The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D. (Respondent or Dr. Saadatmand), has violated section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes (2013), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Parties Petitioner, the Department of Health, is the agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to chapters 20, 456, and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Babak Saadatmand, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Saadatmand holds Florida license number ME 114656. Respondent graduated from the University of Maryland, College of Medicine, in 1988, and completed his residency at Case Western Reserve. He then completed a residency in emergency medicine at Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. Respondent was board-certified in internal medicine, but no longer holds that certification because at the time it was due for renewal, he was no longer eligible because his practice was devoted to emergency medicine as opposed to internal medicine. He remains board-certified in emergency medicine. Respondent has held positions that required him to supervise residents and give lectures at Yale University, New York College of Medicine, and Indiana University. Dr. Saadatmand chose to practice emergency medicine as a traveling physician for the last three years, because of the financial benefits available by doing so while he gained additional experience in emergency medicine. However, he has since or now accepted a position as the assistant program director of the emergency medicine residency program at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida, where his job responsibilities will include the supervision of residents. Dr. Saadatmand holds a medical license in several other states in addition to Florida, and has not been disciplined in any state where he is licensed. Dr. Saadatmand’s Treatment of R.D. In June and July of 2014, Respondent was working as a traveling physician at Parrish Medical Center in Titusville, Florida. While most of his assignments in various emergency facilities have been six months long, the assignment at Parrish Medical Center was for approximately one month. Respondent treated patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, at Parrish Medical Center emergency room. R.D. was accompanied by his wife, C.D. R.D. was a 52-year-old male when he presented to Parrish Medical Center. He had a history of T-cell lymphoma and had been treated for his cancer through the Space Coast Cancer Center. Just days before his presentation to the emergency room on June 27, 2014, he had been cleared to return to his place of employment. However, on June 27, 2014, R.D.’s supervisor called R.D.’s wife, C.D., and asked her to come get R.D. as he was too ill to be at work. R.D. arrived at Parrish Medical Center in the early afternoon, and was triaged by a nurse at approximately 2:13 p.m. The notes from the triage nurse’s assessment recorded, among other things, R.D.’s vital signs upon arrival; his chief complaint, including its duration and intensity; a brief medical history; a list of his current medications; and a drug/alcohol use history. Registered Nurse Sharon Craddock was the emergency room nurse who completed the initial assessment, or triage assessment, of R.D.’s condition. According to her triage notes in the Parrish Medical Center records, R.D.’s chief complaint upon arrival was constipation, which was described as constipation for three days, with bilateral abdominal pain. The pain was described as aching, pressure, shooting, and throbbing, and R.D.’s pain level was reported in Ms. Craddock’s notes as being an eight on a ten-point scale. Her description of his abdomen was “soft, non-tender, round, and obese.” Nurses are directed to record the pain level reported by the patient, and not to alter the pain level based on the nurse’s observation.1/ R.D.’s vital signs were taken upon his arrival at Parrish Medical Center and were recorded in the electronic medical records as follows: temperature, 98.4F; pulse, 127H; respiration, 20; blood pressure, 120/70; and pulse oximeter, 95. The only abnormal reading reflected in R.D.’s vital signs was his pulse, which was above 100, considered to be the upper limit of normal. R.D. reported that he had a medical history which included T-cell lymphoma and that he did not smoke or drink. His current medications were listed as aspirin, Zyrtec, Amaryl, Metformin, Prilosec, Percocet, Pravastatin, and a multivitamin. The Percocet dosage was listed as one tablet, three times daily, as needed for pain. Ms. Craddock also recorded a nursing note for R.D. at 3:37 p.m., and she was in the room when Respondent first went in to see R.D. Ms. Craddock’s nursing note indicates, “Pt with a hx of stomach CA with a recent ‘clean bill of health’ presents with ABD pain and constipation. Occasionally takes Percocet for pain. Wife at BS. Pt. sleepy, states he normally takes a nap this time of day. Pending MD eval with orders.” The Parrish Medical Center chart documents that R.D. was calm, cooperative, and asleep at 15:37 hours (3:37 p.m.). This presentation is generally inconsistent with a patient who is in severe abdominal pain. Dr. Saadatmand saw R.D. at approximately 3:56 p.m. Consistent with the custom at Parrish Medical Center, he worked with a scribe who took Respondent’s dictation for notes during his visit with the patient, and then loaded those notes into the electronic medical record. Respondent would then have the opportunity to review the notes as transcribed and direct the scribe to make any necessary changes. Dr. Saadatmand’s notes indicate that R.D. presented with abdominal pain, and was experiencing moderate pain that was constant with cramping. The description of R.D.’s pain as moderate was based upon Dr. Saadatmand’s observation of R.D. The chief complaint listed was constipation. Dr. Saadatmand took a history from R.D., who reported that he had been diagnosed with gastric lymphoma in 2013, and was treated with radiation and chemotherapy. R.D. and his wife, C.D., reported to Respondent that they feared his cancer might be returning, as his current symptoms were similar to those he experienced when his cancer was first diagnosed. He had returned to Space Coast Cancer Center for some additional screening two to three weeks before the emergency room visit, which included a CT of the abdomen and an upper and lower endoscopy. R.D. and his wife both believed that the results of the screening were normal. Respondent recorded this conversation in the electronic medical record as “[R.D.] had a recent follow up with Dr. Rylander and had normal EGD and colonoscopy. [R.D.] had recent CT scan with cancer center.” Space Coast Cancer Center does not use Parrish Medical Center to perform its CT scans or other testing, so the results of the recent CT scan were not available for Respondent to view. Respondent believed that R.D. and C.D. had followed the directions of R.D.’s oncologists, and R.D. had been a compliant patient. Respondent asked R.D. about his use of Percocet. He did not ask how much he was taking, but how often and whether the use had changed. He considered the answer to this question to be important, because a change in the use could indicate a change in R.D.’s pain intensity. R.D. did not report any change in the amount that he was taking, which was generally an “every other day thing for him.” Respondent testified that, given that the type of Percocet that R.D. was prescribed was an extra-strength as opposed to a standard version of Percocet, it was highly likely that R.D. would suffer from opioid-induced constipation. R.D. reported to Respondent that he had not attempted any laxatives. R.D. also denied having any nausea or surgical history. The lack of a surgical history is significant because patients with a recent surgical history and abdominal pain may be experiencing complications related to the surgery, which would account for the patient’s pain. There is no reference to R.D.’s diabetes in either the nursing triage notes or Dr. Saadatmand’s notes. The only reference in the past medical history is the report of cancer. The list of medications R.D. was taking at home includes Metformin HCI. No evidence was presented to establish whether Metformin is a drug prescribed only for diabetes or whether it is an accepted treatment for other conditions. Moreover, there is no evidence presented to establish how Respondent was to know that R.D. was diabetic if R.D. did not report the condition. In addition to taking R.D.’s medical history, Respondent performed a review of systems and a physical examination, including palpation of his abdomen. In his chart, the electronic medical record states under “review of systems,” “All systems: Reviewed and negative except as stated.” Under the category “Gastrointestinal,” the record indicates “Reports: Abdominal pain, Constipation. Denies: Nausea, vomiting, Diarrhea.” In the physical examination section of the electronic medical record, it is noted that R.D. was alert and in mild distress. The cardiovascular examination indicates that R.D. had a regular rate, normal rhythm, and normal heart sounds, with no systolic or diastolic murmur. With respect to his abdominal exam, Respondent indicated, “Present: Soft, normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” The notation that the abdomen was soft with normal bowel sounds is another way of noting that the abdomen is non-tender. Because R.D. was tachycardic upon presentation to the emergency room, Dr. Saadatmand noted R.D.’s anxiety about the possibility of his cancer returning, and checked his pulse a second time. When Respondent checked R.D.’s pulse, it had slowed to 90, which is within a normal range. In light of R.D.’s normal vital signs, normal abdominal examination, and the length of his pain and constipation, Respondent determined that the most likely cause for Respondent’s pain was constipation, and communicated that determination to R.D. and C.D. He asked whether R.D. had used a laxative and was told he had not. Dr. Saadatmand told R.D. and his wife that the pain medication that he took could be a source for his constipation, and that it would be prudent to try a laxative and see if that produced results before considering any further diagnostic tests. Respondent did not order any lab tests for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014, because his vital signs and abdominal examination were normal. He did not order an EKG for R.D. because there were no symptoms to indicate a cardiac issue. Respondent also did not order a CT scan of the abdomen or pelvis for patient R.D. on June 27, 2014. He felt that, in terms of R.D.’s concern about cancer recurrence, there were tests available to R.D.’s oncologist that would be more useful in detecting any recurrence of R.D.’s cancer that are not available through an emergency room visit. For example, a PET scan would be the most helpful, but is not something that Respondent could order through the emergency room because it is not considered an emergent study. The Department has not alleged, and the evidence did not demonstrate, that R.D. suffered from any emergency condition that additional testing would have revealed and that went undetected by Dr. Saadatmand. Respondent did order a prescription-strength laxative, i.e., Golytely, for R.D., which is a laxative commonly used to treat constipation and to prepare patients for a colonoscopy. Dr. Saadatmand communicated his recommendation to R.D. and C.D., who seemed relieved that the problem might be limited to constipation. He also advised them to return to the emergency room should R.D.’s symptoms get worse or if he developed a fever, because those developments would indicate a change in his condition. R.D. received discharge instructions that are consistent with Dr. Saadatmand’s discussion with R.D. and his wife. The discharge instructions referred R.D. to his primary care physician, noted the prescription for Golytely, and provided information related to the community health navigator. The Patient Visit Information sheet received by R.D. specifically noted that the patient was acknowledging receipt of the instructions provided, and stated, “I understand that I have had EMERGENCY TREATMENT ONLY and that I may be released before all my medical problems are known and treated. Emergency medical care is not intended to be a substitute for complete medical care. My Emergency Department diagnosis is preliminary and may change after complete medical care is received. I will arrange for follow-up care.” R.D. also received printed materials about constipation and how to address the problem. These instructions stated that the patient should contact his or her primary care provider if the constipation gets worse, the patient starts to vomit, or has questions or concerns about his or her condition or care. It also instructed the patient to return to the emergency room if he or she had blood in his or her bowel movements or had a fever and abdominal pain with the constipation. R.D. signed the acknowledgment that he had read and understood the instructions given to him by his caregivers. The acknowledgment specifically referenced the instructions regarding constipation. The written instructions are consistent with the verbal advice provided by Respondent. R.D.’s Subsequent Treatment Unfortunately, R.D.’s symptoms did not improve. He developed a fever and his pain level increased significantly. As stated by his wife, his pain the following day was “way worse” than when he saw Dr. Saadatmand. After a call to her niece, a nurse that worked in the emergency room at Parrish Medical Center, C.D. took R.D. back to the hospital on June 28, 2014, at approximately 6:30 p.m. At that point, he had a heart rate of 125, a temperature of 101.6 degrees, and tenderness in the lower left quadrant of his abdomen. Testing indicated that R.D. had intra-abdominal masses and small collections of extra-luminal gas that suggested the possibility of a contained micro-perforation. There is no allegation in the Administrative Complaint that the micro- perforation existed at the time R.D. saw Respondent. R.D. died on August 23, 2014, as a result of end-stage T-cell lymphoma. The Expert Witnesses The Department presented the expert testimony of Annie Akkara, M.D. Dr. Akkara is board-certified in emergency medicine and has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida for approximately nine years. All of her practice has been in the greater Orlando area in the Florida hospital system. She worked full-time for one year when she first moved to Florida, and since that time approximately 80 percent of her practice has involved reviewing medical charts for Veracode Associates, to determine whether diagnostic codes are fully supported in the medical records. She takes emergency room shifts on an as-needed basis, and has supervisory responsibility over patient extenders, such as nurses and physicians’ assistants, but not over other physicians. Dr. Akkara has never served on any committee for a medical staff at a hospital or helped develop protocols for an emergency room, and has not conducted any type of medical research. Although her position requires her to review electronic medical records, she was not familiar with the program used by Parrish Medical Center. Dr. Akkara reviewed the medical records for the emergency room visits for both June 27 and 28, 2014, as well as the records from the inpatient admission after the June 28 visit. She also reviewed the expert witness reports of Drs. Orban and Smoak. Dr. Saadatmand presented the expert testimony of David Orban, M.D. Dr. Orban practices emergency medicine in the Tampa area. He attended medical school at St. Louis University and completed residencies in orthopedics and emergency medicine. Dr. Orban has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since 1982 and has been board-certified in emergency medicine since 1981. Before he practiced in Florida, Dr. Orban served as an instructor in surgery at the Washington University School of Medicine, and from 1970 through 1983, was an assistant professor of medicine at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). In that position, he supervised residents in the emergency medicine program and helped to develop the program’s curriculum. Dr. Orban left UCLA in 1983 and moved to Florida, in order to help establish the emergency medicine residency program at the University of Florida. Currently, Dr. Orban is the director of emergency medicine for the University of South Florida (USF), College of Medicine, and the Medical Director Emeritus for the Tampa General Hospital Emergency Room. The USF emergency medicine residency program is a competitive program which receives approximately 1,200 applications each year for ten residency positions. Dr. Orban continues to spend approximately 20-24 hours each week practicing in the emergency room, in addition to his teaching responsibilities. He both sees patients on his own and supervises residents who are seeing patients. He has extensive experience in evaluating non-traumatic abdominal pain in the emergency room.2/ Allegations Related to the Standard of Care Dr. Akkara testified that in her opinion, Dr. Saadatmand’s care and treatment departed from the standard of care in a variety of ways. She agreed that Respondent assessed R.D.’s abdomen, but believed that he erred in not specifically documenting that the abdomen was not tender. In this case, the patient record specifically states, “Abdominal exam: Present: Soft, Normal bowel sounds. Absent: Guarding, Rebound, Rigid.” In Dr. Akkara’s view, the notes should have been more specific, and she found fault with the fact that the notes did not use the words “tender” or “non-tender.” Dr. Orban, on the other hand, noted that Respondent specifically documented the absence of guarding, rigidity and rebound tenderness, and described the abdomen as “soft, with normal bowel sounds.” Dr. Orban testified that assessing an abdomen for guarding, rigidity, and rebound are all forms of checking for abdominal tenderness. He did not hesitate to interpret Respondent’s medical records for R.D. as reflecting a normal exam, meaning no tenderness was discovered. Dr. Orban’s opinion is supported by the differences in the medical records from R.D.’s June 27 and 28 emergency room visits, and what options are provided in the electronic medical record when a positive finding for tenderness is chosen. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. The Administrative Complaint alleges and Dr. Akkara opined that Respondent departed from the appropriate standard of care by failing to obtain a complete set of normal vital signs before R.D. was discharged from the hospital. The only vital sign that was ever abnormal during R.D.’s June 27 visit was his heart rate, which upon arrival was 127. Respondent rechecked R.D.’s heart rate when he examined him, and upon re-examination it was 90, well within normal limits. Dr. Orban did not believe that the standard of care required the physician, as opposed to possibly supportive staff, to obtain a complete set of vital signs prior to ordering a patient’s discharge. The evidence established that while there is sometimes a nursing standard in emergency rooms requiring a nurse to obtain a second set of vital signs before a patient is discharged, there is no corresponding standard that requires the physician to repeat all of the vitals as well. Dr. Akkara admitted that while she attempts to get a complete set of vital signs before she discharges a patient, she does not always succeed in doing so. The evidence did not demonstrate a departure from the standard of care for not obtaining a second set of vital signs prior to discharge, especially where, as here, all of R.D.’s vital signs were normal when he arrived at the emergency room, except for his heart rate, and Dr. Saadatmand did, in fact, re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent fell below the standard of care by not ordering routine lab work for R.D. The Administrative Complaint does not allege what purpose the routine lab work would serve in the emergency treatment of R.D. Dr. Akkara testified that routine lab work should have been completed before discharge, and that it was a departure from the standard of care not to do so. She stated that the labs were necessary to assess white blood cell count, glucose levels, and kidney function, and in those cases where tenderness was noted in the upper right quadrant of the abdomen, also could indicate issues with the patient’s liver enzymes. Dr. Akkara acknowledged, however, that it is possible for a CBC (complete blood count) to be frequently misleading in patients with abdominal pain, and is often normal with patients with appendicitis. Blood work often cannot distinguish between serious and benign abdominal conditions, and Dr. Akkara admitted that with respect to R.D., given the records from the subsequent admission, any results from a CBC ordered on June 27 would not have altered the treatment of the patient or changed his ultimate outcome. Dr. Orban testified that in the majority of cases where a CBC is ordered in the emergency room, it is not helpful. Ordering a CBC is helpful where a patient has a fever because it would help identify infection, or where a patient appears anemic. Other than those instances, it is not all that useful and is over-utilized. A chemistry panel measures a patient’s serum levels for things like sodium, creatinine, and glucose. Dr. Orban testified that, even with a diabetic patient, unless the patient is experiencing vomiting, mental status changes, blurred vision, frequent urination, or other symptoms associated with diabetes, a blood chemistry panel would not be helpful for assessing a patient with non-traumatic abdominal pain. Records for R.D.’s June 28 visit (the day after Respondent saw R.D.) note that he was diabetic, while the June 27 records do not. However, it was not established that either R.D. or his wife ever told anyone, whether nursing staff or Dr. Saadatmand, that he was diabetic. There is no testimony that his prescription for Metformin was to treat diabetes, as opposed to some other condition, and there was no evidence to indicate that diabetes is the only condition for which Metformin can be prescribed. Dr. Akkara repeatedly referred to R.D.’s diabetes as a basis for her opinions, but never identified the records that formed a basis for her knowledge of R.D.’s diabetic condition. The evidence presented does not establish that ordering a blood chemistry or CBC was required by the appropriate standard of care related to the care and treatment of R.D. in the emergency room on June 27, 2016. Dr. Akkara also testified that Respondent departed from the standard of care by failing to obtain a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis. Her opinion is based, at least in part, on her belief that Respondent failed to document that R.D.’s abdomen was non-tender. She agreed with Dr. Orban that if a patient has no abdominal tenderness, then a CT scan is probably not warranted. In addition, Dr. Orban testified credibly that over the last ten years, there has been a trend toward over-utilization of CT scans, with the concomitant increased risk of radiation- induced cancer. In this case, R.D. had reported having a CT scan just weeks before this emergency room visit. His abdomen was not tender. In a case such as this one, where the patient presents with non-traumatic abdominal pain and a normal abdominal examination and no fever, a CT scan is not warranted. Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. There is not clear and convincing evidence to establish that the standard of care required Respondent to order a CT scan under the circumstances presented in this case. Dr. Akkara testified that Respondent also violated the standard of care by not ordering an EKG for R.D. However, she acknowledged that R.D. did not present with any cardiac-related symptoms and denied chest pain. The purpose of an EKG is to explore any cardiac-related symptoms, and R.D. did not present with any. Dr. Akkara did not provide any protocols that dictate when an EKG should be ordered. Dr. Akkara also acknowledged that ordering an EKG would have no impact on the care provided to R.D., and that a patient does not need an EKG just because he or she walks in the emergency room with tachycardia.3/ The Department did not establish that the failure to order an EKG violated the applicable standard of care in this case. The Department also has charged Respondent with failing to arrange for follow-up care and failing to discuss follow-up care, as well as reasons for R.D. to return to the emergency room, if necessary. However, as noted in paragraphs 32-34, Dr. Saadatmand discussed follow-up care with R.D. and told him what circumstances would require a return visit to the emergency room. Dr. Akkara acknowledged that the discharge instructions given to R.D. were adequate. As stated by Dr. Orban, the role of an emergency room physician with regard to the assessment of patients is to identify emergency situations and treat them. Emergency situations are those that are acute, rapidly decompensating, and that require either medical or surgical intervention, with most likely a hospital admission for more definitive care. It is not the emergency physician’s responsibility to manage a patient’s chronic conditions. It is routine to advise patients with non- acute conditions to follow up with their established physicians and to provide written instructions to that effect. Dr. Saadatmand’s actions in providing instructions, both in terms of follow-up and possible return to the emergency room, were consistent with the standard of care. Finally, the Administrative Complaint finds fault with Dr. Saadatmand for not conducting another abdominal examination and not re-assessing R.D.’s vital signs prior to discharge. As noted previously, the only vital sign that was abnormal when R.D. arrived was his heart rate. Respondent did re-assess R.D.’s heart rate prior to discharge, and it was normal. With respect to a second examination of Respondent’s abdomen, the Department did not establish that one was necessary. Here, Respondent’s initial examination was normal, and there was a reasonable explanation for his discomfort that Respondent believed needed to be addressed before going any further. Dr. Akkara offered no protocol or other authority other than her own clinical experience to support the opinion that serial examinations of the abdomen were required. On the other hand, Dr. Orban testified that where, as here, where the first examination was normal and there was no fever or vomiting, no second examination would be required.4/ Dr. Orban’s testimony is credited. In summary, the Department did not establish that Respondent violated the applicable standard of care in his care and treatment of R.D. Further, his medical records, while not perfect, justify the course of treatment provided in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), is designated as the state agency responsible for the administration of federal and state Medicaid funds, and is authorized by statute to provide payments for medical services. Respondent, Marvin H. Ledbetter, is a doctor of osteopathy who is enrolled as a general practitioner provider in the Medicaid Program. His professional office is in Ormond Beach, Florida where he is engaged in family practice. Under the Program, Ledbetter is assigned a provider number (48220-0) which is used to bill Medicaid for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. During calendar year 1981, which is the only time period in question, Ledbetter received $42,809 in Medicaid reimbursements from HRS, of which $28,062 related to fees for Medicaid hospital patients. The latter category of fees is at issue. In order to qualify for federal matching Medicaid funds HRS must meet certain federally-imposed requirements, including the establishment of a program integrity section designed to insure that all Medicaid services are medically necessary. If they are not, HRS is obliged to seek recoupment of funds paid to the provider. This proceeding involves an attempt by HRS to recoup certain funds paid to Ledbetter for hospital services. After providing medical services to various hospital patients, Ledbetter completed and sent in the necessary forms to obtain payment. As noted earlier, these payments totaled $28,062 during 1981. Upon receipt of the forms, HRS input the information from the forms into a computer data base, along with similar information from other Medicaid providers throughout the State. This information included, among other things, the number of admissions, number of discharges, amount paid for hospital services and length of stay. The retention of such data is necessary so that possible overpayments may be detected by HRS through the statistical analysis of claims submitted by a group of providers of a given type. Because Ledbetter's total discharges exceeded the average of other family physicians throughout the State, the computer generated a report which flagged Ledbetter for further review and examination. An HRS analyst conducted such a review of Ledbetter's records, and found his average hospital length of stay for patients to be acceptable when compared to the average physician in the State. This report was forwarded to the HRS peer review coordinator who randomly selected thirty of Ledbetter's patients from the computer, and obtained their patient charts (numbering sixty-eight). Such a statistical calculation is authorized by Rule 10C-7.6(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. A medical consultant employed by HRS then reviewed twelve of the sixty-eight charts and recommended the records be sent to a Peer Review Committee (PRC) for its review and recommendation. This committee is authorized by Rule 7C-7.61(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code serves under contract with HRS, and is composed of eight members of the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association. It is their responsibility to review the files of physicians whose Medicaid payments are questioned by HRS's program integrity section. When Ledbetter's records were forwarded to the PRC by HRS, the transmittal letter stated that a "study" of his records had been made, and that said study revealed "overutilization of inpatient hospital services" and "excessive lengths of stay." After a PRC review was conducted in early 1984, the records were returned to HRS with a notation that "mild overutilization" had occurred. According to informal guidelines used by the PRC, this meant that Ledbetter's overutilization fell within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent. HRS accepted these findings but for some reason initially determined that a 40 percent overutilization had occurred, and that Ledbetter was overpaid in 1981 by 40 percent for his hospital services. Finding this amount to be inconsistent with the mild overutilization guidelines, HRS arbitrarily added back two days to each patient's hospital stay, which decreased overutilization to 33.8 percent, or $9,505.06 in overpayments. By proposed agency action issued on May 18, 1984, it billed Ledbetter this amount, thereby precipitating the instant controversy. All of the patients in question were from the lower income category, and most were black. Their home conditions were generally less than desirable, and the ability of the parents to supply good nursing care to ill or sick children was in doubt. At the same time, in 1981 Ledbetter was working an average of 56 hours per week in the emergency room of a local hospital and devoted only minimal time to his family practice. Because of this Ledbetter's number of hospital admissions greatly exceeded the norm when compared to general practitioners who engaged in an office practice. Consequently, he received most of these patients through the emergency room rather than his office and was dealing with patients whose socioeconomic conditions were an important consideration. These factors must be taken into account in analyzing Ledbetter's patient records. HRS does not contend that Ledbetter failed to perform the services for which he was paid--rather, it questions only whether some of the admissions were medically necessary and whether some of the lengths of stay were too long. In this regard, conflicting expert testimony was offered by the parties concerning the amount of overutilization, if any. Expert testimony by two local doctors of osteopathy support a finding that only mild overutilization of admissions and lengths of stay occurred. This is corroborated by HRS's expert (Dr. Smith) and by the testimony of its "live" expert, Dr. Conn, who conceded that lengths of stay were only "a little bit too long." The more persuasive testimony also establishes that while mild overutilization falls within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent, 10 percent is an appropriate median in this proceeding. Using this yardstick, Ledbetter should reimburse HRS for 10 percent for his billings, or $2,806.20.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent repay petitioner $2,086.20 in excess Medicaid payments received for calendar year 1981 claims. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1985.
The Issue Whether the application of Petitioner Naples Community Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to add a total of 35 beds to Naples Community Hospital and North Collier Community Hospital should be approved based on peak seasonal demand for acute care beds in the relevant subdistrict.
Findings Of Fact Naples Community Hospital, Inc., ("NCH") holds the license for and operates Naples Community Hospital ("Naples"), a 331 bed not-for-profit acute care hospital, and North Collier Community Hospital ("North Collier"), a 50 bed acute care hospital. NCH also operates a 22 bed comprehensive rehabilitation facility and a 23 bed psychiatric facility. NCH is owned by Community Health Care, Inc., "(CHC"). Both Naples and North Collier are located within Agency for Health Care Administration ("ACHA") district 8 and are the only hospitals within subdistrict 2 of the district. Naples is located in central Collier County. North Collier is (as the name implies) located in northern Collier County approximately 2-3 miles from the county line. NCH's primary service area is Collier County from which approximately 85-90 percent of its patients come, with a secondary service area extending north into Lee County. Neither Naples nor North Collier are teaching hospitals as defined by Section 407.002(27), Florida Statutes (1991). NCH is not proposing a joint venture in this CON application. NCH has a record of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. NCH proposes to provide health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Neither Naples nor North Collier are currently designated by the Office of Medicaid as disproportionate share providers. NCH has the funds for capital and initial operating expenditures for the project. NCH has sufficient financial resources to construct and equip the proposed project. The costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable. The Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is the state agency charged with responsibility for administering the Certificate of Need program. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center ("Southwest") is a 400 bed for-profit acute care hospital located in Fort Myers, Lee County. Lee County is adjacent to and north of Collier County. Southwest is owned by Columbia Hospital Corporation ("Columbia"), which also owns Gulf Coast Hospital in Fort Myers, and two additional hospitals in AHCA District 8. Southwest's primary service area is Lee County. Although Southwest asserts that it would be negatively impacted by the addition of acute care beds at NCH, the greater weight of the credible evidence fails to support the assertion. The primary market services areas of NCH and Southwest are essentially distinct. However, the facilities are located in such proximity as to indicate that secondary service areas overlap and that, at least during peak winter season periods, approval of the NCH application could potentially impact Southwest's operations. Southwest has standing to participate in this proceeding. Southwest offered evidence to establish that it would be substantially affected by approval of the NCH application. The NCH length-of-stay identified in the Southwest documents is inaccurate and under-reports actual length-of-stay statistics. The documentation also includes demographic information from a zip code (33912) which contributes an insignificant portion of NCH patients, and relies on only two years of data in support of the assertion that utilization in the NCH service area is declining. Southwest's chief operating officer testified that he considers Gulf Coast Hospital, another Columbia-owned facility, to offer more competition to Southwest that does NCH. Further, a physician must have admitting privileges at a hospital before she can admit patients to the facility. Of the physicians holding admitting privileges at Southwest, only two, both cardiologists, also have admitting privileges at NCH. Contrary to Southwest, NCH does not have an open heart surgery program. Accordingly, at least as to physician-admitted patients, approval of the NCH application would likely have little impact. On August 26, 1991, NCH submitted to AHCA a letter of intent indicating that NCH would file a Certificate of Need ("CON") application in the September 26, 1991 batching cycle for the addition of 35 acute care beds to the Naples and North Collier facilities. The letter of intent did not specify how the additional beds would be divided between the two facilities. The determination of the number of beds for which NCH would apply was solely based on the fact that the applicant had 35 observation beds which could be readily converted to acute care beds. The observation beds NCH proposes to convert are equipped identically to the acute care beds at NCH and are currently staffed. The costs involved in such conversion are minimal and relatively insignificant. Included with the letter of intent was a certified corporate resolution which states that on July 24, 1991, the NCH Board of Trustees authorized the filing of an application for the additional beds, authorized NCH to incur related expenses, stated that NCH would accomplish the proposed project within time and budget allowances set forth in the application, and that NCH would license and operate the facility. By certification executed August 7, 1991, the NCH secretary certified that the resolution was enacted at the July 24, 1991 board meeting and that the resolution did not contravene the NCH articles of incorporation or bylaws. Article X, Sections 10.1 and 10.1.3 of the NCH bylaws provides that no CON application shall be legally effective without the written approval of CHC. On September 26, 1991, NCH filed an application for CON No. 6797 proposing to add 31 acute care beds to Naples and 4 acute care beds to North Collier. The CON application included a copy of the NCH board resolution and certification which had been previously submitted with the letter of intent as well as the appropriate filing fee. NCH published appropriate public notice of the application's filing. As of the date of the CON application's filing, CHC had not issued written approval of the CON application prior to the action of the NCH Board of Directors and the filing of the letter of intent or the application. On October 2, 1992, four days prior to the administrative hearing in this case, the board of CHC ratified the actions of NCH as to the application for CON at issue in this case. The CHC board has previously ratified actions of the NCH in such fashion. There is uncontroverted testimony that the CHC board was aware of the NCH application and that no reservation was expressed by any CHC board member regarding the CON application. Although NCH's filing of the CON application without appropriate authorization from its parent company appears to be in violation of the NCH bylaws, such does not violate the rules of the AHCA. There is no evidence that the AHCA requested written authorization from the CHC board. After review of the application, the AHCA identified certain deficiencies in the application and notified NCH, which apparently rectified the deficiencies. The AHCA deemed the application complete on November 8, 1991. As required by statute, NCH included a list of capital projects as part of the CON application. The list of capital projects attached to the application was incomplete. The capital projects list failed to identify approximate expenditures of $370,000 to construct a patio enclosure, $750,000 to install an interim sprinkler system, $110,000 to construct emergency room triage space, and $125,000 to complete electrical system renovations. At hearing, witnesses for NCH attempted to clarify the omissions from the capital projects list. The witnesses claimed that such omitted projects were actually included within projects which were identified on the list. When identifying the listed projects within which the omitted projects were supposedly included, the witnesses testified inconsistently. For example, one witness testified that the patio project was included in the emergency room expansion project listed in the application. Another witness claimed that the patio enclosure was included in an equipment purchase category. Based on the testimony, it is more likely that the patio enclosure was neither a part of an emergency room expansion nor equipment purchase, but was a separate construction project which was omitted from the CON application. Similarly inconsistent explanations were offered for the other projects which were omitted from the capital projects list. The testimony was not credible. The capital projects omitted from the list do not affect the ability of NCH to implement the CON sought in this proceeding. The parties stipulated to the fact the NCH has sufficient financial resources to construct and equip the proposed project. As part of the CON application, NCH was required to submit a pro forma income statement for the time period during which the bed additions would take place. The application failed to include a pro forma statement for the appropriate time period. Based on the stipulation of the parties that the costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable, and that NCH has adequate resources to fund the project, the failure to include the relevant pro forma is immaterial. Pursuant to applicable methodology, the AHCA calculates numeric acute care bed need projections for each subdistrict's specific planning period. Accordingly, the AHCA calculated the need for additional acute care beds in district 8, subdistrict 2 for the July, 1996 planning horizon. The results of the calculation are published by the agency. The unchallenged, published fixed need pool for the planning horizon at issue in this proceeding indicated that there was no numeric need for additional acute care beds in district 8, subdistrict 2, Collier County, Florida, pursuant to the numeric need methodology under Rule 59C-1.038 Florida Administrative Code. The CON application filed by NCH is based on the peak seasonal demand experienced by hospitals in the area during the winter months, due to part-time residents. NCH asserts that the utilization of acute care beds during the winter months (January through April) results in occupancy levels in excess of 75 percent and justifies the addition of acute care beds, notwithstanding the numerical need determination. Approval of the CON application is not justified by the facts in this case. The AHCA's acute care bed need methodology accounts for high seasonal demand in certain subdistricts in a manner which provides that facilities have bed space adequate to accommodate peak demand. The calculation which requires that the average annual occupancy level exceed 75 percent reflects AHCA consideration of occupancy levels which rise and fall with seasonal population shifts. The applicant has not challenged the methodology employed by the AHCA in projecting need. Peak seasonal acute care bed demand may justify approval of a CON application seeking additional beds if the lack of available beds poses a credible threat of potentially negative impact on patient outcomes. The peak seasonal demand experienced by NCH has not adversely affected patient care and there is insufficient evidence to establish that, at this time, such peak demand poses a credible threat of potential negative impact on patient outcomes in the foreseeable future. There is no dispute regarding the existing quality of care at Naples, North Collier, Southwest or any other acute care hospital in district 8. The parties stipulated that NCH has the ability to provide quality of care and a record of providing quality of care. In this case, the applicant is seeking to convert existing beds from a classification of "observation" to "acute care". The observation beds NCH proposes to convert are equipped identically to the acute care beds at NCH. Approval of the CON application would result in no net increase in the number of licensed beds. NCH offered anecdotal evidence suggesting that delays in transferring patients from the Naples emergency room to acute care beds (a "logjam") was caused by peak seasonal occupancy rates. There was no evidence offered as to the situation at the North Collier emergency room. The anecdotal evidence is insufficient to establish that "logjams" (if they occur at all) are related to an inadequate number of beds identified as "acute care" at NCH facilities. There are other factors which can result in delays in moving patients from emergency rooms to acute care beds, including facility discharge patterns, delays in obtaining medical test results and staffing practices. NCH asserted at hearing that physicians who refer patients to NCH facilities will not refer such patients to other facilities. The evidence fails to establish that such physician practice is reasonable or provides justification for approval of CON applications under "not normal" circumstances and further fails to establish that conditions at NCH are such as to result in physicians attempting to locate other facilities in which to admit patients. The rule governing approval of acute care beds provides that, prior to such approval, the annual occupancy rate for acute care beds in the subdistrict or for the specific provider, must exceed 75 percent. This requirement has not been met. Applicable statutes require that, in considering applications for CON's, the AHCA consider accessibility of existing providers. The AHCA- established standard provides that acute care bed accessibility requirements are met when at least 90 percent of the residents in an urban subdistrict are within a 30 minute automobile trip to such facilities. At least 90 percent of Naples residents are presently within a 30 minute travel time to NCH acute care beds. The number of acute care beds in the subdistrict substantially exceed the demand for such beds. Additional beds would result in inefficient utilization of existing beds, would further increase the current oversupply of beds, would delay the time at which need for additional beds may be determined and, as such, would prevent competing facilities from applying for and receiving approval for such beds. The financial feasibility projections set forth in the CON application rely on assumptions as to need and utilization projections which are not supported by the greater weight of the evidence and are not credited. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish that the addition of 35 acute care beds to NCH facilities is financially feasible in the long term or that the income projections set forth in the CON application are reasonable. As to projections related to staffing requirements and costs, the beds are existing and are currently staffed on a daily, shift-by-shift basis, based on patient census and acuity of illness. There is reason to believe that the staffing patterns will remain fairly constant and accordingly the projections, based on historical data, are reasonable. Generally stated, where there is no numeric or "not normal" need for the proposed addition of 35 acute care beds in the relevant subdistrict, it could be predicted that the addition of acute care beds would exacerbate the oversupply of available beds and could cause a slight reduction in the occupancy levels experienced by other providers. In this case, the market service areas are sufficiently distinct as to suggest that such would not necessarily be the result. However, based on the lack of need justifying approval of the CON application under any existing circumstances, it is unnecessary to address in detail the impact on existing providers. The state and district health plans identify a number of preferences which should be considered in determining whether a CON application should be approved. The plans suggest that such preferences are to be considered when competing CON applications are reviewed. In this case there is no competing application and the applicability of the preferences is unclear. However, in any event, application of the preferences to this proposal fail to support approval of the application.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered DENYING the application of Naples Community Hospital, Inc., for Certificate of Need 6797. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of March, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1510 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3-4, 6-8, 16-20, 29-36, 38, 41, 44, 47, 49-61, 80, 88, 95-96, 100, 104, 108, 117-119, 122-125, 127, 134-138. Rejected as unnecessary. 15. Rejected as irrelevant. Peak seasonal demand is accounted for by the numeric need determination methodology. There is no credible evidence which supports a calculation of three years of four month winter occupancy to reach a 12 month average occupancy rate. 21-27, 37, 42-43, 62-64, 66, 97, 99, 101-103, 105-107, 109, 120-121, 126. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 28. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence and contrary to the stipulation filed by the parties. Rejected as not supported by greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence which fails to establish that the transfer of patients from emergency room to acute care beds is delayed due to numerical availability of beds. Rejected as not supported by greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence which fails to establish that the alleged lack of acute care beds is based on insufficient number of total beds as opposed to other factors which affect bed availability. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence which fails to establish reasonableness of considering only a four month period under "not normal" circumstances where the period and the peak seasonal demand are included within the averages utilized to project bed need. 86. Rejected as cumulative. 114. Rejected as unsupported hearsay. Respondent/Intervenor The Respondent and Intervenor filed a joint proposed recommended order. The proposed order's findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 6, 45, 51, 53, 59-67, 69-70, 94-113. Rejected as unnecessary. 16. Rejected as to use of term "false", conclusion of law. 58. Rejected as not clearly supported by credible evidence. 71-93, 114-124. Rejected as cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 W. David Watkins, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez, & Cole Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Edward G. Labrador, Esquire Thomas Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D.C. Newton, II, Esquire Aurell, Radey, Hinkle, Thomas & Beranek Monroe Park Tower, Suite 1000 101 North Monroe Street Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent should recoup Medicaid payments made to Petitioner for health care services provided to eight patients.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Hospital), has contracted with Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), to provide services to Medicaid patients. The parties have agreed that there is a dispute for Medicaid reimbursement for goods and services provided to eight patients: S.G., J.D., R.J., C.A., G.M., S.S., M.P., and C.T. The Agency has paid the Hospital for the services rendered to these eight patients and seeks to recoup the payment based on a retrospective review by a peer review organization, Keystone Peer Review Organization (KePro). The Agency claims that either the admission or a portion of the length-of-stay for the eight patients was medically unnecessary. Services were provided to C.T. in 1994 and to the remainder of the patients at issue in 1995. Payment for Medicaid services is on a per diem basis. The rate for 1994 is $473.22 per day, and the rate for 1995 is $752.14. The Agency contracted with KePro to do a review of the Medicaid payments to the Hospital. KePro employs nurses to review the patient files based on criteria on discharge screens. If the services meet the criteria, there is no further review and the payment is approved. If the nurse determines that the services do not meet the criteria on the discharge screens, the patient's files are reviewed by a board certified physician, who in this case would be a psychiatrist. If the physician determines that the services are not medically necessary, a letter is sent to the Medicaid provider, giving the provider an opportunity to submit additional information. Additional information submitted by the provider is reviewed by a board certified physician. If the doctor concludes that the services are still medically unnecessary, the provider is notified that that services do not qualify for reimbursement and the provider may ask for a reconsideration of the denial. If the provider seeks reconsideration, the file is reviewed by a physician, and the provider has an opportunity to be present during the review. If the physician determines that the services are medically unnecessary, KePro sends a letter to the Agency stating the reasons for denial. The denial letters that KePro sends to the Agency are reviewed by the Medical Director of KePro, who is not a psychiatrist. Dr. John Sullenberger, the Agency's Medicaid physician, reviews the KePro denial letters sent to the Agency, and 99.9 percent of the time he agrees with the findings of KePro regarding whether the services were medically necessary. Dr. Sullenberger does not review the patient's charts when he does this review. The Agency sends a recoupment letter to the Medicaid provider requesting repayment for services provided. Patient S.G., a 12 year-old boy, was being treated pursuant to the Baker Act. He was admitted to the Hospital on March 8, 1995, and discharged on March 25, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and the entire length-of-stay for S.G. based on KePro's determination that it was not medically necessary for the services to S.G. to be rendered in an acute care setting because the patient was neither suicidal nor homicidal. Three to five days prior to his admission to the Hospital, S.G. had attempted to stab his father. He also had further violent episodes, including jumping his father from behind and choking him and pulling knives on his parents. S.G. had a history of attention deficit and hyperactive disorder. He had been using multiple substances, such as alcohol, LSD, cocaine, and marijuana, prior to his admission. His behavior was a clear reference that he was suffering from a psychosis. A psychosis is a significant inability to understand what is reality, including delusions of false beliefs, hallucinations, hearing and seeing things which do not exist, and ways of thinking that are bizarre. Psychosis is a reason to admit a patient, particularly combined with substance abuse. S.G.'s treating psychiatrist noted that S.G. had tangentiality, which means that his thoughts did not stay together. He did not have a connection between thoughts, which is a sign of a psychosis. The chart demonstrated that S.G. had disorder thinking, which includes the possibility of a psychosis. There was also a reference in the charts to organic mental disturbance which could infer brain damage as the cause for the mental disturbance. Two days after admission, there was an issue of possible drug withdrawal because S.G. was agitated and anxious and showed other symptoms. Drug withdrawal, psychosis, and a demonstration of overt violence require a stay in an acute care facility. There was some indication that S.G. was suicidal. While in the Hospital he was placed under close observation, which is a schedule of 15-minute checks to determine if the patient was physically out of harm's way. S.G. was started on an antidepressant, Wellbutrin, because the treating physician thought S.G. was becoming increasingly depressed and was having trouble organizing his thoughts. Antidepressants, as contrasted to a medication such as an antibiotic, may take a minimum of two to three weeks before the patient will benefit from the full effect of the drug. It is difficult to stabilize the dosage for an antidepressant on an outpatient basis. S.G. was taking Ritalin, which is commonly used for children with attention deficit, hyperactivity disorders. During his stay at the Hospital, S.G. was engaging in strange behavior, including absence seizures. On March 16, 1995, he was still lunging and threatening harm. On March 20, 1995, he was still unstable and at risk. The dosage of Wellbutrin was increased. On March 21 and 22, 1995, S.G. was still threatening and confused. S.G. was discharged on March 25, 1995. The admission and length-of-stay for S.G. were medically necessary. Patient J.D. was a 16 year-old boy who was admitted to the Hospital on March 7, 1995, and discharged on March 14, 1995. The Agency denied the admission and entire length-of-stay based on KePro's determination that the patient was not actively suicidal or psychotic and services could have been rendered in a less acute setting. J.D. was admitted from a partial hospitalization program pursuant to the Baker Act because he was observed by a health care professional banging his head against the wall and throwing himself on the floor. He had a history of depression and out-of-control behavior, including being a danger to himself and running away. At the time of his admission, he was taking Prozac. Banging his head against the wall can mean that the patient is psychotic, can cause brain damage, and can be dangerous if the cause of the behavior is unknown. Admission to the Hospital was justified because the patient was extremely agitated and self abusive, requiring restraints and medication to decrease his agitation and self abusiveness. One of the tests administered during his hospital stay indicated that J.D. was a moderate risk for suicidal behavior. During his hospital stay, it was discovered that J.D. had threatened to kill himself while at school. He had been in a partial treatment program during the day, but that environment was not working. There was violence in the home, and J.D. was becoming overtly depressed. During his stay at the Hospital, J.D. was placed on close observation with 15-minute checks. His dosage of Prozac was increased. The admission and length-of-stay for J.D. were medically necessary. R.J., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on January 1, 1995, and discharged on February 9, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement based on a determination by KePro that the treatment in an acute care facility was not medically necessary because R.J. was not psychotic, not suicidal, and not a threat to others; thus treatment could have been provided in an alternate setting. R.J. had been referred by a health care professional at Horizon Center, an outpatient center, because of progressive deterioration over the previous fourteen months despite outpatient treatment. His deterioration included anger with temper outbursts, uncontrollable behavior at school, failing grades, sadness, depressed mood, extreme anxiety, extensive worrying and a fear of his grandmother. R.J. also suffered from encopresis, a bowel incontinence. He was agitated, lacked energy, neglected his hygiene, experienced crying spells, and had difficulty concentrating. R.J. needed to be admitted for an evaluation to rule out a paranoid psychosis. It was necessary to do a 24-hour EEG as opposed to a 45-minute EEG. In order to do a 24-hour EEG, the patient is typically placed in an acute care facility. The EEG showed abnormal discharge in the brain, which could be contributing to a psychiatric illness. At school R.J. had smeared feces on the walls, behavior that could be seen in psychotic persons. There was evidence that he had been hitting and throwing his stepbrother and 3 year-old brother. He was fearful of his grandmother and, based on his family history, there was reason to fear her. R.J. was placed on Buspar, a medication which generally takes two weeks to take effect. Contrary to the Agency's determination, R.J. was disorganized. He was also violent in terms of threatening danger and extreme anger. The admission and length-of-stay for R.J. at the Hospital were medically necessary. Patient C.A., a 9 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on June 1, 1995, and discharged on June 12, 1995. The Agency disallowed one day of the length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the services provided on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in a less restrictive setting. C.A. was admitted for violent and disruptive behavior. He also had an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder and was taking Lithium and Depakote. These medications are used for patients who experience serious mood swings and abrupt changes in mood, going from depression to anger to euphoria. To be effective, medicating with Lithium and Depakote requires that the blood levels of the patient be monitored and the dosage titrated according to blood level. C.A. also was given Wellbutrin during his hospital stay. On June 11, 1995, C.A. was given an eight-hour pass to leave the hospital in the care of his mother. The physician's orders indicated that the pass was to determine how well C.A. did in a less restrictive setting. He returned to the Hospital without incident. He was discharged the next day to his mother. The treatment on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in an environment other than an acute facility; thus the stay on June 11, 1995, was not medically necessary for Medicaid reimbursement purposes. Patient G.M., an 11 year-old male with a history of being physically and sexually abused by his parents, was admitted to the Hospital on March 21, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient hospital treatment from March 28 to April 3, 1995, based on KePro's determination that the length of hospital stay exceeded health care needs at an inpatient level and could have been provided in a less acute setting. At the time of admission, G.M. had suicidal ideation. His school had reported that G.M. had mutilated himself with a pencil, banged himself on the knuckles, and told the school nurse that he wanted to die. Prior to admission, G.M. had been taking Ritalin. His treating physician took G.M. off the Ritalin so that she could assess his condition and start another medication after a base-line period. The doctor prescribed Clonidine for G.M. Clonidine is a drug used in children to control reckless, agressive and angry behavior. Clonidine must be titrated in order to establish the correct dosage for the patient. During his hospital stay, G.M. was yelling and threatening staff. He was placed in locked seclusion, where he began hitting the wall. G.M. was put in a papoose, which is similar to a straitjacket. The papoose is used when there is no other way to control the patient. The patient cannot use his arms or legs while in a papoose. This type of behavior and confinement was occurring as late as March 31, 1995. G.M. was given a pass to go to his grandparents on April 2, 1995. He did well during his pass, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. Treatment in an acute facility was medically necessary through April 1, 1995. Treatment on April 2, 1995, could have been provided in a less acute setting. Patient S.S., a 5 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on March 9, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length of his hospital stay based on a determination by KePro that S.S. was not psychotic or an immediate danger to himself or others and the evaluation and treatment could have been rendered in a less acute setting. Prior to admission to the Hospital, S.S. was threatening suicide, ran into a chalk board at school, scratched his arms until they bled, and showed aggressive intent toward his sister, saying that he would kill her with a saw. S.S.'s condition had been deteriorating for approximately three months before his admission. At the time of admission, he had been suicidal, hyperactive, restless, and experiencing hallucinations. The hallucinations imply a psychosis. S.S. was put on Trofanil, an antidepressant which needs to be titrated. The patient's blood level had to be monitored while taking this drug. During his hospital stay, S.S. was on close observation. All objects which he could use to harm himself were removed from his possession. After he ate his meals, the hospital staff would immediately remove all eating utensils. On March 28, 1995, S.S. threatened to kill himself and became self-abusive. His blood level on March 31, 1995, was sub-therapeutic, and his medication dosage was increased. On April 1, 1995, S.S. had a temper tantrum. The admission and length-of-stay for the treatment of S.S. were medically necessary. Patient M.P., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on April 27, 1995, and was discharged on May 6, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the patient functions on an eighteen to twenty-four month level but is not psychotic and the treatment could have been provided in a less acute setting. M.P.'s IQ is between 44 and 51. He was diagnosed with a pervasive development disorder, which is a serious lack of development attributed to significant brain damage. His condition had deteriorated in the six months prior to his admission. He had episodes of inappropriate laughter, fits of anger, hit his head, hit windows, and put his arm in contact with the broken glass through the window. At the time of his admission, he had a seizure disorder. An EEG and an MRI needed to be performed on M.P. in order to evaluate his condition. M.P. had to have a regular EEG, a 24-hour EEG, and a neurological examination. The patient was aggressive, restless, and uncooperative. In order for the MRI to be performed, M.P. had to be anesthetized. The admission and length-of-stay for M.P. were medically necessary. Patient C.T., a 34 year-old female, was admitted to the Hospital on November 11, 1994, and was discharged on November 26, 1994. The Agency denied the treatment from November 17, 1994, to November 26, 1994, based on a determination by a peer review organization that the patient was stable by November 17, 1994, and psychiatric follow-up could have been performed in an outpatient setting. C.T. was admitted for kidney stones. She did pass the kidney stones but continued to have severe pain. Her doctor asked for a psychiatric consult. The psychiatrist diagnosed C.T. as having a personality disorder, chronic psychogenic pain disorder, and an eating disorder. Her depressive disorder exacerbated pain. C.T. had been given narcotics for the pain associated with the kidney stones. In order to assess her mental status, the physicians needed to taper the dosage of Demerol which she had been receiving. She was started on Sinequan, which is an anti-depressant given to alleviate the psychological condition and to help with the physical complaints. C.T. was later put on Vicodin, an oral narcotic, which seemed to bring the pain under control. The drugs used could cause a drop in blood pressure; therefore, they had to be titrated slowly. Her treating physician was trying to find an appropriate anti-depressant, while weaning the patient from intramuscular narcotics. On November 17, 1994, C.T. left her room and went to the hospital lobby, where she was found by nursing staff. C.T. was crying and saying that she was in pain and wanted to die. During her hospital stay, C.T. was in much distress; she would scream out that she was in pain. On November 18, 1994, she was found crying on the floor of the hospital chapel and had to be returned to her room. It was the opinion of Dr. Bernard Frankel, an expert retained by the Hospital, that C.T. probably could have been discharged a day earlier. The hospital stay for C.T. from November 17, 1994, to November 25, 1994, was medically necessary. The last day of her stay was not medically necessary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to pay to the Agency $752.14 for one day of service provided to G.M., $752.14 for one day of service provided to C.A., and $473.22 for one day of service provided to C.T. and finding that the Hospital is not liable for payment for any of the other services at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a physician licensed to practice in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0025685. For 18 years prior to the event complained of herein, Respondent worked at Indian River Memorial Hospital, where he practiced as an anaesthesiologist. Also prior to the event complained of herein, Respondent was a tri- athlete, training in swimming, biking, and running. During the summer of 1992 he competed in five or six tri-athalons and did quite well in his age class. Respondent was also a snow skier. In accordance with his physical fitness values, Respondent does not drink alcoholic beverages or smoke cigarettes. He is also a vegetarian. Peter G. Wernicke is an orthopedic surgeon in the Vero Beach area. After arriving there, he and Respondent became social friends and went on ski trips together. He also became Respondent's treating physician, caring for Respondent when Respondent suffered broken bones, strains, and sprains as a result of his sporting activities. In early winter of 1992 Respondent seriously injured his knee while snow skiing. Respondent discussed his need for surgery with Wernicke after Respondent returned to the Vero Beach area. Wernicke was insistent that he perform Respondent's knee surgery, but Respondent wanted to have the surgery performed by Dr. Richard Steadman in Vail, Colorado, since he believed that Dr. Steadman was probably the best in the world at taking care of that particular kind of knee injury. Wernicke then insisted that Respondent allow Wernicke to perform the knee surgery with Respondent awake, and once the knee was opened up, Wernicke and Respondent would look at it and decide whether it was something Wernicke was able to take care of or if the knee should be closed and Respondent would then go to whomever he wanted to have the surgery performed. Respondent would not agree to that approach since he well understood that opening the knee twice would double Respondent's risk of infection in that injured knee. Up to the time that Respondent left to travel to Vail for his knee surgery, Wernicke maintained that he was not giving Respondent his blessing for having the surgery performed by someone else. Respondent went to Vail and had Dr. Steadman perform the surgery in early December of 1992. Respondent remained in Vail post-operatively undergoing physical therapy which commenced within hours of surgery being completed to increase his chances of obtaining full range of motion with that knee by keeping it moving and preventing scarring. Respondent returned to Vero Beach on December 13 and returned to work the next morning, working a full shift that day. After his shift was over, he drove himself to Orlando for a meeting. While in Orlando, Respondent began to have very severe pain and swelling in his knee. He drove back to Vero Beach, arriving at his home at approximately 9:30 p.m. Upon his arrival, he telephoned Wernicke, told Wernicke he was in a great deal of pain, and begged Wernicke to help him by meeting him at the hospital and looking at Respondent's knee. Wernicke told Respondent that he would not go to the hospital to meet Respondent, that Respondent should elevate his knee and apply ice, and then see Wernicke in the morning. Respondent elevated his leg and applied ice for the next few hours. By approximately midnight the pain had become "absolutely excruciating," unlike any Respondent had experienced with all of his broken bones and other sports injuries. Although Respondent's tolerance for pain was high enough that he had gone through the surgery performed by Dr. Steadman without pain pills and had tolerated getting on an exercise bike 12 hours after that surgery, Respondent knew that he could no longer endure the pain, that he had a serious problem with his post-operative knee, and that he needed to get help immediately. Respondent got himself up with crutches and got in the car to drive himself to the emergency room. While driving, he telephoned the emergency room at Indian River Memorial Hospital and told the staff he was on his way there and asked the name of the orthopedist who was on call. He was advised that Dr. Wernicke was not only on call, but was present in the emergency room at that moment. Respondent told the emergency room staff to tell Wernicke to wait for him. Respondent then called the operating room at Indian River Memorial Hospital and asked if an anaesthesiologist were there so he could get something to relieve his pain. He was told that Dr. Brennan had just finished with surgery and had taken the patient to the intensive care unit. Respondent then asked for two things: (1) to have Dr. Brennan go to the emergency room to take care of Respondent and (2) to bring Respondent's anaesthesia cart to the emergency room. The operating room staff agreed. Respondent's requests resulted from his experience with that hospital's emergency room staff and procedures. He knew he needed medication for his knee and for his pain. He knew that Dr. Brennan was not employed by the hospital and did not have his own anaesthesia cart there. He knew that the emergency room staff were notoriously slow in responding to patient needs or doctor requests. Therefore, over the years, Respondent had learned that whenever he was called to the emergency room, the patient was better served if Respondent took his own anaesthesia cart and supplies with him. As a result of his telephoning ahead, Respondent's arrival was expected. Dr. Wernicke waited for him. Someone took Respondent's anaesthesia cart to the emergency room and placed it next to a stretcher. Dr. Brennan was paged and told that Respondent needed him in the emergency room, and Dr. Brennan went to the emergency room to assist his colleague. When Brennan got there, Respondent had not yet arrived, but Wernicke was present. Brennan told Wernicke he was there to help with Respondent. For whatever reason, Wernicke told Brennan that Brennan was not needed and told him to leave. Before leaving the emergency room, Brennan told Wernicke that if he were needed he would be nearby in the intensive care unit and to please summon him. Respondent arrived at the hospital emergency room on crutches. The emergency room was currently under construction and had no dividing walls or partitions so that it was simply one room in which everyone could see everything occurring. There were no patients in the emergency room when Respondent arrived, but there were three or four nurses and the emergency room doctor at the nurses' station. Respondent went to the nurses' station to be admitted. He was told that he should wait in the lobby and he would be called when they were ready to begin the admission process. Respondent refused to do that, told them he was in excruciating pain, and insisted that he be given the emergency room release form and financial responsibility form to sign and be taken to one of the emergency room stretchers. He was given the forms to sign, which he did, and he was then escorted to the stretcher next to his anaesthesia cart. For the remainder of his time in the emergency room, Respondent remained on that stretcher which was no more than 30 feet from the nurses' station. No chart for his emergency room visit was prepared by the hospital personnel. Further, no one took his vital signs; no one took his blood pressure; no one asked what his problem or complaints were which caused his visit; and no one asked whether Respondent had any allergies or had recently eaten. Respondent lay on the stretcher waiting for Wernicke to return to the emergency room for approximately five minutes. When Wernicke came in, he was wearing a big smile. He remarked to Respondent that Wernicke could see that Respondent had a problem with his knee. Wernicke then gave one swipe across Respondent's knee with an alcohol swab and prepared to jab an 18 gauge needle into the knee to aspirate it, i.e., to drain the fluid. Respondent became terrified and told Wernicke to stop. Respondent's terror was caused by two fears. First, it was apparent that his knee was full of blood. He knew that blood outside of its normal confines is an irritant which causes inflammation and he knew that it was also the perfect medium in which bacteria could grow. He also knew that the risk of infection in his knee was substantial because it was a post-operative knee. Infection in such a knee presents a best-case scenario of a damaged knee and a worst-case scenario of rendering him a cripple, requiring a total knee replacement. Yet, Respondent saw that Wernicke intended to stick the needle into Respondent's dirty knee without even using a Betadine preparation to remove bacteria from the skin. Second, Respondent was in "unbelievable" pain from the significant swelling in his knee. The surgical incisions above and below his knee had ruptured from the pressure caused by the swelling. In order for Wernicke to aspirate Respondent's knee, it would be necessary for him to poke his fingers into the swollen knee area in order to locate the right place to stick the needle, and it was impossible for Respondent to hold his leg still for Dr. Wernicke to palpate, let alone insert the needle in the correct location. Respondent told Wernicke that he needed an I.V. started; that he needed Kefzol, an I.V. antibiotic, to prevent infection; that he needed Toradol intravenously for its anti-inflammatory effect; and that he was in very, very severe pain and needed pain medication so he could hold his leg still for Wernicke to aspirate. Although Wernicke recognized that Respondent was in significant, severe pain, he told Respondent he would agree to the antibiotic and he would agree to the anti-inflammatory, but that he didn't think Respondent needed anything for pain. Respondent's anaesthesia cart was not equipped with I.V. fluids. Someone brought an I.V. bag and set-up. Respondent does not know who brought the I.V. and whether it was on Dr. Wernicke's order or ordered by the emergency room doctor, but Respondent did not order the I.V. brought. No one offered to start Respondent's I.V. for him, and Wernicke did not tell Respondent that Dr. Brennan had come to the emergency room, had been sent away by Wernicke but was nearby, and had told Wernicke to summon him if he were needed. Wernicke kept telling Respondent to hurry up because it was late and he wanted to go home. He told Respondent that they needed to get finished because Wernicke was doing Respondent a favor just by being there. Respondent, while still lying on his stretcher, started his own I.V. Wernicke assisted Respondent by handing him tape for the I.V. since Respondent was performing the task with one hand. Respondent then removed his medication box from the bottom of his anaesthesia cart. He took out an ampule of Kefzol, a dry powder. He took a syringe and drew fluid from the I.V. that was running into him and mixed up that dry powder antibiotic by flushing it back and forth. He then gave the antibiotic to himself. He attempted to delay Wernicke from inserting the needle into his knee until after the antibiotic could circulate through his system and get to his knee before any bacteria was introduced, a process which would take approximately six minutes to complete enough circulations. Respondent next prepped his own knee with Betadine solution while Dr. Wernicke continued to stand there by his side, watching him. Respondent then took an ampule of Toradol, a new anti-inflammatory medication, and gave himself 60 milligrams intravenously, while Wernicke stood and watched. Although that anti-inflammatory medication would also serve to reduce Respondent's pain, Toradol is a slow-acting medication in that regard, having a slow onset but thereafter lasting for a number of hours. Respondent then removed from his medication box a 5 cc ampule of Alfenta. That ampule is a 2 1/2 inch object made of glass with its name in blue lettering on the outside, large enough to read. Alfenta is a Schedule II controlled substance and is a narcotic. Alfenta has a fast onset and a fast offset; it works in 30 to 60 seconds, and its effect lasts for approximately 10 minutes. While Dr. Wernicke watched, Respondent filled a needle and gave himself 1 cc of Alfenta which is a very conservative test dose for a man weighing 190 pounds who is in good condition. Respondent then waited a minute or a minute and a half to see what effect it had on his pain level and trembling leg. It had very little effect. Therefore, Respondent injected an additional 1/2 cc and waited. That additional amount was sufficient. Wernicke watched as Respondent gave himself the Alfenta, standing, as he had been, within inches of Respondent. As he injected the medications, Respondent filled out the chart on his anaesthesia cart, noting the medication, the dosage, and that he was the patient. Respondent then laid back on the stretcher, closed his eyes, and then told Wernicke he was ready. Wernicke then palpated Respondent's knee and inserted the needle to aspirate Respondent's knee. The pressure in his knee was so high that it blew the syringe back. Wernicke commented that he had never before seen that happen and had never seen pressure like that. Wernicke withdrew approximately 100 ccs of fluid from Respondent's knee, commenting that he did not think he'd seen one with more volume. Although initially Wernicke had said that he did not agree that Respondent needed any pain medication, Wernicke totally acquiesced in everything Respondent did to assist Wernicke in treating Respondent. Wernicke accepted Respondent's judgment and watched Respondent execute step by step the course of treatment Respondent said was needed to render proper medical treatment. Wernicke totally agreed and acquiesced with the use of Alfenta as much as he did the antibiotic and the anti-inflammatory as evidenced by Wernicke's own conduct. Wernicke never told Respondent to stop doing Wernicke's work for him. Wernicke never told him not to administer the medications. Wernicke never suggested that he or someone else perform the administration. Wernicke could have easily stopped Respondent who was laying on a stretcher but did not. Wernicke knew that Alfenta was a pain killer and a narcotic. He did nothing to stop or prevent Respondent from injecting a medication Respondent needed. Further, Wernicke continued to treat Respondent after the administration of Alfenta by thereafter performing the aspiration. After he completed the aspiration, Wernicke left. Respondent lay on the stretcher for a little while. The nurses and the emergency room doctor remained at the nurses' station, and there were still no other patients in the emergency room. Respondent asked if someone would bring him a wheelchair so he could leave, and he was told that they were too busy. Respondent took his crutches and hobbled out of the emergency room. The next morning Respondent reported to work for his regular shift which began at 7:00 a.m. After Respondent completed the first case on his shift that day, at approximately 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. he called Haynes McDaniel, the hospital's pharmacist, and told him what had happened the night before, what medications Respondent had used, and that he had used the medications on himself. Respondent said he needed to do whatever paperwork the pharmacist wanted and specifically asked the pharmacist to bill him for the medications he had used. McDaniel told Respondent that there was no problem regarding the Kefzol and the Toradol and that he would simply send Respondent a bill for those medications; however, as to the Alfenta, the pharmacist needed a prescription for his records. McDaniel asked Respondent who the attending physician had been, and Respondent told him that Peter Wernicke was the attending doctor. McDaniel told Respondent to get a prescription from Wernicke for the Alfenta so that the hospital record keeping would be proper. Respondent went to Wernicke and asked him for a prescription for the Alfenta that had been used, and Wernicke refused. Respondent then personally went to McDaniel and told him that Wernicke would not write the prescription and told McDaniel why, i.e., that Wernicke was still mad that Respondent had not considered him good enough to do Respondent's surgery. McDaniel asked Respondent who could write the prescription because Respondent needed a prescription from somebody and Respondent could not write the prescription for himself. Respondent told McDaniel that he had asked Dr. Brennan to be there to give him the pain medication, that Dr. Brennan had never showed up, but that Brennan was in the hospital at the time the medication was administered. McDaniel suggested that Respondent see if Brennan would sign a prescription. Respondent went to Brennan's office and told Brennan exactly what had happened. He told Brennan he had given himself 1 1/2 ccs of Alfenta and that Wernicke was the attending physician. He told Brennan that Respondent had self- administered and why, that Wernicke had refused to write the prescription and why, and that Haynes McDaniel had suggested that Brennan could sign the prescription for the hospital's records. Dr. Brennan became upset that he had not been there to help when his colleague needed him, agreed to sign the prescription, and offered Respondent pain pills or anything else Respondent needed for what remained a painful knee and leg. Respondent declined the offer of any additional medication. In good faith and in the course of his professional practice, Dr. Brennan signed a prescription for 1 1/2 ccs of Alfenta for Respondent. Respondent then hand- delivered that prescription to the pharmacist. After receiving the prescription from Respondent, the pharmacist wrote an Unusual Occurrence Report dated December 16, 1992. In January of 1993 the hospital summarily suspended Respondent's privileges, and he has been unable to practice medicine since that time. Respondent's emergency room visit happened on a Monday evening. On the following Thursday, Respondent and Wernicke's partner Dr. Jim Cain were in the doctor's lounge together. Respondent told Cain that his leg really hurt him and was swollen, and Cain offered to look at it. Respondent pulled up his scrub suit and showed Cain his calf which was twice its normal size and "hot". Cain suggested that Respondent get an ultrasound and get some blood thinner since it looked as though Respondent had developed phlebitis, a dangerous condition. Respondent immediately went to the x-ray department and had an ultrasound performed. The ultrasound revealed that Respondent had compartment syndrome in his calf, four days after the aspiration was performed. Dr. Wernicke's office notes regarding Respondent's emergency room visit, supposedly dictated that same evening or the following day, discussed the ultrasound that Respondent had. Accordingly, Dr. Wernicke did not dictate his notes regarding his treatment of Respondent on Monday evening or on Tuesday. Those notes, however, do bear Tuesday's date and are included in the hospital's medical record for Respondent's emergency room visit. The medical chart created by the hospital was likely created on December 21, 1992, the date stated on the Unusual Occurrence Report as the date the chart was initiated. The chart which thereafter purports to be Respondent's emergency room record is actually a composite of different patients' charts. To the extent it purports to be Respondent's chart, the entries contained therein are false. The Alfenta used by Respondent was an appropriate drug for the purpose for which it was used. It is a rapid but short-acting narcotic analgesic when given in the amount in which it was given. Further, the amount of Alfenta administered was an appropriate dose. Respondent used the Alfenta because it was an appropriate drug for immediate relief so he could endure the palpation and aspiration of his knee and so he could stop his leg from trembling allowing Wernicke to aspirate it. He knew the Alfenta would be worn off even before the analgesic effect of the anti- inflammatory medication was felt. It is noteworthy that all physicians who testified in this proceeding rated the pain Respondent was in as between eight and ten on a pain scale where ten is the worst. Respondent did not use Alfenta as a result of any addiction, and his use of the drug under the circumstances in this case was not related to any abuse of narcotics. Respondent has not exhibited any of the behavior of a drug user. Respondent did not engage in any attempt to "cover up" his administration of Alfenta to himself. He called the hospital and requested his anaesthesia cart be brought and that an anaesthesiologist come to the emergency room to administer the medication. The administration occurred with the implicit consent of Wernicke and it took place in front of Wernicke, in front of three or four emergency room nurses, and in front of the emergency room doctor. At the time, he filled out the narcotics record on his anaesthesia cart and telephoned the hospital's pharmacist the following day to tell him what had occurred and request that he be billed for the medication he used. His giving the hospital a prescription from Dr. Brennan was caused by Wernicke's refusal to document the treatment he rendered to Respondent, by Respondent's inability to write his own prescription, and was in response to the hospital's specific request that a prescription be written for the purpose of the hospital's record keeping. Further, Dr. Wernicke knew what had happened, as did the other emergency room personnel present that evening, and Respondent fully disclosed the events that had occurred to both Dr. Brennan and to the hospital pharmacist. Respondent's use of Alfenta on December 14, 1992, was not in any way related to patient care and had no impact on any patient care rendered by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-6 and 9-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 8, 13, 14, and 16 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3-19, 21-31, 33-35, 38-40, 42, 43, and 45 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 20, 32, 36, 37, and 44 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 41 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur B. Skafidas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Joseph L. Mannikko, Esquire 215 South Federal Highway, Suite 100 Stuart, Florida 34994 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Arnaldo Carmouze, P.A., committed violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (2001), alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed with Petitioner on February 25, 2004, in DOH Case Number 2002- 16502, as amended; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice as a physician assistant in Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians and physician’s assistants licensed to practice medicine in Florida. § 20.43 and Chs. 456 and 458, Fla. Stat. Respondent, Arnaldo Carmouze, P.A., is, and was at the times material to this matter, a physician's assistant licensed to practice in Florida, having been issued license number PA 9100713. Mr. Carmouze's address of record at all times relevant to this matter is 6545 Southwest 95th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33173. No evidence that Mr. Carmouze has previously been the subject of a license disciplinary proceeding was offered. Mr. Carmouze's Supervising Physician. At the times relevant Mr. Carmouze worked under the supervision of Dr. Manuel Fernandez-Gonzalez, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida. Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez, who has practiced emergency medicine, holds Florida medical license number ME 17907. Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez currently practices family medicine at 9600 Southwest 8th Street, Miami, Florida. Prior to April 2002, Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez and Mr. Carmouze worked together in Miami, providing emergency room care and seeing patients at a nursing home. The emergency room services were provided pursuant to employment contracts that both had entered into with a company providing emergency room services at the hospital in south Florida where Dr. Fernandez- Gonzalez and Mr. Carmouze provided services. Mr. Carmouze's Assignment to Weems Memorial Hospital. The company for which Mr. Carmouze was employed also provided emergency room services for Weems Memorial Hospital (hereinafter referred to as "Weems"). Weems is located in Apalachicola, Florida, located in the Florida Panhandle, approximately 520 miles from Miami. Weems is a rural hospital, licensed under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. It does not have 24-hour, on-site ancillary services such as X-ray, laboratory, and respiratory therapy. These services are available to the emergency room on an on-call basis after business hours. At the times relevant, Malvinder Ajit, M.D., a Florida licensed physician, was the Director of the Emergency Department at Weems. Dr. Ajit has not provided any documentation to the Department indicating that he has ever acted as supervising physician of record for Mr. Carmouze. Mr. Carmouze was assigned by the company by which he was employed to work in the emergency room at Weems in April 2002 and again in June 2002. He worked in the emergency room at Weems as a physician's assistant for part of April 2002, and part of June 2002. While at Weems, Mr. Carmouze provided emergency room medical services to more than 100 patients. While working at Weems, Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez, who remained in Miami, continued to act as Mr. Carmouze's supervising physician. Mr. Carmouze did not notify the Department that he was practicing as a physician's assistant at Weems in April or June 2002. The evidence, however, failed to prove that Mr. Carmouze was working for, and thus "employed," by anyone different from the employer that he worked for in Miami. The only evidence on this issue proved that Mr. Carmouze continued throughout the relevant period to work for Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez and the company that provided emergency room services at Weems. Dr. Carmouze's Treatment of Patient A.M. On June 7, 2002, Patient A.M., an 84-year-old female, was brought to the emergency room (hereinafter referred to as the "ER"), at Weems by ambulance. She arrived at approximately 23:24 hours (11:24 p.m.). A.M.'s medical history included congestive heart failure, coronary artery disease, and atrial fibrillation. She presented to Mr. Carmouze in apparent respiratory distress (respiratory rate of 36 to 40), had no measurable blood pressure, and a pulse rate of 100 to 108. While being transported to the ER from her home, A.M. was given oxygen by rebreather mask. During her transport, her oxygen saturation level improved from 68% to 91%. Mr. Carmouze assessed A.M.'s condition, obtained her medical history, ordered lab work and other tests, and ordered and initiated nebulizer treatments for her. She was alert, oriented and had a Glasgow score of 15/15, indicating she was responding to verbal and pain stimuli. Mr. Carmouze ordered nebulizer treatments with albuterol and atrovent to assist her breathing. Additionally, A.M. received 100% oxygen through a nonrebreather mask. Mr. Carmouze also determined that A.M. was "dry," meaning that her fluid volume was depleted and, therefore, she was dehydrated. As a result, her blood pressure was low. In an effort to treat this condition, Mr. Carmouze ordered an I.V. with 0.9 normal saline. He also ordered a Dopamine drip to increase A.M.'s heart rate in an effort to increase her blood pressure. Mr. Carmouze appropriately denied a request from a nurse to administer Lasix to A.M., because A.M. was "dry." Lasix is a diuretic used to decrease fluid volume. It opens the arteries and reduces fluids, thereby lowering blood pressure. Lasix was contraindicated for A.M. and contrary to the appropriate efforts initiated by Mr. Carmouze to treat A.M.'s low blood pressure. Despite Mr. Carmouze's treatment of A.M., her condition continued to deteriorate. At or near 23:50 hours (11:50 p.m.), approximately 25 minutes after A.M. had arrived at the ER, an ER nurse contacted A.M.'s primary physician by telephone and obtained an order to administer Lasix to A.M. The Lasix was administered immediately. A.M.'s oxygen saturation level was 81%, down 10 points since her arrival, when the Lasix was administered. Within half an hour, at 0:18 hours (18 minutes after midnight) on June 8, 2002, A.M.'s oxygen saturation level had dropped another 10 points, to 71%. A.M. then "crashed and coded." Mr. Carmouze initiated appropriate emergency measures when A.M. coded, including initiating Cardio Pulmonary Recitation and endotracheal intubation. A.M. was given epinephrine, atropine, and a CVP line was placed. These actions by Mr. Carmouze were appropriate. Mr. Carmouze did not attempt or order that A.M. be intubated prior to 0:18 hours when she coded. A.M.'s primary physician, Dr. Sanaullah, arrived at the ER. Shortly after she coded, Dr. Sanaullah continued the same efforts initiated by Mr. Carmouze. A.M., however, did not recover, expiring at 01:00. The "Standard of Care" for Treating A.M. Four expert witnesses testified in this matter, rendering opinions as to whether Mr. Carmouze's treatment of A.M. was consistent with "that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar [physician assistant] as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. . . " (hereinafter referred to as the "Standard of Care"). The expert witnesses who testified were Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez, Dr. Julio Lora, Dr. Harry W. Lee, and James L. Cary, P.A. Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez's testimony as to whether Mr. Carmouze treated A.M. within the Standard of Care is rejected for lack of credibility. Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez's testimony has been found to lack credibility for the reasons explained by Petitioner in paragraph 25 of Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order. That paragraph, except for the last two sentences, is hereby adopted. Additionally, Dr. Fernandez- Gonzalez's testimony is rejected because, in the undersigned's judgment, he made too much of an effort to give the answers that he appeared to conclude that Mr. Carmouze wanted him to give. The testimony of Dr. Lora on the other hand is found to be credible. Dr. Lora, testifying as an expert in cardiology and internal medicine, offered convincing explanations as to why Mr. Carmouze did not violate the Standard of Care in his overall treatment of A.M. and, in particular, in not attempting to intubate A.M. earlier than he did. Dr. Lee's testimony, while corroborating Dr. Lora's testimony, was cumulative and of little weight. A.M. was reported to be awake, alert, and oriented. She was breathing, albeit with difficulty, on her own. Therefore, it was appropriate for Mr. Carmouze to attempt the other measures to assist her breathing he instituted. Mr. Cary's testimony, while credible, was not convincing, especially given Dr. Lora's expert opinions. Mr. Cary's testimony was taken during a discovery deposition by Respondent and, as a result, the benefit of his testimony to Petitioner's case was limited. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Carmouze violated the standard of care: In his treatment of A.M.; By failing "to contact his supervising physician, the ED director, and/or Patient A.M.'s primary physician for assistance in treating Patient A.M."; By failing "to identify a treatment plan for Patient A.M."; and By failing "to consult his supervising physician prior to ordering Demerol, a controlled substance, for Patients C.M., J.S., B.M., R.M., M.F., G.C., G.B., K.S., C.W., M.A.C., R.S., and K.M." Mr. Carmouze's Treatment Plan and Medical Records for Patient A.M. Mr. Carmouze, as the Department has conceded in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, paragraph 13, page 20, did identify a treatment plan for Patient A.M. Having found that Mr. Carmouze did not err when he did not initiate intubation of A.M. earlier than he did, the evidence failed to prove that "he failed to maintain medical records that justified the course of treatment in that he failed to record a reason for not intubating sooner in an attempt to address Patient A.M.'s respiratory distress." There is no indication in Mr. Carmouze's medical records for A.M. that Mr. Carmouze attempted to contact Dr. Ajit or Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez. The medical records do indicate, however, that A.M.'s primary physician, Dr. Sanaullah, was "notified and arrived for code." While the evidence did not prove who notified Dr. Sanaullah, Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Carmouze was not responsible for Dr. Sanaullah's notification. Mr. Carmouze failed to identify himself by name or professional title in A.M.'s medical records. He also failed to include Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez's name and title in A.M.'s medical records. Mr. Carmouze did not ensure that either the signature of his supervising physician or Dr. Ajit was included on A.M.'s medical records. While the quality of Mr. Carmouze's medical records for A.M. was correctly characterized as "minimally acceptable" by Mr. Cary, the evidence failed to prove clearly and convincingly that those medical records were not adequate. This finding is based upon the lack of an unequivocal opinion from Mr. Cary concerning the adequacy of the medical records and a comparison of Mr. Cary's opinions with those of Dr. Lee in support of Mr. Carmouze's medical records for Patient A.M. Mr. Cary, on the one hand, made the following negative comments about Mr. Carmouze's medical records for A.M: "[T]he record isn't really clear on what did happen because he did not write down any times on intervention of what he did." Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1, page 14; "[W]hen you look at this face sheet here you don't get a picture of what happened and at what time, there's no real times there, no progression of the treatment." Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1, page 67. Mr. Cary stated that there was no time noted in Patient A.M.'s history/physical section, and that a portion of that section was illegible. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1, page 21 and 25. On the other hand, Mr. Cary stated that "[the medical record for A.M.] is minimally acceptable, it just doesn't give a good clear picture of the sequence of events." Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1, page 68. Mr. Cary also stated the following when asked if he thought Mr. Carmouze maintained medical records that justified the course of his treatment regarding Patient A.M.: "There were medical records that were there, I think they could have been more complete and more detailed . . . ." These statements, taking into account the fact that Mr. Cary was able to read almost all of Mr. Carmouze's medical record pertaining to A.M. on direct examination by counsel for Mr. Carmouze, reduces the effectiveness of his other opinions. Finally, it is noted that all of Mr. Carmouze's experts, along with Mr. Cary, were able to read Mr. Carmouze's notes, other than a word or two. Patients C.M., J.S., B.M., R.M., M.F., G.C., G.B., K.S., C.W., M.A.C., R.S., and K.M. Patient C.M. On April 23, 2002, Patient C.M., a 20-year-old male presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. C.M. complained of a server headache. In pertinent part, Mr. Carmouze ordered 50 milligrams of Demerol and 50 milligrams of Vistaril. Patient J.S. On April 24, 2002, Patient J.S., a 37-year-old female presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. J.S. complained of a burn. In pertinent part, Mr. Carmouze ordered 50 milligrams of Demerol and 50 milligrams of Vistaril. Patient B.M. On April 24, 2002, Patient B.M., a 46-year-old female, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. B.M. complained of a headache of two-days' duration. In pertinent part, Mr. Carmouze ordered 25 milligrams of Demerol administered to B.M. at the ER. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for B.M. a diagnosis of scabies/headache cluster, severe. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for B.M. Patient R.M. On April 24, 2002, Patient R.M., a 73-year-old male, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. R.M. complained of abdominal pain and constipation of several days’ duration. In patient part, Mr. Carmouze ordered 50 milligrams of Demerol and 50 milligrams of Vistaril administered to R.M. at the ER. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for R.M. a diagnosis of abdominal pain, impaction. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for R.M. Patient M.F. On April 25, 2002, Patient M.F., a 34-year-old female, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. M.F. complained of left-flank pain. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered 50 milligrams of Demerol and 50 milligrams of Vistaril administered to M.F. at the ER. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for M.F. a diagnosis of left-flank pain, left nephrolithiasis. Patient G.C. On June 7, 2002, Patient G.C., a 20-year-old male, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. G.C. complained of right-flank pain. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered two separate doses of Demerol, 50 milligrams each, and Vistaril, 50 milligrams each. Patient G.B. On June 7, 2002, Patient G.B., an 83-year-old female, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. G.B. complained of wrist, knee, and leg pain, secondary to a fall. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered two separate doses of Demerol, 50 milligrams each, and Vistaril, 50 milligrams each. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for G.B. a diagnosis of chest contusion, leg edema, and right Colles' fracture. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for G.B. Patient K.S. On June 8, 2002, Patient K.S., an 18-year-old female, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. K.S. complained of lower back pain secondary to a fall. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered Demerol, 50 milligrams, and Vistaril, 50 milligrams. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for K.S. a diagnosis of intractable back pain, trauma to spine. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for K.S. Patient C.W. On June 8, 2002, Patient C.W., a 46-year-old female, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. C.W. complained of headache and dizziness. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered Demerol, 50 milligrams, and Vistaril, 50 milligrams. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for C.W. a diagnosis of headache and anemia. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for C.W. Patient M.A.C. On June 9, 2002, Patient M.A.C., a 49-year-old female, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. M.A.C. complained of pain in the lower right abdomen and back. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered Demerol, 50 milligrams, and Vistaril, 50 milligrams. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for M.A.C. a diagnosis of diabetes mellitus and abdominal pain. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for M.A.C. Patient R.S. On June 9, 2002, Patient R.S., a 34-year-old male, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. R.S. complained of shoulder pain. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered Demerol, 50 milligrams, and Vistaril, 50 milligrams. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for R.S. a diagnosis of right shoulder tendon tear. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for R.S. Patient K.M. On June 11, 2002, Patient K.M., a 52-year-old male, presented to Mr. Carmouze at Weems' ER. R.S. complained of wrist pain secondary to a fall. In relevant part, Mr. Carmouze ordered Demerol, 50 milligrams, and Vistaril, 50 milligrams. Mr. Carmouze noted in the medical record for K.M. a diagnosis of a Colles' fracture. This is the only diagnosis made at Weems' ER for K.S. Facts Common to Patients C.M., J.S., B.M., R.M., M.F., G.C., G.B., K.S., C.W., M.A.C., R.S., and K.M. Mr. Carmouze did not note in his medical records for Patients C.M., J.S., B.M., R.M., M.F., G.C., G.B., K.S., C.W., M.A.C., R.S., and K.M. (hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Pain Patients "), that he had consulted with Dr. Fernandez- Gonzalez or Dr. Ajit prior to ordering Demerol for the Pain Patients. Demerol is a controlled substance. Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez' testimony regarding alleged consultations he had with Mr. Carmouze concerning the Pain Patients and other patients seen by Mr. Carmouze while at Weems is rejected as lacking credibility for the reasons explained, supra. Mr. Carmouze also failed to note in the medical records for the Pain Patients his name and professional title. His name was stamped on the Emergency Room Record he completed for Patients M.A.C., G.M., and R.S. His name was also written into the space under "Time/Initials" on the Emergency Room Record for Patients M.A.C., C.W., R.M., and J.S. None of these records, however, included his title of "physician assistant." Mr. Carmouze failed to identify Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez or Dr. Ajit by name and professional title in the medical records of the Pain Patients. Mr. Carmouze failed to ensure that the signature of Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez or Dr. Ajit was included in the medical records of the Pain Patients. The Other "106 Patients". While at Weems ER, Mr. Carmouze provided medical services, in addition to A.M. and Pain Patients, to 106 other patients at issue in this case (hereinafter referred to as the "106 Patients"). Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4 is a composite exhibit of medical records for the 106 Patients. There are approximately two patients for whom more than one medical record has been included in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. The foregoing findings relate to the 108 medical records for the 106 Patients. Mr. Carmouze failed to note in most of the medical records for the 106 Patients his name and professional title. Of the approximately 108 records, Mr. Carmouze's name does not appear in any fashion on 48 of them. The rest either include his name (but not title) either stamped on the record or written into the box titled "Time/Initials." On two of the medical records both Mr. Carmouze's name and "P.A." have been written into the box titled "Time/Initials." Mr. Carmouze failed to identify Dr. Fernandez-Gonzalez or Dr. Ajit by name and professional title in the medical records of the 106 Patients. Mr. Carmouze did not ensure that either the signature of his supervising physician or Dr. Ajit was included on the medical records of the 106 Patients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine finding that, Arnaldo Carmouze, P.A., has violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and (v), Florida Statutes, as described in this Recommended Order; issuing a reprimand; placing Mr. Carmouze's license on probation for one year; requiring that he pay an administrative fine of $5,000.00; requiring that he perform five hours of CME in a subject(s) determined appropriate by the Board; and suspending his license for six months (with the suspension stayed provided he complies with probation). DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Irving Levine Matthew Casey Assistants General Counsel Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Julie Gallagher, Esquire Greenberg Taurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Timothy M. Cerio, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. M. Rony François, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issues in this case are set forth in 11 separate counts within the four consolidated cases: Case No. 09-5360 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly monitor and care for a patient in restraints. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure the physician's plan of care for patient was implemented. Case No. 09-5363 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly implement the physician's plan of care for patient. Case No. 09-5364 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to ensure a patients' right to privacy. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that food was served in the prescribed safe temperature zone. Count III--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that only authorized personnel had access to locked areas where medications were stored. Count IV--Whether Respondent failed to perform proper nursing assessments of a patient. Count V--Dismissed. Count VI--Whether Respondent failed to maintain patient care equipment in a safe operating condition. Case No. 09-5365 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to triage a patient with stroke-like symptoms in a timely fashion. Count II--Whether Respondent's nursing staff failed to assess and intervene for patients or ensure implementation of the physician's plan of care.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, monitoring health care facilities in the state to ensure compliance with all governing statutes, rules and regulations. It is the responsibility of AHCA to regularly inspect facilities upon unannounced visits. Often AHCA will inspect facilities for the purpose of licensure renewal, certification, or in conjunction with federal surveys. AHCA will also inspect facilities on the basis of complaints filed by members of the general public. Respondent, Gulf Coast Medical Center ("Gulf Coast" or "GCH") is a hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. South West Florida Regional Medical Center ("SWF") was another hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. SWF closed in March 2009, when it was consolidated with Gulf Coast. On October 15, 2008, the Agency conducted a complaint investigation at SWF; a follow-up complaint investigation was done on November 13, 2008. SWF filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in each of the investigations. The November investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. On December 16, 2008, AHCA performed another complaint investigation at Gulf Coast. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the investigation. The investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing one count. On January 5 through 9, 2009, AHCA conducted a routine licensure survey at Gulf Coast. The hospital filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing six counts (although Count V was dismissed during the course of the final hearing). On February 18, 2009, AHCA did its follow-up survey to the previous licensure survey. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. Case 09-5360 The complaint investigation at SWF on November 13, 2008, was conducted under the supervision of Charlene Fisher. Count I in this case addresses findings by the Agency concerning a patient who was placed in restraints at the hospital on August 28, 2008. The patient, A.D., came into the hospital emergency department under the Baker Act seeking medical clearance to a facility. The patient presented at approximately 4:00 p.m., with back pain. He had a history of drug abuse, so there was concern by the hospital regarding the use of narcotics or certain other medications to treat the patient. The patient engaged in some scuffling with police. A physician signed and dated a four-point restraint (one on each limb) order, resulting in the patient being physically restrained. The restraint was deemed a medical/surgical restraint, rather than a behavioral restraint. AHCA had concerns about the restraint, specifically whether there was a notation for Q 15 (or every 15 minutes) monitoring of the restrained patient. However, medical/surgical restraints only require monitoring every two hours. The restraint worksheet for the patient confirms monitoring every two hours. The patient was ultimately admitted to the hospital at 9:37 p.m., and, thereafter, began complaining of left shoulder pain. The hospital responded to the patient's complaints about back pain and began treating the pain with analgesics. However, the patient continued to complain about the pain. An X-ray of the patient's shoulder was finally done the next morning. Shoulder dislocation was confirmed by the X-ray, and the hospital (four hours later) began a more substantive regimen of treatment for pain. Surgery occurred the following morning, and the shoulder problem was resolved. It is clear the patient had a shoulder injury, but it is unclear as to when that injury became more painful than the back injury with which the patient had initially presented. The evidence is unclear whether or when the shoulder injury became obvious to hospital staff. During its course of treating this patient, the hospital provided Motrin, Tylenol, Morphine, Percocet and other medications to treat the patient's pain. Count II in this case also involved a restrained patient, M.D., who had presented to the emergency department under the Baker Act. The patient was released from handcuffs upon arrival at the hospital. After subsequently fighting with a deputy, this patient was also placed in a medical/surgical restraint pursuant to a physician's order. The doctor signed and dated, but did not put a time on, the restraint order. A time is important because there are monitoring requirements for patients in restraints. However, the time of 0050 (12:50 a.m.) appears on the patient's chart and is the approximate time the restraints were initiated. The proper procedure is to monitor a restrained patient every two hours. This patient, however, was removed from his restraints prior to the end of the first two-hour period. Thus, there are no records of monitoring for the patient (nor would any be necessary). The evidence presented by AHCA was insufficient to establish definitively whether the hospital nursing staff failed to properly respond to the aforementioned patients' needs. It is clear the patients could have received more care, but there is not enough evidence to prove the care provided was inadequate. Case No. 09-5363 On December 16, 2008, AHCA conducted a complaint investigation at SWF. The Agency had received a complaint that the hospital did not properly implement a physician's plan of care. Count I in this complaint addresses alleged errors relating to two of four patients reviewed by the surveyors. Both of the patients came to the hospital from a nursing home. One patient, I.A., had presented to the emergency department complaining of chest pains. The medication list sent to the hospital by the nursing home for I.A. actually belonged to someone other than I.A. I.A.'s name was not on the medication list. The drugs listed on the patient chart were different than the drugs I.A. had been taking at the skilled nursing facility from which she came. The skilled nursing facility actually sent I.A.'s roommate's medication list. The erroneous medications were then ordered by the admitting physician and administered to the patient. The hospital is supposed to review the medication list it receives and then enter the medications into the hospital system. The person reviewing the medication list does not necessarily have to be a nurse, and there is no evidence that the person making the error in this case was a nurse or was some other employee. It is clear, however, that the person reviewing the medication list did not properly ascertain that the list belonged to patient I.A. The other patient from the nursing home had been admitted for surgery at SWF. Again, the nursing home from whence she came sent a medication list that was incorrect. The medications on the incorrect list were entered into the system by a SWF employee. The erroneous medications were ultimately ordered by the attending physician for the patient, but there is no evidence the patient was ever administered those medications. Neither of the residents was harmed by the incorrect medications as far as could be determined. Case 09-5364 From January 5 through 8, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast and SWF in conjunction with a federal certification survey. Count I of the complaint resulting from this survey addressed the right of privacy for two residents. In one instance, a patient was observed in her bed with her breasts exposed to plain view. In the other instance, a patient's personal records were found in a "public" place, i.e., hanging on the rail of a hallway in the hospital. AHCA's surveyor, Nancy Furdell, saw a female patient who was apparently asleep lying in her bed. The patient's breasts were exposed as she slept. Furdell observed this fact at approximately 1:15 p.m., on January 7, 2009. Furdell did not see a Posey vest on the patient. She did not know if anyone else saw the exposed breasts. Furdell continued with her survey duties, and at approximately 5:00 p.m., notified a staff member as to what she had seen. Furdell did not attempt to cover the patient or wake the patient to tell her to cover up. The female patient with exposed breasts was in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the hospital. Visiting hours in ICU at that time were 10:00 to 10:30 a.m., and again from 2:00 till 2:30 p.m. Thus, at the time Furdell was present, no outside visitors would have been in the ICU. ICU patients are checked on by nursing staff every half-hour to an hour, depending on their needs. This particular patient would be visited more frequently due to her medical condition. On the day in question, the patient was supposed to be wearing a Posey vest in an effort to stop the patient from removing her tubing. The patient had been agitated and very restless earlier, necessitating the Posey vest. Also on January 7, 2009, a surveyor observed some "papers" rolled up and stuffed inside a hand-rail in the hospital corridor. This occurred at 1:15 p.m., on the fourth floor of the south wing of the hospital. A review of the papers revealed them to be patient records for a patient on that floor. The surveyor could not state at final hearing whether there were hospital personnel in the vicinity of the handrail where she found the patient records, nor could she say how long the patient records had been in the handrail. Rather, the evidence is simply that the records were seen in the handrail and were not in anyone's possession at that moment in time. Count II of the complaint was concerned with the temperature of certain foods being prepared for distribution to patients. Foods for patients are supposed to be kept at certain required temperatures. There is a "danger zone" for foods which starts at 40 degrees Fahrenheit and ends at 141 degrees Fahrenheit. Temperature, along with time, food and environment, is an important factor in preventing contamination of food and the development of bacteria. Surveyor Mary Ruth Pinto took part in the survey. As part of her duties, she asked hospital staff to measure the temperature of foods on the serving line. She found some peaches at 44 degrees, yogurt at 50 degrees, and cranberry juice at 66 degrees Fahrenheit. According to Pinto, the hospital's refrigerator temperatures were appropriate, so it was only food out on the line that was at issue. Pinto remembers talking to the hospital dietary manager and remembers the dietary manager agreeing to destroy the aforementioned food items. The hospital policies and procedures in place on the date of the survey were consistent with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Food Code concerning the storage, handling and serving of food. The policies acknowledge the danger zone for foods, but allow foods to stay within the danger zone for up to four hours. In the case of the peaches and yogurt, neither had been in the danger zone for very long (not more than two hours). The cranberry juice was "shelf stable," meaning that it could be stored at room temperature. The food services director for the hospital remembers the peaches and yogurt being re-chilled in a chill blaster. She does not believe any of the food was destroyed. Count III of the complaint addressed whether an unauthorized person had access to a room where medications were being stored. A state surveyor, Gary Furdell, was part of the survey team on January 5, 2009. Furdell was touring the second floor of the hospital when he noticed a locked door. Furdell asked a hospital medical technician who was standing nearby about the door. The medical technician gave Furdell the code to unlock the door. Furdell peeked inside and noticed bottles that he presumed were medications. It would be a violation for a medical technician to have access to medications, because medical technicians cannot distribute drugs. The room Furdell looked into is a "mixed use" room located behind a nursing station. A mixed use room is used to store medical supplies, including medications, as long as there is a locked cabinet in the room for that purpose. This particular mixed use room had a locked cabinet. The room is used for the preparation of medications and for other purposes. No narcotics were stored in this particular mixed use room. The room contained locked cabinets used to store other medications. The evidence presented was insufficient to determine what "medications" Furdell may have seen in the room. Count IV of the complaint concerned the nursing assessment of a patient, and whether the assessment was properly and timely performed. A patient, M.S., had been admitted to the hospital on June 18, 2008, for lung surgery. Following the surgery, Amiodarone (a very toxic drug which can cause clots and other complications) was administered to treat M.S. for heart arrhythmia. The Amiodarone was administered intravenously and M.S. developed blisters and irritation at the intravenous site. That is not an uncommon complication with Amiodarone. M.S.'s attending physician was notified about the irritation and prescribed a treatment. He also ordered a consult with an infectious disease specialist who ultimately changed M.S.'s antibiotics. Although M.S. was seen daily by her physicians, the nursing notes do not reflect the assessment and treatment of her blisters. It appears that proper care was rendered, but the care was not documented properly. Another patient was admitted to the hospital on December 15, 2008, with End Stage Renal Disease and diabetes mellitus for which she began dialysis treatment. The patient was not weighed before and after a particular dialysis treatment on January 5, 2009. However, the patient had been moved to an air mattress bed on that date for comfort. The air mattress bed did not allow for a weight to be taken as it could be on a regular bed. There is an allegation in the Administrative Complaint concerning the discontinuation of the calorie count for a patient. This issue was not discussed in AHCA's Proposed Recommended Order, nor was sufficient evidence of any wrong- doing concerning this matter presented at final hearing. During the survey, the hospital was found to be storing the medication Mannitol in blanket warmers, rather than in warmers specifically designed for the drug. The blanket warmers maintained the Mannitol at 100-to-110 degrees Fahrenheit. The manufacturer's label on the drug calls for it to be dispensed (injected) at between 86 and 98.5 degrees Fahrenheit. In order to meet this requirement, the hospital takes the drug out of the blanket warmer in time for it to cool sufficiently before it is injected. There is nothing inherently wrong with using a blanket warmer to store Mannitol. On January 5, 2009, a surveyor found two vials of Thrombin, one vial of half-percent Lidocaine and Epi, and one vial of Bacitracin in operating room No. 4. The operating room is within the secured and locked suite of surgical rooms on the second floor. Two of the vials had syringes stuck in them and one of them was spiked. Whoever had mixed the medications was not attending to them at the time the surveyor made her observation. There were two unlicensed technicians in the room preparing for the next surgery. A registered nurse anesthetist was present as well. There was no identifying patient information on the medications. The hospital's policies and procedures do not require the patient's name to be on the label of medications prepared for impending surgery. That is because the procedures for the operating room include a process for ensuring that only the correct patient can be in the designated operating room. There is a fail-safe process for ensuring that only the proper patient can receive the medications that are set out. At around 2:45 p.m. on January 5, 2009, there were patient records in the emergency department showing that several drugs had been administered to a patient. The surveyor did not see a written order signed by a physician authorizing the drugs. When the surveyor returned the next morning, the order had been signed by the physician. The hospital policy is that such orders may be carried out in the emergency department without a doctor's signature, but that a physician must sign the order before the end of their shift. AHCA cannot say whether the physician signed the order at the end of his shift or early the next day. Count V of the complaint was voluntarily dismissed by the Agency. Count VI of the complaint concerned the status of certain patient care equipment, and whether such equipment was being maintained in a safe operating condition. A patient was weighed at the hospital upon admission on December 27, 2008, and found to weigh 130 pounds using a bed scale. Six days later, on January 2, 2009, the patient's weight was recorded as 134 pounds. Two days later, in the same unit, the patient weighed 147 pounds and the next day was recorded as weighing 166 pounds. During the survey process, the patient was weighed and recorded at 123 pounds on a chair scale. The hospital does not dispute the weights which were recorded, but suggests there are many factors other than calibration of the equipment that could explain the discrepant weights. For example, the AHCA surveyor could not say whether the patient sometimes had necessary medical equipment on his bed while being weighed, whether different beds were involved, or whether any other factors existed. AHCA relies solely on the weight records of this single patient to conclude that the hospital scales were inaccurate. Case No. 09-5365 On February 18, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast. Count I of the complaint from this survey concerned the timeliness of triage for a patient who presented at the hospital emergency department with stroke-like symptoms. AHCA surveyors witnessed two patients on stretchers in the ambulance entrance hallway leading to the emergency department. Each of the two patients had been brought in by a separate emergency medical service (EMS) team and was awaiting triage. One patient was taken to an emergency department room (ER room) 50 minutes after his/her arrival at the hospital. The other patient waited 45 minutes after arrival before being admitted to an ER room. Meanwhile, a third patient arrived at 2:20 p.m., and was awaiting triage 25 minutes later. During their observation, the surveyors saw several nursing staff in the desk area of the emergency department, i.e., they did not appear to be performing triage duties. The emergency department on that date was quite busy. That is not unusual during February, as census tends to rise during the winter months due to the influx of seasonal residents. A summary of the action within the emergency department from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., on the day of the survey shows the following: Patient L.G., 74 years old with stable vital signs, was radioed in by her EMS team at 1:08; L.G. was processed into the ER at 1:21 (which is not an unreasonable time; EMS teams call in when they arrive at or near the hospital. By the time they gain access, wait their turn if multiple ambulances are present, and get the patient inside, several minutes may lapse). L.G. was stabilized and quickly reviewed by ER staff, then officially triaged at 2:04. Patient H.M., an 89-year-old male residing in a nursing home, arrived at 1:20 and was processed in at 1:59. He was triaged at 2:01, but ultimately signed out of the hospital against medical advice. Patient E.M. arrived at 2:18 and was processed at 2:25. Triage occurred one minute later. This patient presented as a stroke alert, and hospital protocol for that type patient was followed. Patient C.J. arrived at 1:08 and was processed at 2:38. Triage occurred immediately after C.J. was processed. This patient was not stroke alert, but had some stroke-like symptoms.1 C.J. had not been transported to the hospital as emergent, because the symptoms had been going on for 24 hours. Patient W.M., an auto accident victim, arrived at 1:40 and was processed at 1:49. Triage occurred within six minutes. Patient M.M., W.M.'s wife (who had been with M.M. in the automobile accident, but was placed in a separate ambulance), arrived at 2:06 and was triaged at 2:34. There is no record of when M.M. was processed. Patient L.M. came to the hospital from a nursing home. She arrived at 1:43 and was processed at 2:35. L.M. was triaged at 2:37. Patient K.M. arrived at 2:45 and was processed within three minutes. Triage occurred at 2:52. Her triage was done very quickly due to the condition in which she arrived, i.e., shortness of breath and low oxygen saturation. Patient R.S. arrived at 1:00 and was triaged at 1:15. The aforementioned patients represent the patients presenting to the emergency department by ambulance during a two-hour period on a very busy day. It is the customary procedure for ER staff to make a quick visual review (rapid triage) of patients as they come into the hospital. Those with obvious distress or life-threatening conditions are officially triaged first. Others, as long as they are stable, are allowed to wait until staff is available for them. As part of their duties, nurses necessarily have to be in the desk area (nursing station) in order to field phone calls from physicians concerning treatment of the patients who present. It is not unusual or improper for nurses to be in the nursing station while residents are waiting in the processing area. It is clear that some patients waited a much longer time for triage than others. However, without a complete record of all patients who presented that day and a complete review of each of their conditions, it is impossible to say whether the hospital was dilatory in triaging any of them. Count II of the complaint addressed the nursing staff and whether it failed to assess and intervene in the care of a patient or failed to implement a physician's plan of care for the patient. Patient D.W. was a 67-year-old female who was morbidly obese, diabetic, debilitated, had end stage renal disease, and was receiving dialysis. Upon admission, D.W. had a Stage 3 pressure ulcer to her sacrum and a Stage 4 ulcer on her left calf. A wound care protocol was initiated immediately, and a Clinitron bed was obtained for her on the day of admission. Due to the seriousness of her condition, the wound care physician declined to accept her case at first. He later ordered Panafil, and it became part of the protocol for treating the patient. The nursing documentation for D.W. was only minimally sufficient, but it does indicate that care was provided. Patient R.H. was an 83-year-old male who presented on February 10, 2009, in critical condition. R.H. was suffering from congestive heart failure, pneumonia, and respiratory failure. Due to the critical nature of his respiratory problems, R.H. was placed on a ventilator. As a ventilator patient, he did not fit the profile for obtaining wound care. Nonetheless, the hospital implemented various other measures to deal with R.H.'s pressure wounds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, imposing a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5363 and a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5364, Count VI. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0040343. On the morning of October 7, 198A, the Metro-Dade County Rescue Squad called the emergency room at Miami General Hospital and informed the staff that they were enroute to the hospital with a gunshot victim. Dr. Segurola, the emergency room physician, was informed of the victim's condition and immediately ordered a nurse to notify the operating room team and call a surgeon because he knew in advance that "this was going to be a serious surgical case." At approximately 7:42 a.m., the rescue squad arrived at Miami General Hospital with the victim, Samuel Kaplan. Kaplan was taken to the emergency room suffering from a gunshot wound to the abdomen inflicted by a .32 caliber bullet. When Kaplan arrived in the emergency room, his systolic blood pressure was approximately 60, he was wearing a MAST suit, he had an intravenous (IV) line going, and he was receiving oxygen. Although Kaplan was conscious and able to speak, his condition was unstable and very serious. Kaplan was initially treated by Dr. Segurola, the emergency room physician. Three nurses, a respiratory therapist and an x-ray technician were also present in the emergency room. Dr. Segurola conducted a brief physical examination of Kaplan. An entrance wound was found, but there was no exit. After the examination, a second IV line was started in the other arm and a third, central line was started in the subclavin vein. The IV lines were set at maximum or "wide open." The emergency room staff was attempting to rapidly increase Kaplan's blood volume and pressure. Kaplan's hemoglobin level was low (approximately 8 or 9), which is a sign that a patient is anemic due to loss of blood. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Respondent received a message from his telephone answering service to call Dr. Segurola at the hospital's emergency room. At approximately 8:02 a.m., the Respondent returied the telephone call and spoke with Dr. Segurola concerning the patient's condition. During the conversation, the Respondent advised Dr. Segurola to contact the operating room team and anesthesiologist to prepare for surgery. The Respondent arrived at the emergency room of Miami General Hospital in response to the call at approximately 8:12 a.m. Upon the Respondent's arrival at the emergency room, he was informed that Kaplan's blood pressure was 108/50, heart rate 106 and respiration 28. The Respondent spoke to Kaplan and Kaplan stated that he had been shot in the stomach. Respondent then proceeded to conduct a brief, but thorough, physical examination of the patient. When Respondent completed his examination, he was advised that Kaplan's blood pressure was approximately 124/50, heart rate remained at 106 and respiration remained at 28. At this point, the Respondent believed that Kaplan's condition was stabilized. Respondent advised Dr. Segurola that Kaplan should immediately be taken to the operating room for surgery. The Respondent was informed that the operating room was not quite ready and that the anesthesiologist had not arrived. While waiting for the operating room team, Respondent and Dr. Segurola reviewed x-rays of Kaplan. The emergency room nurse continued to take Kaplan's vital signs. Kaplan's blood pressure remained at 124/50. At approximately 8:20 a.m., while Respondent, Dr. Segurola and others in the emergency room were waiting for confirmation that the operating room was ready, a hospital admissions clerk walked in and informed the emergency room staff that Kaplan belonged to the Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"). An HMO is a plan in which a patient makes pre-payment for services and is then provided medical services from a designated panel of participating physicians. The emergency room maintained two "on-call" lists, one for HMO surgeons and one for non-HMO surgeons. The Respondent was on the non-HMO list. Dr. Segurola and Respondent had a brief discussion wherein both men acknowledged that under existing hospital policy, the HMO surgeon should have been called. Thereafter, Dr. Segurola informed a nurse to telephone the on-call HMO surgeon. The HMO surgeon on call was Dr. Moises Jacobs. A secretary in the emergency room placed a call to Dr. Jacobs at approximately 8:25 a.m. Dr. Jacobs returned the phone call between 8:25 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. Dr. Jacobs spoke with Dr. Segurola. While Dr. Segurola was on the phone, Dr. Jose Selem, the anesthesiologist, arrived in the emergency room. Dr. Jacobs told Dr. Segurola to ask the Respondent to take the patient to surgery immediately and stated that he would arrive at the hospital in about 20- 30 minutes. When the Respondent was told of Dr. Jacobs' request he replied that the patient was stable and could wait for Dr. Jacobs. Dr. Selem, the anesthesiologist, also spoke with Dr. Jacobs on the telephone. Dr. Jacobs told Dr. Selem to advise Respondent that Respondent could take the patient to surgery. When Dr. Selem advised Respondent of what Dr. Jacobs has said, the Respondent replied that since Dr. Jacobs was coming to the hospital and Kaplan was an HMO patient, Respondent preferred to wait for Dr. Jacobs, the HMO surgeon. Dr. Selem then left the emergency room and went to the operating room to prepare the necessary instruments. At approximately 8:30 a.m., the Respondent advised Dr. Segurola that he was going to the hospital cafeteria for a cup of coffee and, if any changes occurred in the patient, he should be contacted. The cafeteria was located across a corridor approximately 20-25 feet from the emergency room. At the time, Kaplan was still alert and his vital signs were being constantly monitored by the nursing staff. Dr. Segurola remained in the emergency room. The operating room and all necessary personnel were ready for surgery at approximately 8:40 a.m. Sometime between 8:40 a.m. and 8:45 a.m., one of the nurses told Dr. Segurola that the Respondent's condition was deteriorating and that his blood pressure was dropping. At approximately 8:45 a.m., Kaplan's blood pressure had dropped to 80/50. Dr. Segurola told the nurse to give more blood to Kaplan (a blood transfusion had already been started). Dr. Segurola then went to the cafeteria to speak with Respondent. Dr. Segurola told Respondent that the patient's condition was deteriorating, a blood transfusion had been started, and he feared that Kaplan might die in the emergency room. The Respondent inquired as to how long it had been since Dr. Jacobs had been called and Dr. Segurola responded twenty (20) minutes. Respondent questioned whether it really had been 20 minutes. Both men looked at their watches and determined that it had been about 15 minutes since Dr. Jacobs had been called. Respondent told Dr. Segurola to call the anesthesiologist. Dr. Segurola went back to the emergency room, believing that Respondent was going to immediately follow him there. When Dr. Segurola arrived back at the emergency room, Kaplan's condition had not improved. Dr. Segurola waited about three (3) more minutes and went back to the cafeteria for the second time. Dr. Segurola again informed the Respondent about Kaplan's deteriorated condition and his fear that Kaplan was going to die in the emergency room. Respondent once more asked Dr. Segurola to call the anesthesiologist. Dr. Segurola told Respondent that the anesthesiologist was there and that "we need you there." Dr. Segurola then went back to the emergency room. The Respondent remained in the cafeteria. Shortly before 9:00 a.m., while Dr. Segurola was away from the emergency room, Dr. Lustgarten, a neurologist, had just finished his rounds and was leaving the hospital through the emergency room to the parking lot. Dr. Lustgarten looked in on Kaplan to determine if there was any neurological damage. Dr. Lustgarten examined Kaplan and concluded that there was no neurological damage and that, in his opinion, Kaplan's condition was stable with a systolic blood pressure of approximately 100. Dr. Lustgarten left the emergency room just as Dr. Jacobs arrived at approximately 9:00 a.m. Dr. Lustgarten told Dr. Jacobs that Kaplan had no neurological damage. Dr. Jacobs conducted a brief examination of Kaplan and determined that Kaplan needed to be taken to the operating room immediately for surgery. The anesthesiologist, Dr. Selem, had by then been summoned to the emergency room and assisted Dr. Jacobs in an unsuccessful attempt to intubate Kaplan prior to taking him to the operating room. Shortly after Dr. Jacobs arrived, the Respondent left the cafeteria and headed towards the emergency room. Before Respondent reached the entrance to the emergency room, he was informed by one of the nurses that Dr. Jacobs had arrived. The Respondent stood at the entrance to the emergency room for a brief period and watched as Dr. Jacobs and others attended to Kaplan. Respondent then left the building, went to his car and drove home. Meanwhile, Dr. Jacobs performed an emergency exploratory laparotomy and left thoracotomy on Kaplan. Between 9:00 am. and 9:15 a.m., after Kaplan was moved from the emergency room to the operating room, his blood pressure went from 90 down to 60, and he went into shock. There are three possible contributing factors for Kaplan's going into shock at this time: (1) moving him may have dislodged ,a blood clot which in all likelihood prevented an earlier complete "bleeding out"; (2) the blood clot may have been diluted by the IV fluid; and (3) the institution of anesthesia. During surgery it was discovered that the bullet had perforated the aorta, a major blood vessel. While still in surgery, Kaplan went into cardiac arrest and was pronounced dead at 10:25 a.m. on October 7, 1984. At the time that Respondent left the emergency room and went to the hospital cafeteria, Kaplan's vital signs were in a relatively stable condition. Kaplan's vital signs de-stabilized while Respondent was in the hospital cafeteria, and his systolic blood pressure dropped from approximately 120 to approximately 80. At all times prior to being taken to the operating room, Kaplan's vital signs were maintained with the assistance of a MAST suit. A MAST suit is an inflatable device used in the treatment of trauma patients which applies pressure to the body and assists in elevating blood pressure. When the MAST suit is removed, the patient's vital signs will deteriorate again. For this reason, many physicians consider vital signs obtained under such conditions to be false readings, and the MAST suit is usually not removed until the patient is in the operating room. Although the Respondent suspected that the bullet might have damaged the small bowels and caused some internal bleeding, the Respondent neglected to ask about the amount of fluids Kaplan had received. Kaplan had received over 4 to 5 liters of fluid prior to arriving at the hospital and received an additional 5 liters of fluid while waiting to be taken to surgery. Although this information would have been useful, it would not necessarily have indicated the extent of Kaplan's massive internal bleeding. The amount of fluids that Kaplan received prior to the Respondent leaving the emergency room was not necessarily a sign that Kaplan's condition was unstable. In the treatment of trauma cases, time is of the essence. A trauma patient with a gunshot-wound to the abdomen should be taken to surgery as soon as possible. In some cases, it may be advantageous to delay surgery in order to stabilize the patient's vital signs or to increase blood volume. Generally, if surgery is performed within the first hour after the injury is sustained (referred to as "the golden hour"), the better the chances of the patient surviving. The golden hour does not apply to injuries of the heart and major blood vessels. In those cases, the patients will "bleed out" in a time much shorter than one hour. Nevertheless, even where the golden hour has passed, the patient should be taken to surgery at the first available opportunity and without delay. While in the emergency room at Miami General Hospital, Kaplan's condition ranged from "serious" to "critical." From the time that Kaplan was initially admitted to Miami General Hospital his condition was such that he required immediate surgical intervention. A reasonably prudent physician in the Respondent's position would have performed surgery at the first available opportunity and would not have waited for the arrival of another surgeon. Although pursuant to hospital and HMO rules, the HMO surgeon should have been called first, where an emergency situation exists the first surgeon available is expected to take the patient to surgery, and that physician will be provided payment by the HMO. The Respondent was aware of the hospital's and HMO's policies regarding HMO and non-HMO patients based on prior experience. The Respondent has never previously been disciplined or investigated by Petitioner or any medical board in any jurisdiction. Respondent maintains an excellent reputation for competence and compassion among his fellow physicians. Respondent is well liked by his patients and has provided medical services in the past to patients with no medical insurance.
