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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF RESPIRATORY CARE vs JENNIFER ABADIE, R.R.T., 18-005694PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Oct. 26, 2018 Number: 18-005694PL Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2019

The Issue Did Respondent, Jennifer Abadie, R.R.T., violate sections 468.365(1)(q), 468.365(1)(x), 456.072(1)(v), or 456.063(1), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ by committing sexual misconduct?

Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 468, Florida Statutes, charge the Board with regulating the practice of respiratory care in Florida. Ms. Abadie is a licensed registered respiratory therapist in Florida. Ms. Abadie worked for Comprehensive Healthcare of Clearwater (Comprehensive) from October 24, 2017, through February 4, 2018, at its Pinellas County, Florida, location. Comprehensive is a residential rehabilitation and nursing facility. Ms. Abadies’s 89-year-old father was a patient at Comprehensive from before she started working there until his death. He suffered from dementia. Ms. Abadie visited her father frequently, before and after her shifts and when she was not working. G.B. was a severely ill patient at Comprehensive trying to recover from multiple strokes. G.B. was only 56 years old. However, he had extensive medical conditions. They included hypertension, congestive heart failure, fibromyalgia, diabetes, blindness and end-stage renal (kidney) disease. G.B. received dialysis three times a week for his kidney disorder. He took dozens of medications daily. G.B. also had a tracheostomy. A tracheostomy is a tube that goes into the trachea to help people with impaired breathing breathe. The heavy treatment load weighed on G.B. psychologically and caused him anxiety and depression. Ms. Abadie provided respiratory therapy services to G.B. G.B. recognized Ms. Abadie from an earlier time when she worked at Florida Hospital where he had been a patient. He reminded her of that time and established a friendship with her. Over time, the friendship grew closer. As a result of their friendship and Ms. Abadie's compassion for G.B., Ms. Abadie and G.B. spoke regularly. When Ms. Abadie visited her father, she usually checked on G.B. He and Ms. Abadie talked about the range of subjects that acquaintances talk about including families, children, marital status, holiday plans, and day-to-day lives. They spoke regularly by telephone as well as in person. Although they spoke regularly, Ms. Abadie and G.B. did not always speak at length. Sometimes she just waved and poked her head in to say hello. At G.B.'s request, Ms. Abadie brought him items from outside the facility, such as toiletries and a blanket. G.B. grew very fond of Ms. Abadie and wanted her as his girlfriend and eventually his wife. Ms. Abadie did not encourage or reciprocate these feelings or intentions. Lisa Isabelle was G.B.'s only other visitor. G.B. was a friend of her husband. She had known G.B. for most of their lives. Ms. Isabelle rented G.B. a residence on her property. Ms. Isabelle described her relationship with G.B. as "love-hate." Ms. Isabelle held a durable power of attorney for G.B. His family lived out of town and decided it would be good for somebody local to hold the power of attorney. On Sunday, February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie came to Comprehensive to visit her father. She wanted to watch the Eagles play in the Super Bowl with him. Their family is from Philadelphia. Ms. Abadie stopped at G.B.'s room first. Charity Forest, L.P.N., was on-duty that day. G.B. was one of her patients. Towards the end of the first of her two shifts, Ms. Forest noticed that the curtain by G.B.’s bed was pulled halfway around his bed, which was unusual. The door was open. Ms. Forest entered G.B.’s room and looked around the curtain. She saw G.B. and Ms. Abadie sitting on the bed, on top of the covers. The head of the bed was raised about 45 degrees to provide a backrest. G.B. was wearing long pajama pants but not wearing a shirt. Ms. Abadie was wearing jean shorts, a T-shirt, and Keds®. Ms. Abadie was resting her feet on her iPad® so she would not dirty the covers. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were not touching each other. They were talking, watching television, and looking at pictures on Ms. Abadie's telephone. The room was a two-bed room. There was a patient in the other bed. Ms. Forest thought that the two sitting on the bed was inappropriate and left in search of her supervisor. Ms. Forest could not locate her supervisor. But she met another L.P.N., Ruth Schneck. Ms. Forest told Ms. Schneck what she had observed. Ms. Schneck went to G.B.'s room. The door was open. Ms. Schneck briefly entered the room. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Ms. Schneck left immediately, closing the door behind her. She joined the search for the supervisor. Neither Ms. Schneck nor Ms. Forest could locate the supervisor. While looking for the supervisor, Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck encountered Sean Flynn, L.P.N. They told him what they had seen. Mr. Flynn was a licensed practical nurse and a case manager at Comprehensive. He had come to the facility briefly that day in order to take care of some paperwork. After talking to Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck, Mr. Flynn went to G.B.’s room and opened the door. Ms. Abadie and G.B. were sitting on the edge of the bed facing the door. Mr. Flynn asked them if anything was going on. They said no. Mr. Flynn left the room and called Nicole Lawlor, Comprehensive's Chief Executive Officer. Ms. Lawlor told Mr. Flynn to return to G.B.'s room, instruct Ms. Abadie to leave, and tell her that she would be suspended pending an investigation. He returned to G.B.'s room with Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Mr. Flynn asked Ms. Abadie to step outside. She did. G.B. soon followed in his wheelchair. Mr. Flynn told Ms. Abadie that she was suspended and had to leave. G.B. overheard this and became very upset and aggressive. He insisted that Ms. Abadie was his girlfriend and that he wanted her to stay. Ms. Abadie asked to visit her father before she left. Mr. Flynn agreed. Ms. Abadie visited her father for a couple of hours. Ms. Abadie also called Ms. Isabelle to tell her that Mr. Flynn asked her to leave and that G.B. was very upset. After Ms. Abadie's departure, G.B. became increasingly upset and loud. His behavior escalated to slamming doors and throwing objects. Comprehensive employees decided G.B. was a danger to himself and others and had him involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act at Mease Dunedin Hospital. On her way home, Ms. Abadie received a telephone call offering her full-time employment at Lakeland Regional Hospital. February 4, 2018, at 6:08 p.m., Ms. Abadie submitted her resignation from Comprehensive in an e-mail to Ms. Lawlor. Ms. Abadie's only patient/caregiver relationship with G.B. was through her employment with Comprehensive. As of 6:08 p.m. on February 4, 2018, G.B. was not a patient of Ms. Abadie. She no longer had a professional relationship with him. Ms. Lawlor suspended Ms. Abadie on February 4, 2018. She based her decision on the information that Ms. Forest, Ms. Schneck, and Mr. Flynn told her, not all of which is persuasively established or found as fact in this proceeding. Still, Ms. Lawlor's memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie reveals that the nature of G.B.'s relationship with Ms. Abadie and the events of February 4, 2018, were not sexual. Ms. Lawlor's Employee Memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie does not identify a state or institution rule violated in the part of the form calling for one. She wrote "Flagrant violation of code of conduct." The description in the "Nature of Infraction" section of the form reads, "Employee was found cuddling in bed with a resident during her time off." There is no mention of sex, breasts, genitalia, or sexual language. None of the varying and sometimes inconsistent accounts of the day mention touching or exposure of breasts, buttocks, or genitalia. None of the accounts describes or even alludes to sex acts or statements about sex. The only kiss reported is a kiss on the cheek that G.B. reportedly forced upon Ms. Abadie as she was leaving. The deposition testimony of the Board's "expert," offers many statements showing that what the Board complains of might be called "inappropriate" or a "boundary violation" but does not amount to sexual misconduct. He testified about the strain a patient expressing romantic feelings toward a therapist puts on the professional relationship. He says the professional should tell the patient that the statements are inappropriate. The witness says that if the patient starts expressing the romantic feelings by touching the therapist, the therapist must tell the patient that his behavior is inappropriate and begin recording the events for the therapist's protection so that "no inappropriate allegations are made later." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 3). Asked his opinion about allegations that Ms. Abadie was laying on G.B.'s bed, the witness says the behavior "crossed a professional boundary" and that he was not aware of the "behavior being appropriate in any situation." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 16). The witness acknowledged that a hug is not inherently sexual. (Jt. Ex. 3, pp. 24 & 30). In addition, the training and experience of the witness do not qualify him as someone whose opinion should be entitled to significant weight. Among other things, he has never written about, lectured about, or testified to an opinion about sexual misconduct. Had the deposition not been offered without objection, whether the testimony would have been admissible is a fair question. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. After February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie attempted to continue her friendship with G.B. by telephone calls and visits. However, Comprehensive refused for several weeks, against G.B.'s wishes, to allow Ms. Abadie to visit G.B. and would only permit Ms. Abadie brief, supervised visits with her father. G.B. was very upset by Comprehensive's prohibition of visits from Ms. Abadie. He began refusing food and treatment, including medications and dialysis. G.B.'s condition deteriorated to the point that he was admitted to hospice care. At that point, on February 24, 2018, Comprehensive contacted Ms. Abadie and gave her permission to visit G.B and lifted restrictions on visiting her father. A February 27, 2018, e-mail from Shelly Wise, Director of Nursing, confirmed this and admitted that the Agency for Health Care Administration had advised that G.B.'s right as a resident to visitors trumped Comprehensive's concerns. Ms. Abadie resumed visiting her friend, G.B. On May 21, 2018, G.B. passed away. G.B. was a lonely, mortally ill man. He initiated a friendship with Ms. Abadie that she reciprocated. Ultimately, he developed unfounded feelings about her being his girlfriend and them having a future together. The clear and convincing evidence does not prove that the relationship was more than a friendship or that it was sexual in any way.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Mary A. Iglehart, Esquire Christina Arzillo Shideler, Esquire Florida Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Kennan George Dandar, Esquire Dandar & Dandar, P.A. Post Office Box 24597 Tampa, Florida 33623

Recommendation Based on the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Respiratory Care, dismiss the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2019.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.5720.43456.063456.072456.073468.353468.36590.702 DOAH Case (4) 12-1705PL18-0263PL18-0898PL18-5694PL
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs CARY L. HALL, M.D., 08-003018PL (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Jun. 20, 2008 Number: 08-003018PL Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024
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PHILLIP M. WHISLER vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 96-002614RU (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 30, 1996 Number: 96-002614RU Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1997

The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.

Florida Laws (6) 110.105110.227110.233120.52120.56120.68
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs KAYODE EZEKIAL SOTONWA, M. D., 11-005780PL (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Nov. 10, 2011 Number: 11-005780PL Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024
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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. JOSE RODRIGUEZ LOMBILLO, 86-003650 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003650 Latest Update: Sep. 02, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent grew up in Havana, Cuba and was a university student there when Castro came into power. As did most university students, Respondent initially supported Castro but later became disenchanted with the regime. Respondent became interested in photography as a boy and became proficient to the point he sold photographs to the news media and helped defray the expense of his medical training through photography. Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Respondent smuggled out of Cuba photographs of the Russian missiles that had been delivered to Cuba. Respondent acknowledged that he took all of the photographs and videotapes entered into evidence in these proceedings. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. He graduated from medical school in Madrid, Spain in 1964, completed his internship at Johnson Willis Hospital, Richmond, Virginia, in 1965, and his residency in psychiatry at the Menninger School of Psychiatry, Topeka, Kansas in 1968. Respondent came to Naples, Florida in 1969 as Director of Collier County Mental Health Clinic which post he held for several years before devoting all of his time to his private practice. Respondent was married in 1962, and divorced in 1978. He is the father of three children. His two older daughters are working on advanced degrees while the younger son is entering high school. Following his divorce Respondent concluded that by marrying at a young age, he had perhaps missed out on much of life and decided to try a more libidinous life-style. In 1980, Respondent became attracted to a 19-year old licensed practical nurse who was working at Naples Community Hospital. Although he saw her several times in the hospital, they did not engage in conversation but made eye contact in passing each other. In October 1980, another doctor referred a patient who had suffered head injuries in a motorcycle accident to Respondent for treatment. This patient, Joseph DiVito, was seen in the hospital several times by Respondent and again after DiVito was released from the hospital. At the first hospital visit with DiVito, Respondent was surprised to see Laura Hodge, the LPN at Naples Community Hospital, whose eyes had attracted Respondent. She was the woman with whom DeVito was living at the time of his accident. The charges in the Administrative Complaint involving Laura Hodge are sustained only if a doctor-patient relationship existed between Respondent and Hodge. The doctor patient relationship, if it existed, was related solely to the treatment provided DiVito. Hodge testified that she was counseled by Respondent jointly with DiVito and also alone; that Respondent gave her the drug Artine to give DiVito in the event he suffered a reaction from the drug Haldol, which was given DiVito to aid in his memory loss; that after his release from the hospital DiVito was like a baby who had to be taught to feed himself, to walk, and to get around; that she had lunch with Respondent twice, once at Keewaydin Island, where they went by Respondent's boat, and once at a restaurant in North Naples; that following the lunch she felt dizzy and does not remember removing her clothes at her apartment when returned there by Respondent and having pictures taken of her; that after being shown nude photographs of herself, she was afraid of Respondent and feared he would show the pictures to DiVito; that she Accompanied Respondent on an overnight trip to Miami where they shared a motel room; that they went to dinner at a caberet where she drank some wine and began feeling strange; that when they returned to the motel that night, she does not remember anything until the following morning when she awoke upset and began crying; and that Respondent then drove her back to Naples. Shortly thereafter, Hodge left Naples with DiVito and went to Panama City where DiVito operated a boat leasing business during the summer of 1981. She returned to Naples that fall but had no further contact with Respondent. Respondent testified that he was surprised to see Hodge the first time he went to DiVito's room in the hospital; that Hodge told him that she didn't want to stay with DiVito; that the principal person who took care of DiVito when he was released from the hospital was his brother, William DiVito; that DiVito had been a very active man and was anxious to leave the hospital before he was physically ready to do so; that he was ambulatory, could feed himself and his principal problem was loss of memory; that Hodge was never his patient; that they had lunch twice, once at Keewaydin Island and again at a restaurant in North Naples; that both of these times Respondent took numerous photographs of Hodge and gave them to her; that following the lunch and picture-taking at Vanderbilt Beach (North Naples) he drove her to the apartment she had just moved into; that he visited her at this apartment at a later date and while she changed clothes, he took pictures of her in various stages of undressing; that he showed her these pictures after they had been developed; that she accompanied him to Miami where they shared a motel room and went out to dinner; and that they returned to Naples the following day because Hodge was upset. Photographs of Hodge which were admitted into evidence are of a person who appears fully aware that she is being photographed and in many of the pictures appears to be posing. Haldol, the drug given DiVito, can cause an epileptic type reaction; however, the treatment for this reaction is by injection and not orally because of the time it takes oral ingestion to work. The testimony of Hodge respecting Respondent entrusting to her the Artine tablets to place in DiVito's cheek if he had a reaction to the Haldol is less credible than is the testimony of Respondent. Although Respondent saw Hodge when he was treating DiVito and talked to the two of them, he did not thereby make Hodge his patient. Furthermore, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent surreptitiously gave Hodge any drug which could cause her to not remember the taking of the nude photographs. Her coordination and awareness shown in those photographs belie the contention that she was drugged. Diane Beck, R.N., arrived in Naples in 1981 and worked as a nurse at Naples Community Hospital where she met Respondent. After declining several dates with Respondent, Ms. Beck accepted an offer to go scuba diving from Respondent's boat. This involved a weekend trip to the Florida Keys on the boat and they had sex over this weekend. Respondent also took some nude photographs of Ms. Beck with her consent. Evidence presented to establish a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck included one instance where, following a D & C on Beck, the gynecologist asked Respondent if he had Tylenol #3 which Beck could take if needed for pain. When Respondent replied in the affirmative, the gynecologist did not write a prescription for medication for Beck. Although Beck testified that while they were living together, Respondent gave her Darvocet, Motrin and Tylenol #3 for dismenorreah from which she chronically suffered, Respondent denied prescribing these medications for her. The most likely scenario in this regard is that Respondent had such medication available in his home and Beck took them in accordance with instructions previously received from her gynecologist. This did not create a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck. Respondent prescribed benzodiasepines to many of his patients as a tranquilizer and sleeping pill. During the period December 1981 and October 1982 the Upjohn representative (detailer) whose territory included Respondent's office, gave Respondent 465 Xanax tablets as samples. Xanax is a benzodiasepine and the Xanax tablets were .25 mg and .5 mg in strength. The Upjohn company detailer who serviced the Naples area between October 1982 and June 1984 did not testify and no record of benzodiasepines left as samples with Respondent during this period was available at the hearing. Records of those drugs are maintained by Upjohn for the current year and two preceding years only. At the time of this hearing, the earliest record Upjohn had of drugs dispensed to physicians was January 1, 1985. Around November 1982, Upjohn came out with a benzodiasepine called Halcion. This drug was left with Respondent by detailers as samples. Halcion is packaged in sleeves with two tablets in a sleeve. Generally when Halcion is left as a sample, the box contains five sleeves with two tables per sleeve. Halcion has advantages over some other benzodiasepines that it works quickly, the effects wear off quickly and it leaves no hangover effect. Furthermore, the patient may have a memory lapse for the time sedated with Halcion. Use of Halcion is contraindicated by a woman of childbearing age because the drug can adversely affect and cause deformities in a fetus in the early stages of development. Halcion (as well as other drugs) may be obtained by a physician in a stockbottle which generally consists of 100 tablets in a square bottle with a round top. To obtain a stockbottle the physician places his order with the detailer, signs the appropriate FDA forms, the detailer sends the order to his area office and the stockbottle is mailed directly to the physician. No credible evidence was presented that Respondent ever obtained a stockbottle of Halcion from Upjohn. When benzodiasepines are taken in conjunction with the ingestion of ethyl alcohol, the effects of both are enhanced. Hence, there is a danger in taking sedatives while drinking alcoholic beverages. Alcohol alone is a sedative and it is quickly absorbed in the soft tissue such as the brain. When a benzodiasepine is taken at the same time ethanol is being ingested, the alcohol provides a vehicle which allows the benzodiasepine to be more quickly absorbed into the body. While Diane Beck was dating and living with Respondent, several videotapes were made of her and Respondent engaged in various sexual activities. Ms. Beck acknowledged that she voluntarily participated in some of these videotapes but that she was unaware that others were taken. She has no recollection that some of the tapes were being made, nor did she subsequently (before the charges here considered first arose) learn of these videotapes. In those tapes, Beck had been administered Halcion by Respondent without her knowledge or consent. This finding is based upon the following facts: Respondent told Beck he had given her a lot of Halcion. When Beck became pregnant by Respondent in mid-1983, Respondent told her of potential dangers caused by the use of Halcion and suggested she have an abortion. An appointment was made by Respondent with Dr. McCree, a gynecologist, to perform the abortion and on July 11, 1983, Dr. McCree performed a D & C on Beck, aborting the fetus. On one or more occasions Beck observed what appeared to be residue in her after dinner drink, and on at least one occasion asked Respondent about it. Respondent told her it was sugar from the old brandy she was drinking. Respondent acknowledged that he often performed sexual acts on Beck while she was "passed out" and unaware of what he was doing. However, he contended she enjoyed it and had given him permission. The videotapes of a comatose female being shifted around by Respondent to improve the angle for the pictures being taken. This does not appear to be a person merely intoxicated, certainly not one intoxicated with ethanol. This person is as limp as a rag with all muscles appearing to be totally relaxed who is certainly oblivious to what is going on. It is not believed a person merely intoxicated (unless dead drunk) could be moved and manipulated the way Beck was without some reaction. Had Beck been dead drunk, she would perhaps still be intoxicated when she awoke and/or be hung over. Neither of these events occurred. Respondent's steady relationship with Beck terminated in April 1984 after the date for a wedding could not be agreed upon. She moved out of his house but they remained on friendly terms until the existence of the videotapes became known. The third complaining witness, Sandi Karppi, met Respondent in June 1984 on the beach in Naples. At the time Ms. Karppi was an LPN on private duty with a patient where she had one hour off in the late afternoon which she used to walk on the beach. One day while walking along the beach, she was followed by Respondent who was attracted to the energy with which she walked. Respondent overtook her and engaged her in conversation. During the conversation Respondent disclosed his name and that he was a psychiatrist. Ms. Karppi disclosed to him that she had a pap smear taken which was suspicious, that a second test had been done, and she was anxious to obtain the results but her doctor did not return her calls. Respondent volunteered to obtain the results of the later test and inform her. Karppi told Respondent that she walked the beach almost every afternoon and Respondent began visiting the beach to meet her during her hour off from her nursing duties. A short time after the first meeting Respondent called Karppi to tell her that he had the results of her lab test and offered to take her to dinner to give her the results. She consented. Thereafter he continued to meet her on the beach and engage her in conversation. Respondent's version of the timing of the initial events of their relationship is a little different from the version testified to by Karppi; however, these differences are not material to the issue here presented. Respondent testified that Karppi told him of her problems with the pap smear test several days after their first meeting and that he agreed to get the results of the tests. Dr. King advised Respondent obtaining the results of the pap smear and passing them to Karppi. During the meetings on the beach and on boat trips Karppi took on Respondent's boat, Respondent took numerous photographs of Karppi. On one occasion, they went on an overnight trip to Keewaydin Island with Respondent's son Eric and a friend of Eric. The two boys slept in a tent on the beach leaving Karppi and Respondent on the boat. On another occasion they went alone on the boat to Captiva Island where they spent the night on board. Karppi testified that she went to sleep fully clothed while at Keewaydin Island in a bunk bed on one side of the cabin with Respondent in another bed and when she awoke, she was naked. Nude photographs of Karppi in a comatose state are contained in Exhibit 1. Karppi never consented to having her picture taken in the nude. Respondent's version of the nude photographs is that he frequently talked to Karppi about taking nude photographs but she never consented, saying only that maybe she would allow the photographs if out of town or if she was tipsy. Respondent contends these photographs were taken while they were at Captiva Island with only the two of them on the boat and that Karppi drank a lot of wine and passed out. He then disrobed her and took the photographs. Respondent contends he gave Karppi no drugs before she passed out. However, it is concluded that Karppi was given some sedative along with the wine she drank. This conclusion is based upon the following facts: Respondent had access to Halcion, Xanax, Tylenol #3, and other drugs that could induce coma. Respondent had used such drugs on Diane Beck and was aware of the potential for use of these drugs. In order to take some of the photographs in Exhibit 1, Karppi had to be moved around enough to awaken one who was just sleeping or only sleeping off ethanol induced sleep. Some of the actions of Respondent as depicted in these photographs would have awakened or aroused one who was not fully comatose. Karppi has no recollection such photographs were ever taken, though she was sober and had no hangover the next morning. Subsequent to the boat trips Respondent took a vacation during most of the month of July during which he travelled to Europe and the Caribbean. Upon his return to Naples, he renewed his courtship with Karppi and she moved into his home August 26, 1984, the day after Respondent's oldest daughter returned to college. Respondent's testimony that they first had sex that night which Karppi spent in his bedroom is not disputed by Karppi. If they engaged in sex before that time, Karppi was unconscious and unaware of it. During part of the time Karppi stayed at Respondent's home and shared his bedroom, her mother also visited and slept in another bedroom at Respondent's home. This relationship terminated around September when Karppi moved into her own apartment. She and Respondent remained friendly and saw each other occasionally. One night in late December 1984, Karppi called Respondent from the hospital to tell him she had a headache and to ask him to prescribe some medication for her. After learning that Karppi had tried without success to get her doctor on the telephone and that her doctor had prescribed Cafergot for her headaches, Respondent called in a prescription to the hospital pharmacy to give 4 Cafergot tablets to Karppi. The label from the bottle dated December 29, 1984 was admitted as Exhibit 16. In early January 1985, Respondent went to Vail, Colorado, with another woman and Karppi offered to stay at his house with Respondent's elderly mother while he was gone. He agreed and Karppi moved in. While looking for a book in Respondent's bedroom closet, Karppi discovered the nude photographs of her which were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. Having no recollection these pictures had been taken, she was quite shocked and called Respondent at his hotel in Vail. He told her to be calm and they would discuss the matter when he returned. Following a more extensive search, Karppi found numerous other photographs of naked women as well as several videotapes. Karppi contacted her doctor for advice, and he referred her to an attorney who in turn referred her to the State Attorney's Office. At the State Attorney's Office, she produced the photographs of herself she had removed from Respondent's residence and her affidavit was taken. On the basis of Karppi's affidavit and the photographs, a search warrant was obtained and on January 11, 1985, a search of Respondent's home was conducted. During this search, Exhibits 1 - 16 were seized. Subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing, those exhibits unrelated to any individual involved in these charges which were objected to at the hearing were not admitted into evidence as having no relevance to these charges. Following the search of Respondent's residence, criminal charges were brought against Respondent in the Circuit Court in and for Collier County alleging sexual battery and administering drugs to Karppi without her knowledge or consent. Respondent was acquitted of those charges.

Florida Laws (2) 458.329458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE vs DAVID SIMON, D.O., 13-004756PL (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 11, 2013 Number: 13-004756PL Latest Update: Jan. 02, 2015

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, an osteopathic physician who had a year-long consensual affair with one of his patients, committed sexual misconduct in the practice of osteopathic medicine; and if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.

Findings Of Fact Respondent David Simon, D.O. ("Simon"), is a family practitioner who was, at all times relevant to this case, licensed as an osteopathic physician in the state of Florida. His office was located in Palm Beach County, where he practiced medicine from 1985 through the events at issue and beyond, until at least the date of the final hearing. Petitioner Department of Health (the "Department") has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed osteopathic physicians such as Simon. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. In May 2005, a 30-something year-old woman named C.K. became a regular patient of Simon's. As C.K.'s primary care physician from 2005 until the end of 2011, Simon treated C.K. for a variety of physical and psychological disorders. The nature and quality of Simon's medical care of C.K. are not in dispute, the Department having neither alleged nor proved that Simon's treatment of C.K. ever fell below the applicable standard of care, or that Simon's medical records failed to justify any course of treatment he undertook for her benefit. In or around November 2010, while their otherwise unremarkable physician-patient relationship remained intact, Simon and C.K. entered into a mutually consensual sexual relationship. This affair had its genesis in a discussion between Simon and C.K. that occurred on October 12, 2010, during an office visit. While being seen that day, C.K. expressed concern about having been exposed recently to sexually transmitted diseases as a result of experiences which she not only related in some detail to Simon, but also corroborated with photographic evidence stored in her cell phone. In view of these disclosures, Simon lost his professional detachment and entered into a flirtatious conversation of a personal, even intimate, nature with C.K. that was outside the scope of his examination or treatment of C.K. as a patient. C.K. was a willing participant in the non-clinical sexual banter which ensued. Some days or weeks later (the precise date is unavailable), C.K. stopped by Simon's office on a Friday afternoon after business hours, when Simon was there alone. The two resumed their previous, personal conversation, and C.K. proposed that they have sexual relations with one another, a suggestion to which Simon responded positively. Within weeks afterwards, Simon called C.K., and they made arrangements to meet privately after hours at his office, which they later did, as mentioned above, sometime in November 2010. Beginning with that visit, and continuing for about one year, Simon and C.K. met once or twice a month in Simon's office, alone, to engage in sexual activity.2/ Simon used his cell phone to call or text C.K. to schedule these trysts. C.K. consented to the sexual activity with Simon. She was, however, incapable of giving free, full, and informed consent to such activity with her physician.3/ Because C.K. was, at all relevant times, a competent adult, the undersigned infers that her incapacity to freely give fully informed consent stemmed from Simon's powerful influence over her as a patient of his. C.K. and Simon did not have sexual relations during, or as part of, any visit that C.K. made to Simon's office for the purpose of seeking medical advice or care. In other words, doctor's appointments did not provide occasions, or serve as cover, for intimate rendezvous. There is no persuasive evidence that Simon ever tried to convince C.K. that their sexual encounters would be therapeutic or were somehow part of a course of purported medical treatment or examination. Rather, Simon testified credibly (and it is found) that he and C.K. kept their personal and professional relationships separate and distinct.4/ The Department has made much of the type of sexual acts that Simon and C.K. engaged in. Simon described their behavior, somewhat euphemistically, as "sexually adventurous." The Department, in contrast, has implied that Simon is a paraphiliac or pervert, a contention which the undersigned rejects as not just unsupported, but disproved by the evidence. Although at least some of the sexual conduct in question might fairly be dubbed unconventional, more important is that every interaction between these adults took place in private, within the context of mutual consent. There is, moreover, no clear and convincing proof in this record of sexual violence or aggression, nor any evidence of actual injury, damage, or harm. For reasons that will be discussed, the undersigned has concluded that the details of Simon and C.K.'s sexual encounters are irrelevant to the charges at hand; thus, no additional findings about the specific sexual activities are necessary. Simon's liaison with C.K. lasted until late December 2011, at which time C.K. abruptly terminated the relationship. The evidence fails to establish C.K.'s reasons for doing so. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the end of the affair, of which scant evidence was presented in any event, are irrelevant. In the wake of the break up, Simon's affair with C.K. became a matter of public knowledge, gaining him the sort of notoriety few physicians would covet. Facing personal disaster and professional ruin, Simon sought counseling from Helen Virginia Bush, a specialist in sex therapy who is licensed both as a clinical social worker and as a marriage and family therapist. Ms. Bush counseled Simon on subjects such as professional boundaries and erotic transference. At her urging, Simon attended and successfully completed the PBI Professional Boundaries Course, a nationally recognized program for doctors and others at risk of developing inappropriate personal relationships with patients or clients. Ms. Bush testified credibly that in her opinion, which the undersigned accepts, Simon is unlikely to enter into another sexual relationship with a patient or attempt to do so. Simon shares office space and staff with Mary Scanlon, D.O., a physician who, like Simon, specializes in family medicine. Although she has an independent practice, Dr. Scanlon works in close proximity to Simon, whom she met in 2000 during her residency when Simon was the attending physician. Dr. Scanlon believes Simon to be an excellent physician from whom she has learned much about practicing medicine, and her credible testimony that Simon's patients hold him in high regard and have largely stood by him throughout this scandal is accepted. Dr. Scanlon was an effective character witness for Simon who favorably impressed the undersigned with her earnest and forthright demeanor. That she has elected to continue practicing in the office she shares with Simon despite the public disclosure of Simon's disgraceful dalliance with C.K. (which she in no way condoned or tried to excuse), even though she is not contractually bound to stay there, manifests genuine support of and respect for Simon, and tells the undersigned—— more persuasively than any testimony——that his career is worth saving. This is the first time that any disciplinary action has been taken against Simon's medical license. Ultimate Factual Determinations The evidence establishes, clearly and convincingly, that Simon exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship, albeit probably unwittingly, for purposes of engaging C.K. in sexual activity. This ultimate finding is based in part on an inference which follows from the presumed fact of C.K.'s incapacity to consent to sexual activity with Simon, but also on other circumstances, the most salient of which are that the initial steps toward the affair were taken during a medical examination, and that all of the sexual activity at issue occurred in the doctor's office. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Simon is guilty of engaging in sexual misconduct with a patient, as more fully defined in section 459.0141, Florida Statutes, which is a disciplinable offense punishable under section 459.015(1)(l).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Medicine enter a final order finding Simon guilty of committing sexual misconduct with a patient, which is punishable under section 459.015(1)(l), Florida Statutes. Because this is Simon's first such offense, it is further RECOMMENDED that Simon be placed on probation for two years subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as the board deems appropriate, and that an administrative fine of $10,000 be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2014.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68456.072459.0141459.015
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BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINERS vs. JEFFREY R ALSHIN, 86-000959 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000959 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1986

The Issue At issue is whether Jeffrey Alshin is subject to discipline for violation of Section 490.009(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), by committing an act upon a client which would constitute sexual battery or sexual misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983). Sexual misconduct in the practice of mental health counseling is prohibited by Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983); that statute states that sexual misconduct shall be defined by rule. According to the Administrative Complaint, Rule 21U-15.04, Florida Administrative Code, defines sexual misconduct. The Administrative Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 490.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes (1983), for failing to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. The factual basis for these various grounds for discipline is alleged to have been engaging in sexual activity with a client during the period March, 1984, through July 1984, when a counselor-client relationship existed with the client.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey R. Alshin, is a mental health counselor who has been licensed by the State of Florida during the times material to the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint. The client with whom Alshin is accused of sexual involvement, J.S., was referred to him by a Dr. Lemberg, who saw J.S. on March 1, 1984 (Tr. 24). J.S. telephoned Alshin's office and made an appointment to see him on Monday, March 5, 1984 (Tr. 24). On March 5, 1984, J.S. went to Alshin's office for a therapy session and met Alshin for the first time. She had another session with him on March 9, 1984 (Tr. 24-25). From March 5, 1984 a counselor-client relationship existed between Alshin and J.S. (Tr. 82). On the morning of Sunday, March 11, 1986, Alshin invited J.S. to his home for a barbecue (Tr. 26). After the barbecue, Alshin and J.S. went to Respondent's apartment and that evening they engaged in sexual intercourse (Tr. 27-28). Alshin engaged in sexual intercourse with his client on five other occasions between March and June, 1984 (Tr. 29). During the period in which Alshin and J.S. were sexually involved, Alshin was counseling J.S. (Tr. 28-29). Alshin was never married to J.S. Expert testimony submitted at the hearing establishes that for a mental health counselor to have a sexual relationship with a client is conduct which falls below the minimum standards of performance in professional activities for a mental health counselor when measured against prevailing peer performance (Tr. 80).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his license as a mental health counselor be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57490.009490.0111
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JEFFREY DEAN JOHNS vs NASSAU COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 00-003251 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fernandina Beach, Florida Aug. 02, 2000 Number: 00-003251 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 2000

The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause, within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (1999), to terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for alleged sexual harassment of a co-worker. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a maintenance worker at Yulee Primary School in Yulee, Florida (the "school") for approximately 18 years. Petitioner has employed Ms. Joyce Sullivan as a food service worker for approximately three years. Respondent and Ms. Sullivan are co-workers. Respondent has no supervisory authority over Ms. Sullivan, has no authority to discipline Ms. Sullivan, and has no authority to affect the conditions of employment for Ms. Sullivan. The material facts in this case transpired over approximately ten minutes during work hours on April 6, 2000. Respondent approached Ms. Sullivan in the back kitchen of the school cafeteria shortly after breakfast and asked to speak to her privately. Ms. Sullivan agreed, and the two moved to the adjacent serving area near the checkout counter in the cafeteria. Respondent asked Ms. Sullivan to pose for pictures that would be nude, semi-nude, or partially clothed and that Respondent would enter into a contest on the internet. Respondent explained that the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan because the pictures would be taken from the neck down and that Ms. Sullivan could wear a bikini, a thong, or a bra. Ms. Sullivan asked Respondent what he was talking about. Respondent assured Ms. Sullivan that she would not be identified because the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan's face. Ms. Sullivan told Respondent that he was crazy. The entire conversation lasted approximately three minutes. Ms. Sullivan left Respondent and walked to the cash register to "ring up" the school principal who purchased some food. Ms. Sullivan went to an office in the back of the cafeteria with Ms. Sullivan's assistant manager. Respondent went to the back room and told Ms. Sullivan that he would show her some pictures on his computer. Respondent exited the room through the back door of the room to retrieve a laptop computer. Ms. Sullivan and her assistant manager went outside the back room and discussed the situation. Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed. After four or five minutes, Respondent returned to the back room and placed the laptop on the desk in front of Ms. Sullivan. The assistant manager was in the same room at another desk engaged in a telephone conversation. It took about 1.5 minutes for Respondent to turn on the laptop and display some pictures. The pictures included pictures of partially clad women and topless women. The situation terminated after 1.5 minutes when the assistant manager ended her telephone conversation, a child asked Ms. Sullivan to "ring up" some papers, and Ms. Sullivan's manager approached the room. Respondent changed the computer screen to a picture of his daughter and began talking to Ms. Sullivan's manager. Respondent left the school with the computer. Ms. Sullivan reported the incident to her manager, but Ms. Sullivan did not file a complaint for sexual harassment or state to her manager that she had been sexually harassed. Ms. Sullivan's manager relayed the information to Respondent's supervisor who discussed the matter with Respondent. Respondent admitted to the facts and expressed regret. Respondent's manager relayed the information to the Superintendent. The Superintendent investigated the matter and determined that Respondent had engaged in sexual harassment. The Superintendent based his determination on the definition of sexual harassment in the Board's Official Rule 3.54I.C. Rule 3.54I.C., in relevant part, states that sexual harassment consists of: . . . unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: . . . such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work . . . environment. Respondent's request for Ms. Sullivan to pose for sexually revealing pictures was either an unwelcomed sexual advance, request for sexual favor, or other inappropriate oral or written conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with Ms. Sullivan's work performance or created an offensive work environment. The Superintendent testified during cross-examination that he would not have determined that Respondent engaged in sexual harassment if Ms. Sullivan had not said no to Respondent's request. A preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Ms. Sullivan expressly said "no" when asked pose or view pictures. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed and that the entire episode was unwelcomed and offensive within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent has no previous discipline history. Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and its employees prescribes progressive discipline procedures for this case. Except in unusual circumstances, employment can be terminated only after an oral warning for a first offense, a reprimand for a second offense, a written warning for a third offense, and suspension for a fourth offense.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of sexual harassment and suspending Respondent from employment for the time of the current suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. John L. Ruiz, Superintendent Nassau County School Board 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32304 Brent P. Abner, Esquire Suite F 4741 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Martha F. Dekle, Esquire 806 G Street Post Office Box 1644 Jacksonville, Florida 32207

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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GRADY WILLIAM APLIN, JR. vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 90-001844 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 26, 1990 Number: 90-001844 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1990

The Issue Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?

Findings Of Fact On October 4, 1989, Petitioner filed his application for licensure as a real estate salesman. Question #7 of the application asked whether the applicant (Petitioner) had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere even if adjudication was withheld (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The Petitioner admitted to having been arrested on July 3, 1984 and to pleading nolo contendere on October 17, 1985 to committing a sex offense against a child and the commission of lewd and lascivious acts. The Petitioner was placed on probation for ten (10) years for the first offense and was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the second offense with thirty-five (35) days credited for time served. A condition of his probation is that he cannot reside or stay overnight with a child under the age of 18. At the formal hearing in this case, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and admitted that he had molested his oldest daughter, age 11, and pleaded nolo contendere to said offense in 1984 and three (3) months later molested both his oldest daughter, then age 12, and his youngest daughter, then age 9, and pleaded guilty to said offenses. Petitioner further testified that the initial offense had been committed over a period of approximately two weeks and that the second offense had been committed over a period of approximately two months. The offenses occurred while he was undergoing rehabilitation therapy for the traumatic amputation of his leg. Since his release from jail, Petitioner has received treatment for his behavior at the Florida Mental Health Institute, North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center and Community Behavioral Services. Petitioner's brother testified concerning his brother's life. The Petitioner had been an Eagle Scout; had been a scoutmaster; had been a member of the Navy Reserve and had had no problems prior to loosing his leg in an accident. Since his release from jail, the Petitioner has provided child support to his ex-wife and daughters. Petitioner had resided with and been employed by his brother until his brother adopted a child. The condition of the Petitioner's probation that the Petitioner can not reside with a child under the age of 18 required the Petitioner to change his residence and employment with his brother. He was employed by Kelly Temporary Services at the time of hearing and was working in a bank in customer service. The Petitioner has remained in therapy as required by his probation. The Petitioner has been in the presence of children when other adults were present since his release from jail and the Petitioner's behavior was exemplary. The Petitioner's brother opined that the Petitioner had "rehabilitated himself," and pointed out that very severe consequences would result to Petitioner for a third offense. The Petitioner admitted that the offenses had occurred in isolated settings when no other adults were present.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to take the state examination for licensure as a real estate salesman be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-1844 The Petitioner wrote a letter to the Hearing Officer, which was read and considered. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-6. Adopted. 7. Rejected, as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joselyn M. Price, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 212 Orlando, FL 32801 Grady William Aplin, Jr. 905 South Kings Avenue Brandon, FL 33511 Darlene F. Keller, Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.17475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs AUNALI SALIM KHAKU, M.D., 21-001438PL (2021)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake Mary, Florida Apr. 30, 2021 Number: 21-001438PL Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty therefor.

Findings Of Fact Parties and Investigation Leading to Issuance of the Amended Complaint The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Aunali Salim Khaku, M.D., is a neurologist and sleep medicine specialist licensed (ME 114611) in Florida. Respondent completed a neurology residency in 2013 and a sleep medicine fellowship in 2014. He practiced at the VA from 2014 until 2020, initially at the Lake Baldwin facility and then at the Lake Nona facility. From 2020 until early 2021, Respondent practiced at Orlando Health. Other than the allegations herein, the Department has never sought to discipline Respondent. The Department seeks to revoke Respondent’s license based on allegations that he engaged in sexual misconduct during office visits with three female patients—S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. The parties stipulated that the factual allegations, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, constitute sexual misconduct under Florida law. On or around December 6, 2020, M.V.S. reported to both the LMPD and the Department that Respondent acted inappropriately during an office visit on November 30, 2020. The Department investigated further, interviewed M.V.S. and Respondent, and obtained medical records from Orlando Health. On February 17, 2021, the Department issued an Order of Emergency Restriction of License (“ERO”) that restricted Respondent from practicing on female patients based on findings of sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On February 22, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited hearing under sections 120.569 and 120.57. The Department properly did not transmit the case to DOAH at that time, as judicial review of the ERO is via petition in the appellate court. §§ 120.60(6)(c) and 120.68, Fla. Stat. Respondent filed such a petition, but the First District Court of Appeal ultimately denied it on the merits. On March 9, 2021, the Department presented its disciplinary case to a probable cause panel of the Board. After hearing argument from both parties, the panel unanimously found probable cause to issue a three-count Administrative Complaint (“Complaint”) seeking to discipline Respondent for engaging in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. On March 10, 2021, the Department issued the Complaint. On March 16, 2021, Respondent requested an expedited formal hearing under chapter 120. However, the Department did not immediately transmit the Complaint to DOAH because it had just received notification that the VA investigated complaints of sexual misconduct against Respondent by two veterans, S.R. and M.H., who each saw Respondent multiple times between 2014 and 2016. The Department obtained records from the VA. As to S.R., the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations. As to M.H., the VA found no conclusive evidence of misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, which was corroborated by the testimony of his nurse and a medical student. After receipt of the VA records, the Department interviewed S.R. and M.H. Based on this additional information, the Department presented its case to another probable cause panel to amend the Complaint to include allegations relating to S.R. and M.H. After hearing from both parties, the panel voted unanimously on April 23, 2021, to find probable cause of sexual misconduct with S.R. and M.H. On April 27, 2021, the Department issued the three-count Amended Complaint seeking to discipline Respondent’s license for sexual misconduct with S.R., M.H., and M.V.S. On April 29, 2021, Respondent filed a third request for a hearing, which sought transmission of the case to DOAH for an expedited evidentiary hearing to be held within 30 days. On April 30, 2021, 45 days after Respondent’s request for a hearing on the initial Complaint, the Department transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH to conduct an evidentiary hearing under chapter 120.2 2 In filings prior to transmittal of the Amended Complaint to DOAH, in pleadings prior to the final hearing, and orally at the final hearing, Respondent argued that the Department improperly delayed transmitting the case to DOAH and violated his due process rights throughout the investigatory process. Even had Respondent preserved those arguments by including them in his PRO, the undersigned would have found that the Department’s investigation, the probable cause panel proceedings, and the timing of the transmittal of the case to DOAH did not render the proceedings unfair or impair the correctness of the Department’s action based on the weight of the credible evidence. For one, the Department presented its case to the probable cause panel 20 days after issuing the ERO and issued the initial Complaint the next day. It presented the new allegations to a probable cause panel 65 days after the ERO (and 44 days after filing the initial Complaint) and issued the Amended Complaint the next day. The Department then transmitted the Amended Complaint to DOAH on April 30, 2021, one day after Respondent requested a hearing on it and 45 days after requesting a hearing on the initial Complaint. Based on this timeline, the Department met its obligation to promptly institute chapter 120 proceedings. See § 120.60(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (“Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a suspension or revocation proceeding pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57 shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon.”); see also § 456.073(5), Fla. Stat. (“Notwithstanding s. 120.569(2), the department shall notify the division within 45 days after receipt of a petition or request for a formal hearing.”); Fla. Admin. Code. R. 28-106.501(3) (“In the case of the emergency suspension, limitation, or restriction of a license, unless otherwise provided by law, within 20 days after emergency action taken pursuant to subsection (1) of this rule, the agency shall initiate administrative proceedings in compliance with Sections 120.569, 120.57 and 120.60, F.S., and Rule 28- 106.2015, F.A.C.”). The weight of the credible evidence also failed to establish any resulting prejudice to Respondent. He presented no evidence as to how the Department’s decision to investigate the new allegations and issue the Amended Complaint before transmitting the case to DOAH prejudiced his ability to defend against the allegations. The Department notified Respondent of M.V.S.’s complaint and allowed him to provide statements during the investigation, make arguments before both probable cause panels, conduct discovery, and adequately prepare for and defend against the allegations at a final hearing. The fact that the VA did not comply with Respondent’s discovery requests or make witnesses available is neither attributable to the Department nor a reasonable basis to argue prejudice, particularly where Respondent failed to enforce subpoenas or challenge the VA’s discovery objections in state or federal court. The undersigned simply cannot find that the Department violated Respondent’s due process rights by waiting 45 days to transmit the case to DOAH while the Department investigated new allegations involving two other female patients. At best, Respondent’s alleged prejudice is that the Department was able to prosecute him for sexual misconduct with two additional patients, which it had authority to do independently by separate complaint or by moving to amend the Complaint once it transmitted the case to DOAH. The latter option could have resulted in even more delay, as DOAH may have had to relinquish jurisdiction to allow for the new allegations to be approved by a probable cause panel if the Department had not already completed that necessary step. S.R.’s Two Appointments with Respondent in 2014 and 2015 In 2014, S.R., a 58-year-old veteran who just moved to Orlando, requested a neurology referral because she suffers from multiple sclerosis (“MS”). The VA referred her to Respondent with whom she had two office visits. On December 29, 2014, S.R. had her first appointment with Respondent at the VA Lake Baldwin facility. Respondent’s assistant took S.R.’s vitals but did not remain in the room during the examination.3 S.R. never asked for a chaperone to be present and one was not offered to her. Respondent entered the room and made introductions with S.R. They discussed the new VA facility in Lake Nona, where Respondent lived, and restaurants in that area. According to S.R., Respondent said that he hoped to see her, though she did not understand what that meant. S.R. explained that she suffered her first MS attack over 30 years earlier but only recently was diagnosed with the disease after a neurologist ordered an MRI. She discussed her current symptoms, including back pain, muscle spasms, and fatigue. Respondent told her that back problems were common for women with large breasts, which she thought was odd. But, she expressed hope that Respondent could continue to help with her symptoms much like her prior neurologists in South Carolina and South Florida. Respondent examined S.R. and tested her reflexes, vision, coordination, and physical limitations. Respondent said he wanted to listen to S.R.’s heart. Without even trying to listen over her clothes, he asked S.R. to lift her t-shirt. He began rubbing his stethoscope across both her breasts and under her bra. He then cupped the bottom of her left breast with the palm of 3 The VA advocate’s report indicated that S.R. said that Respondent instructed his assistant to leave the room prior to his examination. However, S.R. testified credibly that she never made that allegation and her handwritten statement to the VA advocate also contained no such allegation. That the VA advocate’s hearsay report says otherwise neither calls S.R.’s credibility into doubt nor undermines the clear and consistent nature of her testimony. his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers and touching her nipple. This portion of the examination lasted about ten seconds. At the end of the initial visit, Respondent discussed treatment plans, medication, and physical therapy with S.R. They scheduled a follow-up appointment for several months later. Respondent documented S.R.’s records based on his examination. Although S.R. testified credibly that she had a heart murmur, Respondent noted a regular heart rate and rhythm with no murmurs. He also continued S.R.’s prescription for Diazepam, though several months later he placed an addendum for that initial visit record to indicate the prescription was improperly entered under his name and that he would defer to S.R.’s primary care physician for that medication. S.R. thought Respondent’s conduct was weird because no doctor had ever listened to her heart under her clothes or touched her breasts in that manner. She felt confused and uncomfortable, but she did not report the incident then because she trusted Respondent as her doctor and thought it could have been a mistake. She also thought Respondent might be the only neurologist at the VA. She discussed the incident with her husband and decided that she would be more aware at subsequent appointments. On March 30, 2015, S.R. had her second visit with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility. She arrived early, but the office staff delayed bringing her back and then had trouble taking her vitals. S.R. did not request a chaperone for this visit because everyone seemed very busy. Respondent entered the room and they were again alone. Respondent seemed irritated because he thought S.R. arrived late, which made her defensive. She complained of left hip pain and told Respondent that she had not gone for physical therapy. He examined her hip by lifting her leg, which hurt. She then sat up and he said he needed to listen to her heart. Again, without attempting to listen over her t-shirt and bra, he told her to lift her t-shirt. Because of what occurred during the last visit, S.R. kept her arms tightly by her sides to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her breasts. He kept using his elbow to try to relax her arms while moving the stethoscope higher over her breasts, eventually cupping her breast under her bra. He grabbed at her breasts but got frustrated by her refusal to relax her arms. At that point, Respondent threw the stethoscope into the sink and became angry, which startled S.R. and made her uncomfortable. She requested that he continue her Diazepam prescription to help her sleep at night, which she said her prior neurologist prescribed for muscle spasms. Respondent told her that the drug was for anxiety, not muscle spasms, though he documented in her record that she should continue to take the medication. Respondent also documented again that S.R. had a regular heart rate and rhythm. S.R. felt uncomfortable during the entire visit. She had never had a neurologist get angry or confrontational with her, but she decided not to report the incidents at that time because she was in pain and just wanted to go home. About a month later, she awoke in the middle of the night and realized the inappropriateness of Respondent’s conduct. In August 2015, S.R. returned to the Lake Nona facility to schedule an appointment with a different neurologist. When she saw Respondent’s name on the signage, she immediately went to the patient advocate to report his misconduct in the hope of preventing him from engaging in the same behavior with other patients. She met with the patient advocate and the VA police, and she completed a written statement. Although she was supposed to testify before the VA investigative board, she had trouble finding the room that day and left without speaking to anyone. Based on S.R.’s decision not to pursue criminal charges and the VA’s finding of insufficient evidence to support the allegations, the VA closed the matter as unsubstantiated. However, the matter was referred for clinical and/or administrative follow- up, which resulted in the VA updating its chaperone policy to require signs to be posted in the offices to put patients on notice of their right to ask for a chaperone. S.R. did not report the incidents to the Department at the time because she did not realize she could do so. But, when the Department contacted her in 2021 about this case, she agreed to participate and testify. The undersigned found S.R. to be a highly credible witness who unequivocally testified about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior. S.R.’s testimony was compelling, specific, clear, and materially consistent with the statements she made when the incidents first occurred. Respondent testified about his treatment of S.R., but he conceded he had no independent recollection of the visits. Instead, he based his testimony on what he documented in her medical records and his standard practice. Respondent testified that he conducted a thorough examination in the same manner that he evaluates all of his new patients. He performed a cardiac examination over S.R.’s clothing by placing a stethoscope on her chest in several areas to listen to her heart. He confirmed that he never places the stethoscope on, or allows his hand to come into contact with, a patient’s breasts and that it was impossible that such contact happened with S.R. even inadvertently. He also said that he always has a chaperone present if he needs to listen to a female patient’s heart under her clothing and that is exactly what he would have done had he needed to do so with S.R. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with S.R. and suggested instead that she misperceived what happened. However, he offered no credible explanation for S.R. having such a misperception, except to accuse her of being upset for his refusal to prescribe her Diazepam. S.R.’s medical records fail to document any cognitive impairment and Respondent confirmed that she did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to imagine things that did not happen. Although S.R. admitted that it took her a few months to fully realize what Respondent had done and to report it to the VA, the undersigned has no hesitation in finding her testimony to be a fair and accurate account of Respondent’s actual conduct. The records themselves also call the veracity of Respondent’s testimony into question. Although S.R. credibly testified that she had a heart murmur, Respondent documented the lack of such a murmur even after conducting two cardiovascular examinations of her. Had Respondent conducted a proper cardiac examination, he should have identified and documented her murmur. Further, it cannot be ignored that the treatment plan for both visits continued her prescription for Diazepam, even though Respondent—after the first visit but before the second visit—placed an addendum in the record to indicate that S.R. needed to obtain the prescription from her primary care physician. Respondent’s notes for the March 2015 visit also document that Diazepam continued to be an active prescription for S.R., undermining the suggestion that she would fabricate an allegation of sexual misconduct against Respondent on that basis. Moreover, Respondent’s expert neurologist had never heard of a patient fabricating sexual misconduct allegations against a doctor for failing to prescribe medication. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with S.R. During the first visit, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt and inappropriately rubbed his stethoscope across her breasts and under her bra, cupped her left breast with the palm of his hand while holding the stethoscope between his fingers, and touched her nipple. During the second appointment, Respondent directed S.R. to lift her shirt again. Although S.R. kept her arms tightly against her sides to try to limit Respondent’s ability to touch her inappropriately, he inappropriately rubbed the stethoscope across her breasts, cupped her breast under her bra, and grabbed at her breasts. Respondent did so on both occasions without first attempting to listen to S.R.’s heart over her clothing, which itself was contrary to the standard of care. M.H.’s Four Appointments with Respondent in 2015 and 2016 In late 2015, the VA referred M.H., a 39-year-old veteran, to Respondent for a neurological evaluation after she had an abnormal MRI showing white matter changes in her brain following an illegal drug overdose. M.H. had four office visits with Respondent at the Lake Nona facility on August 12, 2015, November 6, 2015, June 23, 2016, and August 1, 2016. During the first three visits, Respondent discussed M.H.’s medical history, prior drug use, and symptoms, including migraines, pain, possible nerve damage, and cognitive and motor issues; he also conducted physical and neurological examinations. During the fourth visit, Respondent performed a nerve block procedure to address M.H.’s migraines. M.H. testified about the visits and her uncomfortable interactions with Respondent. During several visits, he discussed the lack of sex with his wife and that she allowed him to step outside the marriage. He either asked M.H. out on a date or to meet at a hotel, which she interpreted as an offer of sex, and he also asked if he could call her. He asked her questions about her sex life several times, including how often she had sex with her boyfriend, what positions they liked, the size of her bra, and whether sex was painful. M.H. testified that Respondent also acted inappropriately. During one visit, he either lifted her shirt or asked her to lift her shirt to look at her breasts and listen to her heart. He once blocked the door to prevent her from leaving the room and attempted to put his arms around her to hug her. He once put his hands on the bottom of her buttocks, like a lover’s caress. During the fourth visit when the nurse left the room after the procedure, he had an erection and rubbed it through his pants against her leg while trying to give her a hug. She said that she told her mother in the waiting room after that visit that Respondent had rubbed his erection on her. She also said that he told her not to say anything about their interactions at each visit. In August 2016, M.H. reported Respondent’s conduct to the VA; she did not report the conduct to the Department because she did not know she could. The VA investigative board conducted sworn interviews of M.H., Respondent, his nurse, and a medical student, and it considered numerous letters of recommendation from Respondent’s patients and colleagues. It found no conclusive evidence of sexual misconduct based on Respondent’s testimony, as corroborated by testimony from a nurse and a medical student. M.H. testified passionately about Respondent’s conduct and how it made her feel. However, her recollection of the details—as to what occurred, when, and who was present—was fuzzy and inconsistent in material ways with the testimony she gave to the VA board in 2016, her deposition testimony in this case, and the testimony of her mother. M.H. stated that her recollection in 2016 was better than now, but the inconsistencies outlined below affect the weight to be given to M.H.’s testimony. M.H. testified initially that she and Respondent were alone in the examination room at some point during each visit. M.H. testified that she asked to have her daughter present during either the third or fourth visit, but Respondent refused. M.H. also testified on cross examination that she could not recall if her mother was in the room with her during the first two visits, only to later confirm that her mother must have been present during those two visits based on the testimony she gave before the VA board in 2016. M.H.’s mother testified that she accompanied M.H. to two of the visits, though she could not recall the dates. Contrary to M.H.’s testimony, her mother said she neither came back to the examination room nor met Respondent at any visit and based her testimony solely on what M.H. said. M.H.’s mother testified that M.H. said that Respondent asked her out after one visit and rubbed his erection against her back after another visit, which contravened M.H.’s testimony that Respondent rubbed his erection against her leg while hugging her from the front. Before the VA board in 2016, and contrary to her testimony at the final hearing, M.H. said that Respondent acted professionally during the first two visits and that her mother was present in the examination room both times. M.H. testified that Respondent became unprofessional while they were alone in the room during the final two visits, at which he asked inappropriate questions about her sex life. M.H. explained that she was offered a chaperone before the third visit, but she refused because nothing unprofessional had occurred before, and that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to be in the room during the procedure on the fourth visit. M.H. said Respondent grabbed her buttocks during the third visit and, during the fourth visit, he blocked the door after the procedure, grabbed her buttocks, lifted her shirt to comment on how much he liked her breasts, and rubbed his erection through his pants on her leg. When cross-examined about the inconsistencies, M.H. testified at the final hearing that she may have been protecting Respondent by saying in 2016 that he acted professionally during the first two visits, though she now recalls him acting unprofessionally during all four visits. During her pre-hearing deposition in this case, M.H. testified that Respondent asked questions about her sex life and bra size, discussed his open marriage, and asked her out during the first visit, but he did not touch her inappropriately. M.H. testified that Respondent refused to allow her daughter to stay in the room with her during the second visit and, after the examination, he blocked the door, grabbed her and tried to hug her, rubbed his erection on her stomach and leg, and again reiterated that he was allowed to have sex outside his marriage. She testified that Respondent discussed his open marriage and asked her to date him during the third visit; M.H. said that the office refused to allow her mother to accompany her in the room. M.H. testified that the only uncomfortable thing that Respondent did during the fourth visit was ask her out repeatedly. M.H. testified that Respondent never asked if she wanted a chaperone at any of the visits, though she later acknowledged that a chaperone was present at the fourth visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.H. based only on what he documented in her chart, as he had no independent recollection beyond his review of her medical records. Respondent denied any inappropriate behavior with M.H. He claimed that he never allowed himself to be alone in a room with her because she was engaging in manipulative, drug-seeking behavior. He basically accused M.H. of fabricating the allegations against him because he refused to prescribe her pain medication. However, Respondent’s accusations against M.H. are questionable for several reasons. Respondent never documented in her record his concern about M.H.’s alleged drug-seeking behavior, that a chaperone needed to be present at all visits, or that she had requested pain medication. Although he documented the presence of his nurse and a medical student at the fourth visit, he failed to do the same for the first three visits. One would expect a physician—surely one as concerned about a patient’s drug-seeking history and behavior as Respondent now claims to be—to document those concerns and the presence of chaperones in the medical record to prevent any future false accusation. This is particularly so given that Respondent, at the time, had recently been accused of misconduct by S.R., which he believed was both false and based on her drug-seeking behavior. The medical records also confirm that M.H. informed Respondent at the June 2016 visit that she had been prescribed Lyrica for pain while in jail and that it was working. Respondent noted, “Renewed lyrica,” in the plan/recs section of the record for that visit. Respondent also noted Pregabalin, the generic name for Lyrica,4 in both the active and pending medication lists for both the June and August 2016 visits. The weight of the credible evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that M.H. fabricated her allegations because he refused to prescribe her pain medication, particularly given her credible testimony that she did not 4 According to WebMD, the generic name for Lyrica is Pregabalin. Available at https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-93965/lyrica-oral/details. need pain medication because Respondent continued her Lyrica prescription. It also bears repeating that Respondent’s own expert had never heard of a patient falsely accusing a doctor of sexual misconduct for refusing to prescribe medication. After evaluating the evidence, the undersigned finds M.H. generally to be a more credible witness overall than Respondent. She testified passionately and credibly about Respondent’s requests to meet her outside the office because he had an open marriage and his wife allowed such conduct. She also credibly explained how Respondent commented on the size of her breasts, grabbed her buttocks, and rubbed his erection on her. Importantly, however, the undersigned cannot ignore that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in this case. M.H.’s recollection was too fuzzy and inconsistent to definitively find without hesitation that Respondent engaged in the exact sexual misconduct alleged by M.H. and set forth in the Amended Complaint. If the Department’s burden in this case was a mere preponderance of the evidence, the undersigned would likely find that it proved Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. But, the clear and convincing evidence standard applies herein. And, because M.H. could not provide the type of definitive and clear testimony required in this disciplinary action, the Department failed to prove that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.H. M.V.S.’s One Appointment with Respondent in 2020 On November 30, 2020, M.V.S., a 68-year-old woman, had an initial neurology consult with Respondent at Orlando Health. M.V.S. sought a neurologist based on an abnormal MRI showing a cyst near her pituitary gland and complaints of neck pain radiating to her shoulder and arm. After filling out paperwork in the reception area, a medical assistant or nurse brought M.V.S. to an examination room. The room had an examination table, which could be lowered, a counter, and a chair. M.V.S. sat in the chair while the assistant took her vitals. Although M.V.S. has a history of blood pressure spikes, for which she has called 911 and even gone to the hospital several times, her blood pressure was within normal limits that morning. The assistant waited for M.V.S. to complete the paperwork and then left the room. Respondent entered the room a few minutes later and closed the door behind him. He wore green scrubs and a white lab coat; she wore a skirt, blouse, bra, and underwear. He and M.V.S. were alone for the remainder of the appointment. They initially discussed M.V.S.’s medical history and complaints. M.V.S. talked about her aunt, who had symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and did not recognize her on a recent visit. She was concerned about the disease because she recently had forgotten some small details, like the name of an actor in a movie. M.V.S. did not believe she had significant memory issues, but she wanted research on the disease because it ran in her family. Respondent asked M.V.S. if she lived with anyone, which she interpreted as a question relating to her safety. She informed him that she lived alone within close proximity to a fire station. She also mentioned that her daughter lived in Orlando and her fiancé lived in Longwood. Respondent asked if she had sexual relations with her fiancé; she explained that they did not because her fiancé had prostate cancer. M.V.S. thought the question was odd given the reason for the appointment and because no other physician had ever asked that type of question before. Respondent moved on to M.V.S.’s complaints of neck pain. She explained that she experienced pain on the left side of her neck that radiated to her left shoulder and left arm. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to sit on the table so he could examine her. While standing to M.V.S.’s left, Respondent rubbed and squeezed her neck and shoulders with his thumbs and fingers for a couple of minutes. No other doctor had examined her in that fashion before. He said she felt tense, but never asked if she experienced pain during the examination. She confirmed that it definitely felt like a neck and shoulder massage, which she had received many times. She noted that her cardiologist had recently palpated her neck for pain by using two fingers to poke and feel around, which was different than Respondent’s examination. Indeed, when a doctor palpates for pain, they typically use two fingertips to lightly press and prod in the trouble areas and obtain feedback from the patient about the level of pain. Respondent then examined M.V.S.’s spine while she stood in front of him. He thereafter examined her reflexes, eyes, and extremity strength while she sat on the table. He also conducted a memory test, which she passed. M.V.S. did not recall Respondent listening to her heart during the visit. At that point, Respondent directed M.V.S. to lie face-down on the table, which already was lowered. He asked if he could raise her skirt and she said, yes, because she believed it related to a muscular or skeletal examination. He raised her skirt and, over her underwear, rubbed her lower back and eventually moved down to her buttocks using both of his hands. He rubbed and squeezed both of her buttocks. She confirmed it felt like a deliberate, prolonged massage, which had never happened to her at a doctor’s office. Her mind raced, she felt frozen, and she could not believe what was happening. After one to two minutes, Respondent told her to sit up because he heard a voice. She sat on the end of the table and he began massaging and squeezing her right breast while standing on her right. He told her that he had never done this before and that she was beautiful. She thanked him in a low voice, but she was afraid and felt trapped because they were alone, there were no witnesses, and she was unsure of what he would do. Respondent asked if M.V.S. was comfortable with him massaging her breast and he stopped when she said no. He moved to her left side and explained that his wife would not have sex with him, so she permitted him to have sex outside the marriage. He asked if M.V.S. would meet him for sex and she declined. Respondent asked if that was because her fiancé would object, and she confirmed they had a commitment. At that point, Respondent pulled his lab coat back and said, “Look at this. Look what you did to me.” Respondent revealed his erect penis, which M.V.S. confirmed was clearly visible through his scrubs. Respondent told her to keep this between us, said his assistant would be in shortly with paperwork, and left the room. M.V.S. waited for about seven minutes and, when no one came, she left the room, tried to hold her composure, and checked out. She said nothing before leaving because she felt unsafe and was unsure if anyone would believe her anyway. M.V.S. turned on her car’s air conditioning and drank water to calm down. Her heart was pounding, and she feared having a blood pressure spike. As soon as she arrived home, M.V.S. called her daughter to tell her what happened. M.V.S.’s daughter, who is a nurse, told her to call the police. M.V.S. called the LMPD that afternoon. The officer with whom she spoke suggested that she file a complaint with the Department, which she did on December 6, 2020. Both the Department and the LMPD investigated the allegations, which included interviews of M.V.S. and Respondent.5 M.V.S. also reported the incident to Orlando Health risk management. The undersigned found M.V.S. to be a highly credible witness who testified passionately and definitively about Respondent’s inappropriate sexual behavior during the office visit. She immediately reported it to the LMPD and, within a week, filed complaints with both the Department and Respondent’s employer. M.V.S.’s testimony was clear, specific, detailed, compelling, and materially consistent with the interviews and statements she gave immediately following the visit. Respondent testified about his treatment of M.V.S., but—as he did with the S.R. and M.H.—he conceded he had little to no independent 5 Based on the information obtained from M.V.S. and Respondent, the LMPD placed the case into inactive status pending further evidence. recollection of her or the visit. Instead, he reviewed her medical records, which refreshed his recollection of what occurred during the visit. Respondent denied engaging in any inappropriate behavior with M.V.S. that could have been interpreted as sexual or outside the scope of a proper examination. He testified that he conducted a neurological examination, palpated her neck for pain, checked her reflexes, and conducted a memory test. He said he never massaged her neck and shoulders, touched or massaged her breasts or buttocks, discussed his marriage, solicited her to have sex, said she was beautiful, or revealed an erection through his scrubs. He also said she could not have laid face-down on the table because he never lowered the back or extended the footrest; he confirmed that he would have brought in a chaperone if he needed her to lie on the table. Respondent testified that M.V.S.’s accusations against him were the product of memory loss and cognitive impairment. Although M.V.S. reported a family history of Alzheimer’s and a fear of mild memory loss, Respondent documented that she performed well on her memory and cognitive examinations. M.V.S. and her daughter testified credibly that she did not experience significant memory loss beyond forgetting the name of an actor in a movie. Respondent himself confirmed that M.V.S. did not suffer from hallucinations or ailments that would cause her to perceive things that were not there—a point with which his expert neurologist agreed given the way Respondent documented the medical record. And, more importantly, M.V.S.’s ability to recall the specific details of the visit and do so consistently with the statements she made previously undermine Respondent’s belief that cognitive impairment caused her to fabricate her allegations. The weight of the credible evidence simply does not support the suggestion that M.V.S. misperceived, confabulated, or fabricated her allegations based on memory loss or cognitive impairment. Additionally, Respondent attempted to discredit M.V.S. by suggesting that she may have come onto him. Indeed, he testified that she was verbose and told him during their initial discussion about her history that her fiancé was older, that she was a 60s baby, and that she had not been touched in a while. Aside from M.V.S.’s credible testimony that she said no such things, it cannot be ignored that Respondent conceded that his memory of the visit was based on his review of the medical record, which contained no reference to these comments even though Respondent says they were odd. Respondent also presented evidence that M.V.S. had previously called 911 on multiple occasions relating to blood pressure spikes to undermine the veracity of her testimony. However, the recordings of the 911 calls reveal an individual who, despite being concerned about her blood pressure, is alert, aware of her surroundings, clear-headed, and in no way suffering from an illness that would raise doubts about the veracity of her testimony or her credibility overall. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct with M.V.S. He inappropriately massaged her neck and shoulders, buttocks, and breast. He disclosed that he had an open marriage and solicited M.V.S. to meet him for sex outside the office. He also told her that she was beautiful and revealed his erection through his scrubs.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Kristen Summers, Esquire Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 For Respondent: Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West, Suite 401 Jacksonville, Florida 32258

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, issue a final order finding Respondent committed sexual misconduct prohibited by sections 458.331(1)(j), 458.329, and 456.063(1), suspending Respondent’s license for two years, and thereafter permanently restricting his license to either prohibit him from seeing female patients or, at a minimum, doing so without a chaperone present.7 DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2021. 7 Section 456.072(4), Florida Statutes, provides that the Board, in addition to any other discipline imposed through final order, “shall assess costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case.” Prior to the final hearing, the parties agreed to bifurcate the investigative costs issue (including Respondent’s argument that such costs should not be assessed because they are based on unpromulgated rules) pending resolution of the merits of the Amended Complaint. Upon further reflection, the undersigned concludes that resolving such an issue—even in a bifurcated proceeding—is premature because the Board has not yet issued a final order disciplining Respondent or followed the procedure in section 456.072(4), which requires it to consider an affidavit of itemized costs and any written objections thereto. It is in those written objections where Respondent may challenge the costs as being based on an unpromulgated rule. And, if Respondent’s written objections create a disputed issue of fact, the Department can transmit the investigative costs issue to DOAH to resolve that dispute, just as it did in Case No. 20-5385F. COPIES FURNISHED: Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Suite 401 12724 Gran Bay Parkway West Jacksonville, Florida 32258 Kathryn Hood, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna C. McNulty, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Paul A. Vazquez, JD, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 Kristen Summers, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Elizabeth Tiernan, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Edward A. Tellechea, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265

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