Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibit received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent, Mr. John S. Moncrief, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on June 12, 1980, and was issued Certificate Number C-9151 Mr. Moncrief worked in various law enforcement positions from 1979 through 1984. From December 1, 1981, until September 27, 1982, Mr. Moncrief worked as a Corrections Officer for the Okeechobee Sheriff's Office. During the entire time that Mr. Moncrief worked in law enforcement, the only charges or complaints made against him were those which form the basis for the charges in this case. During the months of March and April of 1982, Mr. Gerald Ray "Cowboy" Powell was an inmate of the Okeechobee County Jail. During a portion of that time Ms. Lynda Carroll was also an inmate of the Okeechobee County Jail. At all relevant times Mr. Powell was housed in a downstairs cell which was used for trustees and minimum security inmates and Ms. Carroll was housed in the women's cellblock which was on the second floor of the jail facility. It was not possible for an inmate housed on the second floor to come down to the first floor without the assistance of a jail employee. On two occasions during the months of March and April of 1982, Moncrief allowed Ms. Carroll to come downstairs at night and visit Mr. Powell in the latter's downstairs cell. In order to do so, it was necessary for Mr. Moncrief to enter the portion of the jail facility in which female inmates were housed and to open locked doors for Ms. Carroll. On both of the occasions mentioned immediately above, Mr. Powell and Ms. Carroll engaged in sexual intercourse in Mr. Powell's cell.2 On one occasion during the month of April of 1982,another Corrections Officer employed by the Okeechobee Sheriff's Office allowed Mr. Powell to go upstairs at night and visit with Ms. Carroll in her cell. On this occasion Mr. Powell and Ms. Carroll did not engage in sexual intercourse. Mr. Moncrief was not involved in any way with Mr. Powell's upstairs visit with Ms. Carroll. During March and April of 1982 the policies and procedures in effect at the Okeechobee County Jail prohibited male Corrections Officers from entering the area in which female inmates were housed unless the male Corrections Officer was accompanied by a matron or a female dispatcher. Policies and procedures in effect at that time also prohibited inmates of one sex from visiting with inmates of the opposite sex. Mr. Moncrief was aware of these policies. It was a violation of these policies for Mr. Monerief to allow Ms. Carroll to visit with Mr. Powell in the latter's cell.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. enter a Final Order dismissing all charges in the Amended Administrative Complaint on the grounds of insufficient evidence. DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 1985, Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH ISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1985.
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Henry A. Faircloth holds certificates as a correctional officer, No. 05-83-599-01, and as a law enforcement officer, No. 16-89-222-03, both issued by petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission; and has held them at all pertinent times. In the spring of 1988, he worked for the Florida Department of Corrections at Holmes Correctional Institution, where he held the rank of major. On May 25, 1988, he was in a meeting about ongoing construction at the prison, when Glenda Parmer told him he was needed in his office, elsewhere in the same building. She had seen James T. Watson and Charles W. Pumphrey, correctional officers who worked as sergeants at Holmes Correctional Institution, escorting Samuel Collier, an unruly and, as it turned out, intoxicated inmate toward the security complex. After Ms. Parmer, a correctional officer who worked as an administrative lieutenant, recounted events to Major Faircloth and told him "that we had some problems," (T.224) she accompanied him on the walk back toward his office. Before they reached the hall onto which Major Faircloth's office opened, they encountered the obstreperous inmate, his hands in handcuffs behind him, (T.234) a sergeant on either side. Although she came within three or four feet of the inmate, Ms. Parmer did not observe any injuries. T.220. The mail room officer, who was also within three or four feet of the inmate about this time, saw no injuries on the inmate's face, either. T.233-4. Neither did Sergeant Pumphrey, at this point. T.541. Major Faircloth, both sergeants and the inmate started down the hall and Ms. Parmer "stepped out of the way so they could go down the hallway." T.220. As he walked by them, Major Faircloth turned to Sergeants Michael Sheppard and William Paul and Inspector William T. Nobles, who were in a group talking, and told them "to wait right there, [and not to] let any inmates come down" (T.66) the hall toward Major Faircloth's office. After he had given this order, Respondent Faircloth entered his office and closed the door. T.43. Messrs. Collier, Watson and Pumphrey had preceded him through the door into the office. From outside the office, the inmate was heard interrupting Major Faircloth, cursing loudly "and raising sand." Id. During the three or four minutes that elapsed before Major Faircloth came back out of his office, four to six noises that "sounded like licks being passed," (T.44) were audible through the closed door at intervals of 30 seconds to a minute. "It sounded like flesh meeting flesh." T.150; T.178. The inmate yelled, "[D]on't hit me anymore." T.235. Major Faircloth emerged from his office without the inmate or Sergeants Pumphrey and Watson, reentering the hall where Sergeants Sheppard and Paul and Inspector Nobles still stood. Sergeant Sheppard noticed spatters of blood on Major Faircloth's shirt, although Major Faircloth was not bleeding, as far as he could see. T.46. Ms. Hutching, the mailroom officer, told Major Faircloth he needed to change shirts, "[b]ecause he had blood spattered all over his shirt." T.238. Sergeant Paul was asked "to go get three shirts . . . two white shirts and one brown shirt . . . [o]fficers' uniform shirts." T.151. Major Faircloth walked toward the control room, then stopped in front of the mailroom and flexed his right hand. When the mailroom officer inquired about his swollen knuckles, Major Faircloth responded, "I knocked that son of a bitch's tooth out." T.238. Frederick Terrell Kirkland, a classification supervisor who is not related to the assistant superintendent, saw Major Faircloth that day and noticed his hand and his blood-spattered shirt. Deposition of Kirkland. When assistant superintendent Kirkland arrived, he spoke to respondent Faircloth, then accompanied him as he went back into the office where the inmate and sergeants Pumphrey and Watson remained. At some point Lieutenant Benny Chesnut entered Major Faircloth's office. After a few minutes, Mr. Kirkland, opening then closing the office door behind him, left to go down the hall to the bathroom. When he returned, Sergeant Sheppard opened Major Faircloth's office door to let the assistant superintendent back in. As he opened the door for Mr. Kirkland, Sergeant Sheppard "saw Major Faircloth slap the inmate in the face." T.482. Samuel Collier was seated in a chair at the time, his hands still behind him in handcuffs. Standing behind Mr. Collier, Sergeant Pumphrey rested his hands on the inmate's shoulders, facing Major Faircloth, who stood in front of inmate Collier. Sergeant Watson stood by the office door. Nothing obstructed his view of Major Faircloth's striking Samuel Collier, although he turned his head and looked at Sergeant Sheppard when the door opened. T.51. "[D]id you see the son of a bitch kick me?" Major Faircloth asked the assistant superintendent. T.83. He later apologized to Mr. Kirkland for hitting the inmate in front of him. T.330, 343. After Samuel Collier had been taken away, Major Faircloth asked William Paul "to get an inmate to go clean the blood up out of his office. But then he said, no not to get the inmate, that the inmate didn't need to see that mess, for [Paul] to clean it up [him]self." T.153. In order to place Samuel Collier in solitary confinement, which was the course decided upon, he had to be sent elsewhere, because appropriate facilities were not then available at Holmes Correctional Institution. Karen Roberts, a nurse who worked at Holmes Correctional Institution, was summoned. After she drew blood, took the inmate's temperature and pulse, and made notes recording his vital signs, Mr. Collier was driven in a van to Okaloosa Correctional Institution. When Michael G. Foley, M.D., chief health officer at Okaloosa Correctional Institution, saw him shortly after lunch on May 25, 1988, Samuel Collier still had "alcohol on his breath." The parties stipulated that laboratory tests on the blood Ms. Roberts took from the inmate "revealed a .17 blood alcohol content." T.10. He had reportedly been drinking "buck," a home brew concocted from prison foodstuffs. Ms. Roberts had noticed a laceration of the upper lip which she felt "did not need suturing" (T.111) and swelling around the eyes, which she testified she attributed to the fact that Mr. Collier was crying. She "[w]anted to put ice on his eyes . . . [but] it was impossible to keep ice" (T.113), or so she testified, so she did not try it. Samuel Collier's injuries, including loose teeth Ms. Roberts overlooked, are consistent with blows received in a fight and could not have been caused by a fall against a fence post coupled with a fall out of a chair onto the floor. T.188. Samuel Collier's injuries resulted at least in part from blows Major Faircloth administered. T.188, 196. When Dr. Foley examined Mr. Collier, both of the inmate's upper eyelids were swollen. An area of his scalp was swollen. There was "a massive hematoma to the upper lip, which is a massive swelling" (T.186) that made it protrude. He "had tenderness, abrasions and contusions to both cheeks. . . [and] some loose upper incisors." T.187. Dr. Foley ordered x- rays "to make sure there w[ere] no fractures." T. 184. The radiologist concluded that no bones were broken, according to Dr. Foley. Meanwhile, Major Faircloth told some correctional officers that they "were supposed to say that he had hurt his hand doing yard work." T.294. When Sergeant Sheppard asked about filing a report, Major Faircloth told him not to "worry about it, you didn't use force," (T.58) "you're not on the duty roster, they don't even know you were here" (T.94) or words to that effect. Major Faircloth's directive contravened Department of Corrections policy, which requires any correctional officer observing force being used against an inmate to prepare a "use of force report . . . and forward it to the Inspector General's office." T.59. The next day, Major Faircloth filed a written report, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, reciting that Sergeants Watson and Pumphrey and Lieutenant Chesnut had used force against Samuel Collier, but omitting any mention of the force he himself had used. On June 28, 1988, while he was interrogated by Inspector G. L. McLain, he falsely denied under oath that he had hit Samuel Collier and injured his own hand. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Inspector McLain had authority to administer the oath in the course of his official duties, and did so to respondent before interrogating him on June 28, 1988, and on July 6, 1988. On July 6, 1988, respondent again answered questions under oath and falsely answered affirmatively when asked whether he had been truthful during the earlier interrogation.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's certificates both as a correctional officer and as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-1395 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 4-15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24-30 and 32-47 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2, 3 and 31 are immaterial as to respondent Faircloth. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16, it was not clear that a fence and gate were in place at the time. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 19, Major Faircloth first joined the group before they reached his office. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 23, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish the exact number of times respondent hit Collier. Sergeant Sheppard saw respondent slap Collier only once. But the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that respondent landed additional blow(s), causing his knuckles to swell. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 22 and 23 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5, it was not clear that a fence was up and that there was a need to pass between those two posts. That Collier hit or fell into a post was not established by the weight of the credible evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 6 and 7, the weight of the credible evidence did not establish that Collier was bleeding when he reached the security complex. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 10, credible evidence did not establish that Collier leapt from the chair and fell, striking a desk and the floor. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13, the nurse's testimony that she thought Collier's eyes were swollen because he had been crying has not been credited. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 16 and 17, the nurse's findings were not "totally inconsistent." She apparently did not examine the inmate's teeth. Some of the swelling she anticipated evidently occurred. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 18, Sheppard's testimony has been credited. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 19, when Sheppard saw Faircloth slap Collier he might have been looking through the clear glass window. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, the weight of the evidence did not establish that nobody saw Collier's injuries before he left HCI. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 24 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Joseph S. White, Esquire Gina Cassidy, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Roy M. Kinsey, Jr., Esquire Kinsey, Troxel, Johnson & Walborsky 438 East Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William F. Reid, is currently and has been at all times pertinent to the issues herein, an inmate at UCI, having been committed to the custody of the DOC for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1978. At the time of filing of the Petition, he was in administrative confinement at UCI but, at the time of the hearing, had been released and was not in that status. Petitioner concedes that even during the period of his administrative confinement, he was awarded basic gain time as provided for since he was committed prior to July 1, 1978. However, due to the fact that he was unable to work while in administrative confinement, he did not receive any incentive gain time during that period. Work opportunities for inmates in administrative confinement status are extremely limited. This is because of the security and manpower problems involved in providing adequate supervision of this category of inmate during a work detail. Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, allows the placing of an inmate in administrative confinement then disciplinary or criminal charges are pending against him and his presence in the general prison population would present a danger to himself, to others, or to the security and order of the institution. It is also authorized when an investigation is pending and the inmate's presence in the prison population might tend to interfere with that investigation. If, for medical reasons, an inmate's remaining in the prison population would create a health or safety risk, administrative confinement is also authorized. Another reason justifying administrative confinement is when the inmate is alleged to have committed misconduct and there is concern that because of that, his safety is at risk. The rule does not provide any maximum length of time for administrative confinement and the reason for this is that the investigations supporting it are of varying complexity and take differing lengths of time. Petitioner and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all of whom have been in administrative confinement in the past, all denied that they had received the required informal hearing called for under the rule. At best, they were told by the officer placing them in administrative confinement generally why this action was being taken. However, they contend they were never given any opportunity to submit anything to a senior official or a classification officer and they are of the opinion that at no time was there an emergency situation involved. The impression that the inmates have is that a corrections officer can have an inmate confined or released for any reason whether there is adequate justification or basis for the action. Clifford Towbridge has been an inmate at UCI since December, 1983. When he was placed in administrative confinement he was advised of this fact by a corrections officer who told him to pack his things and who put him in administrative confinement status without telling him why. He contends he got no hearing but was ultimately told he was being confined because a confidential informant advised that his life was in danger. Approximately two to three weeks later, he was released when he signed a paper indicating that his life was not in danger. At no time was he told who had made the allegation against him and he was not given a hearing either before confinement or before release. Curtis Mangram had an experience with administrative confinement at his prior incarceration at Belle Glade Correctional Institution. At that time he was given no hearing nor was he brought before a review board. When he left administrative confinement at Belle Glade he was assigned to UCI and remained clean until August 4, 1984 when he was placed in administrative confinement there. It appears that his name was mentioned in connection with the rape of a prisoner and he was placed in administrative confinement for several weeks pending investigation of that incident. One day after his release he was again placed in administrative confinement for possession of contraband wine. He was given no hearing prior to being placed into administrative confinement nor was he initially given a reason for this action. However, he wrote several letters to officials within the DOC to determine why this action was taken. The first response he got indicated he was being placed in for evaluation but regardless of the reason, he is sure he was not given a hearing. On neither occasion of his being placed in administrative confinement, in his opinion, was there any emergency reason for precipitous action. From first hand and from what he has seen and heard, it is his opinion that prisoners are placed in administrative confinement solely on the uncorroborated allegations of other prisoners and when this happens, there is no hearing prior to she placement nor within a timely period thereafter. As was stated previously, the witness was placed in administrative confinement on August 4 and was released on August 28. At that time he was told the reason for him having been placed in administrative confinement (the alleged rape) was resolved. The following day, August 29, he was placed back in administrative confinement and was told by a corrections officer that the action was being taken because Lt. Dixon, an investigator, wanted him back in. Later on, Officer Ward, Dixon's assistant, read him his rights and asked him some questions after which the witness was returned to administrative confinement. The witness admits that he had the wine which he subsequently found out was the basis for his second administrative confinement but he was never punished for the wine nor was he ever charged with the rape. He was in administrative confinement for a total of four months at UCI and had he been punished for the unlawful possession of the wine, it is his opinion he would have been placed in disciplinary confinement for fifteen or thirty days, a period much shorter than the entire period of his administrative confinement. Inmate Edwin Paul has been placed in administrative confinement for investigative reasons twelve or thirteen times during the two and a half years he has been an inmate at UCI. He relates that when he is placed there, the corrections officer comes up to him and tells him to pack his things but never gives him a reason for this action. The response to his inquiry is always that someone will tell him. It is his experience that at UCI, regardless of what the rule requires, no review is done and the inmate is not told anything until he files a grievance. That generally takes approximately ninety days to resolve and during this time, the inmate is in administrative confinement earning no incentive gain time. According to Paul, his requests for information as to the reason for his status are met with various answers such as "you're a menace," "none of your business," or "I don't know." It is his opinion that administrative confinement can be imposed on an inmate at the whim of a correctional officer. He contends that in all of his periods of administrative confinement either no charges were preferred against him, or he was found not guilty of the allegation that was laid, but during all that period, he has not received any gain time that he would have earned had he not been placed in administrative confinement. This has affected his status in that had he not been placed in administrative confinement, his sentence would have been up after forty months confinement. Because of his inability to earn gain time, he is not serving the fiftieth month of his period of confinement. Petitioner was placed in administrative confinement on March 17, 1985. He was not then nor has he since that time been given an informal hearing by a correctional officer, he states. He claims he was placed in administrative confinement by a corrections officer - and was not given an opportunity to sign anything regarding this action. On this occasion he was in for two and a half months. In a prior period of administrative confinement, he claims he was not told why he was there officially. Only through the information given him by a friendly corrections officer two weeks after the fact was he advised why he was incarcerated. Never has a senior corrections officer ever held a hearing with him, he states, nor has he ever been told how long the investigation on which his administrative confinement status is based will take. He has not seen any investigative report nor has he even been given any assistance in finding out the reason for his status. Even a personal interview with the superintendent of UCI has not changed this process, he says. Reid and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all contend that the implementation of the rule regarding administrative confinement creates great stress for them because of, (1) the loss of incentive gain time, (2) the inability to get appropriate exercise, and (3) the impact that the status has on the ability to receive visitors, and all agree that being afforded a hearing or being told why the administrative confinement action was being taken would tend to reduce that stress. Petitioner admitted that he does not have much of a problem with the rule except for the fact that it does not put any time limit on the length of the investigation. His complaint is primarily with the way the rule is followed by UCI. Mr. Tabah, the classification specialist at UCI, related that there is no formal board hearing when inmates are placed in administrative confinement. The inmates' case is reviewed by the chief correctional officer and this review is termed a hearing. This action, however, is itself reviewed by the classification team within 72 hours of the hearing. At the inmates' hearing, a form DC4-318 is prepared by the chief correctional officer on which the reason for the administrative confinement action is listed. The bottom half of this form is subsequently filled out by the classification team during its review as to its concurrence or non-concurrence and the team's recommendation for action. The inmate is given a copy of this review and has an opportunity to make comment thereon. Both the recommendation of the team and the comments of the inmate, if any, are referred to the superintendent. Every inmate in administrative confinement is reviewed weekly. Each inmate is usually advised of the reason for his being placed in administrative confinement either at the time or immediately thereafter. Only in emergency cases can the inmate be placed in administrative confinement without review/hearing by the chief correctional officer. In that case, the hearing is held within forty-eight hours. Review of the files on both Mangram and Towbridge reveal that, as to Towbridge, the inmate was advised by the corrections officer placing him in administrative confinement on February 13, 1985 as to the reason therefor. The chief corrections officer approved the actions of the corrections officer thereafter and the following day, the classification team reviewed the action and furnished the inmate with a copy of their recommendation. As to Mangram, the records reflect that he was placed in administrative confinement on August 18, 1984. An informal hearing was held that same day and the action was reviewed by senior corrections officer Bryant at 4:00 P.M. the same day. Mr. Mangram was retained in administrative confinement because of the belief that the safety of the institution required it. It was felt that Mangram was a potentially violent inmate who posed a clear danger to others. As to Mr. Paul, the file reflects that the two times he was in administrative confinement he was advised of the reasons and given a hearing. As to Petitioner, the record reflects that on January 24, 1985 he was placed in administrative confinement and given the reasons therefor by corrections officer Brown. The reviewing corrections officer supervisor Bryant concurred.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has failed to maintain the qualifications for certification as a correctional officer, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on August 31, 1994. She was issued correctional certificate number 145457. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer at the Union Correctional Institution (UCI). She worked the 4:00 p.m.-12:00 midnight shift. R. E. Jernigan, Correctional Officer Inspector at UCI, received an anonymous telephone call on January 6, 1995. The caller stated that Respondent would be attempting to bring drugs into the institution on that date. As a result of this information, Inspector Jernigan arranged for a search of the correctional officers beginning the 4:00 p.m.-12:00 midnight shift. This included a search of the Respondent and her belongings. Correctional Officer Dana L. Alverez assisted in the search. Respondent gave her jacket to Officer Alverez to search. In the upper left pocket of the jacket, Officer Alverez discovered three fingertips cut from a rubber glove, containing what appeared to be marijuana. Officer Alverez removed the substance from the jacket and turned it over to Lieutenant D.L. Nichols. Lieutenant Nichols retained the substance until he turned it over to Inspector Jernigan. Inspector Jernigan notified the Union County Sheriff's Office about the results of the search. Lieutenant Gary Seay of that office responded to the institution. Lieutenant Seay took possession of the substance and placed Respondent under arrest. Lieutenant Seay packaged and sealed the substance in an evidence envelope. He mailed the package via certified mail to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement laboratory in Jacksonville for analysis. Crime Laboratory Analyst Niels H. Bernstein, tested the substance submitted by Lieutenant Seay in this case. Mr. Bernstein examined the package in which the substance was enclosed. He determined that the package was properly sealed. Mr. Bernstein then opened the package and tested the substance according to industry approved methods. He determined that the submitted substance was cannabis, 0.6 grams. UCI terminated Respondent's employment. Respondent entered into and successfully completed a Pre-Trial Intervention Program in regards to the criminal charges filed against her. Upon completion of the program, the criminal charges were dismissed. Respondent's testimony that she did not know her jacket contained cannabis is not credible.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Petitioner's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Linda L. Paige-James Post Office Box 614 Macclenny, Florida 32063 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Petitioner was incarcerated at Union Correctional Institition within the custody and control of the Department of Corrections. On or about March 1, 1983, Petitioner submitted a request to be admitted to the Mutual Participation Program, also known as ''Contract Parole." Thereafter, Petitioner was considered for eligibility for that program by a classification specialist employed by the Department of Corrections and a parole examiner employed by the Parole and Probation Commission. On April 22, 1983, these two officials recommended against Petitioner's request based on Petitioner's "extensive criminal history," "history of drug abuse in the past," his escape from minimum custody while a patient at the Veteran's Administration hospital in Gainesville in December of 1979, and his involvement in a prison disturbance at Marion Correctional Institute in 1978. Chapter 23-20, Florida Administrative code, entitled Mutual participation Program was first adopted by Respondent on September 10, 1981. Respondent conducted rulemaking proceedings in 1982 which resulted in amendments to various portions of Chapter 23-20, Florida Administrative Code. These amendments became effective October 1, 1982. During the course of the rulemaking proceeding, Respondent published notice of the proposed changes in the Florida Administrative Weekly and, in addition, forwarded copies of the proposed changes to all Department of Corrections offices, including each correctional institution. The record in this cause is unclear as to whether these proposed changes were ever posted in the law library or other office at Union Correctional Institution. Petitioner contends that he was never afforded notice of the proposed amendments to Chapter 23-20, Florida Administrative Code, and library officials at Union Correctional Institution do not specifically recall ever having seen such proposed amendments. There are no facts of record in this proceeding from which it could be concluded with any certainty whether any of the provisions of Chapter 23-20, Florida Administrative Code, either as it was initially adopted or as it was amended effective October 1, 1982, were applied to Petitioner's request for participation in that program.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Teresa D. Mejico, was certified as a correctional officer by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, on February 17, 1988, and issued certificate number 03-87-502-02. At approximately 2:45 a.m., on October 3, 1988, respondent, while employed as a correctional officer at the Broward Correctional Institute, was observed by her supervisor leaning on her desk in the officer's station at Dormitory H-4. Sitting in a chair at respondent's side was Inmate Deronda Lemmonds, who was observed holding respondent's right arm, and kissing, licking and nuzzling it, while her right hand was between respondent's legs in the area of her crotch. Respondent was immediately relieved of duty, and later that day was discharged from her employment at Broward Correctional Institute for her failure to comply with Florida Department of Corrections Rule 33-4.002(28), Florida Administrative Code. That rule provides: Employees shall maintain a professional relationship with all persons in the custody or under supervision of the Department, and their immediate family or visitors. No personal or business relationships are permitted. Marriage between employees and inmates is prohibited. That respondent was fully aware of the foregoing rule, and the standard of conduct it established, cannot be gainsaid for she acknowledged such at hearing. Notwithstanding such knowledge, however, respondent persisted in fostering the personal relationship which existed between her and Inmate Lemmonds despite denials to her superintendent that any such relationship existed and counseling from her superintendent to avoid any such relationships. Following the termination of her employment at Broward Correctional Institute, respondent maintained contact with Inmate Lemmonds through the mail and by telephone, and variously expressed her affection and love for the inmate. On one occasion, she mailed the inmate 20-25 photographs of herself, including some photographs that captured respondent in partially nude and suggestive poses. In all, the proof demonstrated that respondent was romantically involved with Inmate Lemmonds while she was employed at Broward Correctional Institute, and continued to be so involved as of the date of hearing. It further demonstrated that she was untruthful with her superintendent, failed to abide the rules of conduct for correctional officers, and neglected her duty to guard Dormitory H-4 while engaged in a liaison with an inmate under her charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking respondent' s certification. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of May 1990. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6410 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Adopted in paragraph 1. 2-4. Adopted in paragraph 4. 5-9. Not material or not necessary to result reached. 10-14. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez Whitehurst Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Teresa D. Mejico 7502 S.W. 5th Street North Lauderdale, Florida 33068 Jeffrey Long, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Invitation to Negotiate No. 12/13-010, issued by Respondent for the operation and management of Bay Correctional Facility, Graceville Correctional Facility, and Moore Haven Correctional Facility, is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, rules, or policies.
Findings Of Fact Parties/Interested Persons Petitioner, CCA, is a private corporation specializing in the design, construction, expansion, and management of correctional facilities. CCA currently operates 61 facilities for the United States federal government and state governments. Respondent, DMS, is authorized to contract for private correctional services under specified circumstances. As a prerequisite to entering into a contract for private correctional services, DMS must find the contract will result in a 7% cost savings to the State over public operation of a substantially similar facility. DOC, a non-party, currently operates 48 public correctional facilities and contracts with private vendors for operation of seven private correctional facilities. With respect to privatized facilities, DOC has the duty and responsibility to calculate the cost per inmate per day (per diem rate) for public operation of a substantially similar correctional facility. The per diem rate must be based on the costs of operating a correctional facility of a similar size, type, and location as the facility sought to be privatized. Brief Background Per Diem Workgroup The Florida Legislature first authorized private correctional facility operation in 1993, adopting the Correctional Privatization Act, chapter 957, Florida Statutes (the Act). As adopted, the Act included a cost-savings requirement: the State must find that private operation of a correctional facility would result in a savings of at least 7% over public provision of a similar facility. In 2001, the Legislature created the Prison Per-Diem Work Group, composed of the staffs of the Auditor General, Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA), and the Appropriations Committee of the Florida Senate and of the House of Representatives (the Work Group). The Legislature directed the Work Group to convene, beginning in 2002 and each year thereafter, for the purpose of developing consensus per diem rates for privately operated facilities. See ch. 01-379, § 2, Laws of Fla. In 2002, the Work Group published a Report of Consensus Per Diem Rates (the Report). The Report included a set of Overall Per Diem Rates for each of the three main population types (adult male, youthful offender, and female), as well as Alternative Per Diem Rates and Program Per Diem Rates. The Overall Per Diem Rates represent an average daily operating cost of all publicly operated facilities. The Alternative Per Diem Rates exclude the costs of operating specialty facilities such as death row and work release, which are not operated by private vendors. The Program Per Diem Rates represent the average cost to provide educational and substance abuse programs to inmates within each of the three population groups. By way of example, the 2002 Work Group developed an Overall Per Diem Rate of $50.53 to operate an adult male correctional facility. The 2002 Work Group explained that the Alternative Per Diem Rates provided examples of adjustments that could be made to the Overall Per Diem Rates to facilitate a more direct comparison between public and private correctional facility costs. The Work Group made a location adjustment to remove the cost associated with a Competitive Area Differential paid to correctional officers in South Florida. Further, the Work Group made a series of size adjustments to reflect the extent to which public facilities of similar size to private facilities are above the location-adjusted average operating per diem. By way of example, the 2002 Work Group calculated an Alternative Per Diem Rate of $44.93 for operation of an adult male correctional facility, a location-adjusted rate of $44.83, and size-adjusted rates of $47.71 on the low end, to $57.60 on the high end. The 2002 Work Group did not adjust the calculated consensus per diem rates to account for cost differentials in private correctional facility operation such as credits for property tax payments, corporate income and sales tax payments, and payments to a maintenance reserve fund. The Report notes that such adjustments were outside the scope of the Work Group’s responsibility, which was limited to identifying public facility operation costs. In 2005, the Work Group convened again and developed consensus per diem rates utilizing the same methodology as used in 2002. The Work Group developed the following Per Diem Rates for operation of an adult male facility: an Overall Per Diem Rate of $51.90; an Alternative Per Diem Rate of $44.84; and Size-Adjusted Per Diem Rates of $51.26 on the low end, to $52.66 on the high end. The 2005 Report on Operating Per Diem Rates does not mention further adjustment of the Adjusted Per Diem Rates to account for cost differentials in private facility operations such as credits for property tax payments, corporate income and sales tax payments, and payments to a maintenance reserve fund. However, the Report does include a note that public correctional facilities realize economies of scale by operating above their design capacity, an advantage that private facilities cannot obtain. Private facilities are limited, by both contract and the standards of the American Correctional Association, to operation at no greater than their design capacity. The 2005 Report notes that the Work Group had not attempted to estimate the impact of economies of scale unavailable to private facilities. In 2006, the Legislature removed the requirement that the Work Group convene on a yearly basis and replaced it with convention upon the call of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. See ch. 06-32, § 4, Laws of Fla. 2010 Procurement In 2010, DMS rebid the contracts for Moore Haven and Graceville, which were previously operated by GEO Group, as well as the contract for Bay Correctional Facility, which was operated by CCA. CCA was awarded the contract to operate all three facilities. To prepare the 2010 ITN, DOC first selected public correctional facilities similar in size, type, and location to the private facilities which were the subject of the ITN. DOC selected the New River Correctional Institution as similar to Bay and Moore Haven, and Wakulla Correctional Institution as similar to Graceville. DOC separated the programming costs of those facilities from the security and indirect costs, arriving at the base per diem operating costs for the two comparable facilities. Next, DOC added in the costs for educational, health, and other programs based on the level of service required by the contract in the ITN. CCA Deputy Chief Development Officer Lucibeth Mayberry testified that she did not recall whether CCA was aware of the methodology used to calculate the per diem rates for the 2010 ITN. She explained that the per diem rates are the bottom line of any competitive correctional facility procurement, and the 2010 rates allowed CCA to put in a competitive bid. No direct evidence was introduced as to the advertised per diem rates included in the 2010 ITN. However, Ms. Mayberry testified that the current per diem rates by contract for Bay and Moore Haven are around $48.00, while that for Graceville is around $34.00. Post-2010 Cost Reductions Since 2010, DOC has significantly reduced its cost to operate Florida’s public correctional facilities. According to an April 2013 report by OPPAGA, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011-2012, per diem rates for operation of adult male correctional facilities housing inmates similar to the private facilities decreased an average of over 8% from the prior year. The average per diem rate for operation of an adult male public correctional facility for FY 2011-2012 was $42.00. The DOC operating cost reductions are the result of the closure of several public facilities, including three adult male non-specialty facilities; consolidation of inmates from closed facilities; and workforce eliminations and reductions. OPAGGA concludes that the primary cause of the decrease in per diem rates was the reduction in the amount contributed by the State to employee retirement. OPAGGA estimates that the statewide requirement for employee to contribute 3% to their retirement, together with the State decrease to special risk retirement, resulted in a savings of $88 million to DOC. DOC has also reduced costs at public correctional facilities by changing its operations. The State maintains an 8% vacancy rate in correctional officer positions, allowing wardens flexibility to staff security posts according to highest priority on a daily basis, while leaving lower priority posts vacant. In FY 2011-2012, DOC began working its housing officers on 12-hour shifts, which allowed for further reduction in security costs. By consolidating inmates from closed facilities with those in operational facilities, DOC has realized an economy of scale in some facilities where more inmates are housed without increasing security costs. The 2010 contracts for operation of Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville correctional facilities expire in 2013. In January 2013, DMS released the per diem rates for operation of similar facilities to be included in the ITN at issue. The published rates are 17% lower than the rates CCA is paid under the current contract to operate those facilities. Hence, the present controversy. The 2012 Per Diem Development Process Michael Weber, DMS Bureau Chief of Private Prison Monitoring, contacted DOC Deputy Secretary Michael Crews on September 21, 2012, to obtain “key information” from DOC to prepare a document with which to solicit vendors for private correctional facility services at Bay, Moore Haven and Graceville correctional institutions. Key information includes the type of inmate (i.e., male, female, or youth), the custody level (i.e., close, medium, minimum, or community), inmate programs to be offered (e.g., re-entry and education, substance abuse), and the medical profiles of inmates to be housed at each of the three facilities. On October 3, 2012, DOC Director of Institutions James Upchurch responded to DMS with a chart showing inmate type, custody, medical profiles, and programmatic profiles for each of the three facilities operating under the current contracts. DOC later notified DMS of adjustments in both custody and programmatic services for the Bay and Moore Haven facilities during the next contract period. Eventually, DOC decided against changing custody type of inmates housed at those facilities. On October 9, 2012, DOC clarified the need to include within the ITN program services for up to 18% psychological grade three (S3) inmates at Bay and Moore Haven. No changes were made to correctional services provided at the Graceville facility under the current contract. On October 10, 2012, DMS issued the ITN. As issued, responses to the ITN were due November 13, 2012, at 11:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time. The ITN includes the proposed contract and requires that proposals must be 7% less than the DOC-calculated per diem rate to be considered responsive. However, the ITN as issued did not contain the per diem rate for facilities substantially similar to Moore Haven, Bay, and Graceville. On October 22, 2012, DOC Secretary Kenneth Tucker sent a letter to the Auditor General requesting an audit and certification of an attached set of spreadsheets calculating the per diem rates for public provision of correctional services at facilities comparable to Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville. The per diem rate for each facility was formulated by DOC in three steps: First, DOC selected a comparable facility; broke out the operating costs by security, administration, and programmatic services; and deducted costs for programmatic services (education, substance abuse, and health services) at the comparable facility. This calculation yielded a per diem rate for the comparable facility based solely on security costs and indirect, or administrative, costs. This rate is referred to as the “above-the-line” number for purposes of interpreting the spreadsheets for each of the three facilities. The above-the-line per diem rate for each facility, as submitted to the Auditor General, was as follows: Bay and Moore Haven -- $41.76; Graceville -- $36.62. Second, DOC multiplied the operations per diem for the comparable facility by the contracted population number for each facility. This calculation yielded operational costs for each of the three contracted facilities. DOC then added to that figure the costs associated with providing the programmatic services requested for the inmate population at each of the three facilities based on the proposed contract. This step yielded the unadjusted operational costs for each facility. Third, DOC adjusted the total cost to account for cost savings realized by DOC through its policy of 12-hour shifts (which private providers cannot match), and deducted costs associated with work camps and work squads at the comparable facilities (private corrections providers do not operate work camps). The total costs to operate were adjusted to provide a per diem rate for operation at a private correctional facility that is comparable to operation at a public correctional facility. This step yielded the total adjusted operational cost for each facility. The total adjusted cost was divided by the contract population for each facility to arrive at the adjusted per diem rate for each of the three facilities, as follows: Bay -- $43.22; Moore Haven -- $42.38; Graceville -- $40.51. For each facility, the adjusted per diem rate was slightly higher than the “above-the-line” per diem rate. On October 26, 2012, DMS published on the State VBS a copy of the October 22, 2012, DOC letter to the Auditor General requesting certification of the per diem rates. CCA staff testified they were shocked by the low per diem rates that DOC requested the Auditor General to certify. The published per diem for Bay and Moore Haven was 17% lower than the per diem certified by the Auditor General for the 2010 procurement in which CCA was awarded the current contract. On October 31, 2012, Ms. Mayberry sent a letter to DMS outlining concerns with the proposed per diem rates in the DOC October 22, 2012, letter to the Auditor General. On November 1, 2012, Petitioner’s competitor, GEO Group, sent a letter to DMS raising similar concerns. By letter dated January 24, 2013, the Auditor General’s office notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate of its completion of the audit of the DOC per diem rate calculations. In the intervening period, DMS issued 10 Amendments to the ITN, the majority of which extended the deadline for Responses from the original deadline of November 13, 2012. The Auditor General’s letter reads in pertinent part: The Auditor General performed selected procedures to evaluate the 2011-12 fiscal year operating costs provided by the Department for the State-operated Holmes and Okeechobee Correctional Institutions that were identified by the Department as substantially similar to the privately- operated facilities. Operating per diems are primarily a function of costs and inmate population. * * * Based on the procedures performed, we concluded, pursuant to Section 957.07(1), Florida Statutes, that the 2011-12 fiscal year Holmes Correctional Institution operating per diem of $41.76 provided by the Department was reasonably consistent with the State’s accounting and budgeting records . . . . The Holmes Correctional Institution operating per diem of $41.76 is an appropriate amount to which necessary adjustment may be made for variations in Bay Correctional Facility and Moore Haven Correctional Facility operations. The letter proceeds with the same findings regarding the FY 2011-2012 operating per diem of $36.62 for Okeechobee Correctional Institution as “reasonably consistent with the State’s accounting and budgeting records” and “an appropriate amount to which necessary adjustment may be made for variations in the Graceville Correctional Facility operations.” As such, the Auditor General’s process evaluated only the “above-the-line” per diem rates in each of the DOC spreadsheets and certified those amounts as the starting point for an adjusted per diem rate for each of the contract facilities. On January 24, 2013, DMS posted the Auditor General’s letter as Amendment 11 to the ITN, as well as a spreadsheet for each of the three contract facilities titled “Public Per Diem with Adjustments.” There are two substantive differences between this publication and the October 22, 2012, spreadsheets provided to the Auditor General by DOC. First, the health care per diem rate was adjusted for both Bay and Moore Haven to account for increased health care costs to house up to 18% S3 inmates at those two facilities. Second, that change increased the adjusted per diem rates for the two facilities. As published on January 24, 2013, adjusted per diem rates for the contract facilities were as follows: Bay -- $43.76; Moore Haven -- $42.91; Graceville -- $41.05. Notably, DMS published at the bottom of the spreadsheet for the Bay Correctional Institution, “Respondents must submit a per diem bid for the Bay Correctional Facility that is no greater than $40.69 to be considered responsive.” The spreadsheets for Moore Haven and Graceville contain the same language specifically incorporating the adjusted per diem rate as a term of the ITN and require bids be 7% below the adjusted per diem rate to be considered responsive. On Monday, January 28, 2013, at approximately 5:30 p.m., DMS again posted Amendment 11 and noted as follows: On January 24, 2013, the Department posted on the VBS two changes regarding the above- mentioned competitive solicitation. However, Amendment 11 was not completely posted. As such, the Department hereby posts Amendment 11 in its entirety.[1/] Petitioner filed a notice of intent to protest the specifications of the ITN on January 30, 2013, and filed its Formal Bid Protest Petition on January 31, 2013. Petition and Issues CCA challenges the ITN on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, CCA alleges DMS is authorized to procure contracts for the operation of private correctional facilities only by Request for Proposal (RFP) pursuant to section 957.07, Florida Statutes. Procedural Challenge/Waiver DMS maintains CCA is precluded from challenging DMS’ choice to procure the private correctional institutional contracts by ITN rather than RFP. The ITN was issued on October 10, 2012, and no intent to protest was filed within 72 hours. DMS argues that the issue of method of procurement has been waived. DMS is correct, as more fully explained in the Conclusions of Law. In order to challenge DMS’ choice to procure private correctional facility operation through ITN rather than RFP, CCA should have filed a notice of intent to protest within 72 hours of DMS posting the ITN on October 10, 2012. Since CCA did not file a notice of intent to protest until January 28, 2013, that issue has been waived. DMS also alleges that CCA waived many of the issues contained in its Petition because CCA did not file notice of intent to protest particular specifications of the ITN within 72 hours of DMS posting the amendments which incorporated those specifications. DMS maintains that CCA is limited in its challenge to whether the per diem rate published on January 28, 2013, accurately accounts for the cost of housing S3 inmates at Bay and Moore Haven. DMS reasons that the only change between the per diem amount published on October 26, 2012, and that published on January 28, 2013, is the small adjustment made to account for S3 inmates and, therefore, it is the only issue timely raised by CCA. DMS’ position on this issue is not supported by the facts. The DOC letter to the Auditor General was not posted as an Amendment to the ITN; did not contain a notice of rights, pursuant to chapter 120.57(3), Florida Statutes; and was not incorporated into the ITN as a term thereof. Neither the above- the-line nor the below-the-line per diem rates had been reviewed or certified by the Auditor General on October 26, 2013, and the certification process was not complete. In fact, the certification process was not completed until January 24, 2013, some 90 days later. DMS represents that CCA’s corporate representative admitted at hearing that CCA could have filed a bid specification protest on October 26, 2012, in response to DMS posting the letter to the Auditor General. However, the testimony of Ms. Mayberry does not bear that out: Q: Was that a discussion that was had internally with regard to different options and vendor relationships about how that might change with filing a protest as opposed to sending a letter? A: At that time, I don’t believe we had -– we knew a protest was possible in Florida and we had filed an intent to protest before which we had withdrawn. But at that time –- we didn’t have a certified per diem. We thought this was going to be fixed. We thought that when we raised concerns, that would be addressed. So I am giving you information because I don’t honestly remember exactly –- I don’t think a protest –- a protest seemed premature to us at that point because we didn’t have certified per diems, as that wasn’t –- we didn’t have the real per diem at that point. We just had the letter from DOC, which we felt certain was going to be adjusted.[2/] Ms. Mayberry did not admit that CCA had a point of entry to challenge the per diem rates in the October 22, 2012, letter; instead she insisted that the rates were not final and a challenge would have been premature. Even if Ms. Mayberry had admitted that CCA could have challenged the posting on October 26, 2012, her opinion would not have been binding on the undersigned because it would have been a legal conclusion. Substantive Challenge Next, CCA challenges the per diem rates included in the ITN through Amendment 11 on the following bases: The per diem rates are not based on the costs associated with comparable publicly operated correctional facilities. CCA maintains DOC acted arbitrarily in selecting the comparable facilities. DOC erred in adjusting the base per diem rate to account for costs associated with programmatic services to be provided under the contract in the ITN. CCA maintains that some adjustments were too high, while others were too low. DOC erred by not including adjustments to the base per diem rate to account for savings realized by operational changes at public institutions which cannot be made by a private vendor. Finally, CCA argues that the overall accounting methodology utilized by DOC is flawed. In summary, CCA argues that the per diem rates for all three facilities are too low because DOC did not correctly choose substantially similar facilities as the bases for public per diem rates, and DOC did not accurately adjust the base per diem rates to fairly account for differences in public and private correctional facility operations. The Contract Facilities CCA challenges DOC’s selection of the Holmes Correctional Institution for comparison to Bay and Moore Haven because Holmes is not “substantially similar” as required by the governing statute. Likewise, CCA challenges the selection of Okeechobee Correctional Institution for comparison to Graceville because it is not “substantially similar.” Under the governing statute, DOC is charged with selecting a public correctional institution which is similar in “size, type, and location” to the facilities sought to be managed by a private correctional institution. Size equates with inmate population of a correctional facility. Both Bay and Moore Haven have a design capacity of 985 inmates. Graceville is a larger facility designed to house 1513 inmates. All three facilities are under contract to operate at design capacity. There are three types of general correctional facilities: adult male, youthful offender, and female. There are also a number of specialty type institutions in the correctional system, such as reception and medical centers, maximum security, death row, and mental health. Adult male facilities may house inmates at different custody levels (close, medium, minimum, and community) and with different health profiles (medical grades 1, 2, and 3; psychological grades 1, 2, and 3; wheelchair; and special needs). Inmates from different custody levels and health profiles may be housed together without changing the primary mission of the facility to a specialty institution. Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville are all adult male facilities, contracted for similar custody levels. Under the ITN, Bay and Moore Haven may accept inmates of medium, minimum, and community custody levels. Both are currently serving 100% medium custody inmates. Graceville is designated to accept close, medium, minimum, and community custody inmates and currently serves 40% close custody inmates. The three facilities are also designated to accept inmates with similar health profiles. Under the ITN, Bay and Moore Haven will accept 84% medical grades 1 and 2, 16% medical grade 3, 82% psychological grades 1 and 2, 18% psychological grade 3, 2% wheelchair, and 6% special needs inmates. Graceville is designated to accept the same percentages of psychological grade inmates and wheelchair inmates, but may accept up to 5% special needs inmates and a small percentage of medical grade 4 inmates. Location refers to the geographic location of a facility. DOC divides correctional facilities regionally. Both Bay (Bay County) and Graceville (Jackson County) are in Region 1. Moore Haven (Glades County) is located in Region 3. For purposes of comparing correctional facility costs, location is significant when a facility is located in South Florida, where employees are paid a competitive area differential. Location is also a factor when an institution is remote from population centers, which may affect staffing and turnover rates. Substantially similar facilities James Upchurch, DOC Assistant Secretary for Institutions and Reentry, selected the public correctional facilities “substantially similar” to the three contract facilities for purposes of calculating the base per diem. Mr. Upchurch came to Florida as Chief of Security Operations for DOC in 1996 following 26 years in operation of public correctional facilities in Mississippi and Arizona. He served as a warden in three different Arizona correctional facilities, including a super max facility, and was a regional director for the State of Arizona as well. Mr. Upchurch was DOC Chief of Security Operations from 1996 until 2011, when, after a brief stint as warden at Franklin County Correctional Institution, he became DOC Director of Operations. In March 2012, Mr. Upchurch was promoted to Assistant Secretary of Institutions and Reentry and now supervises region directors, the deputy assistant secretary for institutions, and the deputy assistant secretary for reentry. Altogether, Mr. Upchurch has 17 years of experience in Florida’s correctional facility operations. After excluding the DOC specialty institutions, Mr. Upchurch identified two institutions similar to Bay and Moore Haven and two institutions similar to Graceville for further review. He asked Vicki Newsome, DOC Assistant Bureau Chief for Population Management and Classifications Services, to pull the facility profiles for comparison. Bay and Moore Haven In his initial analysis, Mr. Upchurch chose Holmes Correctional Facility and Lawtey Correctional Facility as comparable to Bay and Moore Haven and reviewed their facility profiles. Holmes, Bay, and Moore Haven are all located in Region 1 and house adult male inmates. Lawtey does not house S3 inmates and Holmes only houses one S3 inmate. Both Bay and Moore Haven will house up to 18% S3 inmates under the ITN. According to the data reviewed by Mr. Upchurch, Holmes houses 37% close custody inmates, while Lawtey houses no close custody inmates. Neither Bay nor Moore Haven is contracted to house close custody inmates. Holmes is not a stand-alone facility, but rather includes a work camp which is physically separated from the perimeter of the main facility. Lawtey is a stand-alone facility, as are Bay and Moore Haven. Bay and Moore Haven have similar layouts –- four large dorms housing between 250 and 400 inmates each, and one much smaller dorm housing a small number of segregated inmates. By comparison, Lawtey’s inmate population is spread among 10 dorms, one housing 200 inmates and the remainder housing roughly 80 inmates each. Much like Bay and Moore Haven, Holmes houses its population in a series of larger dorms, one housing 250 inmates, seven housing just under 150 inmates each, and one much smaller dorm housing around 60 segregated inmates. Lawtey is a faith- and character-based institution. Bay, Moore Haven, and Holmes are not faith- or character-based. For the 2010 procurement, DOC had chosen the New River facility as comparable, but that facility has since closed. Holmes and New River are 2 of 15 state correctional institutions built on a prototypical layout –- administration and support at the front of the compound, recreation wellness yard in the back, housing units in the middle, and a separate work camp on the grounds but physically separated from the perimeter of the main compound. In the final analysis, Mr. Upchurch selected Holmes as the facility most comparable to Bay and Moore Haven. He based this selection, in large part, on the fact that Holmes was so similar to the New River facility selected for the prior procurement. Mr. Upchurch ruled out Lawtey in his final analysis because it is a faith- and character-based institution, which he testified increases security costs. Further, the layout and dorm capacities of Lawtey are not as efficient as the larger dorms at Bay and Moore Haven. Mr. Upchurch did not verify that Lawtey actually had higher security per diems because it was faith-based. In fact, he explained that the only way to verify that mathematically would be to remove the faith- and character- based mission and compare the resultant costs with the prior costs. Identifying a public correctional institution substantially similar to Bay and Moore Haven is indeed a difficult task. At a contracted inmate population of 985 each, Bay and Moore Haven are significantly smaller than the average adult male public correctional facility. This was true in 2005 when the Per Diem Workgroup was convened to formulate a consensus per diem rate. This disparity in size has only increased in recent years as many public institutions have been closed and their populations consolidated. In FY 2011-2012, only 7 of the 30 public adult male facilities had an average daily population of fewer than 1,500 inmates. Both Lawtey and Holmes are among the seven. The populations of Lawtey and Holmes differ significantly, however. Holmes averaged 1,466 inmates per day in FY 2011-2012, while Lawtey averaged 805. The difference in population between Bay and Moore Haven and that of Lawtey is 185. The difference in population between Bay and Moore Haven and that of Holmes is 481. The evidence was uncontroverted that facility size is one of the most important variables in determining correctional facility costs. The larger the inmate population, the more security is needed. More security means more salaries and benefits. Mr. Upchurch selected Holmes as comparable to Bay and Moore Haven based on its similarity to New River, one of the same prototypes as Holmes, and the similar inmate housing patterns, which were known to him to require similar staffing patterns. Although Holmes has a work camp, which Bay and Moore Haven do not, Mr. Upchurch expected the security costs associated with the work camp (separate perimeter patrol and additional security staffing) would be removed from the per diem rate. Furthermore, Mr. Upchurch considered the security staffing requirements of Lawtey based on his experience not just in Florida, but in his entire 43-year career in public correctional facility operation. Mr. Upchurch’s decision to select Holmes as substantially similar to Bay and Moore Haven was not made without thought or reason or in an illogical manner. Graceville For Graceville, Mr. Upchurch narrowed the decision down to Everglades and Okeechobee correctional institutions, both adult male facilities in Region 4. Everglades and Graceville are similar in population size and inmate profiles. Both facilities house over 1500 inmates. Both house large percentages of close custody inmates (Everglades –- 54%; Graceville –- 42%), and both house S3 inmates, although at different percentages. Mr. Upchurch eliminated Everglades for two reasons. First, based on its location, the facility has experienced high staffing turnover, which has increased hiring and training costs. Second, Everglades has a higher percentage of S3 inmates (24%) than contracted for at Graceville (18%).3/ The evidence was uncontroverted that S3 inmates increase per diem rates because of the cost of psychotropic drugs administered to those inmates. Mr. Upchurch also testified that the presence of S3 inmates can increase security costs. S3 inmates have more disciplinary problems, are more spontaneous, and are more difficult to manage. Mr. Upchurch testified that when a large number of S3 inmates are housed together, they “feed off one another” and create more disturbance. When asked specifically what percentage of S3 inmates would create an increased security cost, Mr. Upchurch estimated around one-third of the population. The number of S3 inmates housed at Everglades does not rise to that level. Mr. Upchurch selected Okeechobee as the facility most substantially similar to Graceville for comparison. The facilities have similar inmate populations –- both house over 1500 inmates with high percentages of medical grades 1 and 2 inmates, similar numbers of special needs inmates, and no wheelchair inmates. However, as emphasized by CCA, Okeechobee serves no S3 inmates. Mr. Upchurch focused on the design efficiencies of the two facilities. Both Okeechobee and Graceville house a large number of inmates in a small number of dorms. The six “T building” dorms at Okeechobee house up to 230 inmates each. The four main dorms at Graceville house approximately 400 inmates each. This design is intentional and creates efficiencies in the officer-to-inmate ratio. Many of the other DOC facilities have multiple smaller “open bay” dorms with less efficient operation.4/ More inmates in fewer dorms equates with lower security costs. Mr. Upchurch also noted that both Okeechobee and Graceville are stand-alone facilities, meaning only one correctional facility is contained within the perimeter.5/ Upchurch testified that, where possible, it is preferable to compare the per diem rates of stand-alone facilities. Mr. Upchurch disagreed with DOC’s selection of the Wakulla Correctional Facility as comparable to Graceville for the 2010 procurement process. The Wakulla facility is actually three different institutions within one: Wakulla Correctional, Wakulla Annex, and Wakulla Work Camp.6/ The facility operates three separate perimeter security details, three separate control rooms, and three sets of security supervisors. Mr. Upchurch testified that he objected to the selection of Wakulla because no adjustment was made to the Wakulla security per diem rate in 2010 to account for the higher security per diem at Wakulla. Thus, he disagreed that Wakulla was comparable. CCA assigns error to Mr. Upchurch’s choice of Okeechobee over Everglades as comparable to Graceville. CCA highlights that Okeechobee houses no S3 inmates, and, therefore, does not incur costs associated with psychotropic drugs for those inmates. Further, CCA notes that between the two comparable facilities, Mr. Upchurch chose the one with the lower total per diem rate -- $33.23 at Okeechobee versus $45.82 at Everglades. The higher per diem rate at Everglades is a factor in both a higher security per diem and a higher health per diem than at Okeechobee. Everglades’ security per diem is $28.00 while Okeechobee’s is $23.99. Higher recruiting and training costs due to turnover likely account for that difference. The health per diem at Everglades is also higher -- $17.14 compared with $8.64 at Okeechobee. The treatment of 24% S3 inmates likely accounts for this higher rate. Mr. Upchurch was aware that the contract with Graceville required the facility to house up to 18% S3 inmates. He did not ignore that requirement in selecting Okeechobee over Everglades. Mr. Upchurch was aware of the process of adjusting the per diem rate of the selected comparable facility to account for the specific programs under the contract. The cost of housing S3 inmates at Graceville was accounted for in the adjustment process. Mr. Upchurch selected Okeechobee as substantially similar to Graceville based upon his significant knowledge regarding the operations of all the DOC facilities. The choice was informed by the size, type, and location of the facilities, as well as the physical layout, size of dorms, efficiencies of staffing, and similarity of inmate profiles. For FY 2011-2012, DOC operated 30 adult male facilities. Of those, 18 had an average daily inmate population of 1500 or higher, as does Graceville. Both Graceville and Okeechobee are stand-alone facilities housing large numbers of inmates in few dorms, which increases staffing efficiencies. Overall, the undersigned does not find that Mr. Upchurch’s choice of Okeechobee was arbitrary, capricious, or erroneous. CCA further assigns error to DOC’s selection of substantially similar facilities because DOC did not undertake a formal process or analytical exercise to select those facilities. It is true that Mr. Upchurch did not review documentation on all 48 DOC correctional facilities, or otherwise consult DOC records, prior to narrowing the choices to two facilities similar to Bay and Moore Haven and two facilities similar to Graceville. Mr. Upchurch relied upon his 17 years of experience in state correctional facility operations, including his knowledge of the facilities’ design, layout, staffing and programming. Once he narrowed the choices, he requested and reviewed the inmate profiles for comparable facilities to the private facilities. As such, his selections were not arbitrary or capricious. Errors Calculating Program Costs Having identified Holmes as substantially similar to Bay and Moore Haven, and Okeechobee as substantially similar to Graceville, DOC began with each facility’s base security per diem plus administrative costs, and multiplied that figure by the contracted population for each of the contracted facilities. To that base operational cost figure, DOC added costs for health services, educational, substance abuse, and behavioral/transition services based on the draft contract in the ITN. DOC program staff specializing in each area calculated the cost to provide the contracted services. Errors were made in those calculations which were admitted to at the final hearing. The health services per diem of $7.82 added to the Bay security per diem was in error. The correct rate is $8.28. As such, the per diem rate published in Amendment 11 for Bay was incorrect. The health services per diem for Graceville was calculated incorrectly as $12.46 rather than $12.56. As such, the per diem rate published in Amendment 11 for Graceville was incorrect. Next, DOC calculated the mental health programmatic costs associated with housing S3 inmates at Bay and Moore Haven as required by the ITN. CCA alleges DOC made an error in calculating that amount because it relied upon FY 2011-2012 pharmacy expenditure data to determine the amount spent on psychotropic drugs, rather than relying on the data from the state accounting system known as FLAIR. Mark Tallent, DOC Director of Budget and Finance, testified that the pharmacy data is a more accurate accounting of the actual amount DOC spent on psychotropic drugs than the FLAIR data. The state accounting system appropriated approximately $11 million for psychotropic drugs and the FLAIR data shows DOC spent over $6 million out of that category. However, Mr. Tallent testified that DOC paid bills for other types of drugs, such as infectious disease drugs, out of that category, so the number is inflated and unreliable as it relates to psychotropic drugs exclusively. He testified that the pharmacy system is more accurate because it correlates each individual prescription with an inmate at a particular facility, allowing for an accurate accounting of the institutional costs for each specific type of drug. Mr. Tallent’s testimony is accepted as credible and reliable. DOC did not err when it calculated the per diem cost of psychotropic drugs based on the figure of $5,045,018 from FY 2011-2012 pharmacy data. Errors in Additional Adjustments The governing statute requires DOC to “calculate all the cost components that determine the inmate per diem in correctional facilities of a substantially similar size, type, and location that are operated by the Department of Corrections, including administrative costs associated with central administration.” § 957.07(1), Fla. Stat. The statute also directs DOC to make some adjustments to account for the public nature of the operation. DOC must include in the per diem an equivalent cost of services that are provided to DOC by other governmental agencies at no direct cost to the agency. Id. Also, the statute requires DOC to include as a cost savings in the calculation of the per diem rate “reasonable projections of payments of any kind to the state or any political subdivision thereof for which the private entity would be liable because of its status as a private rather than public entity,” including corporate income and sales tax payments. § 957.07(2), Fla. Stat. DOC made a number of additional adjustments to account for operations unique to public correctional facilities to arrive at a per diem rate more comparable to that of a private facility. While all these adjustments are not required by statute, they are examined for their accuracy. 12-hour shifts DOC adjusted the per diem to account for the cost savings realized at Holmes and Okeechobee by operating housing security personnel on 12-hour shifts. In calculating the 12-hour shift adjustment, DOC failed to add back in the cost of providing security staff at the private facilities associated with covering the 4 hours essentially unmanned when the cost of the 12-hour shifts were removed. In other words, DOC deducted too much cost when making this adjustment. As such, the per diems published in Amendment 11 for Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville were incorrect. Work Squads DOC also adjusted the per diem by backing out the costs associated with the work squads at Holmes. A correctional facility work squad may perform services such as landscaping, maintenance, or other jobs both on the facility grounds and “outside the fence.” DOC removed the costs associated with work squads under the mistaken impression that none of the private facilities operate work squads. However, Bay and Moore Haven operate work squads in the community, which require supervisory security personnel. As such, the per diem amount published in Amendment 11 for Bay and Moore Haven was incorrect. Work Camps Holmes operates a work camp on its grounds, although it is physically separate from the main unit. The work camp requires both separate perimeter security and supervisory security. DOC adjusted the per diem rate for Bay and Moore Haven to exclude the security costs attributable to the work camp at Holmes. CCA argues that DOC erred by deducting only the security costs attributable to the Holmes work camp, but not other costs associated with the inmate population at the work camp, since private correctional facilities do not operate work camps. Mr. Tallent testified there is no way to back out the costs associated with the work camp at Holmes, other than the salaries and benefits of the security officers, because it is the same budget entity as Holmes Correctional Institution and the costs cannot be separated. No evidence was presented regarding the specific costs CCA expected to be removed, or the amount of those costs. Given the accounting structure of the DOC system, and the uncontested fact that security costs are the driving factor in calculation of correctional facility per diem rates, the undersigned does not find that DOC erred in removal of only the security costs at Holmes. Additional Alleged Errors CCA assigns error to DOC for failure to make additional adjustments to the per diem rates in the ITN. 1. Utility service charge Moore Haven pays a monthly utility service charge of $25,000, which is extraordinarily high. This service charge was not disclosed to CCA by the predecessor operator, GEO Group, and CCA did not take it into account in preparing its response to the 2010 ITN. No evidence was presented to establish that this utility surcharge is paid by the operator of Moore Haven because of its status as a private rather than public entity. If it were, DOC would be required by law to include it as a cost savings when calculating the per diem rate. Without that evidence, the undersigned cannot find that DOC erred by not adjusting the per diem to account for it. DOC has offered to make an adjustment in the per diem to account for this service charge. However, DOC’s offer to make an adjustment during negotiations does not prove an error on its part. 2. Lapse Factor/Vacancy Rate Next, CCA argues DOC erred by not adjusting the per diem rate to account for the DOC “lapse factor.” Contradictory evidence was introduced as to the meaning of “lapse factor” and the related term “vacancy rate.” Based on the preponderance of the evidence, the lapse factor is the percentage of DOC security positions which are temporarily vacant due to normal turnover, during which time recruitment and training of new officers occurs. Mr. Upchurch testified that DOC generally runs a 3% lapse factor. A vacancy rate, on the other hand, is the percentage of positions which remain intentionally unfilled due to a hiring freeze or other cost-saving measure. DOC operates with roughly an 8% vacancy rate as part of its budget cutbacks. For the purpose of the contract sought via the ITN, a vacant position is defined to occur “when the employee assigned to that position has resigned, been terminated, or is reassigned to another position.”7/ The terms of the draft contract do not allow the private correctional facility operator to run a blanket vacancy rate. In fact, the operator will incur a vacancy deduction for positions not filled with permanent employees or contracted staff within 30 days after a position becomes vacant, unless a waiver has been granted.8/ Petitioner argues that DMS erred in not adjusting the per diem rate to account for operation of the public correctional facilities with across-the-board vacancies. DMS testified, and has apparently agreed, that such an adjustment would be fair to account for vacancy rates above the normal 3% lapse factor. Moreover, Petitioner argues that the adjustment should be high enough to account for vacancies in actual posts at comparable institutions. Each warden at each public correctional facility has the flexibility to leave positions, or posts, unfilled on a given day based on the security priority of the post. DOC classifies posts into level 1, 2, and 3 priority positions. Level 1 posts are critical to daily operation of a shift. Level 2 posts are essential to the daily normal operation of a facility and allow all activities and programs to be marginally staffed. Level 3 posts are necessary for long term normal operations. In order to fill a level 1 post, a warden may move to a level 1 post an officer assigned to a level 2 or 3 post for that day; limit non-critical activities, such as recreation or work squads; or pay overtime to fill the level 1 post. Level 3 posts are generally utilized prior to level 2 posts to fill level 1 vacancies. Jinanne West, CCA Senior Director of Financial Planning and Analysis, analyzed the security post charts and daily rosters for the Holmes and Okeechobee facilities. She found that for FY 2011-2012, Holmes had an average security post non-fill rate of 17%, with level 3 posts vacant 73% of the time and level 2 posts vacant 39% of the time. During the same time period, Okeechobee ran an average non-fill rate of 26% with level 3 posts vacant 94% of the time and level 2 posts vacant 72% of the time. CCA’s argument, however, assumes private facilities are required to staff their facilities exactly as public facilities do. The draft contract included as part of the ITN does not bear out that assumption. With respect to security staffing, the contract provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Security Staff Utilization: CONTRACTOR shall develop and implement Security staff utilization in accordance with DC policy and procedure that includes, but is not limited to the following: A table of organization for the security staff for the maximum inmate population for the Facility and the position qualifications, job descriptions, pay levels, number of persons per post, distribution by shift, and security staff to inmate ratio in each housing unit by shift. 5.28.6.2 A detailed Security Post Chart outlining how key functions/duties will be staffed. 6.3 PERSONNEL. * * * CONTRACTOR will provide the Department with a finalized staffing pattern prior to the Service Commencement Date. Positions will be staffed with qualified employees in accordance with the staffing pattern attached hereto as in [Exhibit , to be provided by the CONTRACTOR]. CONTRACTOR’S staffing pattern must be submitted and approved by the Contract Manager prior to the Service Commencement Date. Any modifications to the position requirements or the staffing pattern must be approved in writing by the Contract Manager. * * * Sufficient certified security staff shall be employed at all times to assure that all positions identified as critical complement on the approved staffing pattern, are manned, at all times, for each shift, unless a departure from the staffing pattern has been approved in writing by the Contract Manager. . . . CONTRACTOR shall be required to fill critical complement positions by using overtime or other qualified staff members to ensure that staffing levels do not decrease below the established critical complement. (emphasis added) The private contractor is charged with developing the security staffing pattern for its facility, including the job descriptions, pay levels, number of persons per post, distribution by shift, and security staff to inmate ratio per housing unit. While the contract may penalize the private operator for vacant positions left unfilled after 30 days, no evidence was introduced from which the undersigned can infer that private operation lends itself to any higher than normal lapse rate. It is illogical to count as a cost to the private operator the savings realized by public sector cutbacks. The Legislature intends to ensure more efficient private operation by including the 7% cost-saving requirements. CCA also argued that DOC has an advantage because it maintains high vacancies in individual posts at the level 2 and 3 positions, which private operators cannot do without incurring a vacancy deduction penalty. Again, the contract does not bear that out. The vacancy deduction is tied to vacancies of positions due to resignation, termination, or reassignment. There is no evidence from which to conclude that private operators are separately penalized by running vacancies in individual posts at an institution. In fact, the contract specifically provides for flexible staffing of the private correctional facility similar to that of the public facility –- filling critical complement posts at all times, authorizing the movement of employees from other posts and the use of overtime if necessary.9/ 3. Reception and Medical Center Cost Next, CCA argues that the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 are artificially low and should be further adjusted to account for health care administered to inmates at public reception and medical centers (RMCs). RMCs are public correctional facilities which conduct initial health screening of inmates at intake and may provide medical care to existing inmates as well. Inmates at public institutions may receive health care at RMCs, but the state pays for that health care out of a budget separate from the institution’s budget. In other words, public correctional facilities may send an inmate to an RMC for care and not pay for that care out of the facility’s budget. CCA argues that since it will be charged with the cost to treat inmates at an RMC, the per diem rate should account for that difference as a savings to the public correctional facility. What CCA fails to include in the discussion is the fact that a private correctional facility operator is authorized to use the RMC as a cost-saving measure. Private correctional facilities are required to provide health care, including emergency care, to its inmates offsite only when the onsite Chief Health Officer determines an inmate cannot be treated properly in the facility itself. Only then is the private facility authorized to seek offsite hospitalization or other offsite treatment. The vendor is solely responsible for the costs of the offsite treatment, including the security costs of treating or hospitalizing an inmate offsite. The transfer agreement authorizes the private correctional facility to use the RMC, when space is available, as an alternative to minimize security costs for offsite treatment of the private correctional facility’s inmates. Under these facts, the undersigned cannot find that DMS erred by not including an adjustment to the per diem rate to account for treatment costs of private correctional facility inmates at RMCs. 4. PILOT Fees Next, CCA argued that the published per diem rates are in error because they were not adjusted to account for the fees paid by the private correctional facility to the local government as Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILOTs). A PILOT is made to compensate local governments for the tax revenue lost by virtue of the public correctional facility property being used for a governmental function. DOC does not pay property taxes or PILOT fees related to Holmes, and no such fees are included in the Holmes per diem rates. However, the Bay and Moore Haven facilities are subject to PILOT fees required to be paid to local governments. Such fees are deducted from payments due to private correctional facility operators pursuant to the ITN, and are paid directly to the local governments assessing such fees. Pursuant to section 957.07(2), Florida Statutes, [r]easonable projections of payments of any kind to the state or any political subdivision thereof for which the private entity would be liable because of its status as private rather than a public entity, including, but not limited to, corporate income and sales tax payments, shall be included as cost savings in all such determinations. PILOT fee payments for Bay and Moore Haven are clearly included within the definition of section 957.07(2), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, PILOT fee payments for Bay and Moore Haven should have been included as an adjustment in the Amendment 11 per diem rate spreadsheets. Because PILOT fees were not included in the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 for Bay and Moore Haven, the rates were incorrect. 5. Major Maintenance and Repair Fund The ITN requires payments to be made by private correctional facility operators to the Major Maintenance and Repair Fund (MMRF). MMRF monies are used by the private facilities for maintenance, repairs, and renovations. Payments to the MMRF are deducted by DMS from payments due to private correctional facility operators, thereby reducing the per diem rate paid to private contractors. CCA argues that the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 are erroneous since those rates were not adjusted for MMRF payments. However, if the entire MMRF amount were credited to the private correctional facility, the per diem would not include any costs associated with regular repairs, maintenance, or other facility improvements. The amount paid into the MMRF is returned to the private correctional facility when repairs and maintenance are needed and conducted. There may be better ways to account for the maintenance costs of the private correctional facilities, but the undersigned finds no error in the per diem rate calculation on that basis. 6. Fleet Payments CCA contends the per diem rates should be adjusted to account for the requirement that the private correctional facility acquire a vehicle fleet for each of the three facilities, and that DMS erred in excluding the vehicle fleet costs for Holmes and Okeechobee when calculating the per diem rates. In calculating per diem rates, DMS excluded the one- time fleet cost of $573,986 associated with the purchase of the State vehicle fleet to operate the comparable public correctional facilities. The uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Tallent was that those costs were excluded because the fleets were acquired at the time the Holmes and Okeechobee facilities were first constructed. For example, the Holmes fleet was acquired 24 years ago. Because vehicle costs have changed dramatically during the intervening years, any adjustment to account for fleet cost would be insignificant. Additionally, Mr. Tallent testified that adjusting the per diem rate to account for the fleet charge would provide a windfall to a company, such as CCA, which was currently operating one of the facilities if it was awarded the contract again. At one point, CCA expressed that they were not actually concerned with whether the fleet acquisition cost had been incorporated into the per diem, but rather whether ongoing maintenance costs were included.10/ Mr. Tallent’s testimony was uncontroverted that the operating per diem of the public facilities includes all vehicle maintenance and fuel costs.11/ As such, the undersigned finds that DMS did not exclude vehicle fleet maintenance and fuel costs. The ITN requires private correctional facility operators to provide a fleet of vehicles for use at the Bay, Graceville, and Moore Haven facilities.12/ Given the greater weight of the evidence, the undersigned finds that excluding the fleet costs from the per diem rates incorporated as Amendment 11 was not erroneous. 7. Economies of Scale Last, CCA argues that the per diem rates should be adjusted to account for the economies of scale realized at Holmes and Okeechobee because these facilities are operated above design capacity. CCA maintains this adjustment is necessary since Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville may not exceed design capacity under the contract. Mr. Upchurch agreed that an economies of scale adjustment would be appropriate if a reasonable way to calculate that adjustment could be determined. The 2005 Per Diem Workgroup was convened to establish per diem operating rates for private correctional facilities which would be comparable to operation of public facilities. The report provides, “[t]he workgroup has not attempted to estimate the impact of economies of scale that are not available to private facilities. The workgroup, however, was provided with two estimates ranging from $6.66 per day from the Auditor General’s office to $7.10 per day from Geo Group.”13/ Although the Workgroup report refers to the Auditor General's estimate as an attachment thereto, the estimate was not attached to the report introduced into evidence. Further, no testimony was presented relating to whether the estimates from either the Auditor General or GEO Group were reasonable or otherwise reliable. Given the lack of evidence on whether, and by what methodology, an economies of scale adjustment could be calculated, the undersigned does not find that DMS erred by excluding an adjustment for economies of scale. Accounting Error Jinanne West is CCA’s Senior Director for Financial Planning and Analysis. Ms. West has a master’s degree in accounting and is a certified public accountant. Prior to joining CCA, Ms. West worked for Arthur Andersen for three years, and then taught college accounting. Ms. West evaluated the spreadsheets used to calculate the public comparable per diem rates for Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville and found fundamental accounting errors. To determine DOC’s per diem cost to operate the Bay and Moore Haven facilities, the Amendment 11 per diem rate spreadsheets divided Holmes’ operating costs by its average inmate population of 1,466 to arrive at a per diem rate, but then multiplied the per diem rate by the Bay and Moore Haven inmate populations of 985 to determine the daily costs associated with programming at those facilities. As a result, all operating costs attributable to Holmes were reduced by 33% (1,466 minus 985 divided by 1,466) to arrive at DOC’s projected operating costs to operate a 985-bed facility similar to Holmes. DOC then deducted from the remaining 67% of the Holmes operating costs 100% of the Holmes costs related to Holmes work squads and Holmes work camp staff, and additionally deducted 100% of the savings expected at Holmes due to the transition to 12-hour shifts. However, costs attributable to Holmes work squads and Holmes work camp staff and savings attributable to the 12-hour shift adjustment had already been reduced by 33% in the Amendment 11 per diem rate spreadsheets, given the difference in population between Holmes and the Bay and Moore Haven facilities. By deducting 100% of these costs and expected savings from the remaining 67% of the Holmes operating costs, DOC in effect incorrectly deducted 133% of Holmes’ costs and anticipated savings from the per diem rates. A similar error was found in the spreadsheet for Graceville. The inmate population at Okeechobee is slightly smaller than that at Graceville, leading to erroneous adjustments to the per diem for program costs and adjustments made to account for operational differences at Okeechobee. Due to this error in accounting methodology, the per diem rates published in Amendment 11 for Bay, Moore Haven, and Graceville were incorrect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, and withdraw ITN 12/13-010 for the Operation and Management of Bay Correctional Facility, Graceville Correctional Facility, and Moore Haven Correctional Facility. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 2013.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Department of Corrections (“DOC” or the “Department”), engaged in discriminatory practices against Petitioner, Patrick Quercioli, on the basis of his disability; and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 53-year-old Caucasian male. From approximately November 19, 2004, until August 4, 2016, Petitioner was employed by the Department as a Correctional Officer. He was promoted to the rank of Correctional Officer Sergeant on July 28, 2006. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was working at the Annex section of the Lowell Correctional Institution (“Lowell”) located in Marion County. Lowell is a maximum security prison for female inmates; it has an average daily count of approximately 2,800 prisoners. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida, created pursuant to section 20.315, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for, inter alia, hiring and monitoring all employees engaged in operations at a state prison. Petitioner was separated from his employment with DOC due to the fact that he could not “perform the essential functions of his job.” That determination was based on a report from Petitioner’s therapist, Mrs. Robinson, and her opinion that Petitioner could not effectively perform his duties in the presence of inmates. Inasmuch as all Correctional Officer Sergeant positions require contact with inmates, DOC terminated Petitioner’s employment. The facts leading to the ultimate termination of Petitioner’s employment are anything other than ordinary. A discussion of those facts follows. In October 2014, a female inmate at Lowell was found dead in her cell. Petitioner was named as a suspect in the death, despite the fact that at the time of death he was on vacation with his family, i.e., he was not working at the prison. Local and national news outlets began reporting about the death, and Petitioner was named numerous times as a suspect and possible participant. Apparently, Petitioner’s name had been provided to the inmate’s family prior to her death as someone who had been harassing her. Nonetheless, Petitioner’s character and reputation were impugned by the news stories. Petitioner was placed on administrative leave pending further review by the Department. Meanwhile, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) commenced its own extensive investigation into the death of the inmate. The investigation focused quite heavily on Petitioner and one other correctional officer, but FDLE ultimately concluded that there was no evidence to prove either of the men had taken part in the inmate’s death. The inmate’s death, in fact, was ruled to be from natural causes.1/ The FDLE investigation was concluded on January 21, 2015. The Department did not issue a particular statement concerning Petitioner’s vindication, nor did it publish a notice about the FDLE findings. Petitioner takes great umbrage at this perceived failure by DOC, but cited to no requirement that the Department do so. The Department acknowledges that it did not make any effort to make public the findings of the FDLE investigation. During the FDLE investigation and while Petitioner’s alleged involvement in the incident was being broadcast by the news services, Petitioner began receiving threats against his life and the lives of his family members. Who made such threats or why such threats may have been made was not made clear at final hearing. Whether it was family and friends of the inmate, concerned citizens who perceived Petitioner as some kind of monster, or someone else making the threats, Petitioner was concerned for his safety. He was especially worried for his daughter, who had been living part-time with Petitioner on a split schedule with his ex-wife. When the news stories began to appear, the ex-wife refused to allow the daughter to visit with Petitioner. While he wanted to see his child, Petitioner knew that it was better for her to stay away from him until the situation improved. As a result of the publicity, the threats, and the stress on him and his family, Petitioner developed PTSD. The Department approved Petitioner for participation in EAP on March 6, 2015. EAP paid for counseling sessions with Petitioner’s chosen therapist, Mrs. Robinson. Petitioner had about 12 sessions with Mrs. Robinson while he was covered by EAP. After his EAP coverage expired, Petitioner met with Mrs. Robinson for two more sessions paid for as part of his FMLA leave. Mrs. Robinson identified Petitioner’s condition at the beginning of their sessions as quite extreme. He suffered from nightmares, crippling fear, paranoia, and unwillingness to leave his home. He had dark circles under his eyes and was obviously distraught. Mrs. Robinson began to work with Petitioner to help him view his fears and concerns differently. She taught him to utilize mindfulness meditation techniques. He was shown how to perform activities of daily life without being reminded of the trauma he had experienced. The number of sessions he spent with Mrs. Robinson was not sufficient for her to fully address his needs, however. She was able to diagnose his PTSD and began treatment for that condition, but their relationship ended before she could do much for him. By the time her treatment of Petitioner was concluded, they were working toward Petitioner’s acceptance of some inmates in his workplace, as long as they were not “general population inmates.” Ms. Robinson reiterated that Petitioner should not work within the prison compound, i.e., within the perimeter, at this time. She believed that with further assistance, Petitioner may one day be able to do so. By letter dated March 13, 2015, Mrs. Robinson notified the Department that, concerning Petitioner, “It is recommended that he does not return to work until further notice due to the hostility he has faced from the public, his co-workers and other inmates that he would be responsible for which could trigger further de-compensation and contribute to greater emotional disturbance. Mr. Quercioli is open to learning positive coping skills for improved feelings management as well as the treatments necessary for recovering from PTSD.” For about three months, the Department attempted to determine whether Petitioner would be able to return to work as a Correctional Officer Sergeant. On June 9, 2015, DOC notified Petitioner that his FMLA leave had been exhausted and he needed to talk to his supervisor, Major Patterson, about when he could come back to work. Mr. Patterson contacted Petitioner and basically said he would need to come back to work at the Lowell Annex, i.e., return to his old job. Meanwhile, the Department, by letter dated June 16, 2015, asked Mrs. Robinson for her opinion regarding whether Petitioner could work as a Correctional Officer Sergeant. The parties to this matter characterize the tone of that letter quite differently. It is therefore quoted here in its entirety for the purpose of objectivity: Dear Mrs. Robinson: The above employee [Petitioner] is a Correctional Office Sergeant with the Florida Department of Corrections at Lowell Correctional Institution. Your opinion regarding Mr. Quercioli’s medical status while working in a potentially dangerous environment will assist management in their decision to retain Mr. Quercioli in his current position. In order for us to determine whether or not Mr. Quercioli can safely perform his duties as a Correctional Officer Sergeant, we request that you complete this questionnaire as to his ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of a Correctional Officer Sergeant to full capacity. Please bear in mind that Correctional Officer Sergeants must be able to work split, rotating or fixed shifts, weekends, holidays and overtime possibly without notice as required. Overtime may include double shifts and working on off duty days. In order to assist you in making this determination, I am enclosing a position description and a list of essential functions for the Correctional Officer Sergeant position held by Mr. Quercioli. Also, please bear in mind that Mr. Quercioli’s job does require that he be able to possess a firearm. Furthermore, he could at any time be placed in a situation where the use of physical force, including deadly force may be necessary, to control violent inmates or prevent imminent threat to life. We ask that you provide information regarding how Mr. Quercioli can treat and control his condition in a correctional environment. In addition, we need to know what precautionary measures are required to ensure his physical condition is not exacerbated when he is involved in a highly dangerous situation with inmates or volatile situations with supervisors and/or co-workers. In rendering your opinion, if you determine Mr. Quercioli can perform some duties but not others, please specify which duties cannot be performed and the reason why. Additionally, if there is anything that can be done to allow him to perform these duties, please provide this information. In the letter making this request, the Department included a job description and a brief questionnaire to be filled out by the therapist. The questionnaire asked, “After reviewing the position description of Correctional Officer Sergeant, can Mr. Quercioli perform the duties of a Correctional Officer Sergeant with no restrictions?” The questionnaire went on to ask for any reasons that the question was answered in the negative. Mrs. Robinson replied that “No,” Petitioner could not perform the duties without restrictions. She went on to say that, “With 100% supervision of inmates as his primary duties and his constellation of PTSD symptoms, Mr. Quercioli would be at risk of decompensation. A job with no inmate contact may be possible in the future.” Mrs. Robinson had previously, in response to a Medical Certification request from FCHR, listed a few alternative jobs that Petitioner may be able to do, including: “administration away from inmates; staff security away from general population inmates; key keeper or arsenal maintenance away from general population inmates.” The evidence is unclear as to whether the Department was aware of her suggestions regarding those potential jobs for Petitioner. At final hearing, Ms. Robison reiterated her concern about Petitioner being asked to work in an area where general population inmates might be present. Her testimony, in part, was as follows: Q: “[W]ould he have been able to perform the required functions of his employment position based on what you read in his personnel description, the essential functions of his position, had the department considered or approved any request for accommodations Mr. Quercioli made on the department? A: The current job description, position description for a sergeant as a correctional officer, he couldn’t do that job. Q: Could he do others? A: He could do other jobs and we were working towards limited, you know, his acceptance and, you know, with the cognitive behavioral therapy helps you think different about things and he was opening up to the idea that yes, there will be inmates around but they’re at a lower level of risk, and so he was open to that and for trying to work in a different position. * * * Q: So, earlier or a few moments ago when you said he couldn’t perform under [sic] the position of a correctional sergeant, that’s not a hundred percent accurate, correct? A: Right, that was the job description, that is what he was doing in general population, supervising inmates. He can’t supervise inmates and that has a hundred percent by it, supervision of male or female inmates. That what he -- the part of his job that he couldn’t do. Q: Uh-huh, but with an accommodation, he could do that? A: Yes. In another job, other than supervising his primary one hundred percent duties of supervising male or female inmates. Tr., pp. 48-50. Exactly what duties Petitioner could perform without difficulty is unclear. It is certain he could not supervise inmates 100 percent of the time. Whether he could work around inmates in an environment separated from the prison compound is not certain. Whether he could respond to an emergency situation inside the compound is extremely doubtful.2/ Petitioner’s attorney submitted a letter to DOC dated June 26, 2015. The letter requested accommodations that might make it possible for Petitioner to perform one or more jobs at Lowell. The letter suggested part-time or modified work schedules, job restructuring, and other possibilities. The letter also stated, in part, “Instead of requiring Sergeant Quercioli to once again re-live the nightmares arising from his previous duty in the Lowell Annex, the Department could instead assign him to a less stressful desk job.” DOC responded that a less stressful desk job is not a feasible accommodation because a person in that position would not be able to perform the essential duties of a Correctional Officer Sergeant. The attorney responded to the Department that his previous request for an accommodation was not meant to be limited to a “desk job” only; he meant to include any reasonable accommodations. Though the two conversants used different terminology, it is obvious they were both addressing alternative jobs that did not require Petitioner to work within the prison compound, whether that meant literally sitting at a desk or not. Petitioner intimated, but did not conclusively prove, that there were certain jobs in the administration offices, i.e., outside the compound, that he might be capable of filling. No evidence was presented concerning the exact nature of those jobs, the responsibilities attached thereto, or Petitioner’s qualifications to fill them. Following the exchange of letters between DOC and Petitioner (through his attorney), the Department notified Petitioner via letter dated July 9, 2015, that a “personnel action” was being contemplated by DOC which could result in his dismissal from employment. The basis for a personnel action was that Petitioner’s therapist said he was “currently unable to perform the duties of . . . a Correctional Officer Sergeant.” Petitioner was given the opportunity to attend a pre- determination conference with DOC personnel to provide oral or written statements in regards to the personnel action. A conference was held on July 23, 2015. The Department was represented by Warden Gordon and Colonel Edith Pride. A teamster representative, Michael Riley, accompanied Petitioner to the conference. Petitioner’s attorney, Mr. Bisbee, attended the conference via telephone. Petitioner did not bring his therapist, Ms. Robinson, to the meeting because “it never crossed my mind” that she should attend. At the conference, Petitioner reiterated his desire to return to work, but stated he would rather not interact with inmates, even though he believed he might be able do so. His belief was inconsistent with his therapist’s determination and contrary to his attorney’s representations. It is unclear whether DOC could have assigned Petitioner to a position that did not involve some contact with inmates. There were a few jobs mentioned that take place in the prison’s administration building, outside the perimeter. Some of the “trustee” type inmates working within the administration building may have been much less threatening to Petitioner than general population inmates. But because every Correctional Officer Sergeant is deemed to be on call to attend to disturbances within the prison compound, regardless of their job or workplace, Petitioner could be subject to having close contact with the general population inmates. Petitioner identified one specific job in administration that he thought he might be able to handle despite some inmate contact. That job, in the area of training, was filled by another Correctional Officer Sergeant. Petitioner did not ever formally apply for the job. Subsequent to the predetermination conference, the Department issued a letter to Petitioner advising him that “You will be dismissed from your position as a Correctional Officer Sergeant effective August 4, 2015.” The letter gave Petitioner the right to grieve the action or to appeal it to the Public Employees Relations Commission. Petitioner did not avail himself of either of those options. Instead, he filed a claim with FCHR, resulting ultimately in the present action. DOC based its decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment on the fact that his own therapist had opined that he could not perform the essential functions of a Correctional Officer Sergeant. That is because persons in that position–-no matter what duties they were performing--must be able at a moment’s notice to react personally to any emergency situation that may arise within the inmate population. A correctional officer working in the motor pool, for example, may have to drop what he is doing, pick up a firearm, and rush into the compound to quell a disturbance. A sergeant who is performing training for other officers may have to cease her training and immediately report to duty inside the compound to respond to inmate unrest. There is no job under the Correctional Officer Sergeant umbrella that is immune from contact with inmates at any given time. There was, in short, no reasonable accommodation the Department could offer Petitioner. Two pertinent quotes from the record explain concisely the basis of the Department’s position in this case: As a general rule, we don’t “accommodate” correctional officers because the accommodations requested generally include exemption from the essential functions. We provide alternate duty for those officers who are temporarily unable to perform the duties of their position because of a work related injury. However, while on alternate duty, they do not wear a uniform, nor do they perform the duties of a [Correctional Officer]. * * * Quercioli’s therapist, Beth Robinson, stated he was not able to perform the duties of his position, although a job with no inmate contact may be possible in the future. There are no correctional officer positions, regardless of rank, whose essential functions do not include dealing with inmates. Exhibit 4 to Petitioner Exhibit 1, email from Patricia Linn, human resources analyst. It is not unusual for employees to request so-called “accommodations” from DOC relating to their duties as correctional officers. Such requests may include exceptions to the dress code, a need for ergonomic chairs, leave extensions, parking space changes, alternate work schedules, and the like. Each request is reviewed on its own merits and some are granted, some are denied. In fact, Petitioner alluded to the fact that after the inmate death incident, he had been reassigned to alternate duties not having to do with inmate monitoring. His duties were related to assisting applicants for jobs at Lowell to fill out their applications. Petitioner intimated that he did not enjoy that position. Petitioner asserts that DOC made no effort to contact him to discuss possible accommodations. He did not cite to any existing policy or rule which would require the Department to do so, however. Further, Petitioner admitted that he did not attempt to initiate such conversations with the Department, either. Since losing his job at Lowell, Petitioner has been unable to obtain gainful employment. Of the scores of internet applications for employment (and one in-person interview), not a single position came to fruition. As a result, Petitioner cashed out his state retirement plan, using the money to pay bills and provide for his daughter’s needs. Petitioner presented no evidence in this case that persons with disabilities were treated any differently by the Department when they requested accommodations.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Department of Corrections had legitimate cause for the dismissal of employment of Petitioner, Patrick Quercioli, and that there is no evidence of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2017.
Findings Of Fact On August 28, 1987, Respondent, David E. Hancock, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-02. On March 4, 1988, Respondent, Floyd W. Winkle, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-03. In March, 1989, Respondents were employed as correctional officers by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA operates the county corrections facilities for Bay Counnty, Florida. Additionally, CCA is responsible for booking new arrestees into the jail facility. On March 11, 1989, Respondent Hancock was the supervisor of the night shift at the main jail facility in Bay County. Respondent Winkle was the booking officer. The evening of the 11th was a very heavy evening for arrests. The facility was understaffed for the numbers of arrests being processed. In fact, the holding cells, located in the basement of the jail, were full and female prisoners were being held in the interview rooms across the hall from the holding cells. Marcus Kitchens was brought to the jail in a highly intoxicated state. He was bleeding and exhibited lacerations and abrasions to his face and limbs. Mr. Kitchens was also in a very noisy and rowdy state. During the course of the evening, one of the female prisoners requested to use the restroom facilities. These facilities are located in the holding cells which were occupied by the male prisoners. The male prisoners were transfered to an interview room so that the female prisoner could use the restroom facility in the holding cell. The transfer was made by Officer Winkle. One of the inmates was Marcus Kitchens. He had not yet been officially booked into the jail. While transferring the male prisoners back to the holding cell Mr. Kitchens asked Officer Winkle for a blanket. For a number of valid security reasons jail policy does not permit a prisoner to have a blanket until the prisoner is officially booked into the facility and on his her her way to a more permanent cell. When Mr. Kitchens was told that he could not have a blanket he became violent and charged Officer Winkle, hitting the officer on the left side of face with his fist and knocking the officer's glasses off. Officer Winkle pushed Mr. Kitchens into the holding cell. Mr. Kitchens grabbed Officer Winkle by the shirt and pulled him into the holding cell with him. The two landed up against one of the walls of the holding cell and Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle several more times in the chest and abdomen with his fist. While Officer Winkle was trying to block the blows, Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle again on the left side of the face. Officer Winkle then grabbed Mr. Kitchens and put him on the floor. Officer Hancock heard the noise from the altercation and responded from another part of the basement area to the site of the altercation. By the time Officer Hancock arrived, Officer Winkle had Mr. Kitchens on the floor. Officer Winkle was sitting on top of Mr. Kitchens trying to subdue him. Officer Hancock stepped in between Officer Winkle and the inmate, put his knee into Mr. Kitchens chest, grasped the shoulder area and shoved Mr. Kitchens against the back wall of the holding cell. Officer Hancock inquired if Officer Winkle was alright. After Officer Winkle responded that he was, Officer Hancock told him to leave the cell. Officer Winkle left the cell and Officer Hancock released Mr. Kitchens from the wall. Mr. Kitchens began to charge Officer Hancock. Officer Hancock ordered him not to move and Mr. Kitchens sat back down on the floor. Officer Hancock left the cell and the door was locked. The entire altercation to the close of the cell door lasted a maximum of two and one-half minutes. It was while Respondents were in the holding cell with Mr. Kitchens that the alleged excessive use of force occurred by Officer Winkle banging Mr. Kitchens' head against the floor and hitting him three times on the side of the head with his fist after Mr. Kitchens had submitted to the officers. The use of excessive force was testified to by an officer who arrived from another part of the basement area after the altercation began and who could only have seen the last few seconds of the incident. The only testimony this officer gave regarding Officer Hancock was that while he was leaning against the cell wall he told Officer Winkle that Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after which Officer Winkle allegedly banged Mr. Kitchens' head on the floor and punched him on the side of the head. Contrary to this officer's testimony and corroborative of Respondents' testimony was the testimony of the nurse on duty at the jail facility. She did not see any excessive use of force and did not hear Officer Hancock make the statement referenced above while the officers were in the holding cell. She also testified that Mr. Kitchen's appeared to be struggling somewhat while he was on the floor. Officer Hancock testified that he told Officer Winkle Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after the officers had locked the door to the holding cell. Officer Hancock made the statement in response to Officer Winkle's complaint that he needed help in booking. The statement was meant to communicate to Officer Winkle that help would not be forthcoming and that he had to handle Mr. Kitchens during the booking process. Clearly, given the facts of this case, such a vague statement, regardless of where it was made, does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Officer Hancock aided, abetted, counseled or procured any battery being effected against Mr. Kitchens. Moreover, this case boils down to a swearing match between the various parties and witnesses involved. On these facts and given the demeanor of the witnesses, such a swearing match does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Respondents have failed to maintain the good moral character required of correctional officers. Additionally, given the fact that the Respondents were subdueing a violent inmate and the very short time span in which the alleged use of force occurred it is improbable that any excessive force was used which would reflect on the character of either Respondent. Therefore the Administrative Complaints against each Respondent should be dismissed. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the amended Administrative Complaints filed against David E. Hancock and Floyd W. Winkle be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1992.
