The Issue Whether Respondent knowingly submitted an inaccurate timesheet for April 4, 2018, as charged in the agency action letter dated May 11, 2018.
Findings Of Fact ECUA is a public utility that provides water, wastewater, and sanitation services to customers in Escambia and Santa Rosa counties. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that the Board and employees of ECUA “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost- effective services.” The Manual sets forth the terms and conditions of employment with ECUA. The Manual specifies that: Overtime work should be for emergency or unforeseen situations and to solve problems which are not a part of the daily activities. Supervisors are expected to use overtime work sparingly and employees should respond when called upon. Overtime and compensatory time authorization will be established by the supervisor with the approval of the department director. During the relevant time period, ECUA employed Mr. Boyd as an Industrial Plant Mechanic I. On June 26, 2012, Mr. Boyd signed a document acknowledging that a copy of the Manual was available to him in his supervisor’s office, via ECUA’s intranet, in ECUA’s Human Resources Department, and via compact disc upon request. Mr. Boyd also acknowledged on June 26, 2012, that it was his “responsibility to read the entire Manual/Handbook and to comply with the plans, guidelines, directives, and procedures contained in the Manual/Handbook and any revisions to it.” As an Industrial Plant Mechanic I, Mr. Boyd works under the supervision of a senior mechanic. He normally begins his workday by reporting to the Central Wastewater Reclamation Facility (“CWRF”) at 7:00 a.m. and is dispatched to assigned worksites. He uses an ECUA truck to travel to and from those sites. Mr. Boyd has a 30-minute lunch break for which he is not compensated. He is also allowed one 15-minute break in the morning and another in the afternoon. Mr. Boyd’s typical workday ends at 3:30 p.m. With a 30-minute lunch break, that amounts to an eight-hour workday. In April of 2018, ECUA needed to replace all of the diffusers at its Bayou Marcus Water Reclamation Facility (“the BMWRF”). Mack H. Weeks, ECUA’s Plant Maintenance Manager at the time, had supervisory authority over Mr. Boyd. Shortly before April 4, 2018, Mr. Boyd mentioned to Mr. Weeks that he wanted to stop at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, prior to reporting to the CWRF, in order to see if the water level had decreased to a point where the diffusers in question were visible. According to Mr. Boyd, that information would enable him and the three other members of his four-person work crew to ascertain what parts they needed to complete the repair. However, there was no benefit for Mr. Boyd to stop at the BMWRF prior to reporting to the CWRF.3/ At 6:32 a.m. on April 4, 2018, ECUA’s security system recorded Mr. Boyd passing through a gate at the BMWRF. Mr. Boyd took a picture of a portion of the BMWRF a few minutes later. The security system at the CWRF recorded Mr. Boyd entering the facility at 7:13 a.m. on April 4, 2018. Mr. Boyd traveled back to the BMWRF with Kevin Spinks, an ECUA co-worker, in an ECUA work truck that had been assigned to Mr. Spinks. Carl Ayliffe and another ECUA employee were the remainder of the four-person work crew assigned to that job, and they traveled to the BMWRF in a separate ECUA truck. The tank at the BMWRF was on-line by 3:00 p.m. on April 4, 2018. Every ECUA truck has a global positioning system that enables ECUA to know precisely where each truck is at virtually any given point in time. The GPS on Mr. Spinks’ truck was not functioning because the antenna had been disconnected. However, the GPS on Mr. Ayliffe’s truck was functioning and recorded that he was done working at 4:29 p.m., on April 4, 2018.4/ Rather than returning his truck to the CWRF, Mr. Ayliffe drove the truck to his home because he was on call that night. A camera at the back gate of the CWRF recorded Mr. Spinks returning his truck at 5:07 p.m. on April 4, 2018. ECUA’s security system recorded Mr. Boyd using his employee badge to enter the CWRF through the southeast shop door at 5:09 p.m. on April 4, 2018. In consideration of a need to gather any belongings and/or complete paperwork, Mr. Boyd’s work on April 4, 2018, should have ended at approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 4, 2018. On April 16, 2018, Mr. Boyd, Mr. Spinks, and Mr. Ayliffe submitted timesheets indicating that they each worked eight regular hours and three overtime hours on April 4, 2018. Ultimate Findings The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that there was no benefit to Mr. Boyd stopping at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, prior to reporting for work at the CWRF. The greater weight of the evidence also demonstrates that his stop at the BMWRF was unauthorized by anyone who supervised Mr. Boyd. As a result, Mr. Boyd’s stop at the BMWRF on April 4, 2018, was an attempt to accumulate unnecessary overtime pay. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Boyd began his workday at 7:13 a.m. on April 4, 2018, and his workday should have ended at approximately 5:30 p.m. after he reported back to the CWRF at 5:09 p.m. Given that Mr. Boyd was entitled to a 30-minute, unpaid lunch break, the undisputed evidence indicates that he worked 9.75 hours on April 4, 2018, rather than the 11 hours indicated on his timesheet.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Robert D. Boyd, II, violated Section B-3, attendance records; Section B-13 A (4), conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee; Section B-13 A (13), falsification of records; and Section B-13 A (33), violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2018.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Respondent Oculina Bank is entitled to a Consolidated Environmental Resource Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization to construct three single-family homes, an access drive, surface water management system, and three single-family docks in Indian River County.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner Pelican Island Audubon Society has more than 25 members residing in Indian River County, was in existence for more than a year before Oculina Bank filed its application for the Permit, and was formed for the purpose of protecting the environment, fish, and wildlife resources. Petitioners Carolyn Stutt and Garrett Bewkes live approximately one mile north of the proposed project site, on John's Island, which is on the opposite side of the Indian River Lagoon from the proposed project site. Petitioner Carolyn Stutt uses the Lagoon for boating, nature observation, nature photography, and sketching. Petitioner Garrett Bewkes uses the Lagoon for boating and fishing. Petitioners Orin Smith and Stephanie Smith did not testify at the final hearing nor present other evidence to show they have substantial interests that could be affected by the proposed project. Respondents did not stipulate to any facts that would establish the Smiths’ substantial interests. Respondent Oculina Bank has an undivided ownership interest in the project site and is the applicant for the Permit that is the subject of this proceeding. DEP is the state agency responsible for regulating construction activities in waters of the State. DEP also has authority to process applications for authorization from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board of Trustees") to use sovereignty submerged lands for structures and activities that will preempt their use by the general public. The Project Site The project site is 15.47 acres and located along 45th Street/Gifford Dock Road in Vero Beach. It is on the western shoreline of the Indian River Lagoon. The Lagoon in this area is part of the Indian River- Malabar to Vero Beach Aquatic Preserve. It is an Outstanding Florida Water. The Lagoon is an estuary, but it is almost non-tidal in this area. There is a seasonal rise in sea level that occurs from August to November and it is during this season that waters of the Lagoon flood into adjacent wetlands. The wetlands may be inundated at other times as a result of large storms. The wetlands along the western shore of the Lagoon play a role in regional tarpon and snook fisheries. Wetlands provide essential refuges for early-stage tarpon and snook. When the wetlands are inundated, larval tarpon and snook can move into the wetlands and seek out shallow areas to avoid predation by larger fish. The project site is dominated by salt marsh wetlands. In order to control salt marsh mosquitoes, the site was impounded by the Indian River Mosquito Control District sometime in the 1950s by excavating ditches and building earthen berms or dikes along the boundaries of the site. The mean high water line of the Lagoon in this area is 0.78 feet. The berms were constructed to an elevation of about five feet, but there are now lower elevations in some places. The wetlands on the site are isolated for much of the year because the waters of the Lagoon cannot enter the wetlands unless the waters rise above the lowest berm elevations. This connection only occurs in unusually high water conditions. The impoundment berms have decreased the frequency and duration of the project site’s inundation by waters from the Lagoon. There are almost 14 acres of wetlands impounded by the berms. The impounded wetlands are dominated by salt grass. There are also mangroves, mostly white mangroves, along the side slopes of the berms. Most of the upland areas are dominated by Brazilian pepper trees and Australian pine trees, which are non- native, invasive vegetation. Within the wetlands are three ponds. Before the project site was impounded for mosquito control, it had "high marsh" vegetation such as saltwort and glasswort, as well as black and red mangroves. The impoundment resulted in the reduction of these species. There is now reduced nutrient export from the impounded wetlands to the Lagoon. The project site still provides nesting, denning, and foraging habitat for birds and other wildlife. However, the environmental health and productivity of the wetlands on the site have been reduced by the impoundment berms. The adverse effects of impounding wetlands for mosquito control are widely understood by environmental scientists. Therefore, reconnecting impounded wetlands along the Indian River Lagoon has been a local and state governmental objective. North and south of the project site are salt marsh wetlands that have been restored. To the north is a portion of the mitigation area for a development called Grand Harbor. To the south is the CGW Mitigation Bank. Both adjacent wetland areas were restored by reconnecting them to the Lagoon and removing exotic vegetation. The restored wetlands to the north and south now contain a dominance of saltwort and glasswort. They also have more black and red mangroves. These environmental improvements, as well as an increase in species diversity, are typical for former mosquito control impoundments that have been restored. In the offshore area where the three proposed docks would be constructed, there are scattered seagrasses which are found as close as 25 feet offshore and far as 100 feet offshore. They include Manatee grass, Cuban shoal grass, and Johnson’s seagrass. The Proposed Project The proposed home sites are on separate, recorded lots ranging in size from 4.5 acres to 6.5 acres. The home sites would have 6,000 square feet of "footprint." The houses would be constructed on stilts. There would be a single access driveway to the home sites, ending in a cul-de-sac. The displacement of wetlands that would have been required for the side slopes of the access drive and cul-de-sac was reduced by proposing a vertical retaining wall on the western or interior side of the drive. Each home site has a dry retention pond to store and treat stormwater runoff. The ability of these retention ponds to protect water quality is not disputed by Petitioners. The home sites and access drive would be constructed on the frontal berm that runs parallel to the shoreline. However, these project elements would require a broader and higher base than the existing berm. The total developed area would be about three acres, 1.85 acres of which is now mangrove swamp and salt marsh and 0.87 acres is ditches. One of the onsite ponds would be eliminated by the construction. The houses would be connected to public water and sewer lines. Oculina Bank would grant a perpetual conservation easement over 11.69 acres of onsite salt marsh wetlands. It would remove Brazilian Pepper trees, a non-native plant, from the site. Petitioners' original objection to the proposed project and their decision to file a petition for hearing appears to have been caused by Oculina Bank's proposal to build docks over 500 feet in length. The dock lengths in the final revision to the project vary in length from 212 to 286 feet. The docks do not extend out more than 20 percent of the width of the waterbody. The docks do not extend into the publicly maintained navigation channel of the Lagoon. Because the docks meet the length limit specified in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21, they are presumed not to create a navigation hazard. To reduce shading of sea grasses, the decking material for the docks would be grated to allow sunlight to pass through the decking. There are no seagrasses at the waterward end of the docks where the terminal platforms would be located and where boats would usually be moored. The dock pilings will be wrapped with an impervious membrane to prevent the treatment chemicals from leaching into the water. In Oculina I, the Administrative Law Judge determined that the condition for vessels moored at the proposed docks should be stated as a maximum permissible draft. The Permit imposes a maximum draft for boats using the docks. Fish Survey Oculina Bank conducted a fish sampling survey in 2014 to obtain additional information about the presence of tarpon, snook, rivulus, and other fish on the project site. Twenty-three sampling stations were established and sampled from January 16, 2014 to February 16, 2014. The survey was conducted during a period of seasonal high water in order to catalog the highest number of fish that might migrate in and out of the site during high water. Oculina Bank collected five species of fish that are typically found in impounded areas. No tarpon or snook were found. Oculina Bank did not find Florida Gar or Least Killifish during the fish survey, but Dr. Taylor observed these two species on his site inspection in 2015. He also saw three to five juvenile tarpon. No testimony about snook was presented at the final hearing nor was this fish mentioned in Petitioners’ Proposed Recommended Order. Mangrove Rivulus Rivulus marmoratus, or mangrove rivulus, is designated a species of special concern by the FWC. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-27.005(2)(b). Species of special concern are those species for which there are concerns regarding status and threats, but for which insufficient information is available to list the species as endangered or threatened. Some research indicates rivulus are more common than originally believed. Certain populations of rivulus in Florida are healthy and thriving. A team of scientists who participated in a biological status review of the rivulus for the FWC recommended that the rivulus be delisted. The team included Dr. Taylor and Dr. Wilcox. In Oculina I, Dr. Gilmore did not find any rivulus on the project site, but he expressed the opinion that the site had rivulus habitat and they were probably on the site. In his more recent visits to the project site in conjunction with the current proceeding, Dr. Gilmore did not observe any rivulus. Oculina Bank did not find any rivulus during its fish survey. Dr. Taylor sampled for rivulus on the site on five different days in 2015 and found five rivulus in a ditch outside (waterward) of the impoundment berm. Dr. Taylor sampled “extensively” for rivulus in the interior of the project site, but found none there. Still, he believes there are probably some in the interior. The area where the rivulus were found outside the impoundment berm would not be changed by the proposed project. However, Oculina Bank’s proposal to scrape down the impoundment berm would eliminate many crab burrows, which are habitat for the rivulus. Dr. Taylor and Dr. Wilcox agreed that rivulus are more likely to be found in areas that are tidally connected. The preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioners’ claim that the proposed project would, on balance, adversely affect the mangrove rivulus. However, the recommended permit modifications should benefit the species. Tarpon In Oculina I, Dr. Gilmore testified that the project site was “one of the critical habitats maintaining regional tarpon fisheries.” However, he only observed one “post larval” tarpon in 2012 and none in 2014. Dr. Gilmore stated that a small mesh seine is the best method to sample for these nursery phase tarpon, but he never used such a seine to sample for them on the project site, nor did anyone else. Extensive evidence regarding on-site investigations and literature related to tarpon was presented at the final hearing. Sometimes the testimony failed to distinguish between early stage (larval) tarpon and later stage (juvenile) tarpon, whose habitat needs are not the same. The nursery and refuge functions of the wetlands on the project site relate primarily to larval tarpon, not juvenile tarpon. The shallow ponds on the project site are an important habitat type that can be used by larval tarpon when related hydrologic conditions are compatible. The preponderance of the evidence does not support the characterization of the wetlands on the project site as “critical habitat” for tarpon in the region. The current hydrologic conditions diminish the value of the nursery and refuge functions provided by the wetlands. Improving the connection between the wetlands and the Lagoon can enhance the tarpon nursery function if the improved connection is made without giving predators of larval tarpon access to the interior ponds. Dr. Gilmore stated, “you don’t have to take down the entire dike, you can create low spots.” By low spots, he means areas like the one that currently exists in the southern impoundment berm that is at about elevation 2.0 feet. The preponderance of the evidence shows the proposed project would not adversely affect the nursery function of the wetlands for tarpon if the recommended modifications are made to the Permit to improve the connection to the Lagoon while keeping the interior ponds isolated from the Lagoon for most of the year. Mitigation DEP conducted a Uniform Mitigation Assessment Methodology (“UMAM”) analysis for the proposed project that assumed direct impacts to 2.72 acres of mangrove swamp. It did not account for secondary impacts that could be caused by the proposed project. DEP’s UMAM analysis determined there would be a functional loss of 1.269 units. It further determined that these losses would be offset by the creation of 0.88 acres of salt marsh and the enhancement of 10.81 acres of mangrove swamp, resulting in a net functional gain of 2.342 units. DEP concluded that, if functional losses caused by secondary impacts were included, there would be a functional loss of 2.350 units, which still results in a net gain of 3.056 units. Because DEP determined there would be a net gain in functional value, it did not require Oculina Bank to provide additional on-site mitigation or to purchase mitigation credits from an off-site mitigation bank. The UMAM analysis performed by DEP did not adequately account for the lost tarpon nursery function and the proposed mitigation could further diminish the nursery function. The purchase of mitigation bank credits would not offset the lost nursery function because the mitigation bank was not shown to provide a nursery function.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue Permit No. 31-0294393-003-EI, with the following modifications: The impoundment berm will not be scraped down to mean sea level, but, instead, two new low spots will be created in the impoundment berm at an elevation of approximately 2.0 feet. A new isolated pond will be created to replace the one that will be eliminated by the construction, similar in size to the one that will be eliminated. Internal ditches and other channels will be filled as needed to eliminate predator access to the ponds. If these modifications are not made, it is recommended that the Permit be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Marcy I. LaHart, Esquire Marcy I. LaHart, P.A. 4804 Southwest 45th Street Gainesville, Florida 32608-4922 (eServed) Glenn Wallace Rininger, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Nicholas M. Gieseler, Esquire Steven Gieseler, Esquire Gieseler and Gieseler, P.A. 789 South Federal Highway, Suite 301 Stuart, Florida 34994 (eServed) Jonathan P. Steverson, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Craig Varn, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner proved that Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014),1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant facts: The Parties Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement in chapter 440 that employers in the state of Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance benefits covering their employees. Perez Concrete is a subcontractor/corporation registered to do business in Florida. Its principal business address is 6632 Willow Street, Mount Dora, Florida. Intervenor, KC Curb, is a contractor/corporation registered to do business in Florida. Its principal business address is 4975 Patch Road, Orlando, Florida. A representative of the FFVA Mutual Insurance Company (FFVA) testified. FFVA is a mutual insurance company in Florida which provides, among other things, workers' compensation insurance coverage. The witness was an underwriting supervisor. In general, workers' compensation policies go through a yearly review and renewal process handled by the underwriter. KC Curb had been a client of FFVA since 2006. Perez Concrete has never been a client of FFVA, and Perez Concrete is not a named insured on the workers' compensation insurance policy held by KC Curb from 2013 through 2015. There have been occasions when KC Curb picks up employees of subcontractors and includes them in its self-audits. Under those circumstances, KC Curb pays the premium for those particular subcontractor employees. If KC Curb pays a premium that includes the payroll for a subcontractor's employee, his or her workers' compensation benefits are covered by the KC Curb workers' compensation policy. FFVA performs an audit each year on all of the workers' compensation policies it writes. The final audit is performed, in part, to determine the final premium due on the account for that year. During a final audit, FFVA reviews any payroll paid to subcontractors. If those subcontractors did not have a certificate of insurance, then FFVA would include the payroll paid to that subcontractor to calculate the final premium due from the general contractor. If FFVA identified that there were certain subcontractor employees during the audit that worked for Perez Concrete, who were doing work on the subcontract with KC Curb, the premium would be calculated based upon those additional Perez Concrete employees. As a result, those Perez Concrete employees would be covered under the KC Curb workers' compensation insurance policy and entitled to benefits if injured on the job. KC Curb's final premium would be based on the final yearly audit including any subcontractor employees of Perez Concrete. The subcontractor employees would be covered for any injuries on the job that might have occurred during the year audited. The premium ultimately charged to the general contractor is based solely on the payroll, and not on named employees. KC Curb also does a monthly self-audit which only includes its payroll. The company makes a monthly premium payment based on what is shown in its monthly audit. If KC Curb picks up or includes an employee of a subcontractor on its monthly self-audit and reports pay going to that person, then that subcontractor employee is covered for workers' compensation benefits. When end-of-the-year audits are performed, the reports provided by KC Curb contains names of its own employees or a description of employees. This report would list the employees of KC Curb, but it would not list the employees of any subcontractors, only the amount of payroll for those subcontractors. The owner of Perez Concrete is Agustin Osorio, who testified. Perez Concrete builds concrete sidewalks, driveways, curbs, and inlets. It also does the framing and finishes the concrete. Perez Concrete had a workers' compensation insurance policy providing benefit to its employees in place from August 2013 through April 2015, with Madison Insurance Company. See, generally, Resp. Exhs. B-D. Perez Concrete's policy was canceled for late payments on April 10, 2015. Apparently, Perez Concrete was late with two payments, and the Madison Insurance Company canceled Perez Concrete's workers' compensation policy. Perez Concrete had two employees, in addition to Osorio, in July 2015, when it was first visited by Petitioner's compliance investigator, Stephanie Scarton. Scarton stopped by while the employees were performing a small sidewalk finished job in Rockledge, Florida, for KC Curb. During this first meeting, Osorio told Scarton that the KC Curb's workers' compensation policy "was covering me." Osorio testified that she responded "everything was all right." Upon questioning by the undersigned, Osorio clarified that the first visit of the investigator was in the middle of July 2015 at a work location in Rockledge, Florida. After discussing his operations and telling the investigator about the KC Curb policy coverage, she left. Osorio testified that Scarton called KC Curb that same day to confirm his comments, and then she told him that everything was "all right." Osorio testified that the same investigator visited again on August 19, 2015. That day, she gave him the Stop-Work Order. Osorio testified that it was during the August 19, 2015, visit that she changed her previous response and said that Perez Concrete was not covered under the KC Curb policy. As the owner, Osorio had a valid exemption for himself from workers' compensation coverage from January 2014 through January 2016. Resp. Exh. E. Osorio had a conversation with "Robin" from KC Curb (date not specified). When he asked her whether Perez Concrete was covered, she told him that his company would be covered under KC Curb's workers' compensation policy. Osorio testified that Perez Concrete pays KC Curb seven percent of the weekly revenue derived from working for KC Curb, in order to be included on KC Curbs workers' compensation policy. Perez Concrete pays an additional one percent to KC Curb to be included on its general liability insurance policy. Perez Concrete had bought its own workers' compensation policy in 2013 and in 2014. Resp. Exhs. B-D. When Perez Concrete's policy was canceled by Madison Insurance Company on April 10, 2015, Osorio contacted KC Curb about the insurance. Osorio understood that by doing so, he had secured the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage for his employees. When Osorio contacted the KC Curb representatives, he told them that he wanted to continue working with them and asked them about the insurance coverage. Petitioner's compliance investigator, Scarton, testified. She has held that position since approximately April 2013. She conducts random site visits to verify that companies have workers' compensation coverage. She conducts approximately 80 compliance investigations per month. On July 6, 2015, she conducted a random visit at a construction site where concrete work was being performed by Perez Concrete. She spoke with Osorio who told her that he did not have workers' compensation insurance coverage, but that he was covered through another company. In checking her CCAS automated data system, she confirmed that Perez Concrete did not carry its own workers' compensation policy.2/ After speaking with Osorio and getting his explanation, she contacted KC Curb and spoke with Robin Sempier. She was informed that KC Curb paid the workers' compensation coverage for Perez Concrete. Sempier told the investigator that KC Curb was allowed to proceed in that fashion with its subcontractors under an arrangement from a previous compliance case handled by Petitioner.3/ After speaking with Sempier about Perez Concrete's situation, Scarton contacted her supervisor, Robert Serrone. He directed her to refer the case involving Perez Concrete to Petitioner's fraud unit and to let them handle the investigation. Scarton's next involvement was in August 2015, when she was contacted by her supervisor and directed to issue a stop-work order to Perez Concrete. She obtained the Stop-Work Order, and served it on Perez Concrete on August 19, 2015. Petitioner also served Perez Concrete with a business records request. Perez Concrete did not comply with the request, nor did it submit any business records to Petitioner. Upon inquiry by the undersigned, the parties stipulated on the record that the appropriate amount of the penalty would be $11,902.20, should a violation be proven. The investigator asked the KC Curb representative to send her documentation confirming that KC Curb pays the workers' compensation coverage for Perez Concrete. The investigator opined on cross-examination that the employees of Perez Concrete were not covered by KC Curb. Scarton concluded that "in accordance with the investigations that we conduct, Perez Concrete would need to carry the coverage." Tr., p. 139, line 7. She later stated that on July 6, 2015, she could not confirm insurance coverage "one way or another." Tr., p. 140, lines 6 and 13. Professor Joseph W. Little of Gainesville, Florida, was called to testify as an expert on behalf of Perez Concrete and KC Curb. He is currently employed as an adjunct faculty member at the University of Florida, College of Law. He is also Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Florida, College of Law. He had been employed as a professor at the University of Florida, College of Law, since 1967, teaching workers' compensation law. Little is unquestionably an expert in the field of Workers' Compensation Law. Little also authored the legal hornbook entitled "Workers' Compensation," a publication of the West Publishing Company. Little reviewed the facts of the case by reviewing the documentation provided by counsel who retained him. This included the Stop-Work Order, the petition, an amended petition, motions, and orders issued in the case. He also studied the applicable statutes and administrative rules of Petitioner as well as decisional law that he felt was relevant.4/ Little testified, and the undersigned considered, that he was not aware of any decisional law in the state of Florida interpreting the word "secure" to mean "buy" or "must buy," so long as there was an agreement between the subcontractor and the prime contractor that one or the other would purchase the insurance. Tr., p. 180, line 4. Little testified that the concept of the "statutory employer" found in chapter 440 has remained in place and steady throughout the history of the statute. He pointed out other relevant statutes in chapter 440 that needed to be read in pari materia with one another. An insurance agent from Bouchard Insurance, John Manis, also testified. Bouchard Insurance is a commercial insurance agency which sells workers' compensation insurance. Bouchard Insurance represents FFVA and sells workers' compensation insurance as an agent for that company. Manis had worked on the KC Curb account since 2005. He is familiar with how KC Curb and FFVA conduct their workers' compensation business together, including the payment of premiums. When a workers' compensation policy is written, the business will give its payrolls to the agent who determines the class codes that are applied and used in the policy. At the end of each year, an audit is conducted on those payrolls to determine whether or not the business owes money to FFVA, or if a refund from FFVA is in order. Some companies, like KC Curb, do a monthly audit--during which they input their payroll and are told what premium is due for the month. When a subcontractor of KC Curb declines or fails to obtain its own insurance policy, the subcontractor's employee becomes "like an employee of KC Curb," and FFVA will charge KC Curb for those employees, as if they were its own. The names of actual subcontractor employees are provided at audit time, not during the year. Apparently, this is a common practice in the industry. The office manager for KC Curb is Sempier. She testified that KC Curb is a concrete curb construction company that has been in business for 22 years in the Orlando area. It performs concrete construction services using a combination of in- house crews and subcontractors. One of Sempier's duties is to monitor subcontractor compliance with the Workers' Compensation Laws. She characterized KC Curb as being "very on top of that." Subcontractors are required to provide KC Curb with certificates of insurance before they start any work. Subcontractors are required to produce a certificate of workers' compensation insurance, or they go under the KC Curb policy as an uninsured subcontractor. Although KC Curb requires subcontractors to get their own insurance because this is much less expensive, some of them cannot or do not secure their own, so KC Curb secures it. The subcontractor is back-charged for this coverage. In monthly workers' compensation self-audits, Sempier includes a sheet that shows payroll for KC Curb's uninsured contractors and its own employees. Those numbers are combined together along with other clerical classes and the insurance premium payment is calculated. Tr., p. 221, line 3. Although not required by the FFVA, KC Curb includes payroll numbers for its uninsured subcontractors in each monthly self-audit. Tr., p. 221, line 11. Respondent's Exhibit J, entitled "Self-Reported Payroll," was explained by the witness. The document, prepared and issued by KC Curb for 2015, includes an entry reflecting the total payroll paid each month for KC Curb. This included both KC Curb's own W-2 employees and employees of subcontractors. Tr., p. 227, line 19. The second page of Respondent's Exhibit J (with information regarding other subcontractors redacted) shows that the payroll for employees of Perez Concrete was included beginning April 2, 2015. Tr., p. 224, line 16. Respondent's Exhibit J indicates, bottom right, the number of employees that were picked up from Perez Concrete.5/ Monthly premiums are paid by KC Curb instantaneously "on-line" and are based on the total payroll numbers listed in Respondent's Exhibit J, beginning with page 2. The payment comes directly out a KC Curb's checking account. Sempier testified that once payment was made, all employees included in the payroll amounts are covered by KC Curb's workers' compensation policy, including the Perez Concrete employee number listed. Tr., p. 224, line 23, and p. 253, line 14. See Resp. Ex. J, p. 2, bottom right. Work orders are received from the subcontractors for KC Curb. Those work orders are supposed to list the names of the subcontractor's employees. In this manner, KC Curb is able to determine how many employees are going to be covered by insurance for a particular subcontractor. When KC Curb was informed that the policy of insurance for Perez Concrete had been canceled, KC Curb called Perez Concrete's insurance agent to get the exact date of cancellation. When Perez Concrete's workers' compensation insurance cancellation was confirmed, KC Curb notified Perez Concrete in writing that it needed to promptly provide new certificates of insurance. See Resp. Exh. H. Perez Concrete was likewise notified in writing of KC Curb's requirements for "KC Curb to provide Workers' Compensation Insurance for your Company." See Resp. Exh. I. Osorio testified that Perez Concrete chose to have KC Curb secure the insurance for Perez Concrete after April 10, 2015, and he signed Respondent's Exhibit I agreeing to follow the guidelines for workers' compensation insurance. Thereafter, KC Curb began to pick up and include Perez Concrete's employees on its monthly self-audits. Likewise, it started to pay a premium amount for insurance which included payroll related to Perez Concrete's employees. Sempier was contacted by Petitioner's investigator, Scarton. When she informed the investigator that KC Curb was compliant with the law and was following a procedure previously permitted, the investigator called back that same day and asked for her to get something from her agent verifying that Perez Concrete was covered. Sempier testified that she promptly obtained a letter from KC Curb's insurance confirming coverage for Perez Concrete and thought she attached it with her email back to the investigator. Tr., p. 256, line 18. She subsequently learned that she attached the wrong document to the email, and the investigator did not receive the confirmation letter.6/ The evidence indicated that in the year 2015, KC Curb provided workers' compensation insurance coverage as a "statutory employer" for the employees of approximately seven of its subcontractors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, issue a final order withdrawing or dismissing the proposed penalty and finding that Respondent was in compliance with the statute during the relevant period of time. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2016.
The Issue This proceeding concerns an Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit given by the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") to Respondent, Edmund Burke ("Burke"), for construction of a retaining wall and wooden pile-supported bridge crossing a portion of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The ultimate issues for determination are whether Petitioner has standing to challenge the proposed DER action, and if so, whether the proposed agency action complies with the requirements of Sections 403.91 through 403.938, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edmund Burke, on January 15, 1988, filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") application number 431441608 for a permit to construct a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge approximately 80 feet long and 10 feet wide connecting the mainland with an island in the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The bridge was to span a 50 foot canal or creek ("channel") in the River. One of two retaining walls was to be located on the mainland peninsula. The other retaining wall was to be located on the island (the "initial project"). Between January 15, 1988, and April 28, 1989, the initial project was modified by Respondent, Burke, to satisfy DER concerns over potential impacts, including secondary impacts, relevant to the application. The width of the bridge was reduced from 10 feet to 6 feet. The retaining wall initially planned at the point where the bridge intersects the island was eliminated. The retaining wall on the mainland side of the bridge was relocated above mean high water. Sixty feet of the proposed bridge runs from mean high water to mean high water. An additional 10 feet on each end of the bridge is located above mean high water. The project remained a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge (the "modified project"). The Intent to Issue, dated April 28, 1989, indicated that the modifications required by DER had been made, that the modifications satisfied DER concerns relevant to the initial project, and that DER intended to issue a permit for construction of the modified project. The elimination of the retaining wall obviated any necessity for backfill on the island. The reduction in the width of the bridge virtually eliminated the secondary impacts on the surrounding habitat, resulted in less shading of the water, and precluded vehicular traffic over the bridge. The final modification that was "necessary in order for [DER] to approve this application" was the reduction in the width of the bridge from 10 feet to 6 feet. Petitioner's Exhibit 17. DER's requirement for this final modification was communicated to Mr. Cangianelli in a telephone conversation on April 6, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 18), and memorialized in a letter to Respondent, Burke, on April 14, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 17). The final modification was made, and the Intent to Issue was written on April 28, 1989. Petitioner's Case. Property commonly known as Harbor Estates is adjacent to the site of the modified project. A constructed harbor and contiguous park are located within the boundaries of Harbor Estates. Both are used by residents of Harbor Estates and both are proximate to the site of the modified project. The harbor entrance and site of the modified project are located on opposite sides of a peninsula approximately 40 feet wide and approximately 125 feet long. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that can navigate under the modified project need only travel the length of the peninsula, a distance of approximately 125 feet through the channel, in order to reach the harbor entrance. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that cannot navigate under the proposed bridge must travel around the island, a distance of approximately 1800 feet in the main body of the St. Lucie River, in order to reach the harbor entrance. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that prior to the construction of the bridge the channel was navigable by boats not capable of passing under the bridge after the bridge was completed. Petitioner, Harbor Estates Associates, Inc., submitted no evidence to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of modifications required by DER. Of Petitioner's 26 exhibits, Exhibits 1-19, 24 and 25 were relevant to the initial project but were not material to claims in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of the modifications required by DER. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 was cumulative of DER's Exhibit 6B. Petitioner's Exhibits 22 and 26, respectively, concern a 1980 bridge permit and a Proposed Comprehensive Growth Management Plan for Martin County, Florida. Petitioner offered no expert testimony in support of the pleadings in the Petition including assertions that: the modified project will have a direct adverse impact upon water quality and the welfare or property of others; the channel is navigable by deep-draft motor vessels; the modified project will result in shoaling that will have to be corrected at the expense of Harbor Estates; the modified project will result in prohibited destruction of mangroves; or that the modified project will cause any of the other specific adverse effects described in the Petition. The testimony of fact witnesses called by Petitioner was not material to Petitioner's claims that modifications required by DER were inadequate. The testimony of Bob Nicholas was relevant to allegations of prior violations but was not dispositive of any issue concerning the adequacy of modifications required by DER. The testimony of William Burr was admitted as rebuttal testimony relevant to precedents in the general area of the modified project but failed to address the adequacy of modifications required by DER. Petitioner consistently demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the applicable law, the proper scope of the formal hearing, and the distinction between argument and evidence. Petitioner repeatedly attempted to establish violations of laws not relevant to the proceeding including local laws and other environmental laws. Petitioner attempted to establish issues by arguing with witnesses during direct and cross examination, and by repeatedly making unsworn ore tenus representations of fact. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact in this proceeding because Petitioner failed to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings. Petitioner presented no evidence refuting Respondent, Burke's, showing that the modifications required by DER were adequate to assure water quality and the public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. Evidence presented by Petitioner was not material to the issue of whether the modifications required by DER were adequate for the purposes of the law applicable to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose, primarily to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or approval of the proposed activity. Respondents' Case. The island to be accessed by the modified project is approximately 2.5 acres in area and contains mostly wetland. The island is approximately 900 feet long. The portion of the island that is beyond DER permit jurisdiction is less than 200 feet long and less than 50 feet wide. The site of the modified project is located in Class III waters. Respondent, Burke, provided adequate assurances that portions of the modified project not extending over open water will be constructed upon property owned by him. The single retaining wall to be constructed at the southeastern terminus of the modified project will be constructed landward of DER jurisdiction. The modified project permits neither the installation of water or electrical conduits to the island nor any excavation, filling, or construction on the island. Respondent, Burke, must provide notification to DER before any such activity is begun. The bridge will accommodate no vehicular traffic larger or heavier than a golf cart. Golf cart access is necessary in order to accommodate a physical disability of Respondent, Burke. The modified project employs adequate methods to control turbidity, limit mangrove alteration on the island, and limit potential collisions with manatees. Vegetation, including mangroves, will not be removed. Incidental, selective trimming of vegetation will be allowed to create access to the island. The single retaining wall to be constructed on the mainland will be located landward of mangroves. Turbidity curtains will be used during construction to minimize short term water quality impacts. The modified project requires turbidity screens to be installed if there is any indication of sedimentation. No mechanical equipment will be located on the island during construction. No boats will be moored at the site of the modified project. The modified project will cause no significant downstream shoaling or silting. The site of the modified project is located approximately 15 feet from an existing fishing platform. No significant shoaling has been associated with that platform. The impacts associated with the modified project are similar to the impacts associated with single family docks in the area. No significant shoaling has been associated with such docks. The modified project is not a navigational hazard. The elevation is sufficient to accommodate small boats, canoes, and row boats. Reflective devices are required to alert night boat traffic of its presence. There is adequate clearance under the bridge to prevent obstruction. DER reviewed all applicable rules and criteria in considering the modified project. The modified project will have no adverse effect upon public health, safety or welfare, or the property of others. The modified project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish, wildlife, or their habitats. The modified project will not adversely affect navigation, the flow of water, or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The modified project will not adversely impact fishing value or marine productivity in the area. The modified project will have no adverse impact upon recreational values in the vicinity. The modified project was reviewed in a manner that is customary for similar projects reviewed by DER. It is common practice for DER employees, as they did in this case, to rely upon opinions of other DER professionals in formulating an intent to issue. Other projects within DER jurisdiction in the general geographic area of the modified project and within the same region were considered in DER's review process. Other docks and marinas have been constructed and are proposed for construction within the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. Bridges including pedestrian bridges have been and are proposed to be constructed in Martin County. DER did not require a hydrographic study because the modified project was considered a minor project. DER review took into account the intended future use of the island property and DER's past experience with Respondent, Burke. As part of its review, DER reviewed a conceptual bridge to a single family residence on the island which would not require any fill or construction of retaining walls. In addition, DER considered previous violations on the island under Florida Administrative Code Rules 17-4.070, 17-4.160, and 17-4.530 in connection with an earlier permit that expired before the initial project was begun. Respondent, Burke, provided reasonable assurances that he is the owner of the site of the proposed project. Respondent, Burke, signed DER's property ownership affidavit and submitted a survey. DER's Intent to Issue does not authorize any construction in any area within the jurisdiction of DER other than the modified project. The Intent to Issue constitutes compliance with state water quality standards. DER has not received any requests for a jurisdictional determination in the general geographic area of the modified project. No enforcement action has been initiated by DER or at the request of a third party against Respondent, Burke, for alleged violations of DER rules.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order on the merits issuing the requested permit and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Although most of Petitioner's proposed findings were cast in the form of "fact", they were in substance argument and rejected accordingly. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in part in Finding 1 Findings as to ownership are rejected as beyond the jurisdiction of the undersigned. Finding as to the late filed exhibit is rejected as irrelevant. 2-4, 10-12, Rejected as either irrelevant 16, or not supported by the record. 5 and 6, 37, 40 Rejected as unsupported by 42 the record. 7, 8, 15 Rejected as irrelevant 17, 21-29 and immaterial 9, 13, 14, 18-20 Rejected as immaterial 30-33, 35 and 36 37(a), 38, 39, 41, 48 20(A) Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial except the last sentence is included in Finding 13 34 Included in Finding 12 Rejected as not supported by the record, hypothetical and immaterial. Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent, Burke, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Respondent. Burke's, Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 15 and 16 Included in Finding 1 17, 26, 27 Included in Finding 2 18, 48 Included in Findings 15 and 16 19, 30, 31, 42 Included in Finding 13 20, 21, 44 Included in Findings 4 and 14 22, 23, 25, 32 Included in Finding 17 24 Included in Finding 16 25, 36-38 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 18 Included in Finding 3 Included in Finding 10 Included in Finding 19 35, 39, 43 Included in Finding 20 40, 41 Included in Finding 11 45-47 and 49 Included in Finding 16 51 and 52 Included in Findings 6-8 54 Included in Finding 5 and 8 50 and 53 Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Respondent, DER, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 and 2 Included in Findings 1 and 2 3 Included in Finding 10 4 and 5 Included in Finding 16 6, 9 Included in Finding 2 7 and 8 Included in Findings 9 and 11 10 Included in Finding 13 11 Included in Finding 15 Included in Finding 17 and 14 Included in Finding 16 COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia E. Comer Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia V. Bartell Qualified Representative 615 S.W. St. Lucie Street Stuart, FL 34997 J. A. Jurgens Jones, Foster, Johnson & Stubbs, P.A. 505 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, FL 33402
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue Whether the action of the Board of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board") in authorizing the Department of Environmental Protection to enter into a contract with Mitigation Services PBC, LLC ("Mitigation Services") to operate a mitigation bank on state lands is subject to review under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and, if so, whether the Board's action complies with the requirements of applicable law.
Findings Of Fact Parties Tetra Tech is a Delaware corporation registered to do business in Florida. Tetra Tech is engaged in the business of mitigation banking and operates the Loxahatchee Mitigation Bank in Palm Beach County under a contract with the South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD"). The Board is the Governor and Cabinet and is vested and charged with the acquisition, administration, management, control, supervision, conservation, protection and disposition of state lands. Mitigation Services is a Florida limited liability company and is engaged in the business of mitigation banking in Florida. Background In November 2002, the Board approved an option to purchase 2,020 acres in Palm Beach County from the County. The County had acquired these lands from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation ("Foundation"). The lands included approximately 263 acres known as the Lemon Grove property. At the time that the Board approved the option, Palm Beach County and the Foundation had a Mitigation Agreement which allowed the Foundation to use certain lands, including the Lemon Grove property, for mitigation activities. On September 3, 2003, the Foundation assigned its rights under the Mitigation Agreement to Mitigation Services. In May 2004, the Board acquired title to the lands that included the Lemon Grove property. Mitigation Services contends that the Board, upon its purchase of the lands that were the subject of the Mitigation Agreement, took title subject to the terms of the agreement, including the right of Mitigation Services to operate a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove property. Mitigation Services submitted an application to SFWMD for a permit to operate a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove property. SFWMD required Mitigation Services to provide evidence that the Board agreed to the proposed use of the property for mitigation banking. Mitigation Services asked the Department to provide evidence that the Board approved the intended use of the Lemon Grove property, but the Department declined to do so. The Department did not believe that the Mitigation Agreement allowed Mitigation Services to operate a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove property, despite the fact that there were letters from Palm Beach County and the MacArthur Foundation acknowledging that a mitigation bank was one of the uses contemplated by both parties to the Mitigation Agreement. Mitigation Services and the Department were unable to resolve their disagreement and Mitigation Services requested that the matter be agendaed for review by the Board. The matter was first placed on the Board's agenda for August 2008, but was withdrawn and rescheduled for the Board's public meeting held on October 28, 2008. The agenda item was identified as: Consideration of (1) an extension of an existing mitigation agreement covering the Lemon Grove property within the Pal-Mar Florida Forever Project; and (2) authorization to operate a mitigation bank on the property. At the October 28, 2008, meeting, Department Secretary Sole presented the item, stating: Governor and Cabinet, the DEP recommended denial of the applicant's request. And there are two bases for that recommendation. I just want to hit those real brief. One, just to be clear, when we looked at the mitigation agreement, it was our interpretation, and we've had our counsel look at that, that the mitigation agreement did not authorize a mitigation bank. It did authorize the applicant to go do what we call a project-by-project mitigation, but not a specific mitigation bank. * * * Also the other reason for the Agency's recommendation of denial is in 1998 the Board of Trustees actually identified that mitigation banking on state-owned lands were rejected. The agency brought that forward to the Board of Trustees at that time. The Board of Trustees did acknowledge and approve the use of project-by-project mitigation on Board of Trustees lands but did reject the concept of mitigation banking. Joint Exhibit 1, at 72-75. David McIntosh, representing Mitigation Services, made a presentation to the Board, which included the following comments: What we seek from you is recognition, ratification and protection of our legal rights that DEP has refused to acknowledge. We also request from you an extension, as a matter of fairness of those rights, under fair and practicable terms, so that we can do what we thought we had a right to do when we initially contracted for this. * * * We formed a company to do that, an exclusive wetland mitigation banking company. We promptly and very expensively -- we've spent probably $400,000 in this process already -- applied for a permit to the South Florida Water Management District. * * * [T]he Water Management District, said to us, well, of course, in doing this on somebody else's land, we need the consent of the landowner. That when we tried to contact DEP. And it's been three and a half years trying to get their consent. * * * What we ask is that you recognize our rights, that you instruct the state agencies to cooperate with us as representatives of the landowner in our permit process and that you extend those rights so that we have a reasonable amount of time to do our business and to exercise our contractual rights. Id. at 76-83. Agriculture Commissioner Bronson indicated that "it sounds to me like these are legal issues that are going to probably have to go to court somewhere else." Attorney General McCollum said that he had looked at the Mitigation Agreement and the letters from the County and the Foundation about the intended uses of the Lemon Grove property. He stated: [U]nder law, of course, the State assumes the status of this property at the time and with this understanding there that Mr. McIntosh's company has. So I'm worried that we're here today with a point where we could get involved in a protracted bit of litigation for the State that might be unnecessary. There is certainly at the very least is a case –- what they call a case in controversy here, as to interpreting this, and with the two original parties to this saying there's a mitigation bank right. * * * Plus it looks to me like this has been before you for a long period of time. And it would have been fairer perhaps to Mr. McIntosh and his firm if this had gotten before us or you denied it or something had been resolved before now. And that disturbs me as well. So I would like to think we can work this out, Governor, in some way and let this banking operation exist, as it apparently was intended by the parties, whether or not the contract literally says that or not. Id. at 88-89. Chief Financial Officer Sink stated: General McCollum, like you, I went back and looked at the original mitigation agreement. And I could easily interpret it to say, it doesn't say that you can't operate a mitigation bank. Clearly, the applicant thought -- I mean, he's put a lot of money into this property thinking that he could operate a mitigation bank. Id. at 92. The final motion was to "defer, with some guidance for the Department to negotiate and come back to us at the December meeting with their proposal." Id. at 99. The matter was placed on the December 9, 2009, agenda of the Board, but was withdrawn and rescheduled for the March 10, 2009, meeting of the Board. The agenda item was identified as: Consideration of a request to (1) allow Mitigation Services PBC, LLC to operate a mitigation bank, or other mitigation project, on approximately 263.05 acres of state-owned land known as the Lemon Grove property within the Pal-Mar Florida Forever Project for one ten-year term followed by one five-year renewal term; (2) authorize negotiation of a contract pursuant to the terms outlined below to allow Mitigation Services PBC, LLC to establish a mitigation bank, or other mitigation project, on the Lemon Grove property and delegate authority to the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection, or designee, to approve and consent to the contract between the Board of Trustees, Mitigation services PBC, LLC and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission; (3) determine that, pursuant to paragraph 18-2.018(1)(a), F.A.C., the proposed contract is not contrary to the public interest; (4) determine it is in the public interest to waive the competitive bid requirements of paragraph 18-2.018(2)(i), F.A.C.; and (5) authorize Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission to be the long-term operation and maintenance entity pursuant to the South Florida Water Management District permit. The item was moved, seconded, and adopted by the Board. Part of the Board's action was to delegate to the Department the authority to produce a contract with Mitigation Services that incorporated the terms presented to the Board in the staff report. The contract was being finalized when Tetra Tech filed its petition. The process was stopped, pending the outcome of this proceeding. Public Interest The staff report which accompanied this agenda item contained the following statements (bold type in original): Public Interest Determination Pursuant to paragraph 18-2.018(1)(a), F.A.C., the decision to authorize the use of the Board of Trustees-owned land requires a determination that such use is not contrary to the public interest. DEP is recommending the Board of Trustees make such a determination in this case because the Board of Trustees purchased the Lemon Grove property subject to the mitigation agreement. While DEP and Mitigation Services disagree as to whether the original mitigation agreement authorized a mitigation bank, this recommendation is an effort to resolve the disagreement over what rights existed under the mitigation agreement at the time the Board of Trustees purchased the property. In addition, the activity will help in the restoration of the property and is a compatible use within FWC's management plan. Request to Waive Competitive Bid Requirement Pursuant to paragraph 18-2.018(2)(i), F.A.C., the Board of Trustees may waive the requirement for competitive bids if determined to be in the public interest. Mitigation Services has been working towards a mitigation bank permit under its existing mitigation agreement with the County on the Lemon Grove property prior to the Board of Trustees purchasing the property. Mitigation Services claims they have a significant amount of time invested with the SWFWMD staff in preparing for the mitigation bank permit and also a financial investment for expenditures for the completed surveys and site assessments on the parcel. These investments of time and money were made to receive the SFWMD permit approval necessary to start the mitigation/restoration work and will enable Mitigation Services to begin the restoration in a timely manner. Mitigation Services has seven years experience in mitigation banking at a separate site and according to SFWMD has been found to be in compliance with its current permit. DEP is recommending the Board of Trustees waive the competitive bid process because of these factors. At the March 10, 2009, meeting, Department Secretary Sole stated: And, again, I cannot emphasize more that this really is unique because of the prior history of this site, specific to this property. Mitigation Services, LLC, has been working this permit with the South Florida Water Management District for several years, has invested a lot of money in developing a mitigation bank, which actually takes quite a bit of time and money, which is somewhat to address your concern of why we didn't do a competitive bid. Joint Exhibit 2, at 58. Because the agenda item included a request to "determine it is in the public interest to waive the competitive bid requirements of [Rule] 18-2.018(2)(i)," the affirmative vote of the Board was to make this determination. Tetra Tech contends that the Board did not make findings regarding the public interest factors described in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-2.018, such as general environmental concerns, land use, recreation, aesthetics, economics, and public health and safety, but based its decision solely on the potential adverse impacts on Mitigation Services. However, it must be assumed that the decision of the Board was based on all of the supporting reasons presented to the Board. An important reason that is reflected in the comments of individual Trustees, in the staff reports, and in the official minutes of the Board meetings is that there existed a colorable legal claim that Mitigation Services had the right to operate a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove property, subject to its obtaining a regulatory permit to do so. The colorable legal claim and the perceived equities were integral to the Board's stated belief that it was in the public interest to avoid litigation. Other public interest factors reflected in the comments of individual Trustees, in the staff reports, and in the official minutes of the Board meetings are the restoration of the Lemon Grove property, the ability of Mitigation Services to accomplish the restoration, the compatibility of the use of the property with the management plan of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, the establishment of a permanent endowment for the maintenance of the property, and the equitable compensation that the State would derive from the operation of the mitigation bank. Standing The Lemon Grove property is not far from the Loxahatchee Mitigation Bank operated by Tetra Tech. If Mitigation Services operates a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove property, it is reasonably likely that the two mitigation banks will be competitors in the sale of mitigation "credits." Although the record does not contain sufficient evidence to determine with certainty, there is a reasonable likelihood that the terms of Mitigation Services' contract with the State will enable it to sell credits at a lower price than the credits sold by Tetra Tech for the Loxahatchee Mitigation Bank. Tetra Tech contends that, if the State solicited bids for the operation of a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove property, it is likely that Tetra Tech would have submitted a bid. Tetra Tech showed that it is reasonably likely that the revenue that the State would receive from Mitigation Services from the operation of a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove bank would be less than the amount the State would receive if the contract were competitively bid. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to determine the difference in revenue. Respondents contend that, based on prior Board policy not to allow mitigation banks on state lands, there would be no solicitation of bids for the operation of a mitigation bank on the Lemon Grove property. This allegation is given little weight because it is a matter of speculation. The Board has no written policy to prohibit the operation of mitigation banks on state lands, and no statute has been cited that prohibits the use of state lands for mitigation banking. The Board is apparently free to authorize such uses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund enter a Final Order which authorizes the use of the Lemon Grove property by Mitigation Services under the terms identified in the Board's action taken on March 10, 2009. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Frey Smallwood, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Ronald Woodrow Hoenstine, III, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John L. Wharton, Esquire John J. Fumero, Esquire Rose, Sundstrom & Bentley, LLP 2548 Blairstone Pines Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1567 Mimi Drew, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether four agency memoranda describing policy on mitigation for dredge and fill projects are unpromulgated rules and were relied on by the agency in violation of Section 120.535(1), F.S. During the hearing, and afterwards in writing, Petitioner sought leave to amend its pleadings to incorporate other policies allegedly relied on by the agency in the process of the dredge and fill application review. That request was denied in an order entered on August 23, 1993. Those policies are addressed in the recommended order in DOAH #93-3367.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SIP Properties Limited Partnership (SIP) is the record owner of the parcel at issue, approximately thirty-five (35) acres located in the southwest area of Orlando, Orange County, Florida. SIP proposes to prepare the site for commercial and office use by developing the site into separate parcels or lots with proposed uses such as restaurant or fast food establishments, offices and retail stores. Development of the site requires the construction of compensating storage ponds that will act as retention/detention ponds and filling the site. The proposed improvements will result in the filling of 7.47 acres and dredging of 0.42 acres of wetlands claimed to be jurisdictional by DEP. Based on statements made to SIP by staff regarding department "mitigation policies" applicable to SIP's dredge and fill permit application, SIP believed that department policy memoranda were applied during permit review. SIP attached these various memoranda regarding mitigation to its Petition for Administrative Determination of Violation of Rulemaking Requirement dated May 27, 1993, and identified these memoranda as nonrule policies utilized by the department. The department retains on file and makes available for use by its staff the identified memoranda. However, in this case the department did not rely on or apply the mitigation guidelines contained in the memoranda in SIP's Petition. Instead, it applied Part III of Chapter 17-3120, F.A.C. In Part III of Chapter 17-312, F.A.C., the agency has adopted rules addressing the mitigation issues contained in the memoranda in SIP's Petition. For example, the agency has adopted guidelines in rule 17-312.340(2), F.A.C., for applying ratios when mitigation involves creation of state waters, as in this case. The department presently relies on these rules when reviewing mitigation plans, and does not rely on the policy memos referenced in the petition. Determining the mitigation needed to successfully offset impacts from a project is difficult and depends on many factors, including hydrology, soils, planting methods, and monitoring plans. Determining what is needed to reasonably assure successful mitigation must be done on a case by case basis. Not enough is known about the subject to apply any particular set of directions and expect success. DEP is presently in the process of developing rules to further address most aspects of mitigation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Protection issue its Final Order granting SIP's dredge and fill permit #48-2086169, with the mitigation proposed by the applicant, and establishing an expiration date and monitoring and evaluation plan for determining success of the mitigation as provided in rules 17-312.320 and 17-312.350, F.A.C. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 11th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-3. Adopted in paragraph 2. 4.-6. Adopted in paragraph 7. 7.-8. Rejected as unnecessary. 9. Adopted in paragraph 8. 10.-11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. 12. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 13.-16. Rejected as unnecessary Adopted in paragraphs 11 and 12. Rejected as unnecessary. 19.-21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. 22.-23. Adopted in substance in paragraph 14. 24.-25. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 16. Substantially rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 17, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 18. Rejected as immaterial. The agency witnesses established that the vegetation along the canal evidences the physical connection and there is evidence that water flows from the site into the canal. Rejected as unsubstantiated by reliable competent evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 22. 36.-40. Rejected as unsupported by reliable competent evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary, and as to characterization of merely "relic" wetlands, unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected (the conclusion of jurisdictional limit) as unsupported by the greater weight of evidence. 45.-53. Rejected as immaterial or unnecessary. 54.-56. Adopted in paragraphs 33 and 34. 57. Adopted, as to the limited function, in paragraphs 22 and 23. 58. Adopted in paragraph 26. 59.-60. Adopted in paragraph 23. 61. Rejected, as to the absolute conclusion of "no function", as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. 62. Adopted in paragraph 25. 63.-64. Adopted in paragraph 26. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 30. Adopted in paragraph 34. Adopted in substance in paragraph 31. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 30 and 34. Adopted in paragraph 31. 71.-73. Adopted in paragraph 33. 74.-77. Rejected as unnecessary. 78.-79. Adopted in paragraph 31. 80.-81. Adopted in paragraph 35. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 33. 84.-90. Rejected as unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 15. 2.-3. Adopted in paragraph 16. 4.-5. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraph 16. Rejected as unnecessary and as to "binding" effect, unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 19. 11.-15. Adopted in substance in paragraph 21. 16. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence and inconsistent with proposed findings #18 with regard to the constant level in the canal. 17.-18. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21 and 23. 19.-21. Adopted in paragraphs 19 and 20. 22.-26. Adopted in summary in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraph 27. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in part in paragraph 16. That the forests are "healthy and viable" is rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. Adopted in part in paragraph 25; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 33.-34. Adopted in part in paragraph 27; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 35.-37. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 38.-43. Rejected as unnecessary. 44. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. The stormwater management plan and mitigation will restore the stormwater treatment functions. 45.-47. Adopted in substance in paragraph 30. Rejected as substantially contrary to the greater weight of evidence (as to the negative impact). Adopted in part, as to water quality problems generally, but rejected as to the ultimate conclusion, as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. 51.-52. Adopted in summary in paragraph 31. 53.-54. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 55. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Ronald M. Schirtzer, Esquire Martha H. Formella, Esquire R. Duke Woodson, Esquire FOLEY & LARDNER 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1800 Orlando, Florida 32801 Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire John L. Chaves, Esquire Rosanne G. Capeless, Certified Legal Intern Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
