Findings Of Fact Petitioner in this proceeding is Lykes Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Lykes) a separate, albeit subsidiary, corporation from its parent, Lykes Health Systems, Inc. Lykes is a 166 bed, not-for-profit general acute care community hospital located in Brooksville, Florida. On or about May 30, 1990, Lykes timely filed CON Application No. 6266 to add 30 hospital-based, extended care beds through renovation of existing space. On or about June 14, 1990, Respondent requested Lykes to provide certain items of information omitted from the original application. One of the items requested in Respondent's written omissions request was an audited financial statement of the applicant for Lykes' most current fiscal years, 1988 and 1989. Lykes responded by providing two audits: an audit of Lykes Memorial Hospital, Inc., for the year ending September 30, 1988, and an audit of Lykes Health Systems, Inc., for the years ending September 30, 1989 and 1988 (the consolidated audit). By letter dated July 25, 1990, Respondent notified Lykes that its CON application was being withdrawn from consideration due to the failure of Lykes to submit audited financial statements of Lykes for the most recent fiscal year of operation which ended September 30, 1989. The submission of an audit containing the most current audited financial information is necessary for Respondent to determine an applicant's current financial condition and assess the proposed project's financial feasibility. Such analysis is crucial to a determination of whether the applicant will continue to be an ongoing corporation providing its best services to patients over a long-term period. Respondent's analysis is limited to the audited financial statement of the applicant. To permit an applicant to meet the requirement for an audited financial statement by providing an audited financial statement from an entity different than the applicant opens the door to submission of varying and discretionary types of financial information. Such a practice could result in unfair comparisons of financial information in the process of comparative review with regard to financial information analysis. There are three essential parts to an audited financial statement. Those parts are an independent auditor's opinion; financial statements; and notes to the financial statements. Although Lykes' submission of an audited financial statement for the year ending September 30, 1988, meets requirements contained in Section 381.707(3), Florida Statutes, mandating submission of such a statement by an applicant, the submitted audit was not for the most current fiscal year of operation. Rather, the audit submitted is for the year before. For existing health care facilities such as Lykes, Section 381.707(3), Florida Statutes, also requires the submission of a balance sheet and a profit- and-loss statement for the previous two fiscal years' operation. Respondent has interpreted Section 381.707(3), Florida Statutes, to require an applicant's submission of the most current year's audit. When the application is submitted by an existing health care facility, Respondent requires submission of an audited financial statement for the two most current fiscal years. This requirement is contained in Chapter 11-3, part 6, of Respondent's Certificate of Need Policy Manual. Personnel involved in the preparation of Lykes' application were aware of this requirement. While the audited financial statement of Lykes for the year ending September 30, 1988, provides an auditor's opinion on the financial condition of Lykes, the applicant, at that time; no such opinion is contained in the audit of Lykes Health Systems, Inc., for the years ending September 30, 1988, and 1989, which is specific to Lykes apart from the parent corporation. Respondent does not have access to an applicant's financial records and is therefore dependent upon disclosures or notes to an audited financial statement to provide fair disclosure of the financial statements and identify specific areas of concern. Without such note disclosures, a proper financial analysis cannot be performed. Notes in the consolidated audit of Lykes Health Systems, Inc., are not complete note disclosures for Lykes, the applicant. Further, notes in the consolidated audit were prepared for the consolidated group of businesses operating under the umbrella of Lykes Health Systems, Inc., and not for any individual entity within the group. It is not possible to isolate information applicable to Lykes from the auditor's notes to the consolidated audit. The consolidated audit included statements of revenues and expenses, fund balances, and a balance sheet for Lykes for the fiscal years ending September 30, 1989, and September 30, 1988. However, no decision should be made with regard to those financial statements in the absence of note disclosures specific to Lykes, assuring that an auditor has specifically analyzed that entity and reached an opinion with regard to it. While a note to the consolidated audit contains a breakdown of capital assets for the consolidated group, this is not a specific breakdown of capital assets for Lykes, the applicant. Hence, Respondent cannot determine the applicant's capital assets breakdown. Further examples of the lack of specificity afflicting the consolidated audit include notes which fail to provide a specific breakdown of bonds payable for Lykes; a specific breakdown of or disclosure of contributions by Lykes to the pension plan; and no specific breakdown for Lykes with regard to patient service revenues. Instead, everything is grouped together. The consolidated audit does not contain all of the notes which would appear in an audit of Lykes, the applicant. Additional financial statements included with the consolidated audit contain no notes. The report must be interpreted in relation to Lykes Health Systems, Inc., taken as a whole. The audit of Lykes Health Systems, Inc., cannot be considered a specific audit of Lykes, the applicant. 1/ Rather, the consolidated audit expresses an opinion with regard to the parent corporation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered withdrawing Petitioner's application for CON No. 6266 from further consideration. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-6. Adopted in substance, though not verbatim. 7-9. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted by reference. Rejected, cumulative. Rejected, argumentative. 1st sentence addressed, remainder rejected as unnecessary. 16-17. Rejected, argument. 18-19. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 20-22. Rejected, argument. 23. Rejected, relevance. 24-25. Rejected, unnecessary and argumentative. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3. Adopted in substance, not verbatim. 4. Adopted by reference. 5-15. Adopted in substance, though not verbatim. 16-17. Adopted by reference. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen A. Ecenia, Esq. Suite 400 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Edward G. Labrador, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Dr., Suite 103 Tallahassee, FL 32308 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Gary Savage committed the statutory violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty is authorized for such violations.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Principle Allegations The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing of insurance agents in Florida, pursuant to authority granted in chapter 626, parts I and IX, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69B-231. Mr. Savage is a 75-year-old registered investment advisor and financial planner who also is licensed to sell life insurance in Florida. The Department’s Complaint seeks to revoke Mr. Savage’s license as an insurance agent. Counts I through III and V through VIII concern eight clients, whereby Mr. Savage earned commissions for selling them annuities and, based on agreements they signed, charged them annual one-percent financial planning service fees tied to the value of their portfolios, including the annuities. Each of these counts alleged the following statutory violations: Engaging in unfair insurance trade practices for knowingly collecting an excessive premium or charge. § 626.9541(1)(o)2., Fla. Stat.; Demonstrating a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to conduct insurance business. § 626.611(1)(g), Fla. Stat.; Demonstrating a lack of reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in insurance transactions. § 626.611(1)(h), Fla. Stat.; Engaging in fraudulent or dishonest insurance practices. § 626.611(1)(i), Fla. Stat.; and Misappropriating, converting, or unlawfully withholding moneys belonging to others in conducting insurance transactions. § 626.611(1)(j), Fla. Stat. Count IX charged Mr. Savage with two violations concerning adverse administrative action taken by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) against his securities license: Failing to timely report final administrative action taken by FINRA against his securities license. § 626.536, Fla. Stat.; and Being suspended and fined for violating FINRA’s rules. § 626.621(12), Fla. Stat. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Savage was not working in the financial services industry because FINRA suspended him for several months. During his suspension, Mr. Savage continued to meet with his insurance clients, though he currently has no appointments with life insurers to sell their products. Wearing Two Hats - An Investment Advisor and Insurance Agent Mr. Savage has worked in the investment industry for over 50 years, initially focusing on securities but evolving into financial advising and estate planning work. He has taken numerous courses and examinations relevant to securities law, financial planning, and tax law. Mr. Savage owns two investment advisor businesses: Wall Street Strategies, Inc. (“Wall Street”), is a stock brokerage firm that handles securities transactions; and Advanced Strategies, Inc. (“Advanced Strategies”), is a registered investment advisor firm, offering clients financial planning, tax management, and estate planning advice. In order to provide a wide variety of products to his financial planning clients, Mr. Savage also is licensed as a nonresident agent in Florida to sell life insurance, including annuities.2/ Annuities provide a guaranteed income stream over a term of years, but also come with substantial penalties if they are surrendered or cancelled before the term expires. Fixed index annuities, like those Mr. Savage sold to the clients at issue here, offer portfolios of funds tracking stock market indexes. Owners choose from around six portfolios and can then reallocate by choosing different portfolios each year. Mr. Savage considers himself an investment advisor who is licensed to sell insurance, which is what he tells new clients. Indeed, his businesses are securities and investment advisor firms, not insurance agencies. Mr. Savage’s client base is diverse. Many have portfolios with annuities and other investment products. Some have portfolios with no annuities. Others have portfolios with only annuities, like most of the clients at issue. In order to procure new clients, Mr. Savage held financial planning seminars where diverse speakers discussed financial and estate planning, and tax management. Mr. Savage discussed the types of insurance products he preferred, including fixed index annuities. Other speakers discussed real estate, oil, and investment trusts, which were beneficial from a tax perspective. Most of the clients at issue attended such a seminar and later met with Mr. Savage to discuss their financial plans. When Mr. Savage first met with the clients at issue, he asked them to bring tax returns, investment statements, wills and/or trusts, and other documents relevant for a financial planning discussion. They completed a new client form with information about their assets, investments, and objectives. He often met several times with new clients to develop a plan for them to reach their financial, estate, and tax management goals. To provide financial planning services, Mr. Savage—— like most investment advisors——charged an annual one-percent fee based on the total value of the portfolio. He has reduced or waived his fee if the clients’ situation warranted it or if they continued to purchase products for which he received commissions to compensate him for providing financial planning services. Before that are charged an annual fee, Mr. Savage’s clients signed a “Service Fee Agreement” (“Fee Agreement”), which was on “Advanced Strategies, Inc., Registered Investment Advisor” letterhead and provided as follows: Advanced Strategies charges a 1% (one percent) financial planning retention fee annually. This fee is based upon the total combined value of accounts including annuities, indexed life, mutual funds, income products and brokerage accounts that we manage or provide service for. This amount is tax deductible as a professional fee. The Fee Agreement offered to provide several financial planning services3/: Address, ownership, and beneficiary changes; Duplicate statements and tax returns; Required minimum distribution and withdrawal requests, and deposits; General account questions; One printed analysis per year; Annual review; Asset rebalancing when applicable; Informing client of new tax laws, changes in estate planning, and new exciting products and concepts. The Fee Agreement noted that the non-refundable fee was due on the service anniversary date and that non-payment would result in discontinuation of the planning services until paid in full. Mr. Savage confirmed that the Fee Agreement was voluntary. If clients wanted to purchase a product, but did not want him to manage their portfolio or provide the outlined services, they did not have to sign the agreement. In that event, Mr. Savage would procure the product and not provide financial planning services. All of the clients at issue here purchased annuities from Mr. Savage. He helped them complete the applications with the insurance companies and, if necessary, assisted them with transferring or closing out other investments used to pay the premiums. He ensured that the insurers received the paperwork and the premiums. Once the annuities were procured, he received commissions from the insurers. The Complaint did not allege that he acted unlawfully in recommending annuities to the clients or receiving commissions from the insurers. All of the clients at issue also signed the Fee Agreement and Mr. Savage provided them with services every year.4/ Some of the services were things an insurance agent technically could handle, such as answering client calls, making address and beneficiary changes, providing duplicate statements, assisting with the paperwork for required minimum distributions, withdrawals, and deposits, and asset reallocation. Other services were things that an agent could not provide, such as tax management/credits, duplicate tax forms, assistance with estates, trusts, and wills, and financial planning advice. But, even as to the services an agent technically could provide, Mr. Savage used his financial planning expertise to advise these clients as to a number of decisions relating to their annuities. For instance, although agents can assist with reallocation, required minimum distributions, and withdrawals, Mr. Savage’s securities and financial planning expertise allowed him to make recommendations that took into account an analysis of the stock market, the economy, and the clients’ financial circumstances and overall goals. An agent is not required to have that expertise, which is one reason he charged the clients an annual service fee. Many of these clients did not recall Mr. Savage providing most of the services listed in the Fee Agreement, but the weight of the credible evidence reflects otherwise. He analyzed asset reallocations for these clients every year and, when he believed reallocation was appropriate, he undisputedly made it happen. He provided annual account analyses consolidating the clients’ investment statements. He met with some of them every year to conduct an annual review and, for those he did not meet, he offered to do so in their annual invoice letter. Whenever the clients asked for assistance with questions, address, beneficiary, or ownership changes, withdrawals or required minimum distributions, or deposits, among others, he performed the task. And, as he confirmed and some of the clients acknowledged, the Fee Agreement made it clear that the services were available, even if they did not need all of them in a particular year or did not think to ask. Although some of the clients testified that Mr. Savage failed to tell them that his fee was optional, all of them had a chance to review the Fee Agreement before voluntarily signing it. The agreement noted that the fee was a “financial planning retention fee” based on the value of the accounts “that we manage or provide service for,” and that non-payment “will result in the discontinuation of my/our planning services.” These clients believed they hired Mr. Savage as an investment advisor and many understood that such advisors do charge fees for providing services. More importantly, no client testified that Mr. Savage said his annual fee was required to procure the annuities or was a charge for insurance. Nothing in the Fee Agreement gave that indication either. Mr. Savage credibly confirmed that he did not charge a fee for insurance; rather, the client paid the fees for financial planning services. And, if they decided they no longer wanted Mr. Savage’s services and stopped paying his fee, they took over management of their annuities without losing access to them or the money in them. The Department concedes that Mr. Savage may wear two hats, as both the agent selling an annuity and the financial advisor managing his client’s portfolio. It contends, however, that Mr. Savage violated the insurance code by selling annuities to these clients and thereafter charging them annual fees——tied to the value of the annuities——to provide services that he should have provided for free after earning commissions on the sale of those annuities. The Department’s investigator, Ms. Midgett, testified about annuities, commissions, and insurance agent services based on her experience in the industry as both a former agent and certified chartered life underwriter.5/ Ms. Midgett confirmed that the Department approves both the premiums and commissions applicable to annuities. Once the premium or deposit is paid, the commission is earned; if an additional deposit is made into the annuity, the agent would earn another commission. Ms. Midgett testified that it is improper for an agent to receive a commission and knowingly charge a client any fees with respect to that annuity under section 626.9541(1)(o). However, she admitted that a financial advisor may charge service fees on annuities if they did not receive a commission on the sale. And, if the annuity is ever rolled into a non- insurance product, that agent could charge service fees on that asset because they are no longer tied to the annuity. Ms. Midgett also testified about the services agents are expected to provide. Once an agent sells a product, he or she becomes the agent of record and does “things such as answer questions, beneficiary changes, address changes, yearly reviews, anything to keep that client and to help them in any way they can.” According to her, “it’s basic 101 insurance that an agent services their clients,” which is “extremely important if you want to build your book of business and to keep a client happy.” Importantly, however, Ms. Midgett conceded that no statute or rule specified what services agents were required to provide once they sold an annuity. “It’s just understood when you’re an insurance agent that you’re going to service your clients. It’s part of the sale of the product.” She believed agents learned this in the course study to obtain a license. Although Ms. Midgett testified that Mr. Savage should have provided most of the services listed in the Fee Agreement for free once he earned commissions on the sale of the annuities, she conceded that at least two of them——duplicate tax forms and informing the client of new tax laws——were not services agents would do. She also agreed that agents could not advise clients as to taking money from an annuity and investing in stocks, mutual funds, real estate trusts, or other investment-related options as “those are all investment advisor functions.” Ms. Midgett initially admitted having no knowledge of whether insurance agents were trained in asset reallocation, though she “would assume so” because “[i]f you have a license to sell the product, then obviously you have to have the knowledge of how to be able to service that product and make the allocations.” When she testified several months later in the Department’s rebuttal case, she stated that the manual used to obtain a license in Florida had a chapter on annuities that “touched on” reallocation. But, she admitted she was not an expert on reallocation or analyzing market conditions, and she had only previously worked with one agent who sold annuities, though he did advise his annuity clients on reallocation. In sum, the Department conceded that no statute or rule articulated the services an agent is required to provide upon receiving a commission. The appointment contracts between the agents and the insurance companies, two of which are in the record, apparently do not specify the services agents are expected to provide. At best, the evidence established what a good agent should do to build a book of business; the evidence did not establish what services an agent, like Mr. Savage, was legally required to provide for receiving a commission. Count I – Kathy Butler Ms. Butler met Mr. Savage while working at a yacht club. In February 2011, they met at his office and she filled out a new client form with financial information. In March 2011, Mr. Savage assisted Ms. Butler with the application for a fixed index annuity for $50,000. On that same day, she signed the Fee Agreement, which she understood to be paying for his services as an investment advisor to manage the annuity and ensure it was being invested correctly; she believed he received income from the insurance company. In January 2012, she purchased another fixed index annuity for $8,000. Mr. Savage procured both annuities. Between 2012 and 2015, Ms. Butler received annual invoices from Mr. Savage and paid about $3,265 in service fees. At this point, Ms. Butler deals directly with the insurance companies, though Mr. Savage is still listed as her agent. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered general account questions, made a beneficiary change, conducted annual reviews when requested, sent annual account statements, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2014 and 2015, he handled the paperwork. Ms. Butler knew she could avail herself of the services in the Fee Agreement, even though she chose not to request many of them. Count II – Beverly Wilcox Ms. Wilcox met Mr. Savage at a seminar in early 2009. In February 2009, they met at his office, she completed a new client form, and she signed the Fee Agreement. She believed he was a financial advisor and that she would owe him money, but she did not read the Fee Agreement before signing it. In March 2009, Mr. Savage assisted Ms. Wilcox with the application to purchase a fixed index annuity for $120,000. He procured the annuity, as requested. Between 2010 and 2016, Ms. Wilcox received yearly invoices from Mr. Savage and paid about $6,500 in fees, after which she decided to deal with the annuity company directly. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered questions when asked, offered to conduct annual reviews each year, sent annual account statements, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2012, he handled the paperwork. Count III – Joseph Cerny Mr. Cerny met Mr. Savage while working at a yacht club and knew he was a financial advisor. Mr. Cerny purchased several fixed index annuities and other investments from Mr. Savage, who helped him complete the paperwork and procured the policies. Between 2003 and 2004, he bought two annuities for $100,000 each and two mutual funds for about $30,000 each. In 2008, he bought an annuity for $10,000. In 2010, he bought another annuity for $119,400. Mr. Savage did not charge fees for the first few years. Mr. Cerny believed he received compensation from the companies. However, in March 2010, Mr. Cerny signed the Fee Agreement. Between 2011 and 2012, he received two invoices, paying the first for $1,266.84 but refusing to pay the second. Mr. Cerny and Mr. Savage ended their relationship at that point. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered questions, provided annual statements, assisted with making withdrawals when requested, met with Mr. Cerny yearly, analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he handled the paperwork. Count V – Marion Albano Ms. Albano met Mr. Savage at a retirement seminar in early 2007. In February 2007, they met at his office to go over her investments, including several annuities. Based on his recommendation, she surrendered her old annuities and purchased a fixed index annuity for about $1.6 million. He assisted her with the application and procured the annuity. In February 2007, Ms. Albano also signed the Fee Agreement. Mr. Savage told her there was a service charge to manage the annuity and she agreed because her brother pays the same rate on his managed brokerage account. She was never worried about losing the annuity if she failed to pay the fee. Ms. Albano received invoices from Mr. Savage every year from 2008 through 2015 and testified that she had paid between $110,000 and $120,000 in fees during that time. She had to pay some of the fees out of her distributions. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage answered account questions, corresponded with her daughter about his recommendations, provided her with an account analysis each year, met with her annually to review her account, and assisted her with required minimum distributions and withdrawals. He analyzed reallocation each year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he handled the paperwork. Count VI – Jane D’Angelo Ms. D’Angelo and her late husband, whose son-in-law was an insurance agent, met Mr. Savage at an estate planning seminar in early 2003; they believed he was an investment advisor. In March 2003, he came to their home and they completed a new client form, indicating they had several types of investments, including annuities. Between 2003 and 2016, the D’Angelos invested with Mr. Savage. In 2003, they purchased a tax credit investment for $10,000. In 2005, they purchased a similar investment for $19,000, which resulted in tax credits totaling $17,174. Between 2005 and 2011, they purchased eight fixed index annuities from Mr. Savage. He assisted them with the applications, informing them that the companies paid him directly. He procured the following annuities, some of which were purchased by transferring money from their existing annuities: In April 2005, they bought an annuity for $250,000; in May 2007, they bought an annuity for $32,789.78; in May 2008, they bought an annuity for $29,510; in March 2009, they bought three annuities for $337,554, $550,000, and $6,000; in May 2011, they bought two annuities, one for $40,715 and another for $150,889; and, in June 2011, they bought an annuity for $24,667. Prior to 2010, they paid no service fees. However, in April 2010, they signed the Fee Agreement. Although they were surprised and felt like they had to sign, Ms. D’Angelo agreed they were not coerced or told the annuities would lapse if they failed to do so. Indeed, she never lost access to the annuities even after she stopped paying Mr. Savage’s fees in 2015. Mr. Savage sent them annual invoices from 2010 through 2015, totaling $54,000 in fees. Mr. Savage agreed to waive the 2010 fee and, ultimately, they only paid about $14,511 total. In 2016, Ms. D’Angelo informed Mr. Savage that she no longer needed his services. She had been dealing directly with the insurance companies herself, though they have provided her with names of individuals if she wanted someone to advise her. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to the D’Angelos on the investments he managed for them.6/ He had discussions with them, sent them annual statements, and assisted them with deposits and transfers between annuities, required minimum distributions and withdrawals, income riders, and beneficiary and ownership changes. He analyzed reallocation every year and handled the paperwork when he felt it was appropriate. He also offered to meet annually and held those meetings in years in which they were requested. Count VII – Ernest Blougouras Rev. Ernest Blougouras, a Greek Orthodox priest, attended several financial planning seminars with Mr. Savage. They met privately in February 2005, at which he completed a new client form listing his investments, which included fixed annuities, CDs, mutual funds, bonds, and stocks. Rev. Blougouras purchased fixed index annuities and other investments from Mr. Savage. He told Rev. Blougouras that he received commissions for selling the annuities. Mr. Savage assisted with the applications and procured the policies. Over the last 14 years, Rev. Blougouras purchased nine fixed index annuities. In March 2005, he bought an annuity for $347,003; in April 2005, he bought an annuity for $229,458; in August 2005, he bought an annuity for $102,227; in June 2006, he bought an annuity for $8,300; in May 2007, he bought an annuity for $41,143; in June 2009, he bought an annuity for $50,000; in July 2009, he bought an annuity for $14,308; and, though the record is unclear as to the date, he bought another annuity that was worth $40,572 in 2010. Since 2011, he bought an additional annuity and several non-insurance investments, such as real estate trusts and energy funds. Prior to 2010, Mr. Savage did not charge Rev. Blougouras service fees because he continued to purchase annuities. However, in 2010, Mr. Savage decided to start charging an annual service fee and sent Rev. Blougouras the Fee Agreement. Rev. Blougouras believed that Mr. Savage’s services would be cancelled if he failed to pay the fee and he would have to hire another advisor. He signed the Fee Agreement and continues to use Mr. Savage’s services. Mr. Savage has sent annual invoices to Rev. Blougouras every year since 2010. The record only contains the 2010 invoice for $9,883 and Rev. Blougouras could not recall how much he paid overall. However, he confirmed that he has paid every invoice he has received either himself or with distribution checks he received from the annuities. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to Rev. Blougouras. He prepared paperwork and documents for required minimum distributions and withdrawals, held meetings to review and organize his tax paperwork, copied documents requested, and made address changes when requested. He analyzed asset reallocation every year and, when he recommended reallocation in 2010 and 2011, he completed the necessary paperwork. Count VIII – George Flate Mr. Flate and his wife met Mr. Savage at a financial planning seminar in 2010. In February 2010, they met Mr. Savage and completed their new client form listing their investments, including fixed annuities, CDs, mutual funds, and stocks. They also signed the Fee Agreement, which Mr. Flate believed was a standard service agreement. They thought they hired Mr. Savage as an investment advisor and never believed they would lose access to the annuities if they stopped paying his fees. Based on Mr. Savage’s recommendation, the Flates purchased two fixed index annuities: one annuity was issued in April 2010 for approximately $22,000, and the other annuity was issued in May 2010 for approximately $22,500. Mr. Savage assisted them with filling out the applications and handled the paperwork to ensure the annuities were issued. Between 2012 and 2015, Mr. Savage sent the Flates invoices for his annual service fees every year. In total, they paid approximately $1,506 in service fees. In 2015, the Flates terminated their relationship with Mr. Savage. They have worked with two financial advisors since then, neither of whom charged them service fees relating to the annuities. The weight of the credible evidence shows that Mr. Savage provided numerous services to the Flates. Each year, he met with them to go over their account, provided them with account analyses, analyzed reallocation and, the two to three times they agreed with his recommendations, he handled the paperwork. He handled withdrawals and address changes for them when requested, and he provided them with information as to changes in tax law and estate planning, though they did not believe that was necessary since they had tax and estate lawyers. The Flates understood that Mr. Savage was available to answer their questions and provide the services if they asked. Count IX – FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding On July 14, 2016, two former clients of Mr. Savage’s filed a Statement of Claim with FINRA alleging that he had recommended investments that were not suitable for them. Over Mr. Savage’s objections to proceeding with the hearing as scheduled, the arbitration panel awarded the clients over $725,000 in damages, fees, and costs. The clients filed a petition in Florida circuit court to approve the arbitration award. Mr. Savage responded in opposition and moved to vacate the arbitration award on grounds that it violated his due process rights. On November 9, 2017, the circuit court issued a final judgment awarding over $769,000. On December 4, 2017, Mr. Savage appealed the circuit court’s order to the Second District Court of Appeal. On June 12, 2018, while the appeal was pending, Mr. Savage signed a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (“AWC”) with FINRA. The AWC stated that Mr. Savage accepted and consented, without admitting or denying, the following findings: Wall Street failed to apply for a material change in its business operations, i.e., to sell oil and gas interests, private placements, and non-traded real estate investment trusts, before engaging in more than 50 such transactions, many of which were consummated by Mr. Savage; Mr. Savage failed to timely update his FINRA Form U4 within 30 days of the Statement of Claim being filed against him in July 2016; Mr. Savage failed to timely respond to FINRA’s requests for information relating to an upcoming examination of Wall Street; and Wall Street failed to maintain the minimum net capital requirements of $5,000 while engaging in securities transactions. Mr. Savage agreed to three sanctions: (1) a five- month suspension from associating with any FINRA registered firm; (2) a three-month suspension from association with any FINRA registered firm in a principal capacity, to be served following the five-month suspension; and (3) a $30,000 fine. The AWC confirmed that Mr. Savage waived his procedural rights relating to these alleged violations and made clear that it would become part of his permanent disciplinary record that could be considered in future actions brought by FINRA or other regulators. He was precluded from taking positions inconsistent with the AWC in proceedings in which FINRA was a party, but was not precluded from taking inconsistent positions in litigation if FINRA was not a party. The five-month suspension began on June 13, 2018, and ended on November 17, 2018. The three-month suspension began on November 18, 2018, and ended on February 17, 2019. In the interim, on August 16, 2018, FINRA notified Mr. Savage by letter that it was suspending his securities license indefinitely for his “failure to comply with an arbitration award or settlement agreement or to satisfactorily respond to a FINRA request to provide information concerning the status of compliance.” This letter is not in the record and, as such, it is unclear whether Mr. Savage had an avenue to challenge that suspension directly. Mr. Savage had challenged the underlying arbitration award, which remained pending on appeal in the Second District Court of Appeal. On November 7, 2018, the Second District affirmed the circuit court’s arbitration order. On November 20, 2018, Mr. Savage put the Department on notice of the FINRA disciplinary actions, including the AWC from June 2018 and the decision of the Second District affirming the arbitration award.
Conclusions For Petitioner: David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Financial Services Room 612, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 For Respondent: Michael Buchholtz, Esquire The Law Office of Michael Buchholtz Post Office Box 13015 St. Petersburg, Florida 33777
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order suspending Mr. Savage’s license as an insurance agent for twelve months. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2019.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is the fair market value as of October 15, 1998, of common stock of Citizens Bank of Wakulla held by Petitioners, dissenting minority shareholders.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are stockholders of approximately 36% of the outstanding 150,000 shares of stock of Citizens Bank of Wakulla (CBW). Danny Ray Metcalf, Sr. is president of Metcalf Crab Company, Inc., a seafood processing plant in Wakulla County. Marshall Spears is owner and president of RMS Marine Supply in Wakulla County. Donald L. Tucker is a practicing attorney and former legislator in Tallahassee, Florida. CBW was chartered in 1987 largely through the efforts of Tommy Rowell, prior chairman of the board of the only other bank in the county, Wakulla Bank. With the exception of Mr. Rowell and another banker, CBW's first board was "very green," comprised primarily of businessmen in the community, including Mr. Metcalf. The bank lost money for the first few years. By 1991 when Mr. Rowell resigned as president, the bank's book value had decreased from its initial price of $10 a share to $8 a share. After CBW hired another president it prospered and grew to approximately $18 million. In spite of some financial success the bank's board felt its president's involvement in the community did not adequately enhance the bank's image so that individual left. Skip Young, owner and operator of Harvey Young Funeral Home in Crawfordville, Wakulla County, Florida, became president and chief executive officer of CBW in mid-1994. Mr. Young had been an active director of the bank since its inception. At Mr. Young's insistence the bank hired an experienced financial person, Jack Davis, as executive vice-president and chief financial officer. Both Mr. Young and Mr. Davis remain in their positions. The bank's assets have grown to approximately $35 million and the bank has been profitable since 1993 or 1994. CBW has only paid a single $.15 dividend to its shareholders. In 1997, CBW's board voted in favor of forming a holding company and the bank retained a law firm to set up the company. After the necessary documents were prepared and the issue was presented to the stockholders, Petitioners were concerned that the increased number of authorized shares and broad grant of authority to the board of directors would dilute the stockholders' control. Petitioners therefore dissented from the majority decision to form the holding company. After necessary regulatory approval Citizens Bankshares, Inc., became the holding company of CBW by trading one share of holding company stock for one share of bank stock. Because they did not want shares in the holding company the dissenting shareholders were offered $18 a share, slightly over the October 15, 1998, book value of $17.54, and an amount the board anticipated the stock could bring in the local market. The dissenters declined, and when the parties were unable to agree on a value, it became necessary to select individual appraisers pursuant to Section 658.44, Florida Statutes. CBW's appraiser, Dr. Douglas Austin, issued a report appraising the stock for $19.78; the dissenting shareholders' appraiser, Richard Knight, established the value at $39.60 a share. When the two appraisers could not agree on a third to resolve the disparity, the Florida Department of Banking and Finance (DBF) as required, selected the third independent appraiser, the firm of Sheldrick, McGehee, and Kohler, Inc. (SMK). On June 23, 1999, SMK issued its appraisal establishing a value of $18.55 per share for CBW common stock, effective the date of the merger: October 15, 1998. CBW's offer of that price was rejected by the dissenters and the Petitioners filed a timely request for a formal evidentiary hearing. Their petition resulted in this proceeding. As distilled from the testimony of the several experts in this proceeding and from scant available case law, the valuation or appraisal process requires the a combination of standard formulaic procedures and the appraisers' professional judgement. It is not an entirely mechanical process, and to assess the validity of the process requires scrutiny of the individual experts' background and experience. The individual appraisers who testified were candid and credible professionals. In no instance did it appear that any one appraiser was bent on deriving a pre-determined value. Nonetheless, the values were widely disparate. The task therefore is to probe the methodologies utilized, weigh the experts' evidence, and determine the appropriate value. Richard A. Knight's Opinion Richard Knight was qualified as an expert in the valuation of stock in this case over the objection of CBW. Mr. Knight has extensive background and experience in banking and finance and little experience in actual appraisals. Mr. Knight considered population growth of Wakulla County of 66.58% from 1990 (11,202) to 1997 (18,660). He also considered the growth rate of the bank which was substantially higher than the state average (275.48% compared to 171.3% from 1989-1996; and 16% versus 5% for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1998). Mr. Knight considered recent stock transfers of $18 per share to be unreliable as a measure of value since the bank is a non-publicly traded, stockholder-owned community bank. Mr. Knight looked at reported return on asset and net operating income per share. Mr. Knight selected a multiple of 18 times net operating income per share applied for the year ending 1997, ($2.20) for a value per share of $39.60. Mr. Knight also opined that a fair value of the bank's shares would be 2.25 times book value, translated to $39.04 at the end of August 1998. Although the two methods yielded similar results, Mr. Knight felt the multiple of book method was preferable as with a bank the size of CBW earnings are "somewhat variable." The valuation figures proposed by Mr. Knight did not include marketability or minority shareholders discounts. In cross-examination Mr. Knight agreed that 8-10% would be a fairly reasonable range for CBW's capitalization rate. Capitalization rate is the inverse of the price to earnings (P/E) ratio. A capitalization rate of 10 results in a P/E ratio of 10 times earnings; a capitalization rate of 8 $ results in a P/E ratio of 12.5 times earnings. In either case the multiple of 18 times earnings used by Mr. Knight is inconsistent. The rate of 10 or 12.5 times earnings would yield a lower value than the $39.60 suggested by Mr. Knight. Mr. Knight's opinion that 2.25 was a reasonable multiple of book value was basically an educated guess based partially on his experience that no healthy bank in Florida has sold for under two times book. This opinion did not determine the likelihood of a sale of CBW nor was Mr. Knight able to compile a peer group list of banks sold with which he could compare CBW. Dr. Charles Donald Wiggins' Opinion Dr. Wiggins was retained by Petitioners and produced a thorough detailed report dated March 16, 2000. Dr. Wiggins has a doctorate in business administration and is a licensed CPA in the State of Florida, although he is not practicing as a CPA. He is employed by the firm, Business Valuation, Inc., in Jacksonville, Florida. Dr. Wiggins has extensive experience conducting business appraisals, including dissenters' rights appraisals in other types of businesses and in two bank cases, including the present case. Dr. Wiggins described three primary stock appraisal methods: the income or going concern appraisal based on earnings, cash flow, or some other economic measure of return; a market comparable method based on examination of similar businesses sold; and a liquidation method, in the case of a bank, an adjusted book value approach where the appraiser looks at underlying assets and liabilities and adjusts those from book value to market value. Dr. Wiggins considered the various methods and selected the market comparable method, primarily because he had information on comparable sales from S and L Securities, a well- known organization that provides data on bank sales, by region, asset size, and other specific information on the value multiples (such as P/E), the buyer and the seller. The result of Dr. Wiggins' appraisal was a fair market value of 100 $ equity interest in CBW of $38.13 per share, or a minority equity interest of $28.61 per share. Dr. Wiggins obtained information from appraisal reports prepared for CBW by its experts; he also obtained historical financial and economic information from various banking publications and economic reports; he looked up CBW and similar banks on the FDIC web site and used information already in his office on comparable bank sales. He did not use comparable sales of Florida banks because there was only one reported in the relevant asset range for the prior two years. Instead Dr. Wiggins established a criteria of banks in the $30 to $50 million range in the Southeast that sold in the prior two years. This yielded a sample of 9 banks from West Virginia to Mississippi. In his sample he looked at the average and median market-to-book ratio and found them very close: 2.17, and 2.03, or 2.07. This comparison is based on the reported value the bank sold for versus the reported book value. 2.17 means the bank sold for 2.17 times book value. Although he has published numerous articles on discounted cash flow analysis in appraisals and likes that type of appraisal, Dr. Wiggins did not do that analysis in this case as he did not have the necessary information or time. Nor did Dr. Wiggins examine information with respect to his comparables' net income, equity, market size, market share, and competition. He did not talk with management, and for that and other reasons he designated his appraisal as a "limited scope appraisal." Dr. Wiggins' report discusses the factors listed in U.S. Internal Revenue Services' Rule 59-60 provided by the IRS for guidance to appraisers of closely held businesses. Dr. Wiggins' approach favored a larger over a smaller sample of "comparable" banks but the basic problem of his approach is that it is not possible to determine how valid it is to compare his bank sample to CBW without considering the other factors he felt would limit the sample size. In other words, a single close comparable would have been more valid than the disparate multiple comparables utilized by Dr. Wiggins. The two of the banks in Dr. Wiggins' sample that were closest to CBW in value of deposits, rural market location, and market competition, sold in their entirety for an average of P/B of 1.6 and P/E of 14.43. Those two banks also had substantially better earnings than CBW for the first 3 quarters of 1998. Richard Kohler's Opinion Richard Kohler is principal in the firm, Sheldrick, McGhee, and Kohler (SMK) in Jacksonville, Florida. The firm conducts business appraisals primarily throughout the southeast and has been in operation since 1946. Mr. Kohler's training and experience amply justified his qualification without objection as an expert in valuation of bank stock. In performing his appraisal at the request of the DBF Mr. Kohler and SMK's senior appraiser, Jess Wright, gathered information from CBW and other relevant sources, including a letter from counsel for the dissenter shareholders. Of the three basic methodologies (income, market, and cost or asset approach) they determined the best methodology would be the income or earnings approach, which is most appropriate in any appraisal where the company is making money. Mr. Kohler built a model based on return expectations at different levels of risk in the markets and derived a P/E multiple of 10.7; to that he applied the average of CBW's prior five years earnings, which with ups and downs came close to the anticipated earnings in 1998. The average was $260,000. Multiplying the average earnings times the P/E multiple of 10.7 resulted in a finding of $2,782,000, or $18.55 per share as of October 15, 1998. After that exercise, Mr. Kohler and his colleague applied various reasonableness tests to determine whether their core finding was appropriate. They looked at public companies and using guideline models discounted from their values. They also looked at actual stock transfers at each bank and found they had all been at basically book value. In developing his P/E multiple and capitalization rate the 10% growth selected by Mr. Kohler was very conservative. That is, he erred, if at all, to the benefit of the Petitioners. When he conducted his reasonableness test Mr. Kohler took a 50 $ discount from the value of public companies. Companies that were publicly traded were at approximately 19 or 20 times earnings and about 2 to 2.3 times book value. These companies were much larger than CBW and further, CBW had only paid a one-time token dividend. Mr. Kohler did not apply a minority discount to his valuation. The value he derived from his methodology is a per share value of the entire bank; it is neither a majority nor minority value. If a 51$ interest or other controlling block were to be valued it might have a slight premium. Dr. Douglas V. Austin's Opinion Dr. Douglas V. Austin is a professor Emeritus Finance, at the University of Toledo, Ohio. Prior experience after graduate school included teaching at the College of Business at the University of Michigan and working on mergers and acquisitions for the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. When he began to lose his eyesight in 1967, Dr. Austin returned to academia and at the time of his retirement in 1989 had been a full professor and department chairman for approximately 20 years. Since 1989 Dr. Austin teaches one semester a year and runs his own consulting firm full-time. He is also an attorney licensed to practice in Michigan and Ohio. Dr. Austin has written numerous books and articles on banking-related topics, including bank stock valuation and dissenters' stock appraisals. Without objection Dr. Austin was qualified as an expert in bank stock valuation. In the words of another witness, if bank valuations were rock and roll, Dr. Austin would be Elvis Presley. Dr. Austin is now fully blind and the work done by his firm is under his supervision. Steve Byers, the firm's vice- president, physically prepared the appraisal report in this case. Dr. Austin is fully familiar with the report and directed and reviewed the work. Assured that it was his work product, Dr. Austin signed the report. Dr. Austin's report was by far the most in-depth analysis that was conducted of the bank. He attempted all three methods of business valuation. Dr. Austin appraised the value of 100% of CBW at $23.76 per share and the minority interest held by the dissenters at $19.78 per share. As a result of a computer data entry error, these values were overstated by about $.50, but this is not material. The first action Dr. Austin took in preparing his valuation was to send CBW a 17-page information request for financial statements and information like non-accrual and substandard and doubtful loans, yields on loans, yields on deposits, quality of the loans, and securities. He always looks at the bank. In valuing small financial institutions which are not publicly traded and which have a small number of shareholders, there are no public data to compare it with so you must look at the financial institution itself. Dr. Austin familiarized himself with the balance sheet, the income statement, all the historic bank ratios of this particular bank for five years; he did a peer group analysis, and compared this bank to other banks in the industry. He also gathered data concerning the economy, national, state and local, because growth in deposits and growth in population are figured into economic projections. CBW underperformed in terms of a rate of return on assets. Four out of the previous five years, it was below the 1% rate of return on assets which was standard for the industry. Only in 1997 was the rate above 1%. From a peer group standpoint, CBW had not performed equal to the average of the previous five years of banking history of banks of its size. The bank had a lower return on equity than did other banks. It had a lower capital to asset ratio than did other banks of the same size. It was marginally capitalized in that it had less than 8% capital. Its loan-to-deposit and loan-to-asset ratios were higher than other banks that were competing in the county and other peer group banks in Florida. CBW was suffering some losses which were higher than peer group banks. A discount rate was applied by Dr. Austin from the capital asset pricing model. This is an accepted financial model for determining discount rates and capitalization rates indirectly. Cash flows are a combination of earnings plus available capital minus capital expenditures plus depreciation for each year. Dr. Austin utilized different growth rates in different stages of his valuation. For the first five years, he utilized the growth rate of 8.25%. This was slightly lower than the 9% growth rate of the bank for the past three years. The growth of earnings was predicted to be 2% after the fifth year into the future. In the previous five years, the bank's earnings had fluctuated wildly and it had only one good year of earnings -- 1997. The earnings for 1998 were going to be less than 1997. Looking five years into the future, Wakulla County was going to mature and so was the bank. Therefore, Dr. Austin thought five years into the future the earnings growth of 2% was a logical growth. In the long term, economic growth will remain at approximately 2.0% to 2.4%, barring any exogenous shocks to the economy such as oil embargoes, military conflicts, or political upheavals. Analysts expect annual compound population growth rates of approximately 5.9% for 1997-2000, and approximately 2.0% to 2.5% thereafter. The second valuation method that was used by Dr. Austin was adjusted book value. It was used as a confirmation and as an alternative technique. This technique marks all of the assets and liabilities of the bank's institution from cost to market for a picture of what the bank is worth in terms of market at a point in time. Dr. Austin did not use market comparables because he could not come up with a database which allowed him to identify comparables that traded in the same size level as Citizens Bank. Nor did he do bank sales comparables. It is only appropriate to use bank sales comparables if the dissenters were dissenting from a merger or a holding company acquisition and did not like the price that the acquirers were giving to the sellers and the whole bank was going to disappear. Dr. Austin has done that kind of dissenters' appraisal and used bank sales comparables. In determining the adjusted book value, the first thing that Dr. Austin did was to determine the market value of the CBW's securities portfolio. He then took the yields on various loans and compared them to the Uniform Bank Performance Report for September 30, 1998. He next modified the value of the loans up or down, based on the yield differentials. The loan portfolio was then further adjusted based upon an analysis of the quality of the portfolio. The next thing Dr. Austin did was determine a core deposit value. Because they are perceived as "hot money" (moved from bank to bank based on small changes in interest rates) Dr. Austin disregarded all certificates of deposit (CDs), both above and below $100,000, from core deposits. Dr. Austin's discounted cash flow analysis produced a value of $22.76. The net adjusted asset value came to $23.45. Dr. Austin averaged those two numbers and adjusted the average by adding 11% for control premiums (enterprise value or value ascribed to control of the enterprise) and reduced that number by 25% for a minority discount (considering the dissenters' minority share of the total holdings). Dr. Austin's formula resulted in a value of $19.78 per share. Establishing the Fair Value Certain issues emerged in this proceeding as central to analysis and application of the experts' methodologies. These issues include how to characterize and whether to consider discussions and correspondence with FirsTrust regarding purchase of CBW. The issues also include whether to consider CDs among core assets and whether marketability or minority discounts are appropriate. FirsTrust FirsTrust is a banking business; it owns controlling interest in two banks in Louisiana, has a company that provides automated technology machines (ATMs) all over the country, and owns an insurance company and real estate development business. FirsTrust's assets range between $300 and $600 million. Joseph Canizaro is chairman of the board. From 1996 through mid-1998, Randy Lovitt was employed by FirsTrust as executive vice-president and chief operating officer. He was Mr. Canzaro's right-hand person, managing the banks and operations of all the companies. Sometime around early 1997, FirsTrust was looking to expand into several states in the Southeast. It was looking for potential candidates for merger or purchase rather than starting new banks. Someone told Mr. Lovitt about CBW. Throughout 1997, Mr. Lovitt corresponded with and, on two occasions, visited with Skip Young, Mr. Metcalf, and other CBW board members. The parties executed an exclusivity and confidentiality agreement. On July 23, 1997, Joseph Canizaro sent a non-binding letter of intent to Danny Metcalf as chairman of the board of CBW. The letter included the proposal that FirsTrust would infuse extra capital into CBW in an amount of 50% of its approximate $2,260,000. Then FirsTrust would acquire enough additional stock to give it 80% ownership, paying 2.25 times the adjusted book value. The infusion of capital would have required authorization of additional stock (75,000 shares -- 50% more than the already authorized and issued 150,000 shares) which FirsTrust would purchase at book value. As explained in Randy Lovitt's clarification letter of August 6, 1997, to Danny Metcalf, the intent of the proposal was to reduce FirsTrust's overall costs and provide needed capital for future growth. The letter of intent stated on its face that it was non-binding and was further subject to a satisfactory due diligence analysis being conducted by the purchaser. The letter of intent was never executed as acceptable to CBW. There is some evidence that there were discussions that CBW's board wanted 3 times, rather than 2.25 times adjusted book value. On September 2, 1997, Randy Lovitt sent a letter to "Mr. Metcalf and Board Members" confirming the understanding that the proposal to purchase 70% of outstanding shares at 2.25 times book and plan for additional capital did not meet the CBW's approval and any higher price would make the transaction too expensive for FirsTrust. By May 1998, Danny Metcalf was no longer on the board but continued to pursue a sale of his and other CBW stockholders' shares to FirsTrust for 51% control. Viewing this as a hostile effort, Mr. Young told him to stop. Mr. Young also wrote to FirsTrust's Randy Lovitt on May 5, 1998, explaining that CBW wished to remain independent and . . . to be the best little bank in town, which provides outstanding service and products to small and medium-size business within our community. (Petitioner's Exhibit 47) From the evidence it is apparent that FirsTrust's communications were serious "feelers," rather more significant than earlier casual buy/sell conversations between various Tallahassee bankers and CBW board members over a mullet lunch in Wakulla County. Still, the exercise never reached fruition and if the FirsTrust correspondence could be considered a firm "offer," the proposal remained speculative. The negotiations are worthy of some consideration, but little weight in fixing the value of Petitioners' stock on October 15, 1998, more than a year after the written proposal by FirsTrust, and a substantially smaller percentage of the stock. Discounts Petitioners argue that a minority discount is inappropriate because it would result in a "windfall" to the purchasers, either a majority shareholder or the corporation itself. There is evidence and argument on both sides of this issue, but the most reasonable approach is that of Dr. Austin who applied both a premium and a discount in his valuation process in order to convert the mere numerical calculations into a comparable market price for thinly traded shares. The studies cited in his valuation report suggest that Dr. Austin's methodology was conservative and fair. Certificates of Deposit The third significant issue is whether CD's should be considered among the core deposits of the bank. The current trend among valuation experts is to exclude those CD's as "hot money." Because people are less willing to tie up their assets in a longer term deposit, the period of CD's has decreased in recent years. Those CD's are moved from bank-to-bank as competitive interest rates change from bank-to-bank. While Petitioners suggest that CD depositors in small community banks such as CBW tend to leave their money in their community bank, they presented no evidence of that practice at CBW. Intuitively as valid as Petitioners' argument is the notion that such depositors could be quickly seduced by more advantageous rates offered in the competitive banking environment in Tallahassee, where numerous and larger banks are found. No single shareholder of CBW is a majority shareholder. In order to purchase the dissenting shareholders' stock the holding company has to borrow to replenish its capital. It intends to pay off the loan by offering the stock on a pro rata basis to existing shareholders before offering it in the community. Current book value of CBW stock is between $20 and $21. The limited number of stock sales since CBW's inception have been around book value and Skip Young does not anticipate being able to sell the dissenters' stock for more than book value. Dr. Austin's approach yielded a fair value per share at 112.8% of CBW's book value as of October 15, 1998. Dr. Austin's approach was most thorough, reasonable and consistent with prevailing valuation practices, including Revenue Ruling 59-60 and the guidance of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. In summary, it is found that $19.78 is the fair value per share of the dissenters' shares of CBW.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Office of the Florida Comptroller enter its final order setting the October 15, 1998, fair market value of Petitioners' stock at $19.78 per share. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1993).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1993). Respondent employed Petitioner, a black female, in March of 1980 as a Clerk-Typist II. Over the years, Petitioner worked in the position of Secretary II, Clerk-Typist Specialist, and Secretary Specialist. Petitioner held the position of Administrative Secretary when she filed her Petition for Relief in September of 1996. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was working as a Staff Assistant. In September of 1992, Otto Hough became the Accounting Services Director in Respondent’s Office of Financial Management. He was responsible for several sections including General Accounting, Accounts Receivable, Accounting Systems and Procedures, and Contract Administration. The Office of Financial Management lost eleven (11) of eighty-eight (88) employees due to reorganization of the agency in the early months of 1993. One of the positions that Respondent eliminated was the Staff Assistant position assigned directly to Mr. Hough’s office. As Accounting Services Director, Mr. Hough had the authority to recommend position reclassifications and pay additives for employees in the Office of Financial Management. One of his initial objectives was seek higher pay classifications for as many positions as possible. In 1993, Petitioner worked as an Administrative Secretary in the General Accounting section of Respondent’s Office of Financial Management. Her direct supervisor was the Finance and Accounting Director, a position held by a career service employee. Mr. Hough developed a job reclassification package that impacted about sixty (60) full time positions in the spring of 1993. As a part of that package, Mr. Hough recommended an upgrade of Petitioner’s position from Administrative Secretary to Staff Assistant. He made similar requests for two other Administrative Secretaries. Linda Ball, a black female, worked as an Administrative Secretary in the Accounts Receivable section. Rita Cook, a white female, worked as an Administrative Secretary in the Accounting Systems and Procedure section. The agency’s Comptroller, Personnel Office, and Program Advisory Council approved Mr. Hough’s recommendations to reclassify most of the positions. However, they declined to upgrade the Administrative Secretary positions because the agency’s rules required a select exempt employee to supervise Staff Assistants. In this case, a career service employee supervised all three Administrative Secretaries. Mr. Hough advised the Administrative Secretaries that he would seek a special pay increase for them. Linda Ball subsequently vacated her position as an Administrative Secretary when she transferred to Respondent’s office in Tampa. Her transfer left only Petitioner and Rita Cook occupying the positions of Administrative Secretary. In late 1993 or early 1994, Mr. Hough physically relocated Ms. Cook to his work area. He moved her work station into his office because he lacked secretarial support. At the time, he was officially serving as Accounting Services Director. However, he also acted as Accounting Staff Director for Revenue Management, Financial Support Director, and Comptroller. Except for the position of Accounting Services Director, all of these positions were vacant from March through June of 1994. After her relocation, Ms. Cook continued to occupy the position of Administrative Secretary in the Accounting Systems and Procedure section. She performed eighty (80) percent of her work for that section. The rest of her time was spent providing secretarial support to Mr. Hough. Ms. Cook’s relocation made her position eligible for reclassification from Administrative Secretary to Staff Assistant because Mr. Hough was a select exempt employee. Petitioner had more seniority in time than Ms. Cook. Nevertheless, Ms. Cook was more qualified than Petitioner to work in the office of the Accounting Services Director because of her prior experience in the Accounting Systems and Procedure section. Ms. Cook possessed more expertise and knowledge about Respondent’s district offices. She was familiar with the interaction between the district fiscal offices and the central office in Tallahassee. Mr. Hough was aware that Petitioner did not want to relocate from General Accounting to Accounting Systems and Procedure before he relocated Ms. Cook to his office. In February and May of 1994, Mr. Hough gave Petitioner the opportunity to move upstairs to work in the Accounting Systems and Procedures section. A lateral transfer to a position in that office would have allowed Petitioner to gain knowledge and experience similar to Ms. Cook’s. However, Petitioner declined the offer. She decided to stay downstairs in General Accounting and wait for a position reclassification or a special pay increase. The work environment in the General Accounting section was less stressful than the Accounting Systems and Procedures section. The latter had the additional pressure of interacting with the Deputy Secretary of Administration and Budget. It also was involved with the flow of information to the Legislature. Toward the end of the 1993-1994 fiscal year, Respondent’s Deputy Secretary of Administration selected Glenda Guess as the new Comptroller. The Deputy Secretary directed Mr. Hough to arrange for Ms. Guess to have the level of staff that she was expecting when she came "on board." Pursuant to this directive, Mr. Hough realigned the duties of staff in the offices of the Comptroller and the Accounting Services Director. On June 8, 1994, Mr. Hough approved a reclassification of Ms. Cook’s position from Administrative Secretary to Staff Assistant. Mr. Hough signed the Request for Payroll Action form as the Respondent’s Acting Comptroller. On June 10, 1994, Glenda Guess became Respondent’s Director of Financial Management/Comptroller. The "promotion due to reclassification" resulted in a five (5) percent pay raise for Ms. Cook. She began to devote one hundred (100) percent of her time to duties within the office of the Accounting Services Director. In 1994 and 1995, the agency was in the process of decentralizing its functions. In the short run, this process required the central office to perform additional functions until the district offices could assume those responsibilities. In 1995, Respondent closed the Jacksonville office, phased out twenty-nine (29) positions, and brought the child welfare voucher system into General Accounting at the Tallahassee office. When this change occurred, Petitioner assumed the additional duty of controlling the inflow of documents for the child welfare vouchering system from all the districts. As Petitioner’s responsibilities increased, she and Mr. Hough discussed the possibility of changing her classification from Administrative Secretary to some type of accounting position. However, Petitioner preferred to remain in the secretarial/clerical niche and not seek a position with an accounting orientation. In April of 1995, Mr. Hough sent Ms. Guess a memorandum requesting a ten (10) percent "pay additive for additional duties" for Petitioner. Ms. Guess denied the request because it was not in the correct format. Additionally, she thought a three-to-five percent increase was a more appropriate raise for employees assuming additional duties. At that time, Respondent’s ability to provide pay increases for additional duties was a new concept. Ms. Guess was not aware of a precedent for a ten (10) percent pay increase for additional duties. In May of 1995, Mr. Hough revised Petitioner’s position description to reflect Petitioner’s additional duties. On May 16, 1995, Mr. Hough again requested a ten (10) percent pay additive for Petitioner. He felt the salary increase was justified because Petitioner handled the Child Welfare Vouchering System input documents, as well as the reconciliation documentation from the districts each month. According to Mr. Hough, these additional duties were beyond the scope of Petitioner’s normal tasks as an Administrative Secretary. On May 25, 1995, Petitioner wrote Mr. Hough a memorandum to advise that she would not be satisfied with a three-to-five percent raise. She demanded a ten (10) percent salary increase. Petitioner sent Ms. Guess a copy of the memorandum. On May 31, 1995, Ms. Guess properly denied the second request for Petitioner’s salary additive for the following reasons: (a) the additional duties were of a clerical nature; (b) the additional duties did not require Petitioner to work overtime except for her involvement in year-end closing; (c) Petitioner’s salary was in line with other clerical positions in the Office of Financial Management; (d) funds for pay increases were insufficient to raise the salary of every employee in the Office of Financial Management who were performing additional duties; and (e) a raise of three-to-four percent was more in line with raises given to employees in Respondent’s Office of General Services for assuming additional duties. On or about June 25, 1995, Ms. Guess learned that funds were available for pay increases based on added duties and/or sustained superior achievement. The next day, Ms. Guess sent the Deputy Secretary for Administration a request for pay increases for the following: (a) Melissa Pugh, white female, 7.5 percent for sustained superior achievement and added duties; Beverly Smith, white female, 5 percent for added duties; Kimmie Canfield, white female, 10 percent for added duties and superior performance; (d) Gail Kruger, white female, 5 percent for superior performance; (e) Cindy Philips, white female, 5 percent for superior performance; (f) Barbara Huskey, white female, 5 percent for superior performance; (g) Sonja Bradwell, black female, 5 percent for superior performance; and (h) Petitioner, 5 percent for additional duties. Ms. Canfield worked for Respondent as Staff Assistant to the Financial Support Director for approximately seven months as of June 26, 1995. Her 10 percent raise was due in part to her salary being substantially below the salary of other support staff. Petitioner’s salary remained higher than Ms. Canfield’s even though she was in a more responsible position. Petitioner’s performance evaluations for 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 indicate that she was an above-average employee. She performed her duties in a timely manner with little or no supervision. She willingly assisted her co-workers when they needed help. However, Petitioner’s performance was not superior. Therefore, Ms. Guess properly did not consider awarding Petitioner more than a five (5) percent pay increase for sustained superior performance in June of 1995.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Curley R. Doltie, Esquire Post Office Box 1325 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sandra R. Coulter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 1 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dana Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc. is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Florida. KE Realty Services, Inc. is a Florida corporation which has its principal place of business in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On February 26, 1993, the Department issued a RFP to solicit offers on the SR 7 contract. This RFP was identified as RFP-DOT-92-93-4008. Proposals submitted in response to the request were to be opened March 26, 1993, and the bid tabulations were to be posted on April 29, 1993. Four vendors submitted proposals in connection with the subject RFP: the Petitioners; Gulf Coast Property Acquisition, Inc. (Gulf Coast); The Urban Group; and Keith and Schnars, P.A. Each proposal was scored based upon four criteria: technical plan; price; certified DBE; and executive judgment. The points available for each were preset and known to all vendors. The technical plan could receive a maximum of 75 points, price could receive 20 points, and each of the other criteria could receive 5 points. Obviously, the technical plan portion was the more weighted criterion. The technical plan portion of each vendor's proposal was evaluated by a Technical Review Committee (TRC). This committee consisted of Claire Tronel, Kevin Szatmary, Steve Gonot, Lynda Parsons, Van Neilly, and Cheryl Balogh. The membership of the TRC was not kept secret and Petitioners knew, and perhaps other vendors as well, who would be evaluating the proposals. Each member of the TRC scored the proposals independently. The average of all of the independent scores for each proposal was then computed as the technical plan score. The vendors received the following technical plan scores: Petitioners a 67.42; Gulf Coast a 56.79; The Urban Group a 36.42; and Keith & Schnars a 29.71. To determine the price score, the lowest priced proposal received the maximum number of points (20). The other proposals received a fraction of the twenty points available based upon the relation of their price to the lowest price. According to the formula, Keith & Schnars received the highest price score (20), then The Urban Group (17.20), Gulf Coast (15.60), and finally, Petitioners (10.60). Petitioners received the lowest price score because it submitted the highest priced proposal. The ratio of its price with the lowest priced proposal multiplied by 20 resulted in the 10.60 score. The scores for the DBE criterion are not in dispute but were assigned as follows: Petitioners, 5.0; Gulf Coast, 5.0; The Urban Group, 0.0; and Keith & Schnars, 2.0. The TRC did not know the prices submitted with the proposals until it had completed the technical scores for each vendor. The final criterion, executive judgment, was determined by the Selection Committee which consisted of: Rick Chesser, James Wolfe, and Joseph Yesbeck. This committee considered two factors in assigning its five points. First, the vendor's ability to do the work; and second, the cost of the work. The scores for executive judgment were: 0 for The Urban Group and Keith & Schnars because their technical proposals were poor; 1 for Petitioners because, while their technical proposals were good, their price was high; and 5 for Gulf Coast. Following tabulation of all criteria scores, the vendors were ranked as follows: Petitioners with 84.02; Gulf Coast with 82.39; The Urban Group with 53.62; and Keith & Schnars with 51.71. On April 29, 1993, the Department posted the foregoing tabulation and its intent to award the SR 7 contract to Petitioners on May 3, 1993. Thereafter, allegations of impropriety and/or conflict of interest were raised by an unsuccessful vendor. The claims were: that members of the TRC had family members who were either employed by or under contract to Petitioners; that Petitioners had conversations with Department employees prior to the submission of the proposals regarding a revised Department budget for the SR 7 contract; and that an employee of the Department served as the registered agent for Petitioners. Gulf Coast met with the Department and alleged that improprieties had occurred or conflicts of interests existed that had affected the technical evaluation of the bids. Based upon the allegations, the Selection Committee decided to avoid the appearance of any impropriety and to rescind the intent to award to Petitioners and to reject all proposals submitted. The decision reached by the Selection Committee was hurried as the Department believed it was bound, by law, to reach such decision before 8:00 a.m., May 4, 1993. A complete investigation into the truthfulness of the charges was not finished prior to the imposed deadline. On May 5, 1993, the Department posted its formal notice of its intent to reject all proposals. The basis for such decision was "perceived improprieties in the selection process and possible conflict of interest." There were no actual conflicts of interest in the review of the subject proposals. Further, there were no actual improprieties in the proposal review or scoring. With regard to the allegations related to family members employed by Petitioners, no such conflict existed. Claire Tronel's husband has a contract with Petitioners unrelated to any of the issues of this case. Such contract is well-known in the industry and was known to the vendors prior to the assessment of these proposals. Further, the Department knew of such relationship prior to Ms. Tronel being selected for membership on the TRC. Mr. Tronel is not an officer, partner, director, or proprietor of either Petitioner. Nor does he have a direct or indirect ownership interest in more than a five percent of the total assets or capital stock of either company. Ms. Tronel had refrained from serving as a scoring member of earlier technical review committees because of her husband's contractual relationship. Ms. Tronel's supervisor was aware of the relationship Mr. Tronel had to Petitioners and did not consider his limited business relationship to be a conflict. Ms. Tronel was chosen to serve on the TRC because of her experience in right-of-way services, and the relative lack of experience of some of the other committee members. Before serving on the TRC, Ms. Tronel consulted with the district general counsel in order to determine whether her participation would violate Florida Statutes or the Department's ethical standards. After receiving advice and making same known to her supervisors, it was decided Ms. Tronel should serve as a committee member. The contractual relationship between Mr. Tronel and Petitioner did not effect Claire Tronel's evaluation of the proposals. In fact, if the scores assigned by Ms. Tronel to the technical plans of each proposal were subtracted from the average scores, the margin between Petitioners' technical score and the next highest score would widen. Ms. Tronel showed no favoritism or bias in favor of Petitioners. Gulf Coast did not complain about improper conflicts related to their proposal yet Michael Sheridan, the son of TRC member Linda Parsons, is employed by O.R. Colan, an appraisal firm which was listed as a subcontractor in Gulf Coast's proposal. Perhaps Gulf Coast did not complain about Ms. Parsons' membership on the TRC because Ms. Parsons' relationship to Michael Sheridan is also widely known in the vendor community. Petitioners knew of such relationship but did not dispute the accuracy or fairness of Ms. Parsons. If Ms. Parsons' score were deleted from the scoring, Gulf Coast would have received the highest score. Ms. Parsons, who is the chief review appraiser, generally serves on the technical review committee for projects which include appraisal services. Since her son became an employee of O.R. Colan, Ms. Parsons has served on technical review committees which evaluated proposals submitted by O.R. Colan and those submitted by vendors who listed O.R. Colan as a subcontractor. Michael Sheridan is not an officer, partner, director, or proprietor of either Gulf Coast or O.R. Colan and does not own, either directly or indirectly, more than five percent of the total assets or the capital stock of either company. While Ms. Parsons has been instructed not to serve on technical review committees in the future when her son is reflected as a participant in one of the proposals, she has not been instructed to refrain from participating whenever her son's employer participates in a proposal. Ms. Parsons showed no favoritism toward Gulf Coast in her evaluation of the proposals. The facts do not support even an appearance that Ms. Parsons showed any favoritism toward Gulf Coast. Ms. Tronel and Ms. Parsons did not disregard their public duties in favor of a private interest. Therefore, no impropriety by reason of their participation resulted. The Department's decision to rescind the award to Petitioners and to reject all bids was also premised, in part, on concerns regarding contacts between Petitioners and the Department employees before proposals were submitted. Petitioners contacted the Department to ask questions because during the course of preparing its proposal an issue of pricing became apparent. An inconsistency between the amounts that they were developing for the project and the amounts reflected in the Department's work program budget for the project became obvious. Because of the disparity between the Department's budget for the project and the prices that Petitioners developed, Mr. Thomas became concerned that he was misinterpreting the RFP. Mr. Thomas called the Department and spoke, first, to Van Neilly and, subsequently, to Claire Tronel about his concerns. Ms. Tronel confirmed that all services, including appraisal, were to be included in the proposals submitted. Ms. Tronel did not tell Mr. Thomas that the Department intended to revise its budget for the project, nor did Mr. Thomas tell Ms. Tronel or Mr. Neilly what Petitioners' price for the SR 7 proposal would be. Subsequently, the Department did revise its budget for the SR 7 contract by forty to fifty percent. The revised budget exceeds the price bid by Petitioners. The Department's work program budget is a public document which lists all of the projects planned by the Department for a five-year period and includes the Department's price estimate for each project. Petitioners submit bids for Department projects and normally submit proposal prices which exceed the Department's budget. Petitioners normally submit proposals which are highly ranked for their technical quality. It was not improper for Petitioners to ask the question regarding the inclusion of appraisal services and it was not improper for a Department employee to confirm that appraisal services were to be included in the project. It is common practice for vendors to call Department employees before the submittal of proposals. However, vendors are warned not to rely upon information which is not provided to them in writing. In addition, it would be improper for a Department employee to share information with one vendor, which could be advantageous to that vendor, without also providing the information to all other vendors. Petitioners received no information which gave them an advantage over the other vendors. Rick Conner is a Department employee who was, until recently, the resident agent for KE Realty Services, Inc. Mr. Conner served in this position without compensation. He was not involved in any way in the RFP or the evaluation of the subject proposals. His role as resident agent had no effect on the scoring of proposals, and was not a factor in the Department's decision to rescind the award to Petitioners. There was no evidence offered at the hearing to suggest that the relationship between Rick Conner and KE Realty gave the appearance of impropriety. Petitioners expended approximately $40,000 in the preparation of the proposal; and, if there is a rebid, will incur additional amounts to prepare a new proposal. Petitioners hired additional employees for the SR 7 contract, so that it could report in its proposal that it had the staff on hand to begin work immediately. If the SR/7 Contract is not rebid until late 1993 or early 1994, the opportunity to recoup the overhead expenses associated with these additional employees will be lost. In addition, Petitioners' ability to rebid is adversely affected by the Department's decision since Gulf Coast made a copy of the proposal and may now benefit from the technical ideas and suggestions developed by Petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order awarding job no. 86100-3576/2508 for the SR 7 project to Petitioners. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3034 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioners: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31 through 48, 50, 51, and 53 through 61 are accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as a statement of law, not fact. Paragraph 27 is rejected as irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 30 is accepted; the remainder rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argument or comment. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 17, 21, and 22 are accepted. While paragraphs 18 through 20 accurately state the rationale expressed by the selection committee (one member of which changed his opinion after a thorough review of the facts), the ultimate facts expressed by the paragraphs (for example, that there was an appearance of impropriety) are rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Not one person from the public or from the other vendors testified. The Department took the unfounded allegation of an unsuccessful bidder (not even corroborated at trial) as proof that an appearance of impropriety existed. Paragraph 23 is rejected as argument, conclusion of law, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 24 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 25 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. The first two sentences of paragraph 27 are accepted; the remainder rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraphs 28 and 29 are rejected as argument. Paragraph 30 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argument and contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 32 is rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Martha Harrell Chumbler CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD, EMMANUEL, SMITH & CUTLER, P.A. First Florida Bank Building 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, Mail Station 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent’s decision to disqualify Petitioner’s response to an invitation to negotiate was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious and whether Respondent’s decision not to disqualify Intervenor’s response to the same invitation to negotiate was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact On May 26, 2000, Respondent’s Office of the District Administrator, District 1, issued Invitation to Negotiate ITN-00-AJ01 (ITN). The ITN is for a contract under which the successful applicant would become the “community-based lead agency for foster care and related services in Escambia County.” Section 1 of the ITN is the Introduction. Section 1.1 of the ITN states that Section 409.1671, Florida Statutes, “directs [Respondent] to identify and contract with highly qualified community based organizations that are interested in serving as the lead agency for an integrated system of foster care and appropriate related services.” In response to this legislative mandate, District 1 “is planning a system redesign in which community-based organizations will assume the service provision role currently held by the state.” Section 1.2 of the ITN states that the purpose of the ITN is to solicit the community-based agency that will serve as the lead agency in Escambia County for the integrated provision of foster care and related services. Foster care and related services include “protective services, family preservation, independent living, emergency shelter, residential group care, foster care, therapeutic foster care, intensive residential treatment, foster care supervision, case management, post- placement supervision, and family reunification.” Section 1.2 notes that state-employed protective investigators will continue to receive and investigate complaints of child abuse. Section 1.2.A of the ITN describes this project as one of “major scope” and cautions that “[i]t will take a significant period of time for the selected lead agency to fully develop and implement a community-based system of care for this population.” Within the framework of existing laws, the selected agency “will be encouraged to develop innovative child focused intervention protocols and program components.” Section 1.2.A identifies the “minimal design elements” that must be included in any contract, regardless how the selected lead agency structures the project. These elements include: The selected lead agency will be responsible for all aspects of the delivery of foster care and related services. Within the scope of their expertise and resources, the lead agency can directly supply needed services to children and their families. A network of sub-providers will be developed by the lead agency to assure access to services not available through the lead agency. Capacity and financial risk issues will be managed by the lead agency. An automated system will be put in place by the district in collaboration with the selected lead agency that will allow for real-time communication as well as data transfer between [Respondent], the lead agency and the judicial system. This mechanism will allow judges to be quickly apprised of the progress of children and families under the supervision of the court. A comprehensive quality improvement system must be established by the lead agency. The lead agency and provider network will be accredited in accordance with department policy. In addition, the lead agency will identify and meet the training and job skill development needs of all employees of the system. . . . Section 1.2.C of the ITN describes the relationship between District 1 of Respondent and the lead agency. This ITN starts the process by which Respondent will be relieved of responsibility for foster care and related services in Escambia County. Section 1.2.C notes: “The district will shift from performing to technical assistance and quality assurance.” Section 1.2.E of the ITN describes the start-up process. Section 1.2.E states that the most important part of this process of the privatization of foster care and related services is “[m]oving forward in a planned and deliberate manner.” Section 1.2.E warns: “Transitioning from a broad concept to a carefully implemented system of community-based care requires a period of concurrent planning between the district, the alliance [a community group initially comprising the District 1 Health and Human Services Board and the Circuit Court Chief Judge’s Children’s Council] and the selected lead agency.” Section 1.2.E anticipates a “start-up contract” for a term of six to nine months, during which time Section 1.2.E identifies several deliverables that Respondent will require from the lead agency. Among these deliverables is: “The lead agency will develop a plan for the maximization of Medicaid dollars and all other federal funding streams associated with child protective services.” Section 1.2.E states that, during the start-up period, Respondent will continue to assure the safety of children, while the lead agency submits the deliverables. The end of the start-up contract occurs when the lead agency “demonstrates readiness to assume the management of the sub- provider network and the actual delivery of foster care and related services.” Section 1.2.E states that, at this point, Respondent and the lead agency will negotiate a “service contract,” which will “systematically stage the transfer of foster care, protective supervision, adoptions and all related functions from the department to the lead agency.” Section 1.2.E contemplates that the parties will sign the service contract by July 6, 2001. Section 1.3 of the ITN restates that Respondent will enter into a “start-up contract” with the applicant that Respondent chooses as the lead agency. Conflicting somewhat with Section 1.2.E as to the term of the start-up contract, Section 1.3 states that the term may be six to twelve months. More importantly, Section 1.3 restates the purpose of the start-up contract: “At the conclusion of this contract, [Respondent] will make a determination of the readiness of the provider for a service contract. This determination will be made on the basis of a review of the deliverables required under the start-up contract . . ..” The resulting service contract will be for a three-year term. Section 1.4.A of the ITN defines “[a]pplicant” as: “A not for profit community-based agency that successfully submits an application for consideration under this [ITN].” Section 1.4.R defines “[s]elected applicant” as: “The applicant selected for negotiation under the terms and conditions of this [ITN].” Section 1.4.M defines “[l]ead agency” as: “The not for profit community-based provider responsible for coordinating, integrating and managing a local system of supports and services for children who have been abused, abandoned or neglected and their families. The lead agency is also referred in any contract awarded from this [ITN] as the ‘Provider.’” Section 2 of the ITN is the Invitation to Negotiate Information. Section 2.2 of the ITN warns: Failure to have performed any contractual obligations with [Respondent] in a manner satisfactory to [Respondent] will be a sufficient cause for termination. To be disqualified as an applicant under this provision, the applicant must have: 1) previously failed to satisfactorily perform in a contract with [Respondent], been notified by [Respondent] of the unsatisfactory performance, and failed to correct the unsatisfactory performance to the satisfaction of [Respondent] or, 2) had a contract terminated by [Respondent] for cause. Section 2.6 of the ITN states: “Attendance at the applicant’s conference is a prerequisite for acceptance of applications from individuals or firms.” Section 2.9 of the ITN sets a deadline for submitting all applications by 5:00 p.m. local time on August 24, 2000. This section adds: “[Respondent] reserves the right to reject any and all applications or to waive minor irregularities when to do so would be in the best interest of the State of Florida. Minor irregularities are defined as variations from this [ITN] terms and terms and conditions which does [sic] not effect [sic] the price of the application, or give the prospective applicant an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other prospective applicants, or does not adversely impact the interest of [Respondent].” Section 2.13 of the ITN provides that any person who is adversely affected by Respondent’s decision concerning a procurement solicitation or contract award may file a protest, pursuant to Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Section 2.14 of the ITN sets forth the evaluation procedures. Section 2.14.A states: “Before the district initiates a negotiation with any potential provider, all applications received will be ranked according to the evaluation criteria and score sheet contained in Appendix II of this [ITN]. . . .” Section 2.14.B states: [The evaluation] team will utilize the methods described in Section 7 and the criteria listed in Appendix II of this [ITN] to rank each application received by the district. . . ..” Section 2.14.C adds: “At the conclusion of the evaluation process, the District Administrator will designate a Lead Negotiator and four additional persons to enter into negotiations with the highest ranked applicant for selection of a lead agency. This negotiation for a start-up contract will begin with the highest ranked applicant and continue through the rankings until an award is made. ” Section 3 of the ITN identifies the Minimum Program Requirements. Section 3.1 of the ITN describes Respondent’s expectations of the services to be delivered by the “selected applicant.” Section 3.2 of the ITN adds that the “selected applicant” shall be knowledgeable of all relevant state and federal laws and shall ask Respondent for assistance when necessary. Section 3.2 notes that, at a minimum, the “selected applicant” will be conversant with nine groups of federal and state laws. Among these requirements is Section 3.2.D, which states: “The selected applicant shall ensure compliance with Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), Title XIX (Medicaid), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) requirements.” Section 3.3 of the ITN states: “The purpose and intent of any contract awarded from this [ITN] is to meet the following departmental goals and the principles outlined in Section 1.1 of this [ITN] . . ..” What follows are 13 specific goals to assure the safety and welfare of the children served by the lead agency. Section 3.8 of the ITN states: “District 1 intends to enter into the start-up contract referenced above. The objective of this start-up contract is to prepare the selected lead agency to perform the tasks listed in this section. Written evidence of an organization’s capacity, prior experience and potential to ultimately perform tasks of this scope will be given considerable emphasis and weight when [Respondent] determines with which applicant to enter into negotiations.” Section 3.8.A then details numerous requirements to be imposed by the “selected applicant,” including the submittal, for prior approval, of any new procedures or policies that may affect the State Plan regarding Title IV-E claims or other sources of federal funds. Section 3.9 of the ITN states: Applicants shall include in their application the proposed staffing for technical, administrative, and clerical support. The successful applicant shall maintain an adequate administrative organizational structure and support staff sufficient to discharge its contractual responsibilities. The selected applicant and any subcontractors shall meet, at a minimum, the staff ratios found in Chapter 65C-14, F.A.C., for residential group care. Section 3.10 of the ITN requires the “selected applicant” to ensure that its staff and the staff of its subcontractors meet the qualification requirements of Chapters 65C-14 and 65C-15, F.A.C.; the background screening requirements of Section 435.04, Florida Statutes; and the training and certification requirements of CFOP 175-78, Certification Procedure for Professional Child Protection Employees. Section 3.20 of the ITN identifies the performance measures to be applied to the evaluation of the services provided by the lead agency. Section 3.20.A lists outcomes such as 95 percent of the children served will not be the victims of verified reports of abuse or neglect while receiving services, 85 percent of the children in foster care for less than one year will have had less than two placements, and 100 percent of all judicial reviews will be completed within the statutory deadlines. Section 3.20.B identifies other outcomes whose percentage of achievement will be established in the future; samples of these are the percentage of children who have been in shelter for more than three days who have a family-safety plan upon their release from the shelter and the percentage of children who are placed in out-of-home care and who are later reunited with their families. Section 3.21.C of the ITN warns: “Upon execution of the contract resulting from this [ITN], the successful applicant must meet the standards set forth in Section 3.20 ” Section 3.23 of the ITN provides that the “selected applicant will agree” to coordinate with various other agencies in providing foster care and related services. Section 4 of the ITN covers Financial Specifications. Section 4.2 of the ITN requires the “selected applicant” to submit a “cost allocation plan” that it has been developed in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-122. The cost allocation plan “must describe the allocation methodologies used by the selected applicant to claim expenditures for reimbursement under any service contract awarded from this [ITN].” Section 4.4 of the ITN requires the “selected applicant” to submit a “financial and service plan” that assures that, among other things, “[s]tate funds in the contract must be spent on child protection activities in ways that allows the state to maximize federal funding.” Section 5 of the ITN addresses Standard Contract Provisions. Section 5.1 of the ITN incorporates the appendix containing model contract provisions to be incorporated into any contract resulting from the ITN. Section 6 of the ITN contains Instructions to Prospective Applicants to the ITN. The flush language under this section states that Respondent “will not . . . consider. . .” applications submitted after the deadline and that applicants must submit one original and nine copies of their applications. Also, an officer of the “selected applicant agency” must sign at least one copy of the application. Another provision covers the typographical presentation of application material. The last sentence of the flush language states: “Each application must follow the document structure listed in Sections 6.1 through 6.9 of this [ITN].” Section 6.1 of the ITN requires the execution of a standard acknowledgement form. Section 6.2 requires that the second page of the application consist of a title page with such information as the ITN number and name of the applicant. Section 6.3 requires a one-page executive summary of the application. Section 6.4 requires a table of contents following the executive summary and, after the table of contents, a cross-reference table covering all of the responses required by Section 6 of the ITN. Section 6.5 requires a demonstration of the applicant’s “comprehensive understanding of the scope of the issues associated with the delivery of child protection services in Escambia County” and a presentation of the applicant’s “perspective regarding community[-]based . . . care with foster care and related services. ” Section 6.6 of the ITN is entitled, “Description of Organizational Capacity.” The flush language in Section 6.6 states: “In this section the applicant will, at a minimum[,] address the following factors ” Section 6.6.A is headed, “Description and Qualifications of the Organization.” Section 6.6.A requires 13 items, including articles of incorporation, services currently provided, and formal and informal connections to Escambia County. Section 6.6.B is headed, “Administrative/Fiscal: The applicant must supply the following information ” Section 6.6.B requires the following nine items: The organization’s annual budget. A three-year history of audited financial statements. An estimate of advance payments (if needed) to support this project. The most recent audit reports complete with the management response. Evidence of compliance with previous correction action plans proposed by [Respondent] through any contract. A documented history of maximizing Medicaid revenues. Provide a discussion of the organization’s system of staff recruitment, screening, pre-service training, in-service training, staff development and employee evaluation. Include a three-year staff retention study. A copy of the organization’s disaster readiness plan(s). [Deleted from ITN] A copy of minority business enterprise certificate issued by the Department of Management Services, if applicable. Section 6.6.C is headed, “Scope of the Organization: The applicant must address the following capacity issues . . ..” Section 6.6.C requires eight items, including Section 6.6.C.2, which states: “Evidence of an infrastructure that includes automated communication and record keeping systems that can be linked to the judicial system and the department.” Section 6.6.D is headed, “Clinical Capacity: The application must address each of the following items ” Section 6.6.D lists six items. Section 6.6.E is headed, “Quality Improvement: The application must address each of the following items ” Section 6.6.E lists seven items, including Section 6.6.E.3, which states: “The ability of the organization and the structure through which the standards found in Section 3.20 of this document will be met.” Section 6.7 of the ITN is entitled, “Proposed Statement of Work.” The flush language explains that the statement of work is “to be general and increase in specification during the period of time covered by a start-up contract.” Section 6.7.G states: “Explain how the applicant will provide for integrated generic and specialized case management.” Section 6.8 of the ITN is entitled, “Proposed Implementation Plan.” This section requires the “applicant’s proposed time-lines for sequencing of all the activities that will lead to full implementation of the items in Section 3.” Section 6.9 of the ITN is entitled, “Mandatory Certifications, Assurances and Statements.” This section lists several executed documents that the application must include. Section 7 of the ITN is entitled, “Application Evaluation Criteria and Rating Sheet.” Section 7.A states that the score sheets “for evaluating the [ITN responses]” are in Appendix II. Section 7.A warns: “The score sheet is the instrument used to assess the degree to which the applicant’s response meets the criteria of this [ITN].” Appendix II of the ITN is entitled, “Evaluation Criteria and Scoring Sheet.” The first section of Appendix II is the “Evaluation Methodology,” which states in its entirety: The evaluation team will score the application using the criteria and scoring procedures found in each domain of this appendix. The score for each criteria will be established by consensus of the evaluation team. The scores assigned to each criteria [sic] will be added to determine the final score for each domain. The scores from each domain will be summed to determine the final score for the application and annotated on the attached score sheet. Domain A (Disqualifying Criterion) contains fatal items that must be present if the application is to be scored. With no disqualification resulting from the review of Domain A, Domains B though E will be scored based on the procedures and standards listed. Appendix II, Domain A is entitled, “Disqualifying Criteria.” The first section under Domain A is “Scoring Procedure,” which states: “Score each criteria [sic] as present or absent. If any of these criteria are scored as absent, the applicant is disqualified.” The second section under Domain B is “Criteria,” which lists 23 items. The 23 items are: Application was received at the time and date specified in Section 2.9 of this [ITN]. One original and 9 copies of the application were received by the department in the manner and location specified in Section 2.9 of this [ITN]. The application included a signed and original State of Florida Invitation to Negotiation Contractual Services Acknowledgement Form, PUR 7105. (See Appendix IX) The application included an original signed Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion Contracts/Subcontracts. (See Appendix X) The application included an original signed Acceptance of Contract Terms and Conditions indicating that the applicant agrees to all department requirements, terms and conditions in the [ITN] and in the department’s Standard Contract. (See Appendix XI) The application included an original signed Statement of No Involvement form. (See Appendix XII) The application included an original signed District 1 Statement of Assurances (See Appendix XIII) The application followed the document structure listed in Section 6.1-6.9 of this [ITN]. All forms submitted included an original signature from an individual authorized to bind the applicant to the terms and conditions of this [ITN]. The application contains the title page, the abstract, the table of contents and cross reference table as required in Sections 6.2-6.4 of this [ITN]. Articles of Incorporation. [deleted from ITN] Certificate of Good Standing from the Secretary of State. Documentation from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service of the organization’s Section 501(c)(3) status. Evidence that the applicant provides for and supports a Drug-free Workplace. Evidence that the applicant is willing to comply with the Environmental Tobacco Smoke Restrictions. Evidence the applicant does not employee unauthorized aliens. Three history of financial statements. A disclosure of any financial difficulties and extraordinary obligations. An estimate of advanced payments if needed to support this project. Documentation of compliance with past departmental or Florida state contracts. Most recent financial audit reports complete with management response including evidence of sound credit rating. A copy of the Application Guarantee. Attendance at all applicant conferences is a pre-requisite for acceptance of applications from individuals or firms. [deleted from the ITN] Appendix II, Domains B through E are score sheets. Domain B covers Section 6.5, Domain C covers Section 6.6, Domain D covers Section 6.7, and Domain E covers Section 6.8. Domain C, Factor B, Item 2 covers Section 6.6.B.2. This item states: 2. Analysis of the three year audited financial statements. (See Section 6.6B.2) Points Standard Poor Average Above Average Excellent NOTE: The analysis of the financial statements by the department will at a minimum include: Calculation of selected financial ratios Review of accounting policies A review of credit history will be included in this analysis No items in Domains B through E cover Section 6.6.B.3 through 6.6.B.5. Domain C, Factor B, Item 3 covers Section 6.6.B.6. This item states: 3. History of maximization of Medicaid revenues. (See Section 6.6B.6) Points Standard No history Some experience Experienced Well documented history Domain C, Factor B, Item 4 covers Section 6.6.B.7. This item states: 4. Organization’s system of staff recruitment, training, evaluation and retention. (See Section 6.6B.7) Points Standard No system Incomplete system System in place Well developed / comprehensive system Domain C, Factor C, Item 2 covers Section 6.6.C.2. This item states: 2. Automated communication and record keeping systems. (See Section 6.6C.2) Points Standard No automated systems Limited automation, internal only Currently automated, limited external applications Comprehensive systems Petitioner and Intervenor attended the applicant’s conference, which was held on June 23, 2000. Respondent duly answered all questions of Petitioner and Intervenor. Petitioner timely submitted a response to the ITN on August 22, 2000, and Intervenor timely submitted a response to the ITN on August 24, 2000. These were the only responses to the ITN. Respondent opened the responses on August 25, 2000. Respondent initially disqualified Petitioner’s response by, letter dated August 29, 2000, on the erroneous ground that Petitioner had not attended the applicant’s conference. Withdrawing the August 29 letter, Respondent disqualified Petitioner’s response on other grounds, as cited in a letter dated September 6, 2000. The September 6 letter disqualifies Petitioner’s response because it omitted several items identified in three criteria contained in Appendix II, Domain A. The September 6 letter cites seven “mandatory elements from Section 6 that were referenced in Criteria [sic] 8,” but Respondent later cited only three omissions under Criterion 8: 6.6, B.2: only the 1998-1999 fiscal year audited financial statement was included. 6.6, B.5: Family Safety Program contract corrective action plans were not included. 6.6, B.7: a three year staff retention study was not included. Relying on Criteria 18 and 21, respectively, the September 6 letter cites the following grounds for disqualification of Petitioner’s response: Only two years of financial statements were included, but three were required. Incomplete documentation was provided. No evidence of compliance with the Family Services Program was found in the proposal. Petitioner timely filed a protest and formal written protest of Respondent’s disqualification of Petitioner’s response. Petitioner contends that the disqualification of its response was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and capricious. In particular, Petitioner contends that Respondent applied more stringent standards in its examination of Petitioner’s response than it did in its examination of Intervenor's response. The introduction to Petitioner’s response identifies Bridgeway Center, Inc., as the proposed lead agency, and Foster America, Inc., as its presumably prime subcontractor, although Foster America, Inc., will do business in Florida under the name of Managed Family Services. The title page to Petitioner’s response identifies Bridgeway Center, Inc., and Managed Family Services as the “applicant organization.” Section 2.1.B of Petitioner’s response details the substantial experience of Foster America, Inc., as “the first company established in the United States to address the issues pertaining specifically to the management of foster care.” Considerable portions of the ensuing sections of Petitioner’s response describe the capabilities of Foster America, Inc., to meet the requirements of the ITN. Appendix 16 of Petitioner’s response is entitled “Three-Years of Financial Statements.” Appendix 16 consists of the following financial information for Bridgeway Center, Inc.: statements of financial position for fiscal years ending in 1996-99 and statements of activities for fiscal years ending in 1996-99. At the bottom of each of the four pages containing these statements is the declaration: “The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.” No notes accompany the financial statements contained in Appendix 16. Nothing in Petitioner’s response indicates that these financial statements were audited. These financial statements do not include a statement of functional expenses and statement of cash flows. The attached financial statements do not contain auditor’s reports describing the scope of the opinion. Appendix 18 of Petitioner’s response is entitled, “Most Recent Audit Reports with Management Response Including Evidence of Sound Credit Rating.” Pertaining to fiscal year ending 1999, this set of documents starts with an “independent auditor’s report, stating, among other things, that the financial statements “present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Bridgeway Center, Inc. as of June 30, 1999 and the statement of activities and its cash flows for the year then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.” Following the main independent auditor’s report, the 1999 financial statements comprise a statement of financial position, statement of activities, statement of functional expenses, and statement of cash flows. Following the four financial statements, twelve pages of notes explain in detail many of the individual items contained in the financial statements. Following a nonrequired schedule of revenues, a schedule of expenditures of federal awards and other contract and grant activity, with accompanying notes, responds to the requirements of OMB Circular A-133. Following these items is another independent auditor’s report, also responding to the requirements of OMB Circular A-133. Next is another independent auditor’s report, responding to the state requirement that it opine as to management’s assertion of its compliance with state law. The final document in this set is a management letter from the auditor identifying deficiencies in internal controls, making recommendations for improving operating efficiency, and recording management’s response to each of these observations and recommendations. Strictly speaking, Appendix 18 of Petitioner’s response contains audited financial statements, including notes, only for the fiscal year ending in 1999. However, the statement of financial position and statement of cash flows contain the identical information for the fiscal years ending 1998 and 1999. The statement of activities contains nearly the same information for both years, adding for 1999 only a breakdown of which revenues are unrestricted and which are restricted. The statement of functional expenses contains considerably more detailed information for 1999. The main independent auditor’s report states: “Information for the year ended June 30, 1998, is presented for comparative purposes only and was extracted from the financial statements from that year, on which we presented an auditor’s report dated [approximately one year earlier].” Thus, Petitioner’s response contains audited financial statements only for the fiscal year ending in 1999, but also contains considerable, but not all, information from the audited financial statements for the preceding fiscal year. Petitioner’s response contains considerably less information for the fiscal year ending in 1997. The adequacy of Petitioner’s response, of course, depends on the determination of the specific requirements of the disqualification provisions. There is little agreement on these specific requirements. Respondent and Intervenor erroneously contend that Criterion 8 of Domain A incorporates by reference all of the requirements of Sections 6.1 through 6.9. However, Criterion 8 requires only that the “application followed the document structure listed” in these sections. Nothing in the record casts much light upon the meaning of “document structure.” At a minimum, though, the requirement that each application “follow” the “document structure” listed in Sections 6.1 through 6.9 would be an odd way of requiring that the application contain all of the items required in these sections. In opposition to this contention of Respondent and Intervenor, Petitioner identifies several scoring matrices that assign zero points to responses showing no evidence in response to a specific requirement within Sections 6.1 through 6.9. Petitioner reasons that the absence of evidence is tantamount to the omission of an item. Petitioner then concludes that it would make little sense if the absence of evidence, or omission of such an item, meant the disqualification of the application. Petitioner makes a good point here. The scoring matrices for items for which an omission explicitly means disqualification, such as financial statements, do not assign zero points for the omission of such items. The scoring matrices assign zero points for the omission of an item only as to items that are not explicitly the subject of disqualification. Petitioner relies upon the common definition of structure as, according to Webster’s III New College Dictionary (1995): “Something made up of a number of parts held or put together in a specific way. The manner in which parts are arranged or combined to form a whole.” This is a good definition of “structure” and helps define the meaning of the somewhat obscure phrase, “document structure.” It suffices for this case to determine that “document structure” does not mean each and every requirement contained in Sections 6.1 through 6.9. Most likely, “document structure” means only that each application has to contain documents corresponding to each of the requirements stated in each of these sections: i.e., a standard acknowledgement, title page, executive summary, table of contents and cross- reference table, organizational perspective, description of organizational capacity, proposed statement of work, proposed implementation plan, and all of the specified mandatory certifications. Thus, an applicant could avoid disqualification under Criterion 8 by, as to Section 6.6, including a document describing its organizational capacity, even though the document may have omitted certain items required under Section 6.6, such as professional affiliations of the applicant. Because “document structure” does not incorporate all of the Section 6 requirements into Criterion 8, Respondent has erroneously relied upon the first three, bulleted grounds for disqualification, which identify omissions of Section 6 requirements. Respondent and Intervenor have never contended that Petitioner’s response fails to satisfy the narrower interpretation given “document structure” in this recommended order. Thus, Criteria 18 and 21 are the only grounds on which Respondent could disqualify Petitioner’s response. Criterion 18 requires a “three [sic] history of financial statements.” This obvious typographical error did not obscure for Petitioner the intended meaning of this criterion: any application omitting three years of financial statements would be disqualified. The key question is exactly what the ITN requires, as to financial statements, to avoid disqualification. The failure of Criterion 6 to incorporate, among other provisions, the specific requirements of Sections 6.6.B.2 for a three-year history of “audited” financial statements is significant. Criterion 18 does not require “audited” financial statements, so, unless Criterion 18 incorporates Section 6.6.B.2 into the disqualifying criteria, the omission of audited financial statements, while possibly a scoring matter, is not a basis for disqualification. The identification of a requirement in Domain A does not equate to the identification of a near counterpart to that requirement in Sections 6.1 through 6.9. For example, Criterion 19, which requires disclosure of “any financial difficulties and extraordinary obligations,” has no counterpart in Section 6, or anywhere else in the ITN. Likewise, the portion of Criterion 22 requiring “evidence of sound credit rating” has no counterpart in Section 6, or anywhere else in the ITN. By adding new requirements for disqualification purposes, Domain A does not serve merely as a collection of references to requirements contained in Section 6 or elsewhere in the ITN. This means that it is not possible to read into or out a specific Domain-A requirement that resembles a specific Section-6 requirement those elements necessary to transform it into the Section-6 requirement. Therefore, except for the uncontroversial correction of the obvious typographical error, Criterion 18 is a complete statement of the disqualification requirement concerning financial statements. And Criterion 18 obviously omits the requirement in Section 6.6.B.2 that the financial statements be “audited.” For a not-for-profit corporation, a set of financial statements comprises four financial statements: a statement of financial position, statement of activities, statement of functional expenses, and statement of cash flows. Petitioner’s response contains a full set of the four, audited financial statements applicable to not-for-profit corporations, but only for the fiscal year ending in 1999. These 1999 financial statements are accompanied by all required independent auditor’s reports and notes. Petitioner’s response also contains the three prior years of two of the four financial statements--the statement of financial position (resembling what was traditionally known as the balance sheet for for-profit corporations) and the statement of activities (resembling what was traditionally known as the income statement for for-profit corporations). However, these additional financial statements are unaccompanied by notes and independent auditor’s reports. Petitioner’s response for 1997 and 1998 includes the two financial statements that provide the most information and for 1998 includes considerable information from one of the two missing financial statements. Criterion 18 does not explicitly require all of the financial statements that constitute a complete set of financial statements, so the omission of the information from the 1997 and 1998 financial statements is not necessarily disqualifying, at least if the information provided is substantially complete. The omission of the notes for 1997 and 1998 merits careful consideration. Petitioner’s auditor warns, on each financial statement, that the accompanying notes are an “integral” part of the financial statements. According to the American Heritage Dictionary (1981), “Integral” means: “Essential for completion; necessary to the whole constituent.” In other words, the financial statements submitted by Petitioner are not whole or complete without the accompanying notes. The notes accompanying the 1999 financial statements add explanatory material. Note 1 discloses that Bridgeway Center, Inc. is an accrual-basis taxpayer; values its inventory on the lower of cost or market basis on a last-in, first-out basis; and capitalizes all equipment expenditures over $500 and depreciates its fixed assets over stated cost-recovery periods. Note 3 schedules the receivables owed Bridgeway Center, Inc. by payor and, in the case of Respondent, program. Note 6 details notes payable and lines of credit with terms, interest rates, and monthly payments. Note 7 describes a bond payable in the amount of nearly $2 million. Note 8 identifies real estate leases and rental payments for which Bridgeway Center, Inc. is obligated. Note 10 itemizes by program the sources of income from the State of Florida. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, the determination of whether Petitioner’s response contains three years of financial statements is governed by the less- deferential standard of a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the more-deferential evidentiary standard of clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the omission of two financial statements for 1997 and the omission of some information from the same two financial statements for 1998 does not necessarily preclude its satisfaction of the disqualification requirement of three years of financial statements. However, Petitioner’s omission of the notes for 1997 and 1998 precludes its satisfaction of this disqualification criterion, even by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner’s auditor describes the notes as “integral” to those selected financial statements that Petitioner submitted. Absent an integral part of the already-incomplete submission, Petitioner has failed to prove, even by the less deferential preponderance standard, that its response satisfies the requirement of Criterion 18 for three years of financial statements. Criterion 21 requires “[d]ocumentation of compliance with past departmental or Florida state contracts.” Appendix 19 of Petitioner’s response contains, by program type, 171 schedules identifying compliance issues, corrective action plans, responsible persons, and completion dates. Again, Respondent and Intervenor attempt to add elements from Section 6 to this disqualification criterion of documentation of compliance with past agency contracts. Both parties contend that Criterion 21 should be read in conjunction with Section 6.6.B.5, which requires: “Evidence of compliance with previous correction action plans proposed by [Respondent] through any contract.” For the reasons set forth above, it is impossible to engraft onto Criterion 21 the more demanding requirements of Section 6.6.B.5. In this instance, Respondent answered a question posed by Intervenor consistent with Respondent’s present interpretation of Criterion 21, but this answer--absent an accompanying amendment of the ITN--cannot override the clear disqualification requirement imposed by Criterion 21. Petitioner’s response omits corrective action plans related to contracts for the Family Services Program. This omission was inadvertent, occasioned by the death of the sole Bridgeway employee with knowledge of these matters. As for Criterion 21, Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that its response contains documentation of compliance with past agency contracts. Even if a substantiality requirement were inferred as to Criterion 21, Petitioner’s substantive response would still, by a preponderance of the evidence, satisfy this disqualification requirement. Criterion 21 does not incorporate the comprehensiveness required by Section 6.6.B.5, which requires information concerning “any contract.” Petitioner raises numerous challenges to Intervenor’s response. Partly, these challenges are intended to show how Respondent evaluated Petitioner’s response more stringently. Partly, these challenges are intended to show that Intervenor’s response should be disqualified, regardless of whether Petitioner prevails on its challenge to the disqualification of its response. The latter purpose of Petitioner’s challenges depends upon a ruling allowing it to amend its petition to raise the issue of whether Intervenor’s response should also be disqualified. In challenging Intervenor’s response, however, Petitioner repeats the same mistaken assumptions made by Respondent and Intervenor about the relationship between Domain A and Section 6. In fact, Petitioner extends these mistaken assumptions one level by faulting Intervenor’s response for failing to satisfy non-Domain A provisions that are not even applicable to responses to the ITN. The ITN imposes very few requirements upon ITN responses outside Section 6 and Domains A through E of Appendix II. The two such requirements are Section 2.2, which disqualifies certain applicants with unsatisfactory histories with Respondent; Section 2.6, which requires attendance at the applicant’s conference; Section 2.9, which sets the deadline for submitting responses; and Section 3.9 (first sentence), which requires that responses include proposed staffing for technical, administrative, and clerical support. Apart from some general background descriptions contained in the introductory sections of the ITN, the remainder of the ITN, apart from Section 6 and Domains A through E, deal with the start-up contract and the ultimate service contract. This orientation is amply revealed by frequent use in these provisions of the future tense and descriptions of the non-agency party as the “successful applicant,” “lead agency,” or “selected applicant.” In its proposed recommended order, Petitioner first challenges Intervenor’s response with respect to Criterion 22, which requires the most recent financial audit reports “complete with management response.” Criterion 22 is in Domain A, so it is a disqualification requirement. However, Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such a response is required when, as here, Intervenor’s auditor uncovered no material weaknesses or disagreements to which Intervenor was obligated to respond. In its proposed recommended order, Petitioner challenges Intervenor’s response with respect to Section 6.6.E.3, which addresses the ability of the applicant with respect to federal funding. This is not a Domain-A requirement. In fact, Petitioner’s contentions require application of ITN provisions apart from Section 6 and Domain A that involve the start-up process and are inapplicable to the present stage of this procurement. The deficiency described in the preceding paragraph characterizes the remainder of Petitioner’s challenges to Intervenor’s response, such as with respect to a staff- retention study and demonstration of infrastructure capability. It is thus unnecessary to consider the extent to which Intervenor’s response addresses these items. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent’s proposed determination disqualifying Petitioner’s response is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent’s proposed determination failing to disqualify Intervenor’s response is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing the protest of Petitioner to the disqualification of its response to the ITN and to the failure to disqualify Intervenor’s response to the ITN. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Wilbur E. Brewton Kenneth J. Plante Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. 225 South Adams Street, Suite 250 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Katie George Chief Legal Counsel Lori Lee Fehr Legal Counsel Department of Children and Family Services District 1 160 Government Center, Room 601 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Martha Harrell Chumbler Kelly A. Cruz-Brown Carlton Fields Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the application of Lexington for registration as an investment adviser and the application for registration of John B. Waymire should be approved?
Findings Of Fact The Department's Division of Securities and Investor Protection is charged with the administration and enforcement of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes, the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act. Lexington filed an application for registration as an investment adviser in the State of Florida. The application was filed on May 30, 1985. At the time the application was filed Lexington was known as Amvest Capital Management, Inc. The application was accompanied by an application for registration of John B. Waymire, as principal. By letter dated June 7, 1985, the Department notified Lexington that its application was deficient in 3 ways: The application did not indicate that Lexington was a Foreign Corporation or include a legal opinion stating why such registration was not required under Florida law; The application did not include financial reports as required by Rule 3E-300.02(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code; and Lexington did not meet the net capital/net worth requirements of Rule 3E-600.16, Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated June 17, 1985, Lexington corrected the first 2 deficiencies and requested that the Department waive the net capital requirements of Rule 3E-600.016(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Net Capital Requirement"). By letter dated August 23, 1985, the Department denied Lexington's request for a waiver of the Net Capital Requirement. By letter dated November 11, 1985, Lexington requested that the Department reconsider its request for a waiver of the Net Capital Requirement. In the letter of November 11, 1985, Lexington also informed the Department that its name had been changed from Amvest Capital Management, Inc., to Lexington Capital Management, Inc. By letter dated February 7, 1986, the Department informed Lexington that it would reconsider its request for a waiver of the Net Capital Requirement and requested audited financial statements of Lexington and Piedmont Management Company, Inc., and information concerning the acquisition of a surety bond by Lexington. On May 7, 1986, Lexington provided the Department with documentation, including an audited financial statement for Lexington as of December 31, 1985, which indicated that Lexington had a negative net worth of $1,248,595.00, a general undertaking from Safeco Insurance Company to issue a surety bond for $100,000.00, and a proposed "Continuing Guaranty" agreement from Piedmont Management Company, Inc., guaranteeing all debt of Lexington. The Financial Administrator of the Department was requested to review the Continuing Guaranty agreement submitted by Lexington. She raised questions which led the Department to conclude that it had no authority to waive the Net Capital Requirement as requested by Lexington. The Financial Administrator of the Department orally informed Lexington of its position and indicated that a Declaratory Statement on the issue could be requested. In September of 1986, Lexington filed a Petition for Declaratory Statement on the issue of whether the Department had the authority to waive the Net Capital Requirement. The request was withdrawn by Lexington by letter on March 13, 1987. On April 29, 1987, the Department issued a letter denying Lexington's application for registration as an investment adviser in the State of Florida for failure to meet the Net Capital Requirement. The Department also denied the application of Mr. Waymire for registration as the principal of Lexington because Lexington's application had been denied. The Department's denial was based upon its determination that it did not have the authority to waive the Net Capital Requirement. The information that the Department had requested that Lexington provide was not considered or analyzed by the Department. The following facts concerning the following investment advisers currently licensed in the State of Florida were proved: FSC Advisory Corporation has filed financial statements with the Department for 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 which indicate that the Corporation had a negative net capital of $46,278.00, $79,127.00, $101,024.00 and $90,141.00, respectively, in each of those years. FSC Advisory Corporation has been licensed as an investment adviser in the State of Florida since at least 1977. [The Department has taken no action against FSC Advisory Corporation for failing to maintain the net capital required of licensed investment advisers.] Richard W. Whitehead, Inc., was licensed as an investment adviser on February 5, 1981. Its application included a December, 1980, financial statement which indicated that the company had a negative capital of $589.00. The evidence did not prove that the Department "waived" the Net Capital Requirement. Subsequently filed financial statements for 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 indicate that the company had a negative net capital of $1,071.00, $3,838.00, $4,978.00, $46,582.00 and $33,989.00, respectively, in each of those years. FCA Corporation filed financial statements with the Department for 1984 and 1985 indicating a negative net capital of $115,325.00 for 1984 and $40,136.00 for 1985. The 1985 financial statement was filed in response to a letter of August 13, 1986 from the Department notifying FCA Corporation that it had failed to file a financial statement. Coordinated Financial Services Advisors, Inc., filed a financial statement indicating that it had a negative net capital of $9,019.00 as of March 31, 1987. This statement was filed in response to a letter from the Department dated April 29, 1987, notifying the company that it had failed to file a financial statement. Stratfield Investment Management, Inc., filed a financial statement with the Department indicating that it had a negative net capital of $12,149.00 as of December 31, 1986. Consortium Group, Inc., filed a financial with the Department indicating a negative net capital of $19,947.00 as of October 31, 1986. TFG Consulting, Inc., was registered as an investment adviser by the Department on February 24, 1987. Its application included a July 31, 1986, financial statement indicating a negative net capital of $281.72. The Department informed TFG Consulting, Inc., of this deficiency by letter dated June 13, 1986. Market Metrics, Inc., filed a financial statement with the Department indicating it had a negative net capital of $38,357.00 as of June 30, 1984. Investment Management included a document with its application for registration which indicated that it had a negative net capital of $94,979.00. The Department, however, notified Investment Management of its failure to meet the Net Capital Requirement. By letter dated September 16, 1981, Investment Management notified the Department that it complied with the Net Capital Requirement; it had a net capital of $36,132.00. Generally, the Department took no action against the companies discussed in paragraphs 13a through 13i for failing to maintain the net capital required of licensed investment advisers except to the extent specifically noted in those paragraphs. The evidence did not, however, prove that the Department had waived the Net Capital Requirement for any entity filing an initial application for registration as an investment adviser. The Division of Securities and Investor Protection of the Department has a total staff of approximately 74 persons. The Division's Bureau which processes registrations consists of only 8 professional employees and several clerical positions. The 8 professional employees of the Bureau processed approximately 500 new broker-dealer and investment adviser applications which were approved during the past fiscal year. They also processed applications which were not approved and approximately 3,200 renewals. There are approximately 3,200 broker-dealers and investment advisers, 1,500 branch offices and 120,000 associated persons registered with the Department. Except for bank holding companies, which are discussed, infra, companies which received and/or retained registrations with the Department despite their failure to meet the Net Capital Requirement did so because of Department employee error. From March 6, 1979 until March 20, 1986, the Department issued thirty- three letters in response to requests for waivers of the net capital requirements. In each case the Department indicated that it interpreted Rule 3E-300.02(7)(a), Florida Administrative Code, to allow the Department to waive the Net Capital Requirement if the waiver would not be contrary to the interest of the investing public. Of the thirty-three cases where a waiver was granted, thirty of those cases involved bank holding companies. It is a common practice in bank mergers or reorganizations for a bank to form a bank holding company. Stock of the existing bank is then exchanged for stock of the bank holding company. The bank holding company is required to register as an issuer-dealer and must meet a $5,000.00 net capital requirement. Often, the bank holding company does not meet this requirement until after the transaction has occurred. Therefore, bank holding companies request a conditional waiver from the net capital requirement. Each request is reviewed on a case-by-case basis to be sure the public is adequately protected. The waivers that have been granted were conditioned on the bank holding company complying with the Net Capital Requirement after the exchange of stock occurs. Of the thirty-three waivers proved in this proceeding, thirty were bank holding companies. The evidence failed to prove what type of transaction was involved in the other three cases. The Department's position with regard to waiving the Net Capital Requirement of bank holding companies applied to investment advisers as well as broker-dealers or issuer-dealers. The Department's interpretation of Rule 3E-300.02(7)(a), Florida Administrative Code, with regard to its authority to waive the Net Capital Requirement for bank holding companies set out in the letter to the thirty-three companies referred to above was the same as set out in the Department's letter of February 7, 1986, indicating that the Department would reconsider Lexington's request for a waiver. The Department has stopped granting waivers from the Net Capital Requirement to bank holding companies based upon its present interpretation of the law. The $2,500.00 Net Capital Requirement for investment advisers does not guarantee that customers will not sustain losses or that the adviser will remain solvent. Lexington is an investment adviser doing business in 46 states. The State of Arkansas has taken action to revoke the registration of Lexington in that State. This action is based, in part, on the refusal of the State of Florida to approve Lexington's application. As of the date of its application Lexington had a negative net capital of $1,248,955.00. The negative net capital is due in part to $1,650,000.00 in long-term debt owed to Piedmont Management Company, Inc., and Lexington Management Corporation of New Jersey. Piedmont Management Company, Inc., owns 100 percent of the stock of Lexington Management Corporation of New Jersey, which in turn owns 50 percent of the stock of Lexington. The other 50 percent of the stock of Lexington is owned by "senior management" in Lexington. Lexington's $1,650,000.00 of long-term debt to Piedmont Management Company, Inc., and Lexington Management Corporation of New Jersey is subordinated; all other debts of Lexington would have priority over the long- term dept. Piedmont Management Company, Inc., had net capital of $78,394,000.00 as of December 31, 1985. Lexington does not take physical possession of its clients' assets. Clients' assets are kept with a broker-dealer. Lexington only has the authority to trade a client's account; it does not authority to transfer assets in or out of a client's account. The Continuing Guaranty agreement submitted to the Department by Lexington is not effective indefinitely. The agreement does place the asset and net worth of Piedmont Management Company, Inc., behind the liabilities of Lexington, except subordinated debt. The surety bond commitment was to be in a form specified by the Department. The parties stipulated that Lexington has never met the Net Capital Requirement. If the Net Capital Requirement were waived the investing public would be adequately protected if the actions which the Department and Lexington have discussed are taken. This protection will only be for the effective period of the Continuing Guaranty agreement, however.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the requested waiver of the Net Capital Requirement be DENIED. It is further, RECOMMENDED that the application of Lexington for registration as an investment adviser in the State of Florida and the application of John B. Waymire as principal be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2289 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2. 2 7. 3 3. 4-5 4. 6 5. 7 6. 8 8. 9 9. The "unconditional guarantee" is for a limited period of time, however. 10 30. 11 31. 12-13 12. 14 23. 15 18. 19. The evidence failed to prove that there was a "substantial minority" or that the 3 applicants which were not bank holding companies were broker- dealers or investment advisers. The evidence failed to prove that there is such a "policy." See 21. 18 22. 19-20 12. The evidence failed to prove that the Department's discontinuance of its treatment of waiver request was "abrupt" or a discontinuance of a policy applicable to the Petitioners. 21 Hereby accepted. 22 24. 23 25. 24 29. The first sentence is irrelevant. The last sentence was not proved by the weight of the evidence. 26. The evidence failed to prove that Lexington has a "parent" company. 27 27. 20 Not a proposed finding of fact. 21 18-20. 22 19. 23 14. 24 15 and 16. 25 17. 26 12 and 23. 27 25. 28 32. The last sentence is a statement of law and not a proposed finding of fact. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 29 26. 30 28. 31 See 33. 32 13a and 13j. 33 13b and 13j. 34 Not supported by the weight of evidence. 35 13c and 13j. 36 13d and 13j. 37 13e and 13j. 38 13f and 13j. 39 13g. 40 13h and 13j. 41 13i. 42 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. One Department employee testified that he believed that the rationale for waiving the Net Capital Requirement for bank holding companies (that the investing public was adequately protected) would apply to investment advisers also. This testimony does not prove, however, that the Department has implemented a policy with regard to permanent waivers of the Net Capital Requirement for initial applications of investment advisers. 43 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1. 2 2. 3 3. 4 4. 5 5. 6 6 and 7. 7 8. 8 9. 9 10 and 11. 10 12. 11 13a and 13j. 12 13b and 13j. 13 13c and 13j. 14 13d and 13j. 15 13e. 16 13f. 17 13g. 18 13h. 19 13i. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward W. Dougherty, Esquire and Charles T. Collette, Esquire Mang, Rett & Collettee Post Office Box 11127 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3127 Walter W. Wood Deputy General Counsel and Margaret S. Karniewicz Assistant General Counsel and Charles E. Scarlett Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Banking & Finance Department The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issue to be decided is whether Petitioner meets the "within-one-point" condition of eligibility for licensure as a medical marijuana treatment center under section 381.986(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact BACKGROUND AND PARTIES Respondent Florida Department of Health (the "Department" or "DOH") is the agency responsible for administering and enforcing laws that relate to the general health of the people of the state. The Department's jurisdiction includes the state's medical marijuana program, which the Department oversees. Art. X, § 29, Fla. Const.; § 381.986, Fla. Stat. Enacted in 2014, section 381.986, Florida Statutes (2015) (the "Noneuphoric Cannabis Law"), legalized the use of low-THC cannabis by qualified patients having specified illnesses, such as cancer and debilitating conditions that produce severe and persistent seizures and muscle spasms. The Noneuphoric Cannabis Law directed the Department to select one dispensing organization ("DO") for each of five geographic areas referred to as the northwest, northeast, central, southwest, and southeast regions of Florida. Once licensed, a regional DO would be authorized to cultivate, process, and sell medical marijuana, statewide, to qualified patients. Section 381.986(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), prescribed various conditions that an applicant would need to meet to be licensed as a DO, and it required the Department to "develop an application form and impose an initial application and biennial renewal fee." DOH was, further, granted authority to "adopt rules necessary to implement" the Noneuphoric Cannabis Law. § 381.986(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2015). Accordingly, the Department's Office of Compassionate Use ("OCU"), which is now known as the Office of Medical Marijuana Use, adopted rules under which a nursery could apply for a DO license. Incorporated by reference in these rules is a form of an Application for Low-THC Cannabis Dispensing Organization Approval ("Application"). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 64-4.002 (incorporating Form DH9008-OCU-2/2015). To apply for one of the initial DO licenses, a nursery needed to submit a completed Application, including the $60,063.00 application fee, no later than July 8, 2015.1/ See Fla. Admin. Code R. 64-4.002(5). Petitioner Nature's Way of Miami, Inc. ("Nature's Way"), is a nursery located in Miami, Florida, which grows and sells tropical plants to big box retailers throughout the nation. Nature's Way timely applied to the Department in 2015 for licensure as a DO in the southeast region. THE 2015 DO APPLICATION CYCLE Although the current dispute arises from the Department's intended denial of Nature's Way's October 19, 2017, application for registration as a medical marijuana treatment center ("MMTC"), which is the name by which DOs are now known, the licensing criterion at the heart of this matter, the "One Point Condition," can be satisfied only by a nursery, such as Nature's Way, whose 2015 application for licensure as a DO was evaluated, scored, and not approved as of the enactment, in 2017, of legislation that substantially overhauled the Noneuphoric Cannabis Law. See Ch. 2017-232, Laws of Fla. The current iteration of section 381.986, in effect as of this writing, will be called the "Medical Marijuana Law." The One Point Condition operates retroactively in that it establishes a previously nonexistent basis for licensure that depends upon pre-enactment events. This is analogous to the legislative creation of a new cause of action, involving as it does the imposition of a new duty (to issue licenses) on the Department and the bestowal of a new right (to become licensed) on former applicants based on their past actions. The Department contends that all of the material facts surrounding these pre-enactment events have been conclusively established due to some combination of (i) Nature's Way's waiver of hearing rights, (ii) administrative finality, and (iii) the retroactive reach of the Medical Marijuana Law. Nature's Way, in contrast, maintains that there remain material facts subject to genuine dispute. The undersigned rejects the Department's argument that all of the facts material to Nature's Way's current application are beyond dispute. In brief, the undersigned holds that the One Point Condition places new legal significance on two categories of pre-enactment facts, namely (i) historical and ultimate facts that have never been determined with finality in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding and thus remain subject to dispute; and (ii) facts, both historical and ultimate, that were a critical and necessary part of the final agency action determining an applicant's substantial interests in obtaining a DO license under the Noneuphoric Cannabis Law. Because facts that have been established, quasi-judicially, with finality between parties (hereafter, "adjudicated facts") are binding on those parties in subsequent litigation under the doctrine of administrative finality, they would not be subject to genuine dispute in a proceeding to determine the substantial interests of an applicant seeking licensure under the One Point Condition who was a party to the prior proceeding. In sum, because facts surrounding the inaugural competition under the Noneuphoric Cannabis Law for regional DO licenses are material to the determination of whether an applicant for licensure as an MMTC under the Medical Marijuana Law meets the One Point Condition, these seemingly unrelated matters must be recounted, and found, herein. To understand the issues at hand, it is essential first to become familiar with the evaluation and scoring of, and the agency actions with respect to, the applications submitted during the 2015 DO application cycle. The Competitive, Comparative Evaluation As stated in the Application, OCU viewed its duty to select five regional DOs as requiring OCU to choose "the most dependable, most qualified" applicant in each region "that can consistently deliver high-quality" medical marijuana. For ease of reference, such an applicant will be referred to as the "Best" applicant for short. Conversely, an applicant not chosen by OCU as "the most dependable, most qualified" applicant in a given region will be called, simply, "Not Best." Given the limited number of available DO licenses under the Noneuphoric Cannabis Law, the 2015 application process necessarily entailed a competition. As the Application explained, applicants were not required to meet any "mandatory minimum criteria set by the OCU," but would be evaluated comparatively in relation to the "other Applicants" for the same regional license, using criteria "drawn directly from the Statute." Clearly, the comparative evaluation would require the item-by-item comparison of competing applicants, where the "items" being compared would be identifiable factors drawn from the statute and established in advance. Contrary to the Department's current litigating position, however, it is not an intrinsic characteristic of a comparative evaluation that observations made in the course thereof must be recorded using only comparative or superlative adjectives (e.g., least qualified, qualified, more qualified, most qualified).2/ Moreover, nothing in the Noneuphoric Cannabis Law, the Application, or Florida Administrative Code Rule 64-4.002 stated expressly, or necessarily implied, that in conducting the comparative evaluation, OCU would not quantify (express numerically an amount denoting) the perceived margins of difference between competing applications. Quite the opposite is true, in fact, because, as will be seen, rule 64-4.002 necessarily implied, if it did not explicitly require, that the applicants would receive scores which expressed their relative merit in interpretable intervals. Specifically, the Department was required to "substantively review, evaluate, and score" all timely submitted and complete applications. Fla. Admin. Code R. 64-4.002(5)(a). This evaluation was to be conducted by a three-person committee (the "Reviewers"), each member of which had the duty to independently review and score each application. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 64-4.002(5)(b). The applicant with the "highest aggregate score" in each region would be selected as the Department's intended licensee for that region. A "score" is commonly understood to be "a number that expresses accomplishment (as in a game or test) or excellence (as in quality) either absolutely in points gained or by comparison to a standard." See "Score," Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited May 30, 2018). Scores are expressed in cardinal numbers, which show quantity, e.g., how many or how much. When used as a verb in this context, the word "score" plainly means "to determine the merit of," or to "grade," id., so that the assigned score should be a cardinal number that tells how much quality the graded application has as compared to the competing applications. The language of the rule leaves little or no doubt that the Reviewers were supposed to score the applicants in a way that quantified the differences between them, rather than with superlatives such as "more qualified" and "most qualified" (or numbers that merely represented superlative adjectives). By rule, the Department had identified the specific items that the Reviewers would consider during the evaluation. These items were organized around five subjects, which the undersigned will refer to as Topics. The five Topics were Cultivation, Processing, Dispensing, Medical Director, and Financials. Under the Topics of Cultivation, Processing, and Dispensing were four Subtopics (the undersigned's term): Technical Ability; Infrastructure; Premises, Resources, Personnel; and Accountability. In the event, the 12 Topic-Subtopic combinations (e.g., Cultivation-Technical Ability, Cultivation- Infrastructure), together with the two undivided Topics (i.e., Medical Director and Financials), operated as 14 separate evaluation categories. The undersigned refers to these 14 categories as Domains. The Department assigned a weight (by rule) to each Topic, denoting the relative importance of each in assessing an applicant's overall merit. The Subtopics, in turn, were worth 25% of their respective Topics' scores, so that a Topic's raw or unadjusted score would be the average of its four Subtopics' scores, if it had them. The 14 Domains and their associated weights are shown in the following table: CULTIVATION 30% 1. Cultivation – Technical Ability 25% out of 30% 2. Cultivation – Infrastructure 25% out of 30% 3. Cultivation – Premises, Resources, Personnel 25% out of 30% 4. Cultivation – Accountability 25% out of 30% PROCESSING 30% 5. Processing – Technical Ability 25% out of 30% 6. Processing – Infrastructure 25% out of 30% 7. Processing: Premises, Resources, Personnel 25% out of 30% 8. Processing: Accountability 25% out of 30% DISPENSING 15% 9. Dispensing: Technical Ability 25% out of 15% 10. Dispensing: Infrastructure 25% out of 15% 11. Dispensing: Premises, Resources, Personnel 25% out of 15% 12. Dispensing: Accountability 25% out of 15% 13. MEDICAL DIRECTOR 5% 14. FINANCIALS 20% If there were any ambiguity in the meaning of the word "score" as used in rule 64-4.002(5)(b), the fact of the weighting scheme removes all uncertainty, because in order to take a meaningful percentage (or fraction) of a number, the number must signify a divisible quantity, or else the reduction of the number, x, to say, 20% of x, will not be interpretable. Some additional explanation here might be helpful. If the number 5 is used to express how much of something we have, e.g., 5 pounds of flour, we can comprehend the meaning of 20% of that value (1 pound of flour). On the other hand, if we have coded the rank of "first place" with the number 5 (rather than, e.g., the letter A, which would be equally functional as a symbol), the meaning of 20% of that value is incomprehensible (no different, in fact, than the meaning of 20% of A). To be sure, we could multiply the number 5 by 0.20 and get 1, but the product of this operation, despite being mathematically correct (i.e., true in the abstract, as a computational result), would have no contextual meaning. This is because 20% of first place makes no sense. Coding the rank of first place with the misleading symbol of "5 points" would not help, either, because the underlying referent——still a position, not a quantity——is indivisible no matter what symbol it is given.3/ We can take this analysis further. The weighting scheme clearly required that the points awarded to an applicant for each Topic must contribute a prescribed proportionate share both to the applicant's final score per Reviewer, as well as to its aggregate score. For example, an applicant's score for Financials had to be 20% of its final Reviewer scores and 20% of its aggregate score, fixing the ratio of unweighted Financials points to final points (both Reviewer and aggregate) at 5:1. For this to work, a point scale having fixed boundaries had to be used, and the maximum number of points available for the final scores needed to be equal to the maximum number of points available for the raw (unweighted) scores at the Topic level. In other words, to preserve proportionality, if the applicants were scored on a 100-point scale, the maximum final score had to be 100, and the maximum raw score for each of the five Topics needed to be 100, too. The reasons for this are as follows. If there were no limit to the number of points an applicant could earn at the Topic level (like a baseball game), the proportionality of the weighting scheme could not be maintained; an applicant might run up huge scores in lower-weighted Topics, for example, making them proportionately more important to its final score than higher-weighted Topics. Similarly, if the maximum number of points available at the Topic level differed from the maximum number of points available as a final score, the proportionality of the weighting scheme (the prescribed ratios) would be upset, obviously, because, needless to say, 30% of, e.g., 75 points is not equal to 30% of 100 points. If a point scale is required to preserve proportionality, and it is, then so, too, must the intervals between points be the same, for all scores, in all categories, or else the proportionality of the weighting scheme will fail. For a scale to be uniform and meaningful, which is necessary to maintain the required proportionality, the points in it must be equidistant from each other; that is, the interval between 4 and 5, for example, needs to be the same as the interval between 2 and 3, and the distance between 85 and 95 (if the scale goes that high) has to equal that between 25 and 35.4/ When the distances between values are known, the numbers are said to express interval data.5/ Unless the distances between points are certain and identical, the prescribed proportions of the weighting scheme established in rule 64-4.002 will be without meaning. Simply stated, there can be no sense of proportion without interpretable intervals. We cannot say that a 5:1 relationship exists between two point totals (scores) if we have no idea what the distance is between 5 points and 1 point.6/ The weighting system thus necessarily implied that the "scores" assigned by the Reviewers during the comparative evaluation would be numerical values (points) that (i) expressed quantity; (ii) bore some rational relationship to the amount of quality the Reviewer perceived in an applicant in relation to the other applicants; and (iii) constituted interval data. In other words, the rule unambiguously required that relative quality be counted (quantified), not merely coded. The Scoring Methodology: Interval Coding In performing the comparative evaluation of the initial applications filed in 2015, the Reviewers were required to use Form DH8007-OCU-2/2015, "Scorecard for Low-THC Cannabis Dispensing Organization Selection" (the "Scorecard"), which is incorporated by reference in rule 64-4.002(5)(a). There are no instructions on the Scorecard. The Department's rules are silent to how the Reviewers were supposed to score applications using the Scorecard, and they provide no process for generating aggregate scores from Reviewer scores. To fill these gaps, the Department devised several policies that governed its free-form decision-making in the run- up to taking preliminary agency action on the applications. Regarding raw scores, the Department decided that the Reviewers would sort the applications by region and then rank the applications, from best to worst, on a per-Domain basis, so that each Reviewer would rank each applicant 14 times. An applicant's raw Domanial score would be its position in the ranking, from 1 to x, where x was both (i) equal to the number of applicants within the region under review and (ii) the number assigned to the rank of first place (or Best). In other words, the Reviewer's judgments as to the descending order of suitability of the competing applicants, per Domain, were symbolized or coded with numbers that the Department called "rank scores," and which were thereafter used as the applicants' raw Domanial scores. To be more specific, in a five-applicant field such as the southeast region, the evaluative judgments of the Reviewers were coded as follows: Evaluative Judgment Symbol ("Rank Score") Best qualified applicant ("Best") 5 points Less qualified than the best qualified applicant, but better qualified than all other applicants ("Second Best") 4 points Evaluative Judgment Symbol ("Rank Score") Less qualified than two better qualified applicants, but better qualified than all other applicants ("Third Best") 3 points Less qualified than three better qualified applicants, but better qualified than all other applicants ("Fourth Best") 2 points Less qualified than four better qualified applicants ("Fifth Best") 1 point The Department's unfortunate decision to code the Reviewers' qualitative judgments regarding positions in rank orders with symbols that look like quantitative judgments regarding amounts of quality led inexorably to extremely misleading results. The so-called "rank scores" give the false impression of interval data, tricking the consumer (and evidently the Department, too) into believing that the distance between scores is certain and the same; that, in other words, an applicant with a "rank score" of 4 is 2 points better than an applicant with a "rank score" of 2. If this deception had been intentional (and, to be clear, there is no evidence it was), we could fairly call it fraud. Even without bad intent, the decision to code positions in ranked series with "scores" expressed as "points" was a colossal blunder that turned the scoring process into a dumpster fire. Before proceeding, it must be made clear that an applicant's being ranked Best in a Domain meant only that, as the highest-ranked applicant, it was deemed more suitable, by some unknown margin, than all the others within the group. By the same token, to be named Second Best meant only that this applicant was less good, in some unknown degree, than the Best applicant, and better, in some unknown degree, than the Third Best and remaining, lower-ranked applicants. The degree of difference in suitability between any two applicants in any Domanial ranking might have been a tiny sliver or a wide gap, even if they occupied adjacent positions, e.g., Second Best and Third Best. The Reviewers made no findings with respect to degrees of difference. Moreover, it cannot truthfully be claimed that the interval between, say, Second Best and Third Best is the same as that between Third Best and Fourth Best, for there exists no basis in fact for such a claim. In sum, the Department's Domanial "rank scores" merely symbolized the applicants' positions in sets of ordered applications. Numbers which designate the respective places (ranks) occupied by items in an ordered list are called ordinal numbers. The type of non-metric data that the "rank scores" symbolize is known as ordinal data, meaning that although the information can be arranged in a meaningful order, there is no unit or meter by which the intervals between places in the ranking can be measured. Because it is grossly misleading to refer to positions in a ranking as "scores" counted in "points," the so-called "rank scores" will hereafter be referred to as "Ordinals"——a constant reminder that we are working with ordinal data. This is important to keep in mind because, as will be seen, there are limits on the kinds of mathematical manipulation that can appropriately be carried out with ordinal data. The Department's policy of coding positions in a rank order with "rank scores" expressed as "points" will be called the "Interval Coding Policy." In conducting the evaluation, the Reviewers followed the Interval Coding Policy. The Computational Methodology: Interval Statements and More Once the Reviewers finished evaluating and coding the applications, the evaluative phase of the Department's free-form process was concluded. The Reviewers had produced a dataset of Domanial Ordinals——42 Domanial Ordinals for each applicant to be exact——that collectively comprised a compilation of information, stored in the scorecards. This universe of Domanial Ordinals will be called herein the "Evaluation Data." The Department would use the Evaluation Data in the next phase of its free-form process as grounds for computing the applicants' aggregate scores. Rule 64-4.002(5)(b) provides that "scorecards from each reviewer will be combined to generate an aggregate score for each application. The Applicant with the highest aggregate score in each dispensing region shall be selected as the region's Dispensing Organization." Notice that the rule here switches to the passive voice. The tasks of (i) "combin[ing]" scorecards to "generate" aggregate scores and of (ii) "select[ing]" regional DOs were not assigned to the Reviewers, whose work was done upon submission of the scorecards. As mentioned previously, the rule does not specify how the Evaluation Data will be used to generate aggregate scores. The Department formulated extralegal policies7/ for this purpose, which can be stated as follows: (i) the Ordinals, which in actuality are numeric code for uncountable information content, shall be deemed real (counted) points, i.e., equidistant units of measurement on a 5-point interval scale (the "Deemed Points Policy"); (ii) in determining aggregate scores, the three Reviewer scores will be averaged instead of added together, so that "aggregate score" means "average Reviewer score" (the "Aggregate Definition"); and (iii) the results of mathematical computations used to determine weighted scores at the Reviewer level and, ultimately, the aggregate scores themselves will be carried out to the fourth decimal place (the "Four Decimal Policy"). The Department's computational process for generating aggregate scores operated like this. For each applicant, a Reviewer final score was derived from each Reviewer, using that Reviewer's 14 Domanial Ordinals for the applicant. For each of the subdivided Topics (Cultivation, Processing, and Dispensing), the mean of the Reviewer's four Domanial Ordinals for the applicant (one Domanial Ordinal for each Subtopic) was determined by adding the four numbers (which, remember, were whole numbers as discussed above) and dividing the sum by 4. The results of these mathematical operations were reported to the second decimal place. (The Reviewer raw score for each of the subdivided Topics was, in other words, the Reviewer's average Subtopic Domanial Ordinal.) For the undivided Topics of Medical Director and Financials, the Reviewer raw score was simply the Domanial Ordinal, as there was only one Domanial Ordinal per undivided Topic. The five Reviewer raw Topic scores (per Reviewer) were then adjusted to account for the applicable weight factor. So, the Reviewer raw scores for Cultivation and Processing were each multiplied by 0.30; raw scores for Dispensing were multiplied by 0.15; raw scores (Domanial Ordinals) for Medical Director were multiplied by 0.05; and raw scores (Domanial Ordinals) for Financials were multiplied by 0.20. These operations produced five Reviewer weighted-Topic scores (per Reviewer), carried out (eventually) to the fourth decimal place. The Reviewer final score was computed by adding the five Reviewer weighted-Topic scores. Thus, each applicant wound up with three Reviewer final scores, each reported to the fourth decimal place pursuant to the Four Decimal Policy. The computations by which the Department determined the three Reviewer final scores are reflected (but not shown) in a "Master Spreadsheet"8/ that the Department prepared. Comprising three pages (one for each Reviewer), the Master Spreadsheet shows all of the Evaluation Data, plus the 15 Reviewer raw Topic scores per applicant, and the three Reviewer final scores for each applicant. Therein, the Reviewer final scores of Reviewer 2 and Reviewer 3 were not reported as numbers having five significant digits, but were rounded to the nearest hundredth. To generate an applicant's aggregate score, the Department, following the Aggregate Definition, computed the average Reviewer final score by adding the three Reviewer final scores and dividing the sum by 3. The result, under the Four Decimal Policy, was carried out the ten-thousandth decimal point. The Department referred to the aggregate score as the "final rank" in its internal worksheets. The Department further assigned a "regional rank" to each applicant, which ordered the applicants, from best to worst, based on their aggregate scores. Put another way, the regional rank was an applicant's Ultimate Ordinal. The Reviewer final scores and the "final ranks" (all carried out to the fourth decimal place), together with the "regional ranks," are set forth in a table the Department has labeled its November 2015 Aggregated Score Card (the "Score Card"). The Score Card does not contain the Evaluation Data. The Master Spreadsheet and Score Card are work papers from the Department's free-form comparative evaluation of DO applications in 2015. Essentially notes, these public records provide some insight into how and why the Department made the decisions it took that year, approving some and denying many of the applications it had reviewed. For reasons that will soon become clear, it is important to remember that although these work papers contain relevant information——information which, in fact, informed agency decisions——they are not themselves, separately or taken together, agency actions. Furthermore, not every fact or "evidence" an agency considers during free-form deliberations is necessary and critical to its preliminary agency action. Predecisional matters that the agency takes into account in arriving at its intended action that are merely "deliberative" facts (as opposed to adjudicative facts upon which a party's substantial interests depend) might be informative or explanatory, but they are not a critical and necessary part of the decision. Preliminary Agency Actions Once the aggregate scores had been computed, the Department was ready to take preliminary agency action on the applications. As to each application, the Department made a binary decision: Best or Not Best. The intended action on the applications of the five Best applicants (one per region), which were identified by their aggregate scores (highest per region), would be to grant them. Each of the Not Best applicants, so deemed due to their not having been among the highest scored applicants, would be notified that the Department intended to deny its application. To explain in greater detail, the ultimate factual determination that the Department made for each application was whether the applicant was, or was not, the most dependable, most qualified nursery as compared to the alternatives available in a particular region. The evidence of facts behind these determinations consisted of the applications themselves, whose representations were taken as true. That is, when the Reviewers formed opinions about the relative suitability of the applicants in connection with the multiple categories of criteria, they accepted the facts as stated in the applications; their judgments were based, in effect, on a record of undisputed facts. The Reviewers' Ordinally-coded judgments regarding which applicants were Best, Second Best, Third Best, and so forth in each Domain amounted to a kind of evidence, loosely analogous to opinion testimony, which was in conflict inasmuch as the Reviewers did not agree on all rankings. (The aggregate scores are apparently supposed to synthesize the disparate opinions, to produce a simulacrum of a consensus; because the Reviewers did not collaborate as a collegial body, the aggregate scores do not represent a real consensus.) Crucially, however, despite appearances, the Evaluation Data comprising the Reviewers' opinions was not quantitative but qualitative, for the Reviewers, as mentioned, made no attempt to quantify the relative suitability of the applicants in numeric terms and thus produced no interval data whatsoever. Using the Deemed Points Policy and the Four Decimal Policy, the Department purported to turn the water of Evaluation Data into the wine of finely tuned aggregate scores, which latter provided the direct grounds for the Department's ultimate decisions as to which applicants were the most dependable, most qualified nurseries. The aggregate scores, however, were (and are) devoid of quantitative content and therefore cannot be compared mathematically to find interval differences; it is impossible, after all, to extract information that was never present to begin with. As will be explained, the aggregate scores, if properly construed and corrected for flagrant overprecision, provide at most a very rough idea of the Reviewers' "consensus opinion" (constructive, not actual) as to the relative order of the applicants, sorted by suitability (most – least). In the end, the Department's preliminary decisions on the DO applications were qualitative, not quantitative, and were formulated at a level of generality, i.e., Best-grant/Not Best- deny, far above such particular details as whether an applicant's aggregate score constituted a true interval statement. It was neither critical nor necessary to the preliminary agency actions actually taken that findings be made measuring the precise space between applicants; or that the seemingly granular aggregate scores be adjudged true or credible to the ten-thousandths point. Clear Points of Entry The Department decided preliminarily that Costa was Best and that four other southeast region applicants, including Nature's Way, were Not Best. Accordingly, the Department's intended agency action was to grant Costa's application and deny the rest. Letters dated November 23, 2015, were sent to the applicants informing them either that "your application received the highest score" and thus is granted, or that because "[you were] not the highest scored applicant in [your] region, your application . . . is denied," whichever was the case. The letters contained a clear point of entry whose legal sufficiency as to the stated and recognizable agency action Nature's Way does not dispute, which concluded with the usual warning that the "[f]ailure to file a petition within 21 days shall constitute a waiver of the right to a hearing on this agency action."9/ (Emphasis added). Nature's Way decided not to request a hearing in 2015, and therefore it is undisputed that the Department's proposed action, i.e., the denial of Nature's Way's application because the applicant was not deemed to be the most dependable, most qualified nursery for purposes of selecting a DO for the southeast region, became final agency action without a formal hearing, the right to which Nature's Way elected to waive. The Department argues that Nature's Way thereby waived, forever and for all purposes, the right to a hearing on the question of whether its and Costa's Department-computed aggregate scores of 2.8833 and 4.4000, respectively, are, in fact, true as interval statements of quantity. (Note that if these scores are false as interval data, as Nature's Way contends, then the statement that Costa's score exceeds Nature's Way's score by 1.5167 points is false, also, because it is impossible to calculate a true, interpretable difference (interval) between two values unless those values are expressions of quantified data. Simply put, you cannot subtract Fourth Best from Best.) The Department's waiver argument overreaches. To be sure, Nature's Way waived the right to a hearing on the proposed denial of its application, which was the only recognizable agency action in clear view in 2015. Nature's Way is not attempting in this proceeding, however, to contest the denial of its 2015 DO application. What the Department is really trying to say is that, in contesting the proposed denial of its 2017 MMTC application, Nature's Way is barred by administrative finality from "relitigating" matters, such as the truth of the aggregate scores as quantifiable facts, which were supposedly decided conclusively in the final agency action on its DO application in 2015. The finality issue boils down to whether the truth of the aggregate scores, as measurable quantities, was actually adjudicated (or even judicable) in 2015, so that the numbers 2.8833 and 4.4000 are now incontestably true interval data, such that one figure can meaningfully be subtracted from the other for purposes of applying the One Point Condition. The Department did not explicitly adjudicate the question of the aggregate scores' validity as interval data in taking final agency action on Nature's Way's application and probably never gave the matter serious thought. Thus, we must consider whether the aggregate scores, as quantities, were critical and necessary to the relevant agency action. In this regard, Nature's Way contends that the absence, in the notices of intended decision, of any mention of the numbers comprising the scores is compelling, even dispositive, evidence that the particular scores were not important. Not surprisingly, the Department asserts that its omission of the "final ranks" from the notices to the applicants is "legally irrelevant" to the question of whether the scores were necessarily determined to be true quantities in the agency action. The Department is wrong about the supposed irrelevance of the noninclusion of the scores in the 2015 notices. As regards Nature's Way, the notice of intended action is the only written "order" that was entered determining the applicant's substantial interests; thus, the notice/"order" is the most persuasive proof of what the Department actually decided. That the Department failed, at the time when it would have mattered to the sufficiency of the clear point of entry, to include a finding to the effect that "your aggregate score was determined to be 2.8833 points on a 5-point scale as compared the highest measured score of 4.4000 points" is strong evidence that the truth of an applicant's aggregate score as a statement of fact expressing quantified interval data was not part and parcel of the decision then being taken; if the Department had thought, then, that truthful interval statements of fact were critical and necessary to its proposed action, it presumably would have (and certainly should have) included such information in the notice, over which it had absolute control. Ultimately, the question of whether the aggregate scores were indispensable to, and thus necessarily decided in, the Department's notice of intent/"order" depends on the meaning of the scores. There is a strong tendency to look at a number, such as 2.8833, and assume that it is unambiguous——and, indeed, the Department is unquestionably attempting to capitalize on that tendency. But numbers can be ambiguous.10/ The aggregate scores are, clearly, open to interpretation. To begin, however, it must be stated up front that there is no dispute about the existence of the aggregate scores. It is an undisputed historical fact, for example, that Nature's Way had a final ranking (aggregate score) of 2.8833 as computed by the Department in November 2015. There is likewise no dispute that Costa's Department-computed aggregate score was 4.4000. In this sense, the scores are historical facts—— relevant ones, too, since an applicant needed to have had an aggregate score in 2015 to take advantage of the One Point Condition enacted in 2017. The existence of the scores, however, is a separate property from their meaning. Clearly, the aggregate scores that exist from history purport to convey information about the applicants; in effect, they are statements. The ambiguity arises from the fact that each score could be interpreted as having either of two different meanings. On the one hand, an aggregate score could be understood as a numerically coded non- quantity, namely a rank. In other words, the aggregate scores could be interpreted reasonably as ordinal data. On the other hand, an aggregate score could be understood as a quantified measurement taken in units of equal value, i.e., interval data. In 2015, the Department insisted (when it suited its purposes) that the aggregate scores were numeric shorthand for its discretionary value judgments about which applicants were best suited, by region, to be DOs, reflecting where the applicants, by region, stood in relation to the best suited applicants and to each other. The Department took this position because it wanted to limit the scope of the formal hearings requested by disappointed applicants to reviewing its decisions for abuse of discretion. Yet, even then, the Department wanted the aggregate scores to be seen as something more rigorously determined than a discretionary ranking. Scores such as 2.8833 and 3.2125 plainly connote a much greater degree of precision than "these applicants are less qualified than others." Indeed, in one formal hearing, the Department strongly implied that the aggregate scores expressed interval data, arguing that they showed "the [Department's position regarding the] order of magnitude" of the differences in "qualitative value" between the applicants, so that a Fourth Best applicant having a score of 2.6458 was asserted to be "far behind" the highest-scored applicant whose final ranking was 4.1042.11/ A ranking, of course, expresses order but not magnitude; interval data, in contrast, expresses both order and magnitude, and it is factual in nature, capable of being true or false. In short, as far as the meaning of the aggregate scores is concerned, the Department has wanted to have it both ways. Currently, the Department is all-in on the notion that the aggregate scores constitute precise interval data, i.e., quantified facts. In its Proposed Recommended Order, on page 11, the Department argues that "Nature's Way does not meet the within-one-point requirement" because "Nature's Way's Final Rank [aggregate score of 2.8833] is 1.5167 points less than the highest Final Rank [Cost's aggregate score, 4.4000] in its region." This is a straight-up statement of fact, not a value judgment or policy preference. Moreover, it is a statement of fact which is true only if the two aggregate scores being compared (2.8833 and 4.4000), themselves, are true statements of quantifiable fact about the respective applicants. The Department now even goes so far as to claim that the aggregate score is the precise and true number (quantity) of points that an applicant earned as a matter of fact. On page 4 of its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department states that Costa "earned a Final Rank of 4.4000" and that Nature's Way had an "earned Final Rank of 2.8833." In this view, the scores tell us not that, in the Department's discretionary assignment of value, Costa was better suited to be the DO for the southeast region, but rather that (in a contest, it is insinuated, the Department merely refereed) Costa outscored Nature's Way by exactly 1.5167 points——and that the points have meaning as equidistant units of measurement. If the scores were understood and used only as ordinal data, i.e., solely as numerical expressions of the Department's discretionary value judgment that Costa was Best and Nature's Way, Not Best, then the scores were part of the Department's action on Nature's Way's application. But that is not the meaning being ascribed to the scores in this case. Rather, as just mentioned, the Department is using the aggregate scores as interval statements of quantifiable fact, claiming that Nature's Way "earned" exactly 2.8833 points on a 5-point scale where each point represents a standard unit of measurement, while Costa "earned" 4.4000 points; this, again, is the only way it would be correct to say that Costa was 1.5167 points better than Nature's Way. The aggregate scores assuredly did not need to have this meaning to support the Department's final action on Nature's Way's application. This is because the Department reasonably could have grounded——and, in fact, had to base——its denial of Nature's Way's application on an understanding that the scores expressed numerically (i) the Department's discretionary choice of Costa as the most dependable, most qualified nursery among the southeast region applicants and (ii) the direction of the also- rans (next best to least qualified) in a particular order behind Costa without quantifying any particular distances from Costa or between them. That is, it was not necessary and critical, in 2015, for the Department to find that Costa was 1.5167 points better than Nature's Way in order to deny Nature's Way's application on the more abstract, but sufficient, ground that Nature's Way was Not Best. (Nor could the Department have made such a finding, given that genuine measured quantities were not included in the Evaluation Data.) The point should not get lost that Nature's Way, and the other nurseries, applied for a DO license, not an aggregate score. The agency action in 2015 was not, therefore, to grant a particular score to an application, nor, certainly, was it to grant the applications of those whose score was a particular number, or within one point of a particular number. It was, rather, to choose the most dependable, most qualified nurseries and grant them licenses, while simultaneously denying the other applications. The aggregate scores guided these decisions, to be sure, but they were not, themselves, the matters being decided. Unlike now, where the aggregate scores are facts that must be proven true as quantities so that the "within-one-point" issue can be decided through formal proceedings, they were, then, "proof," sort of, of the ultimate fact that Costa (or another applicant) was the most qualified nursery for a region—— "proof" upon which, moreover, the Department was required to rely in deciding through free-form proceedings whether it intended to grant or deny a particular application. The undersigned finds that while the aggregate scores, as unquantified value judgments (i.e., nonnumeric opinions coded with numbers), were integral to the Department's free-form decision-making process, as interval data they were not essential to the agency action of denying Nature's Way's application——and could not have been, in any event, since the aggregate scores were never infused with quantifiable information content. In short, the truth of the aggregate scores as statements of fact expressing interval data has never been previously adjudicated as between the Department and Nature's Way. Substantiating the foregoing finding is the irrefutable observation that an applicant such as Nature's Way would have gotten nowhere challenging the 2015 proposed agency action based on a dispute about the truth of its aggregate score. Suppose that, after receiving the notice of intended denial, Nature's Way had pored over the Master Spreadsheet and Score Card and determined that the Department had made what it believed was a computational error, which, if corrected, would result in the upward revision of Nature's Way's aggregate score to 3.8833. Imagine, then, what would have happened if Nature's Way had requested a disputed-fact hearing to contest its score based on the alleged mathematical mistake, demanding a correction. Even if the Department disagreed that it had made a mistake, it probably would have denied the hearing request on the grounds that the disputed fact (whether the score should have been 3.8833 instead of 2.8833) was not material, and it would have been within its rights to do so. To change the proposed agency action, Nature's Way would have needed to prove that it was the most dependable, most qualified nursery in the southeast region——not that its aggregate score should have been 3.8833.12/ Now suppose Nature's Way had discovered that an alleged math error had dropped its score to 2.8833 from 4.0033—— an error, in other words, which, if corrected, would have put Nature's Way in first place, above Costa. Even in that seemingly more favorable situation for Nature's Way, to change the proposed denial of its application to a final order granting the same, Nature's Way still would have needed to prove at hearing, where a de novo comparative review of the applications would be undertaken, that it was, in fact, the most dependable, most qualified nursery——an ultimate determination that Costa or another nursery, at least, if not the Department, would almost certainly have disputed. The aggregate scores, together with proof of the alleged math error, might (or might not) have been received in the de novo hearing13/; but, if admitted, evidence establishing that, based on the Evaluation Data, Nature's Way's score actually should have been 4.0033 would not have sufficed, or even been necessary, to prove that Nature's Way was, in fact, the most qualified candidate, since the ALJ would not be sitting in review of the Department's scoring decisions, but instead deciding for himself or herself, anew, the question of relative suitability.14/ The undersigned must acknowledge that the preceding two paragraphs rest on a presupposition of fidelity to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). In fact, in actual proceedings arising from the 2015 preliminary agency actions, as previously mentioned, the Department took the clearly erroneous position that the ALJ was limited to merely reviewing the Department's licensing decisions, under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard, as opposed to formulating final agency actions, which is standard practice in section 120.57 hearings, where the agency's preliminary decisions are given no deference.15/ The Department actually went farther than that, writing that "the ALJ cannot take the place of the three specially qualified [Reviewers because the] ALJ is not a certified public accountant, the director of the [OCU], and a member of the Drug Policy Advisory Council all in one."16/ It is plain that the Department, left to its own devices, would have afforded a very limited, and probably inadequate, administrative remedy to the disappointed applicants of 2015, because even if the ALJ found that the Department had abused its discretion,17/ the ALJ could not (as the Department would have it) do anything to remedy the situation except, perhaps, remand the case to the Department for a brand new evaluation, as an appellate court would remand a case for a new trial. Of course, the Department had, and has, no basis in law for radically amending the APA in such fashion. As it happened, events, in particular the enactment in 2017 of the Medical Marijuana Law, relieved the Department of the burden of defending its untenable arguments before a court of appeal. It cannot go unmentioned, therefore, that the Department, which believes that none of the applicants was ever entitled to a full and fair opportunity to litigate, de novo, the validity of the scores even as ordinal data for purposes of challenging the preliminary licensing decisions, is currently arguing (in true "heads I win, tails you lose" fashion) that those same scores were conclusively adjudicated via final agency action in 2015 to be true as statements of quantified fact, i.e., as interval data. This position cannot prevail. The Master Spreadsheet and Score Card are not modern-day Tablets of Stone upon which the inerrant Law was inscribed by the hand of the Almighty Bureaucrat. To repeat for emphasis, the truth of the scores, as statements of quantified fact, has never been adjudicated. ENACTMENT OF THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAW Effective January 3, 2017, Article X of the Florida Constitution was amended to include a new section 29, which addresses medical marijuana production, possession, dispensing, and use. Generally speaking, section 29 expands access to medical marijuana beyond the framework created by the Florida Legislature in 2014. To implement the newly adopted constitutional provisions and "create a unified regulatory structure," the legislature enacted the Medical Marijuana Law, which substantially revised section 381.986 during the 2017 Special Session. Ch. 2017-232, § 1, Laws of Fla. Among other things, the Medical Marijuana Law establishes a licensing protocol for ten new MMTCs. The relevant language of the new statute states: (8) MEDICAL MARIJUANA TREATMENT CENTERS.— (a) The department shall license medical marijuana treatment centers to ensure reasonable statewide accessibility and availability as necessary for qualified patients registered in the medical marijuana use registry and who are issued a physician certification under this section. * * * The department shall license as medical marijuana treatment centers 10 applicants that meet the requirements of this section, under the following parameters: As soon as practicable, but no later than August 1, 2017, the department shall license any applicant whose application was reviewed, evaluated, and scored by the department and which was denied a dispensing organization license by the department under former s. 381.986, Florida Statutes 2014; which had one or more administrative or judicial challenges pending as of January 1, 2017, or had a final ranking within one point of the highest final ranking in its region under former s. 381.986, Florida Statutes 2014; which meets the requirements of this section; and which provides documentation to the department that it has the existing infrastructure and technical and technological ability to begin cultivating marijuana within 30 days after registration as a medical marijuana treatment center. § 381.986, Fla. Stat. (Emphasis added: The underscored provision is the One Point Condition). The legislature granted the Department rulemaking authority, as needed, to implement the provisions of section 381.986(8). § 381.986(8)(k), Fla. Stat. In addition, the legislature authorized the Department to adopt emergency rules pursuant to section 120.54(4), as necessary to implement section 381.986, without having to find an actual emergency, as otherwise required by section 120.54(4)(a). Ch. 2017-232, § 14, Laws of Fla. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ONE POINT CONDITION AND ADOPTION OF THE EMERGENCY RULE The One Point Condition went into effect on June 23, 2017. Ch. 2017-232, § 20, Laws of Fla. Thereafter, the Department issued a license to Sun Bulb Nursery (a 2015 DO applicant in the southwest region), because the Department concluded that Sun Bulb's final ranking was within one point of the highest final ranking in the southwest region.18/ Keith St. Germain Nursery Farms ("KSG"), like Nature's Way a 2015 DO applicant for the southeast region, requested MMTC registration pursuant to the One Point Condition in June 2017. In its request for registration, KSG asserted that the One Point Condition is ambiguous and proposed that the Department either calculate the one point difference based on the regional ranks set forth in the Score Card (KSG was the regional Second Best, coded as Ultimate Ordinal 4) or round off the spurious decimal points in the aggregate scores when determining the one point difference. The Department preliminarily denied KSG's request for MMTC registration in August 2017. In its notice of intent, the Department stated in part: The highest-scoring entity in the Southeast Region, Costa Nursery Farms, LLC, received a final aggregate score of 4.4000. KSG received a final aggregate score of 3.2125. Therefore, KSG was not within one point of Costa Farms. KSG requested a disputed-fact hearing on this proposed agency action and also filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing and Administrative Determination Concerning Unadopted Rules, initiating Keith St. Germain Nursery Farms v. Florida Department of Health, DOAH Case No. 17-5011RU ("KSG's Section 120.56(4) Proceeding"). KSG's Section 120.56(4) Proceeding, which Nature's Way joined as a party by intervention, challenged the legality of the Department's alleged unadopted rules for determining which of the 2015 DO applicants were qualified for licensure pursuant to the One Point Condition. Faced with the KSG litigation, the Department adopted Emergency Rule 64ER17-3, which stated in relevant part: For the purposes of implementing s. 381.986(8)(a)2.a., F.S., the following words and phrases shall have the meanings indicated: Application – an application to be a dispensing organization under former s. 381.986, F.S. (2014), that was timely submitted in accordance with Rule 64- 4.002(5) of the Florida Administrative Code (2015). Final Ranking – an applicant's aggregate score for a given region as provided in the column titled "Final Rank" within the November 2015 Aggregated Score Card, incorporated by reference and available at [hyperlink omitted], as the final rank existed on November 23, 2015. Highest Final Ranking – the final rank with the highest point value for a given region, consisting of an applicant's aggregate score as provided in the column titled "Final Rank" within the November 2015 Aggregated Score Card, as the final rank existed on November 23, 2015. Within One Point – one integer (i.e., whole, non-rounded number) carried out to four decimal points (i.e., 1.0000) by subtracting an applicant's final ranking from the highest final ranking in the region for which the applicant applied. Qualified 2015 Applicant – an individual or entity whose application was reviewed, evaluated, and scored by the department and that was denied a dispensing organization license under former s. 381.986, F.S. (2014) and either: (1) had one or more administrative or judicial challenges pending as of January 1, 2017; or had a final ranking within one point of the highest final ranking in the region for which it applied, in accordance with Rule 64-4.002(5) of the Florida Administrative Code (2015). The Department admits that not much analysis or thought was given to the development of this rule, which reflected the Department's knee-jerk conclusion that the One Point Condition's use of the term "final ranking" clearly and unambiguously incorporated the applicants' "aggregate scores" (i.e., "final rank" positions), as stated in the Score Card, into the statute. In any event, the rule's transparent purpose was to adjudicate the pending licensing dispute with KSG and shore up the Department's ongoing refusal (in Department of Health Case No. 2017-0232) to grant KSG a formal hearing on the proposed denial of its application. On October 26, 2017, the Department entered into a settlement agreement with KSG pursuant to which the Department agreed to register KSG as an MMTC. The Department issued a Final Order Adopting Settlement Agreement with KSG on October 30, 2017. That same day (and in order to effectuate the settlement with KSG), the Department issued rule 64ER17-7 (the "Emergency Rule"), the validity of which is at issue in related DOAH Case No. 17-5801RE. The Emergency Rule amends former rule 64ER17-3 to expand the pool of Qualified 2015 Applicants by exactly one, adding KSG——not by name, of course, but by deeming all the regional Second Best applicants to be Within One Point. Because KSG was the only 2015 applicant ranked Second Best in its region that did not have an aggregate score within one point of its region's Best applicant in accordance with rule 64ER17-3, KSG was the only nursery that could take advantage of the newly adopted provisions. As relevant, the Emergency Rule provides as follows: This emergency rule supersedes the emergency rule 64ER17-3 which was filed and effective on September 28, 2017. (1) For the purposes of implementing s. 381.986(8)(a)2.a., F.S., the following words and phrases shall have the meanings indicated: Application – an application to be a dispensing organization under former s. 381.986, F.S. (2014), that was timely submitted in accordance with Rule 64- 4.002(5) of the Florida Administrative Code (2015). Final Ranking – an applicant's aggregate score for a given region as provided in the column titled "Final Rank" or the applicant's regional rank as provided in the column titled "Regional Rank" within the November 2015 Aggregated Score Card, incorporated by reference and available at [hyperlink omitted], as the final rank existed on November 23, 2015. Highest Final Ranking – the final rank with the highest point value for a given region, consisting of an applicant's aggregate score as provided in the column titled "Final Rank" or the applicant's regional rank as provided in the column titled "Regional Rank" within the November 2015 Aggregated Score Card, as the final rank existed on November 23, 2015. Within One Point – for the aggregate score under the column "Final Rank" one integer (i.e., whole, non-rounded number) carried out to four decimal points (i.e., 1.0000) or for the regional rank under the column "Regional Rank" one whole number difference, by subtracting an applicant's final ranking from the highest final ranking in the region for which the applicant applied. Qualified 2015 Applicant – an individual or entity whose application was reviewed, evaluated, and scored by the department and that was denied a dispensing organization license under former s. 381.986, F.S. (2014) and either: (1) had one or more administrative or judicial challenges pending as of January 1, 2017; or (2) had a final ranking within one point of the highest final ranking in the region for which it applied, in accordance with Rule 64-4.002(5) of the Florida Administrative Code (2015). (Emphasis added). In a nutshell, the Emergency Rule provides that an applicant meets the One Point Condition if either (i) the difference between its aggregate score and the highest regional aggregate score, as those scores were determined by the Department effective November 23, 2015, is less than or equal to 1.0000; or (ii) its regional rank, as determined by the Department effective November 23, 2015, is Second Best. A number of applicants satisfy both criteria, e.g., 3 Boys, McCrory's, Chestnut Hill, and Alpha (northwest region). Some, in contrast, meet only one or the other. Sun Bulb, Treadwell, and Loop's, for example, meet (i) but not (ii). KSG, alone, meets (ii) but not (i). The Department has been unable to come up with a credible, legally cohesive explanation for the amendments that distinguish the Emergency Rule from its predecessor. On the one hand, Christian Bax testified that KSG had persuaded the Department that "within one point" meant, for purposes of the One Point Condition, Second Best (or "second place"), and that this reading represented a reasonable interpretation of a "poorly crafted sentence" using an "unartfully crafted term," i.e., "final ranking." On the other hand, the Department argues in its Proposed Recommended Order (on page 11) that the One Point Condition's "plain language reflects the legislature's intent that the 'second-best' applicant in each region (if otherwise qualified) be licensed as an MMTC." (Emphasis added). Logically, of course, the One Point Condition cannot be both "poorly crafted" (i.e., ambiguous) and written in "plain language" (i.e., unambiguous); legally, it must be one or the other. Put another way, the One Point Condition either must be construed, which entails a legal analysis known as statutory interpretation that is governed by well-known canons of construction and results in a legal ruling declaring the meaning of the ambiguous terms, or it must be applied according to its plain language, if (as a matter of law) it is found to be unambiguous. Obviously, as well, the One Point Condition, whether straightforward or ambiguous, cannot mean both within one point and within one place, since these are completely different statuses.19/ If the statute is clear and unambiguous, only one of the alternatives can be correct; if ambiguous, either might be permissible, but not both simultaneously. By adopting the Emergency Rule, the Department took a position in direct conflict with the notion that the One Point Condition is clear and unambiguous; its reinterpretation of the statute is consistent only with the notion that the statute is ambiguous, and its present attempt to disown that necessarily implicit conclusion is rejected. The irony is that the Department surrendered the high ground of statutory unambiguity, which it initially occupied and stoutly defended, to take up an indefensible position, where, instead of choosing between two arguably permissible, but mutually exclusive, interpretations, as required, it would adopt both interpretations. The only reasonable inference the undersigned can draw from the Department's bizarre maneuver is that the Emergency Rule is not the product of high-minded policy making but rather a litigation tactic, which the Department employed as a necessary step to resolve the multiple disputes then pending between it and KSG. The Emergency Rule was adopted to adjudicate the KSG disputes in KSG's favor, supplanting the original rule that was adopted to adjudicate the same disputes in the Department's favor. THE DENIAL OF NATURE'S WAY'S APPLICATION FOR LICENSURE AS AN MMTC On January 17, 2018——90 days after Nature's Way submitted its request for MMTC registration——the Department issued a letter denying Nature's Way's application ("Denial Letter"). In the Denial Letter, the Department determined that Nature's Way did not have a pending challenge to the denial of its DO licensure application as of January 1, 2017, and that it "did not have a final score within one point of the highest scoring applicant in its region." As a result, the Department determined it was unnecessary to make any findings as to Nature's Way's demonstration and documentation of its ability to cultivate within 30 days of registration, as required by law. With respect to the "within-one-point" determination, the Department's Denial Letter stated: The highest-scoring entity in the Southeast region, Costa Nursery Farms, LLC, received a final aggregate score of 4.4000 and a regional rank of 5. Nature's Way received a final aggregate score of 2.8833 and a regional rank of 2. To implement section 381.986(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes, the Department adopted Emergency Rule 64ER17-7. This emergency rule states that "within one point" means for the aggregate score under . . . 'Final Rank' one integer (i.e., whole, non-rounded number) carried out to four decimal points (i.e., 1.0000) or for the regional rank under . . . 'Regional Rank' one whole number difference, by subtracting an applicant's final ranking from the highest final ranking in the region for which the applicant applied. Nature's Way was not within one point of Costa Nursery Farms, LLC, either under the "Final Rank" or the "Regional Rank." The Department also asserted that, because Nature's Way had not challenged the Department's November 2015 denial of its DO application, Nature's Way had "thereby waiv[ed] any right to challenge the Department's prior actions or decisions, including the final scoring." THE INVALIDITY OF THE EMERGENCY RULE AND THE VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 120.54 Emergency Rule 64ER17-7(1)(b), (c), and (d) has been declared to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See Nature's Way Nursery of Miami, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, DOAH Case Nos. 17-5801RE & 18-0720RU (Fla. DOAH June 15, 2018)(the "Rule Challenge"). It has been determined, as well, in the Rule Challenge, that the Deemed Points Policy and the Four Decimal Policy, which the Department would use as authoritative rules of decision in determining Nature's Way's substantial interests in obtaining an MMTC license, are unadopted rules whose enforcement violates section 120.54(1)(a). A PREVIEW OF THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Deciding whether a statute is ambiguous or not, and, when necessary, interpreting an ambiguous statute, are questions of law. As such, these matters will be addressed in greater detail further down, in the Conclusions of Law. These legal conclusions, however, shape the universe of material facts. So that the reader will know why the upcoming findings of fact are necessary and relevant, the undersigned will give a quick peek, here, at his conclusions regarding the One Point Condition. The One Point Condition is ambiguous as a matter of law. It is subject to two reasonable, but mutually exclusive, interpretations, both of which, as mentioned, the Department has embraced——simultaneously——in the Emergency Rule. One of these interpretations, however, is clearly superior, namely that the legislature used the term "final ranking" idiosyncratically as a synonym for "aggregate score." This, in fact, is how the Department initially read the statute, pre-litigation, and how the Department implemented the statute, in the absence of controversy, when it licensed Sun Bulb. The other construction, which requires that "final ranking" be understood as "regional rank," is (just barely) within the range of permissible interpretations; being at best plausible, however, this inferior interpretation is rejected in favor of the other, much better and more natural reading of the statute. The One Point Condition does not implicitly "incorporate" the Score Card, which is not even mentioned therein, or otherwise "validate" the aggregate scores. Nor does the statute purport to adjudicate disputes over aggregate scores. While it is possible that some, many, or all of the legislators who supported the Medical Marijuana Law might have believed that the aggregate scores were adjudicated facts (and thus incontestable), such beliefs, however sincerely held, were incorrect and are irrelevant in any event. The aggregate scores, as previously found, were not, in fact, ever adjudicated with finality, and the legislature is not in the business of adjudicating disputes at the party-vs.-party level. The legislature, as it must, left the work of authoritatively resolving disputes of fact between parties about particular aggregate scores to the branches of government having the power to adjudicate, namely the judiciary and, when authorized, the executive. Finally, the phrase "within one point" was clearly intended to reference one interval data point. That is, the legislature plainly intended that a one-point difference between any two applicants would be the same as a one-point difference between any other two applicants. The obvious goal was to deem licensable any applicant who was, in terms of comparative quality, not more than one-point inferior to (i.e., whose proximity on the quality scale was not farther than one point from) the Best applicant in its region——and that is an interval statement. A quantitative, one-point difference in quality (or whatever the relevant value happens to be) between two items cannot be determined unless the quality (or other relevant value) of the two items is expressed in interval data, using numbers that hold quantitative content. DETERMINING THE INTERVAL DATA POINT DIFFERENCE As discussed above, the Department committed a gross conceptual error when it decided to treat ordinal data as interval data under its Interval Coding and Deemed Points Policies. Sadly, there is no way to fix this problem retroactively; no formula exists for converting or translating non-metric data, such as rankings (which, for the most part, cannot meaningfully be manipulated mathematically), into quantitative data. Further, the defect in the Department's "scoring" process has deprived us of essential information, namely, actual measurements. The upshot is that the question of whether Nature's Way's aggregate score is within one point of Costa's score must be answered without having a quantifiable score for either applicant that can be subtracted from the other's. The unattractive options are either to accept the Department's impossibly defective aggregate scores at face value and render a fiat that cannot be defended as a matter of logic and reason, or instead to examine the mere shadows of scores that are the Ordinals, squinting to see anything that might permit at least a shape of the nonexistent quantitative variables to be reasonably imagined. As the first option is foreign to legal reasoning, not to mention a deformation of the administrative remedy that is the formal hearing under sections 120.569 and 120.57, the undersigned has no choice but to deduce a reasonable approximation of the unknowable interval data by adjusting the ordinal data as best anyone can, keeping in mind that the fault for the insufficiency of the available evidence belongs exclusively to the Department. A Second Look at the Department's Scoring Methodology The Department's scoring methodology was described above. Nevertheless, for purposes of analyzing the available ordinal data to tease out a reasonable approximation of usable interval data, so that we can meaningfully subtract Nature's Way's quantified score from Costa' quantified score, the undersigned proposes that the way the Department arrived at its aggregate scores be reexamined. It will be recalled that each applicant received 14 Ordinals from each reviewer, i.e., one Ordinal per Domain. These will be referred to as Domanial Ordinals. Thus, each applicant received, collectively, 12 Domanial Ordinals apiece for the Main Topics of Cultivation, Processing, and Dispensing; and three Domanial Ordinals apiece for the Main Topics of Medical Director and Financials, for a total of 42 Domanial Ordinals. These five sets of Domanial Ordinals will be referred to generally as Arrays, and specifically as the Cultivation Array, the Processing Array, the Dispensing Array, the MD Array, and the Financials Array. Domanial Ordinals that have been sorted by Array will be referred to, hereafter, as Topical Ordinals. So, for example, the Cultivation Array comprises 12 Topical Ordinals per applicant. A table showing the Arrays of the southeast region applicants is attached as Appendix A. Keeping our attention on the Cultivation Array, observe that if we divide the sum of the 12 Topical Ordinals therein by 12, we will have calculated the mean (or average) of these Topical Ordinals. This value will be referred to as the Mean Topical Ordinal or "MTO." For each applicant, we can find five MTOs, one apiece for the five Main Topics. So, each applicant has a Cultivation MTO, a Processing MTO, and so forth. As discussed, each Main Topic was assigned a weight, e.g., 30% for Cultivation, 20% for Financials. These five weights will be referred to generally as Topical Weights, and specifically as the Cultivation Topical Weight, the Processing Topical Weight, etc. If we reduce, say, the Cultivation MTO to its associated Cultivation Topical Weight (in other words, take 30% of the Cultivation MTO), we will have produced the weighted MTO for the Main Topic of Cultivation. For each applicant, we can find five weighted MTOs ("WMTO"), which will be called specifically the Cultivation WMTO, the Processing WMTO, etc. The sum of each applicant's five WMTOs equals what the Department calls the applicant's aggregate score or final rank. In other words, in the Department's scoring methodology, an MTO is functionally a "Topical raw score" and a WMTO is an "adjusted Topical score" or, more simply, a "Topical subtotal." Thus, we can say, alternatively, that the sum of an applicant's five Topical subtotals equals its DOH-assigned aggregate score. For those in a hurry, an applicant's WMTOs (or Topical subtotals) can be computed quickly by dividing the sum of the Topical Ordinals in each Array by the respective divisors shown in the following table: Dividend Divisor Quotient Sum of the Topical Ordinals in the CULTIVATION Array ÷ 40 - Cultivation WMTO Sum of the Topical Ordinals in the PROCESSING Array ÷ 40 - Processing WMTO Sum of the Topical Ordinals in the DISPENSING Array ÷ 80 - Dispensing WMTO Sum of the Ordinals in Topical the MD Array ÷ 60 - MD WMTO Sum of the Topical Ordinals in the FINANCIALS Array ÷ 15 - Financials WMTO To advance the discussion, it is necessary to introduce some additional concepts. We have become familiar with the Ordinal, i.e., a number that the Department assigned to code a particular rank (5, 4, 3, 2, or 1).20/ From now on, the symbol ? will be used to represent the value of an Ordinal as a variable. There is another value, which we can imagine as a concept, namely the actual measurement or observation, which, as a variable, we will call x. For our purposes, x is the value that a Reviewer would have reported if he or she had been asked to quantify (to the fourth decimal place) the amount of an applicant's suitability vis-à-vis the attribute in view on a scale of 1.0000 to 5.0000, with 5.0000 being "ideal" and 1.0000 meaning, roughly, "serviceable." This value, x, is a theoretical construct only because no Reviewer actually made any such measurements; such measurements, however, could have been made, had the Reviewers been required to do so. Indeed, some vague idea, at least, of x must have been in each Reviewer's mind every time he or she ranked the applicants, or else there would have been no grounds for the rankings. Simply put, a particular value x can be supposed to stand behind every Topical Ordinal because every Topical Ordinal is a function of x. Unfortunately, we do not know x for any Topical Ordinal. Next, there is the true value of x, for which we will give the symbol µ. This is a purely theoretical notion because it represents the value that would be obtained by a perfect measurement, and there is no perfect measurement of anything, certainly not of relative suitability to serve as an MMTC.21/ Finally, measurements are subject to uncertainty, which can be expressed in absolute or relative terms. The absolute uncertainty expresses the size of the range of values in which the true value is highly likely to lie. A measurement given as 150 ± 0.5 pounds tells us that the absolute uncertainty is 0.5 pounds, and that the true value is probably between 149.5 and 150.5 pounds (150 – 0.5 and 150 + 0.5). This uncertainty can be expressed as a percentage of the measured value, i.e., 150 pounds ± .33%, because 0.5 is .33% of 150. With that background out of the way, let's return to concept of the mean. The arithmetic mean is probably the most commonly used operation for determining the central tendency (i.e., the average or typical value) of a dataset. No doubt everyone reading this Order, on many occasions, has found the average of, say, four numbers by adding them together and dividing by 4. When dealing with interval data, the mean is interpretable because the interval is interpretable. Where the distance between 4 and 5, for example, is the same as that between 5 and 6, everyone understands that 4.5 is halfway between 4 and 5. As long as we know that 4.5 is exactly halfway between 4 and 5, the arithmetic mean of 4 and 5 (i.e., 4.5) is interpretable. The mean of a set of measurement results gives an estimate of the true value of the measurement, assuming there is no systematic error in the data. The greater the number of measurements, the better the estimate. Therefore, if, for example, we had in this case an Array of xs, then the mean of that dataset (x¯) would approximate µ, especially for the Cultivation, Processing, and Dispensing Arrays, which have 12 observations apiece. If the Department had used x¯ as the Topical raw score instead of the MTO, then its scoring methodology would have been free of systematic error. But the Department did not use x¯ as the Topical raw score. In the event, it had only Arrays of ?s to work with, so when the Department calculated the mean of an Array, it got the average of a set of Ordinals (?¯), not x¯. Using the mean as a measure of the central tendency of ordinal data is highly problematic, if not impermissible, because the information is not quantifiable. In this case, the Department coded the rankings with numbers, but the numbers (i.e., the Ordinals), not being units of measurement, were just shorthand for content that must be expressed verbally, not quantifiably. The Ordinals, that is, translate meaningfully only as words, not as numbers, as can be seen in the table at paragraph 29, supra. Because these numbers merely signify order, the distances between them have no meaning; the interval, it follows, is not interpretable. In such a situation, 4.5 does not signify a halfway point between 4 and 5. Put another way, the average of Best and Second Best is not "Second-Best-and-a- half," for the obvious reason that the notion is nonsensical. To give a real-life example, the three Topical Ordinals in Nature's Way's MD Array are 5, 3, and 2. The average of Best, Third Best, and Fourth Best is plainly not "Third-Best-and-a- third," any more than the average of Friday, Wednesday, and Tuesday is Wednesday-and-a-third. For these reasons, statisticians and scientists ordinarily use the median or the mode to measure the central tendency of ordinal data, generally regarding the mean of such data to be invalid or uninterpretable. The median is the middle number, which is determined by arranging the data points from lowest to highest, and identifying the one having the same number of data points on either side (if the dataset contains an odd number of data points) or taking the average of the two data points in the middle (if the dataset contains an even number of data points). The mode is the most frequently occurring number. (If no number repeats, then there is no mode, and if two or more numbers recur with the same frequency, then there are multiple modes.) We can easily compute the medians, modes, and means of the Topical Ordinals in each of the applicants' Arrays. They are set forth in the following table. Cultivation 30% Processing 30% Dispensing 15% Medical Director 5% Financials 20% Bill's Median Mode Mean 1 1 1.8333 Median Mode Mean 2 2 1.7500 Median Mode Mean 1 1 1.1667 Median Mode Mean 2 NA 2.0000 Median Mode Mean 1 1 1.0000 Costa Median Mode Mean 5 5 4.6667 Median Mode Mean 4.5 5 4.1667 Median Mode Mean 4 4 4.0000 Median Mode Mean 4 4 4.3333 Median Mode Mean 5 5 4.6667 Keith St. Germain Median Mode Mean 4 4 3.4167 Median Mode Mean 4 4 3.2500 Median Mode Mean 2 2 2.4167 Median Mode Mean 4 NA 3.6667 Median Mode Mean 3 3 3.3333 Nature's Way Median Mode Mean 3 4 3.0833 Median Mode Mean 3 3 2.5833 Median Mode Mean 3.5 3 3.6667 Median Mode Mean 3 NA 3.3333 Median Mode Mean 2 2 2.3333 Redland Median Mode Mean 2 2 2.2500 Median Modes Mean 3.5 3, 4, 5 3.4167 Median Mode Mean 5 5 4.1667 Median Mode Mean 2 NA 2.3333 Median Mode Mean 4 NA 3.6667 It so happens that the associated medians, modes, and means here are remarkably similar——and sometimes the same. The point that must be understood, however, is that the respective means, despite their appearance of exactitude when drawn out to four decimal places, tell us nothing more (if, indeed, they tell us anything) than the medians and the modes, namely whether an applicant was typically ranked Best, Second Best, etc. The median and mode of Costa's Cultivation Ordinals, for example, are both 5, the number which signifies "Best." This supports the conclusion that "Best" was Costa's average ranking under Cultivation. The mean of these same Ordinals, 4.6667, appears to say something more exact about Costa, but, in fact, it does not. At most, the mean of 4.6667 tells us only that Costa was typically rated "Best" in Cultivation. (Because there is no cognizable position of rank associated with the fraction 0.6667, the number 4.6667 must be rounded if it is to be interpreted.) To say that 4.6667 means that Costa outscored KSG by 1.2500 "points" in Cultivation, therefore, or that Costa was 37% more suitable than KSG, would be a serious and indefensible error, for these are, respectively, interval and ratio statements, which are never permissible to make when discussing ordinal data. As should by now be clear, ?¯ is a value having limited usefulness, if any, which cannot ever be understood, properly, as an estimate of µ. The Department, regrettably, treated ?¯ as if it were the same as x¯ and, thus, a reasonable approximation of µ, making the grievous conceptual mistakes of using ordinal data to make interval-driven decisions, e.g., whom to select for licensure when the "difference" between applicants was as infinitesimal as 0.0041 "points," as well as interval representations about the differences between applicants, such as, "Costa's aggregate score is 1.5167 points greater than Nature's Way's aggregate score." Due to this flagrant defect in the Department's analytical process, the aggregate scores which the Department generated are hopelessly infected with systematic error, even though the mathematical calculations behind the flawed scores are computationally correct. Dr. Cornew's Solution Any attempt to translate the Ordinals into a reasonable approximation of interval data is bound to involve a tremendous amount of inherent uncertainty. The Department, however, cannot be permitted to benefit from, or take advantage of, this uncertainty, because the uncertainty flows directly and solely from the Department's fundamental conceptual error, not from any lack or failure of proof attributable to Nature's Way. If we want to ascertain the x behind a particular ?, all we can say for sure is that: [(? – n) + 0.000n] = x = [(? + a) – 0.000a], where n represents the number of places in rank below ?, and a symbolizes the number of places in rank above ?. The Ordinals of 1 and 5 are partial exceptions, because 1 = x = 5. Thus, when ? = 5, we can say [(? – n) + 0.000n] = x = 5, and when ? = 1, we can say 1 = x = [(? + a) – 0.000a]. The table below should make this easier to see. Lowest Possible Value of x Ordinal ? Highest Possible Value of x 1.0004 5 5.0000 1.0003 4 4.9999 1.0002 3 4.9998 1.0001 2 4.9997 1.0000 1 4.9996 As will be immediately apparent, all this tells us is that x could be, effectively, any score from 1 to 5——which ultimately tells us nothing. Accordingly, to make fruitful use of the Ordinals, we must make some assumptions, to narrow the uncertainty. Nature's Way's expert witness, Dr. Ronald W. Cornew,22/ offers a solution that the undersigned finds to be credible and adopts. Dr. Cornew proposes (and the undersigned agrees) that, for purposes of extrapolating the scores (values of x) for a given applicant, we can assume that the Ordinals for every other applicant are true values (µ) of x, in other words, perfectly measured scores expressing interval data——a heroic assumption in the Department's favor. Under this assumption, if the subject applicant's Ordinal is the ranking of, say, 3, we shall assume that the adjacent Ordinals of the other applicants, 2 and 4, are true quantitative values. This, in turn, implies that the true value of the subject applicant's Ordinal, as a quantified score, is anywhere between 2 and 4, since all we know about the subject applicant is that the Reviewer considered it to be, in terms of relative suitability, somewhere between the applicants ranked Fourth Best (2) and Second Best (4). If we make the foregoing Department-friendly assumption that the other applicants' Ordinals are µ, then the following is true for the unseen x behind each of the subject applicant's ?s: [(? – 1) + 0.0001] = x = [(? + 1) – 0.0001]. The Ordinals of 1 and 5 are, again, partial exceptions. Thus, when ? = 5, we can say 4.0001 = x = 5, and when ? = 1, we can say 1 = x = 1.9999. Dr. Cornew sensibly rounds off the insignificant ten-thousandths of points, simplifying what would otherwise be tedious mathematical calculations, so that: Lowest Possible Value of x Ordinal ? Highest Possible Value of x 4 5 5 3 4 5 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 1 2 We have now substantially, albeit artificially, reduced the uncertainty involved in translating ?s to xs. Our assumption allows us to say that x = ? ± 1 except where only negative uncertainty exists (because x cannot exceed 5) and where only positive uncertainty exists (because x cannot be less than 1). It is important to keep in mind, however, that (even with the very generous, pro-Department assumption about other applicants' "scores") the best we can do is identify the range of values within which x likely falls, meaning that the highest values and lowest values are not alternatives; rather, the extrapolated score comprises those two values and all values in between, at once. In other words, if the narrowest statement we can reasonably make is that an applicant's score could be any value between l and h inclusive, where l and h represent the low and high endpoints of the range, then what we are actually saying is that the score is all values between l and h inclusive, because none of those values can be excluded. Thus, in consequence of the large uncertainty about the true values of x that arises from the low-information content of the data available for review, Ordinal 3, for example, translates, from ordinal data to interval data, not to a single point or value, but to a score- set, ranging from 2 to 4 inclusive. To calculate Nature's Way's aggregate score-set using Dr. Cornew's method, it is necessary to determine both the applicant's highest possible aggregate score and its lowest possible aggregate score, for these are the endpoints of the range that constitutes the score-set. Finding the high endpoint is accomplished by adding 1 to each Topical Ordinal other than 5, and then computing the aggregate score-set using the mathematical operations described in paragraphs 104-105. The following WMTOs (Topical subtotals) are obtained thereby: Cultivation, 1.2250; Processing, 1.0500; Dispensing, 0.6625; MD, 0.2000; and Financials, 0.6667. The high endpoint of Nature's Way's aggregate score-set is the sum of these numbers, or 3.8042.23/ Finding the low endpoint is accomplished roughly in reverse, by subtracting 1 from each Topical Ordinal other than 1, and then computing the aggregate score-set using the mathematical operations described in paragraphs 104 and 105. The low endpoint for Nature's Way works out to 1.9834. Nature's Way's aggregate score-set, thus, is 1.9834-3.8042.24/ This could be written, alternatively, as 2.8938 ± 0.9104 points, or as 2.8938 ± 31.46%. The low and high endpoints of Costa's aggregate score-set are found the same way, and they are, respectively, 3.4000 and 4.8375.25/ Costa's aggregate score-set is 3.4000- 4.8375, which could also be written as 4.1188 ± 0.7187 points or 4.1188 ± 17.45%. We can now observe that a score of 2.4000 or more is necessary to satisfy the One Point Condition, and that any score between 2.4000 and 3.8375, inclusive, is both necessary and sufficient to satisfy the One Point Condition. We will call this range (2.4000-3.8375) the Proximity Box. A score outside the Proximity Box on the high end, i.e., a score greater than 3.8375, meets the One Point Condition, of course; however, a score that high, being more than sufficient, is not necessary. Nature's Way meets the One Point Condition, therefore, if any value within the range of its score-set falls within the Proximity Box. In fact, 89% of Nature's Way's score- set is inside the Proximity Box. This is easier to see if the aggregate scores of Nature's Way and Costa are overlaid, as follows: As is readily apparent, Nature's Way's aggregate score-set (the green bar) extends far into the Proximity Box (shaded yellow), almost to the hilt, leaving only a handle comprising 10.95% of the range exposed. Notice, further, how the opposite end of Nature's Way's score-set gets to the right of Costa's score-set, from 3.4000 to the tip of the range——coincidentally, a segment of practically the same length (10.63%) as the handle——which means that, based on the available data, we cannot exclude the possibility that Nature's Way actually outscored Costa and would have emerged in 2015 as the highest scored applicant had the Reviewers been required to quantify the differences between applicants. For reasons discussed below, the undersigned suspects that the Reviewers likely would not have scored Nature's Way the winner, but no matter, for that is not the issue. On the dispositive issue, the undersigned determines as a matter of ultimate fact that Nature's Way was likely (indeed, was almost certainly) within one point of Costa. In short, a preponderance of the evidence, and more, supports the finding that Nature's Way satisfies the One Point Condition. An Alternative That Uses the Average Domanial Ordinals to Extrapolate Scores If the Reviewers had actually scored the applicants with numbers reflecting interval data, we could have determined an average Domanial score for each applicant by dividing the sum of all of its scores by 42. This would represent the typical Domanial score for the applicant. Comparing the applicants' typical Domanial scores would reveal not only the typical Domanial ranking at the Reviewer level, but also the typical distribution of suitability——i.e., the degrees of difference, actually quantified——at the Domanial level, as measured at the Reviewer level. We, of course, cannot find the applicants' mean Domanial scores because we lack any Domanial scores. But it might be possible to conjure Domanial scores by making some reasonable assumptions about the relative proximity of the applicants, in terms of suitability, based on the Domanial rankings. We can, for example, calculate the typical Domanial Ordinal for each applicant, by dividing the sum of all of its Domanial Ordinals by 42. Comparing the applicants' respective mean Domanial Ordinals should give us at least a rough idea of the where each applicant was typically ranked in a typical Domain, at the Reviewer level. This latter information might also give us an impression of how close (or separated) the applicants actually were to (or from) each other as a function of suitability. For this purpose, averaging the Domanial Ordinals is preferable to simply averaging the MTOs because the small number of Ordinals in the MD and Financials Arrays makes their MTOs subject to skew. In the Southeast region, the mean Domanial Ordinals are as follows: Rank Applicant Sum of Domanial Ordinals Average Domanial Ordinal 5 Costa 181 4.3095 4 Redland 136 3.2381 3 Keith St. Germain 130 3.0952 2 Nature's Way 129 3.0714 1 Bill's 66 1.5714 If we assume, as the Department assumes, that the mean of ordinal data is at all meaningful, we can say, based on these figures, that Costa was the consensus favorite, with an average rank of Second Best; Bill's was the least favorite by general agreement; and the others were effectively in a three- way tie for second place, each having a typical ranking of Third Best. If we assume further, as the Department assumes, that the mean of ordinal data tells us something useful about the quantitative differences between the applicants, then we can say, based on the figures above, that the unknown scores (x) behind the Ordinals should reflect a distribution of suitability in which three of the applicants are bunched up in the center (at the peak of the Bell Curve so to speak), while the favorite and least favorite stand noticeably apart.26/ When the available data are viewed in this light, it becomes reasonable to expect that if any one of the applicants in the middle (Redland, KSG, or Nature's Way) were found to be "within one point" of Costa, then so too should the others in that group be found, since the putative consensus view of the Reviewers was that these three applicants were effectively indistinguishable on the merits. Indeed, we should be surprised if that were not the case. It also becomes reasonable to imagine what the interval scores might have looked like, if only impressionistically. While it is impossible to bring forth such scores except by reasonable guesswork, we could do worse than using the average Domanial Ordinals set forth above as plugs for the unknown scores. If, in other words, we assume that the following scores correspond to the respective Ordinals of rank, we can recalculate the applicants' aggregate scores, using the Reviewers' rankings. Rank Corresponding Score 5 4.31 4 3.24 3 3.10 2 3.07 1 1.57 The aggregate scores which emerge from this recalculation, while admittedly not scientifically reliable, will at least paint a more accurate picture of the perceived distances between the applicants than do the Department's hopelessly flawed aggregate scores. This exercise produces the following outcome: Applicant Aggregate Score Rank Costa 3.8192 5 Redland 3.2346 4 Keith St. Germain 3.1774 3 Nature's Way 3.0613 2 Bill's 2.0698 1 While the undersigned cannot find that these are likely the applicants' actual aggregate scores (for it is beyond human capacity, given the paucity of available data, to pinpoint the scores with such confidence), he can find that this table likely shows with greater clarity the quantitative differences between the applicants than anything the Department has produced. Using the mean Domanial Ordinals to construct Domanial scores, it is determined that the quantitative difference between Costa and Nature's Way, as best this value can be ascertained, is most likely less than one point (which is sufficient to satisfy the One Point Condition), with three- quarters of a point being an informed, if unscientific, approximation of the genuine difference. ROUNDING OFF THE SPURIOUS DIGITS Remember that the Ordinal 5 does not mean 5 of something that has been counted but the position of 5 in a list of five applicants that have been put in order——nothing more. Recall, too, that there is no interpretable interval between places in a ranking because the difference between 5 and 4 is not the same as that between 4 and 3, etc., and that there is no "second best-and-a-half," which means that taking the average of such numbers is a questionable operation that could easily be misleading if not properly explained. Therefore, as discussed earlier, if the mean of ordinal data is taken, the result must be reported using only as many significant figures as are consistent with the least accurate number, which in this case is one significant figure (whose meaning is only Best, Second Best, Third Best, and so forth). The Department egregiously violated the rule against reliance upon spurious digits, i.e., numbers that lack credible meaning and impart a false sense of accuracy. The Department took advantage of meaningless fractions obtained not by measurement but by mathematical operations, thereby compounding its original error of treating ordinal data as interval data. When the Department says that Nature's Way's aggregate score is 2.8833, it is reporting a number with five significant figures. This number implies that all five figures make sense as increments of a measurement; it implies that the Department's uncertainty about the value is around 0.0001 points——an astonishing degree of accuracy. The trouble is that the aggregate scores, as reported without explanation, are false and deceptive. There is no other way to put it. The Department's reported aggregate scores cannot be rationalized or defended, either, as matters of policy or opinion. This point would be obvious if the Department were saying something more transparent, e.g., that 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 2.8833, for everyone would see the mistake and understand immediately that no policy can change the reality that the sum of three 1s is 3. The falsity at issue is hidden, however, because, to generate each applicant's "aggregate score," the Department started with 42 whole numbers (of ordinal data), each of which is a value from 1 to 5. It then ran the applicant's 42 single- digit, whole number "scores" through a labyrinth of mathematical operations (addition, division, multiplication), none of which improved the accuracy or information content of the original 42 numbers, to produce "aggregate scores" such as 2.8833. This process lent itself nicely to the creation of spreadsheets and tables chocked full of seemingly precise numbers guaranteed to impress.27/ Lacking detailed knowledge (which few people have) about how the numbers were generated, a reasonable person seeing "scores" like 2.8833 points naturally regards them as having substantive value at the microscopic level of ten-thousandths of a point——that's what numbers like that naturally say. He likely believes that these seemingly carefully calibrated measurements are very accurate; after all, results as finely-tuned as 2.8833 are powerful and persuasive when reported with authority. But he has been fooled. The only "measurement" the Department ever took of any applicant was to rank it Best, Second Best, etc.——a "measurement" that was not, and could not have been, fractional. The reported aggregate scores are nothing but weighted averages of ordinal data, dressed up to appear to be something they are not. Remember, the smallest division on the Reviewers' "scale" (using that word loosely here) was 1 rank. No Reviewer used decimal places to evaluate any portion of any application. The aggregate scores implying precision to the ten-thousandth place were all derived from calculations using whole numbers that were code for a value judgment (Best, Second Best, etc.), not quantifiable information. Therefore, in the reported "aggregate scores," none of the digits to the right of first (tenth place) decimal point has any meaning whatsoever; they are nothing but spurious digits introduced by calculations carried out to greater precision than the original data. The first decimal point, moreover, being immediately to the right of the one (and only) significant figure in the aggregate score, is meaningful (assuming that the arithmetic mean of ordinal data even has interpretable meaning, which is controversial) only as an approximation of 1 (whole) rank. Because there is no meaningful fractional rank, the first decimal must be rounded off to avoid a misrepresentation of the data. Ultimately, the only meaning that can be gleaned from the "aggregate score" of 2.8833 is that Nature's Way's typical (or mean) weighted ranking is 2.8833. Because there is no ranking equivalent to 2.8833, this number, if sense is to be made of it, must be rounded to the nearest ranking, which is 3 (because 2.8 ˜ 3), or Third Best. To report this number as if it means something more than that is to mislead. To make decisions based on the premise that 0.8833 means something other than "approximately one whole place in the ranking" is, literally, irrational——indeed, the Department's insistence that its aggregate scores represent true and meaningful quantities of interval data is equivalent, as a statement of logic, to proclaiming that 1 + 1 = 3, the only difference being that the latter statement is immediately recognizable as a delusion. An applicant could only be ranked 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5——not 2.8833 or 4.4000. Likewise, the only meaning that can be taken from the "aggregate score" of 4.4000 is that Costa's average weighted ranking is 4.4000, a number which, for reasons discussed, to be properly understood, must be rounded to the nearest ranking, i.e., 4. The fraction, four-tenths, representing less than half of a position in the ranking, cannot be counted as approximately one whole (additional) place (because 4.4 ? 5). And to treat 0.4000 as meaning four-tenths of a place better than Second Best is absurd. There is no mathematical operation in existence that can turn a number which signifies where in order something is, into one that counts how much of that thing we have. To eliminate the false precision, the spurious digits must be rounded off, which is the established mathematical approach to dealing with numbers that contain uncertainty, as Dr. Cornew credibly confirmed. Rounding to the nearest integer value removes the meaningless figures and eliminates the overprecision manifested by those digits. When the aggregate scores are rounded to remove the deceitful decimals, the results are: Costa, 4; Redland, KSG, and Nature's Way, 3; and Bill's, 2. These corrected "final ranks" require a corresponding adjustment of the "regional ranks" because there is a three-way tie for second place. Thus, using unspurious aggregate scores to regionally rank the applications, the positions are as follows: Costa, 5; Redland, KSG, and Nature's Way, 4; and Bill's, 1. In sum, as yet another alternative to determining whether Nature's Way is "within one point" of Costa, the elimination-of-spurious-digits approach shows that Nature's Way satisfies the One Point Condition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Health enter a final order approving Nature's Way's application for registration as an MMTC unless Nature's Way fails (i) to meet any pertinent requirement of section 381.986 not set forth in section 381.986(8)(a)2.a., or (ii) to provide documentation to the Department that it has the existing infrastructure and technological ability to begin cultivating marijuana within 30 days after registration. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2018.
