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MANATEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ROBERT GAGNON, 13-004291 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Nov. 06, 2013 Number: 13-004291 Latest Update: Oct. 20, 2014

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent from his employment contract.

Findings Of Fact The School Board is duly constituted and charged with the responsibility and authority to operate, control and supervise the public schools within Manatee County, Florida. Art. IX, Fla. Const.; ch. 1012, Fla. Stat. The School Board has the authority to discipline employees. § 1012.22 (1)(f), Fla. Stat. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by the School District. Mr. Gagnon has been in the education field for approximately 23 years, and has been with the School District since 2002. Mr. Gagnon served as an assistant principal at Lakewood Ranch High School and as principal at Palmetto High School, both of which are in Manatee County. Mr. Gagnon was the principal at MHS beginning with the 2007-2008 school year. Mr. Gagnon served as the MHS principal until he transitioned to the position of assistant superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction for the School District in January 2012. Mr. Gagnon served as the interim superintendent for approximately one month in September/October 2012 and then returned to the assistant superintendent position when another person was appointed interim superintendent. In 2005 the School District posted a position for a specialist in the OPS to investigate alleged School District employee misconduct. The then superintendent wanted to establish a standardized method of investigating employee misconduct. Ms. Horne interviewed for the position, and was appointed as the first OPS specialist. As there were no School District policies or rules in place when she started, Ms. Horne assisted in writing the School District’s OPS policies. Sections 39.201 and 39.202, Florida Statutes, are incorporated into the School District’s policies and procedures as Policy 5.2(1), Policies and Procedures Manual, School Board of Manatee County (2013), which provides: Mandatory Duty to Report Suspected Child Abuse. All employees or agents of the district school board who have reasonable cause to suspect abuse have an affirmative duty to report it. Employees or agents so reporting have immunity from liability if they report such cases in good faith. This includes suspected child abuse of a student by an employee. Ms. Horne provided the training on this policy and other policies to School District employees. As the OPS investigator, Ms. Horne was to “investigate alleged employee misconduct and other matters as assigned” to her by her supervisor. Ms. Horne never had the authority to determine whether or not someone had engaged in misconduct or to make any recommendations as to what may or may not have happened. Her role was to simply gather the information, prepare a report of her findings, and provide that report to her supervisor. In November 2012, Mr. Martin was the School District’s assistant superintendent for District Support, and Ms. Horne’s direct supervisor. During her eight-year tenure as the OPS specialist, Ms. Horne investigated over 800 cases of employee misconduct. The School District uses a progressive discipline model for its employees. Should an employee exhibit behaviors that could be considered inappropriate or misconduct, the School District has a step-by-step method of taking disciplinary action, from simply talking with the employee up to termination of employment. If it is an egregious action, such as sexual conduct with a student, immediate termination is an option. The discipline begins on-site by the site-based managers where the incident occurs. Those site-based managers could have that simple conversation, and if need be, it could progress to a verbal directive, a memorandum of conference, and/or a written reprimand. Site-based managers include principals, assistant principals, directors, and assistant directors.3/ In those instances where the disciplinary action could lead to days without pay or termination, actions that could only be taken by the School Board, OPS would open an investigation. During the first two weeks of November 2012, Mr. Rinder was approached by several MHS teachers regarding concerns for their students. When Mr. Rinder spoke with Mr. Sauer, MHS’s principal, about those concerns, Mr. Sauer asked Mr. Rinder to type up the list (Rinder’s List) and give it to Mr. Sauer. Mr. Sauer, in turn, forwarded Rinder’s List to the OPS. Rinder’s List: [1.] One staff member reported a phone call to a female student during class. The student was upset by the call and told the staff member that Mr. Frazier had asked her if “she had gotten her period and did she need him to go to the drug store for her.” [2.] One staff member reported that Mr. Frazier repeatedly called for a female student during class. When asked if it was important, Mr. Frazier said “yes”. [sic] When the staff member asked the student what the problem was, the answer was “My mom wanted to take me to lunch and he helped me do it”. [sic] [3.] Male student was failing a core class. He told the teacher that “Frazier told me that he will change the grade”. [sic] [4.] A female student was observed getting into Mr. Frazier’s vehicle after school hours and was transported. [5.] Female student told a staff member that she overheard students talking about several meetings in the park late at night with Mr. Frazier. She stated that Mr. Frazier placed and [sic] empty water bottle between her legs as she was walking down the sidewalk. [6.] Female student was observed sitting on Mr. Frazier’s lap eating cake off his fork. [7.] Female student reported to a staff member that Mr. Frazier made a comment to a student in the hall that he had put her on skype [sic] and she took a picture and has it saved on her cell phone. She is scared that he will retaliate if she tells. [8.] Female student told a staff member that Mr. Frazier had made comments to her at the Tiki Bar that she was old enough to be there and they could talk. When she refused to talk with him, she started having issues with Mr. Frazier at school. She transferred to LIFE program to get out. [9.] Female student was reported to a staff member by several students who stated that she was having a relationship with Mr. Frazier. She transferred schools. This conversation was overheard by two teachers in the hall. [10.] The Math Department this week was discussing Mr. Fraziers [sic] questionable activities. Upon receipt of Rinder’s List, Ms. Horne was directed to open an investigation into the allegations contained therein. The subject of the investigation was an MHS parent liaison4/ and assistant football coach named Roderick Frazier. In a very general sense, the allegations involved misconduct by a teacher. Rinder’s List initiated the Frazier investigation. However, Rinder’s List contains blatant hearsay which cannot form the basis for a finding of fact without corroboration. There was no testimony provided by any students mentioned in items 2, 3, 5 (first sentence), 7, 8, or 9 above; hence, it is impossible to verify what occurred. Item 10 merely indicates that an entire department at MHS discussed “questionable activities” by an individual, but it provides no specific activities. There was no credible, non-hearsay evidence in this record to substantiate any of these allegations (items 2, 3, 5 (first sentence), 7, 8, 9 or 10). On November 14, 2012, an email with an attached letter from then-Superintendent David Gayler, was sent to Mr. Sauer around 8:40 p.m., advising him that Mr. Frazier was to be placed on paid administrative leave (PAL) on Thursday, November 15. Mr. Sauer notified Mr. Frazier appropriately. The School Board’s policy regarding placing an employee on PAL is dependent upon whether there is a potential for harm to any student and/or the employee could incur a suspension or termination from employment. Due to an on-going investigation at a different school, Ms. Horne did not arrive at MHS to begin the investigation until the afternoon of Thursday, November 15. Ms. Horne first interviewed Mr. Rinder, as Rinder’s List did not contain any names of teachers or students who were allegedly involved. Upon obtaining the names of the teachers who had expressed concerns, Ms. Horne interviewed most of the teachers on November 15. By the time Ms. Horne completed her teacher interviews, the students had been dismissed from school and were no longer available. At some time, Mr. Rinder observed a female student getting into Mr. Frazier’s car after school (Rinder’s List, Item 4). Mr. Rinder was not alarmed by this sight, but merely thought it was Mr. Fazier’s son’s girlfriend getting a ride. There was no testimony that Mr. Rinder ever brought this information to Mr. Gagnon’s attention. Ms. Aragon brought two concerns about Mr. Frazier to Respondent’s attention: 1) she thought that girls were sitting too close to Mr. Frazier in golf carts at MHS; and 2) Mr. Frazier had called her classroom telephone to talk with a female student. Neither Ms. Aragon nor Mr. Gagnon were absolutely certain as to when these concerns were brought to Mr. Gagnon’s attention: Ms. Aragon thought they were brought to his attention during one conversation, and Mr. Gagnon thought there were two separate conversations approximately a year apart, based on the actions that he took to address them. Mr. Gagnon’s testimony is more credible. Upon being told of the golf cart issue, Respondent immediately went to the MHS courtyard and observed Mr. Frazier with a female student sitting in his golf cart. At the same time, Respondent observed two other assistant principals with students of the opposite sex sitting in their golf carts. Respondent addressed Mr. Frazier first, and then issued a directive to his discipline staff that no one was to allow a student to just sit in a golf cart. Respondent directed that if there was a legitimate reason to transport a student, that was fine, but students were no longer to just sit in the golf cart. With respect to the telephone incident (Rinder’s List Item 1), Mr. Frazier called Ms. Aragon’s classroom and bullied his way to speak with the female student. After the student hung up the phone with Mr. Frazier, she appeared to be upset. Ms. Aragon immediately questioned the student, and Ms. Aragon understood that Mr. Frazier had inquired about the student’s menstrual cycle. Ms. Aragon thought it was “inappropriate” for Mr. Frazier to be speaking with a female student about her menstrual cycle, but Ms. Aragon testified that she did not know if the conversation impacted the student’s day. Ms. Aragon was not privy to the actual conversation between the student and Mr. Frazier, and the student with whom the conversation was held did not testify. The actual telephone conversation is hearsay. Ms. Aragon sought guidance from the teacher’s union president as to what to do. When Ms. Aragon spoke with Mr. Gagnon about Mr. Frazier’s telephone call, Mr. Gagnon immediately turned the issue over to an assistant principal for investigation. Based on the report from the assistant principal, Mr. Gagnon was not concerned that anything inappropriate or sexual was happening.5/ At some point in time, Ms. Coates overheard two female students comment about Mr. Frazier. Although Ms. Coates asked the students to tell her directly the basis for their comment, the students declined. (Neither student testified at hearing.) Shortly thereafter, Ms. Coates told Respondent the students’ comment. Ms. Coates heard Mr. Gagnon respond that something was going around on Facebook. Mr. Gagnon did not remember Ms. Coates telling him of the students’ comment. However, Mr. Gagnon routinely reviewed the disciplinary records for the three parent liaisons and was satisfied that Mr. Frazier was not showing favoritism in his discipline to one group of students over another. It is not uncommon for students to perceive that a teacher is showing favoritism towards a student or group of students. At the conclusion of the teacher interviews on November 15, Ms. Horne understood that the allegations had occurred a year or two before they were reported in Rinder’s List. This thought process was reinforced when Ms. Horne met with some of the MHS administrators in Mr. Sauer’s office where they had a telephone conference with Mr. Martin. Following the telephone conference, Ms. Horne returned to the School District’s main office and again conferred with Mr. Martin for directions. On November 15 or 16, 2012, Ms. Horne had a brief conversation with Mr. Gagnon at the School Board building. Mr. Gagnon asked about the Frazier investigation. Ms. Horne responded that the only issues she was hearing had previously been addressed, and that Ms. Horne would be returning for other interviews. Additionally, Mr. Martin had a brief conversation with Mr. Gagnon about the Rinder List allegations. Mr. Gagnon maintained that the allegations were old and had been dealt with appropriately. Ms. Horne shared with Mr. Martin that the Rinder List allegations were old and had been dealt with previously. Based on this information, Mr. Martin, in his sole discretion, determined to remove Mr. Frazier from PAL on November 16, 2012, and return him to work. Ms. Horne was surprised by this, as her investigation was incomplete. Ms. Horne interviewed Mr. Frazier as well as one other teacher, on November 16, 2012. Although Ms. Horne had the name of an alleged victim, Mr. Martin directed her not to interview that student at that time. In January 2013, a former MHS female student, D.K., wrote a letter to MHS alleging that Mr. Frazier did various inappropriate acts towards her while she was a student at MHS during the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years. In her letter, D.K. stated that she became close to Mr. Frazier during her two years at MHS. D.K. met Mr. Frazier at a park near her home, but during her second year at MHS (2011-2012), Mr. Frazier “started being weird with [her] and saying inappropriate things to” her. D.K. admitted that she frequently rode in Mr. Frazier’s golf cart around the school, and that Mr. Frazier put a water bottle (Rinder’s List Item 5, second sentence) in between her legs (between her knees and crotch) as they were sitting in the bleachers at the softball field and while sitting in a golf cart. D.K. came forward with the letter because she had heard of the Frazier investigation and that it was being closed. Several days after D.K.’s letter was received in OPS, Ms. Horne interviewed D.K., who was accompanied by her mother. Ms. Horne was unable to confirm D.K.’s credibility completely because Ms. Horne left OPS prior to the conclusion of the Frazier investigation. The most disturbing part of D.K.’s testimony came when D.K. admitted, and Ms. Peebles confirmed, that during the 2010- 2011 school year, Ms. Peebles walked into Mr. Frazier’s office unannounced and observed D.K. sitting on Mr. Frazier’s lap holding a piece of cake (Rinder’s List Item 6). Ms. Peebles immediately instructed D.K. to get off Mr. Frazier’s lap and to sit in a chair on the other side of his desk. Mr. Frazier appeared to be unfazed by Ms. Peebles entering his office unannounced and witnessing this scene. Mr. Frazier proceeded to handle the disciplinary matter that Ms. Peebles had brought to him. Ms. Peebles reported the observation to an assistant principal, Matthew Kane, but not to Respondent. Ms. Peebles did not believe there was abuse on-going, but thought it was “not appropriate” for Mr. Frazier to have a student sitting on his lap. D.K. testified that “after he [Mr. Frazier] got in trouble he started getting me [D.K.] in trouble for things that I had been getting away with the whole time I was there [at MHS].” D.K. did not provide a time-frame or what “trouble” Mr. Frazier had gotten her into while D.K. was at MHS, and no evidence was provided otherwise. Further, D.K. never told Mr. Gagnon of any issues involving Mr. Frazier. D.K. was enrolled at a different local high school when Mr. Frazier was placed on PAL. Ms. Peebles relayed another issue regarding Mr. Frazier; however, it involved hearsay and was not corroborated by the student who initially reported the issue to Ms. Peebles. The absence of direct, non-hearsay testimony precludes a finding of fact as to that issue. In late January 2013, Ms. Horne transferred to an assistant principal position at a school district elementary school. Both Ms. Horne and Mr. Martin confirmed that the Frazier investigation had not been completed when Ms. Horne left OPS. Ms. Horne had not submitted a written report to her supervisor which would have signaled the completion of the Frazier investigation. The specialist position in OPS remained vacant until July 2013 when Mr. Pumphrey assumed the position. Mr. Pumphrey confirmed that there “had been an ongoing investigation both at the School District level and law enforcement surrounding Rod Frazier.” In an effort to gain speed in his investigation, Mr. Pumphrey reviewed the Frazier investigation file and became aware that the School District “had stalled their investigation pending the outcome of the criminal investigation.” Mr. Pumphrey reviewed Mr. Frazier’s personnel file and determined there was “no documentation of any discipline to Mr. Frazier.” Additionally, Mr. Pumphrey pulled all the published information including media accounts and police reports, and reviewed them. As Mr. Martin had been instrumental in hiring Mr. Pumphrey, the two spoke several times “because this thing [the Frazier investigation] was all over the place.” Several days after re-starting the Frazier investigation, Mr. Pumphrey expressed to the superintendent his concern about the close proximity of Mr. Pumphrey’s office to that of Mr. Gagnon and requested that Mr. Gagnon6/ be placed on PAL. The superintendent did so. During the course of the Frazier investigation, Mr. Pumphrey considered that Mr. Gagnon’s actions or inactions during the course of the Frazier investigation constituted “administrative negligence and/or intentional misconduct.” Mr. Pumphrey broadened the Frazier investigation to determine whether district administrators “had prior knowledge of complaints by female students and faculty regarding inappropriate conduct involving Frazier and, if so, why the complaints were not timely addressed.” There is no credible, non-hearsay evidence in the record to substantiate that Mr. Gagnon failed to investigate or report inappropriate conduct by a faculty member. When apprised of questionable or suspect conduct, Mr. Gagnon took the steps necessary to inquire. The absence of direct, non-hearsay testimony precludes a finding that Mr. Gagnon acted in the fashion alleged in the administrative complaint.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Manatee County School Board, enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2014.

Florida Laws (9) 1006.0611012.221012.271012.7951012.796120.569120.5739.20139.202
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TOM GALLAGHER, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs MARY GREEN, 00-004821PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Dec. 04, 2000 Number: 00-004821PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2024
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs DJUNA ROBINSON, 14-000726PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 18, 2014 Number: 14-000726PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2024
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs RAY MOLHEM, 13-002442PL (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:North Fort Myers, Florida Jul. 02, 2013 Number: 13-002442PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2024
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JOHN L. WINN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs JUDY KARPIS, 07-000909PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 20, 2007 Number: 07-000909PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2024
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs ROBYN BERMAN, 15-004793PL (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Aug. 27, 2015 Number: 15-004793PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs A + GROWING ACADEMY, INC., D/B/A A +GROWING ACADEMY, INC., 18-000042 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Jan. 04, 2018 Number: 18-000042 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2018

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.001(11) (2013),2/ as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for inspecting, licensing, and monitoring child care facilities such as the one operated by Respondent. It is the Department’s responsibility to ensure that all such facilities are safe and secure for the protection of the children utilizing those facilities. The Department inspects each licensed day care center several times a year. In the event of a complaint, additional inspections and/or investigations are conducted. Respondent is a licensed child care facility located in Manatee County, Florida. On October 12, 2017, Ms. Linzmayer received a complaint from an anonymous source who said she worked at the Academy. As a result of that complaint, Ms. Linzmayer was prompted to call the Department’s abuse hotline. Ms. Clark was working as an investigator for the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office, Child Protective Investigation Unit in October 2017. When notified of the potential abuse allegation, Ms. Clark conducted an investigation on October 12, 2017. The scope of Ms. Clark’s investigation centered on the allegations that a teacher had hit a child in the mouth. Ms. Clark spoke with employees at the Academy and then met with the alleged victim (A.O.) and the child’s family at a local law enforcement office. Ms. Clark’s investigation did not substantiate the case (of actual abuse) because she did not have proof that something did or did not happen. Ms. Clark notated that the Academy had not contacted the abuse hotline regarding the suspected child abuse and there was no incident report.4/ Ms. Barna-Roche conducts health, safety, routine and renewal inspections, as well as complaint inspections of child care facilities. After receiving the hotline abuse allegation, Ms. Barna-Roche inspected the Academy and spoke with several of its employees. As a result of her inspection, Ms. Barna-Roche found that the Academy failed to report the alleged child abuse. The only first-person account of the alleged classroom events of October 6, 2017, was provided by Ms. Gonzalez, a former teacher at the Academy. Ms. Gonzalez was in the two-year-old classroom, with another teacher, Ms. Tover. Ms. Gonzalez credibly testified that she did not “pop” a child in the mouth, and that she had never told Ms. Tover she had “popped” or used physical or inappropriate force relative to A.O. Ms. Gonzalez provided a brief history of her association with Ms. Tover, which was unflattering to both. For a time Ms. Gonzalez lived in the same house with Ms. Tover and members of Ms. Tover’s family. A disagreement arose regarding Ms. Gonzalez’s dog, and Ms. Gonzalez was asked to leave the house. In order to gather her belongings from the house, Ms. Gonzalez was forced to call law enforcement for assistance. This disagreement appears to have spilled over to the Academy, where both women worked. As part of her supervisory duties, Ms. Johnson (also known as Ms. Charlotte or Charlotte Hill) makes it a point to observe the children as they enter and leave the Academy. She conducts these observations in order to address any potential issues regarding a child’s well-being and to provide excellent service to the children and their parents in the care provided. Ms. Johnson was not in the two-year-old classroom on October 6, 2017, but observed the children entering and leaving the Academy that day. Ms. Johnson did not see the alleged abuse victim, A.O., with a fat or bloody lip as he left Respondent’s facility on October 6, 2017. Ms. Johnson was aware that Ms. Gonzalez had lived in the same house as Ms. Tover and her sister, and Ms. Johnson knew that Ms. Gonzalez moved out of the house prior to October 2017. Ms. Johnson was aware of some interpersonal issues between Ms. Tover and Ms. Gonzalez that were not associated with the Academy. Both Ms. Gonzalez and Ms. Johnson acknowledged being mandatory reporters, and clearly testified that had either seen or thought there was abuse, they would have reported it. As alleged in paragraph 4 of the AC above, in one instance Ms. Tover is alleged to have “witnessed another teacher ‘popping a child on the mouth’ and informed the child’s grandmother, who also works at the facility.” Yet, in paragraph 5 of the AC, Ms. Tover “confirmed her account of the alleged abuse. At the time of the incident, she turned around when she heard a child crying.” (emphasis added). Ms. Tover did not testify at hearing. There is no evidence that any abuse occurred. The testimony provided by Ms. Linzmayer, Ms. Clark, and Ms. Barna-Roche relies upon hearsay, and in some cases hearsay upon hearsay. Their testimony is found to be insufficient to meet the burden in this proceeding. The lack of direct evidence of the alleged abuse is troublesome. The indication that Ms. Tover “witnessed” the abuse or turned around after she heard a two-year-old child cry and was told something occurred is insufficient to overcome the direct testimony of the alleged perpetrator, who denied the accusation. It is true that additional training in spotting child abuse or suspected child abuse, and reporting such abuse or suspected child abuse is warranted at the Academy; however, the evidence is not clear and convincing that any abuse, real or suspect, occurred on October 6, 2017.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, and based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2018.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5739.0139.201402.301402.302402.310402.319
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs WIZ KIDZ LEARNING 2 INC., D/B/A WIZ KIDZ LEARNING 2, 17-005759 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 17, 2017 Number: 17-005759 Latest Update: Apr. 26, 2018

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, a child care facility operating under a probation-status license, violated the terms of probation by committing three Class II Violations, as Petitioner alleges, and if so, whether the license should be suspended or revoked; and, alternatively, whether, if Respondent committed the alleged Class II Violations (or any of them), Petitioner should deny Respondent's application for renewal of license.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Wiz Kidz Learning 2, Inc. ("Wiz Kidz"), holds a probation-status Certificate of License, numbered C11MD1914, which authorizes the company to operate a child care facility in Palmetto Bay, Florida, for six months, from September 2, 2017, through March 1, 2018. The licensee does business under the name Wiz Kidz Learning 2. As the operator of a licensed child care facility, Wiz Kidz falls under the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner Department of Children and Families ("DCF"). At the time of the final hearing, Wiz Kidz had been a probation-status licensee for more than six months. DCF had converted Wiz Kidz' license to probation status effective June 29, 2017, after finding Wiz Kidz guilty of violating the staff-to-child ratio rules four times in a two-year period, as charged in an Amended Administrative Complaint dated May 25, 2017, which Wiz Kidz had not contested. The conditions of probation were that Wiz Kidz would pay all outstanding fines, not violate the staff-to-child ratio rules again, not commit any other Class I or Class II Violations while on probation, and submit to biweekly inspections. Wiz Kidz' initial probation-status license had been due to expire on September 1, 2017. Shortly before that date, however, Wiz Kidz had submitted a renewal application, which meant that, by operation of law, the probation-status license would not expire until DCF had finally acted upon Wiz Kidz' application for renewal.2/ Instead of simply allowing Wiz Kidz to operate on the "unexpired" license, however, DCF issued a new probationary license to Wiz Kidz effective from September 2, 2017, to March 1, 2018, which essentially renewed the initial probation-status license for another six-month period of probation.3/ On August 17, 2017, DCF employees Claudia Alvarado Campagnola and Quendra Gomez conducted an inspection of the Wiz Kidz facility between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., during which they observed three alleged incidents of noncompliance with "Class II" (mid-level) licensing standards, namely: (1) storing a toxic substance in a place accessible to children; (2) failing to provide adequate direct supervision; and (3) failing to possess a current attendance record during a fire drill. On September 26, 2017, DCF issued to Wiz Kidz a Notice of Intent to Deny Child Care Facility Licensure, which gave notice that DCF planned to deny Wiz Kidz' pending application for renewal of license because, on August 17, 2017, Wiz Kidz had been "cited for 3 class II violations and 7 class III violations in direct violation of [its] probationary license terms." The "toxic substance" seen on August 17, 2017, was an alcoholic beverage. Upon entering the facility, Ms. Gomez noticed two unopened bottles of champagne at the back of a shelf, behind (and partially obscured by) a large plastic toy and other items. There is no photograph of the shelf in evidence, and the descriptive testimony lacked precision; as near as the undersigned can tell, this shelf was several feet long, about one foot deep, and mounted about five feet high on one of the classroom walls. One detail is not disputed: the shelf was above the heads of even the oldest children in care (between the ages of six and seven years). Thus, even if a child could have seen the bottles, he would not have been able to take possession of them without deliberate effort; because the bottles were well out of reach, the child would have needed to stand on a stepladder or its equivalent (e.g., a suitable chair) to get his hands on them. There is no evidence that a stepladder was available. Ms. Gomez testified that a child could have pulled over a chair and climbed on it to reach the champagne bottles. Perhaps so. On the other hand, while the undersigned can reasonably infer that there were chairs in the classroom, he cannot reasonably infer that any of them would have been fit to enable a child to access the bottles. To establish the element of "accessibility" based on the theory that a chair could be used as a stepladder, DCF needed to prove that a suitable chair was actually there for a child present in the classroom to use. This it failed to do. There is no evidence regarding the dimensions of the available chairs, nor any evidence concerning the heights of the children. The witnesses provided only a rough idea of the height of the shelf; their reasonably consistent accounts constitute clear and convincing evidence of the general fact that the shelf was higher than the kids' heads, but not of the actual measurement. Absent proof of these material facts, Ms. Gomez's testimony regarding the way a child could have gotten hold of the champagne bottles is too speculative to support a finding that these items were, in fact, physically accessible to the children. In addition, there is no evidence suggesting that a child could have dragged a chair over to the shelf and clambered up without attracting the attention of an adult. Given that the shelf was located in the classroom, the undersigned infers that no child reasonably could have pulled this off, unless the adult in the room were asleep at the switch. Finally, it is worth mentioning that if a child were able to stand on a chair and grab a champagne bottle without being caught, he still would not have access to the "toxic substance" in the bottle unless he could somehow pour it out. There is no evidence in the record concerning how one opens a champagne bottle, but common experience teaches the undersigned that a young child (the children in care were less than eight years old) likely would have difficulty twisting out the cork. In any event, DCF failed to prove that any of the children at Wiz Kidz reasonably could have popped the cork on the champagne, and therefore it failed to prove that the champagne was accessible to a child. The other two alleged violations occurred during a fire drill, which the inspectors required Wiz Kidz to conduct, in their presence, during the children's nap time. Three children exited the facility in their bare feet. The area where the children were assembled after evacuating the "burning building" was near a dumpster; some litter and tree branches were on the ground. From these facts, which were not seriously disputed, DCF infers that the children were not adequately supervised. The undersigned rejects this inference, which does not reasonably and logically follow from the basic facts. To begin, there is no rule that requires children always to wear shoes. Thus, that some of the children had removed their footwear before taking a nap is of no concern. When the alarm went off, staff evidently did not make these children pause to put their shoes back on, which would have protected their feet——but delayed their exit. To be sure, it is probably a good practice, generally speaking, to prevent young children from going outside barefoot. Clearly, however, it is best not to let them perish in a fire; in an emergency, getting to safety is the highest priority. Because the purpose of a fire drill is to simulate an actual emergency, the fact of the barefoot children prompts undersigned to infer, not that staff failed to provide adequate supervision, but that staff facilitated the speediest escape under the circumstances. During the fire drill, one of the teachers failed to take along a current attendance record when leaving the building, which (unlike the wearing of shoes) is mandated by rule. Ultimate Factual Determinations Wiz Kidz is not guilty of storing a toxic substance in a place accessible to children because the evidence failed to establish an incident of noncompliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.002(1)(f). Wiz Kidz is not guilty of failing to provide adequate direct supervision because the evidence failed to establish an incident of noncompliance with rule 65C-22.001(5)(a). The undersigned determines, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a staff member failed to possess a current attendance record during a fire drill, which constitutes an incident of noncompliance with licensing standard No. 33-12, which implements rule 65C-22.002(7)(e). This was Wiz Kidz' first occasion of noncompliance with licensing standard No. 33-12.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding Wiz Kidz not in violation of the terms of probation. It is further RECOMMENDED that Wiz Kidz' application for renewal of license not be denied based on the commission of a Technical Support Violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2018.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.60402.301402.310402.319
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KAREN SIEBELTS vs. BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 88-004697 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004697 Latest Update: Jun. 29, 1989

The Issue Did Respondent Siebelts commit the offenses set forth in the petition for dismissal (Case No. 88-4697) and the amended administrative complaint (Case No. 89-0189) filed against her? If so, what discipline should she receive?

Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Karen Siebelts has held a State of Florida teaching certificate since 1976. Her current certificate was issued May 1, 1986, and covers the areas of elementary education, elementary and secondary reading, and secondary social studies and psychology. For the past thirteen years Siebelts has been employed by the School Board of Broward County as a classroom teacher. During the early stages of her employment, she taught at Melrose Park Middle School. She then moved to Perry Middle School, where she taught a class of emotionally disturbed sixth graders. Her performance at these two schools was rated as acceptable. In November, 1979, Siebelts was assigned to teach at Charles Drew Elementary School, a neighborhood school located in the predominantly black Collier city area of Pompano Beach. The charges lodged against Siebelts are based on specific acts she allegedly committed while she was a Chapter I Reading/Math and Computer teacher at Charles Drew providing remedial instruction to students whose test scores reflected a need for such special assistance. On January 22, 1985, while seated with her fifth grade students at a table during a reading lesson, Siebelts inadvertently kicked one of the students in the shin. The incident occurred as Siebelts was moving her legs to a more comfortable position. The force involved was minimal and produced no visible injuries. The student immediately demanded an apology from Siebelts. Siebelts responded to this demand with silence. She neither apologized nor said anything to suggest that she had intended to kick the student. Earlier in the lesson, Siebelts had directed the student to stop talking. The student had defied the directive and continued to talk. It was not until approximately three minutes after the student's initial defiance of the directive, however, that the kicking incident occurred. Nonetheless, the student suspected that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her because of her failure to obey Siebelts' order that she not talk. When the student came home from school that day she told her mother that Siebelts had intentionally kicked her during class. The mother immediately reported the incident to the principal of the school, Hubert Lee. The matter was referred to the School Board's Internal Affairs Unit for investigation. The requested investigation was conducted. Following the completion of the investigation, a written report of the investigator's findings was submitted to the administration. No further action was taken regarding this incident until approximately three and a half years later when the instant petition for dismissal was issued. Siebelts was annoyed when she learned that the student and her mother had accused her of wrongdoing in connection with the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. On February 19, 1985, she expressed her annoyance in front of her fifth grade class and in their presence threatened to take legal action against those students and parents who had made libelous or slanderous statements about her or had otherwise verbally abused her. She told the students that they and their parents would be subpoenaed to court and if they did not appear they would be incarcerated. The principal of the school was informed of these remarks shortly after they were made, but it was not until the instant petition for dismissal was issued on August 22, 1988, that Siebelts was first formally charged with having made the remarks. Before coming to work on January 28 1986, Siebelts took a codeine pain medication that her physician had prescribed. When classes started that morning she was still under the influence of the medication. She was listless and drowsy. Her speech was slurred and she appeared incoherent at times. She also had difficulty maintaining her balance when she walked. Because Siebelts had been taking this medication "on and off" since 1979, she had been aware of these potential side effects of the medication when ingesting it on this particular occasion. A teacher's aide in Siebelts' classroom concerned about Siebelts' condition summoned the principal, Hubert Lee, to the classroom. When he arrived, Lee observed Siebelts seated at her desk. She was just staring and seemed "to be almost falling asleep." The students were out of control. They were laughing and making fun of Siebelts. After questioning Siebelts and receiving an answer that was not at all responsive to the question he had asked, Lee instructed Siebelts to come to his office. Siebelts complied, displaying an unsteady gait as she walked to Lee's office. In Lee's office, Siebelts insisted that she was fine, but conceded that she was "on" prescribed pain medication. Throughout their conversation, Siebelts continued to slur her words and it was difficult for Lee to understand her. Pursuant to Lee's request, Dr. Lorette David, Lee's immediate supervisor, and Nat Stokes, a School Board investigator, came to Lee's office to observe and assess Siebelts' condition. A determination was thereafter made that Siebelts was not capable of performing her instructional duties that day, which was an accurate assessment. She therefore was sent home for the day. Because of her impaired condition, rather than driving herself home, she was driven to her residence by Dr. David. Although she believed that she was not suffering from any impairment, Siebelts did not protest the decision to relieve her of her duties because she felt that any such protest would have fallen on deaf ears. Following this incident, Siebelts was issued a letter of reprimand by Lee. She also was referred to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program because it was felt that she might have a substance abuse problem. Siebelts agreed to participate in the program and received counselling. At no time subsequent to January 28, 1986, did Siebelts report to work under the influence of her pain medication or any other drug. During the 1987-1988 school year, Siebelts and two other Chapter I teachers, Rosa Moses and Mary Cooper, occupied space in Charles Drew's Chapter I reading and math laboratory. Their classrooms were located in the same large room and were separated by makeshift partitions. Siebelts is white. Moses and Cooper, as well as the aides who were assigned to the laboratory during that school year, are black. In October, 1987, Moses complained to Principal Lee that Siebelts was not teaching her students, but rather was constantly engaging in loud verbal confrontations with them that disrupted Moses' lessons. Lee had received similar complaints about Siebelts from others. He therefore asked Moses to advise him in writing of any future classroom misconduct on Siebelts' part. Siebelts continued to engage in conduct in her classroom which Moses deemed inappropriate and disruptive. On November 4, 1987, for the last five minutes of one of her classes, she loudly exchanged verbal barbs with her students. Her yelling made it difficult for Moses and Cooper to teach their lessons. On November 5, 1987, throughout an entire 45-minute class period, Siebelts was embroiled in a verbal battle with a student during which she made derogatory remarks about the student's size. She called the student "fat" and told her that she "shake[d] like jelly." The student, in turn, called Siebelts "fruity" and likened her to a "scarecrow." On that same day during a later class period, Siebelts took a student by the arm and, following a tussle with the student, placed him in his seat. Thereafter, she made belittling remarks to the other students in the class. She said that they were "stupid" and "belonged in a freak show." She also referred to them as "imbeciles." Siebelts further told her students that their "mothers eat dog food." On November 25, 1987, Siebelts commented to the students in one of her classes that they would be able to move around the classroom with greater ease if they were not so fat. As she had been asked to do, Moses provided Lee with a written account of these November, 1987, encounters between Siebelts and her students, but Lee did not take any immediate action to initiate disciplinary action against Siebelts. Although she did not so indicate in her report, Moses believed that the unflattering remarks that Siebelts had made to the students on these occasions constituted racial slurs inasmuch as all of the students to whom the remarks had been addressed were black and in addressing these remarks to the students as a group she had referred to them as "you people." Moses thought that "you people" had meant black people in general, whereas Siebelts had intended the phrase to refer to just the students in the classroom. At no time during any of these reported incidents did Siebelts make specific reference to the students' race, nor did she specifically attack black people in general. The target of her demeaning and insulting remarks were those of her students whose unruly and disrespectful behavior she was unable to control. Her efforts to maintain discipline and promote learning in the classroom had failed. She had become frustrated with the situation and verbally lashed out at her students. Unfortunately, these outbursts only served to further reduce her effectiveness as a teacher. On March 1, 1988, Siebelts was involved in an incident similar to the one which had occurred more than three years earlier on January 22, 1985. As on the prior occasion, Siebelts was sitting at a classroom table with her students. Her legs were crossed. When she repositioned her legs, her foot inadvertently came in contact with the top of the head of a student who was crawling under the table to retrieve a pencil the student had dropped. The student had been told by Siebelts not to go under the table but had disobeyed the instruction. She had been under the table for approximately a minute and a half before being struck by Siebelts foot. The blow to the student's head was a light one and produced only a slight bump. Nonetheless, after getting up from under the table, the student, a brash fourth grader who had had confrontations with Siebelts in the past, threatened to physically retaliate against Siebelts. Siebelts did not say anything to the student and the class ended without the student following through on her threat. Following this incident, Siebelts telephoned the student's mother at home to discuss the student's classroom behavior. The call was placed sometime before 9:00 p.m. The conversation between Siebelts and the mother soon degenerated into an argument. They terminated the discussion without settling their differences. Lee subsequently met with the mother. He suggested that a meeting with Siebelts at the school be arranged. The mother indicated to Lee that she would not attend such a meeting unless school security was present. She explained that she was so angry at Siebelts that she was afraid that she would lose her composure and physically attack Siebelts if they were in the same room together.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission issue a final order suspending Karen Siebelts' teaching certificate for two years and that the School Board of Broward County issue a final order suspending Siebelts until the reinstatement of her teaching certificate. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of June, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 88-4687 AND 89-0189 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties: Commisioner of Education's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance in the Findings of Fact portion of this Recommended Order. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Siebelts was not charged with having made threatening remarks the day after the January 22, 1985, kicking incident. These threats were allegedly made, according to the charging documents, on February 19, 1985. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts engaged in name-calling on dates other than those specfied in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint otherwise, it is accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Furthermore, the witness whose testimony is recited in this proposed finding later clarified her testimony and conceded that Siebelts did not use the precise words quoted in this proposed finding. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts made "racial comments" on the dates specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint. Insofar as it states that such comments were made on other occasions, it is rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. According to the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, Siebelts threatened her students with legal action on February 19, 1985. This proposed finding, however, relates to alleged threats of legal action made by Siebelts during the 1987-1988 school year. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Siebelts' Proposed Findings of Fact First unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Second unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and :incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Third unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as unnecessary; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fourth unnumbered paragraph: Rejected as more in the nature of a statement of opposing parties' position than a finding of fact; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Fifth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; sixth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; seventh sentence: Rejected as subordinate; eighth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; ninth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; tenth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; eleventh sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; twelfth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Sixth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Seventh unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony (The exculpatory testimony of Siebelts which is summarized in the first three sentences of this paragraph has not been credited because it is contrary to the more credible testimony of other witnesses) fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Eighth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as subordinate; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; fifth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; sixth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; seventh sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; eighth sentence: Rejected as subordinate; ninth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Ninth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fifth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Tenth unnumbered paragraph, first sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; fourth sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Superintendent of School's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated in substance, except for the fourth sentence, which has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated in substance except to the extent that it asserts that Siebelts "advised the students that they and their parents would be placed in jail because of the lies and the slander." The preponderance of the evidence reveals that she actually told them that they and their parents would be incarcerated if they did not appear in court when summoned. First sentence: Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony; second sentence: Rejected as subordinate. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second and third sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument concerning relatively insignificant matters than findings of fact addressing necessary and vital issues. Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that Siebelts had alcohol on her breath. Any such suggestion has been rejected because it is contrary to the testimony of Investigator Stokes. Stokes, who has been employed by the School Board as an investigator for the past 20 years, testified that he was standing one or two feet away from Siebelts and did not detect the odor of alcohol on her breath. In view of his experience regarding the investigation of these matters, his testimony has been credited. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Siebelts made inappropriate remarks regarding the students' clothing or other matters on dates other than those specified in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint, it has been rejected as outside the scope of the charges. Insofar as it asserts that Siebelts made derogatory remarks about black people in general on the dates specified in these charging documents, it has been rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding indicates that Siebelts otherwise insulted the students in her class on the dates specified in the charging documents, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "disparaging remarks" which are the subject of this proposed finding were purportedly made during the 1984-1985 school year. The "disparaging remarks" referenced in the petition for dismissal and amended administrative complaint were allegedly made, according to these charging documents, during the 1987-1988 school year, more specifically, on November 4, 5, and 25, 1987. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. The "critical" remarks referred to in this proposed finding were allegedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. First sentence: Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the extent it references reactions to "disparaging" and "critical" remarks that were purportedly made prior to the 1987-1988 school year. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Rejected as a summary of the testimony of Siebelts' former students and colleagues rather than a finding of fact based on such testimony. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it reflects that Moses actively monitored Siebelts classroom conduct "through December of 1987." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that such active monitoring actually ceased November 25, 1987; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent it indicates that Noses heard Siebelts tell her students that they "were dirty and needed baths." This comment was purportedly overheard, not by Moses, but by Margaret Cameron, a teacher's aide who had left Charles Drew prior to the commencement of the 1987- 1988 school year; fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. These proposed findings are based on Cameron's testimony regarding offensive comments she had allegedly overheard while an aide in Siebelts' classroom. These pre-1987-1988 school year comments, however, are not mentioned in either the petition for dismissal or the amended administrative complaint. First sentence: As this proposed finding correctly points out, Siebelts' insulting comments only served to heighten the students' hostility and anger toward her. There is no persuasive competent substantial evidence, though, to support the further finding that these comments "resulted in several physical altercations between the students;" second sentence: Rejected inasmuch as there no persuasive competent substantial evidence that there was any "heated verbal exchange" on November 5, 1987, between Siebelts and the student which preceded their "altercation." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the verbal battle with her students occurred immediately after this incident; third sentence: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although she may used physical force during her encounter with this student, it is unlikely that she actually "tossed" him into his seat. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected as beyond the scope of the charges. Rejected inasmuch as there is no persuasive competent substantial evidence to support a finding that Siebelts telephoned the student's mother as a result of the incident near the air-conditioner. The preponderance of the evidence does establish that Siebelts did telephone the mother on a subsequent occasion, but there is no indication that Siebelts threatened the mother or otherwise acted inappropriately during this telephone conversation. Although the mother asked to have security personnel present during a parent-teacher conference with Siebelts, the preponderance of the evidence reveals that this request was not the product of any threats that Siebelts had made against the mother. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Siebelts' testimony that the contact was unintentional is plausible and has been credited. The circumstantial evidence presented by Petitioners (including evidence of prior confrontations between Siebelts and the student) raises some questions regarding the veracity of Siebelts' testimony on this point, but such evidence is not sufficiently compelling to warrant the discrediting this testimony. Given her penchant for verbalizing to her students her thoughts about them, had Siebelts intended to kick the student as a disciplinary measure, she undoubtedly would have made this known to the student, rather than remain silent as she did; second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, except to the extent that it suggests that immediately after kicking the student, Siebelts had a "smirk on her face." To this limited extent, this proposed finding is not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; fourth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Rejected as not supported by any persuasive competent substantial evidence; second, third, fourth and fifth sentences: Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. Rejected as more in the nature of argument and a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based on such testimony. To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that Siebelts' behavior at school on January 28, 1986, and her verbal attack of her students on November 4, 5, and 25, 198', reduced her effectiveness as a teacher, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Insofar as it indicates that other conduct in which she engaged resulted in a reduction or loss of effectiveness, it has been rejected as either contrary to the greater weight of the evidence (other conduct specified in charging documents) or beyond the scope of the charges (other conduct not specified in charging documents). COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Whitelock, Esquire 1311 S.E. 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Suite 322, Bayview Building 4,1040 Bayview Drive Post Office Box 4369 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Virgil L. Morgan, Superintendent Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Thomas P. Johnson, Ed.D. Associate Superintendent Human Resources Broward County School Board 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 Craig R. Wilson, Esquire Suite 315 1201 U.S. Highway One North Palm Beach, Florida 33408-3581 Karen B. Wilde Robert F. McRee, Esquire Executive Director Post Office Box 75638 Education Practices Commission Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Administrative Code (3) 6B-1.0016B-1.0066B-4.009
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