The Issue On February 28, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued a Notice To Show Cause to Robert O'Brien (O'Brien) alleging that O'Brien violated Section 326.006(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. Specifically, O'Brien was charged with allowing an unlicensed person to attempt to sell a 52' Hatteras known as "Watermellon" on behalf of O'Brien Yacht Sales. The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. On May 15, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued an Amended Notice To Show Cause to David Sandmann (Sandmann) alleging that Sandmann violated Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Sandmann was charged with offering or negotiating to sell a 52' Hatteras, known as "Watermellon". The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT Petitioner filed an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes, states that: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence. A thorough review of the record has been made. The Division adopts and incorporates by reference the first sentence of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Petitioner's exceptions to the remainder of Finding of Fact number 15 are accepted because the remainder of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15 is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The second sentence, "The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat." is rejected because, the Petitioner presented testimony which proved that Sandmann: offered "to help" the Division investigators when they approached the boat. (T. 20, 38-39). gave the Division investigators a business card with his name and O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc. written on it. (T. 19, 38-19, 52)( P's Exh. 2) gave the Division investigators a spec sheet containing information about the boat. (T. 21, 32, 39, 52). (P's Exh. 3). told the Division investigators that the price of the boat was negotiable. (T 22, 29-30, 39-40, 52). told the Division investigators that the commission would be paid by the seller. (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43) had a copy of a blank sales contract faxed to him (from O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc.) at the boat show. (T. 22- 23, 41, 52) Also at Recommended Order, page 5, paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12. Additionally, there was no competent substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact that Respondent Sandmann was not offering or negotiating to sell the boat, because these actions were uncontroverted. Respondent Sandmann never denied that he was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. Furthermore, the sentence in question is not a Finding of Fact, but rather a Conclusion of Law. The Administrative Law Judge's characterization of this as a Finding of Fact, does not make it so. In Hernicz v. State Dept. of Professional Reg., 390 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), facts were undisputed that a nurse practitioner had done certain acts, and when the Board concluded that the actions were a violation of the statute, the court held that that amounted to a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. The "facts" were the individual actions that were taken by the Respondent, whether these acts violated the statute was a Conclusion of Law. As stated above, the acts, themselves, in this case were neither denied nor disputed. The second sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The third sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 states that "[I]t is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts". The "expectation of receiving compensation" was the argument relied on by the Respondents at hearing as their defense to participating in the boat show. Because "compensation" is an integral part of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, its interpretation should be left to the expertise of the agency. It is a well settled principle that the interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement is entitled to great weight, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985); Shell Harbor Grou, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 487 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Division believes that "compensation" can be other than a monetary commission, as claimed by Respondents. "Compensation" can be "perks" such as transportation or use of a house or yacht, or something intangible, such as friendship and affection. The existence of a quid pro quo is what is looked for. Furthermore, from a thorough reading of the record, it was proven by substantial competent evidence that a commission was anticipated being paid, because Petitioner's investigators were told that "the commission would be paid by the seller". (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43). Possibly, no monetary commission was paid to Sandmann, because the yacht did not sell. Regardless, the Division finds that the friendship between Mr. Mellon and Sandmann was adequate compensation under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. The third sentence of Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The fourth sentence, "Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the `Watermellon' solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner", is also rejected. The Division does not dispute the long standing friendship of Respondent Sandmann and Mr. Mellon, however being someone's "friend", does not exempt them from Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. There was uncontroverted testimony that Respondent Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. That is all that is necessary for him to be within the jurisdiction of the Division, and require him to have a license. Although his friendship could be his motivation or compensation for being on the yacht, his actions, while there, show that he was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon". The fourth sentence of Finding of Fact Number 15 is stricken in its entirety. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner filed an Exception to Conclusion of Law number 23 contained in the Recommended Order. This conclusion stated that the Petitioner had failed to meet its burden as to Sandmann because it failed to establish that he was attempting to sell the yacht, and, if the case against Sandmann failed, then the case against O'Brien failed. The Division rejects this Conclusion of Law because it believes that Petitioner proved by substantial competent evidence that Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon", and that friendship is adequate compensation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that administers and enforces the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent O'Brien has been licensed as a Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent O'Brien owns and operates O'Brien Yacht Sales. Respondent O'Brien resides in and has his principal place of business in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mr. Sandmann is a resident of Essex, Connecticut. He has never been licensed as a yacht salesman or as a yacht broker. Mr. Sandmann makes his livelihood as the owner of a dog collar manufacturing business. Henry Mellon, the boat's owner, held a salesman's license issued by Petitioner that expired in August 1994. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Mellon was not licensed by the Petitioner. Respondent Sandmann, Respondent O'Brien, and Mr. Mellon have been close friends for many years. Mr. Mellon formerly worked for O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon and Respondent Sandmann are old friends from college. The Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show permitted only new yachts or brokered yachts. Individuals were not supposed to sell boats in this show. Respondent O'Brien was aware of this restriction. In October 1995, Respondent O'Brien had the boat "Watermellon" displayed and listed for sale at the 36th Annual Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show. The asking price for the sale of the Watermellon was $425,000. Mr. Mellon is neither an officer or a director of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon signed a form styled "Application and Contract for Exhibit Space" so that the Watermellon could be exhibited at the boat show and on this application represented that he was a vice president of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Neither Respondent O'Brien or his company paid to put the Watermellon in the Boat Show and neither expected to receive any commission from the sale of the Watermellon. Respondent O'Brien was acting out of friendship with Mr. Mellon. 1/ On October 27, 1995, Peter Butler and Robert Badger, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, attended the Boat Show and went to the Watermellon. They observed a sign on the back of the boat that advised that the boat was being offered by O'Brien Yacht Sales and gave its telephone number. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger approached the boat and asked a person, later identified as Respondent Sandmann, whether Respondent O'Brien was aboard. Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that Respondent O'Brien was not aboard, asked if he could help them, and gave them a business card with his name and the name of O'Brien Yacht Sales on it. No licensed salesman was on board at this time, but Mr. Mellon, the owner of the boat, was aboard. 2/ Respondent Sandmann gave Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger a copy of a printed sheet containing basic information about the Watermellon. This sheet, referred to as a spec sheet, contained errors that Respondent Sandmann verbally corrected when he gave them the sheet. In response to questions, Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that the price of the boat was negotiable and that the commission would be paid by the seller. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger asked Respondent Sandmann if they could see a copy of the contract that a buyer would need to sign if he purchased the boat. In response, Respondent Sandmann contacted the O'Brien Yacht Sales office and had someone fax to him a copy of the contract used by O'Brien. Respondent Sandmann then gave the form contract to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger. The business card given by Respondent Sandmann to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger was printed in 1994 when Respondent Sandmann, who is fluent in French, Spanish, and Italian, accompanied Mr. Mellon to a boat show in Europe. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger did not inquire as to the amount of the commission that would have been paid by the seller of the Watermellon because Petitioner does not regulate commissions. None of Respondent Sandmann's acts, when considered individually, required a license from the Petitioner. 3/ The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat. It is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts. Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the Watermellon solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order as to these consolidated cases that dismisses the charges filed against these respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1996.
The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's Florida real estate sales associate license?
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, issued license number 3015177, in accordance with Chapter 475 of the Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a sales associate with Diane Lynne Severino, P. O. Box 354491, Palm Coast, Florida 32135-4991. On or about August 6, 2004, Joaquin Torres and Marine Hopson (Torres) entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the real property located at 9 Rockwell Lane, Palm Coast, Florida. Respondent was the sales associate on the above transaction. The closing did not occur on the above transaction. Additional Facts: According to Petitioner's records, the following constitutes the history of Respondent's sales associate license: Francis Anthony Severino, Sr., Sales Associate, License #SL-3015177 From January 1, 2004 to October 4, 2004, he was a sales associate affiliated with Team Real Estate, Inc. doing business as Realty Executives Fun Coast Team license number CQ 1008966, a brokerage corporation located at 185 Cypress Point Parkway, suite 4, Palm Coast, Florida 32164; From October 4, 2004 to March 31, 2005 said licensee was invalid due to no employing broker or no filing of a request to remain a sales associate under another broker. From March 31, 2005 to the Present he is a sales associate affiliated with Diane Lynne Severino license number BK 666867, a brokerage sole proprietorship doing business as Severino Realty located at 170 North Beach Street, Daytona Beach, Florida 32114. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1. In his testimony Respondent indicated that his affiliation with Team Real Estate, Inc. ended on September 13, 2004, when he became inactive with that firm. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 2 is a copy of a DBPR RE-2050-1 Request for Change of Status form intended to establish the separation from that business. Mark Vost the real estate broker for Team Real Estate, Inc. filled out, signed, and sent it in. It has a fax stamp of September 13, 2004. The request by Mark Vost to inactivate Respondent as a sales associate with Team Real Estate, Inc., through the form DBPR RE-2050, was dated September 13, 2004, and officially received by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation on October 4, 2004. More significantly, Respondent testified that he filled out a DBPR RE-2050-1 a Request for Change of Status to be affiliated with Severino Realty whose broker was Diane L. Severino. At that time, Ms. Severino was Respondent's wife. A copy of the Request for Change of Status is found as Respondent's Exhibit numbered 3. It is dated September 13, 2004. Unlike Respondent's Exhibit numbered 2, Respondent's Exhibit numbered 3 does not have a fax stamp showing the date of transmission. Respondent indicated that he personally went to the fax machine in the office of Severino Realty and transferred his license to Petitioner by fax machine. On September 13, 2004, the date reflected on the form, Petitioner did not confirm the fax receipt by Petitioner. Respondent's explanation is that the fax machine upon which the transfer to Severino Realty of his sales associate license "did not have a receipt that prints out." Respondent in his testimony stated " . . . When I dialed the phone I got the dial tone, it rang, it answered, it made that beeping noise, and it never came and said anything that it did not go through and that it was an error. So I just assumed that it was accepted, because normally when a fax machine answers you, that beeping sound and it means that it is acknowledged and if it does not answer it’s a busy signal and you try dialing again." According to Respondent, from that point forward he assumed that his sales associate license had been transferred from Team Real Estate, Inc. to Severino Realty. It had not. Petitioner had evidence of the change of status of Respondent's license to inactive with Team Real Estate, Inc. It did not have evidence of the activation of Respondent's sales associates license with Severino Realty, even should one accept Respondent's testimony that he tried to fax the DBPR RE-2050-1 form designating a change in his broker to Diane L. Severino of Severino Realty on September 13, 2004. Ultimately the portrayal of Respondent's license history established in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1 is accepted where Respondent is recognized as being affiliated with Severino Realty commencing March 31, 2005. Respondent was involved with the Torres in a number of real estate transactions. One involved a purchase of a residence at 98 Ulysses Trail in Palm Coast, Florida, through a contract between Joaquine Torres and Holiday Builders, Inc. On July 21, 2004, the parties signed the contract. The total purchase price was $180,190.00. Respondent was named in the Sales/Forms FHA-VA- Std. in the portion of the forms described as "Realtor Referral" and Realty Executive is written next to his name. This is understood to refer to Team Real Estate, Inc. where Respondent was employed as a sales associate. The real estate commission involved with the purchase was 6 percent. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. The real estate commission due Realty Executives (Team Real Estate, Inc.) was $8,129.00 in Respondent's name. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. On September 24, 2004, when the purchase was settled at closing, the $8,1029.00 was paid, in relation to the property at 98 Ulysses Trail. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3. On September 24, 2004, the Torres as seller, with Severino Realty being reflected as the broker signed an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement for the 98 Ulysses Trail property. The price reflected was $229,800.00 with a broker's commission of 5.5 percent. The listing agreement bore one signature, that of the seller. The form did not name the authorized listing associate or broker. It referred to the brokerage firm name as Severino Realty. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. Earlier, Mr. Torres entered into a "Showcase Home Purchase Completed Field Model Agreement" with Holiday Builders, Inc. for a residence at 9 Rockwell Lane, Palm Coast, Florida. On August 6, 2004, the parties signed the agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. On September 24, 2004, an Exclusive Rights of Sale Listing Agreement form was prepared between the Torres and Severino Realty on 9 Rockwell Lane, listing the sales price as $164,900.00. At the time, the Torres did not own the home. The brokerage commission was 5.5 percent. A seller's signature was attached. No other signature was provided. No one was listed as associate or broker. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6. The Torres' contract on 9 Rockwell Lane never closed due to the inability of the Torres to provide sufficient funds to conclude the purchase. On October 7, 2004, the Torres executed a Promissory Note to pay Respondent $5,000.00 upon the first sale of homes at 98 Ulysses Trail, 9 Rockwell Lane and 14 Ethel Lane. The amount was to be paid in 180 days from the date of the note payable at PO Box 354491, Palm Coast, Florida 32135 or "at such other place as payee or holder may specify in writing or in person." Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7. On October 7, 2004, Mark Vost, broker/manager for Realty Executives Fun Coast Team Real Estate, Inc., wrote the title company that would be handling the closing on the 9 Rockwell Lane Property to advise that $5,000.00 of commission should be credited to the buyer with the balance of $879.00 being paid to Realty Executives the Fun Coast Team. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 8. This coincides with the settlement charges in the settlement statement for the 9 Rockwell Lane property that did not close on the anticipated date. October 12, 2004, was the scheduled closing date. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9. After the Torres purchase of 9 Rockwell Lane did not close, Respondent telephoned Ms. Torres and said that she would have to pay him $6,000 because of the percentage (commission) he was losing. He made more than one call. Respondent told Ms. Torres that the failure to close on the 9 Rockwell Lane property was not his problem. Respondent told Ms. Torres that she had to pay because she did not buy the property at 9 Rockwell Lane, that he lost his time and lost his commission and that it was her fault. Respondent told Ms. Torres to give him a check. Eventually, Respondent came to the Torres home to get money from the Torres that he said was due. Based upon the demand for money, Ms. Torres wrote a check payable to Frank Severino in the amount of $6,000.00. The face of the check stated the purpose for the check as "9 Rockwell Lane." The check was written on October 12, 2004, the date Respondent went to the Torres' home. The payment was not intended as any form of gift or gratuity to Respondent. Respondent deposited and cashed the check. A replica of the check and its execution is found as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Sections 455.227(1)(n) and 475.25(1)(b), (d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2004), and revoking Respondent's sales associate license.1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2007
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed yacht broker.1 She is the yacht broker for Yachting Consultants, Inc. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In April 1999, Respondent was the listing broker of record regarding the sale of a 43-foot Pilgrim yacht. The selling broker was Mark Lipkus, a licensed yacht broker. John Pribik, a licensed salesperson, was Respondent's representative in the sale of the Pilgrim yacht. Mr. Pribik was under the supervision and control of Respondent and Respondent was responsible for his actions. Respondent had a buyer for the Pilgrim yacht, and the closing for the sale of the yacht was scheduled for April 13, 1999. The buyer was financing the purchase of the yacht. In a sale situation, a buyer and a seller have different responsibilities. The seller is responsible for providing all of the documents needed for a sale. The buyer is responsible for providing the funds for a sale. In the sale of the Pilgrim yacht, the responsibilities of the Seller and the Buyer did not change. There is a commission from the sale of a yacht, which is paid by the seller and, in accordance with standard industry practice, paid at closing. By standard industry practice, the commission split is 70/30, but can differ upon agreement. Mr. Lipkus received a down payment of $15,000.00 from the Buyer and placed the down payment in his escrow account. Mr. Lipkus was of the mistaken belief that the commission was payable by the Buyer, not the Seller. No co-broker agreement was entered into between Respondent or Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus regarding commission. There was no discussion regarding the split of the commission between them. On a prior sale involving Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, the commission split was 60/40. Mr. Pribik and Respondent assumed the commission split of the sale of the Pilgrim yacht would again be 60/40. Considering the prior sale, it was not unreasonable for Respondent and Mr. Pribik to assume a 60/40 split of the commission. Mr. Lipkus assumed the commission split would be 70/30. A power of attorney had been prepared by the Seller who was unavailable for closing due to being in a remote area in the Philippine Islands. Mr. Pribik provided the power of attorney to the documenting agent who reviewed the power of attorney and found it to be satisfactory. The mortgage broker received a copy of the power of attorney prior to closing and forward a copy to the lending institution. The lending institution notified the mortgage broker at some point before closing that the power of attorney was unacceptable. In turn, the mortgage broker contacted the documenting agent regarding the unacceptability of the power of attorney and informed the documenting agent that a new power of attorney was required before closing could take place. Mr. Pribik was notified by the mortgage broker that a new power of attorney was required. The responsibility to obtain the new power of attorney was the responsibility of the listing broker, who was Respondent via Mr. Pribik. As far as Mr. Pribik was concerned, with the time remaining before closing2 and with the Seller being in the Philippine Islands, he believed that it was virtually impossible to obtain a new power of attorney by the time of closing. The mortgage broker, taking the position that he should do whatever he could to effectuate a closing, encouraged Mr. Pribik to attempt to contact the Seller. Complying, Mr. Pribik was able to make telephonic contact with the Seller and Mr. Pribik and the mortgage broker spoke with the Seller, who agreed to provide a new power of attorney. Based on the verbal assurance by the Seller to provide the new power of attorney, the lending institution agreed to proceed with the closing, which was re- scheduled for April 14, 1999. A new power of attorney was faxed to the Seller, and the Seller executed it and faxed it back. According to industry standard, all commissions are paid at closing when a seller receives the funds. Also, according to industry standard, closing is not delayed until a commission is paid. Mr. Lipkus mistakenly believed that the commission was paid by a buyer, coming out of a buyer's deposit. As a result, he expected to take the commission out of the Buyer's down payment, which was held in Mr. Lipkus' escrow account. After obtaining his commission, Mr. Lipkus was going to forward the remaining monies. On April 13, 1999, the original date for the closing, the closing could not take place because the financing from the lending institution was not available, based upon the absence of a new power of attorney. Also, Mr. Lipkus had not made arrangements for the deposit monies to be at closing or forwarded a settlement statement to closing, which were both needed for the closing. Respondent contacted Mr. Lipkus by fax regarding the commission monies and the settlement statement, demanding both items in order for closing to take place. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Respondent demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Respondent was threatening to delay the closing unless she had the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Respondent was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Additionally, on the original closing date, closing was to take place at the office of the mortgage broker. Mr. Pribik, the Buyer, and the mortgage broker were present for the closing. Mr. Lipkus did not intend to attend, and did not attend, the closing. Since the commission monies were not available at closing, Mr. Pribik telephoned Mr. Lipkus and demanded that the commission monies be available and, told him that if not made available, the closing could not take place. In Mr. Pribik's opinion, the monies were needed for closing. The evidence is not clear and convincing as to whether Mr. Pribik demanded the monies held by Mr. Lipkus prior to closing or whether Mr. Pribik was threatening to delay the closing if he did not have the monies prior to closing. The evidence suggests that Mr. Pribik was demanding the monies to be in place at closing. Furthermore, for the first time, Mr. Pribik and Mr. Lipkus, during the telephone conversation, became aware of their disagreement as to the proper commission split, whether 60/40 or 70/30. Believing that Mr. Pribik would prevent a timely closing, Mr. Lipkus agreed to Mr. Pribik's split of 60/40. Closing occurred on April 14, 1999. The necessary documents and finances were present. At the final hearing, Respondent expressed with sincerity that, if she did anything wrong, she wanted to know exactly what it was, so that she would not engage in the same conduct again. Furthermore, Respondent expressed the frustration that, prior to hearing, no one had explicitly told her what she had done wrong and that, at hearing, she continued to be unsure what she had done wrong because she had not been explicitly told what she had done wrong. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Finding that Giovanna Gallottini did not violate Rule 61B-60.008(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Not sustaining the Notice to Show Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined based on conduct, set forth hereinafter in detail, which is specifically alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed herein dated June 24, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. At all times pertinent to the charges herein, Respondent was the holder of a Florida Real Estate license and operated as a real estate broker. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 and Stipulation of the parties). On October 17, 1985, Respondent obtained four exclusive listing agreements from John S. Blosnick (Blosnick) for warehouses he owned located in Miami, Florida. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2). Respondent was unable to find a buyer for the units and instead leased them to Jim Gardner and V.I.P Car Care pursuant to a business lease entered into on July 22, 1986. During the time, Blosnick was experiencing financial difficulties and needed someone to either purchase or lease the premises. The lease specified that Mr. Gardner would use the premises for the manufacture and repair of cars and boats. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). During the fall of 1986, a company that Respondent was affiliated with and served as President, Reaction Marine, Inc., took over the rental units and began constructing boat hulls from fiberglass resin. At this time, Reaction Marine erected a sign outside the warehouses where it remained during the time of the instant hearing. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). On January 6, 1987, Respondent's bookkeeper, a Mrs. Bryant, issued a check for payment of rent drawn on the account of Reaction Marine, Inc. to John Blosnick for $945.00. The check was subsequently returned for insufficient funds. That check remains unpaid as of the date of hearing. After Reaction Marine began occupancy of the Blosnick warehouses, Respondent and Jim Gardner had a dispute and Gardner is no longer affiliated with Reaction Marine. Respondent who owned the molds for boat manufacturing, continued to store the molds in the leased warehouses. During the time when Respondent obtained the exclusive listing agreement to sell the warehouses for Blosnick, they were good friends and Blosnick frequented Respondent's office and home two to three times per week. Respondent is an entrepreneur of sorts and owns three bars and various and sundry other businesses in the Miami area. Respondent and Blosnick often talked about different business ventures as Blosnick was interested in pursuing business ventures with Respondent. As early as the fall of 1986, Blosnick was aware that Respondent was affiliated with Reaction Marine, Inc., and that Reaction Marine thereafter occupied the subject warehouse. Respondent has offered to make good on the check which was returned for insufficient funds against the account of Reaction Marine, Inc., however that offer is contingent upon Blosnick's tender of the check to Respondent upon payment. Blosnick has requested that payment be made to a third party and has not offered to tender the check to that third party simultaneous with Respondent's tender of payment to make good on the returned check. Respondent has attempted to clean the floors of the warehouses by removing the resins, epoxys, and gel coats caused by Reaction Marine, Inc. This was done during January and February, 1987 by Respondent using the assistance of an acquaintance, Heather Rockcastle, who was involved with the cleaning of the warehouse and restoration of the floors to their original condition. The cleanup process took more than one day. In Respondent's second attempt to gain entry to the warehouses, Blosnick had hired a locksmith to change the locks and thereby prevented Respondent from gaining entry. The lease agreement entered into by Blosnick and VIP Car Care specifies that the property was to be used and occupied as a place for car and boat manufacture/repair. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3). Pursuant to the terms of that business lease, VIP Car Care was authorized to assign or sublet the premises for the usage here which was consistent with the usage for which VIP Car Care leased the premises. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3, first stipulation and condition of the business lease).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of May 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Contract Attorney DPR-Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mark Weissman, Esquire Katz and Weissman 300 Aragon Avenue Suite 330 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 William O'Neil Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the application of Ronald J. Palamara (“Palamara”) for licensure as a yacht and ship broker under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was previously a licensed yacht and ship broker in Florida, holding Yacht Broker License No.324. On April 28, 1999, the Petitioner’s prior license expired. The Petitioner reapplied for a Yacht Broker license on February 24, 2000. Robert Badger (Badger), at that time an investigator with the Division, investigated the application for form pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, and found that there were no problems with the form of the application. Badger also reviewed the application for moral character of the applicant pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3), Florida Administrative Code. On the application, the Petitioner indicated that he had a criminal background, but failed to disclose the nature of the criminal background on the application. In a letter from the Division addressed to the Petitioner, additional information was requested regarding his criminal background. The Petitioner replied in a letter that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor for resisting an officer without violence. The Petitioner also disclosed on the application that he had a civil Final Judgment against him in the matter of Chinnock Marine, Inc. v. Barthelemy & Palamara, Case No. 98- 19512 (Fla. 17th Cir. 1999). He did not fully disclose the details relating to events that led to the judgment. Instead, he stated on the application that the claims were “unfounded” and that Chinnock Marine “misled the court.” The subject application is dated February 22, 2000. On that application, the Petitioner was specifically required to disclose any “pending” civil suits involving a yacht. At the time of his application, another civil matter was pending against the Petitioner in World Class Yachts v. Palamara, Case No. 99-12923 (Fla. 17th Cir. 2001), which was filed on July 22, 1999. The Petitioner failed to disclose the pending World Class Yachts civil suit.2 Subsequent to the filing of the subject application, a non-final order was entered against the Petitioner finding that he was in default and rendering judgment for World Class Yachts in the amount of $157,500. The Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal of the circuit court’s non-final order of default to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order of default. Palamara v. World Class Yachts, Case No. 4D01-3260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The Petitioner admits that the World Class Yachts case relates to a yacht. Although the circuit court had not entered a Final Judgment against the Petitioner in the amount of $157,500.00 at the time of the hearing in this case, the World Class Yachts civil litigation involving a yacht should have been disclosed on the application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3)(a)6, Florida Administrative Code. In both Chinnock Marine and World Class Yachts, the Petitioner has moved to vacate the default judgments, alleging that he was not properly served. The Petitioner has worked in the yacht brokerage business in South Florida for many years. He has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license. In the community in which he lives and works he enjoys a reputation for being a person of integrity, honesty, and good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this case granting the license sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2002.
The Issue Whether the Respondent operated as a salesperson without being the holder of a valid and current license as a real estate salesperson, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0475436 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license was issued to Respondent as a salesperson c/o Dolphin Realty Referral Inc., 2525 Pasadena Avenue, Suite L., South Pasadena, Florida 33707. On December 18, 1996, Respondent presented a written offer to listing agent Sharon Simms for property located at 3900 48th Avenue, South, St. Petersburg, Florida. In connection therewith, Respondent, who was the building contractor for buyer Joseph S. Sparra, accepted a $2,000 deposit which was placed in the escrow account of Dolphin Realty Referral Inc., of which Thomas J. Hassel was qualifying broker. Hassel drafted the contract and qualified Joseph S. Sparra with Sigmund Financial for a first mortgage. The Respondent was employed by Hassel as an independent contractor. Thomas Hassel, the Respondent's employing broker, advised him that he was not sure Respondent's license was active, but the Respondent made no attempt to contact the Petitioner to ascertain his licensure status. On January 24, 1997, the Respondent accompanied Joseph S. Sparra to the closing at Anclote Title Services, where the Respondent provided the escrow money and accepted a $5,780 commission check on behalf of Dolphin Realty Referral, Inc. During the entire transaction, Respondent was not properly licensed with Dolphin Realty Referral, Inc., nor with any other real estate brokerage. Respondent's license was involuntarily placed on inactive status from January 1, 1996, through July 20, 1997, due to no employing broker. Hassel later advised Respondent that his license was not transferred to the new corporation when the broker changed its name from Dolphin Realty of Pinellas County to Dolphin Realty Referrals, Inc. The Respondent did not accept a share of the commission on the house in St. Petersburg, Florida. Respondent did not participate as a real estate salesperson in any other transaction while his license was on inactive status.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: The Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(a) and (e), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; and, Impose an administrative fine of $500 and require Respondent to complete a 45-hour salesperson's post-licensure course, as prescribed by the Florida Real Estate Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 John A. Kitzmiller, pro se 2613 59th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33707 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a Florida-licensed yacht salesman, should be disciplined for violation of Rule 61B- 60.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, DBPR, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (the Division) was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and discipline of yacht salespersons and brokers in this state and the regulation of the yacht-brokering profession. Respondent, Justo Lamar (Lamar), has been licensed as a yacht salesperson since November 1976. Prior to this action, Lamar has never been the subject of disciplinary action arising out of the practice of his profession. This action was precipitated by a yacht owner, Juan A. Galan (Galan), who unsuccessfully attempted to sell his yacht to a client of Lamar's. In July 1998, Galan listed his yacht, the Caliente, for sale through Ardell Yacht and Ship Brokers (Ardell). The listing resulted in negotiations for the purchase of the Caliente by one Larry Griggs (Griggs), a prospective customer represented by Lamar. At all times relevant to this case, Lamar was acting as a sales agent for Allied Marine and its broker, Dwight Tracy (Tracy). As set forth in more detail below, the negotiations between Galan and Griggs took place over a three-month period from October 1998 through December 1998 with no meeting of the minds. On July 12, 1999, some seven months after negotiations between Griggs and Galan terminated, Galan lodged a complaint with DBPR. Although the complaint was ostensibly directed against salesman Lamar and broker Tracy, each and every allegation in the complaint was directed to the broker's conduct, not Lamar's. Galan, who did not testify at final hearing, alleged in his complaint that "Broker presented a contract representing that deposit had been received/deposited (upon acceptance). In fact, broker never deposited check and we wasted our time and money on survey/sea trial as buyer was not (at that time or any time later) financially capable of buying boat @ $1.75 million." Galan provided some, but by no means all, of the documents which revealed the details of the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations between Galan and Griggs. In the narrative portion of his complaint, Galan asserted that he lost money on sea trials and implied, without actually stating, that the Caliente had been taken off the market during the pendency of negotiations with Griggs. For reasons which remain unclear, the Division did not focus its investigation on Tracy, who was the obvious target of Galan's complaint. Instead, it targeted Lamar, who was an obvious add-on target of Galan's ire. The exhibits reveal a complex series of offers and counteroffers and jockeying for negotiating advantage, not just between Galan and Griggs as prospective Seller and Buyer of the Caliente, but also between Lamar and the two brokers, all three of whom stood to profit if the transaction were consummated. Negotiations for the Caliente began in late October 1998. On October 30, 1998, Lamar's client Griggs, through a corporation he controlled, issued a $150,000 check for "Deposit, 72' (sic) Caliente Sportfisherman." This check accompanied a Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998, offering to purchase the Caliente for $1,500,000. That same day, Galan's representatives faxed Lamar to advise that Griggs' offer was insufficient. Lamar forthwith provided the check to his broker, Tracy. Negotiations between Galan and Griggs continued in November. Galan chose to by-pass his own Broker and negotiate directly with Lamar over lunch on November 18, 1998. Lamar wrote Galan's demands on the back of a restaurant placemat. The primary sticking point was Galan's insistence on a "bottom line" of $1,665,000 to him, after all commissions and other expenses, if any, were paid. Griggs nevertheless persevered in his effort to buy the Caliente for $1,500,000. On November 24, 2000, Griggs executed another Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement in which he offered an entity called Majua, Inc., of which Galan was President, the opportunity to sell the Caliente to Griggs for $1,500,000. Galan signed the November 24 agreement, but added an addendum which materially changed the terms. The addendum unilaterally purported to raise the sales prices to Galan's previously stated "bottom line" of $1,665,000. Thanksgiving passed, and negotiations wore on. On December 4, 1998, Griggs executed a third Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement, raising his offer to $1,755,000. The new offer expressly stipulated that Griggs' $150,000 earnest money check could be deposited when and if all parties executed this new proposed agreement. Like the October 29 and November 24 brokerage purchase and sale agreements, the December 4 document never ripened into a contract. The December 4 document was a clear and unembarrassed reminder from Griggs that an earnest money check had been written by Griggs, but was not on deposit, and was not going to be on deposit until such time as Galan had signed off on the contract as written by Griggs. Galan nevertheless permitted a sea trial of the Caliente in furtherance of negotiations, now in their fifth week. Also as part of the negotiating process, Galan permitted some, but not all, of the inspections requested by Griggs. Expenses for the sea trial and inspections were borne entirely by Griggs. By Christmas Eve, relations between the parties had deteriorated to the point where Lamar retrieved the check from the Allied Marine corporate files and returned it to Griggs. At no time did negotiations with Lamar's client Griggs preclude or interfere with efforts by Galan to negotiate with and sell the Caliente to any other prospective purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DBPR enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2001.
The Issue Whether Broward County should issue an Environmental Resource Permit (the "ERP" or "Permit") to Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc., for the construction of five finger piers as sized, configured, located and approved by Broward County's Proposed Permit issued in 2007?
Findings Of Fact The Port Laudania Property Port Laudania is a privately-owned marina basin (the "Marina Basin" or the "Basin") in Broward County. Located just off the Dania Cut-off Canal south of Port Everglades, the Marina Basin is not far from the Atlantic Ocean and the Intra-coastal Waterway that lies along all of Florida's east coast. There are no fixed bridges or other impediments to the passage of large sea-going boats and ships between the Basin and the Atlantic. The Marina Basin is an ideal spot to berth large vessels such as yachts and those used in the ocean-freight shipping business. PBPH owns the submerged lands in the western approximate two-thirds of the Basin as well as adjacent uplands. Together, these submerged lands and uplands constitute the parcel located at 750 N.E. 7th Avenue in the City of Dania (the "PBPH Parcel"). Immediately adjacent is a parcel owned by C-Term, a Florida general partnership. Located at 760 N.E. 7th Avenue in Dania, the uplands at the address and the approximate eastern one-third of the Marine Basin (the part not owned by PBPH) comprise the "C-Term Parcel." The PBPH Parcel and the C-Term Parcel make up the Port Laudania Property. Prior to a conveyance in 1987 that divided the Port Laudania Property into two parcels, the property had been under common ownership. The entire property was owned in fee simple by Dennison Marine, Inc. ("DMI"). Just prior to the division of the property into two parcels, DMI conveyed an easement that would ensure that owners and lessees of both parcels would have unhindered access from the Dania Cut-off Canal to their respective parcels: a Cross-use Easement of Ingress and Egress (the "Cross-use Easement"). The Cross-Use Easement for Ingress and Egress On June 29, 1987, DMI executed the Cross-Use Easement.2/ Earlier, DMI had divided the Port Laudania Property into two parcels (Parcel I and Parcel II in the Cross-use Easement, referred-to in this order mainly as the C-Term Parcel and the PBPH Parcel, respectively) and had entered into an Agreement for Deed and Lease with Port Denison, Inc., for the purchase and sale of one of the two parcels. The transaction subject to the agreement had not yet occurred so that DMI remained the sole owner of the Port Laudania Property on the date the Cross-Use Easement was established. The Cross-Use Easement contains the following: WHEREAS, both Parcel I and Parcel II share an inlet off of Dania cut-off Canal, . . . WHEREAS, it is to the mutual advantage of the present and future owners, tenants, invitees, etc. of both Parcel I and Parcel II that the entire inlet be available to the owners of the other parcel for the purposes of ingress and egress; NOW THEREFORE, . . . Denison Marine, Inc., with the consent of Port Denison, Inc., does hereby for itself and its successors and assigns, give and grant to the future owners, tenants and future tenants of all or any portion of the Property, their respective customers, employees, agents, invitees, successors and assigns, a non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress over and across the inlet as described in Composite Exhibit "C" hereto. This non-exclusive easement shall run as a covenant with the land and constitute [sic] an appurtenance thereto. Petitioners' Ex. 1 at 0164-0165. Composite Exhibit "C" of the Cross-Use Easement contains sketches and descriptions of both the "Easterly Portion of the Marina," see id. at 170-171, (the C-Term Parcel) and the "Westerly Portion of the Marina," see id. at 172-173 (the PBPH Parcel.) The descriptions include the entire Basin except for that occupied by the boat lift in the northern end of the Basin.3/ Neither the legal descriptions nor the surveys attached to the Cross-Use Easement depict any finger piers, docks or pilings in the Basin. Under the Cross-Use Easement, the ability of the parties to amend the rights granted therein is governed by the following: This Agreement may be altered, amended or terminated by written document executed by all the then fee simple title holders of all portions of the Property and then record holders of any first mortgages then encumbering any of said lands and recorded in the public records of Broward County, Florida. Petitioners' Ex. 1, second page, BK 1490 PG0165. C-Term has not agreed to amend the Cross-Use Easement to permit construction of the docks contemplated by the 2007 Notice of Intent and Proposed Permit. The rights conferred by the Cross-Use Easement are property rights that govern the use of the Basin. The Basin and the Cut-off Canal The Basin is man-made and frequently referred-to in documents that relate to it as an "inlet" off the Dania Cut-off Canal. Small and medium-sized pleasure crafts, large yachts, mega-yachts,4/ and commercial cargo vessels, some of which are as lengthy as 250 feet regularly pass through The Dania Cut-off Canal in the area of the Basin immediately south of its mouth. Aerial photographs show that the Basin was excavated in the early 1960's. Shortly after excavation, the Port Laudania Property was used as a commercial cargo terminal. Since at least 1967, the Basin has accommodated cargo vessels with lengths up to 250 feet give or take 15 feet. Petitioners' Exhibit 145 is an aerial photograph that shows vessels of approximately 250 feet on both sides of the Basin. For the approximately 250-foot vessel on the east side of the Basin (the C-Term side), the margin of error in measuring the vessels from the aerial is "[p]robably 10 feet, plus or minus." Tr. 1049. G&G has operated numerous vessels in the Basin at lengths of over 200 feet. Of the seven vessels that G&G owned or operated at the time of hearing the maximum length is 234 feet. From April 1999 to March 2006, vessels owned or operated by G&G have struck finger piers or docks on the PBPH side of the Basin "a handful of times." Tr. 893. None of the details of these collisions was produced at hearing. Standard procedure for such incidents would have been to file an internal report or a captain's report, but Mr. Ganoe could not remember whether a report was filed.5/ For his part on the PBPH side of the Basin, Mr. Straub is not aware of any G&G vessels hitting boats moored at the finger piers on the PBPH side of the Basin, indicating that the collisions were not serious. In contrast to evidence that collisions have occurred is evidence from one frequent navigator of the Basin, Jim Steel of Steel Marine Towing. With the exception of the years in college, Mr. Steel has towed vessels in the area of Broward County consistently since 1988 when he began towing with his father at the age of 12. The range in length of the vessels, both commercial and private, that Mr. Steel has towed is from 120 to 250 feet. Mr. Steel has towed hundreds of vessels in and out of the Basin. During those times, he has observed various dock and finger pier configurations. He never collided with the docks on the PBPH side of the Basin with his tugboat or the vessels he towed even when the fifth finger pier was 150 feet long during the time period from 1995-96. Mr. Steel described the Dania Cut-off Canal in the vicinity of the Basin as a congested area with a number of facilities that cater to marine traffic. Large motor yachts (100 feet to 150 feet in length), mega-yachts (longer than 150 feet), commercial vessels (up to 250 feet), smaller pleasure craft as well as other smaller boats comprise the traffic seeking access to facilities along the canal. The facilities include Harbortown Marina across the canal from the Basin, which has some spots for large motor yachts and berths for hundreds of smaller boats up to 90 feet. Facilities in the area that serve mega- yachts are Director's Shipyard, Powell Brothers, and Playboy Marine. In the last five years, new facilities have been opened along the canal for smaller pleasure craft: American Offshore, Dania Beach Club and Dusty's. Mr. Steel described their function, "[t]hey are . . . what you would call rack and stack," (tr. 1562) storing boats sized from 20 to 40 feet pulled in an out of the water and stacked with a forklift. There are eight or nine such facilities west of the Basin. Mr. Steel estimated each of these facilities house at least several hundred boats. Mr. Steel summed up the traffic in the canal: "Some bright sunny days, it is extremely congested, some days it is not as congested, but there's always traffic there." Tr. 1550. 2001: The Delegation Agreement On May 22, 2001, an agreement was entered by three parties. Entitled "Delegation Agreement Among the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, The South Florida Water Management District and Broward County" (the "Delegation Agreement"), it delegated to Broward County's EPD "the authority for permitting, compliance, and enforcement on behalf of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection and the South Florida Water Management District programs." Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 1, at 11, 12. "Section 11E. of the Delegation Agreement provides that permits issued by the County under the Delegation Agreement 'shall consolidate in a single document the permit under part IV of Chapter 373 of the Florida Statutes, and any required Environmental Resource License' ("ERL") required under Chapter 27 of the Broward County Code of Ordinances ("BCC" or "Code").[']" Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 2, at 12. In April of 2002 or thereabouts, Broward Yachts submitted an after-the-fact application to EPD for an ERP and an Environmental Resource License (the "Dock Application"). "The Dock Application sought approval to install six total docks [finger piers] comprised of five [finger piers composed of] floating docks in the Basin, with lengths ranging from 150 feet to 190 feet, and one dock, in the canal parallel to the seawall, with a length of 240 feet." Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 4, at 12. Although the docks were on the PBPH Parcel of the Port Laudania Property, the application was not PBPH's, the owner; instead it was submitted by Broward Yachts, a PBPH tenant. PBPH and C-Term Tenants From November of 1998 to March of 2005, Broward Yachts, Inc. ("Broward Yachts")6/ leased the PBPH Parcel from PBPH for the purpose of manufacture and sale of private yachts and boat dockage. Broward Yachts sold certain of its assets to Lewis Property Investors, Inc., under an Asset Purchase Agreement dated March 2, 2005. On March 8, 2005, Lewis Property Investors' assigned its interest in the Asset Purchase Agreement to Broward Marine. Broward Marine is a Florida limited liability company, formerly engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and servicing private yachts and activities that constituted operation of a marina on the PBPH Property. Broward Marine leased the PBPH Property starting in March of 2005. It continued to occupy the property under a lease-purchase option agreement with PBPH until June of 2009. C-Term's Property is the subject of a tenancy with G&G, an ocean-freight shipping company. G&G, therefore, has shared the Marina Basin with Broward Marine in recent years. Broward Marine's Departure In March 2009, Broward Marine signed an early termination of its lease with PBPH caused by Broward Marine's failure to pay rent. Broward Marine has not been a tenant or otherwise in possession of the PBPH Property since approximately November, 2009.7/ The termination of Broward Marine's lease was effective on June 15, 2009. After termination of the Broward Marine lease, the PBPH Property was re-let to Broward Shipyards, Inc., an entity that is not a party to this proceeding. At the time of the termination, Broward Marine's interests in the 2002 Dock Application and a revision of the application in 2003 (the "2003 Revised Application") were assigned to PBPH.8/ In the meantime, PBPH has pursued the application which had its origin in a complaint about the unpermitted structures and a warning notice issued by the County in 2002. See paragraph 35., et seq., below. The application for the license and permit was for floating docks. Floating Docks The floating docks used by Broward Yachts and others on the PBPH side of the Basin generally come in sections of 8-10 feet. They are secured to existing pilings in the Basin by a collar which slides up and down the piling or, as Mr. Lewis put it at hearing, "[t]hey float up and down . . . as the tide comes in and goes out." Tr. 204. The top of the piling emerges from the water and the rest of the piling extends downward generally into the bedrock at the bottom of the Basin. A series of floating docks make up a finger pier. Finger piers, the structures authorized by the Proposed Permit, can be lengthened or shortened by adding or removing floating docks based on business needs.9/ The ability to easily lengthen or shorten a finger pier in response to the business needs of PBPH or its tenants accounts for one of the main evidentiary features in this proceeding: the many finger pier configurations that appear in aerial photographs over the years and, in particular, since 1998 when PBPH came into ownership of the PBPH Parcel. The floating docks have been constructed of wood and Styrofoam. Those that PBPH seeks to install under the Proposed Permit will be "concrete bathtubs," tr. 580, which "work just as well and are a lot more permanent." Id. Structures made of concrete are of much likely to cause damage in the event of a collision with a vessel than are floating docks made of wood and Styrofoam. Warning Notice and 2002 Dock Application On January 22, 2002, the EPD visited the PHPB Property in response to a complaint about unlicensed docks. Julie Mitchell (then known as "Julie Karczyk"), a Natural Resources Specialist with the County was present on the property during the visit to conduct an inspection. In a Case Summary admitted into evidence, Ms. Mitchell documented the visit with an employee of the State Department of Environmental Protection. The two visitors asked the manager of the property to provide a copy of permits and licenses for the docks on site. If he could not provide them he was advised of the necessity to apply for them. At the time of visit, there were four finger piers composed of floating docks on the PBPH side of the Basin. The four piers protruded into the Basin at an angle similar to the angle of the finger piers shown in the drawings approved by the Proposed Permit. These four docks (from north to south) had lengths of 117, 130, 150 and 150 feet respectively and were each 7.5 feet wide. The northernmost dock was separated from the second dock (the dock immediately to its south) by 52 feet; the second dock was separated from the third by 60 feet; and the third from the fourth by 55 feet. There was also a fifth structure. It may have been a fifth finger pier, but, because of its width which is substantially more than the 7.5 feet, see Petitioners' Ex. 114F (an aerial photograph with a "fly date" of January 2002), it is more likely to have been "work platforms to construct the docks." Tr. 114. Whatever its function, the fifth structure did not protrude into the Basin as far the four others. It was "[r]ight up against the seawall." See id., Petitioners' 125 at 5, and tr. 114. Ms. Mitchell checked the County records and could not locate a license or permit for finger piers or other structures in the Basin. No evidence of a license or permit was provided by either PBPH or any of its tenants. The status of the finger piers and floating docks today remains the same: unlicensed and unpermitted. The County required Broward Yachts as the tenant of the PBPH Property to submit an after-the-fact permit and license application if it wished to keep the structures. Broward Yachts submitted its application for an ERP and Environmental Resource License ("ERL") to the County (the "2002 Dock Application") on April 16, 2002. In the meantime, Broward Yachts installed an additional finger pier in the Basin angled from the seawall just as the four piers observed by Ms. Mitchell. The installation occurred without County authorization. On May 2, 2002, the County issued Warning Notice No. WRN02-0125 (the "Warning Notice"). Directed to both Broward Yachts and PBPH, the Warning Notice contains one count. See Petitioners' Ex. 7. The count reads as follows (bold type in original): Respondent: Broward Yachts, Inc. Respondent: Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. Violated section 27-333(a)(1), BCC, which states: "No person shall conduct or cause to be conducted mangrove alteration, construction, demolition, dredging or filling in regulated aquatic or wetland resources, except in accordance with a currently valid environmental resource license issued by DPEP and all general and specific license conditions therein." By: constructing docks and installing pilings without a valid DPEP Environmental Resource License. Corrective Action: The respondent must apply for an after- the-fact license from the Department for the dock construction and piling installation. The license will not be issued until the respondent obtains a South Florida Water Management District Right-of-Way permit for the pilings located within the Dania Cut-off Canal. Correct within 14 days of this notice. Id. The 2002 Dock Application was filed on April 16, 2002 (prior to the Notice of Warning.) In the meantime and subsequent to the Notice of Warning, the County conducted a review of the 2002 Dock Application. The 2002 Dock Application The 2002 Dock Application was signed by Paul Bichler of Tri County Marine. Mr. Bichler and his company are listed on the application as the "Entity to Receive Permit," see Respondents' Ex. 3 at 3-4, and Bill Thomas of Approved Permit Services, Inc., is listed as the "Agent Authorized to Secure Permit." Id. The owner of the land is shown as Richard Arnold, General Manager of Broward Yachts. Mr. Arnold signed the application in order to give Mr. Thomas the authority to act as the agent of Broward Yachts in securing the permit. There is no mention of PBPH in the application. Part 8 of the 2002 Dock Application requires the applicant to describe in general terms the proposed project, system or activity. Filled in is: "Install Floating Docks!" Id. at 3-5. No other description is offered. The application contains as attachments a map of the site showing the Port Laudania Property and a drawing of Parcel A at the site (the PBPH Parcel.) The drawing shows six finger piers to be installed. Five are attached to the western seawall of the Port Laudania Property at such an angle so that they lie in the Basin in a southwesterly direction (much the same as the four finger piers observed in January of 2002 by Ms. Mitchell). The lengths of the five range from 150 to 190 feet. The fourth and fifth finger piers are proposed to be 180 feet and 155 feet in length, respectively. The sixth pier lies roughly parallel to the southern terminus of the bulkhead on the PBPH Parcel and extends into the mouth of the Basin. Unlike the other five, the sixth structure is not attached to the western seawall. To the south of the bulkhead and with no attachment to the bulkhead, it runs 240 feet in length. At its eastern end, it overlaps the boundary between the Basin and the Dania Cut-off Canal and protrudes into the canal. Id. at 3-9. The drawing also depicts pilings associated with each of the six structures. The floating docks applied for in the 2002 Dock Application were to be made out of Styrofoam and wood. Permitting Criteria/County Review The County's evaluation and processing of the 2002 Dock Application was conducted appropriately pursuant to the Delegation Agreement. Section (1) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.30210/ (the "ERP Additional Conditions Rule") requires an applicant to "provide reasonable assurances that the construction, alteration, operation, maintenance, removal, and abandonment of a system" will meet conditions contained in subsections (a) through (d).11/ For systems located in, on, or over surface waters that are not Outstanding Florida Waters, such as the finger piers and floating dock systems proposed by PBPH, reasonable assurances must be provided that the activity "will not be contrary to the public interest [the "Public Interest Test"] . . . as determined by balancing"12/ seven criteria listed in the ERP Additional Conditions Rule: Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangerment or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the activity will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the activity will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity; Whether the activity will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the activity will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of s. 267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. Of the seven criteria, above, the two deemed most relevant and determinative for the EPD in processing the 2002 Dock Application were 1., and 3., that is, whether the activity will adversely affect public safety, the property of others, and navigation. The County considered the proposed sizes, locations and configuration of the docks as shown in the drawing attached to the application. It had no navigational experts on staff and did not consult with outside navigational experts. Nonetheless, the County considered the nature of the use and whether it would adversely affect safety and navigation. The County also considered an objection to the location of certain pilings and a "future floating pier along the south edge of the basin at Port Laudania." Petitioners' Ex. 8 at 4. The objection had been lodged by the Port Everglades Pilot's Association in a letter dated May 1, 2002: Port Everglades Pilots are responsible for insuring the maximum level of safety of commercial vessels transiting the water of Port Everglades and Port Laudania. * * * I am writing to you in reference to some pilings that have been driven by Broward Marine for what appears to be a future floating pier along the south edge of the basin at Port Laudania in Broward County, Florida. This is the basin that is shared by Broward Marine and G&G Shipping and located within the City of Dania Beach. These pilings are affecting the safe navigation of commercial vessels that have already been using the basin at Port Laudania for many years. Vessels docked at this new pier will pose additional risk to navigation. * * * I would like to go on record stating that the location of these pilings and potential pier is not satisfactory as it hinders the navigation of commercial vessels using the basins at Port Laudania. Id. The letter is signed by Captain James J. Ryan, Managing Pilot for the Port Everglades Pilots' Association. The County acknowledged receipt of the application in a letter dated August 16, 2002, and informed Broward Yachts' agent that the "application for license is incomplete." Petitioners' Ex. 8. The letter requested prompt submission of the information listed on an attached sheet and warned that failure to submit it within 60 days of the request could result in denial. Two items were found omitted or incomplete in the application. The first was a "South Florida Water Management District right-of-way permit for the pilings located within the Dania Cut-off Canal." Petitioners' Ex. 8 at 2 of 3. The second was a response to the navigation issue posed by the Port Everglades Pilot Association. Id. The County's letter advised that upon a showing of resolution of issues posed by the omissions, the Department would process the application as an ERP since the applicant was allowed by a state administrative rule to apply for an ERP concurrently with an ERL. To that end, the letter requested payment of an additional $700 fee. Id. Four other items were also requested for submission. Five months later, Broward Yachts' agent wrote Ms. Mitchell listing seven responses as "the additional information you requested." Petitioners' Ex. 9. With regard to Item 2, the letter states: 2. I am working with Dan Boyer who is handling the Right of Way permit @ SFWMD, I am also addressing same issue with him, if I can demonstrate that a boat when moored at the proposed dock will not extend more than 25% into the canal, he will recommend to the Board of Governors that the project be approved. I am waiting for a signed and sealed survey to show the exact width of the waterway at this location. Petitioners' Ex. 9. With regard to Item 3, the agent responded, "[c]heck enclosed." The letter did not respond to all the requested information. For example, with regard to requested information concerning the anticipated use of the dock proposed within the Dania Cut-off Canal, whether boats would be moored on both its sides, and the anticipated length and draft of the boats, the agent responded, "I will need to get back to you about this one!" Id. Together with a memorandum dated July 21, 2003, the agent submitted revised drawings for the permit (the "2003 Revised Dock Application" or the "Revision"). The Revision removed any portion of the structures or pilings from the Dania Cut-off Canal in order to avoid the requirement for a SFWMD Right-of-Way Permit. Instead of the six finger piers shown in the 2002 Dock Application, the Revision showed seven. Six were similar to the five that angled into the Basin in a southwesterly direction from where they touched the western seawall. The six piers ranged from 120 feet in length to 150 feet in length. The seventh was similar to the sixth finger pier in the 2002 Dock Application but was depicted as being only 60 feet in length. It no longer protruded into the Dania Cut-off Canal. See Petitioners' Ex. 10 at 2. A memorandum to the file dated August 11, 2003, shows that Ms. Mitchell faxed the drawings in the 2003 Revised Dock Application to the Port Everglade Port Association. The memorandum reported that Captain Ryan responded by saying "he no longer had any objections to the project because the structures had been removed from the ROW [of the Dania Cut-off Canal]." Petitioners' Ex. 11. The memorandum also reported that Captain Ryan stated that there still may be navigational and safety concerns with the proposed pier lengths and locations, and that there may be special circumstances for ships wanting to use the basin such as, navigation during slack tide only, daylight only, and other factors that would exacerbate the concerns. Six weeks or so later, Ms. Mitchell signed a letter from the County. The letter, dated September 29, 2003, advised Broward Yachts that the additional information submitted in response to the January 2002 request had been received. It also advised that the project required an Environmental Resource License (in addition to the ERP) and that the application for such a license had been received. To fully evaluate the project, additional information was needed. This second request for additional information consisted of one item: [1] A Cross Access Agreement (attached), recorded on October 27, 1987, states that "the entire inlet be available to the owners of the other parcel for the purposed (sic) of ingress and egress." The Department has received objections from the adjacent property owner that the proposed docks, specifically the most southern 150-foot-long dock, may hinder the navigation of commercial vessels using the basin. Please provide evidence that the proposed docks will not negatively affect the safety and navigation of vessels using the basin. Petitioner's Ex. 12, Completeness Summary, Environmental Resource License Application at 2 of 2, (emphasis added.) The additional information requested was not provided by Broward Yachts or any other party. On October 6, 2003, Ms. Mitchell forwarded a copy of the Cross-use Easement to the County Attorney's Office and asked for it to be reviewed "to confirm that the [easement] pertains to both facilities [the applicant's and G&G's] and that G&G has a basis for their objection." Petitioners' Ex. 13. The objection by G&G was expressed as: "the most southern proposed finger pier will hinder [G&G's] ability to safely navigate their vessels." Id. Attached is a drawing that depicts seven docks. Opinion of the Broward County Attorney's Office In response to Ms. Mitchell's request, an opinion of the Broward County attorney's office was issued on October 31, 2003. The opinion addresses two questions: first, does the Cross-use Easement pertain to both facilities operated by Broward Yachts and G&G; and, second, does G&G have a basis for its objection. Both questions were answered in the affirmative with the following elaboration on the second question: The Easement includes granting a non- exclusive right to the successors of Port Denison, Inc. to use "all or any portion of the Property . . . for ingress and egress over and across the inlet as described in Composite Exhibit C. . ." The Property referred to in Exhibit A includes all of Parcels I and II. Composite Exhibit C is made up of a sketch and legal description of the easement area, with each Parcel having its own description and sketch. The physical structures referred to that limit the easement are the wetface of the bulkhead and the boat hoist structure. The easement rights granted are not similarly limited by reference to docks or piers that may have existed around the time that the easement was granted. This reading of the easement is consistent with the intent of the parties, as clearly reflected in the last "Whereas" clause which reads: " . . . it is to the mutual advantage of the present and future owners, tenants, invitees, etc. that the entire inlet be available to the owners of the other parcel for the purposes of ingress and egress." Since G&G Shipping's objection is related to the use of the inlet for ingress and egress with reasonable reference to navigation safety, and G&G Shipping accommodates uses that it does not anticipate will interfere with such activities, its objection to the license application has a basis in its easement rights. While the additional correspondence from Broward Yachts dated October 11, 2003, refers to an undated photo showing floating docks that are asserted to exist "around the time that the agreements were drawn-up for cross access," this photo doesn't control or limit the terms of the Easement, which grants the use of the entire inlet to both parties. Petitioners' Ex. 16 at 1-2. Another RAI On December 16, 2003, the County sent another request for information (RAI) to Broward Yachts (the "December 16, 2003 RAI." The request stated, "[y]our response dated October 14, 2003, does not adequately address the navigational and safety concerns stated in our letter [of September 29, 2003]." Petitioners' Ex. 17. The December 16, 2003, RAI referenced the County attorney's October 31, 2003, Opinion which "concluded that G & G Marine, Inc., does have a legal basis for their objection to the docks." Id. The December 16, 2003, RAI concluded: [T]he Department has not received reasonable assurances that the proposed docks will not negatively affect navigation and safety, nor have we received a response regarding the objections. It is the intent of this letter to inform Broward Yachts, Inc. (applicant) and Mr. Bill Thomas (agent) that the license application will be closed, pursuant to Section 27- 55(d)(4), if all requested information is not provided within ten (10) days of the receipt of this letter. Id. Broward Yachts requested an additional 90 days to provide the information. The request was granted. A second request to extend the time for providing the information another 90 days was denied by the County. The County Holds its Position Correspondence dated July 8, 2004, from Larry Zink, Esquire, requested reconsideration of the County's October 31, 2003, Opinion. The County responded in a letter dated July 21, 2004. See Petitioners' Ex. 22. The July 21, 2004, letter refers to "additional information, such as Mr. Denison's Affidavit and references to Florida case law," id. and then concludes: After consideration and based upon the Easement, Broward Yachts' letter of October 11, 2003, [Mr. Zink's] letters of May 5, 2004, May 21, 2004, and July 8, 2004, Mr. Denison's affidavit, Florida law, and G&G Shipping's objections dated November 5, 2003 and April 13, 2004, the conclusion that G&G has a basis for its objection to the Project is still correct . . . . Id. The July 21, 2004, letter addresses Florida Law with regard to the Cross-Use Easement: Florida Law: You have asserted that "[t]he Florida Court's have held that to determine the scope of an easement the Court's attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time the easement was created," referencing the cases of Hillsborough County vs. Kortum and Florida Power Company vs. Silver Lake Homeowners Assn. However, the following more completely summarizes the relevant case law standards: The construction or interpretation of an easement is not evidentiary; it is a matter of law. Hillsborough Co. v. Kortum, 585 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991), rev. denied, 598 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1992). The determination of the extent and nature of an easement granted or reserved in express terms by deed depends upon a proper construction of the language of the instrument, for an examination of all of the material parts thereof, and without consideration of extraneous circumstances. Kotick v. Durrant, 143 Fla. 386, 196 So. 802 (1940). An easement holder has the right to do what is reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement, but the right must not be increased to any greater extent than reasonably necessary and contemplated at the time the easement was created. Crutchfield v. F.A. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1954). However, rights of the owners of an easement are not absolute and unlimited. The owner of the servient estate may use [the] land, including the easement, in such a way that will not interfere with the easement owner's right of passage. Tortoise Island Communities, Inc. v. Roberts, 394 So.2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). (String citations have been omitted for brevity.) As you may know, the Circuit Courts of Florida have exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions involving title and boundaries of property. See Section 26.012(2)(g), Florida Statutes. Therefore, it is the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court that has jurisdiction and authority to determine the relative title interest rights of Broward Yachts and G&G in relation to the Project. The Office of the County Attorney respectfully declines to act in a role which is the proper jurisdiction of that Court. Within the limited scope of the previous and instant reviews, it is merely apparent that G&G objects to the Project and holds a title interest which, on its face, could be negatively affected by the Project. Therefore, it has a basis for its objection. Id., paragraph 2, at page 2 of 3 (emphasis added.) The County determined that Broward Yachts had not provided reasonable assurances that the Project would not adversely affect safety and navigation and would not violate the Cross-Use Easement. In light of the determination, the County sent a memorandum on July 21, 2004, see Petitioners' Ex. 23, requesting such assurances (the "July 21, 2004, RAI"). The July 21, 2004, RAI recognized that the issue with regard to the Cross-Use Easement was the subject of litigation between Broward Yachts and G&G Marine, but in the meantime requested reasonable assurances with regard to the navigation and safety issues or "have your client amend its application to resolve this concern." Id. As with the December 16, 2003, 10 RAI, the July 21, 2004, RAI was required to be answered in 10 days. The County hoped that a response would provide guidance from a navigational expert that the new docks would not affect the ability of other vessels to come in and out of the Basin. Denial and Petition for Review By the end of January 2005, the ten-day period for submitting additional information relative to the 2003 Revised Dock Application had expired. No information relative to safety and navigation concerns or compliance with the Cross-Use Easement had been submitted. By letter dated January 31, 2005 (the "Application Denial"), the Broward County EPD announced its decision to deny the application based on a lack of "reasonable assurance that the proposed docks will not negatively affect navigation and safety, nor violate the Cross-Use Easement . . . ." See Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 7 at 13. The County's intent in issuing the Application Denial was to deny both the ERL and ERP. The parties stipulated to what happened next: Broward Yachts filed a Petition for Review of Final Administrative Determination, Environmental Resource License Application No. DF03-1121, Environmental Resource Permit Application No. 06-0194386-001 (the "Administrative Review Petition") with EPD on February 7, 2005, challenging the denial of its "license and permit applications." The Administrative Review Petition invoked the procedures of Chapter 27, BCC. Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, para. 8 at 13. The Administrative Review Petition did not invoke the procedures of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to an internal procedure, the Administrative Review Petition was reviewed by the Department Director. After an independent review, the Department Director upheld the denial. That decision was communicated to Broward Yachts in a letter dated March 11, 2005, signed by Eric Myers, Director of the Broward County EPD. See Petitioners' Ex. 41. The March 11, 2005, letter proposed a compromise that related to an aerial photograph taken at roughly the time of the submission of the 2002 Dock Application. The photograph showed four finger piers ranging in length from 130 to 150 feet. The County offered to permit such a configuration if Broward Yachts modified its application. Broward Yachts was apparently unwilling to do so. Broward Marine Involvement The denial of the 2002 Dock Application was directed only to the application filed by Broward Yachts. Likewise, the Administrative Review Petition was filed solely by Broward Yachts. In March of 2005, however, Broward Marine took over the possession and operation of the PBPH Property from Broward Yachts. It also purchased the assets of Broward Yachts, including the 2002 Dock Application and the 2003 Revised Application. Response to the County's Proposal In June of 2005, the County met with representatives of Petitioners to discuss acceptable dock configurations. Petitioners advised that they would accept a configuration consisting of four docks extending into the Basin at a southeasterly angle and that they would be amenable to a fifth dock parallel and immediately adjacent to the southern portion of the PBPH bulkhead. The County presented the proposal to Mr. Zink, counsel for Broward Yachts, Broward Marine and PBPH in a letter dated July 11, 2005. Mr. Zink responded by letter dated July 14, 2005. The letter references: "Broward Yachts, Inc. - Floating Docks" even though at the time the 2002 Dock Application and the 2003 Revised Dock Application had been assigned to Broward Marine. The one paragraph letter reads: I am in receipt of Michael Owens July 11, 2005 letter regarding the above matter. Though my client does not agree the 2002 aerial photos are historically representative of the number of floating docks, Broward Yachts is submitting herewith a revised drawing dated July 13, 2005 which accepts what is proposed in paragraph two (2) of Mr. Ownens July 11, 2005 letter. Petitioners' Ex. 54, (emphasis added.) The revised drawing, that was neither signed nor sealed, was attached to Mr. Zink's letter. It shows five floating docks "ALL 7'6" WIDE," id. at second page, four of which are angled into the Basin in a southeasterly direction, none of which are more than 150 feet in length. It also shows a fifth dock that lies immediately adjacent to the eastern seawall of the bulkhead on the PBPH property so that it does not angle into the Basin at all. It is 200 feet long and stops short of the south end of the bulkhead so as to be well clear of the Dania Cut-off Canal. Mr. Zink's acceptance of the proposal on behalf of Broward Yachts did not, however, lead to a resolution. The County asked for two additional matters: signed and sealed drawings from an engineer and that PBPH, as the owner of the property, become the applicant. PBPH Steps In Through a letter dated October 20, 2005, Mr. Zink agreed to the two additional demands of the County. The letter enclosed "sealed drawings for the above applications." Respondents' Ex. 6. The applications were referenced in the letter as ERL and the ERP for "Broward Yachts - Floating Docks," but the letter stated, "[a]s per your E-mail of August 25, 2005, a Revised Application identifying Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. as the property owner will be submitted to you directly by my client." Id. The signed and sealed drawings that were submitted did not reflect the proposal made by the County and agreed to by Mr. Zink on behalf of his client in July of 2005. The drawings showed one finger pier immediately alongside the western seawall of the bulkhead and five finger piers composed of floating docks that angled into the Basin. The signed and sealed drawings showed six finger piers instead of five and five finger piers that angled into the Basin instead of the four envisioned by the agreement finalized by Mr. Zink's letter on July 14, 2005. In a letter dated November 11, 2005, and received on November 16, 2005, that was characterized by Mr. Zink as "a follow up on my October 20, 2005, letter to [the County]," Petitioner's Ex. 7, Mr. Zink enclosed two documents: "1) Original executed Application on behalf of Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. 2) Drawing prepared by Frank L. Bennardo, P.E., depicting the docks." Id. The letter dated November 11, 2005, was not accepted for reasons outlined in an e-mail message from Julie Mitchell to Eric Myers. See Petitioners' Ex. 69. In the wake of the message, the County continued to process the 2003 Revised Dock Application. In a letter dated December 16, 2005, with the same reference line used in his earlier correspondence ("Re: Broward Yachts, Inc. - Floating Docks"), Mr. Zink submitted "(2) Revised Drawings prepared by Frank L. Bennardo, P.E., Inc. dated 11/30/05 depicting the five (5) finger piers as per the July 13, 2005, conceptual drawing approved by DPEP." Petitioners' Ex. 75. As represented by Mr. Zink, the drawings matched the configuration proposed by the County in its letter of July 11, 2005. At this point in the series of events initiated by the Notice of Violation in 2002, the parties would have been justified in thinking that an agreement had been reached, that the ERL and ERP could be issued and that all files on the matter of the Broward County EDP could be successfully closed. Mr. Lewis on behalf of Broward Yachts expressed the sentiment at hearing: [I]n the course of that same period, [Mr. Ganoe] was concerned about turning vessels where the fifth dock was. And we put a buoy in the basin where the length of a boat extending beyond that pier would be, he had given us a radius of what he wanted. We had McLaughlin Engineering take that, and I can't remember how many feet that he wanted clear in that area, plotted it on a drawing, went over it with him, thought we had an agreement. Tr. 181 (emphasis added.) Between the County's July 2005 proposal and Mr. Zink's December 16, 2005, letter that appears to have finalized the proposal's acceptance, however, a disruptive event occurred. The event caused destruction in the Basin, halted businesses on both of its sides and stressed the resources of the County: Hurricane Wilma. Hurricane Wilma Hurricane Wilma destroyed most of the docks and pilings in the Basin. In the wake of the destruction, Broward Marine submitted an application to the County for the issuance of a general license (the "General License") to repair and re- install pilings and ramps. The difference between projects that require an ERL, such as the project at issue in this proceeding (which required both an ERL and an ERP), and those that require only a general license was explained by Ms. Mitchell at hearing: "A general license is for smaller projects, specifically for docks where the total overwater area is less than 500 feet . . . ." Tr. 386. A Broward County general license was also distinguished from the ERP at issue in this case. Projects for which the overwater area is less than 1,000 feet are not subject to ERPs. The general license was approved in a letter issued by EPD's Wetlands/Uplands Resources Section: This letter is to inform you that your request for a General License has been granted. General License No. GL- DAN0512-029 authorizes the installation of ten (10) pilings and five (5) floating ramps, adjacent to 750 NE 7th Avenue, in the City of Dania Beach. Respondents' Ex. 9 at 9-2. The General License authorized pilings and ramps only; it did not authorize floating dock structures such as finger piers. The approved project description was attached to the January 6, 2006, letter. It shows the approved project to be pilings installed within the Basin at certain distances from the seawall. For the northernmost four set of pilings the distances range from 115 feet to 150 feet. The distance from the seawall of the fifth set of pilings (the southernmost set that corresponds to the fifth finger pier applied for in the ERP application) is 75 feet, a distance significant to safety and navigability. Notwithstanding that the General License did not authorize finger piers, Broward County installed finger piers in the Basin. The installation of finger piers was done without an ERL or an ERP. When asked why a Notice of Intent was not issued that reflected the parties' putative agreement at the end of 2005, Ms. Mitchell replied, "To be honest, I don't recall because there was so much settlement going on outside of our department with the attorneys, I don't remember exactly why it ended up going [to hearing.]" Tr. 397. The record is unclear as to why a Notice of Intent was not issued. It may have been because of the interruption and destruction of Hurricane Wilma and the confusion it caused when country resources were diverted to other pressing matters. It may have been because of lack of communication between all of the parties and their attorneys. Or, it may have been because of objections from Broward Marine that are referenced in Petitioners' Ex. 69 as to the November 16, 2005, submission of information. The objections are counter to Mr. Zink's letter of December 16, 2005, and inconsistent with Mr. Lewis' recall of having reached an agreement in mid-2005. Whatever the reason, a Notice of Intent for an ERL and an ERP authorizing finger piers and floating docks as referenced in Mr. Zink's December 16, 2005, letter was not issued. In March of 2006, the 2002 Dock Application and the amendment to it in the 2003 Revised Application proceeded to hearing before a Broward County Hearing Examiner because of their denial by the County. The March 2006 Hearing, the Final Order and the Omnibus Order The hearing was held on March 30, 2006. There were two parties to the proceeding: Broward Yachts, Inc., as the Petitioner, and Broward County Environmental Protection Department. Aside from the County, none of the parties to this proceeding13/ (DOAH Case No. 08-1393) were parties to the proceeding before the Hearing Examiner. In his Final Order, the Hearing Examiner described those who participated or were present: At the hearing, the Environmental Protection Department was represented by Michael Owens, Esquire, who presented the testimony of Julie Krawczyk, Natural Resource Specialist II. The Petitioner was represented by Larry Zink, Esquire, who presented the testimony of Glenn Straubb [sic], the President of Palm Beach Holdings, Inc. Also in attendance at the hearing was Steve Ganoe, President of G&G Marine, Inc. ("G&G") Respondents' Ex. 10. The Hearing Examiner entered the Final Order on June 5, 2006. The Final Order found that "these docks, is some shape or form, have existed in this area for over twenty one years and have been used for substantially the same purpose for those years." Id. at 10-2. The order further found "that no competent substantial evidence was presented that would support or warrant the denial of the license and permit sought by the Petitioner [Broward Yachts] to maintain its existing docks." Id. at 10-3. The order concluded, "The administrative decision denying the license/permit to maintain the docks is quashed and the matter is remanded to EPD to take appropriate action in accordance with the terms of this Final Order." Id. The order is based on the following finding: The only relevant standard to this proceeding . . . is . . . whether the docks will adversely affect public safety or welfare or the property of others. No evidence was presented that the docks, which have been in existence since 1985, have ever caused an accident or that they impede G&G's reasonable use of the easement. Moreover, while the EPD does have the right to regulate these docks and the navigable water upon which the docks rest, the easement area is not generally travelled by the public and more or less serves as an entrance to only two businesses, G&G and that of the Petitioner. Id. Broward County filed a motion for reconsideration of the Final Order. G&G filed a motion for rehearing and/or reconsideration as a "nonparty." See Respondents' Ex. 11. Both motions were considered in an order entitled "Omnibus Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Post Hearing Motions." Respondents' Ex. 12. The County's motion was denied. The motion of G&G's was granted in part. The motion was found to request relief not inconsistent with the Final Order. "Specifically, G&G requests that the Final Order prohibit the installation of additional docks and prohibit increasing the size of the existing docks." Id. at 12-2. The Omnibus Order grants the following relief: Petitioner may maintain the five existing docks and repair and replace them, but may not do so in a manner that causes any of the docks to protrude at a greater length or distance into the waterway. Additionally, Petitioner may not construct or maintain any docks other that the five existing docks. Id. at 12-2, 12-3. Neither the Final Order nor the Omnibus Order contains a finding of fact as to the configuration of docks at the time of the hearing conducted by the Hearing Examiner. There is evidence in the record of this case (DOAH Case No. 08-1393) that the five docks existing on March 30, 2006, were configured consistently with the pilings authorized by the General License, that is, they had lengths beginning with the northernmost dock of 135, 135, 150, 150 and 75 feet, respectively. At the time of the final hearing in this proceeding, moreover, the docks were present in the Basin in approximately the same configuration as existed in March of 2006. The 2006 and the 2007 NOIs On October 23, 2006, the County issued a Notice of Intent (the "2006 Notice of Intent") to issue a combined permit/license for the construction of the five docks ranging from 132 feet to 192 feet in length. The 2006 Notice of Intent was issued solely because the County believed it was required by the Hearing Examiner's Final and Omnibus Orders. See Tr. 405. The configuration of docks authorized by the 2006 Notice of Intent resembled the July 2005 Proposal accepted by Mr. Zink on behalf of Broward Yachts: four docks angled into the Basin in a southwesterly direction with one additional dock parallel and adjacent to the seawall. The County did not conduct any evaluation of its own between the dates of the Hearing Examiner's Final and Omnibus Orders as to whether the configuration authorized by the 2006 Notice of Intent had unacceptable impacts to navigation and safety. The draft permit attached to the 2006 Notice of Intent contains several sets of conditions. DEP General Conditions, Broward County EPD General Conditions and ERP and ERL Specific Conditions ("Specific Conditions"). The Specific Conditions were included under the County's authority to impose conditions necessary to carry out the intent of the ERP and ERL permitting regulations. Specific Condition 18 is "Mooring of vessels with lengths exceeding the length of the permitted structures is prohibited." Respondents' Ex. 13 at 13-17. The purpose of including Specific Condition 18, as testified by Eric Myers, Director of the Broward County EPD at the time the 2006 Notice of Intent was issued, "was to make sure that . . . adequate navigation was maintained within the Basin." Tr. 560. G&G challenged the 2006 Notice of Intent by filing a petition for formal proceedings with EPD seeking a clarification in interpretation with regard to the lengths of vessels to be moored in the PBPH side of the Basin vis- à-vis the length of the permitted structures. Broward Marine also filed a Petition for Formal Proceedings challenging the 2006 NOI. In furtherance of discussions with the County, Broward Marine, by letter dated June 26, 2007, submitted four surveys for consideration by the County. The first purported to show the dock configuration existing after Ms. Mitchell's January 2002 visit but before the submission of the Permit Application; the second purported to show the dock configuration on December 11, 2003; the third showed the dock configurations sought by Broward Marine; and the fourth showed all configurations overlapping. None of the surveys depicted the dock configuration existing on January 22, 2002, the date of the Ms. Mitchell's visit, which was the configuration the County had requested Broward Yachts to submit for approval. The County did not transmit the G&G petition or the Broward Marine petition to DOAH. Instead, on or about August 23, 2007, EPD issued another Notice of Intent to Issue Permit/License (the "2007 NOI") to PBPH. The 2007 NOI identifies the proposed project as the Broward Yachts Marine Facility, with permit No. 06-0194386-001 and License No. DF03-1121 and lists the Permittee/Licensee as "Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc." Respondents' Ex. 14 at 14-9. With respect to the factors considered by the County in issuing the 2007 NOI, it provides: The Department reviewed the information presented in the petitions, the Hearing Examiner's Final Orders, and surveys provided by Broward Marine with a letter dated June 25, 2007, and as a result has reformulated the draft permit and agency action. Respondents' Ex. 14 at 14-3. The 2007 NOI also referred to an earlier NOI and draft permit issued on August 2, 2007. On August 8, 2007, EPD was notified of typographical errors in the August 2, 2007, NOI. As a result of the typographical errors and other previous errors, the 2007 NOI stated, "this Notice hereby supersedes the October 23, 2006, and August 2, 2007, Notices of Intent to Issue and draft permits/licenses." Id. The Proposed Permit and the draft Environmental Resource License attached to the 2007 NOI allows PBPH to construct five floating finger piers as detailed in a section of the Proposed Permit entitled "PROPOSED PROJECT DESIGN," as follows: The proposed project is to construct five (5) floating finger piers in an existing privately-owned marina basin. From north to south, the finger piers shall have the following sizes: (1) 7.5-foot-wide by 122-foot-long pier; (2)7.5-foot-wide by 135.8-foot-long pier; (3) 7.5-foot-wide by 150.5-foot- long pier; (4) 7.5-foot-wide by 150.5- foot-long pier; and (5) 7.5-foot-wide by 152.6-foot-long pier. All five (5) finger piers shall be placed sixty-five (65) feet apart and angled in a southeasterly direction from the existing seawall, as depicted on the attached drawing. The total over-water area of the structures shall be 5,378.25 square feet Respondents' Ex. 14 at 14-10. The dock configuration authorized in the Proposed Permit is the same dock plan depicted in Exhibit C to the June 25, 2007, letter from Broward Marine to the County. The County issued the 2007 NOI, revising the dock configuration from what it had authorized in the 2006 NOI, due to objections from Broward Marine that the configuration in the 2006 NOI was not consistent with the Final Order and the Omnibus Order. The Proposed Permit also eliminated Specific Condition 18 that was in the 2006 NOI. It did not impose any restriction or limitation on the length of vessels that may be moored at the proposed finger piers, and PBPH indicated at hearing that it would moor vessels alongside the finger piers whose lengths exceeded the piers.14/ In addition to elimination of Specific Condition 18, there were other significant differences between the 2006 NOI and the 2007 NOI. For example, the 2007 NOI allows all five finger piers to be placed 65 feet apart and angled in a southeasterly direction from the seawall. In contrast, the 2006 NOI provided that the southernmost pier of the five would be placed immediately parallel to the seawall so that it did not jut out at all into the Basin. The 2007 NOI contemplates that the structure of the finger piers would be more permanent. The 2003 Revised Application had sought floating docks, of the type existing at the time made of Styrofoam and wood, as opposed to fixed piers. The concrete pilings and the concrete tub floating docks contemplated by the 2007 NOI are more permanent than the existing wood pilings and the wood and Styrofoam docks. Eric Myers, Director of EPD at the time, signed the 2007 NOI. When he did so on August 26, 2007, he believed that the issues regarding safety and navigation that had been raised by G&G and C-Term had been resolved "based on the advice of staff." Tr. 529. Historical Configuration of Docks in the Basin PBPH contends that the finger pier and dock configuration authorized by the 2007 NOI is consistent with historical lengths and configurations of piers and docks in the Basin. The evidence establishes that the length, number, configuration and locations of docks within the Basin varied greatly over time. As Mr. Straub testified in response to a question about the dock configuration when the property was acquired by PBPH, "Whatever we wanted them to be. It could change from day-to-day and month-to- month." Tr. 582. Aerials taken by Broward County dating back to 1998 demonstrate that the docks in the Basin ranged in number, length and location until 2006 when docks were installed following issuance of the General License. Until 1998, there were many different configurations. Since 2006, the number, lengths, and sizes of the docks have remained fairly consistent to the time of hearing. In the January 2007 Broward County aerial photograph, the five docks (from north to south) have lengths of 151.5, 136, 156, 156 and 88 feet, respectively. These lengths are roughly similar to the piling configuration authorized by the General License.15/ Safety and Navigation16/ The multiplicity of factors that affect navigation in the Dania Cut-off Canal "makes maneuvering extremely tricky" in the canal. Tr. 1574. These same factors affect Basin ingress and egress of G&G vessels and other vessels that have access to the Basin. Wind near the Basin comes from any direction. The predominant wind in the area of the Basin is out of the east/southeast at average speeds of 10-12 knots. From time-to-time, of course, the wind shifts. When cold fronts come through the area, for example, they generally come from the west/northwest and the wind blows mainly from the north. Strongest winds associated with a cold front are usually "anywhere from 20 to 30 knots. Constant winds with a good cold front, usually 15 to 20 knots." Tr. 1260. Direction and strength of wind affects stability and handling capacity of vessels entering and exiting the Basin. The bow of the vessel is affected the most. In the front, it is the narrowest part of the vessel, the least heavy, and has the least draft (depth in the water). Vessels entering and exiting the Basin are affected by leeway defined by Mr. Danti at hearing: "[L]eeway is the physical amount of sideways motion that is going to be activated on a vessel by the wind. It is the amount of side motion created by the wind on a vessel." Tr. 1268-9. Leeway varies depending on a number of factors, among them, the strength and direction of the wind, the angle of the vessel, and its draft. Ocean-freight shipping vessels have different handling characteristics from yachts. The effect of leeway on vessels in the Basin varies from vessel to vessel. Typically, the effect of leeway is greater on G&G vessels than on the PBPH vessels. The current in the Dania Cut-off Canal is 2.0 to 2.5 knots. The current in the canal in the immediate vicinity of the Basin has significant effects on the maneuverability of vessels. Because of the current in the canal, it is advisable for vessels entering and exiting the Basin to perform the majority of turns and other maneuvers in the Basin rather than in the canal. Another factor that makes turning maneuvers by G&G vessels safer in the Basin is boat traffic in the Dania Cut-off Canal. That traffic has increased greatly in recent years, as Mr. Steele testified. Vessels exiting the Basin, furthermore, must yield to vessels in the canal. Boat traffic is not visible to the typical G&G vessel until the vessel has committed to exiting the canal. Once committed, the G&G vessel cannot stop and wait for traffic to pass. It must complete the exit maneuver. It is much better, therefore, for the G&G vessel to turn in the Basin before committing to an exit so that it can emerge bow-first with a better view of canal traffic rather than emerge by backing out. Another factor that makes turning in the Basin safer is the Harbortown Marina, located directly across the canal from the Basin. There is a greater chance for collision the farther the G&G vessels must go into the Dania Cut-off Canal before beginning maneuvers necessary to head out to sea. Vessels will have to go closer to the southern side of the canal, that is, farther into the canal, when emerging from the Basin if they back out and turn in the canal rather than turn in the Basin before heading out toward the Atlantic Ocean. The Basin has a width of 320 feet at the north end and a width of 323 feet at the south end. Mr. Danti fashioned an "Unobstructed Line," depicted on Petitioners Ex. 114A and superimposed on Exhibits 114B through 114"O", fourteen aerial photographs of the Basin taken between 1998 and 2008.17/ The line commences at the north end of the Basin 162' from the Basin's western seawall and runs to the south with two "jogs" to the west before it ends at a projected bulkhead line in the mouth of the Basin just north of the Dania Cut- off Canal. The two jogs run perpendicular to the western seawall; the first, to the tip of the fourth finger pier allowed by the 2007 NOI and the second to a point 59.90 feet east of the western seawall in the approximate middle of the fifth and southernmost finger pier allowed by the 2007 NOI. The part of the Basin to the east of the Unobstructed Line is a navigational safe area (the "Safety Zone") created by Mr. Danti in which it is safe, in his opinion, for G&G vessels to turn and take maneuvers necessary to safely enter and exit the Basin. The Unobstructed Line and the Safety Zone were determined by Mr. Danti in a calculation that took into consideration factors including wind, current and tide, as well as the length, width, draft, maneuverability and handling characteristics of the bulk of G&G vessels and the fact that G&G vessels entering and exiting the Basin need the use of a minimum amount of space in the southern part of the Basin to initiate and complete safe entry and exit navigation maneuvers. Ultimately, the Safety Zone provides a minimum distance for a vessel 190 feet in length determined as half the beam of a vessel18/ from the bow, stern or either side of a vessel to any other vessel, dock, piling or seawall. It does not take into account factors that may require a greater distance such as wind, current and traffic under conditions that are less desirable than the best conditions experienced in the area of the Basin ("Best Conditions"). In order for vessels of the size and character that enter and exit the Basin to do so safely under Best Conditions, no finger piers, docks or moored vessels should protrude from the PBPH side of the Unobstructed Line into the Safety Zone. Under ideal wind, current, and weather conditions, the lengths of the first four finger piers from north to south as authorized by the Proposed Permit will not result in adverse effects to safety and navigation of vessels in and around the Basin. The fifth finger pier, however, is another matter. Authorized to be 152.60 feet in length as depicted in the Proposed Permit, it will protrude by more than 77 feet into the Safety Zone developed by Mr. Danti. Put another way, the fifth finger pier will adversely affect safety and navigation unless it is 75 feet or less in length given its southeasterly angle depicted in the Proposed Permit.19/ The authorized length of the fifth finger pier is not the only navigation and safety issue about which Mr. Danti testified. The length of vessels moored at the finger piers in the Proposed Permit, if too long, can present safety and navigation issues, as well, for G&G's vessels coming in and out of the Basin. With respect to the three northernmost finger piers, moored vessels should not extend past the Unobstructed Line, that is, they should not extend more than 162 feet measured perpendicularly from the Basin's western seawall. With respect to the fourth finger pier, vessels moored there should not extend past the 150.50 feet allowed for the length of the pier as depicted in the Proposed Permit. Similarly, no vessels moored at the fifth finger pier should extend past the end of a longest possible safe fifth finger pier, that is, one that is no more than 75 feet in length at the angle depicted in the 2007 NOI. The adverse affects on safety and navigation caused by the fifth finger pier at the length and as configured in the Proposed Permit would not be alleviated by G&G's use of tugboats to assist vessels entering and exiting the Basin. Tugboats are connected to the vessels they tug by tow lines at the bow and stern of the vessels. Such an arrangement adds approximately 85 feet to a typical G&G vessel of 190 feet, thereby requiring more room in the Basin for maneuvering than the vessel would need under its own power. The use of tugboats would require an even more expansive Safety Zone than was developed by Mr. Danti.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Broward County: modify the Proposed Permit attached to the 2007 Notice of Intent to shorten the length of the fifth finger pier to 75 feet and then issue the permit with the modification; or absent such a modification, deny the issuance of the Proposed Permit as applied for by PBPH. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2010.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Section of General Regulation has violated Section 120.535 F.S. by adoption of a policy which meets the definition of a "rule" under Section 120.52(16) F.S., without complying with the rulemaking procedures established by Section 120.54 F.S.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner originally applied and was licensed as a yacht and ship salesman in June, 1992. To be a salesman, one must be associated with a licensed broker who prominently displays the salesman's license. On April 15, 1994, Petitioner contacted Respondent agency by telephone to discuss renewal of his salesman's license issued June 3, 1992 and due to expire under its own terms on June 3, 1994. At that time, Kathy Forrester told Petitioner that his file reflected that his license had been "cancelled" effective March 10, 1993 due to a letter received on or about March 1, 1993 from Petitioner's employing broker, Frank Stanzel. Mr. Stanzel's letter showed that he was relocating his business from Miami to Ft. Lauderdale and that he wanted his two salesmen's licenses transferred to the new location. He enclosed with his letter the two salesmen's licenses for agency action, as required by agency rules. Mr. Stanzel further reported that Petitioner had left his employ on October 19, 1992, taking his license with him, so Mr. Stanzel could not return Petitioner's license to the agency. On March 22, 1993, five months after Mr. Stanzel heard the last of Petitioner and approximately three weeks after he notified the agency of Petitioner's leaving his employ, Mr. Stanzel's broker's license expired. Under the terms of the agency rules, Mr. Stanzel was required to apply for a new license. He applied. His broker's license was not renewed retroactively, and his new license became effective August 30, 1993. For approximately five months, from March 22, 1993 to August 30, 1993, Mr. Stanzel was not a licensed Florida broker. Neither Mr. Stanzel nor the Respondent agency notified Petitioner of this fact nor did anyone notify Petitioner at that time that his salesman's license was deemed "cancelled" during the broker's lapse. After finding out for the first time on April 15, 1994 that the agency presumed his salesman's license "cancelled" by Mr. Stanzel's notification that Petitioner had taken his salesman's license and left Mr. Stanzel's employ, Petitioner and his father prevailed upon Mr. Stanzel to execute an affidavit dated May 19, 1994 to the effect that Mr. Stanzel had misunderstood, now believed Petitioner had been diligently working at yacht sales after October 19, 1992, and wanted Petitioner's salesman's license reinstated. The affidavit was submitted to the agency. Although Ms. Forrester had misgivings about the affidavit, the agency reinstated Petitioner's salesman's license effective April 29, 1994, after receiving the affidavit (TR 25-28). The reinstated license still had the original expiration date of June 3, 1994. The agency did not reinstate Petitioner's salesman's license retroactive to October 19, 1992 when Petitioner went into construction work fulltime, to the date of Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expiration, or to the date of Mr. Stanzel's new broker's license. Petitioner accepted his salesman's license as reinstated. Petitioner did not renew his salesman's license on June 3, 1994, so it expired by its own terms. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner filed an application to be licensed as a yacht and ship broker, together with the required bond, fee, and fingerprints. On August 2, 1994, Peter Butler, Head of the Section of Yacht and Ship Brokers, wrote Petitioner a deficiency notice, explaining that the agency regarded Petitioner's salesman's license "cancelled" during the lapse of his employing broker's license. The agency has no rule which specifically states that when an employing broker's license expires, his salesmen's licenses are automatically cancelled. The language employed in the deficiency notice was, "any salesman licenses held by [the employing broker] were considered cancelled (sic) for that period of time [the period while the employing broker's license was expired/lapsed] because they did not have an actively licensed broker holding their license." [Bracketed material added for clarity.] This language is the focus of this proceeding. The deficiency notice did not refer to the prior "cancellation" of Petitioner's salesman's license based on Mr. Stanzel's March 1, 1993 notice that Petitioner had left his employ effective October 19, 1992. The deficiency notice cited Section 326.004(8) F.S. [1993] which provides: Licensing.- (8) A person may not be licensed as a broker unless he has been a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years, and may not be licensed as a broker after October 1, 1990, unless he has been licensed as a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years. Bob Badger, an agency investigator, submitted a report to Mr. Butler dated September 1, 1994 expressing his opinion that even with Mr. Stanzel's after-the-fact affidavit, Petitioner's salesman's license would have been interrupted by the fact that he had no licensed broker holding his salesman's license during Mr. Stanzel's broker's license lapse of five months. He further concluded that Petitioner's salesman's license was "suspended" for a short period for not renewing his salesman's license bond. After review of the investigation report, on September 19, 1994, the agency issued its Intent to Reject Petitioner's broker's application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. alluding to the deficiency notice and citing Section 326.004(8) F.S., for Petitioner's failure to complete two consecutive years as a salesman. Section 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and rules enacted thereunder clearly place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesmen's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of a salesman's license when a broker is no longer associated with the selling entity. Typically, salesmen turn in their licenses through the original broker for cancellation by the agency and receive new ones when they move from one broker's oversight to another's. Salesmen who are employed by one broker also switch their salesman's licenses to another active broker whenever the first broker disassociates from a yacht sales company and moves to another company, quits, retires, or lets his broker's license lapse. Due to the common dynamics of the employment situation whereby salesmen are under the active supervision of their employing broker in the company office, they usually know immediately when a broker's license is in jeopardy or the broker is not on the scene and supervising them. This knowledge is facilitated by the statutes and rules requiring that all licenses be prominently displayed in the business location. Anybody can look at anybody else's license on the office wall and tell when it is due to expire. If licensees are in compliance with the statutes and rules, no active salesman has to rely on notification from the agency with regard to the status of his own or his broker's license. In the present case, Petitioner removed himself from all contact with Mr. Stanzel as of October 19, 1992. Therefore, he did not know what was occurring in the office or with any licenses. All agency witnesses testified substantially to the effect that since they have been employed with the agency and so far as they could determine since its inception, agency personnel have relied on Sections 326.002(3), 326.004(8), 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and Rules 61B-60.005 and 61B-60.008(1)(b) and (c) F.A.C. to preclude licensing someone who has not been actively supervised by a Florida licensed employing broker for two consecutive years. More specifically, agency personnel have always applied Sections 326.004(14)(a) and (b) to place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesman's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of the salesman's license when his broker is no longer associated with the sales entity. The agency has always interpreted the word "broker" as used in Chapter 326 F.S. and Chapter 61B-60 F.A.C. to mean "Florida licensed broker." See also, Section 326.002(1) and 326.004(1) F.S. and Rule 61B-60.001(1)(g) F.A.C. These interpretations are in accord with the clear language of the applicable statutes and rules. Petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to show that he had received treatment different than others similarly situated.
The Issue Whether or not the corporate names Sarasota Yacht Club on Coon Key, Inc., and Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., are deceptively similar to each other and, if so, whether or not pertinent rules and regulations of the Department of State require the latter chartered corporation to amend its Articles of Incorporation and registration to reflect a new name due to a "bad faith" name reservation by Respondent, Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony adduced at the hearing, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Documents on file in the Division of Corporations, Department of State, reveal that the Articles of Incorporation for the Sarasota Yacht Club, 1/ a Florida corporation not for profit, were granted by the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, Florida, on June 30, 1926. (See Exhibit A of the Stipulation received herein as the parties' Joint Exhibit 1.) Sarasota Yacht Club came under the jurisdiction of the Division of Corporations of the Department of State (Respondent) on April 18, 1963, with the filing of certain amendments to the Articles of Incorporation (Exhibit B of Joint Exhibit 1). The Sarasota Yacht Club was dissolved on September 3, 1976, for failure to file its Annual Report for 1974 and subsequent years. Notices mailed by Respondent, Division of Corporations, to the Sarasota Yacht Club were directed to 1100 Ringling Boulevard, an address which was erroneously given on the 1973 Annual Report of Sarasota Yacht Club, whose correct address is 1100 John Ringling Boulevard. (Exhibit C of Joint Exhibit 1.) The postmaster of Sarasota, Florida, upon inquiry by the Department, indicated that mail addressed to the Sarasota Yacht Club at 1100 Ringling Boulevard would not automatically be forwarded to 1100 John Ringling Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida. (Joint Exhibit 1 and testimony of John W. Arnold, the manager of Sarasota Yacht Club on Coon Key, Inc., during the calendar years 1975 through 1979.) On July 9, 1979, Martin J. McGuire, Ethel May McGuire and William Kecht filed Articles of Incorporation under the name Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., which corporation was granted Charter No. 748001. (Exhibit D of Joint Exhibit 1.) Sarasota Yacht Club reinstated its Charter under the name of The Sarasota Yacht Club on Coon Key, Inc., on September 24, 1979, with the original Charter No. 705493. (Exhibit E of Joint Exhibit 1.) Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., Charter No. 748001, failed to file its Annual Report prior to July 1, 1980, and was involuntarily dissolved December 8, 1980, and failing reinstatement of Charter No. 748001, pursuant to Chapter 10- 1.09, Florida Administrative Code, the name Sarasota Yacht Club will become available for reissuance on December 8, 1981. (Joint Exhibit 1.) Sarasota Yacht Club on Coon Key, Inc., Charter No. 705493, has attempted to reserve the name Sarasota Yacht Club so that it may be restored to the use of its name granted on June 30, 1926, however, the Respondent, Department of State, Division of Corporations, will not process said name reservation until December 8, 1981. (Exhibit F of Joint Exhibit 1.) During the years 1975 through 1979, when Messr. Arnold was manager of Sarasota Yacht Club, the Club continued to do business with various State agencies and regularly renewed various licenses with the Department of Natural Resources; gasoline dealers; special fuel certificates; Department of Business Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants; Internal Revenue Service special tax stamps and licenses issued by the City of Sarasota, including the Health Department. Also, during this period, the Club received various letters which were not properly addressed, such as John Ringling Causeway, Ringling Causeway, etc. As stated herein, Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., Charter No. 748001, was formed on July 3, 1979, for the express purpose of encouraging boating and yachting to provide entertainment food, refreshments and social activities for its members and guests. Accordingly, the purpose for which that club was formed is the identical purpose for which Petitioner was originally formed and continues to operate since 1926. Also, both corporations operate in the same locality, Sarasota, Florida. Respondent, Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., however, has not conducted any business in furtherance of its corporate purpose other than the chartering of the corporation. Martin McGuire, one of the incorporators of Respondent, Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., was a former member of Petitioner. His membership was terminated for reasons unknown to the Hearing Officer, during 1979. On July 12, 1979, Norman Jacobson, an attorney licensed to practice in Florida received a phone call from Martin McGuire. Attorney Jacobson has known attorney Martin McGuire for more than thirty-five (35) years. Attorney Jacobson attended law school with Martin J. McGuire at John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. During the July 12, 1979, conversation, attorney McGuire related to attorney Jacobson, certain alleged problems that Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., was experiencing including personal, financial and tax liabilities which could affect the Club (Petitioner) if made known to the public. This conversation took place subsequent to the time when attorney McGuire had been expelled as a member of Petitioner. According to Jacobson, attorney McGuire agreed to dissolve Corporate Charter No. 748001 provided Petitioner do the following: l. Reinstate his membership in good standing; Guarantee his continued membership in good standing; and Agree to certain unspecified changes in Petitioner's by-laws. Attorney Jacobson advised attorney McGuire that those concessions could not and would not be made if his recommendation to the Club's membership were adopted. Attorney Jacobson considered McGuire's demands to be a form of blackmail. Attorney Jacobson reported to the Club (Petitioner) the details of the conversation and discussions that he had with attorney McGuire as outlined above and the Club unanimously agreed to maintain its original decision to cancel attorney McGuire's membership. Messr. Brady, a former practicing attorney and also an employee of the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, is familiar with Petitioner's history. Messr. Brady recounted that the Club was formed during 1926, and its stature has continuously grown. The Club presently boasts of a membership in excess of 500 and regularly sponsors regattas and other sailing events. The Club is sponsoring its third annual sailing regatta this month and one of its female members is a finalist in this year's Adams Cup Race.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the corporate name Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., be found deceptively similar to Sarasota Yacht Club on Coon Key, Inc., and that approval for use of the name Sarasota Yacht Club, Inc., be withdrawn by the Secretary of State. 2/ RECOMMENDED this 16th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16 day of November, 1981.
