230-22 only allows claims for consultations by a dental specialist (oral surgeon, periodontist, endodontist, or prosthodontist). Dr. Clement is not a dental specialist and should not have submitted claims for such procedures. The manual's definition and interpretation of the appropriate billing procedure for consultation services is in accordance with the generally accepted practice of dentistry. On ninety four occasions, Dr. Clement submitted claims and received payment for behavior management and nitrous oxide on the same visit. HRSM 230- 22 only allows claims for behavior management where nitrous oxide is not used. There was no evidence to show that both behavior management and nitrous oxide on the same visit was necessary. On seven occasions, Dr. Clement submitted claims and received payment for extracting more than one first tooth in a given quadrant. HRSM 230-22 provides a fee of $10.00 for the extraction of the first tooth in a given quadrant which is billed on a claim as procedure D7110 whereas each additional tooth extracted in the same quadrant at the same time is reimbursed at the rate of $7.00 and billed on a claim as procedure D7120. The fee for the removal of the first tooth in a given quadrant is higher than the fee for each succeeding tooth in the same quadrant because anesthesia for the first tooth does not have be administered for each succeeding tooth in the same quadrant. Dr. Clement received payment for 117 alveolectomies (a reshaping of the bone) performed on 52 children which is an excessive number. Alveolectomies should only be performed in extreme cases where, without an alveolectomy, the insertion of dentures or partials would be impossible. It is standard dental practice to perform an alveolectomy only where a denture is supplied. Performing an alveolectomy on a child is not a common practice. There was no evidence that Dr. Clement performed the alveolectomies in preparation of insertion of partials or dentures. Dr. Clement filed an excessive number of claims for pulp caps. A pulp cap is a protective material utilized when the pulp of the tooth is exposed (direct pulp cap) or nearly exposed (indirect pulp cap). HRSM 230-22 differentiates a pulp cap from a medicated base. A pulp cap is reimbursable as a separate claim, the medicated base is not. Dr. Clement claimed and received payment for pulp caps 68.7 percent of the time in conjunction with a tooth restoration. There was credible evidence to show that in the generally accepted practice of dentistry, pulp caps are used no more than 5 percent of the time in a tooth restoration. Dr. Clement billed for pulp caps whenever he applied a medicated base, even though the pulp was not exposed or nearly exposed. On one hundred occasions Dr. Clement improperly filed claims and received payment for palliative (emergency) treatment at the same time that he filed a claim and was paid for regular dental treatment. Palliative treatment is used to relieve pain and discomfort on an emergency basis when time and circumstances contra-indicate a more definitive treatment and additional services. In the general accepted practice of dentistry, palliative treatment is used as a temporary measure to assist the patient until such time as regular treatment can be provided. Palliative treatment and any other treatment are mutually exclusive and normally would not be given on the same day. On those occasion where Dr. Clement filed claims and received payment for both palliative treatment and regular treatment on the same day, there is insufficient evidence to show that this treatment was within the generally accepted practice of dentistry. On sixteen occasions Dr. clement improperly filed claims and was paid for prophylaxis, periodontal scaling, and gingival curettage all on the same date of service. Prophylaxis is the standard cleaning of the teeth. Periodontal scaling is a more advanced procedure of cleaning wherein larger deposits of caclculus are removed by scraping. Gingival curretage is a more drastic procedures wherein pockets which have formed between the gum and the teeth are scraped out. While all three procedures are different, they overlap somewhat and it is not a generally accepted practice of dentistry to perform more than one of these procedures at any given time. There was no evidence presented to show that performing all three procedures on the same date was necessary or was within the generally accepted practice of dentistry. Dr. Clement filed an excessive number of claims for gingival curretage. Dr. Clement claimed and received payment for gingival curretage on 14 percent of his patients under the age of 17. In the generally accepted practice of dentistry, the use of gingival curretage on children will not normally exceed 1 percent to 3 percent for ages 10 and under or 3 percent to 6 percent over the age of 10. Although Dr. Clement urged that these claims for gingival curretage had been given prior approval, the evidence showed that the prior approval had been given based on information furnished by Dr. Clement and the dental consultant giving the prior approval did so on that information on a case by case basis and did not know of the excessive use of gingival curretage by Dr. Clement. Based on the nine areas cited for inappropriate billing, there is substantial competent evidence to show that Dr. Clement was not following generally accepted standards of dental practice.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that Dr. Clement has abused the Florida Medicaid Program and terminating Dr. Clement from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. Respectfully submitted and entered this 7th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3023 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 as clarified. 21. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 17 but clarified. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 9 The first sentence adopted in Finding of Fact 19. The balance is rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore E. Mack, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Harold E. Regan, Esquire 308 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Should Respondent be disciplined for practicing beyond the scope of his license or by accepting and performing professional responsibilities which he knows or has reason to know that he is not competent to perform? See Section 460.413(1)(t), Florida Statutes, formerly Section 460.413(1)(u), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is charged with regulating the practice of chiropractic pursuant to Sections 20.165, 20.42, Florida Statutes and Chapters 455 and 460, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a Florida licensed chiropratic physician. His license number is No. CH-0001538. He was issued that license on September 21, 1968. Respondent practices chiropratic at the McCall Chiropractic Clinic located at 811 Grace Avenue in Panama City, Florida. Respondent is not licensed as an osteopathic or allopathic physician as recognized by the Florida Board of Osteopathic Physicians or the Board of Medicine respectively. In 1992 Respondent sent Micheal Smith, D.C., a chiropractic physician practicing in Panama City, Florida, information described as an invitation for Dr. Smith to join Respondent in clinical research "designed to test the effectiveness of Scalar E.M. Technology upon AIDS-CANCER opportunistic organisms falling within the meaning of chapter 460.403(3)(a)(b)(c)(e), and Rule 21D-1702, Florida Statutes." The correspondence went on to describe some details about the research. In particular, Respondent stated that "preliminary field data suggest that Scalar E.M. TENS Technology is effective in 47 pathological conditions including AIDS-Cancer disease." The correspondence also set forth information concerning patients who wished to contribute to the research by making financial contributions to the "Allaganey Occupational Development Foundation, 22 Floor Pacific First Center, 1425th Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101-2333". Respondent provided Dr. Smith a sheet on the McCall Chiropractic Clinic letterhead related to purported medical research at Stanford University in 1988 studying "the Biological Interactions with the Scalar Energy Cellular Mechanisms of Action" in response to weak ELF ectromagnetic (EM) radiation and the claimed results. That sheet describes how the McCall Chiropractic Clinic would be "conducting private research into the effectiveness of Scalar E.M. Technology upon the following conditions, for a two-year period of time." Arthritis Arm Pains Angina Pectoras Arethemia Asthma Allergies Bacterial Infection of the Lung Carple Tunnel Syndrome Cancer of the: Bone, Brain, Bladder, Bowell, Lungs, Liver, AIDS Colon Polyps Cholitis Candidia Albicans Deafness Diabetes Neuropathy Emphysemia Eckcemia Ear Infection Epstine Barr Infection Exothalmic Goider Feavers Fungus of the skin Fibrosis of the Lung Gout High Blood Pressure Herniated disc Herpes B infection Hemrroids Hardening of the arteries Herpes of the Genitals Hypertrophy of the Prostate Inflimation of the joints Nectniuria Kendidia Albicans Leg Pains Multipleschlerosis Musculardistrohy Neuropathy Nose bleads Premenstral Syndrome Paracititis of digestive track Phlebitis Sinus Infection Tumors of the Eye Varicose Veines Warts Leupus Erethematosis Parkinsons Disease Dr. Smith was also provided with a copy of an advertisement which stated: ATTENTION: Aids - Cancer Patients Dr. Curtis J. McCall, Jr. Chiropractor Research program utilizing scalar tens antineoplastic technology is available through the provisions of Chapter 460.403(3)(a)(b)(c)(e) Rule 21D-1702 Florida Statutes. Patients suffering with Aids - Cancer disease who would like to participate in the research program should call 769-1708 for an appointment or come by the office: 811 Grace Ave., P.C., Fla. 32401 In the 1993 yellow pages for the Panama City, Florida, telephone book, Respondent placed an advertisement to this effect: MCCALL CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC PEOPLE HAVE TRUSTED THE HANDS OF DR. McCALL SINCE 1968 -- TENS AIDS -- CANCER THERAPY -- 811 Grace Av Panama Cy 769-1708 In the July 8, 1993 advertising service in the "Thrifty Nickel" circulated in Panama City, Florida, Respondent placed the following advertisement: NOTICE: The McCall Chiropractic Clinic has on display a 1953 classified federal document that discloses successful treatment for cancer. Patient response indicates this technology is effective in the treatment of 47 conditions. This technology is available through the provisions or Chapter 460- 1403(3), (a), (b), (c), (e). Rule 210-1702 Florida Statutes. Phone 769-1708 for appointment, 811 Grace Avenue, Panama City, Florida 32401. F24 On July 19, 1993, Respondent, on stationary from McCall Chiropractic Clinic, wrote to TCRS, Inc., in Tallahassee, Florida, asking that company to place McCall Chiropractic Clinic on its list of AIDS/Cancer Therapeutic Center listings for national referrals. That correspondence gave a brief description of the service that Respondent intended to provide. It indicated that the therapy to be provided would cost the patient $18.00 per 20 minutes. Through Respondent's activities that have been described, Respondent directly held himself out to the public as having the ability to treat persons with AIDS. In furtherance of his intentions, Respondent developed a treatment protocol consisting of approximately 55 weeks of treatment to be monitored initially by Respondent at his chiropractic facility. That protocol required the patient to receive TENS therapy for two hours each day. The TENS device is designed to deliver transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation. Its principal chiropractic use is for pain control. However, Respondent, in his intended care, contemplated that the device would stimulate "T-Cells" in combatting AIDS. In the protocol, Respondent also required monthly blood tests to monitor the patient's "T-Cell" counts. The protocol required the patient to be free from all other drugs, in particular, the AIDS treatment medication "AZT". Under the protocol, the patient was required to receive a weekly injection of a compound identified as "chondriana", in amounts determined by Respondent. Finally, the patient was to ingest a compound identified by Respondent as "life crystals". On or about February 4, 1994, Respondent began to care for the patient C.L. That care ended on September 29, 1994. In this arrangement Respondent and C.L. had a chiropractic physician-patient relationship. Patient C.L. died on August 18, 1995. Respondent made a diagnosis, proposed a course of treatment and directly treated C.L. for AIDS. In this treatment Respondent maintained a patient record for C.L. In an effort to secure reimbursement for the services provided to C.L., Respondent prepared insurance claim forms, affixing a diagnosis of AIDS to the claim forms and had C.L. assign benefits to the Respondent from the insurance policy. In this connection Respondent had C.L. execute a sworn statement describing the services received from Respondent. It was Respondent's expectation that the claim forms would be honored by the insurance carrier and that Respondent would be paid for the services rendered to C.L. With one exception, Respondent's billings to the insurance carrier for C.L.'s visits to Respondent's office were all for the treatment of AIDS. An investigation was instituted by the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation/ Agency for Health Care Administration to ascertain whether Respondent was offering patient treatment for AIDS. James Cooksey, an investigator with the regulator, performed that investigation in conjunction with Tom Willoughby, investigator for the Bay County, Florida, Sheriff's Office. James Cooksey is an insurance fraud/medical malpractice investigator. To conduct the investigation Mr. Cooksey assumed the fictitious name James Stark. The reason for assuming the name was to present James Stark as a patient suffering from AIDS. In furtherance of the investigation Mr. Cooksey went to the Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center and obtained a fictitious positive AIDS test in the name James Stark. On May 16, 1994, Mr. Cooksey initiated contact with Respondent. The investigator traveled from Tallahassee to Panama City. When he reached Panama City he called Respondent and told Respondent that he needed to come and talk to him. Respondent invited Mr. Cooksey to come by that afternoon. On May 16, 1994, Mr. Cooksey met with Respondent at Respondent's office. At that meeting Mr. Cooksey told Respondent that the investigator understood that Respondent could possibly cure AIDS. Mr. Cooksey further stated that he had seen something in a newspaper article that Respondent was treating AIDS patients and explained to Respondent that Mr. Cooksey had contracted AIDS and was interested in being cured. Mr. Cooksey provided Respondent with the results of the fictitious blood test. When Mr. Cooksey presented to Respondent he did not complain of any condition other than AIDS. Respondent did not physically examine Mr. Cooksey. Respondent explained to Mr. Cooksey about the nature of Respondent's treatment in which the TENS unit, also known as a Rife machine, chondriana and life crystals would be used. To demonstrate the treatment Respondent took Mr. Cooksey into a room in the back of his office, a treatment room, and had Mr. Cooksey take his shoes and socks off and place his feet on a metal pad associated with the TENS unit. When the unit as turned on Mr. Cooksey could feel tingling inside his feet. On this occasion Respondent told Mr. Cooksey that, he, Mr. Cooksey could get injections of chondriana and then the machine would be turned on and Cooksey would receive stimulation to fight the infection associated with AIDS. Respondent told Mr. Cooksey that the initial treatments for AIDS would have to be done at his office where Respondent would monitor the investigator. Respondent indicated that a nurse would come to the office and give the injections of chondriana and that Mr. Cooksey would be monitored concerning those injections until Mr. Cooksey's "system built up a little". Mr. Cooksey understood that he was to receive those injections and use the TENS unit and was not to take other forms of medication during the treatment. Respondent gave Mr. Cooksey a card with the name of a blood test that would need to be obtained and the results reported to Respondent. Mr. Cooksey was responsible for paying for the blood test. Respondent told Mr. Cooksey that the life crystals were to be taken in orally as a drink and they were described as being part of the AIDS treatment. On this date Respondent gave the investigator an estimate of the costs of this treatment, constituted of $2,000 for the TENS unit and $2,925 for chondriana and life crystals. Subsequent to that date Respondent called Mr. Cooksey and left a message on Cooksey's telephone. Respondent also wrote the investigator on May 23, 1994, providing the investigator more information concerning Respondent's treatment for AIDS. The investigator then went to the state attorney's office in Panama City and informed the state attorney of the nature of the administrative investigation and the belief that the activities by Respondent might constitute a criminal law violation. The state attorney represented to the investigator that he concurred. The state attorney then had Mr. Cooksey contact the Bay County Sheriff's office. Following that contact Mr. Cooksey took up a joint investigation between Mr. Cooksey and Bay County Sheriff's investigator Tom Willoughby. On October 18, 1994, Mr. Cooksey placed a call to Respondent and told the Respondent that he was in Panama City and would like to come by and meet with the Respondent and that he would be accompanied by a friend who might be able to "come up" with the money that was required to purchase the chondriana and life crystals and TENS unit. The part of the friend was to be played by Officer Willoughby. Mr. Cooksey and Officer Willoughby then went to Respondent's office where Respondent again explained the nature of the AIDS treatment. Officer Willoughby asked the Respondent questions concerning the nature of the treatment and how much the treatment would cost. Respondent explained that the treatment involved injections of the chondriana, drinking the life crystals and using the TENS machine for two hours a day to treat James Stark for AIDS. At the October 18, 1994 meeting between the investigators and Respondent, Respondent stated that a nurse practitioner with whom he was friends would administer the chondriana and that activity would be monitored by Respondent in Respondent's office. Officer Willoughby asked Respondent if there would be side affects to the injections. Respondent indicated that there would be sweating and that Respondent would monitor Mr. Cooksey for whatever period of time would be necessary for the side affects to subside. The investigators watched a video tape explaining the treatment for AIDS which Respondent intended to employ. The injections of chondriana would be given monthly. Respondent indicated to the investigators that he would instruct Mr. Cooksey on how many of the life crystals to take. Respondent told the investigators that the cost of the TENS unit was $2,000.00 and that the unit would be used to spread the impulses through out the body. Respondent indicated to the investigators that the nature of the treatment would form new T-cells to replace T-cells containing the AIDS virus or which were cancerous. Respondent had stated in Officer Willoughby's presence that the TENS unit cost $500.00 to produce. Respondent and the two investigators then went to a local health food store, known as the Olive Leaf, to ascertain the amount of money needed to pay for chondriana which the health food store would provide. There, the attendant at the store indicated that he could arrange to provide the chondriana and life crystals for a price approximating $2,800.00. After leaving the health food store the investigators told the Respondent that they would come back with the necessary money on October 21, 1994. The investigators returned to Respondent's office on October 21, 1994, after obtaining warrants to search the office and arrest the Respondent. Before Respondent was arrested and the search made, the investigators asked Respondent to again explain the nature of the treatment that would be provided to Mr. Cooksey and paid Respondent $1,700.00 for the TENS unit from funds belonging to the Bay County Sheriff's Office. Respondent gave the investigators a receipt for the $1,700.00 payment. Respondent was then arrested for practicing medicine without a license. On one occasion Respondent explained to the investigators that the procedures that were used to treat Mr. Cooksey for AIDS were not condoned by the FDA, but that it was working in other places where it had been tried and that three patients treated in another location had gained remission from the AIDS. Based on the proof, it is found that Respondent diagnosed Mr. Cooksey as having AIDS and developed a course of treatment for that condition. Paul Doering, M.S., is a registered pharmacist in the State of Florida. He is also licensed as a consultant pharmacist in the State of Florida. He is a Distinguished Service Professor of Pharmacy Practice at the University of Florida. He is accepted as an expert pharmacist. Mr. Doering established that the drug AZT is an antiviral drug designed to address the HIV virus associated with AIDS. Mr. Doering established that AIDS is an acronym for acquired immuno- deficiency syndrome, "a disease that affects the immune system caused by a virus or different types of viruses which attack the immune system in the body rendering the body unable to effectively mount an immune response when it comes into contact with certain types of infectious organisms." Mr. Doering established that drugs are divided into two basic groups, one group which is sold without prescription and the other group requiring a doctor's prescription. The latter category of drugs are known as Federal Legend Drugs. Mr. Doering established that there is no reference to a medication known as "chondriana" in any directory of medications which he was familiar with. As he established, chondriana does not constitute a food because foods are not generally injected into the human body. Mr. Doering established that chondriana has not been approved to be used as a drug in the United States, nor is it an experimental drug, based upon his research of sources that list drugs or experimental drugs. Marianne Gengenbach, D.C., is licensed to practice chiropractic in Florida and is an expert in chiropractic practice. She established that chiropractors are limited to using proprietary drugs, and then only where the chiropractor has passed a specific exam and obtains a proprietary drug license. Proprietary drugs are "over the counter drugs" not prescription drugs. Absent such as a license to prescribe proprietary drugs chiropractors may only make recommendations, educate patients and prescribe nutritional supplements. Dr. Gengenbach established that Respondent had diagnosed C.L. for AIDS and had treated C.L. for that condition. The treatment was directly related to the condition AIDS, and Dr. Gengenbach established that the treatment was outside the accepted standard of care for chiropractic and exceeded the scope of authorized practice from the view point of a practitioner. As Dr. Gengenbach established, Respondent also exceeded the proper scope of practice in caring for C.L. by recommending that C.L. discontinue the AZT therapy. Those same perceptions were held for treatment of Mr. Cooksey and are accepted. Dr. Gengenbach established that Respondent proposed a course of treatment for Mr. Cooksey related to the condition AIDS, without reference to any other complaints by the patient. As a consequence the course of treatment which Respondent planned for Mr. Cooksey was directed solely to the HIV infection as established by Dr. Gengenbach. Dr. Gengenbach established that the use of the chondriana and life crystals was intended to treat Mr. Cooksey for AIDS. Dr. Gengenbach established that even should the substances chondriana and life crystals be considered food or nutritional supplements, there proposed use for Mr. Cooksey would not meet the prevailing standard of care for chiropractic, in that they would be employed for the treatment of AIDS. Respondent intended that the chondriana and life crystals be used in the cure, treatment, therapy and prevention of AIDS in C.L. and Mr. Cooksey. Respondent intended that those substances affect the structure and function of the bodies of those patients. In proposing and carrying out the treatment that has been described directed to AIDS, Respondent did so mindful that chiropractic physicians in Florida are prohibited from directly treating the AIDS condition. Respondent's treatment of C.L. and proposed treatment of Mr. Cooksey violated the standards of practice acceptable to a reasonably prudent chiropractic physician under similar conditions and circumstances and exceeded the scope of his chiropractic license. In the past Respondent has been disciplined by the Board of Chiropractic on three separate occasions. Two of those cases involve the receipt of a reprimand and in the third case Respondent's license was suspended and he was required to pay an administrative fine. Respondent was also required to cease and desist the activities described in these facts based upon action taken by the Board of Medicine, which was persuaded that Respondent was engaging in the treatment of AIDS without benefit of a medical license.
Recommendation Based upon the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, given the severity of the offense and the danger posed to the public, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which revokes Respondent's license to practice chiropractic medicine in Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1995. APPENDIX CASE NO. 95-2881 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 5 and 6 constitute conclusions of law. Paragraphs 7 through 13 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 15 through 35 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 36 through 40 are conclusions of law. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 42 and 43 are conclusions of law. Paragraphs 44 through 51 are subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 5 constitute legal argument as reported at pages 2 through 5. The proposed facts 1-3 found at pages 15 and 16, Paragraph 1 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 2 is rejected as a discussion of activities of the Probable Cause Panel, not a proper subject for consideration. Paragraph 3 constitutes a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Medical Quality Assurance-Allied Health Agency For Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Curtis J. McCall, D.C. 514 North Bonita Avenue Panama City, FL 32401 Diane Orcutt, Executive Director Agency For Health Care Administration Board of Chiropractors 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) Whether Respondent violated sections 409.913, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Sanction Letter dated January 18, 2012, by failing to have documentation evidencing the receipt of Core Assurances training in six employees' files; failing to have documentation evidencing the receipt of required HIPAA training in one employee file; and failing to have documentation evidencing the receipt of Zero Tolerance training in one employee file2/; and (2) if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program pursuant to chapter 409. Petitioner's duties include operating a program to oversee the activities of Medicaid recipients, and providers and their representatives, to ensure that fraudulent and abusive behavior and neglect of recipients occur to the minimum extent possible, and to recover overpayments and impose sanctions as appropriate. § 409.913(1), Fla. Stat. To that end, Petitioner is authorized to conduct investigations of Medicaid providers to determine compliance with the Medicaid program. § 409.913(2), Fla. Stat. Respondent is an enrolled Medicaid provider providing home-based and community-based services to the developmentally disabled in a residential habilitation setting.3/ Respondent became an enrolled Medicaid provider in April 2004, and has been an enrolled Medicaid provider at all times pertinent to this proceeding. Medicaid Provider Agreement To become enrolled as a Medicaid provider for the developmentally disabled in Florida, a provider applies with Petitioner and the Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD"). If the provider is approved for enrollment in the Medicaid program, it enters into a Medicaid Provider Agreement ("MPA") with Petitioner. The MPA establishes the terms and conditions of the provider's participation in the Medicaid program. A key condition is that the provider agrees to comply with all federal, state, and local laws, including rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including the applicable Medicaid Handbooks. The Florida Medicaid Development Disabilities Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, dated November 2010 ("DD Handbook"), and the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook, dated July 2008 ("General Handbook"), are applicable to this proceeding. Petitioner's Inspection of Respondent's Facility On September 28, 2011, Ms. Gina Selwitz, an Inspector Specialist with Petitioner's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity, conducted an unannounced site inspection at Respondent's facility to review Respondent's employee records and recipient files for compliance with applicable Medicaid program requirements. As part of the inspection, Ms. Selwitz reviewed the records of six employees for documentation that they had received required training in a range of areas, including Core Competency, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") compliance, and Zero Tolerance Training, as required under state and federal law and rules and the General Handbook and DD Handbook. Ms. Selwitz determined that required documentation showing Core Assurances training was missing from six of Respondent's employees' files. She also determined that required documentation showing HIPAA training was missing from the file of one of Respondent's employees. Additionally, she determined that required documentation showing Zero Tolerance training was missing from the file of one of Respondent's employees. Demand Letter Regarding Submittal of Missing Information While conducting the compliance inspection, Ms. Selwitz hand-delivered to Respondent a demand letter dated September 28, 2011. The demand letter stated in pertinent part: Pursuant to Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (F.S.), this is official notice that the Agency requests the documentation for services paid by the Florida Medicaid program to the above provider number. The Medicaid-related records to substantiate billing for the recipients identified on the enclosed printout are due within fifteen (15) calendar days of your receipt of this notification. In addition, please complete the attached questionnaire and submit it along with the copies of the Medicaid- related records. Please submit the documentation and the attached Certificate of Completeness of Records to the Agency within this timeframe, or other mutually agreed upon timeframe. The referenced questionnaire and printout were not attached to the demand letter. Ms. Selwitz provided Respondent a handwritten list of items that she determined were missing from its files and that needed to be submitted in response to the demand letter. Respondent's Responses to Demand Letter and Sanction Letter On October 12, 2011, Respondent's representative, Mr. Orukotan, sent Ms. Selwitz electronic mail requesting that she send the editable Developmental Services Medicaid Provider Questionnaire form so Respondent could complete and submit it by October 14, 2011. After further electronic mail exchange, Ms. Selwitz provided the form to Mr. Orukotan on October 18, 2011. Respondent submitted the completed Questionnaire on November 3, 2011. In addition, Respondent submitted its Certificate of Completeness of Records and the other items that were requested in Ms. Selwitz's handwritten list provided with the demand letter. The handwritten list did not identify employee training documentation for Core Assurances, HIPAA, and Zero Tolerance as missing from Respondent's files; accordingly, Respondent did not provide that documentation as part of its November 3, 2011, submittal. Subsequently, Petitioner issued a Sanction Letter, dated January 18, 2012, which in part alleged that Respondent failed to have documentation in its files evidencing the receipt of employee training in Core Assurances, HIPAA, and Zero Tolerance. After receiving the Sanction Letter, Respondent submitted documentation of employee training in Core Assurances, HIPAA, and Zero Tolerance to demonstrate its compliance with the Medicaid program documentation requirements. Ms. Selwitz claimed that in addition to the handwritten list, she had given Respondent a typewritten list that identified other specific information, including the employee training documentation, that she determined missing from Respondent's files and needed to be provided pursuant to the demand letter. Respondent credibly testified that he never received this typewritten list of additional requested items. In support of Ms. Selwitz's testimony, Petitioner provided, as a supplemental exhibit, a typewritten form entitled "Residential Rehabilitation Provider." At the top of the form were three spaces to be filled in with the facility's name and the date and time of inspection; however, no information regarding Respondent's facility or its inspection was filled in the spaces, which were left blank. The form generally requested a range of items, including "[a]ll employee records (include Level II (FDLE and FBI) background check information)[4/]" but did not specifically request that Core Assurances, HIPAA, or Zero Tolerance employee training documentation be provided. The form further stated: "please provide the following records so that they may be reviewed on-site . . ."; This statement was followed by a list of items. However, Petitioner's facility inspection checklist and notes did not identify these items as missing from Respondent's files.5/ Rather than comprising an additional list of information that Ms. Selwitz prepared and provided to Respondent to specifically identify missing information to be submitted pursuant to the demand letter, the Residential Rehabilitation Provider list instead appears to be a general form list that Petitioner provides before or at the time of facility inspection. Under any circumstances, the form's lack of specificity regarding employee training documentation for Core Assurances, HIPAA, and Zero Tolerance would not have given Respondent notice that Petitioner had determined such documentation was missing from its files and needed to be provided as part of its response to the demand letter. The credible evidence establishes that Respondent was not given this typewritten form or otherwise notified that Petitioner had determined that employee training documentation for Core Assurances, HIPAA, and Zero Tolerance was missing from its files and needed to be provided pursuant to the demand letter. Respondent's Compliance With Record-Keeping Requirements Section 409.913, Petitioner's rules, the DD and General Handbooks, and federal law require that providers keep and produce as required, specified employee records, including records demonstrating training in a range of areas, including Core Assurances, HIPAA, and Zero Tolerance. Ms. Selwitz testified that if information determined to be missing from a provider's files during a compliance inspection is timely submitted pursuant to the demand letter, the provider is deemed to be in compliance with the applicable record-keeping and document production requirements in state and federal Medicaid law. Here, Petitioner did not notify Respondent that it had determined that certain employee training documentation was missing from its files. Thus, Respondent was not given the opportunity to establish compliance with the record-keeping and document production requirements by timely submitting this documentation in accordance with Petitioner's demand letter. Mr. Orukotan testified that Respondent kept the requested documentation in its employee files and would have provided it, had Petitioner notified Respondent that its inspection determined the documentation was missing. His testimony, which is bolstered by the fact that Respondent did timely submit all information pursuant to the handwritten list provided with the demand letter, is deemed credible and persuasive. As previously noted, Respondent submitted the employee training documentation upon being informed, pursuant to the Sanction Letter, that Petitioner had determined such documentation was missing from its files.6/ Under the present circumstances——where Petitioner failed to afford Respondent an opportunity to demonstrate compliance by timely responding to its demand letter, and where Respondent, when informed of the deficiencies, submitted the requested documentation——the undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Respondent violated chapter 409, Petitioner's applicable rules, the DD Handbook, the General Handbook, and federal law, as charged in the January 18, 2012, Sanction Letter.7/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order determining that Respondent did not violate federal and state Medicaid laws as charged in the January 18, 2012 Sanction Letter. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or Petitioner), is entitled to a recoupment for a Medicaid overpayment to Respondent, Humane Minority, Inc. (Humane or Respondent), in the amount of $177,581.26.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. As part of its duties, Petitioner attempts to recover Medicaid overpayments from Medicaid providers. At all times material to this case, Humane was licensed to provide various health care services to Medicaid recipients under a contract to AHCA as a Medicaid provider. As provider number 255724000, Humane participated in the Medicaid program from January 1, 2005, to February 8, 2006 (audit period). As a Medicaid provider, Respondent was subject to audit. This case arose when the Discovery Unit of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI) identified that during the audit period Humane billed 1.5 times as much for one week as compared to ten other weeks, which is an indicator of billing irregularities. As a result, the Discovery Unit of MPI recommended a comprehensive audit of Humane. Gary Mosier, a Registered Nursing Consultant employed by AHCA in the bureau of MPI, initiated the audit of Humane after receiving the Discovery Unit’s File #47650 Recommendation memo dated May 19, 2006, referring Humane for a comprehensive audit. On or about June 13, 2006, MPI requested 30 random Medicaid patients' records from Humane’s entire Medicaid patient group for the audit period. Humane complied with the request and supplied records. The submitted medical records included a Certificate of Completeness of Records from Humane stating the documents supplied constituted all of the Medicaid-related records for the 30 patients during the Audit period. After Humane provided the requested medical records to Mosier, he forwarded the records to three physician consultants: Machado, a general practitioner; Edgar, a psychiatrist; and Reisman, an urologist. Each physician consultant reviewed Humane’s records relevant to his area of expertise and filled out agency worksheets detailing why claims should be disallowed. MPI reviewed Humane’s records provided and the worksheets filled out by the three physician consultants and determined that overpayments were made to Humane due to numerous services in whole or in part not being covered by Medicaid, which violated various Medicaid policy guidelines set forth in both the Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook (General Handbook)1 and the Florida Medicaid Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Physician Services Handbook).2 Humane violated policy by providing documentation that supported a lower level of office visit than the one for which Humane billed and received payment. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payments for some services that were not documented. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services rendered by a practitioner who was not a member of Humane’s group. Humane violated policy by billing for procedure codes that have time requirements but not documenting the time spent providing the service. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services performed by another practitioner who was not enrolled in Medicaid at the time the services were rendered. Humane violated policy by billing and receiving payment for services for which the medical records, when reviewed by a Medicaid physician consultant, indicated that the services provided did not meet the Medicaid criteria for medical necessity. Humane violated policy by billing for radiology services when the reading and interpretation was done by a radiologist outside of the physician’s group. Humane violated policy and was paid for billing and received payment for portable x-ray services where Humane performed only the technical component and an independent interpreter performed the professional component. Humane violated policy and received payment when Humane did not bill according to the current procedural terminology guidelines in certain instances. On March 13, 2007, MPI issued its Preliminary Audit Report (PAR). The report detailed the Medicaid policy violations, overpayment amounts, and provided Humane the opportunity to submit an explanation or additional documentation demonstrating that some or all of the claims were properly paid. The report also notified Humane that a Final Audit Report (FAR) would be issued identifying the amount of overpayment due. Humane did not respond to the PAR. Consequently, on April 27, 2007, MPI issued a FAR, that included the amount of $177,581.26 that Humane received from Medicaid that was not authorized to be paid. This grand total of $177,581.26 constitutes an overpayment that Humane must return to the agency. A Final Audit Report-Corrected Copy was issued on May 22, 2007, correcting the total amount due.3 In addition to the overpayment amount, Petitioner also seeks a fine in the amount of $3,000.00. The fine is a calculated amount as authorized by rule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order requiring Humane to repay the Agency for the principal amount of $177,581.26 together with an administrative fine of $3000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent is liable for overpayment of Medicaid claims, for the period of January 1, 2004, through January 1, 2006, as stated in Petitioner’s Final Audit Report (FAR), dated July 19, 2006, due to Respondent’s failure to properly document for services billed and collected, in violation of Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2006),1 and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the single state agency under federal law, charged with administration of the Medicaid Program in Florida, and is charged with recovering overpayments to providers. Petitioner’s Bureau of Medicaid Integrity (MPI) has the primary responsibility to audit medical service providers who participate in the Medicaid program. MPI is a Bureau under the AHCA Inspector General. MPI conducts audits to review provider’s compliance with applicable statutes, rules, and policies regarding billing Medicaid for services rendered. An MPI audit is separate and distinct from an annual or other licensure survey or inspection conducted by Petitioner. The MPI audit is a compliance audit not a licensure one. MPI is mandated to review for provider fraud and abuse to ensure that the recipients are receiving the service for which Medicaid is paying. Respondent is a Florida licensed Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner (ARNP) and provided medical services, including psychological counseling to Medicaid recipients, pursuant to a contract with Petitioner under her Provider number 302123800. Respondent participated in the Medicaid program at least from July 1, 2001, and continuously through December 31, 2005 (end of the Audit Period). Petitioner was paid for the services rendered. The audit period for Respondent was determined to be from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2005. Claims for services were reviewed for a standard two-year audit period, and were audited for coding, records and visits. Thirty recipients were picked as a sample of recipients to examine during the two-year audit period. The selection was random and computer generated. Respondent was notified that Petitioner was conducting an audit. Respondent provided the charts on the 30 recipients to be examined and each of their claims during the audit period, which comprised all of her medical records. Gary Mosier is a Registered Nurse (RN), and holds a master’s degree in health care administration. Mosier is employed by the AHCA Inspector General, MPI, and is a nurse consultant and investigator. He was lead analyst and investigator in this matter. James Edgar, M.D., a psychiatrist with 35 years of experience, was retained by Petitioner as a peer review expert to review the charts and give a coding opinion. Billing codes are five-digit numbers. There are general guidelines for establishing the degree of difficulty which are set forth in documents such as Documentation Guidelines for Evaluation and Management Services, published by the American Medical Association. However, the correct coding can only be established through expert testimony, which is based upon established and identified criteria. With respect to each of the services reviewed, Petitioner relied upon the opinion of its expert, Dr. Edgar, as to whether or not Respondent billed Medicaid correctly. Dr. Edgar based his opinion on a review of documents regarding each service which were provided to him by Petitioner. In each instance where the Billing Code 90807, Individual Psychotherapy, Insight Orientation, appeared on Respondents charts for all 30 patients, Dr. Edgar down-coded the charts to Code 90862, medical management. He did not disallow payment, he adjusted each of them. His opinion was that, without the time spent with the patient being delineated on the medical chart, then the visit must be down-coded, or it could be denied completely. Dr. Edgar’s testimony was credible and persuasive. A Preliminary Audit Report (PAR) was sent to Respondent on September 12, 2006. The PAR informed Respondent of an alleged overpayment and explained her options prior to the completion of a FAR. It also put Respondent on notice of possible sanctions for lack of response to Petitioner. AHCA pays for mental health counseling when the face- to-face time spent with the recipient is documented. The medical records resulting from these services are required by law to be maintained for five years following the dates of service. These records must be made available when requested by Petitioner. Respondent was requested to produce office appointment sheets or calendars in order to document her face-to-face time with patients. Respondent sent non-contemporaneous time listings, rather than chart materials or office materials to verify and document time spent. There existed no charted or office records of the time spent with patients. Although Respondent testified that these time listings were implied because of the code that she submitted to Petitioner, this testimony is not persuasive in proving a material fact in dispute. The FAR was sent to Respondent on November 7, 2006, with the spreadsheet attachment. As with the PAR, it informed Respondent of the issues involved with the audit and the overpayment calculations and sought to levy a sanction, if one applied. There was no documentation in the charts of the time expended in the patient encounter, as required under the law. Although Petitioner agreed that the use of the Code 90807 implied that there was one hour of face-to-face contact with a patient, CPT policy requires both medication management and therapy, not just medication management. There was no time of service, time spent, and no start or stop times noted in the medical records. These notations are specifically required under Medicaid policy. A record must reflect the time spent face-to-face with a patient. The final overpayment calculation and final audit reports document that the overpayment to be recouped, and which Petitioner seeks, is $12,500.70, with an added sanction of $1,500.00. The preponderance of evidence has shown that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $12,500.70, and that Petitioner is authorized to impose a penalty of $1,500.00.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order instructing Respondent to repay the sum of $12,500.70, and imposing a fine if appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2010.
