Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue Whether the petitioner's application for renewal of his community association manager's license should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Richter is a licensed community association manager, having been issued license number 1,439 by the Department in 1988. Mr. Richter's community association manager's license was renewed by the Department in 1990 and 1992. Mr. Richter is also licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation as a real estate broker and as a Certified Public Accountant. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, is the state agency charged with the administration of chapter 468, part VIII, Florida Statutes, and is specifically responsible for reviewing and approving applications for renewal of community association manager's licenses. The Bureau of Condominiums carries out this function. Community association manager's license renewal applications for the 1994 renewal year were required to be postmarked no later than September 30, 1994. On or about September 15, 1994, Mr. Richter mailed his completed 1994 license renewal application to the Department, together with a check made payable to the Department in the amount of $50.00, the required license renewal fee. In late November 1994, Mr. Richter telephoned the Department and inquired about the status of his renewal application. He spoke with Donald Sapp, an employee of the Bureau of Condominiums, who told him that the Department was behind in processing renewal applications for community association manager's licenses. The Department completed processing applications for the 1994 renewal period in mid-January 1995. On February 17, 1995, Mr. Richter telephoned the Bureau of Condominiums and advised Mr. Sapp that he had not received his 1994 license and that the check he wrote for the fee had not cleared his bank. Mr. Sapp stated that he would look into the matter and call Mr. Richter back. On February 21, 1995, Mr. Sapp telephoned Mr. Richter and advised him that the Department had no record of having received his 1994 license renewal application and check. Mr. Sapp asked Mr. Richter to send the Department a copy of his check register for the period including September 15, 1994, a copy of his bank statements for September, October, and November 1994, and a copy of a stop payment order on the check he wrote for the license renewal fee. On February 22, 1995, Mr. Richter sent Mr. Sapp, via Airborne Express, a copy of his check register and of the requested bank statements. He refused to place a stop payment order on his check, however. On March 10, 1995, Mr. Richter sent the Department a replacement check in the amount of $50.00 for the 1994 license renewal application fee. This check was received and, in accordance with standard procedure, deposited by the Department. Mr. Richter completed all of the continuing education hours required for license renewal prior to September 30, 1994. Mr. Richter has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he timely mailed his 1994 license renewal application and that he should be granted a community association manager's license for 1994-1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order finding that Michael Richter's 1994 community association manager's license renewal application was postmarked prior to the September 30, 1994, deadline and granting Mr. Richter's application for a renewal license for 1994-1996. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of April 1996. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether discipline should be imposed against Respondent for operating on an expired public lodging establishment license, an offense which is deemed by rule to constitute operation without a license.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Lakeside is an apartment building with 19 units located at 1048 Northeast 18 Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304- 2408. The Division issued Lakeside a license, numbered 16- 10553-H, to operate as a public lodging establishment. According to information in the Division's official database, as reproduced in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 1/ the "current license expiration date [for Lakeside's license] is December 1, 2000." On July 20, 2000, Division employee Robert Shaw conducted a routine inspection of Lakeside and found the apartment complex to be open and operating. On a Lodging Inspection Report that he prepared on that date, 2/ Mr. Shaw noted two minor violations, neither of which is at issue here. On the same form, Mr. Shaw inscribed the date that Lakeside's license would expire, as shown below, in the blank spaces provided for that purpose in a line that read: REMINDER: Your license expires 12 /01 /00 Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Mr. Shaw testified, however, that at the time of this inspection, he did not know whether or not Lakeside was licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Lakeside Apartments. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner on November 20, 1980, be dismissed by final agency order. DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of February, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone: (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: William D. Moore, Esquire Ella Jane P. Davis, Esquire 700 Barnett Bank Building Department of Transportation Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. Lawrence Johnston, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Respondent or Division), should deny West Flagler Associate, Ltd.’s (Petitioner or West Flagler) June 30, 2015, and July 1, 2015, applications for new summer jai alai permits under section 550.0745, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering activities in Florida pursuant to chapter 550. West Flagler is the owner of pari-mutuel permits and is authorized to conduct pari-mutuel pools on exhibition sports in Miami-Dade County pursuant to chapter 550. There are seven pari-mutuel permits for pari-mutuel pools on exhibition sports in Miami-Dade County. The permitholders are South Florida Racing Association, LLC (Hialeah Park)(“SFRA”); Fronton Holdings, LLC (Miami Jai Alai); Summer Jai Alai Partnership; West Flagler Associates, Ltd. (Flagler Dog Track); Calder Race Course, Inc.; Tropical Park, LLC; and West Flagler Associates, Ltd. (Magic City Jai Alai). Summer Jai Alai Partnership is the holder of a summer jai alai permit. West Flagler currently possesses a summer jai alai permit in Miami-Dade County. On June 30, 2015, West Flagler filed the June Application, pursuant to section 550.0745, for a “new permit” to conduct summer jai alai in Miami-Dade County. West Flagler’s June Application was based on its conclusion that a new summer jai alai permit was available because SFRA had the smallest total pool or handle in Miami-Dade County for two consecutive fiscal years, i.e., state fiscal years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014, and that SFRA declined to convert its pari-mutuel permit to a permit to conduct summer jai alai. On July 1, 2015, West Flagler filed the July Application, pursuant to section 550.0745, for a “new permit” to conduct summer jai alai in Miami-Dade County. West Flagler’s July Application was based on its conclusion that a new summer jai alai permit was available because SFRA again had the smallest total pool or handle in Miami-Dade County for two consecutive fiscal years, i.e., state fiscal years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015, and that SFRA again declined to convert its pari- mutuel permit to a permit to conduct summer jai alai. On July 14, 2015, the Division denied the June Application on the grounds that there was not a summer jai alai permit available for fiscal years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 because SFRA did not have the smallest play or total pool in Miami-Dade County for those two consecutive years. The Division maintains that West Flagler (Magic City Jai Alai) had the smallest total pool in 2012/2013 and Summer Jai Alai Partnership had the smallest total pool in 2013/2014. That basis for the denial remains the position of the Division in this proceeding. On December 7, 2015, the Division issued an amended notice of denial that modified the denial of the July Application from one based on there being no lowest handling pari-mutuel permitholder for consecutive fiscal years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015, to one based on the grounds that 1) “West Flagler is incapable of converting its summer jai alai permit to a summer jai alai permit because there would not be an actual conversion as contemplated by statute”; and 2) “West Flagler has not shown that the issuance of a summer jai alai permit to West Flagler, which already holds a summer jai alai permit, would generate an increase in total state revenue over the revenue West Flagler generates under its current, identical permit.” West Flagler’s June Application does not seek to convert its existing summer jai alai permit to a summer jai alai permit. Rather, the application is predicated upon the creation of a new summer jai alai permit when SFRA declined to convert its pari-mutuel permit to a permit to conduct a summer jai alai fronton. West Flagler’s July Application does not seek to convert its existing summer jai alai permit to a summer jai alai permit. Rather, the application is predicated upon the creation of a new summer jai alai permit when SFRA declined to convert its pari-mutuel permit to a permit to conduct a summer jai alai fronton. The disagreement between the parties regarding the June Application revolves around whether “simulcast export” wagers should be included in calculating a permitholder’s “play or total pool within the county” for purposes of section 550.0745(1). The Division argues that a permitholder’s total pool includes live wagers, intertrack wagers, and simulcast export wagers. West Flagler argues that a permitholder’s total pool includes only live wagers and intertrack wagers.1/ A live wager is a wager accepted at a permitted Florida facility on a race or game performed live at that facility. Permitholders derive income, in the form of a commission, on live wagers placed at their facilities. Permitholders pay taxes on live wagers. An intertrack wager is a wager accepted at a permitted Florida facility on a race or game transmitted from and performed live at, or simulcast rebroadcast from, another permitted Florida facility. Permitholders derive income, in the form of a commission, on wagers placed at other Florida facilities on races or games transmitted from the permitholder’s facilities. Permitholders pay taxes on intertrack wagers. A simulcast wager is a wager placed at a Florida facility on an out-of-state race transmitted to the Florida facility. Permitholders pay taxes on simulcast wagers. An intertrack simulcast wager is a wager placed at a Florida guest track on an out-of-state race transmitted by the out-of-state track to a Florida host track, and then re- transmitted by the Florida host track to the Florida guest track. Permitholders pay taxes on intertrack simulcast wagers. A simulcast export wager is a wager accepted at an out-of-state facility on a race or game performed live at a permitted Florida facility. Permitholders derive income, in the form of a commission, on simulcast export wagers accepted by out-of-state facilities on races or games transmitted from the permitholder’s facilities. The Division does not know the commission structure between the permitholders and out-of-state facilities. Permitholders do not pay taxes on simulcast export wagers, and the state receives no revenue from simulcast export wagers. In sum, live wagers, intertrack wagers, simulcast wagers, and intertrack simulcast wagers are those placed at Florida pari-mutuel facilities, and subject to Florida taxation. Simulcast export wagers are those placed on Florida events at out-of-state facilities, and not subject to Florida taxation. Licensed betting facilities across the country -- and generally across the world -- contract with a licensed totalisator (the “tote”)2/ by which all wagers are accounted for. Data on all wagers placed on a hosting permitholder’s event (with uncommon exceptions when an out-of-state facility receiving a hosting permitholder’s simulcast broadcast forms its own pool) are sent by the tote to the hosting permitholder to be included in its total price pool, and used to determine payouts on winning wagers. The totes also capture simulcast export wagers for use in calculating the commission paid by the guest tracks. A permitholder’s pool amounts are reported to the Division by the tote company on a daily basis. The daily tote report includes live, simulcast, intertrack, intertrack simulcast, and simulcast export wagers. The daily tote reports are reviewed by the Division’s auditing section to ensure that wagers are accounted for and paid. The Division maintains a central monitoring system by which it captures the daily amounts for all wagers from the daily tote reports, and compiles them up to produce a cumulative report. A permitholder’s pool amounts are also reported to the Division directly by the permitholder in monthly pari-mutuel reports, and annual financial statements. The monthly reports and annual financial statements are reviewed by the Division’s revenue section. Since simulcast export wagers are not taxed by Florida, the Division’s monthly report and annual financial statement forms do not include simulcast export wagers as part of the facility’s handle. Due to the combination of low overall handles, and tax credits available for net operating losses, jai alai facilities (as opposed to cardrooms operating therein) do not generate any tax revenues for the state. Thus, the only revenues derived by the state from jai alai facilities are the $40 per game daily license fees and 15-percent admission tax required by section 550.0951. The parties stipulated that the Third District Court of Appeal considered only live wagers and intertrack wagers in its analysis of whether the “smallest play or total pool within the county” included only wagers physically placed within Miami- Dade County, as reflected in the Court’s opinion in South Florida Racing Association v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, So. 3d , 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 11334, 2015 WL 4546935 (Fla. 3d DCA July 29, 2015).3/ If simulcast export wagers are excluded from a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, SFRA had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2012/2013 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are included in a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, West Flagler Associates, Ltd. (Magic City Jai Alai) had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2012/2013 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are excluded from a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, SFRA had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2013/2014 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are included in a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, Summer Jai Alai Partnership had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2013/2014 state fiscal year.4/ If simulcast export wagers are excluded from a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, SFRA had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2014/2015 state fiscal year. If simulcast export wagers are included in a pari- mutuel facility’s play or total pool within Miami-Dade County, Summer Jai Alai Partnership had the smallest total handle in Miami-Dade County for the 2014/2015 state fiscal year. Regardless of whether out-of-state simulcast export wagers are included in the calculation of facilities’ “play or total pool,” a single pari-mutuel facility (either SRFA or Summer Jai Alai Partnership) had the smallest play or total pool within Miami-Dade County for the consecutive 2013/2014 and 2014/2015 state fiscal years. The Division did not notify West Flagler of any apparent errors or omissions in its July Application. The Division did not request that West Flagler provide any additional information with its July Application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that West Flagler Associate, Ltd.’s, June 30, 2015, and July 1, 2015, applications for new summer jai alai permits be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about March 6, 1984, petitioner applied for a DER permit to construct a marina on state owned submerged land located in Punta Rassa, Lee County, Florida. The original design requested approval to build slips for 54 boats. This design was later modified to conform to suggested modifications made by DER staff. The modification reduced the size of the marina to 30 boat slips. By an Intent to Issue dated April 24, 1985, petitioner was advised that the DER intended to issue the permit with 17 special conditions. Special Condition Number 1 advised petitioner of the Florida law which states that construction on state sovereignty lands may not be commenced prior to receiving from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, easement, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use. In none of the 17 special conditions, nor in any other portion of the Intent to Issue, was it stated when the permit time would begin to run, or when it would expire. The expiration date of the proposed permit simply was not mentioned. The Intent to Issue did contain a standard "point of entry" notice, advising that a petition for a hearing could be filed and stating that the hearing process was designed to formulate agency action. Having no objection to the DER's Intent to Issue and the conditions thereof, the petitioner determined not to request an administrative hearing with regard to said Intent. On May 17, 1985, the DER issued to petitioner Permit Number 360836415. This permit included 15 general conditions and the same 17 special conditions that were contained in the Intent to Issue. In addition, the permit stated that it would expire on June 1, 1987. The permit was accompanied by a letter. Neither the letter, nor the permit, bore the stamp of the agency clerk or contained language advising petitioner of its right to petition for an administrative hearing or other "point of entry" language. DER never notified petitioner by any document that contained "point of entry" language that the permit time would begin running immediately and would expire on June 1, 1987. In order to obtain a sovereignty land lease from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, petitioner was required to modify its proposed marina design by reducing the number of boat slips to 14. The Trustees approved the lease on or about July 29, 1986, although the Certification of Board Action attesting the Board's approval of the lease, as well as the sovereignty submerged land lease itself, was not forwarded to the petitioner until March 12, 1987. Due to the modifications required by the Trustees, the petitioner requested DER to modify its permit to reflect the reduction of the project scope. The request represented a minor modification to the permit and was granted by DER by letter dated September 30, 1986. The letter of modification does not suggest that the original expiration date of the permit had been changed. As of June 1, 1987, construction work on the proposed marina had not yet begun. The petitioner's agent relied upon a promulgated rule of the DER and assumed that the permit time would not begin to run on this project until petitioner had obtained consent to use state owned submerged land. DER's Dredge and Fill Application is encompassed in a form which is adopted by reference in Rule 17-1.203(1), Florida Administrative Code. This rule was adopted in 1982 and is still in effect today. A portion of that form, Appendix E, paragraph 3(g), on page 30, states that Where the proposed activity involves the use of state-owned submerged lands, DER shall not issue a permit before approval or consent of use is obtained from DNR, although DER will continue to process the application to the extent possible. (Emphasis supplied.) Except for this rule, DER has no other published instructions to applicants as to when permit times begin to run. Since the effective date of the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act (Sections 403.91 - .929, Florida Statutes) in October of 1984, DER has not followed its policy outlined in Form 17-1.203(1), as adopted by rule. This contrary practice is based on DER's interpretation of the Henderson Act's failure to include language which was previously included in Section 253.124, Florida Statutes, to the effect that DER permits do not become effective until all other local, state and federal permits are issued. DER's internal practice that calculates the running of the permit time prior to receiving approval to use state owned submerged land is not the subject of any public notice, memorandum or instructions generally available to the public or permit applicants. DER does not require permittees to provide proof of submerged land consent subsequent to the issuance of the DER permit. Also, DER has no internal mechanism for regularly apprising itself of permits which are soon to expire. DER does process and grant time extensions of permits. Requests for time extensions are made through a simple written request, and DER will generally grant such requests if the subject permit is still valid. If the DER permit has already expired at the time that the request for an extension is made, DER requires a new permit application. In this case, petitioner did not request an extension at any time before June 1, 1987. As noted above, it was the belief of petitioner's agent that the two-year permit term would not begin to run until the required Trustee's consent was secured. It was not until June 23 or 24, 1987, that he learned that DER considered the permit to have expired on June 1, 1987. In July of 1987, petitioner did re-apply for a new permit, but DER had environmental objections to the issuance of a new permit. The petition initiating these proceedings was subsequently filed.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order holding that Permit Number 360836415 does not expire until two years from March 12, 1987, and that appropriate recognition be given to the time which has elapsed due to the pendency of the instant proceeding. Respectfully Submitted and entered this 13th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1989. APPENDIX The Proposed findings of fact Submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted, incorporated and/or Summarized in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner 7. Rejected as an improper factual finding. Respondent 19. Last three Sentences rejected as contrary to the evidence. 21. Partially rejected due to the existence of Rule 17-1.203(1), Florida Administrative Code. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Richard Grosso, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent Robin Audifredd d/b/a St. Francis Place a/k/a Family Ties (Respondent) operated an assisted living facility without a required license and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the sole owner of St. Francis Place. She has never done business as "Family Ties, ACLF, Inc." At all pertinent times, Respondent held a license from the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation to operate St. Francis Place as a boarding home. Respondent's license to operate St. Francis Place as a boarding house allows up to 16 residents. Respondent provides non-transient housing for her residents. During pertinent times, there were approximately 13 residents housed at St. Francis Place. Some residents of St. Francis Place have conditions such as alcoholism, dementia, schizophrenia, manic depression, memory loss, and head trauma. Most of the residents of St. Francis Place were placed by other agencies, such as the United States Veterans Administration (VA). In addition to housing residents for pay, at the time of the hearing, Respondent was providing housing to three former homeless residents free of charge. According to the Complaint, Respondent was operating St. Francis Place in a manner that required a license from the Agency as an ALF because she was providing "personal services"2/ to one or more residents who were not related to Respondent. A license from the Agency is not required for facilities that provide "personal services" to no more than two non-relative residents who do not receive optional state supplementation, if the owner or renter of the facility resides at the facility. See Conclusions of Law 65, infra. According to Respondent, she did not need to be licensed as an ALF because she resided at St. Francis Place and only provided "personal services" to one non-relative resident, who was not receiving optional state supplementation. There is no evidence that any resident of St. Francis Place was receiving optional state supplementation during the pertinent time period. Respondent owns the building located at 1030 Jo Jo Road, Pensacola, Florida, from which she operates St. Francis Place. Respondent also owns a home at 425 Belle Chase Way, Pensacola, Florida. According to Respondent, she "resides" at both 1030 Jo Jo Road and at 425 Belle Chase Way, in Pensacola, Florida. Respondent testified that she actually spends more time at 1030 Jo Jo Road, where St. Francis Place is located. Petitioner's employees provided testimonial evidence to the effect that Respondent spends a great deal of time at St. Francis Place. Their testimony supports a finding that Respondent spends three or four nights a week at St. Francis Place. Despite the evidence showing that Respondent spends a lot of her time at St. Francis Place, it is found that Respondent's residence is 425 Belle Chase Way, Pensacola, Florida, rather than 1030 Jo Jo Road, based upon the following findings which are supported by clear and convincing evidence: Respondent claims homestead exemption at 425 Belle Chase Way. Respondent receives her phone bill at 425 Belle Chase Way address. In 2009, Respondent's address was listed as 425 Belle Chase Way on the title listing Respondent as a co-owner of her mother's motor vehicle. Respondent had no regular room at St. Francis Place. Rather, she either slept on a couch near the main entrance or on a couch in a back room. Although Respondent would also occasionally sleep in a room set aside for residents when there was a vacancy, Respondent had no regular room at St. Francis Place to sleep or keep her clothes. In February of 2009, Respondent's attorney in Respondent's divorce proceedings listed Respondent's address as 425 Belle Chase Way. Prior to February 2010, the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety (DMV) listed Respondent's address as 425 Belle Chase Way. On February 13, 2010, the DMV issued Respondent a duplicate driver's license indicating that her address was 425 Belle Chase Way. By the time of the final hearing, the address listed on Respondent's Florida driver's license had been changed to 1030 Jo Jo Road. The change of address from 425 Belle Chase Way to 1030 Jo Jo Road was made on April 8, 2010, just five days prior to the final hearing. Despite the recent change, Respondent testified that she did not know what address was listed on her driver's license. That testimony was not credible. Neither was Respondent's testimony that she "resided" at St. Francis Place. The phone number and address for St. Francis Place is listed in the Pensacola area 2009 AT&T Real Yellow Pages (Yellow Pages) under the heading "Assisted Living." At the final hearing, Respondent explained that she never authorized the listing and has contacted Yellow Pages and asked them to remove the listing. Respondent's testimony in that regard is undisputed, and it is found that Respondent did not authorize St. Francis Place to be listed in the Yellow Pages under the heading "Assisted Living." On March 25, 2009, a site visit of St. Francis Place was conducted by the Medicaid Fraud Unit of the Florida Attorney General's Office. The next day, on March 26, 2009, the Agency for Health Care Administration conducted a survey of St. Francis Place. The undisputed testimony clearly showed that, when the site visit and survey were conducted, there was one resident, identified as "G. T.," who was totally contracted and required assistance with daily living such as bathing, dressing, feeding, and taking medications. Respondent admits, and it is found, that Respondent and her employees provided "personal services" to G. T. within the meaning of applicable ALF licensing laws. G. T. is a resident who has had multiple sclerosis for many years. Respondent has known G. T. for over 16 years. G. T. had been a resident of St. Francis Place since it first opened its doors approximately six years prior to the date of the final hearing. The Agency was aware that G. T. was a resident of St. Francis Place and was receiving personal services prior to the March 2009, site visit and survey. There is no indication, however, that the Agency took any action prior to March 2009, to alert Respondent that she was considered to be operating an ALF without a license. Katherine Cone and Norma Endress were members of the teams who conducted the site visit and survey of Respondent's St. Francis Place facility on March 25 and March 26, 2009, respectively. During her visit on March 25, 2009, Ms. Cone believed that resident G. T. was not receiving proper care and arranged for her transport to a local hospital. G. T. was treated and released back to St. Francis Place. According to Ms. Endress, who saw G. T. the very next day, she observed no demonstrated harm to any resident at St. Francis Place. The evidence is insufficient to conclude that G. T. was harmed while a residing at St. Francis Place.3/ After the site visit and survey, both Ms. Cone and Ms. Endress believed that, in addition to the personal services provided to G. T., there was evidence that staff at St. Francis Place was providing personal services in the form of assistance in administering medications or filling pill organizers for other residents. The evidence presented at the final hearing, however, was insufficient to show, clearly and convincingly, that personal services were rendered to other residents. The insufficient evidence included: Photographs and the surveyors' recollections of pill reminder or pill organizer boxes that looked as though they were full of medications; Photographs and the surveyors' recollections of medication containers stored in a centrally located medication cart with wheels; Photographs and Ms. Cone's recollection of documents in folders above the medication cart containing information related to transportation and outside services for residents such as pharmacies and transportation companies. Ms. Cone's testimony that one of Respondent's employees, Kathleen Wentworth, told her at the time of the site visit that she maintained pill organizers with medications for several residents, and that Ms. Wentworth had signed a statement to the effect that staff at St. Francis Place administered medications to residents. Ms. Endress' testimony that one of the residents told her that staff at St. Francis Place had filled his pill reminder box. The evidence was insufficient because it was not further supported. Respondent and her testifying employees explained, and other evidence indicated, that the medication cart remained unlocked and was accessible so that residents could retrieve their own medications. There was no testimony from a St. Francis Place resident, employee or Respondent, or anyone else with actual knowledge, indicating that either Respondent or her employees ever assisted any resident other than G. T., with their medications. As far as Ms. Cone's hearsay recollection of what Ms. Wentworth told her, Ms. Wentworth testified at the hearing that the conversation did not occur. In addition, while Ms. Cone remembered a written statement signed by Ms. Wentworth, no such document was entered into evidence. Finally, photographs and Ms. Cone's recollection of folders with documents about services available from other vendors, such as pharmacies or transportation providers, did not show that Respondent was providing personal services to her residents. According to Ms. Endress, prior to leaving St. Francis Place after the site visit on March 26, 2009, she informed Respondent that Respondent was operating without the requisite ALF license, and that Respondent would be hearing from the Agency within 10 days. In contrast, Respondent testified that one of the Agency's employees, Ms. Klug, told her that she could "care for two people without an ALF license," and that Ms. Endress had given her similar assurances. Consistent with Ms. Endress's recollection, the Agency sent a letter to Respondent dated March 27, 2009, which informed Respondent that the Agency "considers you to be operating as an Assisted Living Facility (ALF) without being licensed." Considering that letter, together with the recollection of Ms. Endress, and the comparative credibility of the witnesses testifying on this point, it is found that, while one or more Agency employees informed Respondent that there was an exception to the AFL license requirements, Ms. Endress informed Respondent on March 26, 2009, that Respondent needed an ALF license, and that Respondent would be hearing from the Agency within ten days. The Agency's letter mailed to Respondent on March 27, 2009, stated in its entirety: Dear Ms. Audiffred, You are hereby notified that the Agency for Health Care Administration considers you to be operating as an Assisted Living Facility (ALF) without being licensed. Based on Section 429.14(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Fla. Stat.), it is unlawful to own, operate, or maintain an assisted living facility without obtaining a license under Chapter 429, Part I, F.S. Section 429.02(6), Fla. Stat., defines an ALF as "any building or buildings, section or distinct part of a building, private home, boarding home, home for the aged, or other residential facility, whether operated for profit or not, which undertakes through its ownership or management to provide housing, meals, and one or more personal services for a period exceeding 24 hours to one or more adults who are not relatives of the owner or administrator." The statute provides an exemption from licensure for not more than 2 adults who do not receive optional state supplementation (OSS) when the person who provides the housing, meals and personal services owns or rents the home and resides therein. This exception can be found in Section 420.04(2)(d), Fla. Stat. Based on evidence of unlicensed activity, the Agency intends to proceed with all available legal action, including bringing injunctive proceedings against you in a court of competent jurisdiction, to insure that you immediately cease and desist from offering these services. Further, Section 429.19(7), Fla. Stat., provides that "any unlicensed facility that continues to operate after agency notification is subject to a $1,000 fine per day". [sic] If you believe you are not operating as an ALF in violation of law as described, you may submit in writing any information which would demonstrate that to the Agency within 24 hours of receipt of this notice. Any information you wish to have considered by the Agency must be actually received within 24 hours of your receipt of this Notice of Violation. If you have any questions, you may reach me at 850-922-8822. The letter was signed by Barbara Alford, R.N., B.S.N., Field Office Manager, and was copied to Alberta Granger, Assisted Living Unit Manager, and to the Regional Attorney. The fines set forth in the Complaint are premised upon penalties accruing at the rate of $1,000 per day from the day after the Agency's March 27, 2009, letter to Respondent, through July 21, 2009, when the Agency found that G. T. was still residing at Respondent's facility. According to paragraph 13 of the Complaint, "pursuant to § 408.812, Fla. Stat. (2009), the Agency notified the Respondent by certified mail that the facility was in violation of Florida Law on March 27, 2009." The Agency's March 27, 2009, letter, however, does not refer to section 408.812, contains a number of wrong citations to the law, and is equivocal on the issue of whether the Agency was actually requiring Respondent to cease and desist. The law in effect in March 2009 when the letter was written was the 2008 version of Florida Statutes, not the 2009 version referenced in the Complaint.4/ The first paragraph of the March 27, 2009, letter refers to section 429.14(1)(m), Florida Statutes, for the proposition that "it is unlawful to own, operate, or maintain an assisted living facility without obtaining a license. " There is, however, no section 429.14(1)(m) in either the 2008 or 2009 version of section 429.14. The next statutory reference in the letter is in the second paragraph which refers to section 429.02(6) for the definition of ALF. Both the 2008 and 2009 versions of section 429.02(6), however, define "chemical restraint," not ALF. Although, further down in the second paragraph, the letter correctly refers to section 429.04(2)(d), for the exception where no license is required; the third paragraph of the letter erroneously refers to section 429.19(7) for the quote "any unlicensed facility that continues to operate after agency notification is subject to a $1,000 fine per day." That language does not appear in either the 2008 or 2009 version of section 429.19, and has not appeared in chapter 429 since 2006. In fact, instead of providing for a $1,000 per day fine, section 429.19(7), Florida Statutes (2008), in effect on the date of the letter, provides: In addition to any administrative fines imposed, the agency may assess a survey fee, equal to the lesser of one half of the facility's biennial license and bed fee or $500, to cover the cost of conducting initial complaint investigations that result in the finding of a violation that was the subject of the complaint or monitoring visits conducted under s. 429.28(3)(c) to verify the correction of the violations. A provision for the imposition of a $1,000 per day fine from the date of notice does not appear in either the 2008 or 2009 versions of chapter 429. Rather, the authority to impose a $1,000 per day fine for operating an ALF without a license which was in effect in March 2009, when the letter was written is found in section 408.812(4), Florida Statutes (2008), which provides that "[a]ny person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance." Although the Complaint, served approximately 9 months after the letter, refers to section 408.812, the letter does not even mention chapter 408. In addition, the actual language of section 408.812(4) differs from the quote in the letter from an old version of section 429.19(7) that was no longer in effect. Aside from being inaccurate on the law, the letter does not explain why the Agency "considers" Respondent to be operating an ALF without a license, or what aspects of Respondent's operations required her to need a license beyond her license to operate a boarding house. Even though the letter fails to describe which aspects of Respondent's operations violate the law, and does not set forth the referenced "evidence of unlicensed activity," the letter advises Respondent that she may submit information to the Agency within 24 hours to demonstrate that she is "not operating an ALF in violation of law as described." Additionally, although suggesting that the Agency intends to proceed with legal action to insure that Respondent "cease[s] and desist[s] from offering these services," the letter does not identify which services or tell Respondent to stop operations. In addition to giving Respondent time to provide the Agency with information that she is not in violation of the law, the letter advises Respondent of the exception to the requirement of a license for not more than 2 adults "when the person who provides the housing, meals and personal services owns or rents the home and resides therein." While it has been found that Respondent did not actually reside at St. Francis Place, it is further found that Respondent believed that she could care for two patients without an ALF license as mentioned in the letter. Respondent received the Agency's March 27, 2009, letter on or about April 1, 2009. Within 24 hours after receiving the letter, Respondent sent the Agency an undated written response addressed "To Whom it May Concern." Respondent's written response mentioned that she had discussed with Ms. Endress, the one resident that they "give care to" and that Ms. Endress had advised, "Well legally you can take care of two people without a license." Respondent's written response further reported that a representative from the VA had suggested to several of Respondent's residents that they should move out. Respondent's written response also advised that a number of visits and surveys of St. Francis Place had been conducted in March 2009, by various agencies, including the VA, the Medicaid Fraud Unit from the Florida Attorney General's Office, the Florida Department of Children and Families, and the Agency. The last paragraph of Respondent's written response states: St. Francis Place is a liscenced [sic] non-transient rooming house and the arrangements provided by our business is stated below. The renters residing at St. Francis Place are responsible for their own medications, laundry, and living quarters. As a non-transient rooming house and being in operation for the past six years, we have always encouraged our renters to maintain their own independence. Six of the thirteen renters have their own Florida drivers liscence [sic]. Several of the renters attend school or maintain employment. Several renters perform odd jobs for pay at St. Francis Place, such as yard work, sweeping porches, or taking out trash etc. Monthly Rent includes: three meals a day accessible laundry room transportation upon request utilities garbage service use of telephone cable. On July 21, 2009, surveyors from the Agency once again visited St. Francis Place and observed that G. T. was still residing there and receiving personal services. Sometime after July 21, 2009, the Florida Department of Children and Families moved G. T. from St. Francis Place to a facility known as the "Villas" in an Alzheimer's lock-down unit. The Agency never sought an injunction to force Respondent to cease operating St. Francis Place. There is no evidence that the Agency suggested to Respondent corrective measures or actions that she could take to comply with the law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order finding that Respondent Robin Audifredd d/b/a St. Francis Place5/ operated an assisted living facility without a license in violation of section 408.812, but imposing no administrative fine or penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent owned a commercial vehicle identified as a 1983 KW, VIN:IXKKD28X3DJ298929 (vehicle) which was operated by Trinity Trucking of Tampa, Florida. On August 7, 1990 the Respondent's vehicle while traveling on S.R. 5 in Monroe County, Florida was stopped and weighed by the Department. The total weight of the vehicle was 79,440 pounds consisting of 10,380 pounds on the steering axle, 35,900 pounds on drive tandem and 33,160 pounds on rear tandem. A Load Report and Field Receipt was completed and indicated the legal weight to be 35,000 pounds. This is the legal weight established for a commercial vehicle by Section 316.545(2)(b), Florida Statutes when that vehicle has an expired registration. The Respondent's Florida International Registration Plan (IRP) Temporary Operational Permit No. 061084 had expired on August 3, 1990, and Respondent had not obtained another Florida IRP Temporary Operational Permit or a current registration for the vehicle on August 7, 1990 when the vehicle was stopped and weighed. Using the "no tag" tax class weight of 79,440 pounds and subtracting the legal weight of 35,000 pounds as established by statute the vehicle was 44,440 pounds overweight. The Department assessed the Respondent a penalty of $0.05 per pound for each pound the vehicle was overweight which resulted in a total penalty assessed the Respondent of $2,222.00. After the Respondent purchased a valid tag for the vehicle and paid the penalty the vehicle was released. Respondent applied for registration in the Florida IRP in accordance with Section 320.0715, Florida Statutes, and was issued a 60-day Temporary Operational Permit in accordance with Section 320.0715(3), Florida Statutes, on June 4, 1990 with an expiration date of August 3, 1990. Sometime around June 28, 1990 Respondent was advised by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) that additional information was needed in order to further process his application for registration in the Florida IRP. Sometime around the week of July 9, 1990 Respondent mailed the requested information to IRP, Motor Carrier Service. DHSMV, however, the letter was misdirected to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), possibly the U.S. Postal Service confused IRP with IRS, but, in any event, the information was returned to the Respondent in October 1990 by IRS. By this time, the Respondent had purchased a valid Florida tag and decided not to pursue registration of this vehicle in the Florida IRP. Respondent admitted that he was aware that the temporary operational permit for the vehicle expired on August 3, 1990 even though he was not personally operating the vehicle. Respondent also admitted that he made no inquiry to the DHSMV as to the status of his application for registration and did not request any extension of his temporary operational permit before the permit expired or before the vehicle was found to be overweight on August 7, 1990. It was only after the vehicle was found to be overweight due to the expired permit that Respondent checked with DHSMV and was advised that the requested information had not been received. There was no evidence that it was the policy of the Department to disregard the provision of Section 316.545(2)(b), Florida Statutes, establishing a legal weight of 35,000 pounds for a vehicle with an expired registration when the DHSMV had an application on file for registration in the Florida IRP which was being processed by DHSMV. On August 7, 1990 the Respondent's vehicle was 44,440 pounds overweight when it was stopped and weighed in Monroe County, Florida on S.R. 5, and the calculation of the penalty ($0.05 x 44,440 pounds = $2,222.00) is correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order finding the Respondent subject to the penalty as assessed and denying his request for refund of the penalty. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-4945 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 2, 3, 4 and 5. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 10. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Respondent waived the filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Copies furnished to: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Glenn E. Porter 5213 Fourth Street Bradenton, FL 34203 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue Should the Department of Revenue grant Petitioner's request for a temporary tax exemption permit and request for refund of sales and use tax which has been paid under protest? See Section 212.08(5)(a) and (b)3a, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner opened a new commercial laundry facility in Pompano Beach, Florida, in 1993. Petitioner installed in the new facility machinery and equipment costing approximately $1,400,000.00 for the purposes of cleaning and processing linens used by hospitals in the south Florida area (the "Laundry Equipment"). Petitioner charges a fee to hospitals in the south Florida area for cleaning and processing the hospitals' linens with the Laundry Equipment. The new facilities are additional, not replacement, facilities. The Laundry Equipment: Qualifies as "industrial machinery and equipment", as defined by Section 212.08(5)(b) and (6)(c), Florida Statutes; Was purchased by Petitioner for use in a new business; Processes items of tangible personal property, the hospital's linens, at a fixed location; Was purchased before Petitioner first began its productive operations and delivery was made within 12 months of that date; and Has increased productive output at Petitioner's commercial laundry facility. The equipment included a tunnel washer system, conveyers, feeders/folders, ironers, a boiler, and air compressors. By application dated September 3, 1993, Petitioner applied for a temporary tax exemption permit with respect to the Laundry Equipment which it planned to purchase for use in its new business. Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer obtain that permit to receive the exemption. The Department denied Petitioner's application. On August 22, 1994, Petitioner paid to the Department, under protest, the sum of $18,095.36, which represented the tax of $16,773.98, plus interest of $1,321.38, on Petitioner's purchase of the Laundry Equipment. Petitioner timely filed its claim for refund, which the Department denied. Respondent denied Petitioner's request for a temporary tax exemption permit, and Respondent denied Petitioner's refund claim based upon Rule 12A- 1.096, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's request for a tax exemption permit and Petitioner's refund claim are based upon the exemption provided in Section 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes, which applies to a new (as opposed to an expanding) business.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies the request for a tax exemption permit and a refund in the amount of $18,095.36. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Pierce, Esquire Emily S. Waugh, Esquire MACFARLANE, AUSLEY, FERGUSON & MCMULLEN Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James McAuley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
