Findings Of Fact In 1987, the Respondent DOT began its review of the public roads within Glades County in order to assign maintenance and jurisdictional responsibility in accordance with the current functional classification of each road. By law, the DOT is required to conduct such a review every five years. Section 05040 of State Road 78 is located within the unincorporated area of Glades County. This paved, two-lane road segment is 14.8 miles in length, and predominantly runs in an east-west direction. Approximately two miles of the eastern portion veers to the north, where the segment then connects with State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27). The western terminus of this road segment adjoins State Road 29, and the eastern terminus as mentioned previously, adjoins State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27). There is a radical change in direction at both ends where the segment connects with the two adjacent roads. At the western terminus, State Road 29 runs in a southwesterly to northeasterly direction. The southwesterly portion of State Road 29 runs in a southwesterly to northeasterly direction. The southwesterly portion of State Road 29 enters into Hendry County and extends to LaBelle, the county seat. At the eastern terminus, State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) runs for approximately five miles before it reconnects with another portion of State Road 78 which runs in a northeasterly direction around the border of Lake Okeechobee into Okeechobee County, and onto the City of Okeechobee, the county seat. Through the use of approximately four miles of the southwesterly portion of State Road 29 and approximately five miles of the easterly portion of State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27), State Road 78 becomes a transportation corridor which connects Hendry County, Glades County, and Okeechobee County. This corridor is used by members of the Gulf Citrus Growers Association in Hendry County to transport citrus to market in other parts of the state. State Road 29 and State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) are functionally classified as arterial roads on the state highway system. During the functional classification evaluations within Glades County, Section 05040 of State Road 78 was reviewed by DOT. As part of the process, an inventory worksheet was used to determine how the road would be classified under the current scoring system. A Rural Arterial Inventory Worksheet (Respondent's Exhibit 15) was used to determine the roadway's System Attribute Score (SAS). As part of the evaluation process, the system element coefficient must be located within Table Number 4 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code. The Administrator of Transportation Data for District 1 correctly determined that the system element coefficient was 5, and the rural element number was 12. The first attribute reviewed on the worksheet in order to obtain the SAS was the Traffic Factor. Under the definitions found in Table 1 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code, the Traffic Factor is calculated by multiplying the Average Daily Traffic Count by the county's normalizing coefficient Tpd of 1.73. Again, the administrator correctly assessed the value of 2,782 on the worksheet. Usually, a score below 3,000 under the Traffic Factor results in an evaluation score of "zero" on the Rural Arterial Inventory Worksheet. However, Table Number 1 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code, notes that when 50% of traffic volume is non-local traffic, a score of "one" is placed on the worksheet instead of a "zero." Competent and credible testimony presented at hearing from local citizens, who had the opportunity to know the composition of the traffic on the road segment, revealed that a relatively small percentage of Section 05040 of State Road 78 traffic was local. The majority of the traffic was comprised of out-of-county motorists. Based upon this testimony, the Traffic Factor score on the worksheet should be changed from "zero" to "one." The second attribute reviewed on the worksheet was the Access Factor. This score is calculated by dividing the average daily traffic (ADT) by the number of access points per mile. Instead of using available information with the DOT or asking for information from local authorities regarding this attribute, the administrator grossly overestimated that the road segment contained twenty access points per mile. No reasonable basis was presented at hearing by the administrator for his "estimate" of twenty access points per mile on a rural segment in one of the more remote and under populated areas within his district. The videotape presented at hearing clearly demonstrates that there are not twenty access points per mile on this roadway. Unrefuted testimony presented at hearing revealed that approximately twenty-five families reside along this 14.8 mile stretch of road. There is also a large rock mine, a cemetery, and the county landfill. Respondent's Exhibit 5, the General Highway Map of Glades County, shows that a DOT facility is located on this road segment. There are four roads which intersect the road segment and one railroad grade crossing. A locked gate at the Caloosahatchee Rock Mine has a driveway which connects to the road. To deny the road segment the minimum score of "one" on the access factor, the DOT would have to estimate in its calculation that there are more than ten access points per mile on this road. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, there are far less than ten access points per mile on this road segment. Therefore, the Access Factor score on the worksheet should be changed from "zero" to "one." The Trucks and Network Factor attributes which each received a score of "one" from the administrator. These scores were not challenged by Petitioner. The Extent of Road attribute was not properly tested by the administrator. Under Rule 14-12.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, the entire State Road 78, along with the southwesterly portion of State Road 29, and the eastern portion of State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) should be utilized for the Extent of Road (miles) measurement. As the entire length of the extended transportation corridor exceeds twenty miles, the score should be "one" instead of "zero." The Mobility Attribute was not properly assessed. Rule 14-12.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, allows the extended transportation corridor to be used to determine the total number of counties in which the road is located. Testimony presented at hearing regarding the use of the road segment as part of the transport route of citrus from Hendry County through State Road 78 in Glades County to Okeechobee County supports the finding that the road is located in three counties. The score as to the Mobility Attribute should be changed from "zero" to "one." Section 05040 of State Road 78 is in an overall physical condition which is at least commensurate with contemporary roads of like age and existing functional classification (rural major collector) within Glades County.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order that the Department's functional classification of the road segment was incorrect, that the functional classification of the road as a rural minor arterial be reinstated, and that the jurisdiction over the road remain with the Department. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of October 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1227 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Rejected. Not a factual finding. Accepted. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Statement of the Issues. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #19. Accepted Accept the first sentence. The second sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that the Hearing Officer found the road to be improperly classified. The rest is rejected as conclusionary. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. The financial ability provision within the statute was repealed, and a determination cannot be made on the basis of factors outside rule or statute. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accept the first two sentences. The third sentence is rejected. See HO #2. Fourth sentence is accepted. See HO #5. Fifth sentence is accepted. See HO #7. Sixth sentence is rejected. See HO #7-#18. Seventh sentence is accepted. See HO #8. Eighth sentence is rejected. Improper conclusion. Ninth sentence is accepted. See Conclusions of Law. Tenth sentence is accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See HO #19. Rejected. The financial ability provision within the statute was repealed, and a determination cannot be made on the basis of factors outside the rule or statute. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Rider, Esquire Post Office Box 608 Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, P.E., Interim Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 =================================================================
The Issue The issues for disposition in this case are whether Respondent committed willful violations of section 106.07(7), Florida Statutes (2014), when its campaign treasurer failed to notify the filing officer that Respondent had not received funds, made contributions, or expended reportable funds during four 2014 reporting periods; and, if so, whether Respondent is subject to civil penalties in view of the holding in PAC for Equality v. Department of State, Florida Elections Commission, 542 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity responsible for investigating complaints and enforcing Florida's election and campaign financing laws, chapters 104 and 106, Florida Statutes. § 106.25, Fla. Stat. Respondent is a political committee organized for the purpose of sponsoring and supporting a constitutional initiative to conserve and protect Florida’s scenic beauty, which is primarily directed to restrictions on billboards along Florida highways. Respondent has been a registered political committee since 2002. Prior to 2014, Respondent suspended its campaign to gather petitions to place the constitutional initiative on the ballot. Respondent has not abandoned the campaign, and the initiative remains legally active. Prior to 2014, Respondent’s most recent financial activity was an expenditure of $61.25 in the first quarter of 2011. Respondent’s assets during 2014 consisted of $157.50 held in a bank account. There were no contributions received or expenditures made by Respondent during the times pertinent to this proceeding. Respondent’s treasurer is Mr. Crescimbeni. Mr. Crescimbeni acknowledged his responsibility as treasurer to accurately report to the Division of Elections the contributions received and expenditures made by Respondent, and the dates of each. The reporting requirements were contained in a political committee handbook and copy of the Florida statutes that are provided by Petitioner to all political committees. Mr. Crescimbeni acknowledged having received and read both documents. Although some reporting requirements have changed since Mr. Crescimbeni’s receipt of the political committee handbook, Mr. Crescimbeni believed that he understood the reporting requirements. Mr. Crescimbeni understood that, since Respondent neither received contributions nor made expenditures, the requirement to submit a treasurer’s report was statutorily waived, though there was a requirement to notify the filing officer that a report was not being filed. In 2013, section 106.07 was amended, creating 33 reporting periods for calendar year 2014, significantly more than existed prior to the amendments. Ch. 2013-37, § 9, Laws of Fla.3/ Reports for the 33 reporting periods in 2014 were statutorily waived pursuant to section 107.07(7), inasmuch as there were no contributions or expenditures. Notifications of no activity were filed for each of the 33 reporting periods in 2014, all of which were timely, except the four identified in the Order of Probable Cause. The M5 Filing Period The notification of no activity for the 2014 M5 reporting period of May 1 through May 31, 2014, was due by midnight on June 10, 2014. The notification of no activity for the 2014 M5 reporting period was filed on Saturday, June 14, 2014, at 11:50:59 a.m. On the morning of Saturday, June 14, 2014, Mr. Crescimbeni picked up Respondent’s mail from the post office. He then traveled to his office, where he opened the mail. Among the items received was a notice from the Division of Elections advising Respondent that its M5 report had not been received by the filing deadline. The letter was dated June 11, 2014, and bore a postmark of June 12, 2014. When Mr. Crescimbeni realized his error, he immediately uploaded the report of no activity at 11:50 a.m. on the morning of June 14, 2014. Mr. Crescimbeni testified credibly that “[m]y delayed filing of the M5 notification of no activity was neither deliberate nor a repeated failure. It was simply an oversight and nothing more.” The P1 Report The notification of no activity for the 2014 P1 reporting period of June 1 through June 20, 2014, was due by midnight on Friday, June 27, 2014. The notification was filed on Saturday, June 28, 2014, at 9:34:11 a.m. The notification was filed without any form of notification from Petitioner. Mr. Crescimbeni indicated that the late filing of the PI notification of no activity, which occurred within hours of the time due, was not deliberate, and was unintentional and an oversight. The G1 Report The notification of no activity for the 2014 G1 reporting period of August 23 through 29, 2014, was due by midnight on Friday, September 5, 2014. The notification was filed on Saturday, September 6, 2014, at 3:52:33 a.m. The notification was filed without any form of notification from Petitioner. Mr. Crescimbeni indicated that the late filing of the GI notification of no activity, which occurred within hours of the time due, was not deliberate, and was unintentional and an oversight. The D2 Report The notification of no activity for the 2014 D2 reporting period of October 25, 2014, was due by midnight on Sunday, October 26, 2014. The notification was filed on Monday, October 27, 2014, at 10:12:15 a.m. The notification was filed without any form of notification from Petitioner. Mr. Crescimbeni indicated that the late filing of the D2 notification of no activity, which occurred within hours of the time due, was not deliberate, and was unintentional and an oversight. As to each of the four notifications of no activity referenced above, Mr. Crescimbeni credibly testified that the delay was: [T]he result of my temporary inattention and each such delay was a simple and inadvertent omission on my part that was promptly remedied . . . . I was never indifferent to the required filings of notifications of no activity. Each such delay by me in making such filing of said notification was not intentional. Each such delay was not deliberate, purposeful, or with any intent or consciousness on my part to avoid the notification of “no” activity. Mr. Crescimbeni’ testimony is accepted. There was no evidence adduced at the hearing suggesting there to have been any financial or political advantage or benefit that could reasonably be derived from the late filing of the four notifications of no activity referenced above. The Commission does not investigate willfulness and does not make a finding of willfulness until after the determination of probable cause in a Probable Cause Hearing.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the intended contract award to Intervenor pursuant to Request for Proposals P2056 for a Community Based Intervention Services Program in Brevard County, Florida, is contrary to Respondent’s governing statutes, Respondent’s policies and rules, and the request for proposals.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is the procuring agency for the RFP at issue in this proceeding. Eckerd is a not-for-profit corporation duly-organized under the laws of the State of Florida. White is a not-for-profit corporation duly-organized under the laws of the State of Florida. On September 4, 2009, the Department issued the RFP to select a provider to operate a 44-slot Community Based Intervention Services Program for youth ages ten through 21 in Brevard County, Florida. Eckerd did not protest the specifications of the RFP nor the methodology that the Department had historically used in scoring proposals for similar services within 72 hours of the issuance of the RFP. Eckerd and White submitted timely responses to the RFP on or before October 14, 2009. Under the RFP, one of the categories that the Department evaluates is the “Evaluation of the Past Performance for Non-Residential Programs.” One of the three components of the past performance standard is: Part I—Evaluation for Past Performance in Florida. This includes, as a subcomponent, the provider’s “Combined Success Rate” (CSR), with an assigned value of 200 points. The RFP defines CSR as “Percentage of youth who do not recidivate,” and further provides, “Points are awarded based on the combination of successful youth program completions, and the percentage of youth who do not recidivate.” Each proposer was required to complete and submit with its proposal Attachment C to the RFP entitled “Data Sheet: Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs” (Data Sheet). The Data Sheet was to provide certain information for non-residential programs that the proposer had operated in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007, including program name, contract number, number of completions during FY 2006-2007, and FY 2006-2007 Recidivism Rates. Some of the information, such as the completions and the recidivism rates, was to be based on information found in the Department’s 2008 Florida Comprehensive Accountability Report [CAR].1 The CAR is prepared by the Department and includes program outcomes, including total releases, number of completions, completion rates, and success rates for all types of probation and community intervention programs that released youth in FY 2006-2007. The information is reported by judicial circuit. The CAR may report information on different programs in a judicial circuit, and some of the programs may be included in one contract with a provider. For example, White has one contract in the Second Judicial Circuit, contract number P2028, but the CAR reports information for two programs under contract number P2028. In the Fourth Judicial Circuit, White has one contract, contract number D7102, under which services are provided in Duval and Nassau Counties. The CAR treats the counties as being separate programs and provides separate data for the services provided in Duval County and for the services provided in Nassau County. As set forth in the Data Sheet, the number of completions is defined as “[t]he number of youth completing the program during FY 2006/2007 documented in the Department’s 2008 Florida Comprehensive Accountability Report.” In the CAR, the column titled “N4” provides the number of youth who successfully completed a specific program. The recidivism rate is the percentage of youth who later offended. The Data Sheet provides that the recidivism rate is found in the “2006-2007 Recidivism Column as reported in the Department’s 2008 Florida Comprehensive Accountability Report.” The CAR does not report recidivism rates; it reports success rates. Instead of providing the percentage of youth who completed the program and reoffended, the CAR reports the percentage of youth who did not reoffend. Thus, the recidivism rate is calculated by subtracting the success rate from 100. The Department relies on data from the CAR in determining the percentage of recidivism because the success completion percentages that are reported in the CAR have been calculated already. Therefore, it is easy to calculate the recidivism percentages using the CAR success rates. Paul Hatcher, senior management analyst for the Department, is the individual responsible for determining the CSR for providers who have submitted proposals in response to requests for proposals issued by the Department. Mr. Hatcher is the only individual who performs this function for the Department and has been in this position, performing this task, for over nine years. Mr. Hatcher processes the proposals through a standard procedure. The RFP provides that the information submitted in the Data Sheet “will be verified by the Department [and] [a]ny inaccurate or omitted information will be corrected.” After receiving the proposals, Mr. Hatcher verifies the accuracy of the information provided, including the number of completions and the recidivism rate reported on the Data Sheets submitted with each proposal, against the information provided in the corresponding CAR. If the information regarding a program is reported incorrectly, Mr. Hatcher corrects it to conform to the information in the appropriate CAR. The information submitted on the Data Sheet is submitted by contract number. The contract number is how the Department identifies quality assurance reviews, as well as fiscal and other data sources. For example, for contract number P2028, White submitted the completions for both programs in the Second Judicial Circuit. One program had 19 completions and the other program had 29 completions, for a total of 48. White intended to combine the completions for placement under Column 9 of the Data Sheet but erroneously used the combined number of releases. Pursuant to the RFP, Mr. Hatcher corrected the data to reflect the combined completions as reported in the CAR.2 The CAR reported a success rate of one program as 63% and the success rate of the other program as 69%, which equated to recidivism rates of 37% and 31%. White recorded the recidivism rates for the contract on the Data Sheet as 37%/31%. The same approach was used for reporting the information on contract number D7102 for the services provided in Duval County and Nassau County in the Fourth Judicial Circuit. The services provided in Duval and Nassau Counties were considered by the Department to be one program; however, the CAR reported the information by county as if they were separate programs. The completions for both counties were intended to be combined for reporting on the Data Sheet, but White recorded the combined number of releases on the Data Sheet.3 Mr. Hatcher corrected the data to reflect the combined completions as reported in the CAR. The CAR reported the success rates for the Duval County program as 62% and the success rate of the Nassau County program as 100%. These success rates equated to recidivism rates of 38% and 0%. Because the Department is looking for the recidivism rate for each contract, and the CAR reports the success rates used to calculate recidivism rates by program as in the Second Judicial Circuit or by county as in the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Mr. Hatcher averages the combined recidivism rates to come up with one recidivism rate for each contract in the Second and Fourth Judicial Circuits. Thus, the recidivism rates for contract number P2028 for the Second Judicial Circuit were averaged, resulting in one recidivism rate of 21%. The same method was applied to the recidivism rates for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, resulting in one recidivism rate of 19%. After checking the reported numbers and making all necessary changes, including making corrections to the data to match the data reported in the CAR and averaging the recidivism rates for contracts encompassing more than one program or more than one county, Mr. Hatcher inputs the number of completions and the recidivism rate for each contract into a standardized Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (Spreadsheet), which performs the actual calculations and computes the total CSR for each individual proposal. The Spreadsheet uses fixed formulas to perform the mathematical calculations necessary to determine the CSR for each proposal. The last two columns on the right hand side of the Spreadsheet relate to the CSR, and the numbers shown therein are generated by the fixed formulas. The Spreadsheet performs several calculations. It multiplies the number of completions by the recidivism rate for each contract to obtain the number of youth recidivating. Then, from each contract, the number of youth recidivating was subtracted from the number of total completions to obtain the number of successful youth for each contract. It then adds each of these successful youth figures together and divides the total by the combined total number of completions, resulting in the total CSR. The Department awarded Eckerd a score of 129 points based on a 64.5% Combined Success Rate. The Department awarded White a score of 160 points based on an 80% Combined Success Rate. On December 11, 2009, the Department posted its Notice of Agency Action, which indicated its intent to award the contract to White. The Department awarded White the highest overall score of 1554.49 points. The Department awarded Eckerd the second highest overall score of 1544.49 points. On December 28, 2009, Eckerd filed the Petition pursuant to Subsection 120.57(3), Florida Statutes (2009),4 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-110.004. The same Spreadsheet had been used by the Department for several years in calculating the CSR for proposals submitted in response to requests for proposals. Additionally, the Department’s practice of averaging scores for single-contract programs with more than one set of data was not a new scoring concept for the procurement at issue. In 2007, Eckerd submitted a response to Request for Proposal P2303 (RFP P2303) issued by the Department and was awarded the contract by achieving the highest score that was calculated in the same manner as the scores for the procurement at issue.5 In the Data Sheet submitted by Eckerd for RFP P2303, under program name, it entered in one cell, a single-contract program (contract number P70444) operated by Eckerd in the Tenth and Twelfth Judicial Circuits as “Circuit 10, 12, West/EYDC.” In its Data Sheet for RFP P2303, Eckerd took the total number of completions from the 2006 CAR for the Tenth Judicial Circuit and the Twelfth Judicial Circuit for contract number P7044, 19 and 31, respectively, and added them together for a total of 50 completions, which it entered under the “Number of Completions” column. The 2006 CAR reported recidivism rates for the Tenth and Twelfth Judicial Circuits as 26% and 23%, respectively, for contract number 7044. Eckerd listed both recidivism rates in its Data Sheet for RFP P2303 under the “2004-2005 Recidivism Rate.” Mr. Hatcher averaged the recidivism rates for contract number 7044 resulting in a single recidivism rate of 25%. This figure was used in the Spreadsheet to calculate the CSR. The Data Sheet submitted by Eckerd for RFP P2303 also contains two boxes at the bottom of the page that contain statements indicating that each circuit was reported separately and that the cell contains both circuits. The boxes have arrows that point to the relevant combined data cells in the “Number of Completions” and “2004-2005 Recidivism Rate” columns. The information contained in the data cells was derived from the 2006 CAR, which listed separate data for the Tenth and Twelfth Judicial Circuits even though the services provided were through a single contract. Eckerd has also submitted responses for other requests for proposals, RFP P2028, RFP P2032, and RFP P2034, using the same data for each Data Sheet as it used for the Data Sheet submitted for RFP P2303. On February 15, 2010, the Department changed its policy on the scoring methodology to be used in procurements such as the one at issue. The change in policy was expressed in an addendum to RFP P2062. The addendum stated in part: If the 2008 CAR Report lists a program with more than one recidivism percent, list all of the percentages and the number of completions for the program on Attachment C [Data Sheet], and the Department will be treating a Provider’s program with more than one recidivism rate as separate programs for the purposes of calculating success rate and will not be averaging the programs. The Department verifies all program information from the CAR Report. This change in policy was in response to the anticipated changes to the 2009 CAR, which will report and identify multiple areas of information, including more programs with several separately reported recidivism rates. The change in policy was implemented upon evaluation of the 2009 CAR and in anticipation of the release of the 2009 CAR. Eckerd claims that the policy of averaging recidivism percentages for contracts in which the CAR lists more than one recidivism rate resulted in an inaccurate recidivism percentage for White’s contracts for the Second and Fourth Judicial Circuits. For example, in the Fourth Judicial Circuit, the recidivism rate for Duval County was 38%, and the recidivism rate for Nassau County was 0%. Eckerd contends that the multiple recidivism rates as calculated from the CAR should have been used in the Spreadsheet rather than an average of multiple recidivism rates for a single contract. When the recidivism rate that is calculated from the CAR report for Duval County is used, the number of youth reoffending is 87.4, and the number of youth reoffending in Nassau County is 0%. When the average recidivism rate of 19% is used for Duval and Nassau Counties, the number of youth reoffending drops to 44.08, which is not an accurate accounting of the actual number of youth who reoffended. When the recidivism rate is lowered, the success rate will rise. Therefore, if the method espoused by Eckerd was used, White would have received a 71.9 score for CSR, resulting in a decrease of the points awarded to White of 16 points for CSR and a corresponding decrease in the total points awarded to White. Using Eckerd’s methodology, Eckerd would have received the highest number of points.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Petition filed by Eckerd. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2010.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Affordable Home Ownership Corporation, is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Affordable Home Ownership Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AHO"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation. Respondent, the Department of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Among other things, the Department is charged with responsibility for implementing and administering Florida tax laws, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. During 1996, AHO submitted an application for an exemption under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as a charitable organization. According to the Articles of Corporation of AHO, its purpose is: To raise the economic, educational and social levels of the underprivileged residents of Lake City (Columbia County), Florida, and its trade area, who are substantially underemployed and have low income, by fostering and promoting community-wide interest and concern for the problems of such residents, and to that end; Racial tension, prejudice, and discrimination of economic and otherwise may be eliminated; Sickness, poverty and crime may be lessened and; Educational and economic opportunities may be expanded among the residents of Lake City (Columbia County), Florida, and its trade area. To expand the opportunities available to said residents to own, manage, and operate business enterprises in economically underprivileged or depressed areas; to assist said residents and groups in developing management skills necessary for the successful operation of business enterprises; to provide financial support for the successful operation of business enterprises by said residents and to assist said residents in obtaining such financial support from other sources. To aid, support and assist by gifts, contributions or otherwise, other corporations, community chests, funds and foundations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious, scientific, literary or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholders or individuals, and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. To do any and all lawful activities which may be necessary, useful or desirable for the furtherance, accomplishment, fostering or attainment of the foregoing purposes, either directly or indirectly, and either along or in conjunction or cooperation with others, whether such others be persons or organizations of any kind or nature such as corporations, firms, associations, trust, institutions, foundations, or governmental bureaus, departments or agencies. The Department conceded in its proposed recommended order that AHO meets the requirement for exemption in this matter that it be designated a Section 501(c)(3) charitable organization by the United States Internal Revenue Service. The services provided by AHO are provided without charge to its clients. Those services include recruiting families who are qualified for federal home loans who are committed and able to provide their time and labor to construct their own housing. AHO brings several such families together to share the labor and effort necessary to build housing for each family. Each family shares in the labor of constructing the home of each other family in the group. AHO assists the families prepare mortgage applications necessary to receive federally subsidized loans and provides credit counseling necessary for families to qualify for such loans. Once a family qualifies for a loan, AHO assists in the selection of house plans, the selection of construction materials, the organization of the family groups, teaches general construction techniques and assists with all aspects of completing construction of housing. AHO also assists in bookkeeping necessary to administer mortgage loans. AHO does not act as a general contractor. Nor does AHO provide construction labor or materials, or the funds necessary for construction. AHO receives administrative grants through the state's Housing Finance Agency as a Community Housing Development Organization. AHO's expenses in providing its services are entirely expenses of the organization. AHO's total expenditures are for its day-to-day operations. No funds are expended directly for clients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue denying the certificate of exemption sough by Affordable Home Ownership Corporation. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this this 2nd day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Rufus L. Smith Executive Director, A.H.O.C. Affordable Home Ownership Corporation Post Office Box 7347 Lake City, Florida 32055 Kevin J. ODonnell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue for consideration in this proceeding is whether the activities of petitioner, Mallinckrodt, Inc., were subject to the Florida corporate income tax for the years 1972, 1973 and 1974.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the testimony, depositions and stipulation of counsel concerning four depositions, the following relevant facts are found: At the time of enactment of the Florida corporate income tax, petitioner was in the process of closing down a small plastics plant located in Jacksonville, Florida. This facility, which had an inventory of $77,054.00, was closed and disposed of at the end of January 1972. Among other endeavors, petitioner is in the business of manufacturing and selling calcium stearates. The stearates are manufactured in St. Louis, Missouri, and all inventories are located at the St. Louis plant. Calcium stearates are manufactured from animal (usually beef) fats and tallows and are used in the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe, essentially as a lubricant to facilitate the extrusion process. They come in a powdered form and are packaged in heavy paper sacks approximating the size of a sack of cement. Numerous sacks are placed on a wooden pallet, strapped with steel binders to the pallet for shipment and, often, the entire pallet will be wrapped in heavy cardboard in order to minimize breakage and spillage. The pallets are then loaded on common carriers in full carload or truckload quantities for shipment to the customers, with freight charges being paid by the petitioner. During the years in question -- 1972 through 1974, petitioner had from ten to fifteen stearate customers in the State of Florida. Bill Rhymes represented the petitioner in Florida and other southeastern states. He resided in Charlotte, North Carolina, and did not maintain a residence or an office within Florida. His purpose was to make potential customers aware of the products manufactured and sold by the petitioner and to act as a liaison between St. Louis and individual customers if technical problems arose. Orders from Florida customers were placed directly to St. Louis, either by telephone or by written order. The orders were either accepted or rejected exclusively by the St. Louis office. Credit checks and collection efforts were accomplished out of the St. Louis office. The principal salesman in Florida did not make actual sales arrangements and had no authority over pricing, freight or other conditions of sales. While the salesman in Florida did periodically contact petitioner's Florida customers, this was not done for the purpose of servicing the sold goods. Primarily, the contacts were made to insure that if there was a problem with the stearates due to the customer's machinery or manufacturing process, the next batch ordered would be of a different compound. The majority of petitioner's customers in Florida were large companies to which full truckload shipments of stearates were made direct. However, petitioner also had three smaller customers new into the field of manufacturing PVC pipe. These new businesses lacked storage capacity and had limited cash flow. In order to accommodate these smaller businesses, petitioner allowed them to purchase under a blanket order specified bulk quantities of stearates at bulk prices. Petitioner then arranged to ship the entire load of stearates to the U & Me Warehouse in West Palm Beach for periodic pick up by the customer and payment by the pickup. Petitioner entered into an "in and out" arrangement with the U & Me Warehouse. It was charged for the cost of moving the stearates into the warehouse, for the cost of loading them upon the customer's trucks and for the cost of storage based upon the actual amount of space required for the stearates. The prices and costs to petitioner fluctuated from month to month depending upon the amount of activity. The U & Me Warehouse and the petitioner did not have a rental agreement whereby petitioner paid a specified fee for a specified amount of space reserved to it in the warehouse. All shipments of stearates by petitioner to the U & Me Warehouse were the result of a blanket order from a specific customer. Due to the labor and space costs of segregating the material, the individual pallets and sacks of stearates were not marked as being designated to any particular customer. Prior approval was required from petitioner before any goods were released from U & Me to the customer. Petitioner never sold merchandise out of the U & Me Warehouse to persons other than the customer who originally ordered it and there were no instances where the specified customer failed to pick up on a periodic basis its entire order of stearates. As noted above, the use of the West Palm Beach warehouse was primarily for the benefit of petitioner's smaller customers who had limited cash flow and storage capabilities. The warehouse arrangement allowed those customers to purchase stearates at truckload prices and pick them up in less than truckload quantities. These customers were billed by the pickup, and also received a freight rebate on each delivery. As one of the three original customers which utilized the warehouse method of delivery grew in size, it was able to take direct full truckload shipments at its plant. During the year 1972, petitioner shipped approximately 60,000 pounds of stearates to the U & Me Warehouse every two or three months. Lesser amounts were shipped in 1973 and 1974. Petitioner's agents did make periodic checks of the status of the stearates located in the warehouse. This was done for the purpose of determining the actual physical condition of the goods and their treatment by the shippers and the warehouse. The goods were briefly examined to determine if the sacks had been broken and how they were stacked and stored. No physical count of the goods was made. No check was made of stearates in the possession of customers. Because of the presence in the State of Florida of its plastic plant in Jacksonville in January of 1972, petitioner filed a Florida corporate income tax return showing the full value of that property at the beginning of the year and a value of zero at the end of the year. An auditor with the respondent determined that the stearates shipped to the U & Me Warehouse during 1972, 1973 and 1974 constituted inventory which established a tax nexus for those years. The respondent accordingly issued its notice of proposed deficiency. Contending that it's sole activity in Florida beyond January 31, 1972, was the solicitation of orders which were approved and filled outside the State of Florida, petitioner maintains that it is not subject to the Florida corporate income tax and requests that the proposed deficiencies be set aside.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED THAT the proposed deficiency assessment against petitioner of corporate income taxes for 1972, 1973 and 1974 be set aside, and that the petitioner's liability for those years be confined to only that amount (less the amount previously paid) which reflects petitioner's activities with regard to the plastic plant in Jacksonville which was closed at the end of January, 1972. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of May, 1980. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin K. Phipps Post Office Box 1351 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 and Raymond H. Mann Post Office Box 1351 St. Louis, Missouri 63134 Shirley W. Ovletrea Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether the Respondent's law enforcement officer certification should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined for multiple violations of Section 943.145(3), Florida Statutes (1981). At the formal hearing the Petitioner called as witnesses Virgil P. Sandlin, David Charles Myers, Joseph Weil, and Neal Branch. Petitioner offered and had admitted into evidence four exhibits. The Respondent testified on his own behalf and offered no exhibits into evidence. Subsequent to the formal hearing, the Respondent filed a motion to supplement the record and that motion is denied on the basis that the documents sought to be made a part of the record are irrelevant to these proceedings. Respondent also filed a motion to dismiss and that motion is hereby denied. Counsel for Petitioner and Respondent filed proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings and conclusions are inconsistent with this order, they were rejected as not being supported by the evidence or as irrelevant to the resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to these proceedings the Respondent was and is the holder of law enforcement certificate number 02-13259. That certificate is now in inactive status. During the months of April through November, 1981, the Respondent was an employee of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission and was under the supervision of Blanchard Neal Branch. While employed with the Commission as an investigator, Atwell was issued a Toyota pickup truck, firearms, credentials, and confidential identification. The identification was a driver's license with Atwell's cover name. This driver's license was to be used strictly for identification and Respondent had been instructed of this fact on several occasions prior to June, 1981. Respondent was also issued a credit card for the purchase of gasoline for the government vehicle only. On June 24, 1981, Respondent was stopped for speeding by Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Virgil P. Sandlin. When stopped Respondent gave his name as Robert Leonard Austin and gave the trooper his confidential identification as his driver's license. The name, Robert Leonard Austin, was Respondent's cover name and the name that appeared on the license. This stop took place on U.S. 19 about five or six miles north of Inglis, Florida. The Respondent was given a ticket for driving 69 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone. At the time he was stopped, Respondent had another individual in the truck with him. Approximately a month after the citation was issued Respondent contacted Trooper Sandlin and asked to meet with him. Trooper Sandlin did meet with Respondent and Respondent showed him his badge and asked the trooper to speak with the judge and ask him to withhold adjudication on the speeding ticket. Trooper Sandlin said he would do it as a professional courtesy. During this meeting Respondent used the name of Bobby Austin. As a result of the citation Respondent was found guilty and fined $25. The case was heard on August 13, 1981, and the fine was to be paid within ten days. The fine was not paid and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles was notified to suspend Respondent's confidential driver's license. After learning of this, Captain Branch ordered Respondent to go to the court in Levy County and pay the fine. At the time of the stop in Levy County on June 24, 1981, Respondent was assigned to an undercover investigation in Dixie County and had lost complete contact with his backups for the 24-hour period in which he had been stopped. Prior to being assigned to the Dixie County investigation, Respondent had been assigned to an investigation in Levy County, but was not authorized to work on that investigation during the time he was assigned to the Dixie County investigation. Prior to June 24, 1981, Respondent had been counseled about driving at excessive speeds and had been cautioned to abide by the speed limits posted. On October 31, 1981, Respondent was stopped for speeding near Chiefland, Florida. The officer did not get an official clocking on Respondent's truck but estimated his speed to be in the range of 55 to 70 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone. When the Chiefland police officer, David C. Myers, stopped the Respondent, he shined his spotlight on Respondent's vehicle and Respondent got out of the vehicle with his hands up. The police officer had radioed in a description of the truck and was informed that a vehicle meeting that description had been involved in a domestic dispute earlier in the day. As a result of this information, when Respondent gave the officer his driver's license, the officer began to run a wanted check on the license, which carried a Quincy address. At this time Respondent gave the officer a second driver's license with the same picture. He also showed the officer his credentials and explained that he was in the area working undercover with the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. Respondent described for the officer the case on which he was working. At no time during this stop did the officer draw his weapon. No charges were brought by the officer. After this incident Respondent informed Captain Branch, his supervisor, that he had had a run-in with a Chiefland police officer and that the officer had pulled a gun on him. Captain Branch called the police officer and questioned him about the incident. The officer denied pulling his gun and Captain Branch again questioned Atwell about the incident. Atwell again stated that the officer had pulled a gun and demonstrated the combat stance the officer had taken. At the time he was stopped in Chiefland, Respondent was assigned to an undercover investigation in Levy County where Chiefland is located. Because of problems relating to unauthorized trip extensions and problems with per diem (the method Respondent had used for claiming per diem), Respondent had been counseled and placed on a very strict schedule prior to October, 1981. He was instructed in each assignment as to when he would report to the assignment and when he would return. He was also given a call-in schedule and was instructed to call in and get authorization for any change or extension of his return time. In October, 1981, Respondent had two unauthorized trip extensions. On or about October 9, 1981, Respondent was on a trip and extended the trip two or three days without authorization. He did not call in and his supervisor had no knowledge of his whereabouts for that two- or three-day period. On October 23, 1981, Respondent left on a trip and was instructed to return no later than the morning of October 25, 1981. Respondent did not return and did not call in until October 27, 1981, when Captain Branch received a call from Respondent from his home in Quincy. He was two days overdue. When questioned about the unauthorized extension, Respondent stated he was with the subject of the investigation the entire time and could not call in. However, Respondent's investigative report revealed that he was not with the subject from midnight on October 24 to 1:00 p.m. on October 25, and from midnight on October 25 to the afternoon of October 26. Respondent could have called in during these time periods. During his employment with the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission the Respondent was counseled regarding irregularities in his per diem travel expense reports and vehicle cost reports. During the months of April through October, 1981, there were numerous discrepancies and unexplained irregularities in the travel expense reports, vehicle cost reports, law enforcement itinerary, and law enforcement investigative activity reports filed by Respondent. These irregularities include: A per diem report filed by Respondent reflects that he was on assignment in Levy County from 5:00 p.m. on April 9, 1981, through 8:00 a.m. on April 12, 1981. Per diem for this period was claimed and paid. On April 10, 1981, 20.7.gallons of gasoline were purchased in Quincy on Respondent's government credit card. On April 11, 1981, 31.2 gallons of gasoline were purchased in Chattahoochee on Respondent's government credit card. The itinerary report filed by Respondent for April 14, 1981, indicates 8 hours of duty. However, Respondent's vehicle cost report for the same date indicates his vehicle was in Quincy (home) on April 14. On April 18, 1981, Respondent purchased 18 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. On April 21, 1981, Respondent purchased 30.7 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. Respondent's itinerary for this period states that he was off duty on April 18 and 19 and worked in Tallahassee on April 20. The cost report for Respondent's vehicle indicates 266 miles were driven to Tallahassee and back to Quincy and vicinity. On April 24, 1981, Respondent purchased 33.3 gallons of gasoline in Quincy and on April 27, 1981, purchased 35.4 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. The itinerary report filed by Respondent for this period reflects that he was off duty April 24 through April 26, 1981, and worked four hours in Tallahassee on April 27. Respondent's vehicle cost report shows Respondent's vehicle was idle during this period except for a trip to Tallahassee. 70 miles were reported as driven during this period, but 35.4 gallons of gasoline were purchased. On May 15, 1981, 32 gallons of gasoline were purchased on Respondent's government credit card. On May 16, 1981, 31.9 gallons of gasoline were purchased on Respondent's government credit card. These purchases were made on a credit card issued in the name of Fredrick R. Tedder, an alias used by Respondent in a prior case. On May 19, 1981, 28.3 gallons of gasoline were purchased by Respondent on his government credit card in Quincy, Florida. Respondent's itinerary indicates he was off duty May 16 and 17 and worked in Tallahassee on May 18. The purchase on May 16 was not logged on the vehicle cost report and no receipts were submitted for this purchase. On May 23, 1981, Respondent purchased 12.2 gallons of gasoline in Quincy and on May 26, 1981, purchased 32.3 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. Respondent's itinerary report shows he was off duty May 23 and 24, and worked four hours in Tallahassee on May 25. The vehicle cost report shows the vehicle was idle on May 24 and made a trip to Tallahassee on May 25. 75 miles were reported as driven on these dates, but 32.3 gallons of gasoline were purchased. On June 6, 1981, Respondent purchased 17.4 gallons of gasoline in Quincy and on June 10, 1981, purchased 31 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. Respondent's itinerary report reflects that he was off duty June 6, 7, and 8 and worked 6 hours in Tallahassee on June 9. 18 miles were reported as driven on these dates but 31 gallons of gasoline were purchased. The purchase on June 6, was not logged on the vehicle cost report and Respondent submitted no receipts for this purchase. On June 11, 1981, Respondent purchased 11.2 gallons of gasoline in Crystal River, Citrus County, Florida. Respondent's travel voucher, itinerary report and investigative report show activities in Levy County from June 10 to June 12. The June 11 purchase was not logged on the vehicle cost report and no receipts were turned in. The license tag number recorded by the station attendant was not that of Respondent's commission-issued vehicle but was the tag number of a vehicle registered to Anita M. Simzyk of Inglis, Florida. On June 12, 1981, Respondent purchased 27.5 gallons of gasoline in Quincy and on June 16 purchased 23.6 gallons of gasoline in Capps, Florida. Respondent's itinerary report shows he was off duty on June 13 and 14 and worked in Tallahassee 6 hours on June 15. The vehicle cost report shows Respondent's vehicle was idle on these dates except for a trip to Tallahassee on June 15. 70 miles were reported as driven on these dates, but 23.6 gallons of gasoline were purchased. On June 17, 1981, Respondent purchased 36 gallons of gasoline in Chiefland, Levy County, Florida. Respondent's travel voucher indicates he left Tallahassee at 9:00 a.m. on June 16, en route to Dixie County and returned to Tallahassee at 1:00 p.m. on June 19. Respondent's investigative trip report indicates he arrived in Cross City, Dixie County, at 10:00 a.m. on June 16, went to Inglis in south Levy County from 10:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. on June 16 and returned to Cross City until midday on June 19. The vehicle cost report and itinerary also indicate detail in Dixie County during this period. On July 1, 1981, Respondent purchased 19.9 gallons of gasoline in Chiefland, Levy County, Florida. Respondent's travel voucher indicates he left Tallahassee for Dixie County at 2:00 p.m. on June 30 and returned to Tallahassee at 8:00 p.m. on July 3. No investigative trip report was submitted for this period and the vehicle cost report and itinerary report indicate detail in Dixie County during this period. On July 9 and July 13, 1981, Respondent's itinerary report shows 10 hours duty and 3 hours duty respectively. Respondent's vehicle cost report indicates his vehicle was idle on these two dates. On July 10, 1981, Respondent purchased 31.3 gallons of gasoline in Quincy and on July 14, 1981, purchased 29.3 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. Respondent's itinerary report indicates he was off duty July 4 and 5, worked in Tallahassee July 6 and 7, was off duty July 8, worked in Tallahassee July 9 and 10, was off duty July 11 and 12 and worked in Tallahassee July 13. The vehicle cost report indicates Respondent's vehicle was idle on these dates except for trips to Tallahassee on July 6, 7, and 10. There were 196 miles reported as driven during this period, but 60.6 gallons of gasoline were purchased. A travel voucher filed by Respondent indicates he left Tallahassee for Inglis at 10:00 a.m. on July 22, 1981, and returned to Tallahassee on July 24 at 4:00 a.m. There was $100 in per diem paid for this trip but no investigative report was filed for this period indicating travel to Inglis. The vehicle cost report shows travel from Tallahassee to Key West on July 19, Key West to Inglis on July 22 and return from Inglis to Tallahassee on July 23. On July 20, 1981, Respondent purchased 32.9 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. On July 25, 1981, Respondent purchased 33 gallons of gasoline in Quincy, Florida. On July 28, Respondent purchased 14.3 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. Respondent's travel voucher indicates he returned to Tallahassee at 4:00 a.m. on July 24. His itinerary indicates he was off duty on July 24, worked 7 hours on July 25, was off duty July 26, and worked 5 hours in Tallahassee on July 27. Respondent's vehicle cost report indicates his vehicle was idle on these dates except for trips to Tallahassee on July 25 and July 27. 230 miles were reported as driven during this period and 14.3 gallons of gasoline were purchased. On July 24, 1981, Respondent claimed investigative expense money. His itinerary for July 24, 1981, indicates he was off duty on July 24. On August 1 and 2, Respondent claimed investigative expense money of $8.75 and $6.50 respectively. Respondent's itinerary shows he was off duty both of these days. Respondent submitted no vehicle cost information for the period August 1 to August 10. The last logged mileage on July 31, 1981, was 52,282 and the next logged mileage was 53,525 on August 10. 1,243 miles were reported as driven during this period and 950 miles were unaccounted for. On August 6, 1981, Respondent purchased 37 gallons of gasoline in Quincy, Florida. Respondent's itinerary indicates he was off duty August 1 through 5. The July 6 purchase was not logged on the vehicle cost report and no receipts were turned in for the purchase. Respondent's travel voucher indicates he left Tallahassee for Inglis at 11:00 a.m. on August 6. His investigative trip report indicates he arrived in Inglis at 4:30 p.m. on August 6 and returned to Tallahassee on August 10 at 8:30 p.m. The distance from Tallahassee to Inglis round trip is 290 miles. The Respondent purchased 14.2 gallons of gasoline in Otter Creek and 31.9 gallons of gasoline in Crystal River on August 10, 1981. The purchase in Otter Creek was not recorded on the vehicle cost report. On September 2, 4, and 8, respectively, Respondent purchased 23.2 gallons of gasoline, 29 gallons of gasoline, and 27.4 gallons of gasoline in Quincy, Florida. Simultaneous with the purchase of 27.4 gallons on September 8, the Respondent also purchased 14.9 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. An itinerary filed by the Respondent indicates he was off duty from September 1 through September 3, worked 8 hours in Tallahassee on September 4, and was off duty September 5 through September 9. The vehicle cost report reflects that Respondent's government truck was idle during this time period except for the trip to Tallahassee on September 4. The 14.9 gallons of gasoline purchased on September 8 were not recorded on the vehicle cost report and no receipts were turned in for this purchase. 632 miles were recorded as driven and 94.5 gallons of gasoline were purchased during this time period. Respondent's itinerary indicates he worked 7 hours on September 21, and the vehicle cost report indicates Respondent's vehicle was in Levy County on September 21. However, Respondent's trip report and travel vouchers show that he returned to Tallahassee at 10:00 p.m. on September 20. Respondent's travel voucher reflects he left Tallahassee at 2:00 p.m. on September 24 en route to Inglis. His investigative trip report states that Respondent arrived in Inglis at 6:00 p.m. on September 24 and went back and forth from Inglis to Floral City until September 29. Respondent's travel voucher and trip report state that he returned to Tallahassee at 7:00 p.m. on September 29. However, an additional day of per diem for September 30, was added after the last entry on September 29. On October 1, 1981, Respondent purchased 23 gallons of gasoline in Quincy. Respondent's travel voucher stated he returned from Inglis at 7:00 p.m. on September 29 and the recorded ending mileage was 59,529. Respondent's itinerary report indicates he worked in Tallahassee 6 hours on September 30 and 10 hours on October 1. The recorded ending mileage on October 1 was 59,870. 341 miles miles were recorded as driven during this period and 23 gallons of gasoline were purchased. On October 6, Respondent's itinerary report indicates he worked 6 hours. His vehicle cost report for the same date reflects his vehicle was idle that date. Respondent's travel voucher indicates he left Tallahassee at 5:30 a.m. en route to Cross City and returned to Tallahassee at 11:00 p.m. the same day. Respondent's itinerary report indicates he was on duty 3 hours that date. Respondent's travel voucher states that he left Tallahassee at 5:30 a.m. on October 13, en route to Cross City and returned at 11:30 p.m. the same day. His itinerary report shows Respondent was off duty on October 13. The vehicle cost report indicates travel from Quincy to Cross City on both October 12 and October 13. On October 15, 1981, Respondent purchased 23.8 gallons of gasoline in Chiefland, Levy County, Florida. His itinerary report for the same date indicates he was off duty. The vehicle issued to Respondent was a four-cylinder Toyota pickup truck with dual fuel tanks. This truck was to be used for official state business only.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 943.145(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981) , and revoking Respondent's law enforcement officer certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Grady Henry Atwell Post Office Box 667 Quincy, Florida 32351 Robert R. Dempsey, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Daryl G. McLaughlin, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact After the Department of Transportation (DOT) proposed to reject its bid on State Project, Job No. 97860- 3319 as unresponsive, for failure to meet a women's business enterprise (WBE) goal, and failure to document good faith efforts to reach the goal, Capeletti initiated substantial interest proceedings, Capeletti Brothers, Inc. and State Paving Corporation vs. Department of Transportation and John Mahoney Construction Company, Inc., No. 85-3003, contending that it had made good faith efforts to meet the goal and that it had adequately documented the efforts; that the second low bidder had not met the goals; that DOT treated the goals as quotas; and that the DOT committees who evaluated the bids met in violation of the Sunshine Law. At the hearing in the present case, the parties stipulated that Capeletti's "bid was rejected because of noncompliance with Rule 14-78.03 as it relates to women's business enterprises and for noncompliance with the bid specifications which incorporated those provisions. The rule provisions under challenge read, in pertinent part: 14-78.03 General Responsibilities. In furtherance of the purpose of this rule chapter, the Department shall establish overall DBE and WBE goals for its entire DBE one WBE program. In setting the overall goals the Department shall consider the following factors: the number and types of contracts to be awarded by the Department; the number, capacity, and capabilities of certified DBEs and VBEs likely to be available to compete for contracts let by the Department; and the past experience of the Department in meeting its goals and the results and reasons therefore. To implement its DBE and WBE goal program the Department may: . . . (b) establish contract goals on each contract with subcontracting opportunities for certified DBEs and WBEs The Department shall establish separate contract goals for firms owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals and for firms owned and controlled by women. In setting contract goals, the Department shall consider the following factors: the type of work required by the contract to be let; the subcontracting opportunities in the contract to be let; the estimated total dollar amount of the contract to be let; and the number, capacity and capabilities of certified DBEs and WBEs. For contracts with an estimated total dollar amount of $1,000,000 or less, the contract goals shall not exceed 50 percent of the identified potential for DBE and WBE participation. For contracts with an estimated total dollar amount of $1,000,000, the contract goals shall not exceed 75 percent of the identified potential for DBE and WBE participation. For all contracts for which DBE and WBE contract goals have been established, each bidder shall meet or exceed or demonstrate that it could not meet, despite its good faith efforts, the contract goals set by the Department. The DBE and WBE participation information shall be submitted with the contractor's bid proposal. Award of the contract shall be conditioned upon submission of the DBE and WBE participation information with the bid proposal and upon satisfaction of the contract goals or, if the goals are not met, upon demonstrating that good faith efforts were made to meet the goals. Failure to satisfy these requirements shall result in a contractor's bid being deemed nonresponsive and the bid being rejected. DOT proposes to deem Capeletti's bid nonresponsive forits conceded failure to meet a WBE goal and for the alleged failure to document good faith efforts to meet the goal. Citation Deleted In the course of the adoption of amended Rule 14- 78.03, Florida Administrative Code, Bjarne B. Andersen, Jr., an attorney on the staff of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, wrote Ms. Margaret-Ray Kemper, DOT's Deputy General Counsel, on January 22, 1985, with reference to amended Rule 14-78.03, stating: Sections 339.05 and 339.081, F.S., contain no specific rulemaking authority . . . while we do agree that the rule appears in part to implement s.339.05, F.S., as amended by Ch. 84-309, L.O.F.; we do not believe this "assent to Federal aid" is specific rule authority. It is at best implied authority. The day before a DOT employee (who, counsel represented at hearing, is not a lawyer) had written Ms. Elizabeth Cloud, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Administrative Code and Laws, Department of State, as follows: Based upon a telephone conversation with Mr. Bjarne B. Andersen, Jr. of the Legislative Joint Administrative Procedures Committee and further legal review by our office, we request that the . . . "law implemented" be amended to . . . [delete reference to Section 339.05, Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.)] In an internal memorandum dated March 8, 1985, DOT's Deputy General Counsel set out DOT's legal position in these words: Subpart A of 49 CFR, Part 23, defines minority persons . . . The definition of minority does not include women. However, women are encompassed within the definition of minority business enterprise which is defined as a small business concern owned and controlled by one or more minorities or women. 49 CFR, 23.5. 49 CFR, Part 23, Subpart C, sets forth general requirements for all recipients of federal funds. Among those requirements is a policy statement to be included in every financial assistance agreement affirming a commitment to MBE/DBE participation in contracts financed in whole or in part with federal funds. Also required is a MBE/DBE affirmative action program which must be incorporated by reference into financial assistance agreements. The program is made "a legal obligation and failure to carry out its terms shall be treated as a violation of this financial assistance agreement." 49 CFR, S23.43(b). The goal program is one of the required WBE/DBE program components. 49 CFR, S23.45(g). . . . However, although women are included within the definition of MBEs, 49 CFR, Part 23, Subpart C, requires recipients to establish separate overall and contract goals for firms owned and controlled by minorities and firms owned and controlled by women. 49 CFR, 23.45(g)(4). The memorandum relies exclusively on 49 CFR, Part 23, Subpart C, 23.45(g)(4) as authority for Florida's WBE program, citing no federal or state statutes as authority.
Conclusions This cause is before the Department of Community Affairs on an Order Closing File, a copy of which is appended hereto as Exhibit A. On December 18, 2007, Respondent City of Bunnell adopted an amendment to its comprehensive plan by Ordinance No. 2006-21 (Amendment). The Department reviewed the Amendment, determined that it did not meet the criteria for compliance set forth in Section 163.3184(1) (b), Florida Statutes, and caused to be published a Notice of Intent to find the Amendment not “in compliance.” The Department then instituted this administrative FINAL ORDER No. DCA09-GM-290 proceeding against the City pursuant to Section 163.3184(10), Florida Statutes. On August 4, 2009, the City rescinded the Amendment by Ordinance No. 2009-23. By virtue of this rescission, the instant controversy has been rendered moot and this proceeding must be dismissed. See Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Heredia, 520 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (dismissing case on appeal as moot where suspension of driver’s license was rescinded by the Department).
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (b) (1)®) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER No. DCA09-GM-290 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by U.S. Mail to each of the persons listed below on this ND day of keegush , 2009. Paula Ford Agency Clerk The Honorable Donald R. Alexander Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By U.S. Mail Sidney M. Nowell, Esquire Sidney M. Nowell, P.A. Post Office Box 819 Bunnell, Florida 32110-0819 Clay Henderson, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 200 South Orange Avenue, Suite 2600 Orlando, Florida 32801-3461 * By Hand Delivery Lynette Norr Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
