The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive a refund of insurance premiums paid to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Division administers health plans, including COBRA, for the benefit of employees of the State of Florida. Petitioner was an employee of the State of Florida from 1991 until February 11, 2000, which was his last day on the payroll of the Office of the Attorney General. On May 27, 1998, Petitioner was placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List by the U. S. Air Force. He was presented an identification card reflecting his rank as colonel. His identification card reflects that he was eligible for medical insurance. As a retired military person Petitioner was eligible for treatment at a military medical facility or through TRICARE. TRICARE is a comprehensive health insurance program for military personnel. TRICARE may be a primary provider or a secondary provider of health benefits. During his active employment with the state, however, the TRICARE coverage was secondary. This means that the state paid any claims to the extent of its policy limits and the remaining amount of any claim would be processed and paid in accordance with TRICARE coverage. Petitioner was aware that placement on the Temporary Disability Retired List was, as the name implied, a temporary situation. It was his expectation that subsequent to being placed on the list, the U. S. Air Force would determine either that he was disabled to the extent that he would receive disability retirement, and thus continue to be eligible for TRICARE, or that he would be denied disability retirement and would have to arrange for other medical insurance, or do without. During Petitioner's employment with the Florida Department of Legal Affairs, he was covered by the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan. On February 11, 2000, when Petitioner terminated his employment with the Florida Department of Legal Affairs, he was seeking to have the State of Florida declare him disabled. Pursuant to law, Petitioner's entitlement to the benefits of the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan continued until March 31, 2001. Without taking action to secure health insurance, Petitioner would have only TRICARE as an insurer. However, if the state determined him to have become disabled while employed by the state, he would be covered by the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan, retroactively. On May 11, 2000, the Florida Division of Retirement denied Petitioner's application for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. The effect of this determination was to terminate the possibility of coverage under the State Group Health Self Insurance Plan with the reduced premiums available to a person on disability retirement. The Florida Department of Legal Affairs failed to immediately notify the Division that Petitioner had terminated his employment. As a result, the Division did not send Petitioner a Notice of Continuation Coverage Eligibility until immediately after to May 11, 2000. The notice informed Petitioner of his right to have family continuation coverage in return for a premium of $517.96. It further informed him that he had until July 11, 2000, to elect coverage which would be retroactive to April 1, 2000. A second Notice of Continuation Coverage Eligibility, dated May 22, 2000, was sent to Petitioner. This notice similarly informed Petitioner of his right to have family continuation coverage in return for a premium of $517.96 but informed him that he had until July 22, 2000, to elect coverage which would be retroactive to April 1, 2000. The second page of the Notice of Continuation Coverage Eligibility informed Petitioner, inter alia, that coverage would be available for 18 months for voluntary or involuntary termination, 29 months for certain disabled qualified beneficiaries, and 36 months for all other qualifying events. The second page also informed Petitioner that coverage might end on the occurrence of several events. The event asserted to be pertinent to this case is the date the insured becomes covered by another group health plan which does not contain any limitation or exclusion with respect to a pre- existing condition. Petitioner filed a "Continuation of Coverage Enrollment" form dated July 21, 2000. This form noted that the date of the event that precipitated eligibility for coverage was February 11, 2000. Petitioner wrote on the form in his own hand, "I am permanently and totally disabled; I and my dependents am covered under TRICARE at present." At the bottom of the "Continuation of Coverage Enrollment" form, the Division authorized coverage dating back to April 1, 2000. Petitioner sent the Division a check in the amount of $517.96 to cover the initial premium. The date on the check was July 21, 2000. Sometime prior to August 24, 2000, he sent the Division another premium payment in the amount of $517.96. At the time Petitioner filed the "Continuation of Coverage Enrollment" form and submitted the premiums, he was covered by the regular military medical system, because he was considered to be retired by the U.S. Air Force. However, since the question of his disability with the U.S. Air Force had not been decided, he was aware of the possibility that his military health coverage could end at any time. By maintaining a COBRA policy, he was insuring that he would not find himself in a posture where he had neither COBRA nor TRICARE. On August 16, 2000, the U.S. Air Force determined that Petitioner was disabled and was entitled to the medical care provided by law for retired service persons, which includes TRICARE, presumably, for life. It was at this point Petitioner demanded the return of the premium he paid. Petitioner's theory for the refund is that he was, under the law, ineligible for COBRA coverage during the two months that he paid a premium with respect to it. On September 29, 2000, in a letter signed by Ria Brown, Benefits Administrator, the Division reiterated its refusal to refund the premiums and noted that Petitioner was covered under COBRA for the period April 1, 2000, through May 31, 2000. The letter informed Petitioner that, "Based on the information in your letter, you are eligible and entitled for TRICARE Standard coverage, but you did not indicate that you are actually enrolled." Ms. Brown also advised the following: Coverage at time of COBRA event: Section 4980(f)(2)(B)(iv) provides that a qualified beneficiary's right to COBRA continuation coverage may be terminated when the qualified beneficiary "first becomes," after the date of the COBRA election, covered under another group health plan (subject to certain additional conditions) or entitled to Medicare benefits. The final regulations provide that an employer may cut off the right to COBRA continuation coverage based upon other group health plan coverage or entitlement to Medicare benefits only if the qualified beneficiary first becomes covered under the other group health plan coverage or entitled to the Medicare benefits after the date of the COBRA election. Petitioner asserted in a reply, also dated September 29, 2000, that contrary to Ms. Brown's assertion, he was actually enrolled in TRICARE Standard during the operative period. In a letter dated October 3, 2000, Merrill Moody, the Division Director, informed Petitioner that his claim for refund was being denied because he had a contractual relationship with the Division and that he got the product for which he paid-- health insurance coverage for April and May, 2000. Mr. Moody also pointed out that the Division was required under law to allow active employees and their covered dependents, to participate in COBRA, notwithstanding their participation in other programs.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of State Group Insurance enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for a refund of $1035.92. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia Forrester, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Morris Shelkofsky 3721 Crawfordville Road, No. 17 Tallahassee, Florida 32310-7074 Cynthia Henderson, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue At issue is whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Corrected Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine in Florida. Respondent is, at all times material to this case, a licensed physician in the state of Florida and employed by Bennett Family Practice in Boca Raton, Florida. He has no prior disciplinary history, and had been uneventfully licensed to practice medicine in Florida since 1994. C.R. became a patient of Bennett Family Practice on April 21, 2000. She saw medical professionals other than Respondent for a couple of minor matters prior to the office visit which gives rise to this case. On July 9, 2001, C.R. went to Bennett Family Practice in order to seek an MMR vaccination in furtherance of her application to do graduate work at Florida Atlantic University (FAU). FAU required that prospective students obtain this vaccination, as part of the application process, or obtain documentation of a medical excuse to forego the vaccination. The portion of the application package dealing with medical issues, including vaccinations, contains a warning that pregnant women, or women who are attempting to conceive, should not be vaccinated. On July 9, 2001, C.R. was over 34 years old, and newly pregnant. Pregnancy is one of several contraindications to the administration of an MMR vaccine. Other contraindications include certain allergies, and HIV positive status. Murry made no effort to determine what, if any, of these contraindications might be present. No factual circumstances existed at the time which would have justified the administration of the vaccine to C.R. while she was pregnant. C.R. brought to her appointment an FAU immunization form. The form contained four pages with six parts and directed the student or parent to fill in the first three parts on the first two pages and the health care provider to fill in the remainder. C.R. filled in the parts for the student or parent; however, she had not read nor filled out any other portion of the four page form. Murry testified to his expectation that a well educated patient, which C.R. undisputedly is, “should” have read the form she came in with. However, Murry did not communicate that expectation to C.R. It is the responsibility of the physician to take reasonable measures to ascertain the existence of contraindications to administering a vaccination, including the pregnancy status of a woman of childbearing age who seeks an MMR vaccination, yet Murry failed to take any measure directed at obtaining this basic information. More specifically, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) advises that “. . . women of childbearing age should receive rubella-containing vaccines . . . only if they state that they are not pregnant and only if they are counseled not to become pregnant for 3 months after vaccination.” C.R. made no such statement and did not receive the counseling recommended by the CDC. In some practices, including Murry’s, office protocol requires that patients be provided with an information form concerning the risks, benefits, and contraindications for the vaccination. Where this procedure is employed, it remains the physician’s responsibility to take the steps necessary to assure that the patient has in fact read the form, and understands it. Once the doctor affirmatively determines that a female patient of childbearing age is not pregnant, and has been appropriately counseled not to become pregnant for three months, the standard of care further requires that this information be documented in her medical record. Because neither Murry nor an appropriately trained staff member discussed with C.R. the issue of pregnancy as it relates to a woman of childbearing age seeking the MMR vaccination, it follows that her patient chart does not reflect any information on the date she received the vaccine relating to her pregnancy status. Murry's office protocol does not call for either the doctor or the medical technician who prepares and gives the vaccination to document that the patient read the information sheet and understood it. Thus, there is no way to be sure that, on a busy day, the protocol was followed. In this case, the greater weight of evidence suggests that it was not. The vaccination was given to C.R. by certified medical assistant Josette Lewis-Harris (Lewis-Harris). On an average day, Lewis-Harris sees as many as 40 patients. Lewis-Harris claims to have given C.R. an MMR information form. C.R. denies that. In weighing the conflicting evidence on this point, the undersigned had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of C.R. and Lewis- Harris and to consider their demeanor while testifying in light of their opportunity and motivation to fully and completely recall the details of C.R.'s July 9 visit. Also taken into account is the testimony of Murry and one of his partners, whose testimony concerning office protocols for vaccinations left room for doubt that medical technicians at Bennett Family Practice are appropriately trained to be the safety net to ensure that vaccinations are not administered where contraindicated. Lewis-Harris does not recall many details about her brief encounter with C.R., while C.R. states unequivocally that no Bennett employee provided her with a form to read. The form which Murry contends was provided to C.R. in accordance with office protocol does state that pregnant women should not have the vaccination; however, the form is dominated by sketches of a little boy and a baby, and is, by its own title, directed to parents of young children. The form is titled M M AND R Vaccine (MMR) and subtitled, "What you need to know before you or your child gets the vaccine." Nothing about the form would attract the attention of a woman who thought herself to be pregnant, or who was attempting to become pregnant. Because C.R. was one of as many of 40 patients encountered that day by Lewis-Harris, the tribunal credits the memory of C.R. as being more accurate on the matter of whether Lewis-Harris provided C.R. with the form. However, even if C.R. had been furnished the form, it would not absolve Murry of liability for violating the standard of care, where, as here, Lewis-Harris admits that she never asked C.R. if she might be pregnant. C.R. was not counseled not to become pregnant, and no contemporaneous documentation exists to establish that C.R. was given the form which explains the dangers of the MMR vaccine, and that she was cognizant of the section of the form which discussed pregnancy. More fundamentally, the evidence failed to establish that the responsibility for averting a possibly life threatening consequence can be shifted onto a patient in the manner suggested by Respondent, no matter how well educated the patient might be. Lewis-Harris testified somewhat ambiguously about C.R. having expressed reluctance to get the shot. Yet, Lewis-Harris did not alert Murry to that reluctance. If in fact Lewis- Harris’ memory on this point is accurate, it further underscores the inadequacy of Murry’s supervision of the potentially dangerous process of administering vaccinations. A patient who expresses reluctance to receive a vaccine warrants scrutiny and evaluation which is beyond the training of a medical technician. In failing to make any effort to ascertain C.R.’s pregnancy status, and to counsel her that, as a woman of childbearing age, she should take care not to become pregnant for three months following administration of the MMR vaccine, Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. In reaching the factual determination that Murry violated the standard of care under the unique facts of this case, careful consideration was given to the testimony of the expert witnesses for both sides. Dr. Libert, Petitioner's expert witness, testified that Murry's conduct did not meet the required standard of care. His testimony was credible. The testimony of Respondent's expert was discredited by his imprecise grasp of the facts of this case and his unwillingness to render unqualified testimony. For example, Respondent’s expert, under direct examination by Murry’s attorney, was asked if he was “familiar with what the standard of care requires for the administration of MMR vaccine.” He attempted an answer, but qualified it by saying "again this is out of my field of course.” This qualification did nothing to bolster confidence in his opinion that ordering the MMR vaccination for CR was within the standard of care. Murry's expert further discredited himself when he stated that “since the patient had received printed literature for her and her husband to review, that there was no breach of the standard of care.” There is no record evidence that C.R.’s husband was present on July 9, 2001, and, in any event, the evidence established that C.R. is a competent adult, thus, the duty of care was owed to her, and not her husband. On balance, the testimony of Petitioner’s expert is the more credible and persuasive and is given greater weight. That testimony, and the record as a whole, amply supports the conclusion that it is not within the standard of care to rely exclusively upon a form document when the answer to one direct question might avoid possible catastrophic consequences. Additionally, the evidence established that an MMR vaccine is a legend drug, which was inappropriately prescribed under the facts and circumstances of this case. After she received the vaccination, C.R. learned of the contraindication and telephoned Murry’s office. Murry arranged for her to be seen by an obstetrician, but C.R. chose not to continue care with Murry and his partners. Murry argues that C.R.’s fetus likely did not suffer any actual injury by reason of the vaccination. Be that as it may, the standard of care was violated when the vaccination was given. What happened after is irrelevant. Neither can any inference in Murry's favor be drawn from C.R.'s refusal to follow his suggestion as to whom to consult for follow-up care.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon consideration of the Recommended Range of Penalty under Rule 64B8-8.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, and Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances under Rule 64B8- 8.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the charges outlined in the Administrative Complaint and imposing the following penalties: A reprimand; An administrative fine of $20,000 (consisting of $10,000 for the standard of care (t) violation and $5,000 each for the medical records (m) and legend drug (q) violations); Continuing medical education classes specified by the Board; Corrective action with respect to office protocols for determining if vaccinations are appropriate to the particular patient; A refund of all fees paid by C.R. and/or her insurer for services rendered on July 9, 2001. One year of probation, with terms set by the Board. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Board should also impose costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of this case in compliance with Section 456.072(4), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Irving Levine, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Barr, Murman, Tonelli, Slother and Sleet, P.A. 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Suite 1700 Tampa, Florida 33602 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. John O. Agwunobi, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent in the State of Florida licensed to sell health insurance. At all times material hereto, Respondent was not formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. However, Cleveland Insurance Agency often referred clients to Respondent for health and Medicare supplement policies because Cleveland Insurance Agency did not handle those type policies. Prior to November 1987, Respondent, working in conjunction with Cleveland Insurance Company, sold to Irene Goldberg a health insurance policy issued through Provider's Fidelity Insurance Company (Provider's Fidelity). On November 29, 1987, Ms. Goldberg paid $1,504.56 as the annual renewal premium for this health insurance policy which extended her coverage through December 4, 1988. In March of 1988, Ms. Goldberg contacted Cleveland Insurance Agency and requested that someone review her health insurance coverage. Cleveland Insurance Agency referred Ms. Goldberg's request to Respondent. Respondent was familiar with the terms and conditions of the health insurance coverage Ms. Goldberg had in place and he knew that she had paid the premium for this policy through December 1988. Upon visiting with Irene Goldberg on or about March 10, 1988, Respondent presented Ms. Goldberg with a business card that intentionally misrepresented his status with Cleveland Insurance Company. Because Ms. Goldberg had placed most of her insurance needs through Cleveland Insurance Agency during the past few years, Respondent intentionally misled Ms. Goldberg into thinking that he was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. During that visit, Respondent recommended to Ms. Goldberg that she purchase a policy of insurance issued by First National Life Insurance Company (First National) to replace her Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg specifically discussed with Respondent a preexisting medical condition which required periodic medical treatment and the need for the treatment required by this condition to be covered by the new policy. Respondent assured Ms. Goldberg that the preexisting condition would be covered by the new policy. Respondent also told Ms. Goldberg that he would cancel the Provider's Fidelity policy and that he would secure on her behalf a pro rated refund of the premium she had paid to Provider's Fidelity. Based on Respondent's representations, Ms. Goldberg agreed to purchase the First National policy. On March 30, 1988, Ms. Goldberg gave to Respondent a check made payable to First National Life Insurance Company in the amount of $1,892.00, the amount Respondent had quoted as the full annual premium. A few days later, Respondent contacted Ms. Goldberg and advised her that there would be an additional premium in the amount of $1,360.00, which Ms. Goldberg paid on April 4, 1988. This additional premium was, according to Respondent, for skilled nursing care coverage which First National had added as a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg had purchased. The skilled nursing care coverage was, in fact, a separate policy which was not a mandatory feature of the policy Ms. Goldberg thought she was purchasing from First National. Respondent misled Ms. Goldberg as to the terms of the policies he had sold her and as to the number of policies he had sold her. Respondent represented that the premiums he had collected on behalf of First National were in payment of a single health insurance policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg four separate policies, and he collected a commission for each of the policies. When Ms. Goldberg received her insurance documents from First National, she learned for the first time that Respondent had sold her four separate policies of insurance, including a cancer policy that she and Respondent had never discussed. In addition to the health and cancer policies, Respondent sold Ms. Goldberg a home convalescent care policy and a separate skilled nursing care policy. Respondent had sold Ms. Goldberg policies of insurance that Ms. Goldberg had not requested and that she did not know she was buying. Upon reading the health policy, Ms. Goldberg discovered that her new First National Life policy excluded her preexisting condition. Ms. Goldberg contacted Respondent who told her that he had not cancelled the Provider's Fidelity policy as he had agreed to do and that he had not tried to get the pro rated refund of the Provider's Fidelity premium. Respondent told her that any claim she might have for the preexisting condition should be filed under the Provider's Fidelity policy. Ms. Goldberg then complained to First National which, after an investigation, refunded to Ms. Goldberg the premiums she had paid for the three policies. Respondent had received a commission on the policies of insurance he had sold to Ms. Goldberg. As of the time of the hearing, Respondent had not reimbursed First National for the commission he had received based on the premiums that were subsequently refunded to Ms. Goldberg. In February 1988, Respondent met with Helen Krafft to discuss her health insurance needs. During the course of the meeting, Respondent presented to Ms. Krafft a business card which intentionally misrepresented his affiliation with Cleveland Insurance Agency. This business card misled Ms. Krafft into believing that Respondent was formally affiliated with Cleveland Insurance Agency. On February 18, 1988, Respondent sold to Ms. Krafft a health insurance policy through First National and a health insurance policy issued through American Sun Life, at which time he collected a premiums in the total amount of $519.80 for six months of coverage from each of the two policies. In July 1988, Respondent visited with Ms. Krafft at her place of work and told her that she should pay her renewal premiums for the health insurance policies on or before August 1, 1988, to avoid a premium increases. Respondent knew, or should have known, that there were no premium increases scheduled for those policies and that there were no discounts for early payment of the premiums The renewal premiums Respondent quoted Ms. Krafft for the two policies totaled $485.40. At Respondent's instructions Ms. Krafft delivered to Respondent her signed check dated July 18, 1988, in the amount of $485.40 with the payee's name left blank. Respondent accepted these trust funds from Ms. Krafft in a fiduciary capacity. Instead of using these funds to pay the premiums as he had agreed to do, Respondent filled his name in on Ms. Krafft's check and cashed it. Ms. Krafft learned that Respondent had not used the funds she had given him to renew her two policies when she started getting late payment notices from the two insurance companies with accompanying threats of cancellation if the premiums were not paid. In late September 1988, Respondent paid to Ms. Krafft the sum of $485.40 in cash. In June of 1988, Steven R. and Marilyn Hill applied, through Respondent, for a health policy with First National. The Hills paid the initial premium of $304.37 by check made payable to First National on June 26, 1988. Because of underwriting considerations, First National informed Respondent that the Hills would have to pay a higher premium to obtain the insurance they wanted. The Hills were not willing to pay the higher premium and requested a refund of the amount they had paid. First National made the refund check payable to Steven Hill and mailed the check to Respondent. There was no competent, substantial evidence as to what happened to the check other than First National Life stopped payment on the check and it never cleared banking channels. A second refund check was later delivered to Steven Hill. First National contended at the hearing that Respondent had accrued a debit balance in the amount of $2,692.45 as a result of his dealings as an agent of the company. Respondent contended that he is entitled to certain offsets against the amount First National claims it is owed based on commissions he contends that he had earned but had not been paid. First National had not, prior to the hearing, submitted to Respondent any type of accounting of sums due, nor had it explicitly demanded any specific sum from Respondent. Instead, First National had made a blanket demand that Respondent return all materials belonging to First National and advised that future commission checks would be held in escrow. From the evidence presented it could not be determined that Respondent was indebted to First National.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order which finds that Respondent committed the multiple violations of the Florida Insurance Code as set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order and which further revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer to Respondent, John Richard Klee. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-3269 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are rejected in part as being a conclusion of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in material part by paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. 10 are adopted in material part 11 are adopted in material part 12 are adopted in material part 13 are adopted in material part 14 are adopted in material part 15 are adopted in material part 16 are adopted in material part 17 are adopted in material part 18 are adopted in material part 19 are adopted in material part 20 are adopted in material part 21 are adopted in material part 22 are adopted in material part 23 are adopted in material part 24 are adopted in material part 25 are rejected as being The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 6 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraphs 5 and 7 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 2 and 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 26 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 27 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 28 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 29 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 30 are adopted in material part by paragraph 14 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Roy H. Schmidt, Esquire Office of the Treasurer Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee Florida 32399-0300 Greg Ross, Esquire 400 Southeast Eighth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Don Dowdell General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner's claim against her state group health insurance company for services related to a Magnetic Resonance Imaging examination (MRI) should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner was employed by the State of Florida and was a participant in the State of Florida group health insurance plan, which is a self-insured plan administered by the State of Florida in conjunction with the plan's third party administrator, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida (BCBSF). This plan is frequently referred to as the PPO Plan, an acronym for preferred provider organization. Prior to April 26, 2002, Petitioner's physician detected a lump in Petitioner's right breast. Petitioner's physician ordered mammography and ultrasound examinations to be performed on Petitioner's right breast. Those examinations were performed on April 1, 2002. Following those tests, Petitioner's physician ordered an MRI examination of the right breast, which was performed on April 26, 2002, and is the procedure at issue in this proceeding. Following that MRI, Petitioner had another mammography and ultrasound for the diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer. Respondent has paid Petitioner's claims for coverage of the mammography and ultrasound examinations. Respondent has denied payment for the professional fee associated with the MRI in the amount of $215.00. Respondent has paid the facility fee associated with the MRI in the amount of $1,705.00. Respondent asserts that the payment of that fee was in error and intends to seek reimbursement for that payment if it prevails in this proceeding. The terms of coverage of the state group health insurance plan are set forth in a document entitled "State Employees' PPO Plan Group Health Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefit Document" (Benefit Document). The Benefit Document (at page 31, paragraph 47 of the section entitled "Services Not Covered By The Plan") specifically excludes the following from coverage: 47. Services and procedures considered by BCBSF to be experimental or investigational, or services and procedures not in accordance with generally accepted professional medical standards, including complications resulting from these non-covered services. The Benefit Document has a section entitled "Definitions of Selected Terms Used By The Plan" beginning at page 49. The definition of the phrase "experimental or investigational services", found at page 51, includes, in pertinent part, the following: . . . any evaluation, treatment, therapy, or device that: * * * is generally regarded by experts as requiring more study to determine maximum dosage, toxicity, safety or efficacy, or to determine the efficacy compared to standard treatment for the condition has not been proven safe and effective for treatment of the condition based on the most recently published medical literature of the U.S., Canada or Great Britain using generally accepted scientific, medical or public health methodologies or statistical practices is not accepted in consensus by practicing doctors as safe and effective for the condition is not regularly used by practicing doctors to treat patients with the same or a similar condition The Benefit Document provides at page 51 that BCBSF and the Division of State Group Insurance determine whether a service is experimental or investigational. The testimony of Dr. Wood established that an MRI of the breast is experimental or investigational within the meaning of the Benefit Document. 2/ MRI examinations of the breast are not reliable diagnostic tools because such examinations result in an unacceptable number of cases where an MRI produces false negative findings that reflect the absence of cancer where cancer is, in fact, present in the breast. According to Dr. Wood, an MRI cannot be relied upon and should not be used to avoid a biopsy of a suspicious mass because a patient would run an unacceptable risk that the detection of cancer may be delayed or missed. Dr. Wood also testified that radiologists in Florida performing services for the state group insurance health plan have been informed of BCBSF's position. Petitioner's doctors did not inform her prior to the examination that the MRI examination would not be covered by her insurance plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying coverage for the MRI claims submitted by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2003.
The Issue Whether the Department properly excluded coverage for care provided to Petitioner’s child.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Susan Carswell, was employed by the State of Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Statistics, from June 1994 until December 1998. She enrolled herself and her children in the State Group Health Insurance Plan (State Plan). The State Plan, Section XXVIII, paragraph A, provides as follows: 18. 'Condition' shall mean any disease, illness, injury, accident, bodily dysfunction, pregnancy, drug addiction, alcoholism, or mental or nervous disorder. * * * 21. 'Covered Services and Supplies' shall mean those health care services, treatments, therapies, devices, procedures, techniques, equipment, supplies, products, remedies, for which expenses are covered under the Benefit Document. (emphasis supplied) * * * 23. 'Custodial Care' means care which does not require Skilled Nursing Care or rehabilitation services and is designed solely to assist the Participant with the activities of daily living, such as: help in walking, getting in and out of bed, bathing, dressing, eating, and taking medicine. (emphasis supplied) * * * 40. 'Illness' means physical sickness or disease, pregnancy, bodily injury, or congenital anomaly. * * * 49. 'Medically Necessary' means the service received required to identify or treat the illness, injury, or mental or nervous disorder which a physician has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must (1) be consistent with the symptom [sic], diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s condition, (2) be in accordance with standards of good medical practice, (3) be required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or his/her physician, (4) be approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question, and (5) be the most appropriate, efficient and economical medical supply, service, or level of care which can be safely provided. * * * 56. 'Outpatient' means a patient who is receiving medically necessary care or treatment ordered by a physician and who is not an inpatient. * * * 80. 'Skilled Nursing Care' means care which is furnished by, or under the direct supervision of, licensed Registered Nurses (under the general direction of the physician) to achieve the medically desired result and to ensure the Participant’s safety. Paragraph C of the State Plan provides for covered medical and surgical services and supplies as follows: Seventy percent(70) of the Allowance for Medically Necessary Inpatient/Outpatient services and supplies provided to a Participant by a Non-Network Provider for the treatment of the Participant as a result of a covered accident, illness. (emphasis supplied) * * * Ninety percent (90) of the Allowed Amount for Medically Necessary Inpatient/Outpatient services and supplies provided to a Participant by a Network Provider for the treatment of the Participant as a result of a covered accident, illness. (emphasis supplied) Paragraph D of the State Plan provides for other covered services as follows: The Plan shall pay eighty percent (80) of the Allowed Amount or Allowance, whichever is applicable, for the following Medically Necessary Services when ordered by a physician for the treatment of the Participant as a result of a covered accident, illness . . . . Nursing care by a Registered Nurse or Licensed Practical Nurse. Paragraph G of the State Plan provides for exclusions to covered services and supplies as follows: The following are not Covered Services and Supplies under the Plan. 4. Any services and supplies which are not medically necessary. * * * 14. Any services in connection with Custodial Care or preventive care; immunizations or except those in accordance with Child Health Supervision Services or when necessary as a result of an accident. The term "treatment" is not defined in the State Plan. Veronica Carswell is the daughter of Petitioner. She was born on May 5, 1983. Veronica was born healthy, but due to problems resulting from an illness that hospitalized her when she was a week old, she is severely disabled. Her current state is due either to her illness or an accident. She has cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, and vision problems. She is a spastic quadriplegic, severely brain damaged and profoundly mentally retarded. Her body is severely dysfunctional. She has a tracheotomy tube for breathing and a gastrostomy tube for feeding. Veronica is totally dependant on other people for her care. From 1987 to 1998, Veronica resided in a specialty care residential hospital facility in New York. In 1998, Petitioner moved her daughter to Florida so that she could reside at home. In preparation for the move, Petitioner advertised for and hired licensed practical nurses (LPNs) to provide her daughter with the care she needed on a 24-hour basis. Petitioner hired LPN’s because she had discovered it was considerably cheaper to hire an LPN than pay for the services of a lesser qualified home health care aid through a licensed home health care agency. The LPNs provided care to Veronica according to a Care Plan devised by Kathleen Hamilton, LPN, and approved by Dr. Gary Soud, Veronica’s physician. The Care Plan provides for medically necessary treatment or management of Veronica’s current condition and bodily dysfunction. The care required in the plan is recognized as appropriate care and treatment by experts in the field and is not being given for purposes of convenience. Nurse Hamilton is also one of the LPNs who care for Veronica and has provided health care services to Veronica for one year. Other LPNs provide services to Veronica similar to those provided by Nurse Hamilton. The services provided by the LPNs hired by Petitioner include repositioning of Veronica periodically throughout the day, feeding through the gastric tube, checking residual fluid in Veronica’s stomach with a syringe, administering medication through the gastric tube, misting to keep secretions moist, suctioning of the tracheotomy tube, changing the tracheotomy tube ties, replacing the tracheotomy tube every 3 weeks, assessing Veronica’s cardiopulmonary status at least every eight hours and continuously throughout her care, and monitoring Veronica’s oxygen saturation every four hours or as needed by her condition at the time. The attention Veronica requires in order to maintain her breathing is fairly constant, to the point that when Nurse Hamilton testified, she had to sit or stand beside Veronica to administer care, primarily suctioning, to her. Although seizures have not been a problem, Veronica still requires monitoring by a nurse for small seizures, which while not deadly, could adversely affect Veronica’s condition. Veronica’s condition is fragile and without constant care she can quickly deteriorate. Arguably a lay person with proper training could perform the activities involving the gastric tube and repositioning. However, the evidence did not show that Petitioner is adequately trained or able to perform the tasks required for proper use of the gastric tube or repositioning. Moreover, the evidence did not show that such training was available. Likewise, the evidence did not show that a trained lay person was available to perform the care required in relation to the gastric tube or repositioning or that such a person would be more efficient or economical to hire. In fact, the evidence showed that a trained nurse's aide would be more expensive than hiring an LPN to perform the same tasks. Therefore, it would seem appropriate that an LPN perform these services. The same economic analysis applies to all aspects of Veronica’s Care Plan. Additionally the evidence was clear that the care required which involves the gastric tube is not simply care or treatment given for the sole purpose of assisting Veronica with her activities of daily living. Veronica’s condition necessitates the use of special expertise to feed her because she does not feed normally. In order to maintain her status to prevent her deterioration and even death and to prevent infection, which are recognized medical goals, she must receive additional care such as checking her stomach fluids, and cleaning and maintenance of the gastric tube. The amount she is fed must be carefully monitored. The actual feeding of Veronica is a minimum part of the care which is required because she has a gastric tube. The greater activities are the care functions performed for the purpose of maintaining her current status and preventing infection. Since the care and treatment Veronica receives involving the gastric tube are not designed for the sole purpose of assisting Veronica to eat, they do not fall within the exclusion for custodial activities. Similarly, Veronica’s care concerning repositioning is not for the sole purpose of assisting Veronica in her activities of daily living. Repositioning maintains Veronica’s circulation and must be done in order to maintain her current health status and current level of atrophy. Repositioning also prevents the formation of pressure sores. Therefore, because repositioning has multiple medical purposes such care does not fall under the custodial care exclusion. Veronica cannot breathe without a tracheotomy tube. All of the care given to Veronica which involve the tracheotomy tube are medically necessary to maintain her current medical state and to maintain an appropriate level of oxygen in Veronica’s blood and tissues. The same is true of the John Bunn mist administered to Veronica to keep her secretions moist so that she can cough them up or have them suctioned out of her air passageway. Blockage of the air passageways is a real danger with Veronica. The tube coming out is a danger to Veronica. Without these treatments or procedures Veronica’s oxygen level would drop and she would deteriorate. As indicated earlier, the tracheotomy care is constant. Because her breathing is so impaired, Veronica needs to be monitored constantly in addition to the cardiopulmonary assessment done every eight hours and oxygen saturation check done two times per shift. Such monitoring is a nursing assessment requiring special training which is best done by a nurse. Nothing involving the tracheotomy is done for the sole purpose of aiding with Veronica’s activities of daily living. Therefore the custodial exclusion does not apply. Except for the replacement of the tracheotomy tube every month, none of the care or treatment rendered to Veronica is required to be performed by a registered nurse (RN) or under the supervision of a RN. However, some of the care and treatment requires nursing expertise of at least the training of an LPN. However, all of the care can be part of a nurse's function and, at least in this case, is better supplied by a nurse, given Veronica’s fragile condition, level of impairment and the fact that the care is provided most efficiently and economically by an LPN. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to payment of her claim under the State Plan.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner’s claim be paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Lamar Winegeart III, Esquire 219 Newman Street, 4th Floor Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cindy Horne, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Thomas D. McGurk, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Prior to the institution of this proceeding, Petitioner had undergone surgical sterilization through a procedure known as a vasectomy. Subsequent to the Petitioner having the vasectomy, Petitioner made a decision to have the procedure surgically reversed. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was a member of the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (Plan). At some time prior to having the vasectomy surgically reversed the Petitioner obtained and reviewed the Brochure from the Plan (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Page 1 of the Brochure advises the members of the Plan (members) that the Brochure is "not a contract since it does not include all of the provisions, definitions, benefits, exclusions, and limitations" of the Plan and that its purpose is to furnish members a summary of the benefits available under the Plan and provides a regular telephone number and a SunCom telephone number for the Office of State Employees Insurance (OSEI) in Tallahassee, Florida for the members to call if there are any questions. Page 4 of the Brochure contains a paragraph entitled "Benefit Inquiries" and provides a regular telephone number and a SunCom telephone number for members to call the OSEI on questions concerning benefits. Page 12 of the Brochure contains a paragraph entitled "Claims Inquiries" and provides a TOLL FREE WATS LINE number for the Jacksonville Office of Blue Cross and Blue Shield for members to use when calling that office on questions concerning claims or claims problems. OSEI interprets "Claims Inquiries" to mean inquiries concerning payment, nonpayment or timeliness of claims as distinguished from whether certain services are covered under the Plan which would be "Benefit Inquiry". Page 9 of the Brochure contains a paragraph entitled "Limitations and Exclusions" wherein surgery to reverse surgical sterilization is listed as one of those procedures that the Plan finds necessary to limit or exclude payment. Immediately above the paragraph entitled "Limitations and Exclusions" on page 9 the Brochure advises the member that exclusions and limitations are contained in the Benefit Document on file in the individual's personnel office and the OSEI in Tallahassee, Florida. The Benefit Document is defined on page 2 of the Brochure as the document containing "the provisions, benefits, definitions, exclusions and limitations of the" Plan. Section VII, EXCLUSIONS, subparagraph P. of the State Employees Group Health Insurance Benefit Document (Document) (Respondent's Exhibit 3) specifically excludes surgery to reverse surgical sterilization procedures from coverage under the Plan. The Department of Administration has been designated by the Florida Legislature as the State agency responsible for the administration of the Plan and to make the final determination as what benefits are covered under the Plan in accordance with the Document. There was no evidence presented to show that this responsibility had been delegated to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (Administrator) who was selected by the competitive bid process to provide claims payment services, actuarial and printing services, and medical underwriting of late enrollee applications. Before having surgery to reverse surgical sterilization, the Petitioner contacted the Jacksonville Office of the Administrator and was advised by an unidentified person in that office that the Plan would cover the hospital costs for reverse surgical sterilization but would not cover the doctor's fee. The Petitioner did not at any time material to this proceeding contact the OSEI in Tallahassee or the local personnel office concerning the Plan's coverage of surgery to reverse surgical sterilization. Petitioner acted on the advice of the unidentified person in the Jacksonville Office of Blue Cross and Blue Shield, plus his reading of the Brochure, to come to the conclusion that there was a limitation on the benefits available under the Plan for surgery to reverse surgical sterilization rather than an exclusion of benefits for that procedure; the limitation being that the Plan would pay for hospital costs but not the doctor's fees. Prior to entering the hospital, the Petitioner's admission, being elective, was certified under the Plan's Preadmission Certification Program. However, the Petitioner was advised that the admission being certified did not mean that the services requested were covered under the Plan and that the services rendered would be subject to the limitations and exclusions listed in the Plan. On or about July 30, 1986, Petitioner was admitted to Fish Memorial Hospital where Dr. Youngman performed surgery to reverse surgical sterilization and was discharged on July 31, 1986. After surgery was performed, claims were made under the Plan and, the State of Florida, through the Administrator, made the following payments in connection with the surgery: (a) Fish Memorial Hospital - $935.10; (b) Southeast Volusia Radiology Associates - $19.10; (c) Clifford Chu, M.D. - $742.00 and; (d) Robert Charles Youngman, M.D. - 742.00 Although claims made by the different health care providers (providers) for the services rendered to the Petitioner indicated a diagnosis of Azoospermia which is defined as the absence of live spermatozoa in the semen, there was insufficient evidence to show that this diagnosis was the primary reason for payments being made in error to the providers by the Administra- tor for the services rendered in connection with Petitioner's surgery to reverse surgical sterilization. Subsequent to the health care providers being paid by the Administrator for services rendered to Petitioner under the Plan, the OSEI made a determination that none of the services rendered to the Petitioner to reverse surgical sterilization were covered under the Plan, and demanded reimbursement from the providers. All of the providers, with the exception of Dr. Youngman, reimbursed the Plan but, since the Petitioner had paid Dr. Youngman prior to the claim being made, the Petitioner had received Dr. Youngman's claim and subsequently reimbursed the Plan. Petitioner made a demand on the State to pay the providers since he had been informed by the Administrator that the services, at least the hospital costs, were covered under the Plan. Respondent, at Petitioner's request, reviewed its denial of coverage and determined that costs incurred for surgery to reverse surgical sterilization was not covered under the Plan. By letter dated September 25, 1987, received by Petitioner on October 1, 1987, Respondent advised Petitioner of that decision and of his right to a hearing should he desire one. Petitioner was also advised that he had twenty-one (21) days to file a petition and failure to timely comply would result in the action contemplated in the letter becoming final. A Petition For Formal Proceedings and Notice of Appearance was received by the Respondent on October 26, 1987 bearing a certificate of service dated October 23, 1987. The petition was mailed by Petitioner and received by the Respondent more than 21 days after receipt of the letter by the Petitioner on October 1, 1987. Respondent's ore tenus Motion For Remand Or, In The Alternative, To Dismiss The Petition citing Petitioner's failure to timely file his petition was filed at the hearing on May 12, 1988 some five and half (5 1/2) months after Respondent's receipt of the petition. Upon the Respondent determining that the Petitioner's surgery to reverse surgical sterilization was not covered under the Plan, Petitioner became responsible for all costs incurred for the surgery rather than just Dr. Youngman's fee which resulted in Petitioner being responsible for $3,057.70, in addition to Dr. Youngman's fee. Had the surgery been covered under the Plan, the Petitioner would have only been responsible for $91.90, plus Dr. Youngman's fee.
Recommendation HAVING considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order DENYING Petitioner payment for the costs incurred for the surgery to reverse surgical sterilization requested in his Petition for Formal Proceedings. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-1452 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were submitted in unnumbered paragraphs but, for clarity, I have numbered them 1 through 18. The first two sentences of paragraph one are rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Although an employee of the Administrator represented to Petitioner that the procedure was covered, there was no approval in that the Administrator did not have that authority. The last two sentences of paragraph one are adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 16, and 17. The first two sentences of paragraph 2 are adopted in Finding of Fact 19 but clarified. The last two sentences in paragraph two are adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified. (4-7) Rejected as immaterial to irrelevant except the last sentence of paragraph 7 which is adopted in Finding of Fact 11 but clarified to show the 800 number being provided under "Claims Inquiries". Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11 but clarified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11 and 14 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as immaterial or irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24 but clarified. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 13 but clarified. The first sentence of paragraph 17 is adopted in Finding of Fact 8 and although there is a difference in the meaning of "limitations" and "exclusions", there was no substantial competent evidence in the record that the Brochure and Document were inconsistent in this regard, therefore the last sentence is rejected. Rejected as a restatement of a witness' testimony and not a finding of fact but additionally, rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent (1-6) Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 through 6, respectively. (7-8) Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. (9-10) Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. (11-14) Adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 12, 11 and 13, respectively. (15-16) Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. (17) Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See Finding of Fact 17. (18-19) Adopted in Findings of Fact 18 and 19, respectively. (20) Rejected as a restatement of a witness' testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also, it would be rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. (21-22) Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. (23) Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. (24-25) Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. (26-28) Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Lester A. Lewis, Esquire P. O. Drawer 9670 Daytona Beach, Florida 32020 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a health insurance agent should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Michael Halloran, was licensed and eligible for licensure as a health insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was licensed to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Life Insurance Company (NSLIC) and Transport Life Insurance Company (TLIC). He was also under contract with Diversified Health Services of St. Petersburg, Florida until that firm terminated his agency appointment on May 5, 1989. This proceeding involves the sale by respondent of various health insurance policies to four customers in January and February 1989. In 1987, Raymond H. Koester, a Largo resident, purchased from respondent a supplemental Medicare policy for both him and his wife. Their first policy was issued by American Integrity. A year later, respondent persuaded the Koesters to replace that policy with one issued by Garden State Insurance Company on the ground the latter policy represented an "improvement" over their existing policy. On January 10, 1989 respondent met with the Koesters for the purpose of selling them new health insurance coverage. During their meeting, respondent advised the Koesters that a new NSLIC policy would provide unlimited custodial and home health care, a type of coverage desired by the Koesters. Relying upon respondent's representation, the Koesters agreed to purchase two new policies. They filled out an application and paid Halloran $2,628 which was the premium for the first year. When the application was completed, respondent answered "no" to the question of whether the new policies were intended to replace existing coverage. This was a false representation. In June 1989 the Koesters learned that they had a problem with their new policies. This advice was conveyed to them by petitioner's investigator who advised them that the policies sold by Halloran loran did not provide any custodial or home health care benefits. Had the Koesters known this, they would not have purchased the insurance. On January 18, 1989 respondent visited Grace Miller, an elderly resident of Venice, Florida, for the purpose of selling her a health insurance policy. At that time Miller had an existing policy in force since 1983 which provided supplemental Medicare coverage. Respondent advised Miller that her existing coverage was inadequate and that more coverage was needed. More specifically, Halloran represented that a new NSLIC policy would supplement her basic Medicare coverage and increase her overall health insurance coverage. Based on that representation, Miller agreed to purchase a replacement policy issued by NSLIC. As it turned out, the policy sold to Miller was of little or no value to a Medicare recipient, such as Miller, and simply filled in the gaps on a major medical policy. Had Miller known this to begin with, she would not have purchased the policy. Respondent also persuaded Miller to purchase a long-term care policy from TLIC. She allowed respondent to fill out the application using information from her old policy. Without telling Miller, respondent misrepresented on the application her date of birth as December 2, 1921 when in fact she was born on December 2, 1911, or ten years earlier. By doing this, Halloran was able to reduce Miller's premium from $1,159.92 to $441.72. Had Miller known that she was responsible for paying a much higher premium, she would not have purchased the policy. On February 25, 1989 respondent accepted another check from Miller in the amount of $773.00 for an unknown reason. At about the same time, respondent submitted to NSLIC an application for a medical-surgical expense policy dated the same date purportedly executed by Miller In fact, Miller had not executed the policy and her signature was forged. NSLIC declined to issue a new policy to Miller since she already had a policy of that type in effect. On January 20, 1989 respondent visited Gertrude Simms, an elderly resident of Fort Myers. Simms desired to purchase a hospital expense insurance policy with a provision for dental insurance coverage. Simms desired such coverage because she had a medical condition that required her to have her teeth cleaned frequently to avoid an infection. Respondent was aware of this condition. Nonetheless, Halloran prepared an application with NSLIC for a limited medical-surgical expense insurance policy which did not provide any dental coverage. Respondent accepted a $1,100 check from Simms which he represented to her was the first year's premium. In fact, the first year's premium was only $506. Although respondent was supposed to return to Simms' home to explain the policy provisions, he never returned. At about this same time, TLIC received an application on behalf of Simms for a long-term care insurance policy bearing the signature of respondent as agent. However, Simms had no knowledge of the application and did not wish to purchase such a policy. The information contained in the TLIC application misrepresented Simms' age so that the premium was lower than it should have been. Although TLIC issued a policy and sent it to respondent, Halloran never delivered it to Simms. On February 1, 1989 respondent visited Velma Sonderman, who resided in Venice, Florida, for the purpose of selling her a health insurance policy. She had become acquainted with respondent through Grace Miller, who is referred to in finding of fact 4. Sonderman was then covered by a supplemental medicare insurance policy issued by United American Medicare. According to Sonderman, respondent gave a "snow job" and represented he could sell her better coverage through NSLIC. Sonderman agreed to purchase a new policy for supplemental medicare coverage to replace her existing policy and signed an application filled in by respondent. However, the application submitted by respondent was for a NSLIC limited benefit health insurance policy rather than the medicare supplement insurance policy Sonderman believed she was purchasing. Respondent also convinced Sonderman to purchase a long-term nursing home care policy issued by TLIC. When filling out the application on her behalf, but without telling Sonderman, respondent misrepresented Sonderman's birth date as July 11, 1915 instead of the correct date of July 11, 1911. By doing this, Sonderman's premium was reduced from $999.36 to $599.04 per year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's license as a health insurance agent be REVOKED. DONE and ENTERED this 4 day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4 day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-3. Substantially used in finding of fact 1. 4-17. Substantially used in findings of fact 4, 5 and 6. 18-29. Substantially used in findings of fact 9 and 10. 30-33. Substantially used in findings of fact 2 and 3. 34-45. Substantially used in findings of fact 7 and 8. 46. Substantially adopted in finding of fact l. Copies furnished to: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James A. Bossart, Jr., Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Mr. Michael Halloran 2519 McMullen Booth Road Clearwater, FL 34621 Donald A. Dowdell, Esquire Department of Insurance Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), in DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL; Subsections 456.072(1)(l), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003), in DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL; and Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), in DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relating to the three Administrative Complaints at issue, Dr. Kachinas was a licensed medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 65595. He is board-certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4678PL In 2002, Dr. Kachinas was working at several clinics that were owned by the same individual. He received payment from Sarasota Women’s Health Center and Tampa Women’s Health Center. His primary office was located in Sarasota, but he rotated through the offices located in Clearwater and Tampa. He was advised that he would be attending a patient in the Tampa office. One of the medications that he used in his method of sedating patients, Propofol, was not available in the Tampa office. He took a vial of the Propofol and took it to the Tampa office, holding the vial in his hand. While at the Tampa office, Dr. Kachinas drew the Propofol into a syringe. He did not have to use the Propofol for the patient. He placed the syringe filled with Propofol inside the sock that he was wearing. Dr. Kachinas transported the syringe back to the Tampa office. He used this method of transport so that the office manager in the Tampa office would not know that he was transporting the drug. When he got back to the Tampa office, he placed the filled syringe in a secure place. Propofol must be used within 24 hours after being drawn into a syringe. The next day it was decided that the drug would not be used on another patient, and Dr. Kachinas wasted the syringe filled with Propofol. At the clinics where Dr. Kachinas worked, there were no logs to keep track of the drugs, except for the drug Fentanyl. Dr. Kachinas acknowledged in a letter dated January 30, 2007, to the Department of Health that his method of transporting Propofol was “unorthodox.” In the same letter, Dr. Kachinas acknowledged that “a reasonable and prudent doctor would not generally transport medication in that manner, but foolishness seemed reasonable in that aberrant environment.” DOAH CASE NO. 09-4679PL On March 26, 2004, B.S. presented to Premier Institute for Women’s Health (Premier) for an elective termination of pregnancy. Dr. Kachinas was the physician who handled the procedure. Dr. Kachinas maintained records relating to B.S. at Premier. In 2004, Petitioner subpoenaed B.S.’s records from Dr. Kachinas’ office. Petitioner received a packet of documents, which purported to be B.S.’s medical records. In July 2006, Lori Jacobs, an employee of Premier, sent Petitioner another copy of the documents sent in 2004. Neither the records provided in 2004 nor the records provided in 2006 contain progress notes for B.S.’s treatment on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. For the first time on November 5, 2009, Dr. Kachinas produced a three-page document, which he claimed was part of B.S.’s medical records that had been misplaced in B.S.’s insurance file. Two of the pages purported to be progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004. The third page, which is also labeled as a progress note, is dated June 29, 2004, and appears to relate to insurance claims. The two pages relating to March 26 and 27 are on paper which is a different color from the progress note relating to insurance claims and the progress notes which were previously furnished in 2004 and 2006.1 Additionally, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, contain a break in each of the ruled lines on the sheets on both the right and left sides of the sheets. The insurance progress note and the progress notes furnished in 2004 and 2006 do not have such breaks in the ruled lines. Dr. Kachinas completed a Laminaria Insertion report documenting procedures done on March 26, 2004, and March 27, 2004. The March 26, 2004, report documents the insertion of Laminaria and administration of medications. The comment section of the report documents the removal of the Laminaria and administration of medications on March 27, 2004. The comment section continues to document the administration of medications and the taking of vital signs after the removal of the Laminaria and also the transfer of the patient to Doctors Hospital. The detail on the comment sections suggests that Dr. Kachinas was making his progress notes in the Laminaria Insertion report. The failure to produce the purported progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, until November 5, 2009; the difference in the color of the paper of the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress notes and the other progress notes in Dr. Kachinas’ records; the presence of breaks in the ruled lines on the March 26 and 27, 2004, purported progress reports, which do not appear on the other progress notes; and the detail of the comments on the Laminaria Insertion report support the conclusion that the progress notes submitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 were not done contemporaneously with the treatment given to B.S. on March 26 and 27, 2004, but were prepared for this proceeding. Thus, the progress notes for March 26 and 27, 2004, are not credited. Dr. Kachinas determined B.S.’s pregnancy to be at approximately 23½-to-24 weeks’ gestation, the last week of the second trimester. He confirmed by sonogram that the gestation period was 24 weeks. On March 26, 2004, Dr. Kachinas began the induction of labor ordering the insertion of ten Laminaria, which are osomotic cervical dilators which cause the cervix to open and allow easier emptying of the uterus. Dr. Kachinas’ records do not show that B.S.’s medical history was taken prior to the insertion of the Laminaria. However, Dr. Kachinas did take a medical history of B.S. at the time of her admission to Doctors Hospital, and the history is recorded in the medical records. Prior to the insertion of the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas’ records do show that a limited physical examination of B.S. was done. The Laminaria Insertion report shows that B.S.’s baseline blood pressure, temperature, and pulse were taken and recorded. There was no expert testimony of what other physical examination should have been done. Dr. Kachinas injected the fetus with Digoxin, which is injected directly into the fetus to stop the fetal heartbeat, causing an Intrauterine Fetal Demise (IUFD). The injection of the Digoxin was not documented in B.S.’s medical records. B.S. was then released from Premier. On March 27, 2004, B.S. returned to Premier. Prior to removing the Laminaria, Dr. Kachinas did an ultrasound and determined that there was still fetal heart activity and fetal movements. Dr. Kachinas continued the labor induction procedure by removing the Laminaria and administering Cytotec and high dosages of Pitocin. When the Laminaria were removed, there was a rupture of membranes with a loss of essentially all the amniotic fluid. Sometime during the afternoon of March 27, 2004, Dr. Kachinas did another ultrasound and determined that there was no fetal heart activity. Based on the length of time from the Digoxin injection to the ultrasound showing no fetal heart activity, the loss of amniotic fluid, and the administering of medication to cause contractions, Dr. Kachinas determined that the Digoxin injection was not the cause of death. On March 27, 2004, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Dr. Kachinas transferred B.S. to Doctors Hospital and had her admitted to the hospital for failure to progress with the induction of labor procedure. While at the hospital, B.S. continued to experience pain. On March 28, 2004, Dr. Kachinas performed the following procedures on B.S.: mini-laparotomy, hysterotomy, removal of products of conception, and a modified Pomeroy bilateral tubal ligation. In his description of the procedures, he stated that the fetal demise was at least of 48 hours duration. However, Dr. Kachinas’ records do not reflect the time of the fetal demise. Jorge Gomez, M.D., Petitioner’s expert witness, credibly testified that a physician is required to document the time of the fetal demise. In the hospital records following B.S.’s surgery, Dr. Kachinas listed the post-operative diagnosis as a failure to induce labor, an intrauterine fetal demise, a thin umbilical cord, and asymmetric intrauterine growth retardation, a condition in which the fetus is smaller than expected for the number of weeks of pregnancy. An autopsy was performed on the fetus. A surgical pathology report was also issued. The pathology report showed mild infarcts on the maternal side. On the fetal death certificate, Dr. Kachinas listed the immediate causes for the IUFD as a possible cord incident and multiple placental infarctions. Dr. Kachinas did not document the elective termination or the Digoxin injection on the fetal death certificate. Dr. Gomez disagrees with the reasons for IUFD given on the death certificate. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that the infarcts were severe enough to have contributed to the fetal demise. His credible reading of the pathology report does not indicate that there was any evidence of a cord incident. Dr. Gomez is of the opinion that the cause of death should have been listed as elective termination. Dr. Gomez’ opinion is credited. However, Dr. Gomez did not give an opinion on whether the fetal demise was caused by the injection of Digoxin. DOAH CASE NO. 09-4680PL On December 13, 2005, K.M. was seen by Walter J. Morales, M.D., at Florida Perinatal Associates, which specializes in internal fetal medicine. Dr. Morales performed an ultrasound on K.M., who was pregnant with twins as a result of in vitro fertilization. The ultrasound revealed that the twins were fraternal, meaning that each twin had a separate placenta and a separate sac. One of the twins, Twin A, had an anomaly called a cystic hygroma, which results from an obstruction, causing the lymphatic fluid, which normally drains into the juglar vein, to accumulate in the neck area. Approximately 50 percent of the fetuses which have this anomaly in the first trimester also have a chromosomal anomaly, such as Down syndrome. The decision was made to have K.M. return to Florida Perinatal Associates in three weeks for further evaluation. On January 3, 2006, Edgard Ramos-Santos, M.D., a partner of Dr. Morales, performed another ultrasound on K.M. Dr. Ramos-Santos found that Twin A, a male, had a cystic hydroma, a thickening of the nuchal fold2, and shortened femur and humerus. These findings are soft markers for abnormal chromosomes. The ultrasound also revealed a possible heart defect. At the time of the ultrasound, Twin A was cephalic bottom, meaning that Twin A was positioned lowest in the uterus. Dr. Ramos-Santos also performed an amniocentesis on Twin A on the same date as the ultrasound. The amniocentesis showed that Twin A had an abnormal chromosome pattern compatible with trisomy 21 or Down syndrome. Both ultrasounds showed that Twin B, a female, appeared to be normal. At the request of K.M., no amniocentesis was performed on Twin B on January 3, 2006. At the time of the ultrasound performed on January 3, 2006, the presentation of Twin B was cephalic right. The findings of the January 3, 2006, ultrasound were discussed with K.M. and her husband. On January 9, 2006, Dr. Ramos-Santos discussed the results of the amniocentesis with K.M.’s husband. It was decided that a selective feticide would be performed on Twin A. Selective feticide is a procedure in which a solution of potassium hydroxide is injected into the fetus’ heart to make the heart stop beating. K.M. was referred to Dr. Kachinas at Premier for the selective feticide. On January 10, 2006, Roberta Bruce, a nurse at Florida Perinatal Associates, sent to Premier by facsimile transmission the January 3, 2006, ultrasound report for K.M. and K.M.’s insurance information. The cover page for the facsimile transmission included a note from Ms. Bruce, which stated: “* FYI Fetus have different gender. The male is the affected one.” The standard of care as specified in Section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2005), requires a physician performing a selective feticide to correctly identify the affected fetus. Dr. Kachinas did not correctly identify Twin A prior to performing the selective feticide and performed the procedure on Twin B, the normal fetus. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound on K.M., but failed to identify the correct position of Twin A in relation to K.M. The ultrasound done on January 3, 2006, by Dr. Ramos-Santos showed that Twin A was located at the bottom and Twin B was located to the right of K.M. In his progress notes, Dr. Kachinas placed Twin A on the right and Twin B on the left. Although it is possible for twins to shift positions, it is not probable that the twins shifted from left to right. Dr. Kachinas performed an ultrasound, but failed to identify that Twin A was the fetus with multiple anomalies. Although the standard of care required Dr. Kachinas to do a Level 2 ultrasound evaluation, a Level 1 ultrasound evaluation would have identified the cystic hygroma, the shortened long bones, and the sex of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas failed to perform an adequate ultrasound evaluation by failing to identify the anomalies and the gender of Twin A. Dr. Kachinas’ notes do not show whether Twin A or Twin B had anomalies. His notes did not identify the sex of each of the twins. His notes did not document the attempts that Dr. Kachinas made to identify the anomalies such as a recording of the length of the long bones or any examination made to identify the sex of each of the twins. On January 24, 2006, K.M. returned to Florida Perinatal Associates for another consultation. Dr. Morales performed another ultrasound, which revealed that Twin A, who had the anomalies, was still viable. The ultrasound revealed the continued presence of a cystic hygroma, the thickening of the nuchal fold, shortened extremities, and a congenital heart defect. The ultrasound also showed that the viable twin was male. The presentation of Twin A was shown by the ultrasound as cephalic bottom.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4678PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2002), by failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances; finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2002); imposing an administrative fine of $2,500; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4679PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas did not violate Subsections 456.072(1)(l) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003); imposing an administrative fine of $1,000; and placing Dr. Kachinas on probation for one year. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as to DOAH Case No. 09-4680PL that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005), by committing gross medical malpractice; finding that Dr. Kachinas violated Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); imposing an administrative fine of $2,000 and placing him on probation for one year for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2005); and revoking his license for the violation of Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2005). DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2010.
The Issue Whether petitioner owes respondent premiums on account of insurance coverage (Family I) under the State Employees Group Health Insurance Program from March 1, 1979, to August 31, 1981? If so, whether petitioner is obligated to pay the underpayment as a condition of continued insurance coverage?
Findings Of Fact Until December 6, 1978, petitioner, who has worked as a forest ranger for Florida's Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services since 1967 or 1968, was married to Betty R. Brogdon, the mother of his two children. Betty Brogdon was employed by Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services at the time of the dissolution of her marriage to petitioner. A provision of the dissolution decree required petitioner to maintain health insurance in effect for the children. During the marriage, in April of 1978, petitioner applied for, and received Family I insurance in the Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan, Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, continuing the coverage under a predecessor policy. Petitioner paid a premium for the Family I coverage reduced by certain employer contributions, after formally bringing to his supervisor's attention the fact that Betty R. Brogdon was also a state employee, and signing forms to that effect. Before August 1, 1979, the employer contributed 75 percent of the amount of the premium for Individual I coverage for each employee. From August 1, 1979, until August 1, 1980, the employer contributed, in addition, 25 percent of the family premium. On and after August 1, 1980, the employer contribution for each employee increased to 75 percent of the amount of the premium for Individual I coverage plus 50 percent of the family premium. Since this amount exceeds the total premium for Family I, families with this coverage in which both spouses work for state government have paid no insurance premium for Family I coverage since April 1, 1980. After the marriage ended, Betty Brogdon applied, on February 6, 1979, for Individual I health insurance, by submitting a form through the personnel office at the Sunland Center in Marianna, where she was employed. Since she had been a beneficiary under the family policy that her husband kept in force while they were married, her application reflected no change in that policy. When it reached the Bureau of Insurance of the Department of Administration, it was indistinguishable from any other new application by an employee who had not signed up when beginning work. After medical approval on May 7, 1979, she received Individual I coverage for herself only. Petitioner works with four other forest rangers and a supervisor at a site seven miles west of Marianna. There is no "personnel technician" stationed there and none visits. He told his supervisor of the divorce and, on March 2, 1979, filled out a "personnel action request" form furnished by a district office of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services in Bonifay, Florida, indicating "[m]arital and dependent change," which reached the Director of the Division of Forestry on March 9, 1979. Like other forms of its kind, this form never reached the Bureau of Insurance of the Department of Administration. The Bureau of Insurance did receive, however, on August 13, 1981, a "change of information" form reporting the Brogdons' dissolution of marriage on December 6, 1978. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Effective the following month, on advice of the Bureau of Insurance, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services subtracted from petitioner's paychecks the same insurance premium other employees not married to state employees paid for Family I coverage. The Bureau of Insurance lacks authority to make such deductions itself. Between March of 1980 and December 31, 1982, the only claims submitted under the policy were for petitioner himself. But for the $100.00 deductible, these claims were paid. The difference between what a state employee married to another state employee paid for Family I insurance coverage between July 1, 1979, and August 31, 1981, and what a state employee not married to another state employee paid for the same coverage amounts to $864.42.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent direct petitioner to pay the sum of eight hundred sixty-four dollars and forty two cents ($864.42) within ninety (90) days of entry of final order. If petitioner fails to make timely payment, that respondent cancel his Family I State Employees Group Health Insurance Program policy. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben R. Patterson, Esquire 1215 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
