The Issue Whether Respondent is indebted to Petitioner for Florida- grown citrus products sold to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Respondent are Florida-licensed citrus fruit dealers operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. Great American was the surety for J and G Citrus' fruit dealer's license for the 2006-2007 citrus shipping season. J and G Citrus is Petitioner's customer. Petitioner ships fruit on behalf of J and G Citrus under their name for a service charge and fee for fruit, the cost of packing, and shipping. Petitioner and Respondent entered a written contract on November 12, 2004, for such services. Cushman's replacements policy provides that a customer should notify Cushman of any problem and the company will refund the monies for the order or replace the package. Cushman guarantees to "honor all replacement requests in a timely manner at no cost to you." J and G Citrus utilized the policy during its contract with Cushman. Cushman delivered the following fruit orders for J and G Citrus from December 22, 2006, to February 16, 2007: 292 navel fruit trays at $3.35 a tray; 168 grapefruit trays at $3.35 a tray; 87 honeybells trays at $6.88 a tray; and 29 tangerine trays for $6.88 at tray. The costs for the fruit shipped totaled $2,339.00. J and G Citrus was invoiced this amount. Accordingly, Respondent was obligated to pay Petitioner the total sum for the fruit. After Cushman Fruit invoiced J and G Citrus for the outstanding balance, no payment was received. On March 28, 2007, Cushman informed J and G Citrus of its bill and told Respondent that "You need to get current." J and G Citrus responded on the same day that it would provide a payment schedule by Monday. On April 23, 2007, J and G Citrus confirmed by email that they were going to start paying and would provide a payment. On May 7, 2007, Cushman requested the payment schedule from J and G Citrus again and informed the company, "I need a response from you today." Cushman never heard further from Respondent regarding payment. To date, the invoices are unpaid and the monies are owed to Cushman. Petitioner performed all of its duties under the contract with J and G Citrus and Respondent failed to pay for the services. J and G Citrus is, therefore, indebted to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered requiring Respondent pay to Petitioner the sum of $2,339.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Alvarez Cushman Fruit Company, Inc. 3325 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Rob Brehm Great American Insurance Company Post Office Box 2119 Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, M-38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Brian D. Jerome Carla Dupleich J & G Citrus Groves 5781 Seminole Way Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 Honorable Charles Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issue presented for decision is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20-15.002, and 20-15.003 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 under various provisions of the Florida Constitution as well as the Export Clause, Article 1, s. 9, cl. 5, of the United States Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated) ("Tampa Juice"), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief": [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render Petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 116. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the Tampa Juice case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002, order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. Those emergency rules were held invalid in Peace River, and are not at issue in the instant case. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. In the March 7, 2003, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 29, no. 10, p. 1036), the Department published amendments to the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rules, as amended, read as follows: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20-15.001 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial rule to implement a non- discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.002 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.003 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20- 100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New . The Final Order in Peace River held that the Proposed Rules were not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law below. Judge Maloney has yet to rule on the backward-looking remedy proposed by the Department. On March 26, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an order extending until May 1, 2003, the time for interested parties to file motions to intervene with regard to the Department's proposed backward-looking relief. The order noted that the parties have stipulated to the suspension of the back tax as to plaintiffs and objecting non-parties until further order of the court. On February 19, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-- Import-Export." The sole issue before Judge Maloney was "whether Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, (the 'Equalization Tax'), as it existed in 1997, violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the 'Import- Export Clause')." (Emphasis in original) After setting forth the standard for analysis of whether a taxing scheme violates the Import-Export Clause under Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), Judge Maloney ruled as follows: It is precisely [the exemption for United States products found in 601.155(5), Florida Statutes] that causes the 1997 Equalization Tax to contravene the Import-Export Clause. Specifically, the court finds that because the statute exempts "citrus fruit grown within the United States," but does not exempt citrus fruit grown in foreign countries, the exemption causes the tax to "fall on imports as such simply because of their place of origin." Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286. Additionally, because the tax falls on foreign-grown citrus as such simply because of its origin but does not fall on domestic-grown citrus, the Equalization Tax, with the exemption, creates a "special tariff or particular preference for certain domestic goods." Id. (i.e. California, Arizona, and Texas citrus products). * * * In conclusion, because the court finds the exemption contained within the 1997 Equalization Tax violates both the first and third elements of the Michelin test,1 the court finds the 1997 Equalization Tax violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the "Import-Export Clause"). On March 31, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." In this order, Judge Maloney found that the box tax itself, Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners and Intervenor in the instant case are licensed citrus fruit dealers regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, they are subject to the rules of the Department. Petitioners and Intervenor buy, sell, and manufacture citrus juices. They shipped products made with non- Florida U.S. juice during the tax period without paying equalization taxes. Petitioners and Intervenor have been notified by the Department that they are liable to pay back taxes pursuant to the Proposed Rules, as well as the invalid Emergency Rules.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent H & R Packing & Sales Company, LLC, must pay Petitioner the full contract price for citrus fruit that said Respondent accepted upon tender despite knowing that the goods were nonconforming.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Betty H. Shinn, d/b/a Shinn Groves ("Shinn"), is in the business of growing citrus fruit and hence is a "producer" within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department"). Respondent H & R Packing & Sales Company, LLC ("HRPS"), is a "citrus fruit dealer" operating within the Department's jurisdiction. On November 3, 2004, Shinn and HRPS entered into a contract (the "Contract") whereby HRPS agreed to harvest "fresh fruit quality" navel oranges from a particular section of Shinn's grove, which oranges Shinn agreed to sell to HRPS for the price of $8.00 per field box. The Contract provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The SELLER [that is, Shinn] shall take all reasonable and normal precautions to maintain fresh fruit quality during the life of this agreement. Failure to exercise close control to mites and other pests shall constitute a violation of this agreement. Further, the BUYER [i.e. HRPS] may at his option cancel this contract or renegotiate the price to be paid and the conditions of sale. In addition, the parties agreed that HRPS would pick the fruit no later than January 1, 2005, and pay for the oranges "within 45 days of the week of the harvest." An agent of HRPS's named Frederick Gaines inspected the crop identified to the Contract on a couple of occasions in November and December 2004. At some point he notified Shinn that the oranges were being damaged by rust mites. Shinn arranged to have the crop sprayed with Thiolux (a miticide), which was done around December 6, 2004. HRPS harvested the crop on January 3, 2005. (HRPS's performance in this regard was nonconforming, because the oranges were to be picked no later than January 1, 2005. By allowing HRPS to proceed after the deadline, however, Shinn waived HRPS's untimely performance.) At or about the time of the harvest, Mr. Gaines orally notified Charles Shinn (who is the son——and an agent——of Petitioner Betty Shinn) that the oranges had been damaged by rust mites and consequently were not fresh fruit quality. Mr. Shinn suggested that the oranges be "run through" the packing house (where the fruit would be graded on its quality), after which the parties could renegotiate the price, if necessary, to adjust for any material deficiencies in the quality of the crop. This proposal was evidently acceptable to HRPS, for it proceeded to harvest the oranges with knowledge that the crop was (or might not be) fresh fruit quality. HRPS picked 790 field boxes of oranges from Shinn's grove pursuant to the Contract. When these oranges were graded at the packing house, an unusually small percentage (approximately 34%) could be "packed out," that is, packaged and delivered for sale as fresh fruit.i The rest "graded out," i.e. failed to meet the standards for sale as fresh fruit, and were sold, at a loss, to juice processors. HRPS was obligated under the Contract to pay Shinn for the oranges on or before February 22, 2005, but HRPS let the deadline pass without either paying for the oranges or notifying Shinn of a breach with respect thereto. By letter dated March 17, 2005, Shinn demanded that HRPS pay the full contact price of $6,320 for the fruit harvested under the Contract.ii HRPS responded to Shinn's demand-letter via correspondence dated March 24, 2005. In this letter, HRPS acknowledged the Contract's existence but disclaimed the duty to pay in full due to the fruit's generally poor quality. HRPS expressed some willingness to resolve the matter amicably but offered no payment. Shinn was not satisfied and initiated this administrative proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations HRPS harvested and hauled away the oranges identified to the Contract. This performance constituted acceptance of the goods, and such acceptance was made with knowledge of a (possible) nonconformity, namely that the oranges were not fresh fruit quality due to rust mite damage. The apparent nonconformity was made manifest to HRPS shortly after the harvest, when an unusually small percentage of the pertinent crop was "packed out." HRPS failed, however, to notify Shinn of the breach within a reasonable time after confirming the nonconformity. Consequently, HRPS is barred from any remedy for breach. HRPS's failure to pay for the oranges at the Contract rate constituted a breach of the Contract entitling Shinn to recover the full price, together with pre-award interest. Accordingly, HRPS is obligated to pay Shinn the principal amount of $6,320.00, together with statutory interest of $378.20 (for the period 02/22/05 - 12/31/05). Interest will continue to accrue on the outstanding balance of $6,320.00 in the amount of $1.56 per day from January 1, 2006, until the date of the final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Shinn the sum of $6,320.00, together with pre-award interest in the amount of $378.20 (through December 31, 2005), plus additional interest from January 1 2006, until the date of the final order, which will accrue in the amount of $1.56 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Golden Gem Growers, Inc. (Golden Gem), owes Petitioner the money alleged in the Amended Complaint based on two written contracts between Petitioner and Golden Gem.
Findings Of Fact During the citrus growing season of 2000-2001, Golden Gem was a citrus fruit dealer defined in Subsection 601.03(8) and was licensed and bonded in accordance with Chapter 601. Golden Gem operated a packinghouse in Alturas, Florida, and regularly purchased citrus fruit for sale in the fresh fruit market. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) is the surety on the fruit dealer's bond issued to Golden Gem for the 2000-2001 season. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner and Golden Gem entered into Contract No. AS-7199. The contract provided, in relevant part, that Petitioner was to deliver Valencia oranges and other citrus fruit to Golden Gem and that Golden Gem was to handle, pack, ship, sell, and market the fresh fruit provided by Petitioner. On May 9, 2001, Petitioner and Golden Gem entered into Contract No. AS-7208. The contract provided, in relevant part, that Petitioner was to deliver Valencia oranges to Golden Gem and that Golden Gem was to handle, pack, ship, sell, and market the fresh fruit provided by Petitioner. Contracts AS-7199 and AS-7208 require Golden Gem to detail and account for all the Valencia oranges delivered by Petitioner and packed by Golden Gem. Each contract provides for attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Petitioner delivered 115,740 boxes of Valencia oranges to Golden Gem and Golden Gem processed all 115,740 boxes. Golden Gem packed the oranges into 182,650 cartons but accounted to Petitioner for only 159,731 cartons. Golden Gem collected $1,172,715.40 for 159,731 cartons of Petitioner's Valencia oranges. Golden Gem was entitled to deduct expenses for packing, shipping, and handling in the total amount of $630,475.10. Golden Gem owed a net payment to Petitioner of $542,240.30. Golden Gem paid $518,284.82 to Petitioner. The balance owed for the fruit accounted for by Golden Gem is $23,955.48. Golden Gem owes Petitioner an additional $85,757.36 for the proceeds of an additional 22,919 cartons of Valencia oranges for which Golden Gem has not accounted to Petitioner. The amount due is net after adjusting the gross price for handling charges that Golden Gem is entitled to under the terms of the contracts. Golden Gem owes Petitioner a total amount of $109,712.84 for Valencia oranges that Petitioner delivered to Golden Gem in the 2000-2001 shipping season. Petitioner is the prevailing party. Petitioner incurred reasonable attorney's fees of $10,570.00 and costs of $398.24.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order adopting the findings and conclusions in this Recommended Order and requiring Respondents to pay Petitioner the sum of $109,712.84. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Alves Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Golden Gem Growers, Inc. Post Office Drawer 9 Umatilla, Florida 32784 Maggie Evans, Esquire 131 Waterman Avenue Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 500 Third Street, Northwest Post Office Box 1072 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072 Brandon J. Rafool, Esquire Post Office Box 7286 Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7286 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture 407 South Calhoun Street Mayo Building, Mail Stop 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent, IMG Citrus, Inc. (Respondent), owes Petitioner, Vero Beach Land Company, LLC, (Petitioner) the sum of $63,318.50 for citrus that was purchased but not harvested.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner and Respondent were involved in the growing and marketing of citrus fruit in the State of Florida. For purposes of this Order, Petitioner is also described as "the seller"; Respondent is described as "the buyer." On October 26, 2007, Respondent agreed to purchase fruit from Petitioner. The terms of their agreement were reduced to writing. The “Fresh Fruit Purchase Agreement” provided that Respondent would purchase from Petitioner all of the citrus fruits of the varieties of merchantable quality as delineated in the contract. More specifically, Respondent was entitled to purchase the following described citrus from Petitioner: Block Name Variety Est Field Boxes Price Unit of Measure Rise Movement Date Pepper Grove Red Grapefruit 16,000 $4.50 Floor FB ½ Rise to Grower March 15th, 2008 Pepper Grove White Grapefruit 20,000 $2.00 Floor FB All Rise to March 15th, Grower 2008 Pepper Grove Navels 2,500 $5.00 Floor FB All Rise to Grower January 1, 2008 The contract recognized that “only that fruit produced as the result of normal seasonal bloom” and not late maturing or out of season bloom would be included. Additionally, all of the fruit was to be for fresh shipment. Citrus intended for the fresh market must be visually appealing as well as having other attributes associated with the fresh fruit market. Discolorations or damage to the fruit makes it unsuitable for the fresh fruit market. In anticipation of the crop the buyer expected to harvest, Respondent advanced to Petitioner the sum of $34,500.00. Additional payments were to be made to Petitioner as described in paragraph 2 of the contract. Critical to this matter, however, were the terms of the contract set forth in paragraph 3. That paragraph provided: Merchantability of Fruit: Seller represents to Buyer that all fruit sold under this Agreement shall be sound and merchantable, in conformance with industry standards, and fit for their intended purpose of fresh packing and marketing. Grower shall keep said fruit sprayed sufficiently to keep the fruit bright and free from rust mite, disease and insect damage and shall not fertilize or cultivate the grove upon which the fruit is grown, during the term of this Agreement, in anyway that will deteriorate the quality of the fruit. In the event such fruit is rendered not merchantable by virtue of damage from cultivation, fertilization, re-greening, cold, hail, fire, windstorm, or other hazard, the Buyer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement and the Seller shall refund to the Buyer the advance payment this day made, or that portion thereof not applied in the payment for fruit picked prior to termination. The buyer shall have four weeks from the occurrence of such cold, hail, fire, windstorm or other hazard within which to notify Seller that the fruit has been rendered non merchantable and of the termination of this agreement. Seller shall reimburse the Buyer for all deposits and advances made on unpicked fruit within thirty (30) days of notification by Buyer. Paragraph 6 of the parties’ Fresh Fruit Purchase Agreement provided: Default: Should the Buyer, without lawful excuse, fail or refuse to pick and remove the fruit subject to this Agreement within the time specified or any extension thereof, the Seller hereby accepts and agrees to retain the deposit this day made less portion thereof applied and deducted as aforesaid, as his liquidated damages for such failure without any other claim for damage against the Buyer. In the event of any sale or attempted sale of the crop to a third party or other unexcused failure to deliver, Buyer shall be entitled to avail itself of all available legal and equitable remedied [sic] including injunctive relief. If either party fails to materially comply with the provisions of the agreement, the other party must give written notice of non- compliance, stating the nature of the violation or non-compliance and giving the other party thirty (30) days to bring themselves into compliance. If a disagreement exists regarding the interpretation of this Agreement, the parties agree to discuss the issues and negotiate in good faith to resolve the dispute. No waiver of any breach, right or remedy, shall constitute a continuing waiver, nor shall it be construed as a waiver of any other breach, right or remedy. Paragraph 7 of the contract provided, in pertinent part, that the agreement could be “supplemented or modified only by written agreement between the parties.” The parties did not provide any written supplements or modifications to their agreement. Petitioner wanted to have his fruit removed in a timely manner as he did not want the fruit left to potentially interfere with the next year's crop. It was Petitioner's desire to have the fruit picked as early and as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the contract provided for a pick or "movement date." With regard to the navel oranges, the movement date was January 1, 2008. The movement date for the grapefruit was March 15, 2008. Presumably, these dates were negotiated and agreed to by the parties. Had Petitioner wanted earlier movement dates, that was within a contractual option available at the time of contract negotiations. The "Pepper Grove" that is described in the parties' agreement is a 120 acre grove sectioned into four blocks. The white grapefruit are located on two interior blocks with the red grapefruit on the two outer blocks. The navels were located on a portion of one of the outer blocks adjacent to the roadway. All of the blocks border 122nd Avenue. Presumably, as the four blocks adjoin one another it would be fairly easy to move from one block to the next to complete picking the crop. The contract specified that Respondent would purchase 2,500 boxes of navels. Respondent picked 2,928 boxes of navels from Petitioner's grove. This fruit was harvested between December 6, 2007 and January 10, 2008. Respondent did not meet the "movement date" specified in the contract and Petitioner apparently did not complain, in writing, regarding this technical violation. Moreover, the buyer did not allege that the navels were not acceptable quality or merchantable. This fruit was in the same block as the grapefruit. The contract price for the navels was $5.00 with 100 percent of the rise to go to the seller. On or about December 19, 2007, Petitioner inquired as to whether Respondent wanted to be released from the contract. This request was not reduced to writing and Respondent did not accept the verbal offer. On or about December 22, 2007, Respondent started harvesting the Pepper Grove grapefruit. In total Respondent harvested 4,266 boxes of the white grapefruit. Respondent harvested 5,400 boxes of red grapefruit from the Pepper Grove. In total, Petitioner's Pepper Grove produced 13,077 boxes (out of the contract volume of 16,000) of red grapefruit. In total, Petitioner's Pepper Grove produced 19,289 boxes (out of the contract volume of 20,000) of white grapefruit. Based upon the volumes produced by the Pepper Grove and the contract prices with the rise going to Petitioner for the navels, Respondent owed Petitioner $25,034.40 for the navels harvested, $24,300 for the red grapefruit, and $8,532.00 for the white grapefruit. These amounts total $57,866.40. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent had paid Petitioner $59,126.48. Of the unpicked fruit left on the trees by Respondent, Petitioner was able to market 15,023 boxes of white grapefruit that went to the cannery and yielded $7,965.46. The red grapefruit that went to the cannery yielded $4,162.21. Red grapefruit that was harvested by Minton yielded 1,056 boxes, but only $168.96. Thus, Petitioner recovered only $12,296.63 for the 22,700 boxes of fruit that Respondent left on the Pepper Grove. Respondent maintained that it did not pick Petitioner's fruit because it was damaged by rust mite. If true, Respondent claimed that the fruit would not meet fresh fruit standards. Although Petitioner acknowledged that some of the fruit did have damage, Mr. Hornbuckle maintained that he offered fruit from another grove to make-up the difference in volume. None of the conversations that allegedly occurred regarding the rust mite issue were reduced to writing at the time. Petitioner maintains he had more than sufficient fruit to meet the amounts due under the parties' agreement. On March 6, 2008, Respondent issued a letter to Petitioner that provided, in part: We are very sorry however we are unable to continue to harvest the grapefruit from your groves due to the lack of merchantability of the fruit for the fresh market. Due to the disease and insect damage present on the fruit, the return on the fruit is unable to cover harvesting and packing charges for the fresh channel. On March 11, 2008, Petitioner wrote back to Respondent and stated, in part: Please be advised that refusal to harvest any additional fruit constitutes a breach of the contract, which requires IMG Citrus to harvest all of the red and white grapefruit no later than March 15, 2008. All of the navel fruit was to have been harvested by January 1, 2008. Contrary to your letter, the fruit is merchantable, and does not have disease or insect damage which unreasonably reduces the merchantability of the crop. At the time of the allegations of rust mite or other damage, Petitioner took pictures of his crop to demonstrate that it appeared to be healthy fruit. Respondent did not have pictures to demonstrate its claim that the fruit was not merchantable. Moreover, Respondent did not formally document that the fruit was unacceptable until March 6, 2008. Under the terms of the contract, the harvesting of the grapefruit was to be completed March 15, 2008. Respondent's claim that it purchased fruit from Duda Products, Inc. (Duda) to demonstrate the market price for grapefruit is not persuasive. The contract with Duda named a variety of "Ruby Reds." There is no evidence that the "Ruby Red" variety is comparable to the whites and reds depicted on Petitioner's contract. Respondent claims that the packout percentage for Petitioner's fruit did not support the harvesting of the crop. That is to say, that the percentage of fruit meeting a fresh fruit quality did not justify the harvesting and packing expense associated with Petitioner's fruit. If the fruit were not marketable in the fresh market, the fruit had no value to Respondent. The parties' agreement did not, however, specify what would be an acceptable packout percentage to support a notion that the fruit was merchantable. Taken to extreme, Respondent could claim any percentage short of 100 percent demonstrated fruit that was not merchantable. No evidence of an industry standard for an acceptable packout percentage was presented.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order approving Petitioner's complaint against Respondent in the amount of $51,021.87. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Collins Westchester Fire Insurance Company 436 Walnut Street, Routing WA10A Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, M-38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Melanie Sallin Ressler, COO IMG Citrus, Inc. 2600 45th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32967 Michel Sallin IMG Citrus, Inc. 7836 Cherry Lake Road Groveland, Florida 34736 Larmarcus E. Hornbuckle Rebecca Hornbuckle Vero Beach Land Company, LLC 6160 1st Street Southwest Vero Beach, Florida 32968 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent owes Petitioner $13,853.00 for failure to harvest Petitioner's 2004 Valencia orange crop, as alleged in the Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lionel LaGrow, is a resident of Highlands County, Florida. Respondent, Chapman Fruit Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Respondent" or "Chapman"), is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Hardee County, Florida. Chapman is a duly licensed fruit buyer in the State of Florida and is owned by Ray Chapman (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Chapman"). Mr. LaGrow owns and operates a 26-acre grove in Highlands County, Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. LaGrow's grove contained varieties of citrus referred to as "Earlies," "Mids," and "Valencias." The Earlies and Mids varieties are picked early in each fruit season and the Valencias are picked late in each fruit season. At all times relevant to this proceeding Reggie Cooper (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Cooper") was an employee of Chapman. Mr. Cooper was authorized by Chapman to enter into binding agreements and to make arrangements for and supervise the picking and hauling of Mr. LaGrow's citrus. Mr. LaGrow and Chapman entered into a Pick and Haul Contract (hereinafter referred to as "Contract") dated November 9, 2001, by which Mr. LaGrow agreed to sell, and Chapman agreed to purchase, fruit grown on the 26-acre tract located in Highlands County, Florida, for shipping seasons 2001-2002, 2002-2003, and 2003-2004. The Contract did not provide prices within the Agreement itself for picking and hauling the fruit. The parties verbally agreed to prices for picking and hauling at the time of each year's harvest. The Contract, as written, was a "Delivered-In" Contract, meaning that Mr. LaGrow retained the right to arrange for picking and hauling the fruit at any time during the term of the Contract. Mr. Cooper made arrangements for and supervised the picking and hauling of Mr. LaGrow's citrus. After the citrus was picked, Chapman provided Mr. LaGrow statements that accurately and fairly account for all fruit harvested by Chapman's contracted harvester. The statements showed the gross income, the costs of picking and hauling, as well as other expenses, and the net income to Mr. LaGrow. The parties followed the procedure described in paragraph 7, beginning in November 2001 of the 2001-2002 citrus shipping season through the harvesting of the Earlies and Mids in the 2003-2004 fruit season. There were 3,531 boxes of Earlies and Mids harvested by Chapman's contractor in November 2001 for the 2001-2002 citrus shipping season from the LaGrow property. When multiplied by the total pounds of solids (19,881.16), a gross purchase price of $15,904.93 resulted. Picking and hauling in the amount of $2.00 per box was deducted leaving $8,180.86 payable to Mr. LaGrow. Chapman tendered a check in the amount of $8,180.86 to Mr. LaGrow. There were 3,103 boxes of Valencias harvested by Chapman's contractor in March 2002 for the 2001-2002 citrus shipping season from the LaGrow property. When multiplied by the total pounds of solids (21,085.57), a gross purchase price of $20,031.29 resulted. Picking and hauling in the amount of $2.20 per box was deducted leaving $13,134.87 payable to Mr. LaGrow. Chapman tendered a check in the amount of $13,134.87 to Mr. LaGrow. There were 1,785 boxes of Earlies and Mids harvested by Chapman's contractor in the 2002-2003 citrus shipping season from the LaGrow property. When multiplied by the total pounds of solids (11,063.98), a gross purchase price of $10,068.22 resulted. Picking and hauling in the amount of $2.86 per box was deducted leaving $4,628.44 payable to Mr. LaGrow. Chapman tendered a check in the amount of $4,628.44 to Mr. LaGrow. There were 1,594 boxes of Valencias harvested by Chapman's contractor in the 2002-2003 citrus shipping season from the LaGrow property. When multiplied by the total pounds of solids (10,582.23), a gross purchase price of $10,053.12 resulted. Picking and hauling in the amount of $2.77 per box was deducted leaving $5,601.87 payable to Mr. LaGrow. Chapman tendered a check in the amount of $5,601.87 to Mr. LaGrow. There were 316 boxes of Earlies and Mids harvested by Chapman's contractor in the 2003-2004 citrus shipping season by Chapman's contractor from the LaGrow property. When multiplied by the total pounds of solids (1,847.46), a gross purchase price of $1,385.59 resulted. Picking and hauling in the amount of $3.55 per box was deducted leaving $252.57 payable to Mr. LaGrow. Chapman tendered a check in the amount of $252.57 to Mr. LaGrow. There were no problems or disputes between Chapman and Mr. LaGrow regarding the harvesting of the citrus until the 2003-2004 Valencia crop was to be picked. All harvesting of Mr. LaGrow's fruit during the Contract period was performed by Chapman's contracted harvester. There was no fruit harvested from the LaGrow property by any one other than Chapman's contracted harvester during the Contract period. During the Contract period there was a steady decline in production from the LaGrow grove property. From the first year of the Contract to the second year of the Contract there was a nearly 51 percent reduction in the number of net boxes harvested. From the second year of the Contract to the third year of the Contract, with respect to the Earlies and Mids, there was an 82.3 percent reduction in the number of net boxes harvested. There were an insufficient number of boxes of Valencia oranges on the LaGrow property available for harvest in 2004. Had Chapman harvested, or arranged to harvest the 2004 Valencia crop, once picking and hauling charges were applied, a negative balance owed would have resulted. Mr. Cooper, on behalf of Chapman, made multiple attempts to arrange for harvesting of the 2004 Valencia crop, including, but not limited to, contacting M.E. Stephens, IV, who declined to harvest the fruit based on the quantity available for harvest. For the same reason, other harvesters advised Mr. Cooper that they could not harvest the LaGrow 2004 Valencia crop. Though unsuccessful, Mr. Cooper's efforts to have the crop harvested were reasonable under the circumstances. Mr. Cooper never told Mr. LaGrow that because of the quantity of the Valencia oranges in 2004, he was unable to find a contractor to harvest the fruit. Although it became apparent that Mr. Cooper had not arranged for the Valencia oranges to be harvested, Mr. LaGrow never contacted Mr. Chapman or Mr. Cooper. Under the subject Contract, Mr. LaGrow could harvest or make arrangements to have the Valencia oranges harvested. However, Mr. LaGrow failed to take steps in 2004 to have the Valencia oranges harvested and sold. Mr. LaGrow's Complaint contends that Chapman owes him $13,853.00 for failing to harvest and sell the Valencia oranges in the 2004 season. In Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, he seeks $9,586.50 in "damages."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner of Agriculture enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent's, Department of Citrus, proposed changes to Rules 20-71.005, 20-71.006, and 20-72.009, Florida Administrative Code, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and the testimony of witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In Florida, all citrus processing plant operations are under continuous inspection by USDA inspectors as a result of a Cooperative Agreement, which has an effective date of July 1, 1968, between the Consumer and Marketing Services (now known as Agricultural Marketing Services), the USDA, and the Florida Department of Agriculture (now known as Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services). By its terms, the Cooperative Agreement contemplates that the State of Florida agency (Respondent herein) may develop standards for processed citrus products under authority granted by Florida state law. As such, Respondent establishes policy and the USDA implements the policy established by Respondent. Since 1949, Chapter 601, Florida Statutes (the "Florida Citrus Code"), has vested Respondent with general and specific legislative authority to inspect, grade, develop minimum quality and maturity standards, and to do myriad other things to ensure the quality of processed citrus products. In addition, the Florida citrus industry has implemented internal quality control testing and standards in an effort to instill consumer confidence in Florida citrus products. Not unlike many other segments of commerce, the Florida citrus industry has evolved from small, local operators to large multi-state conglomerates. Innovation and consolidation has resulted in new products, production techniques, and citrus processing methodology. Where bulk concentrate was stored in 55-gallon drums in the 1950s, it is now stored in 100,000-gallon tanks, and can be transported in huge container trailers towed by semi-tractors. As the Florida citrus industry has changed, so too has governmental and internal testing for product wholesomeness, maturity, grade, and safety. Upon delivery to a citrus processing plant, all citrus fruit is tested for wholesomeness and maturity before it is processed. This initial inspection is accomplished by the arbitrary selection of approximately 38-45 pounds of citrus from throughout a 500-box load. If the citrus passes this initial testing, it proceeds to be processed. Processed citrus product is later tested for grade and, finally, undergoes microbial, pathogen, and safety testing by the Food and Drug Administration. In addition, processors undertake private testing to assure particular quality assurance. In 2001, the Florida Legislature repealed Subsection 601.48(1), Florida Statutes, and, as a result, deleted the statutory requirement for inspections of grade standards in registered citrus processing plants. The repeal of Subsection 601.48(1), Florida Statutes, eliminated legislative direction for a grade inspection; however, there remained other inspection requirements. Section 601.49, Florida Statutes, provides that it is unlawful for any person to sell or transport canned or concentrated products unless the same has been inspected and accompanied by a certificate of inspection or manifest indicating that an inspection has taken place. Subsection 601.48(3), Florida Statutes, exempts intrastate shipment of processed citrus products between licensed citrus fruit dealers who operate processing plants from grade labeling requirements. In 2000, Respondent, by Rule 20-71.005, Florida Administrative Code, established manifest requirements and statements for in-state transport of processed citrus products between registered facilities owned by the same processor. This was the precursor to the proposed rule changes, which are the subject of this rule challenge. Proposed Rule 20-71.005, Florida Administrative Code, allows the intrastate transport of bulk processed citrus products between registered facilities, eliminating the requirement that both facilities be owned by the same individual or entity and establishes informational requirements for the shipping manifest. One of the informational requirements for the shipping manifest established in the proposed rule is a certified statement that "the processed citrus products are being transported in bulk as processor grade." "Processor grade" is a new designation. Proposed Rule 20-71.006, Florida Administrative Code, establishes manifest requirements for transport of processed citrus products with the exception of bulk processed citrus product shipments specified in Rule 20-71.009, Florida Administrative Code. Proposed Rule 20-71.009, Florida Administrative Code, authorizes an inspector to issue a certificate of processor grade, which reflects that the bulk processed citrus product has been inspected for wholesomeness and maturity and ensures that the bulk processed citrus product will be inspected and/or re- graded before final shipment. The proposed rules reflect changes that are taking place in citrus processing methodology; the rule changes ensure that inspection as required by Section 601.49, Florida Statutes, takes place.
The Issue The issues concern the complaint by Petitioner against Respondents for the alleged failure to pay for $125.00 worth of medium zucchini squash also referred to as medium green squash. See Sections 604.15 through 604.30, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner sells produce. East Coast purchases produce and resells that produce at wholesale. The transaction which is in dispute here concerns an April 25, 1990 sale of medium zucchini squash. On that date Jerry B. Portnoy, Vice President for East Coast who runs the day to day operations of the company and buys produce spoke with Petitioner. In that conversation, which took place early in the morning, Petitioner stated that he had the squash to sell. Portnoy told Petitioner that he had plenty of that form of produce on hand. Petitioner stated that this was the last picking and that he would give Portnoy a good price. The price that Petitioner mentioned was $2.50 a crate. Mr. Portnoy said that he could use about 100 crates and he reiterated that he had plenty of that type of produce on hand. That comment by Mr. Portnoy met with the remark by Petitioner which was to the effect, that there might be a few additional crates above the 100 discussed. Portnoy said that he did not need any more than 100 crates in that he had plenty of that produce on hand. As Portnoy described at hearing, he felt that he really did not even need 100 crates; however, based upon the past working relationship between the Petitioner and Portnoy he agreed to take 100 crates. Contrary to the agreement between Portnoy and the Petitioner, sometime on the evening of April 25, 1990, Petitioner delivered 236 crates of the squash. No one was at East Coast at its Jacksonville, Florida business location to receive the squash and inspect them. East Coast would not have accepted 236 crates that were delivered if it had known of that number of crates. No one was available to inspect the squash until the following morning. On April 26, 1990, Mr. Portnoy examined the squash and found that some of the product was inferior and was in a state of decay. As a consequence, Mr. Portnoy called the Petitioner on the telephone on that morning and told the Petitioner that the Petitioner had sent too many crates and some of the squash were bad. Nonetheless, Mr. Portnoy told Petitioner that he would work it out as best he could, meaning that he would sell as much of the product as possible. During contact with the Petitioner on the part of East Coast, Petitioner did not ask for a federal inspection. East Coast was able to sell all but 50 crates of the squash as delivered. It submitted payment in the amount of $465 as reflected on the face of the invoice which Petitioner sent to East Coast. That exhibit is Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. It reflects that 50 crates were dumped which had they been sold would have been worth $125.00. It is that $125.00 which is in dispute. Mr. Portnoy called the Petitioner after the squash had been sold. That call took place a couple of weeks later. In the course of this conversation the Petitioner said that he did not want to hear about problems anymore and that he wanted to be paid for the full amount of all crates delivered. Mr. Portnoy said that 50 crates had been lost and that the amount being remitted through a check would relate only to those crates that had been sold. This describes the amount remitted on June 15, 1990 set out in Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Petitioner replied that he did not know if he would cash the check or not. Mr. Portnoy said that the check in the amount of $465.00 was for payment in full. This concluded their business until the time of the complaint filed by the Petitioner. On that facts as reported, there was no agreement to sell more than 100 crates. The additional crates that were sold by East Coast was a gratuitous gesture on the part of East Coast for which Petitioner was paid the full amount. The 50 crates that were not paid for contained inferior products for which Petitioner was not entitled to payment. This speaks to the 50 crates that were dumped which had they been sold would have been worth $125.00.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which dismisses the complaint of the Petitioner and relieves the Respondents of any financial obligation to pay the contested $125.00 claim. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: David Browning c/o David Browning Wholesale Produce 234 Church Street Starke, FL 32091 East Coast Fruit Company Jerry Portnoy, Vice President Post Office Box 2547 Jacksonville, FL 32203 James W. Sears, Esquire 511 North Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, FL 32803 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
