Findings Of Fact Alfred Perry is a fifteen year old child under commitment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) who on July 16, 1980, was granted the privilege of transferring to an Intensive Counseling Program under the direct supervision of the Bureau of Group Services, Division of Youth Services. While participating in that program, Respondent was permitted to remain in the custody of his father at Fort Pierce, Florida. The transfer was the subject of a furlough agreement entered into by Perry and HRS on the same date. Under the terms of the furlough agreement, Perry was required to comply with fourteen conditions of supervision as a prerequisite to remaining in the treatment program and on furlough (Exhibit No. 1). In the event a condition was violated, Respondent was subject to being transferred to another program or facility of the Division of Youth Services (Exhibit No. 1). Because of certain alleged violations of Perry's Supervision Agreement (Exhibit No. 3), an informal transfer hearing was held on August 27, 1980, in Fort Pierce, Florida, before a Youth Services Program Specialist. By Order dated September 2, 1980, the Specialist recommended that Perry's furlough be revoked for violating Conditions (1), (4) and (11) of his Supervision Agreement, and that he be transferred to another program/facility. Since that time, Perry has been assigned to the Training School at Okeechobee, Florida. Condition No. 1 of the Agreement requires that Respondent "promptly and truthfully answer all questions directed to (him) by the counselor." On or about August 4, 1980, Respondent telephoned his counselor and advised her he had been injured when falling off a motorcycle and would therefore be unable to attend a required group session. While conceding he also watched a basketball game in a playground adjacent to his home after the injury occurred, he nevertheless maintained the injury prevented his participation in the group session on that date. Condition No. 4 requires that Respondent "not change or leave residence." This condition prohibits Respondent from spending the night at another person's house without having obtained permission from his counselor. The counselor was advised by Respondent's father that Perry spent the nights of July 18, August 18 and 19, 1980, at his sister's house. Respondent confirmed he spent several nights at his sister's home during the period in question. Although prior permission to stay overnight was required from the counselor, Respondent failed to obtain such permission on each occasion. Condition No. 11 provides that Respondent observe an 8:00 p.m. curfew on weekday nights and a 9:00 p.m. curfew on Fridays and Saturdays. Respondent acknowledged he was not inside his father's house at the required time on the evening of July 30, 1980.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the furlough agreement of Alfred Perry be revoked and the action of Petitioner on September 2, 1980, be sustained. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of January, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: K. C. Collette, Esquire District 9 Legal Counsel Department of HRS 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Mr. Alfred Perry Florida School for Boys Route 2, Box 250 Okeechobee, Florida 33472 Shirley M. Steele, Esquire Assistant Public Defender 111 Atlantic Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 33450
The Issue Was Petitioner denied a promotion on account of her gender?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed by the Department since 1991. Petitioner is a Field Biologist, Grade Level I. Among other things, she monitors surface water quality by collecting water in various environments and analyzing it in a laboratory. Early in 1994, there was a reorganization of her section and she began to work in the laboratory under the supervision of Jerry Owen. In the middle of 1994, Jim Wright became the supervisor of the laboratory section and, thus, Petitioner's supervisor. Subsequent to Mr. Wright becoming her supervisor, she experienced problems with regard to work assignments. Petitioner had been trained to operate the section's motorboats in 1991, and had operated them in the past. In January 1995, there were questions about Petitioner operating the boats. Subsequently, Environmental Specialist III Lee Banks told her she could no longer operate the boats. Under the supervision of Mr. Wright, Petitioner was assigned many secretarial duties. She was criticized for her lack of skill in filing. Mr. Wright suggested that she get some advice on how to properly file. She was instructed to learn to type and criticized when she failed to learn that skill. She was told that she couldn't travel to meetings and seminars until she completed a typing tutorial. During this period at least two informal documents were circulated in the section which were derogatory toward women. They could be considered offensive to someone with tender feelings, but they contained no vulgarity and were not outrageous. The origin of the documents was not demonstrated. Mr. Wright sometimes belittled the employees who were under his and he or others in the section sometimes told jokes, including "dumb blonde" jokes. On October 15, 1996, Petitioner learned that a co- worker, Pat O'Conner, a Field Biologist, Grade Level I, had his position upgraded to Field Biologist, Grade Level II. Pat O'Conner is a male and had less seniority in the Department than Petitioner. The position upgrade was not advertised and was not open to competition. Petitioner complained about this and was told to "sit tight" until an ongoing investigation of Mr. Wright was completed. Mr. Wright was removed from his position in March 1997. Petitioner prepared a complaint with the Jacksonville Equal Opportunity Commission, which was signed on September 20, 1997, and filed sometime shortly afterward. Petitioner's complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations was filed on November 14, 1997.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and because of the reasons set forth in paragraphs 21 and 28, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which dismisses Petitioner's claim of discrimination based upon gender. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Amy B. Kalmbacher 600 Domenico Circle, A-10 St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6515 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to unlawful employment practices by discriminating against her based on her age, sex, and/or disability contrary to Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and by retaliating against her contrary to Section 760.07, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact On or about February 17, 1992, Petitioner began working for Respondent in the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences as an Other Personnel Services (OPS) Secretary. On or about January 11, 1993, Petitioner became a Program Assistant in the University and Support Personnel System. In late 1999 or early 2000, Petitioner began working as an Administrative Assistant for Dr. Folakemi Odedina, a Professor and Director of the Economic, Social, and Administrative Pharmacy Division (ESAP). Initially, Petitioner enjoyed working for Dr. Odedina in an office located in the Frederick S. Humphries Science and Research Center (Science and Research Center). However, in time Petitioner's professional relationship with Dr. Odedina began to deteriorate, along with the expanding responsibilities of the job.1 In January 2001, Petitioner fell while she was carrying some documents from one of Respondent's buildings to another. The fall injured Petitioner's ankle, hip, and lower back. Petitioner was pregnant at the time of her fall in January 2001. She filed a workers' compensation claim as a result of the accident and subsequently returned to work with medical limitations as to activities involving lifting and walking. In a memorandum dated May 16, 2001, Petitioner advised Dr. Odedina and the ESAP faculty that she soon would be going on three to four months of parental leave. She also advised them that she had removed her personal belongings and other items belonging to other departments that had been on loan to her. In June 2001, Petitioner fell again while she was at work. She was in her ninth month of pregnancy at the time of the second accident. She decided not to return to work until after the birth of her baby. In a memorandum dated June 14, 2001, Dr. Odedina acknowledged that Petitioner would be out on sick leave, followed by parental leave until October 2001. Dr. Odedina wanted Petitioner to turn in her office keys and provide information about the office voicemail password so that the office would continue to function efficiently during Petitioner's absence. Apparently, Petitioner had not removed her personal belongings from her office as stated in her May 16, 2001, memorandum. On June 14, 2001, Petitioner and Melvin Jones, an investigator for Respondent's Police Department went to the office after 5:00 p.m. to remove Petitioner's personal belongings. During the moving process, Mr. Jones took a typewriter and a chair, both of which were university property on loan to Petitioner from another university office, to the library on the fourth floor of the Science Research Center. Petitioner intended to leave the chair and the typewriter there until someone could return them to the office in the department to which they were officially assigned. Additionally, in packing her personal items, Petitioner or Mr. Jones inadvertently packed and removed a black office telephone from the premises. On June 15, 2001, Dr. Odedina noticed that the typewriter and telephone were missing from Petitioner's office. After making an unsuccessful effort to contact Petitioner, Dr. Odedina reported to Respondent's Police Department that the typewriter and telephone were missing from Petitioner's office. Respondent's Police Department immediately initiated an investigation of unauthorized removal of state property with Petitioner as the suspect. On June 15, 2001, Petitioner realized that she had mistakenly packed the black telephone with her personal belongings. She returned it to Respondent that same day. Thereafter, Respondent's Police Department closed its investigation after verifying that Petitioner never removed the typewriter from the Science Research Center and that she returned the telephone on June 15, 2001. On June 25, 2001, Petitioner delivered her baby. Subsequently, Petitioner received medical treatment for physical problems that were the result of her on-the-job falls. Between parental leave and workers' compensation leave, Petitioner was out of work for approximately eighteen months. During Petitioner's absence from work, Dr. Odedina hired an OPS employee to temporarily fill Petitioner's position. At some point in time, Petitioner contacted FCHR to make an inquiry concerning discrimination. In a letter dated August 28, 2002, relative to FCHR Case No. 2202827, FCHR advised Petitioner as follows: "Based on the information you provided, we are unable to pursue this matter further." FCHR then cited Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes (2002), for the proposition that a complaint must be filed within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory act. From 1994 to 2004, and at all times relevant here, Dr. Henry Lewis was the Dean of the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences. From January 2002 through July 2002, Dr. Lewis also served as Respondent's interim president. Since 2004, Dr. Robert Thomas has served as Dean of the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences. At all times relevant here, Dr. Thomas served as Associate Dean of the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences. In a letter dated October 9, 2002, Dr. Lewis advised Petitioner that he had received documentation from Ruth Beck, Petitioner's Rehabilitation Consultant, regarding accommodations for Petitioner's return to work with medical restrictions. Dr. Lewis requested that Petitioner meet with Respondent's Equal Opportunity Programs Office to determine what accommodation are to be provided upon Petitioner's return to work. The recommended accommodations included an ergonomic chair and a desk equipped with a keyboard tray and mouse extension. It was also suggested that Respondent provide Petitioner with a flat screen monitor and a utility cart because Petitioner's permanent office in the Science and Research Center was small and too cramped to accommodate Petitioner's physical limitations. Petitioner needed a more spacious work area, with adequate storage space in close proximity, than was available in her office at the Science and Research Center. Even with the new furniture and equipment, Petitioner's needs could not be met in her old office. Accordingly, it was mutually agreed that, upon her return to work, Respondent would assign Petitioner to work temporarily in the Division of Pharmacy Practice, under the supervision of Dr. Otis Kirksey. Dr. Kirksey's office was located off-campus at 565 East Tennessee Street, Tallahassee, Florida, in a building with a ramp and without stairs that Petitioner would have to climb. Petitioner's assignment to work in Dr. Kirksey's office was temporary. Dr. Odedina and the ESAP faculty and staff planned to move to the new Dyson Pharmacy Building as soon as it was completed. The new facility would have sufficient space, furniture, and equipment to accommodate Petitioner's needs in her position as Administrative Assistant to Dr. Odedina. In November 2002, Petitioner learned that her doctor would not sign a form stating that Petitioner had a permanent disability. Instead, he agreed that she needed a disabled parking permit for a temporary period, for three months through February 5, 2003. On December 2, 2002, Petitioner began to work for Dr. Kirksey as an Administrative Assistant/Receptionist. She agreed to begin working in that capacity even though all the accommodations she needed were not immediately available. Petitioner was eager to return to work. By February 18, 2003, Respondent had provided Petitioner with all necessary accommodations. She had the ergonomic chair and a desk equipped with a keyboard tray and mouse extension. Given her more specious work area, a flat screen monitor and/or utility cart was not required to accommodate her physical limitations. Petitioner did not want to return to work for Dr. Odedina under any circumstances. She was aware that Dr. Kirksey was going to hire a new employee for a Program Assistant position. However, Petitioner never applied for the new Program Assistant position because she believed that Dr. Kirksey had already made up his mind to hire another person for the job. There is no evidence that Dr. Kirksey ever intended to deprive Petitioner of the opportunity to apply for the Program Assistant position or that he would not have considered her application if she had filed one. On October 6, 2003, Petitioner had a meeting with Dr. Lewis about her work assignment. During the meeting, Petitioner and Dr. Lewis discussed another position that was available. The position involved keeping track of student volunteer hours. After the meeting, Petitioner mistakenly believed that Dr. Lewis had offered her the new position, which would not have been under Dr. Odedina's supervision. During the October 6, 2003, meeting, Dr. Lewis asked Petitioner how things were going in her private life, i.e. whether she had anyone special in her life. Petitioner replied that she did not have such a relationship and that with all the drama she was experiencing in her personal life, she did not need to be involved with anyone. There is no indication that Petitioner was offended by Dr. Lewis's personal expressions of concern for Petitioner's well being. On October 8, 2003, Petitioner met with Drs. Lewis and Thomas. During the meeting, Petitioner adamantly refused to return to work for Dr. Odedina. Petitioner made the following statement: "I do not want to see FAMU facing a wrongful death lawsuit for an employee killing a supervisor." Drs. Lewis and Thomas were concerned about the statement, which they understood to be a threat against Dr. Odedina. However, they believed they would be able to handle any problem that might arise when Dr. Odedina joined the prescheduled meeting. Petitioner was agitated during the meeting with Dr. Lewis and Dr. Thomas. She became more agitated when Dr. Odedina joined the meeting. Dr. Odedina went to the meeting expecting to discuss Petitioner's office space and accommodations when she moved into the Dyson Pharmacy Building with the rest of the ESAP faculty and staff. She was not aware that Petitioner had made a threatening comment. Initially, Dr. Odedina was obviously pleased that Petitioner would be returning to work for her. However, as the October 8, 2003, meeting proceeded, Dr. Odedina felt that Petitioner's demeanor was hostile. Dr. Odedina got the impression that Petitioner was resisting the idea of returning to work for Dr. Odedina. At that point, Dr. Odedina insisted that Petitioner return to work for ESAP or, if Petitioner continued to work for Dr. Kirksey, his office should be responsible for paying Petitioner's salary. At one point during the October 8, 2003, meeting Petitioner complained that she suffered from migraine headaches and depression. She showed Drs. Lewis, Thomas, and Odedina prescriptions for Imatrex and Prozac. Before Petitioner left the meeting on October 8 2003, Dr. Lewis told Petitioner that she should write a letter stating that she refused to return to work in the ESAP office under Dr. Odedina's supervision. Petitioner subsequently wrote a letter, describing it as a "notice of transfer," but clearly indicating that she chose not to return to work for Dr. Odedina. After Petitioner and Dr. Odedina left the October 8, 2003, meeting, Drs. Lewis and Thomas discussed Petitioner's threatening statement against Dr. Odedina. They decided to report it as a serious threat of bodily harm to Respondent's Director of Personnel, Vice President for Academic Affairs, and Provost, first by telephone, and later in writing. Dr. Lewis also contacted Dr. Odedina by telephone, advising her of the threat and directing her not to report to work on October 9, 2003. Finally, Dr. Lewis informed Respondent's Police Department about the threatening statement. Respondent's Provost, Larry Robinson, drafted a letter dated October 9, 2003. According to the letter, Petitioner was on administrative leave with pay, effective upon receipt of the notice. The letter advised Petitioner of a pending investigation of an employment matter and directed her to return all university-owned property. The letter advised Petitioner to refrain from reporting to work or visiting the campus, until further notice. The only exception was that Petitioner could continue to transport one of her sons to Respondent's Developmental Research School. On October 10, 2003, Respondent's Police Department initiated a formal investigation about Petitioner's threatening statement based on the written statements of Drs. Lewis and Thomas. On that date, Respondent's investigator, James Rose, filled out an incident report, indicating that he had interviewed Dr. Odedina and that Respondent's Director of Personnel had requested him to deliver the October 9, 2003, letter to Petitioner. Officer Rose was not able to deliver the October 9, 2003, letter to Petitioner until October 11, 2003. After Officer Rose gave Petitioner the letter placing her on administrative leave with pay, Petitioner stated that she only made the comment about Dr. Odedina because the department was about to transfer her back to Dr. Odedina's office. Petitioner told Officer Rose that she never intended to harm Dr. Odedina. On October 13, 2003, Petitioner returned her office key to Respondent. She left the key at Respondent's Police Department's communications office. On October 14, 2003, Petitioner filed her first Employment Charge of Discrimination with FCHR. In that initial complaint, identified hereinafter as DOAH Case No. 04-2003, Petitioner alleged as follows: (a) Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her disability by failing to accommodate her back impairment; (b) Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her age because Respondent did not give Petitioner an opportunity to apply for a position ultimately given to a younger, less senior employee; and (c) Respondent placed Petitioner on administrative leave with pay. In a letter dated October 31, 2003, Respondent advised Petitioner that Respondent intended to terminate her employment for threatening and/or abusive language and conduct unbecoming to a public employee. In an undated letter, Petitioner requested a conference in order to make an oral or written statement to refute or explain the charges against her. On or about November 3, 2003, Petitioner requested information about the return of her personal property located in Dr. Kirksey's office. Officer Rose approved Petitioner's request to retrieve her property. Sometime after November 3, 2003, Officer Rose concluded that Petitioner had made a threatening statement. However, Officer Rose found no indication that Petitioner intended to carry out the threat against Dr. Odedina. Accordingly, Respondent's Police Department suspended its investigation. In a letter dated November 17, 2003, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had scheduled a predetermination conference on November 24, 2003. By letter dated December 8, 2003, Petitioner informed Respondent that she received the November 17, 2003, letter on December 5, 2003. She asserted that she did not receive timely notice of the predetermination conference. In a letter dated December 11, 2003, Respondent advised Petitioner that it was proceeding with the employment action. According to the letter, Petitioner's dismissal from employment would be effective on December 19, 2003. However, Petitioner had an opportunity to request arbitration. On December 19, 2003, Petitioner reminded Respondent that she did not receive timely notification of the predetermination conference. She requested Respondent to schedule another conference. In a letter dated January 9, 2004, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had scheduled a predetermination conference for January 13, 2004. However, a subsequent letter dated January 13, 2004, rescheduled the conference for February 18, 2004. In a letter dated March 3, 2004, Respondent advised Petitioner that her dismissal from employment was effective March 11, 2004. On February 2, 2005, Petitioner filed a Consented Motion for Abatement or Alternatively, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice in DOAH Case No. 04-2003. On February 8, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Diane Cleavinger entered an Order Closing File in DOAH Case No. 04-2003. Judge Cleavinger's order is silent as to any prejudice that might have resulted from closure of the file in DOAH Case No. 04-2003. However, the parties agreed during the hearing in the instant case that FCHR never entered a final order in the prior case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2005.
The Issue Due to the pre-trial motion(s), the present issue is whether or not the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of this cause.
Findings Of Fact This cause was initiated by Petitioner's complaint of "age" and "sex" discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on or about May 22, 1996. Petitioner (then-complainant) was a female corporal in the bailiff's unit of the Bay County Sheriff's Office. She complained of a hostile work environment. On July 28, 1999, the Florida Commission on Human Relations, by its Executive Director, entered a "Determination: No Cause" Order. Therein, the Commission found: Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, and the timeliness and all jurisdictional requirements have been met. Pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, an Investigatory Report has been submitted by the office of Employment Investigations. On the basis of the report and recommendation, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by Rules 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, it is my determination that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful practice has occurred. Thereafter, Petitioner's "Petition for Relief" was filed with the Commission. The date of filing is not apparent from the materials provided to the Division, so it is not possible to determine therefrom if the Petition for Relief was timely filed within 35 days of July 28, 1999, as required by law. However, the Commission did not give notice of the Petition to Respondent nor transmit it to the Division until September 24, 1999. Petitioner's Petition for Relief alleges discrimination against Petitioner on the basis of "gender" (female), "age," and "retaliation" on the basis of a hostile work environment. On the face of the Petition, it is not possible to determine if the added claim of retaliation is based upon an internal grievance, a prior complaint pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, or the discrimination complaint before the Commission which gave rise to the instant Petition for Relief before the Division.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief herein for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Milkowitz, Esquire 2731 Blair Stone Lane Post Office Box 14922 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4922 R. W. Evans, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler & Evans 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building f, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's termination from employment by Respondent on June 15, 2005, was discriminatory in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2005), due to Petitioner's race (African American).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a Black female, was employed by Respondent from November 23, 1998, until her termination on June 14, 2005. Petitioner had performed her duties as a housekeeper adequately during her employment period and had no major disciplinary reports in her record. Her annual reviews indicate she was a fair employee. She had a history of tardiness, but seemed to be getting better in her last years of employment. Petitioner had received a verbal warning notice on March 8, 2005, relating to an altercation with another employee, Katrina Stevens. It appears Petitioner did not instigate the confrontation nor did she actively participate in the argument between Stevens and another employee. She simply happened to be standing nearby when it occurred. A verbal warning notice is preliminary to a reprimand. The other employee, Martine Lane, received a reprimand for the incident. On June 8, 2005, Petitioner received another verbal warning notice, this time for instigating negative remarks toward her supervisor. The gravamen of her complaint about the supervisor was that a certain co-worker had been named Employee of the Month instead of Petitioner. Petitioner became more defiant towards her supervisors and management toward the end of her employment. She would not help out other employees when asked, preferring to tend to her own work area, even when her work was completed. She also made derogatory comments to the co-worker who had won Employee of the Month. When Petitioner's behavior did not change, a decision was made to terminate her employment. It was a difficult decision because good housekeepers were hard to find and Petitioner's work product had always been acceptable. Petitioner had always been well-liked and respected by fellow employees. Both co-workers and management had encouraged Petitioner to apply for supervisory positions when they opened. Her supervisors indicated that, with some training, she could handle a supervisory position. The decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made by the Executive Housekeeper, Steve Jensen. He relied upon input from other management. On June 18, 2005, Petitioner was stopped from clocking in when she came to work. She was told to report to Jensen's office, which she did. At that time Jensen asked her whether she was still happy with her job, then told her she was being terminated. The reasons given were that she was not supportive, not a team player, and had become more belligerent to management. No mention of race was made as a basis for her termination and none seems to have existed. Petitioner was advised she would be entitled to vacation pay, but it was later discovered she had already used up her available vacation time. Respondent subsequently called Petitioner to offer her a different job, but Petitioner had no interest in returning to work for the company. Respondent has anti-discrimination policies in place, is an equal opportunity employer, and employs minorities in supervisory positions. Interestingly, however, there were no other Black housekeepers employed while Petitioner was working. When a supervisory position opened, Respondent would attempt to fill the position from within its existing employee pool. Two such positions opened when Petitioner was employed. Seven then-current employees applied for those positions, including Petitioner. Of the seven, four had prior supervisory experience; Petitioner did not. Two of the applicants had been with the company longer than Petitioner. Five of the seven applicants had computer knowledge and skills; Petitioner did not. Petitioner is the only candidate who admitted a fear of heights, a minor consideration for the position. Petitioner is the only candidate who stated she could not work on weekends. Petitioner was clearly not the best applicant for the job based on comparison to other candidates. Petitioner did not provide any evidence that her race was a basis for her termination from employment. None of her witnesses provided credible statements concerning discrimination. In fact, her witnesses by and large did not see any discrimination by management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane Hawkins 1556 University Lane, Number 407 Cocoa, Florida 32922 Theodore L. Shinkle, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 1800 West Hibiscus Boulevard, Suite 138 Melbourne, Florida 32901 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes (2013),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) and (e), while in a classroom at Neptune Beach Elementary School on September 19, 2013, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the demeanor of the witnesses, the documentary evidence presented, and the record as a whole, the following facts are found: The Florida Education Practices Commission (“the Commission”) is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to teaching certificates as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796. § 1012.79(7), Fla. Stat. Petitioner, as Commissioner of Education, is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida teaching certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. At all times relevant to the instant case, Ms. Kennedy held Florida Educator Certificate 889874, covering the areas of Elementary Education and English for Speakers of Other Languages. Ms. Kennedy’s certificate is valid through June 30, 2017. Ms. Kennedy began her teaching career in 2001 after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in Elementary Education from the University of North Florida. The school district assigned Ms. Kennedy to Neptune Beach Elementary on September 9, 2013, approximately two weeks into the 2013-2014 school year. The principal of Neptune Beach Elementary, Elizabeth Kavanagh, then assigned Ms. Kennedy to a third-grade class being taught by Ms. Amber Rodenkirch. It is unclear whether the two teachers were equals in the classroom or if Ms. Rodenkirch gave direction to Ms. Kennedy. The students in Ms. Rodenkirch and Ms. Kennedy’s class (“the class”) sat at tables rather than in chairs with a writing surface attached thereto. As illustrated by Petitioner’s Exhibit 13, the chairs utilized by the students were of two types. One type consisted of a plastic seat resting on metal tubes. The metal tubes had four flat ends making contact with the floor. The second type of chair also consisted of a plastic seat resting on metal tubes. However, the second type of chair made contact with the floor by having two metal tubes lying flat on the floor. As a result, it would be much easier to slide the second type of chair along a carpeted floor than the first. When seated in the second type of chair, the children in the class would often lean forward. By doing so, they would cause the back portion of the metal tubes on which the seat rested to rise up off the floor. When working with a student, Ms. Rodenkirch and Ms. Kennedy would be standing behind or next to a seated student. If that student was seated in the second type of chair and leaning forward, there was a tendency for the metal tubes on which the seat rested to come down on a teacher’s foot once the student leaned or sat back in his or her chair. Because it was painful for a chair to come down on her feet, Ms. Kennedy greatly preferred the first type of chair to the second. On September 19, 2013, Ms. Kennedy had recently been in a surfing accident which left one of her feet black and blue. In all likelihood, Ms. Kennedy was particularly concerned that day with the children leaning forward in their chairs. On September 19, 2013, Ms. Rodenkirch was working with a student and was 10 to 14 feet away from Ms. Kennedy. A student, C.J., was leaning forward in his chair, and Ms. Rodenkirch witnessed Ms. Kennedy tip C.J. out of his chair. After getting up from the floor, C.J. sat back down in his chair and appeared to be startled. Ms. Rodenkirch asked Ms. Kennedy if C.J. fell out of his chair, and Ms. Kennedy responded by stating, “With a little help.” Ms. Rodenkirch interpreted that statement as confirmation that Ms. Kennedy intentionally tipped C.J. out of his chair. At a different time on September 19, 2013, Ms. Rodenkirch was again about 10 to 14 feet from Ms. Kennedy when she witnessed Ms. Kennedy tip another student, N.B., out of his chair. As was the case with C.J., N.B. fell to the floor and was startled. Ms. Rodenkirch did not say anything to Ms. Kennedy after witnessing the incident with N.B. However, she was very upset about what she witnessed that day and reported what she saw to Ms. Kavanaugh after the children left school. After hearing Ms. Rodenkirch’s description of what happened in the class earlier that day, Ms. Kavanaugh called her supervisor, the regional superintendant, and requested direction. The regional superintendant, Kelly Coker-Daniels, instructed Ms. Kavanaugh to contact the Department of Children and Families and the local school district’s investigative branch. Both of the aforementioned entities conducted investigations. The local school district concluded that there was “substantial evidence to sustain the charges of exercise of poor judgment and inappropriate physical contact with students against Robin Kennedy for her role in these incidents.” (emphasis in original). Based on the investigation conducted by the Department of Children and Families, the Duval County Public School System: (a) issued a letter of reprimand to Ms. Kennedy; and (b) notified her that, pending approval by the school board, she would be suspended for 15 consecutive working days without pay. Because of the events described above, the parents of C.J. and N.B. requested that their children be transferred to another third-grade class. At least one other student transferred to a different class because she was worried that Ms. Kennedy would pull a chair out from under her. During the final hearing in this matter, Ms. Kennedy denied ever intentionally doing anything that could injure a student. During cross-examination, she responded affirmatively when asked if Ms. Rodenkirch was lying when she testified that she saw Ms. Kennedy tip C.J. and N.B. out of their chairs. However, the undersigned finds that Ms. Rodenkirch was a much more credible and persuasive witness than Ms. Kennedy. Therefore, the undersigned credits Ms. Rodenkirch’s testimony and finds that Ms. Kennedy did tip over the chairs of C.J. and N.B. on September 19, 2013, at Neptune Beach Elementary. Without a doubt, tipping students out of their chairs reduced Ms. Kennedy’s effectiveness as a teacher. That is underscored by the fact that students were transferred to other third-grade classes due to Ms. Kennedy’s actions. Ms. Kennedy’s conduct demonstrates that she failed to make reasonable efforts to protect her students from mental and/or physical harm. While it is very fortunate that none of the students in the class suffered any serious physical injuries, that might not have been the case if a student had hit his or her head on a hard object after being tipped out of his or her chair. Also, it is obvious that tipping a student out of his or her chair could expose that student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. Accordingly, Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Kennedy violated section 1012.795(1)(g) and (j) and rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) and (e).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order suspending Robin Welch-Kennedy’s educator’s certificate for 12 months. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2016.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was subject to discrimination in employment for the reasons alleged in the Petition.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Sylvester Brown, was terminated from his position as Laborer, position number 51343, within the Facilities Operation and Maintenance Department of Florida State University (FSU) on October 7, 1999, for violation of a Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner had been employed by FSU for 24 years. Petitioner's Disciplinary Violations Leading to Termination Attendance is a critical element of the Laborer's job because departmental productivity depends on the reliable availability of employees. The Petitioner received a copy of Rule 6C2-4.070, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action, Rules of the Florida State University Administrative Code on January 29, 1988, which provided notice to the Petitioner of FSU's standard of conduct and the associated penalties for violation. The Petitioner was cited for numerous disciplinary infractions prior to his dismissal. The Petitioner's work history documents a consistent trend of absences which grew progressively worse over time. A list of documentation in evidence, exhibiting disciplinary action taken by FSU against the Petitioner includes: A three day suspension for Absence Without Authorized Leave (AWOL) and Excessive Absences, dated January 3, 1997. A written reprimand for Excessive Absences and AWOL, dated August 6, 1996. An oral reprimand for excessive absences, dated April 26, 1996. 1996. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated February 29, A written reprimand for AWOL, dated August 14, 1991. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated June 5, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated February 22, 1989. A written reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated July 8, 1988. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated May 25, 1988. The Petitioner was cited for excessive tardiness in an official written reprimand dated July 8, 1988, and the Petitioner was again reminded that his performance hindered the department's ability to perform its function. An oral reprimand for excessive tardiness, dated January 28, 1988. An oral reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment, dated July 11, 1985. A written reprimand for misuse of state property and equipment dated March 21, 1984. A written reprimand for excessive absences, dated February 7, 1984. A written reprimand for AWOL and misuse of state property and equipment dated, January 25, 1983. A three day suspension for AWOL, dated July 27, 1981. A written reprimand for AWOL, dated July 13, 1981. The Petitioner was directed in an August 14, 1991, written reprimand to phone his supervisor as close to 8:00 a.m. as possible on days he would be unable to report to work. The Petitioner was reminded in the February 29, 1996, written reprimand of the policy requiring employees to provide supervisors with advanced notice or documentation for leave to be authorized. The Petitioner was informed on April 26, 1996, that his absences, both excused and unexcused, exceeded established attendance and leave standards. Specifically, from January through April, the Petitioner used 33 hours of annual leave, 31 hours of sick leave, and 29 hours of leave without pay. FSU notified the Petitioner that his absences and sick leave totaling 33 hours during the period from April 26, 1996 to August 6, 1996, were deemed excessive and in contravention of departmental standards. The Petitioner was also cited for six hours of being absent without authorized leave. The Petitioner's chronic absenteeism did not improve. The period from August 6, 1996 through January 3, 1997, witnessed 46 hours of sick leave or unauthorized leave on the Petitioner's part. An inventory of the Petitioner's absences following his suspension from January 7-9, 1997 until August 22, 1997, catalogued 56 hours of sick leave, 16 hours of leave without pay and two hours of absence without authorized leave. This amount of leave was "considered to be excessive and completely unacceptable." [Id.] Further, the university did not receive any medical excuses for the Petitioner's use of sick leave during this period. [Id.] Counseling was provided to the Petitioner by FSU regarding the use of sick leave on August 17, 1998. An examination of the Petitioner's attendance revealed that he used 63 hours of sick leave from February 20, 1998 through August 6, 1998. [Id.] The university's standard for the same period of time was 33 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The Petitioner was further advised by FSU that he would not be compensated for three consecutive absences or three absences within a 30-day period without proper medical documentation. FSU assessed the Petitioner's attendance from January 8, 1998 through August 6, 1998, by comparing the standard allocated for sick leave to the Petitioner's actual use of sick leave. The sick leave standard for employees for the period under review was 44.16 hours whereas the Petitioner expended 67 hours of sick leave. [Id.] The record establishes that the Petitioner was warned 17 times in writing through reprimands, memorandums, and counseling notices dating back to 1981 that absenteeism was punishable under university employee disciplinary standards. Tardiness and absenteeism are, in fact, grounds for dismissal under the FSU Handbook for Employees. The Petitioner was warned twice in writing that failure to rectify his recurring absenteeism could result in his dismissal. Petitioner's Termination The FSU's Guidelines for Disciplinary Action are based on the concepts of progressive and cumulative discipline. The Disciplinary Guidelines outline standards to apply for punishable offenses to ensure similar treatment. Ms. Susannah Miller, Manager of Employees Relations at FSU, testified that the Petitioner's personnel file revealed the worst case of absenteeism she has seen at FSU. Excessive absences is defined in the Guideline for Disciplinary Action as "an attendance record of recurring absences, even though all or a majority of the absences were necessary and excused." Dismissal is allowed as proper punishment for an employee's fourth violation of the excessive absence rule. FSU notified the Petitioner of its intention to terminate him for excessive absences, effective on or shortly after October 12, 1998. In lieu of firing the Petitioner, FSU elected to allow the Petitioner to enter into a "Last Chance Agreement" (LCA) with FSU to avoid dismissal. Ms. Miller stated that Last Chance Agreements allow a final opportunity for employees to improve their performance. Ms. Miller further testified that to her knowledge FSU has never retained any employee that violated a Last Chance Agreement. The Last Chance Agreement required the Petitioner to (1) obtain prior written approval of requests for annual leave or leave without pay; (2) follow departmental policy and call-in between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. and speak personally with his supervisor or proper designee if he was sick and unable to report to work; and (3) agree that violation of any LCA provision would result in immediate termination for cause. The Petitioner violated the Last Chance Agreement when he did not report for work on August 27, 1999, because he neither obtained prior approval for the absence nor followed the call-in procedure. The Petitioner also failed to provide any documentation justifying his absence. The Petitioner was in violation of the Last Chance Agreement on August 31, 1999, when he was tardy without permission and failed to follow the call-in procedure. The Petitioner's breach of the Last Chance Agreement is even more egregious because he collected his paycheck prior to work and could have easily informed his supervisor or the designee that he needed leave that day. In addition to violating the terms of the Last Chance Agreement, the Petitioner was also AWOL on August 27 and August 31, 1999. AWOL is "failure to obtain approval prior to any absence from work" and is punishable by dismissal for the third occurrence. The Petitioner admitted that he violated the Last Chance Agreement. On September 15, 1999, FSU informed the Petitioner of its decision to terminate him for violating the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave. The Petitioner was dismissed on October 7, 1999. Petitioner's Step One Grievance was denied on December 13, 1999. FSU's decision to terminate the Petitioner for violation of the Last Chance Agreement and absence without authorized leave was upheld by the State University System of Florida in its Step Two Grievance decision. Petitioner's Injury The Petitioner's Position Description reveals that lifting is an integral part of a laborer's duties. The Petitioner's 1995 Position Description allocates 85 percent of the job's essential function to lifting, moving and arranging university property and requires that the laborer be able to lift 30 pounds. The Petitioner sustained a back injury at work on September 4, 1997. The Petitioner's job duties changed as a result of the injury and he was tasked with inspecting fire extinguishers from September 10 through November 12, 1997. A physical capacity assessment performed on the Petitioner indicated that he was capable of performing at a medium demand level. The Department of Labor defined medium demand as capable of lifting 50 pounds and pushing and pulling 50 pounds. The Petitioner was temporarily re-assigned to the Grounds Section of the Facilities, Operations and Maintenance Department on December 23, 1997. The Petitioner testified that his job function involved re-cycling. The Petitioner's assignment in the Grounds Section was light duty and he was informed that his job duties could be modified after his physician reviewed the physical capacity assessment. Dr. Alexander, the Petitioner's physician, declared the Petitioner fit for medium demand duty with a 35-pound lifting limit on March 24, 1998. Robert Pullen, American Disabilities Act Coordinator at FSU, was directed by Carolyn Shackleford, under the University's Reasonable Accommodation Policy, to ensure that the Petitioner's job activities with the Grounds Section did not exceed the 35p-pound lifting threshold. The Petitioner never contacted Mr. Pullen's office regarding reasonable accommodation. Mr. Pullen determined that the Petitioner's duties did not violate the lifting restriction and were in full compliance with the accommodation policy. The Petitioner testified that he could lift 35 pounds repetitively. The record reflects no evidence of age discrimination committed by the Respondent against the Petitioner. The record indicates no evidence that the Petitioner was terminated due to his race. The Petitioner presented no evidence or testimony regarding retaliation by FSU.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,
Findings Of Fact Timothy M. Gray applied for an instructional position with the Pinellas County School Board in May 1984 and accepted an annual contract to teach at Safety Harbor Middle School for the school year starting in the fall of 1984. He taught a course to eighth grade classes called Power and Transportation, which is predominantly a shop course. Gray was certificated to teach industrial arts in 1980. The charges involved in these two cases stem from inappropriate remarks Gray allegedly made to various students in his class or in the school. Gray denies making the improper remarks attributed to him. Specifically, Respondent is alleged to have made inappropriate remarks of a sexual nature to Paul Bartolo and Mark Fulghum while driving them home from a school detention period that caused them to miss their bus. Respondent admits that he gave these 14- and 15- year-old boys a ride home after their detention. He lived in the same direction as the two boys and giving them a ride home was not out of his way. Both of these boys were discipline problems. During the school year Paul served about 15 detentions and was suspended twice. Both were in Respondent's Power and Transportation class and both had been placed on detention by Respondent. During the ride home Paul was in the front seat of Respondent's car and Mark was in the rear seat. Both boys testified that during the ride home an extensive conversation ensued and that Respondent, after answering a question regarding his marital status in the negative, continued with he liked snatch. Respondent admits the conversation and his attempts to reach these boys to improve their attitudes toward school but denies ever using the word "snatch." During discussions with girls on the school bus and at school regarding Respondent and his comments, Paul and Mark told the girls that Respondent said he liked snatch. At this time a lot of rumors were being circulated among the eighth graders in Respondent's classes about the way he looked at them and comments he had made they deemed inappropriate. The prime mover of this group was Dana Shaver, who testified only by deposition in these proceedings. Dana urged Paul and Mark to report Respondent's remarks to the principal. In a deposition (Exhibit 1) Dana testified that Gray had seen her at the beach over the weekend and told her in class Monday that he had seen her at the beach in her bikini and that she did not have much of a tan for a beach girl. This embarrassed Dana and she hung her head and did not hear Respondent say she would look better without it (bikini) on. This was later reported to Dana by an anonymous girlfriend. Respondent admits he saw Dana and another girl at the beach but denies saying anything more to her than she did not have as good a tan as he did. Dana's parents requested she be moved from Respondent's class in Power and Transportation (which she did not like) because of her being "embarrassed" by Respondent. Evidently, no embarrassment was involved discussing use of the word "snatch" with boys in her class. Kera Lampman is a bright 13-year-old who was in Respondent's Power and Transportation class. She testified that Respondent told her she had a nice butt and that she could get straight A's in his class. Respondent denies ever using the word "butt" to Kera but does not deny the remarks about her grades as Kera is a straight-A student. Respondent also testified that he was trying to get Kera moved to a more challenging class when he was suspended. Alissa Lanier, a 14-year-old student at Safety Harbor Middle School, testified that while walking from the bus drop to the entrance door immediately before classes started in the morning she heard someone say, "You've got a nice ass." When she turned around she saw Respondent some 20 feet away. She had never talked to Respondent, was not in his class, and testified Respondent was the only person on the ramp besides her. Respondent not only denies making such a remark but also testified that he frequently has bus ramp duty before school starts and he has never been in the area between the bus stop and school entrance doors shortly before school was due to start when the area was not crowded with students. The testimony that this area would be crowded immediately prior to school starting is deemed more credible. Respondent's denial that he made any comment to any girl he did not even know is more credible than is the testimony that this remark was heard from someone 20 feet distant in the bus ramp area immediately prior to school starting. Shelly Evans, a 14-year-old girl in Respondent's class heard Respondent say he had seen Kera and Dana at the beach and they looked great in their bikinis. During the period when others were reporting Respondent's actions she too reported this comment to the principal. One witness testified that Respondent looked at her in a strange way in class; that it appeared to her that he was staring. Such discussion and remarks including comments about bodies were being circulated among students at Safety Harbor Middle School and was brought to the attention of the principal who interrogated some of the students. The principal was told substantially what was testified to at these proceedings. During the investigation which followed Respondent denied using the words "snatch," "butt," or "ass," while talking to any of the students. Respondent, before coming to Safety Harbor Middle School, had worked in a Y conservation program involving young men. This age group was doubtless older than the 13-15 year olds in the eighth grade class Respondent taught at Safety Harbor Middle School and were less impressionable than eighth grade students. Hearing from one of her teachers that rumors were going around the school regarding Gray's language in the presence of students, Mrs. Raymond, Principal of Safety Harbor Middle School obtained the name of one or more students reported to be aware of such language and called them into her office. After obtaining statements from these students, who appeared as witnesses in these proceedings, Mrs. Raymond confronted Gray, who denied making inappropriate comments. Nevertheless, she recommended his immediate suspension with pay pending the next meeting of the School Board, who was authorized to suspend Gray without pay. Upon her recommendation, Gray was immediately suspended.
